

BOLLINGEN SERIES XCIX



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NIETZSCHE'S *ZARATHUSTRA*

NOTES OF THE SEMINAR


GIVEN IN 1934-1939 BY

C. G. JUNG

EDITED BY JAMES L. JARRETT

IN TWO VOLUMES

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BOLLINGEN SERIES XCIX

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume 1

INTRODUCTION	ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xxii
A NOTE ON THE TEXT	xxiii
MEMBERS OF THE SEMINAR	xxiv
LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS	xxvi
SPRING 1934	
I. 2 May 1934	3
II. 9 May 1934	21
III. 16 May 1934	38
IV. 23 May 1934	56
V. 6 June 1934	72
VI. 13 June 1934	91
VII. 20 June 1934	110
VIII. 27 June 1934	129
AUTUMN 1934	
I. 10 October 1934	149
II. 17 October 1934	166
III. 24 October 1934	183
IV. 31 October 1934	202
V. 7 November 1934	219
VI. 14 November 1934	236
VII. 21 November 1934	246
VIII. 28 November 1934	263
IX. 5 December 1934	281
X. 12 December 1934	300
WINTER 1935	
I. 23 January 1935	323
II. 30 January 1935	339
III. 6 February 1935	356
IV. 13 February 1935	372
V. 20 February 1935	388
VI. 27 February 1935	407

CONTENTS

VII.	6 March 1935	424
VIII.	13 March 1935	441

SPRING 1935

I.	8 May 1935	457
II.	15 May 1935	474
III.	22 May 1935	489
IV.	29 May 1935	506
V.	5 June 1935	523
VI.	12 June 1935	541
VII.	19 June 1935	561
VIII.	26 June 1935	580

AUTUMN 1935

I.	16 October 1935	601
II.	23 October 1935	619
III.	30 October 1935	638
IV.	6 November 1935	658
V.	13 November 1935	677
VI.	20 November 1935	692
VII.	27 November 1935	712
VIII.	4 December 1935	729
IX.	11 December 1935	748

Volume 2

WINTER 1936

I.	22 January 1936	767
II.	29 January 1936	786
III.	5 February 1936	804
IV.	12 February 1936	821
V.	19 February 1936	840
VI.	26 February 1936	857
VII.	4 March 1936	873

SPRING 1936

I.	6 May 1936	893
II.	13 May 1936	911
III.	20 May 1936	926
IV.	27 May 1936	946
V.	3 June 1936	965

CONTENTS

VI.	10 June 1936	983
VII.	17 June 1936	1000
VIII.	24 June 1936	1019

SPRING 1937

I.	5 May 1937	1037
II.	12 May 1937	1055
III.	19 May 1937	1075
IV.	26 May 1937	1093
V.	2 June 1937	1113
VI.	9 June 1937	1132
VII.	16 June 1937	1149
VIII.	23 June 1937	1170
IX.	30 June 1937	1189

SPRING 1938

I.	4 May 1938	1209
II.	11 May 1938	1230
III.	18 May 1938	1248
IV.	25 May 1938	1264
V.	8 June 1938	1281
VI.	15 June 1938	1298
VII.	22 June 1938	1317

AUTUMN 1938

I.	19 October 1938	1339
II.	26 October 1938	1355
III.	2 November 1938	1372
IV.	9 November 1938	1389
V.	16 November 1938	1404
VI.	30 November 1938	1421
VII.	7 December 1938	1437

WINTER 1939

I.	18 January 1939	1457
II.	25 January 1939	1475
III.	1 February 1939	1493
IV.	8 February 1939	1512
V.	15 February 1939	1528

REFERENCES TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i>	1545
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INDEX	1547
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INTRODUCTION

In the Spring of 1934, Dr. C. G. Jung brought to a conclusion a seminar at the Zürich Psychological Club which had been running since October 1930. The subject matter with which Jung and his students—practicing analysts, those training to be analysts, and selected analysts—had engaged themselves was visions, more especially the remarkable painted visions of an American woman, Christiana Morgan. As this final term drew to a close, the question arose as to what the next seminar should center upon, for by now the importance—almost the necessity—of such a lecture/discussion series was well established. Before Visions, there had been the Dreams Seminar, and so on back to 1923—perhaps even earlier—when Jung started this kind of teaching for a very particular audience. In 1934 the group apparently had little hesitation in deciding upon Nietzsche as their new topic, and more particularly Nietzsche's strange and wonderful *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. And so it was that when the group, some of whom had dropped out and been replaced by others, convened in May, it was to hear their mentor's warning that they all had an uphill and rocky path before them, for not only was Nietzsche's mind highly convoluted and devious, but his *Zarathustra* particularly so, with a style invented for this very purpose—whatever *that* was! But nothing daunted, they set to, and as in previous seminars, the excitement grew as their leader (who loved mountains) began to ready them for a journey that was destined to end before its natural culmination, drowned out by the alarms of war as the fateful summer of 1939 approached.

By this time another feature of the seminars was also familiar: the recording of the lectures and discussions. A professional secretary had been engaged to take notes, which in turn were edited by Mary Foote with the help of various members of the group, virtually all of whom were taking their own notes. Bound multigraphed copies of these notes were then made available to the participants, and to others associated with Analytical Psychology, but each "volume" bore a warning that the report was intended for the exclusive use of "members of the Seminar with the understanding that it is not to be loaned and that no part of it is to be copied or quoted for publication without Prof. Jung's written permission."

An important reason for this restriction was undoubtedly Jung's not

having edited the notes, at least not beyond giving a quick run-through and answers to questions Miss Foote had, perhaps about a proper name not caught by the secretary. But for all the explicit prohibition, copies *were* made, and the multigraphed copies began to appear in cities all over the world, especially where C. G. Jung Institutes were established, for the word got out that here was something special—indeed, unique. For those who had never been present at a lecture, these typescripts afforded an opportunity to get acquainted with *Professor Jung*, speaking extemporaneously and with considerable informality, fielding questions and observations (by persons who were in most instances themselves highly intelligent and knowledgeable students of human nature), not worrying if the discussion meandered some distance from the main path, offering suggestions for further reading, alluding to contemporary political and economic happenings, telling jokes. In 1957 Jung gave permission for “going public,” and the appearance in 1984 of *Dream Analysis*, edited by William McGuire, inaugurated a project to publish most of Jung’s seminar notes.¹

Jung’s recommendation to the Seminar of the Nietzsche text would have been no surprise to those who knew him well. Already in his early works, Jung had discussed Nietzsche, and most of his associates must have heard him attest to the importance this German philosopher-poet-psychologist had had for his own intellectual coming-of-age. In the chapter “Student Days” of his autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, we read Jung’s account of how in medical school, he’d had to curtail his philosophical readings:

The clinical semesters that followed kept me so busy that scarcely any time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was able to study Kant only on Sundays. I also read Eduard von Hartmann [famous then for his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*] assiduously. Nietzsche had been on my program for some time, but I hesitated to begin reading him because I felt I was insufficiently prepared.² At that time he was much discussed, mostly in adverse terms, by the allegedly competent philosophy students, from which I was able to deduce the hostility he aroused in the higher echelons. The supreme authority, of course, was Jakob Burckhardt, whose var-

¹ For a fuller account of the history of the seminars, see Mr. McGuire’s Introduction in *Dream Sem.*

² Presumably Jung means *studying* instead of *reading*, for by the summer of 1898 (when he turned 23) he was quoting Nietzsche extensively in a lecture to his medical fraternity. See *The Zofingia Lectures* (Princeton, B.S. XX: A, 1938).

ious critical comments on Nietzsche were bandied about. Moreover, there were some persons at the university who had known Nietzsche personally and were able to retail all sorts of unflattering tidbits about him. (p. 101/105)

All of this whetted Jung's appetite, and yet he "was held back by a secret fear that I might perhaps be like him" (p. 102/105). Still, curiosity got the better of him and he plunged with enthusiasm into the early collection of essays called *Thoughts Out of Season* (or *Untimely Meditations*) and then on to *Zarathustra*, which "like Goethe's *Faust*, was a tremendous experience for me." Yet there remained the feeling that this was very dangerous territory, from which he retreated to the safer ground of empirical studies.

Medical school completed, he had gone to Zürich's Burghölzli Hospital as resident psychiatrist. Then came the historic meeting with Freud. Jung must have been surprised at this well-read man's admission that he had never read Nietzsche. Indeed this seems to have planted in the younger man's mind the seed of suspicion, one that grew into a later conviction, that Freud's heavy emphasis upon eros and his neglect of the power drive could be better stated as "Freud versus Nietzsche" than as "Freud versus Adler" (*MDR*, p. 153/150).

After the break with Freud in 1913 and during the enforced isolation of the war years, Jung began a closer reading of *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Gay Science*, *Genealogy of Morals*, and of course *Zarathustra*. Now he was even more strongly impressed with how powerfully Nietzsche's case illustrated his own growing understanding that one's most basic beliefs have their roots in personality and in turn one can discover much about an author's own personality from his writings. In *Psychological Types* (1921) he recognized Nietzsche as a highly introverted intuitive, with a strongly developed thinking function, but with serious weaknesses in sensation and feeling. In contrast to the intellectualistic Bergson, Jung wrote,

Nietzsche made far greater use of the intuitive source and in so doing freed himself from the body of the intellect in shaping his philosophical ideas. . . . If one can speak of an intuitive method at all, *Zarathustra* is in my view the best example of it, and at the same time a vivid illustration of how the problem can be grasped in a non-intellectual and yet philosophical way. (CW 6, par. 540)

Schopenhauer and Kant, the other two great philosophical influences on Jung, were both thinking types—a function that comes out

strongly in Nietzsche too in his more aphoristic writings—but here at last was a philosopher whose interests were more psychological than metaphysical, and who was constantly in search of a world-view that would guide and enrich life and not, as in Schopenhauer's case, simply intone the inevitability of frustration. And yet, Jung came to think, nobody illustrates better than Nietzsche the necessity not to take at face value what a philosopher or psychologist says and writes, but to examine the words in the context of the quality of his life as lived.

We must look very critically at the life of one who taught such a yea-saying, in order to examine the effects of this teaching on the teacher's own life. When we scrutinize his life with this aim in view we are bound to admit that Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the lofty heights of heroic sublimity—heights that he could maintain only with the help of the most meticulous diet, a carefully selected climate, and many aids to sleep—until the tension shattered his brain. He talked of yea-saying and lived the nay. His loathing for man, for the human animal that lived by instinct, was too great. Despite everything, he could not swallow the toad he so often dreamed of and which he feared had to be swallowed. The roaring of the Zarathustrian lion drove back into the cavern of the unconscious all the “higher” men who were clamouring to live. Hence his life does not convince us of his teaching. For the “higher man” wants to be able to sleep without chloral, to live in Naumburg and Basel despite the “fogs and shadows.” He desires wife and offspring, standing and esteem among the herd, innumerable commonplace realities, and not least those of the Philistine. Nietzsche failed to live this instinct, the animal urge to life. For all his greatness and importance, Nietzsche's was a pathological personality. (CW 7, par. 37)

As will be apparent from the lectures below, Jung believed that Nietzsche's psychosis announced itself long before the break in 1889, and the neurosis, he was sure, was there all along. About a mental illness, Jung had no romantic illusions. A creative person is not creative, or more creative, because of neurosis—quite the contrary. Against Freud, he maintained with firmness that “art is not a morbidity.” At the same time, Jung recognized that “a person must pay dearly for the divine gift of creative fire” (CW 15, par. 158). This is especially true of the kind of artist he called “visionary,” those with startling prescience, like Goethe and Joyce—and certainly this strange, lonely, ailing, productive genius that was Nietzsche.

Jung saw in Nietzsche one who had greatly assisted in the nineteenth-century discovery of the unconscious, thus constituting an exception to Freud's complaint that philosophers pay attention only to the purely mental side of life. But Freud was unwilling to read *Zarathustra*, even though he sensed the ways in which Nietzsche had anticipated some of his own ideas, for fear that he be unduly influenced by ideas that were merely speculative rather than grounded in empirical practice. Jung on the other hand was always delighted to discover anticipators of any sort: they seemed somehow to contribute an advance confirmation of his own expression of what he took to be archetypally grounded ideas.

This present volume appears at a time when Nietzsche's reputation has reached a new height. In his own short lifetime—he had a little over fifteen years of mature, creative work before his breakdown in 1889—he was one more gossiped about or ignored than taken seriously. Many of his writings he had to publish out of his own slender resources. Only right at the last was he beginning to be recognized by a few important people outside the narrow circle of his acquaintances: August Strindberg, Georg Brandes, Hippolyte Taine. Yet his mental collapse made it all too easy to dismiss his ideas as brilliant but—mad. Even as late as 1925, a popular history of philosophy textbook in America made no mention of Nietzsche in the march of nineteenth-century ideas; yet without always being acknowledged, Nietzsche had a notable effect on twentieth-century writers: Thomas Mann, Shaw, Lawrence, Remy de Gourmont, Heidegger, Jaspers—the list could go on and on. A hundred years after his birth, Nietzsche was to be recognized as a major thinker—and, more generally, writer.

The brilliance of his mind must have been apparent from early along. Once he found his academic specialization, classical philology, at Bonn and then Leipzig, he was recognized by his teachers and fellow students to be destined for high achievement, as is evident by his appointment to the University of Basel at the age of 24 with promotion to a full professorship a year later. Yet his first sizable work, the original *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, was a disappointment to those who expected him to follow the lines of conventional scholarship. Here it was that Nietzsche established his identity with Dionysos, even though he balanced this god of music and darkness with Apollo, the patron of Greek sculpture, form, light. As a young man he was the faithful follower of Schopenhauer, and when he met Wagner, he found, as he thought, a living exemplar of the philosopher who taught

that in music and the contemplation of the Eternal Ideas lay the only escape from the wheel of will to which we are all so miserably strapped. Both of these heroes were celebrated in his *Untimely Essays*, but it was not long before his idols began to tarnish. Schopenhauer, he came to think, was right in the importance that he attached to Will, but wrong in not celebrating it in the form of Will to Power—by which Nietzsche meant especially the power of creative genius, grounded in the severest discipline. (“All creators are hard” was one way he put it.) Wagner he counted one of the greatest exemplars of artistic creativity, but unfortunately (Nietzsche came to think), there was in him a streak of decadence, a softness, a romantic weakness, even a sentimental nostalgia for Christianity: consider *Parsifal*!

Jung was to see in Nietzsche’s radical shifts of judgment what he called (taking the word from Heraclitus) *enantiodromia*, a pendulum swing from one judgment or belief to its opposite. He even cites as an example Nietzsche’s “deification and subsequent hatred of Wagner” (CW 6, par. 709). Nietzsche showed himself to be a fine teacher at Basel, but in only a few years the teaching duties proved too onerous for his delicately balanced organism. He had to take a leave, and not long after, to petition for a remarkably early retirement. The rest of his life he lived on a modest pension, enough to supply him board and room, pen and ink, and train tickets to carry him from Basel to Turin to Genoa to Nice to Venice, continually on the move in search of the right climate, which with a new diet, was ever his hope for relief from his miseries—blinding headache, indigestion, failing eyes, dizzy spells, insomnia, etc.—which were to be his lifelong lot. Worst of all was the loneliness. But as he became more and more the yea-sayer, he saw his loneliness and even his sickness as essential to the creative tasks he had set for himself; as he wrote, late in his conscious life, to Georg Brandes, “My illness has been my greatest boon: it unblocked me, it gave me the courage to be myself.” And *Zarathustra*, he called “a dithyramb to solitude.”

Although he was to go on to write the works reckoned by philosophers as his masterpieces—*The Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Anti-Christ*, *The Gay Science*—he always reckoned *Zarathustra* his greatest achievement, and it remains the favorite of most people who read Nietzsche at all. Composed, as he liked to say, six thousand feet beyond good and evil, if ever there was a work written out of inspiration, this is it. Each of the first three parts (which is as far as Jung’s seminar ever got) was written in about ten days, and

for all of the work's poetic style, it is quintessential Nietzsche.³ Here is the emergence of the self-announced immoralist, here is the will to power, here the eternal recurrence of the same, the death of god, and the overman. In the semi-legendary Persian prophet Zarathustra, he found his spokesman for the necessity of a complete reversal of mankind's attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations.⁴ Everything that has been revered—especially by Christians—was to be denounced and abandoned, and that which had been reviled was to be embraced and practiced. In what he called the “transvaluation of all values,” he celebrated not amoralism but what the western tradition has called immoralism and immorality. In renouncing the antithesis of good and evil, he embraced the opposition of good and bad.

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness.

This particular formulation came later, but the sentiment, the idea, is already in *Zarathustra*.

Although he prided himself on having “unlearned self-pity,” it would have required an overman (which Nietzsche made no claim to be) not to be devastated by the silence that greeted what he knew to be a major work. (In 1876 he reported that each part had sold sixty or seventy copies!) To compensate for the neglect of others, he found it necessary, it seems, to make ever stronger claims for himself: “the foremost mind of the century” was the way he put it four months before his collapse. But also, “With this *Z[arathustra]* I have brought the German language to a state of perfection.” Not Nietzsche at his most endearing, but the number who today find the boasts *not* ill-founded is impressive. Yet he had to settle for a self-assurance that his time would come: “Some people are born posthumously.” And no doubt that would mean interpreters. Here was another source of anxiety: almost better—maybe even really better—to be ignored than misunderstood. “If you should ever come around to writing about me,” he wrote to his friend Carl Fuchs (who was indeed tempted to do so),

³ The first two parts of *Zarathustra* appeared in 1883, the third in 1884, and the fourth, which gave Nietzsche more trouble, appeared in a privately printed edition of a mere forty copies in 1885.

⁴ Nietzsche was later to say to a friend that perhaps his title should have been *The Temptation of Zarathustra*, very possibly thinking of Jesus' temptation in the wilderness.

... be sensible enough—as nobody has been till now—to characterize me, to “describe”—but not to “evaluate.” ... I have never been characterized, either as a *psychologist* or as a *writer* (including *poet*), or as the inventor of a new kind of pessimism (a Dionysian pessimism born of strength, which takes pleasure in seizing the problem of existence by the horns), or as an *Immoralist* (the highest form, till now, of “intellectual rectitude,” which is permitted to treat morality as illusion, having itself become *instinct* and *inevitability*).

Many have indeed characterized and described Nietzsche, but few have minded his plea not to evaluate. Certainly Jung’s whole bent as a psychotherapist was to look beyond the words by which men and women pronounce their truths and exalt their ideals to other signs of the quality of life being led.

When Jung began his *Zarathustra* seminar, Nietzsche, dead a third of a century, was becoming famous. Many biographies had been written, including one by Nietzsche’s own sister. His philosophical acumen was being increasingly recognized, interpreted, and taught. His mastery of the German language was receiving ever greater recognition. Even his own claims to being a psychologist (than which he could imagine no greater calling) were receiving grudging recognition, at least by those in the traditions of Depth Psychology. But there was also the alarming spectacle of Nietzsche’s being trumpeted as a prophet for National Socialism. Jung knew this claim to be based on a complete misunderstanding: consider Nietzsche’s contempt for nearly everything German, his hatred of anti-Semitism, his exposure of “the neurosis called Nationalism.” Or this:

As soon as war breaks out anywhere, there also breaks out precisely among the noblest people a pleasure that, to be sure, is kept secret ... ; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience.

All the same, there were bound to be those who would jump to the conclusion that lectures on Nietzsche were a kind of attempt to give the Nazis an intellectual justification. Perhaps even more dangerous were those Nazi sympathizers in Switzerland and elsewhere who might claim as allies any student of Nietzsche.

It is perhaps not easy for those distanced from the intensity of political and economic feelings in the thirties, to understand that even this little seminar, devoted to psychological analysis, was not exempt—who

was?—from the growing sense of the inevitability of a dreadful war, with the outcome uncertain—for perhaps it *was* to be Deutschland (in its new guise) “Über Alles.” These seminar notes evidence over and again an uneasy awareness even in this protected environment of the violence abroad in Europe. Certainly Jung was intensely conscious of the importance of *Zarathustra* as a foreshadowing of the cataclysm about to overtake Europe and the world. Late in the seminar he said, “Perhaps I am the only one who takes the trouble to go so much into the detail of *Zarathustra*—far too much, some people may think. So nobody actually realizes to what extent he was connected with the unconscious and therefore with the fate of Europe in general.”

For all the tension of the times, Jung was busy as ever. In addition to this seminar, he was conducting another in German on children’s dreams. He was traveling: to London to deliver the Tavistock Lectures; to Yale University to deliver the Terry Lectures, *The Psychology of Religion*, and to India, where he was awarded three honorary doctorates. And he was writing, of course: “A Review of the Complex Theory,” “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” “Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy,” “What is Psychotherapy?” “The Practical Use of Dream Analysis,” “The Development of Personality,” “Yoga and the West”—to mention only some of his publications dating from this time. He had a large clinical practice. There was his annual Swiss military duty to perform. He was *paterfamilias* to a large household. Besides a running correspondence with many friends, he was generous in answering queries and prayers for advice from strangers who wrote him from all parts of the world. Yet year after year Jung continued as a teacher, particularly in this format that had established itself over the years: the group of twenty-five or thirty carefully selected persons, with a strong central core of veterans, who would hear the lectures and participate in the discussion on those magical Wednesday mornings. Yet in these troubled times, there were those who would raise a question about whether to continue the *Zarathustra* seminar: wouldn’t it be better and not so distressingly charged to move to a quieter subject, say Goethe’s Fairy Tales? But a vote came out in favor of continuing with *Zarathustra*, and so Jung went on to wrestle and dance with the immensely complex psyche of Nietzsche.

The written confrontation of giants in intellectual history is always fascinating and often exceedingly illuminating: Plato and Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, Aquinas and Aristotle, and so on down to more recent times: Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Jung and Freud. Interestingly, Nietzsche seems to have had a particularly mag-

netic quality for some of the finest intellects of the twentieth century: thus both Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger wrote voluminously on this most provocative of thinkers. And then—now—Jung and Nietzsche.

Always in these confrontations of peers there are affinities—otherwise, why bother? Listen to Aristotle say, “We Platonists.” And for a time, Jung said, “We Freudians.” Jung could *not* have said, “We Nietzscheans,” yet he shared much with Nietzsche. Both were haunted by Christianity. Alike, they were elitists—not on trivial grounds of wealth, family, class, race, but with respect to intelligence, understanding, and consciousness. For Nietzsche, who self-consciously addressed his works to “the very few,” the great distinction was between the slave morality of accommodation, appeasement, mercy, forgiveness, turning the other cheek, *and* the morality of the masters, the overmen. Jung, too, often said that in terms of their conscious development, most people have not got beyond the Middle Ages and thus, perhaps, should be left slumbering in their family parlors and church pews. For both Jung and Nietzsche, the road to individuation—to use Jung’s term—is lonely and rough, especially if there is a widespread lack of understanding of, even of belligerence toward, the mission. Thus, at times, each had a sense of being, as Nietzsche put it, posthumous.

Alike they were contemptuous of hedonism, the philosophy of comfort, pleasure, satisfaction. Both—though neither would have put it this way—were in the existentialist tradition of belief that without conflict and suffering, consciousness is doomed to stagnation and regression. Both sought, instead, for a philosophy and psychology (if they would admit a difference between the two) whose test is simply but richly this: does it conduce to a life rich in fulfilment, attainment, even transcendence to a realm of integration beyond what is reachable from the comfortable couches of everydayness. Theirs, alike, was a philosophy of darkness, no less than light, a celebration of the Dionysian spirit wherein is found the scariness of the unconscious with its alarming dreams which are yet the great source of human creativity. Both deplored and regretted—yet acknowledged the prevalence of—what Nietzsche called “the diminished personality” with its cautiously expurgated conception of what is real and important. They agreed that no one’s intellectual or artistic achievement can be understood or fairly assessed without regard for the whole self of the creator. Thus, listen to Jung’s applause for Nietzsche’s claim: “I have always written my works with my whole body and life”—this in contesting any such thing as a merely intellectual problem. Both were, in Jung’s terms, highly de-

veloped in intuition and thinking; both were introverts. Both acknowledged their debt to Heraclitus, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Dostoevsky. Jung would have rejoiced in Nietzsche's equating greatness in a man with his "comprehensiveness, and multiplicity, his wholeness in manifoldness—how much and how many things a person could bear and take upon himself, how far a person could extend his responsibility." Nietzsche anticipated Jung as to the part of the psyche that is an *it* (Freud's *id*), something that dreams, anticipates, thinks, but is below the level of the subject-ego. And what must have been the astonishment on the part of the inventor of Archetypal Psychology when he encountered Nietzsche's praise of Siegfried: "A marvelously accurate, archetypal youth." Or better yet, of the *Ring*: "A tremendous system of thought without the conceptual forms of thought"—an extraordinary description of the archetype. Their important differences will come out, as never before, in the long commentary that lies ahead in this book, but two important disagreements between these thinkers may be mentioned here. The first is that for the one, the aesthetic dimension of life was of primary importance, for the other, the religious. It is no accident that the one overwhelmingly important friendship in Nietzsche's life was with a musician—indeed a musician whose great ambition was to make his operas (or as he preferred to say, "music dramas") transcend the trivialities of public entertainment, to become grand syntheses of music, literature, visual design, dance, mythology, and philosophy. Nietzsche wholly agreed with the aspiration, and if he became disillusioned with the all-too-human Wagner, it was because Wagner finally also wanted to include religion—worst of all, Christianity. Like Nietzsche, Jung was a pastor's son and both can be easily seen as in revolt against the pieties of their early households. Still Jung, unlike Nietzsche, saw in the various religions of the world an inescapable and often profound attempt to symbolize man's eternal quest for meaning. Against Nietzsche (and Freud) Jung believed that the great world religions represent brave attempts to grasp the nature of the soul and the possibilities—albeit dreadfully remote—of salvation. Thus, to neglect the profound questions of the origins and destinies of human consciousness is as self-defeating as neglecting dream and myth.

If Aeschylus and Shakespeare and Goethe are no less worth our time and energy than are the prophets and gurus, it is because they share the latter's concern with the ultimate questions, not because of a highly developed aesthetic capability or a mastery of the grand style. We can imagine Jung smiling in agreement with Nietzsche's little poem

that says, "I am naught but a word maker," yet would Nietzsche have smiled in return, "Is it not written, 'In the beginning was the word' "? Certain it is that Nietzsche's career-long effort—almost desperate in its intensity—to achieve, for each of his multifarious purposes, the *right* style, the ultimate way of integrating form and content, was an *idée fixe*, one Jung could hardly share or condone.

Another great parting of the ways for these men comes out clearly in an early criticism by Jung: agreeing as to the necessity of not losing touch with the instincts (for instance, through excessive intellectualization or other forms of spirituality), they differed as to the best path toward a higher level. Nietzsche undoubtedly

felt the Christian denial of animal nature very deeply indeed, and therefore he sought a higher human wholeness beyond good and evil. But he who seriously criticizes the basic attitudes of Christianity also forfeits the protection which these bestow upon him. He delivers himself up unresistingly to the animal psyche. That is the moment of Dionysian frenzy, the overwhelming manifestation of the "blond beast," which seizes the unsuspecting soul with nameless shudders. The seizure transforms him into a hero or into a godlike being, a superhuman entity. . . . If heroism becomes chronic, it ends in a cramp, and the cramp leads to catastrophe.

To be sure, Nietzsche would again have agreed with Jung when he says, just a little later in this passage, "Man can suffer only a certain amount of culture without injury." But then Jung's criticism resumes: "The endless dilemma of culture and nature is always a question of too much or too little, never of either-or" (CW 7, pars. 40-41).

And yet did not Nietzsche say, as if in answer to Jung's criticism, "I am one thing, my writings are another"? And the (now old) New Critics and virtually the whole fraternity of philosophers would say, "Yes, leave the man and his life alone: stick to the text." Indeed, Jung would in a sense agree that one's writings and the rest of one's life may be discrepant. And the creative work (in any medium) may represent an imaginative extension of what passes for reality, even a compensation for the limitations of character that may doom the greatest genius to stretches of mediocrity in day-to-day existence. "Yet," we can imagine Jung's continuing, "this whole seminar is devoted to the analysis of one of your 'excellent books' to determine as nearly as possible the quality of the life of its author, for how can one *not* be in one's own creations? And did you not say, 'I judge a philosopher by whether he is able to serve as an example'?"

INTRODUCTION

The last question Nietzsche put in the last of his books was simply: "Have I been understood?" Now Nietzsche or, more likely, a Nietzschean, might well add, "Does Jung finally do justice to the greatness of Nietzsche as philosopher, as writer?" And (again with presumption) one might imagine the *Geist* of Jung answering, "Is not the question rather, 'Have we, by way of our analysis of your text and what it tells us about your life, better understood the human condition?' "

This seminar, like all of Jung's seminars, is about Analytical Psychology.

James L. Jarrett

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editor of a work as richly allusive as any of Jung—but especially in the seminar notes, which he did not himself provide footnotes for—must seek help from colleagues, acquaintances, and highly recommended strangers on matters historical, theological, astronomical, horticultural, psychological, and so on. In the present instance, much my greatest debt is to William McGuire, the master of them that know Jung texts and Jungiana. He saved me from many a slip or blunder. Joseph Henderson who was, in its latter stages, a member of the Seminar, helped me imagine the scene by his vivid accounts of the meetings and of a great many of the participants. Gerhard Adler, Lilliane Frey-Rohn, Aniela Jaffé, and C. A. Meier were also helpful in providing background material and answering specific questions.

Others who gave generously of their time and scholarship are: Joan Alpert, John Anton, Thomas G. Barnes, Patricia Benson, Robert Browning, Robert Cockrell, Randy Cross, Joseph Fontenrose, Jennifer Gordon, Paul Heist, Dennis Jarrett, Richard Kern, Thomas Leahy, S.J., Charles McCoy, Alexander Nehamas, Kenneth Paigen, Graham Parkes, Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, Evert Schlenger, Martin Schwartz, Will Tuttle, Claude Welch. Elisa Leptich, as my research assistant, haunted the Berkeley library and came up with many identifications. Marjorie Jarrett devoted hundreds of hours to collating, juggling, and word-processing the notes. Virginia Draper made useful discoveries and in addition offered a number of helpful stylistic suggestions. Babette Jackson did most of the indexing. Finally, I am grateful to the members of a small but intense study group that has, year after year, been investigating Jung's personality typology, for their (as always) stimulating discussion of parts of the text: Noelle Caskey, Wayne Detloff, Ravenna Helson, and Byron Lambie.

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

The notes that constitute the text have here been followed closely but not slavishly. By far the greatest number of changes have been in punctuation, but occasionally minor changes in syntax have been made in the interest of clarity. A very small number of deletions have been made, but exclusively of stories or other material the reader has recently encountered in virtually identical form.

Professor Jung's English, both oral and written, was of course excellent, but as with almost all non-native speakers, he sometimes made a slight deviation from the perfectly idiomatic. Except in the few instances in which clarity was thereby sacrificed these have been allowed to stand in order to stay as close as possible to the speaker's own "voice."

MEMBERS OF THE SEMINAR

No register of members has come to light. The following list accounts for persons whose names appear in the transcript; others whose names were not recorded but are known to have attended are Mary Bancroft, *Mary Briner, Helena Cornford (later Mrs. Joseph Henderson), Mary Foote, *Aniela Jaffé, *Riwkah Schärf, and *Jane Wheelwright. Only surnames are given in the transcript, and given names have been supplied here insofar as possible. An asterisk indicates a member who, according to present knowledge, was or later became an analytical psychologist.

Adler, Mrs. Grete
 Allemann, Mr. Fritz
 Bahadurji, Dr.
 Bailward, Mrs.
 *Bash, Mr. K. W.
 Baumann, Mr. Hans H.
 Baumann, Mrs.
 Baynes, Mrs. Cary F.
 Bennett, Mrs.
 *Bertine, Dr. Eleanor
 Bianchi, Miss Ida
 *Brunner, Mrs. Cornelia
 Burgers, Frau Dr.
 Case, Mrs.
 Crowley, Mrs. Alice Lewisohn
 Dürler, Mrs. Helen
 *Elliot, Dr. Lucille
 Escher, Dr. Heinrich H.
 Fabisch, Miss
 *Fierz, Mrs. Linda (Fierz-David)
 Fierz, Prof. Hans
 Flower, Mrs.
 *Franz, Miss Marie-Louise von
 *Frey, Dr. Liliane (Frey-Rohn)
 Fröbe-Kapteyn, Mrs. Olga

Frost, Mrs.
 *Hannah, Miss Barbara
 *Harding, Dr. M. Esther
 *Henderson, Dr. Joseph L.
 *Henley, Dr. Eugene H.
 *Henley, Mrs. Helen
 Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,
 Princess Marie-Alix
 *Howells, Dr. Mary
 Hughes, Miss
 *Jaeger, Mrs. Manuela
 James, Dr.
 Jay, Mrs.
 *Jung, Mrs. Emma
 Kaufmann, Miss
 Kirsch, Mrs. Hilda
 *König, Miss von: Olga,
 Baroness von König
 Fachsenfeld
 Layard, Mr. J. W.
 Leon, Mrs. Frances Goodrich
 Lohmann, Mrs.
 Martin, Mr. P. W.
 Maxwell, Mrs. Scott
 *Mehlich, Mrs. Rose

MEMBERS OF THE SEMINAR

Mellon, Mrs. Mary Conover	Strong, Mrs.
Naeff, Mrs. Erna	Stutz, Mrs.
Neumann, Dr. Erich	Taylor, Miss Ethel
Nuthall-Smith, Mr.	Taylor, Miss N.
Reichstein, Prof. Tadeus	van Waveren, Mr.
Roques, Mrs. Hedwig von	von Barnhard, Mr.
*Sachs, Mrs.	Volkhardt, Mrs.
Schevill, Mrs. Margaret E.	Welsh, Miss Elizabeth
Schlegel, Mrs. Erika	*Wheelwright, Dr. Joseph
Schlegel, Dr. J. E.	*Whitney, Dr. James Lyman
*Scott-Maxwell, Mrs. Florida	*Whitney, Dr. Elizabeth
Sigg, Mrs. Martha	Goodrich
Stauffacher, Mrs. Anna	*Wolff, Miss Toni
*Strong, Dr. Archibald McIntyre	Zinno, Mrs. Henri F.

LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

Apocrypha = *The Apocryphal New Testament*. Ed. M. R. James. Oxford, 1924.

B.S. = Bollingen Series.

BG&E = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York, 1966.

CW = *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*. Ed. Gerhard Adler, Michael Fordham, and Herbert Read; William McGuire, Executive Editor; tr. R.F.C. Hull. New York and Princeton (B.S. XX) and London, 1953–1979. 20 vols.

Daybreak = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*. Tr. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge and New York, 1982.

Dream Sem. = C. G. Jung: *Dream Analysis. Notes of the Seminar Given in 1928–1930*. Ed. William McGuire. Princeton (B.S. XCIX), 1984.

Ecce Homo = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*. In *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, vol. XVII.

Freeman* = *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. Ed. Kathleen Freeman. Oxford, 1948.

Gay Science = Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York and Toronto, 1974.

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Hollingdale* = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*. Ed. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1961.

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I Ching = *The I Ching, or Book of Changes*. The Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes. 3rd edn., Princeton (B.S. XIX) and London, 1967.

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Letters/Middleton = *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Ed. and tr. Christopher Middleton. Chicago, 1961.

MDR = *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* by C. G. Jung. Recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé; tr. Richard and Clara Winston. New York and London, 1957. (As the editions are differently paginated, double page citations are given.)

*Mead** = G.R.S. Mead, *Fragments of a Faith Forgotten*. New Hyde Park, New York, n.d.

N/Complete = *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Ed. Oscar Levy. Edinburgh and London, 1915.

N/Letters/Fuss = *Nietzsche: A Self-Portrait from His Letters*. Ed. and tr. Peter Fuss and Henry Shapiro. Cambridge, Mass., 1971.

N/Letters/Levy = *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Ed. Oscar Levy; tr. Anthony M. Ludovici. New York and Toronto, 1921.

N/Life = Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, *The Life of Nietzsche*. New York, 1912. 2 vols.

N/Works = *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*. New York, n.d. (This anthology includes the Thomas Common translation of *Zarathustra* used by the seminar, along with an introduction by Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche.)

Tibetan = *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*. Compiled and edited by W. Y. Evans-Wentz, with a Psychological Commentary by Dr. C. G. Jung. London, Oxford, New York, 1960.

Twilight = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Anti-Christ*. Ed. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968.

Untimely Meditations = Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*. Tr. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge and New York, 1983.

WP = Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann; tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York, 1968.

Zimmer/Myths = Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization*. Ed. Joseph Campbell, Princeton (B.S. VI), 1946.

Zimmer/Philosophies = Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*. Ed. Joseph Campbell. Princeton (B.S. XXVI), 1951.

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SPRING TERM

May / June 1934

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LECTURE I

2 May 1934

Dr. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: I made up my mind to give you a Seminar about *Zarathustra* as you wished, but the responsibility is on your heads. If you think that *Zarathustra* is easier than those visions, you are badly mistaken, it is a hell of a confusion and extraordinarily difficult.¹ I broke my head over certain problems; it will be very hard to elucidate this work from a psychological angle. However, we will try to do our best, but you must cooperate.

I think, concerning the technique, that it will be best to go through the chapters from the beginning, and I am afraid it will take us far more than one term to plough through the whole thing. It is considerably longer than the visions we have been working on but we can stop any time you wish; perhaps you will get sick of it in the long run but I would not know any other way of dealing with it. You know, these chapters of *Zarathustra* are sort of sermons in verse, but they have some analogy with the visions in as much as they are also evolutionary incidents. They form a string of experiences and events, manifestations of the unconscious, often a directly visionary character; and therefore it is probably recommendable to follow the same technique in the analysis which we have applied to the visions. There are certain chapters which consist of or start from visions, or are comments on visions or dreams Nietzsche had had, and other chapters are sermons spoken by Zarathustra.

Now Zarathustra is by no means a merely metaphorical or poetical figure invented by the author himself. He once wrote to his sister that Zarathustra had already appeared to him in a dream when he was a

¹ A previous seminar, devoted to the analysis of the painted visions of an American woman, Christiana Morgan, had concluded only the previous March 21, having begun October 30, 1930. The abridged notes of Mary Foote have been published as *Visions Seminars* (Zürich, 1976), in two volumes.

boy.² Then I found an allusion to the peculiar fact that Nietzsche as a young man studied in Leipzig, where there is a funny kind of Persian sect, the so-called Mazdaznan sect, and their prophet is a man who calls himself El Ha-nisch. But that man is said to be a German from the blessed land of Saxony named Haenisch, a well-known Saxon name; as a matter of fact, the professor of Oriental languages here told me that when he was studying Persian in Leipzig, this man was in the same seminar.³ He is certainly not the originator of that Mazdaznan sect; it is of older origin. They took over certain Persian ideas from the *Zend-Avesta*, particularly the hygienic rules which they applied in a more or less mechanical way, accompanied by metaphysical teaching also taken from the *Zend-Avesta*, which, as you know, is a collection of the sacred books of the Zoroastrian belief. It has been assumed that Nietzsche became acquainted with certain members of that sect and thus got some notion about Zarathustra or the Zoroastrian traditions. Personally, however, I don't believe this; he would never have gotten a very high idea of Zarathustra through their representations. Nietzsche was a well-read man, in many ways very learned, so it is quite probable or even certain, that he must have made some special studies along the line of the *Zend-Avesta*, a great part of which was already translated in his days. There is now a good German translation, and an English one in the series of *The Sacred Books of the East*. It consists of books of very different periods, the earliest of which, the Yasna, includes the so-called *Gāthās*, sermons in verse.⁴ These are called the verse sermons of Zarathustra and are written in a special dialect of old Iranian; as they are very archaic, the oldest of all, it is assumed that they really go back to the time of Zarathustra. And these would form the model for the verse sermons of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*.

We must go a little into the history of that Zoroastrian belief because it plays a certain role in the symbolism of the book. Zarathustra is almost a legendary figure, yet there are certain notions about him which prove that he must have been a real person who lived in a remote age.

² Nietzsche's sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, wrote that "the figure of Zarathustra and a large number of the leading thoughts in this work had appeared much earlier in the dreams and writings of the author." N/Works (see List of Bibliographic Abbreviations), Introduction, p. 13. This is the Thomas Common translation that the seminar was reading throughout.

³ Emil Abegg of Zürich University, professor of Oriental Languages, best known for *Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran* (Berlin & Leipzig, 1920).

⁴ The *Gāthās*, or songs, are the first part of the Persian scriptures, the *Zend-Avesta*. See *Ancient Persia*, tr. A.V.M. Jackson et al. (New York, 1917), vol. VII in F. Max Müller, *The Sacred Books of the East* (Oxford, 1879-1926). 50 vols.

It is not possible to place him exactly either geographically or chronologically, but he must have lived between the seventh and ninth centuries B.C. probably in north-western Persia. He taught chiefly at the court of a king or prince named Vishtaspa. (The Greek form of this name is *Hystaspes*, which you may remember was the name of the father of Darius I.) The story says that Zarathustra first became acquainted with the two ministers at the Court of Vishtaspa, and through them with the noble queen whom he converted, and then through her he converted the king. This is psychologically a very ordinary proceeding, it usually happens that way. One of the most successful propagandists of early Christianity in high circles was the Pope Damasus I, whose nickname was *matronarum auriscalpius*, meaning the one who tickles the ears of the noble ladies; he used to convert the nobility of Rome through the ladies of the noble families.⁵ So this is probably a historic detail in the life of Zarathustra. Then in contradistinction to certain other founders of religions, he married and lived to be quite old. He was killed by soldiers, while standing near his altar, on the occasion of the conquest of his city.

The *Gāthās* are probably authentic documents which date from Zarathustra's time and it is quite possible that they were his own doing. Practically nothing can be concluded from them as to historical detail, but that ancient teaching was remarkably intelligent for those days, and it was characterized by one particular feature which was, one could say, the clue for the fact that Nietzsche chose that figure. In fact, Nietzsche himself says that he chose Zarathustra because he was the inventor of the contrast of good and evil; his teaching was the cosmic struggle between the powers of light and darkness, and he it was who perpetuated this eternal conflict. And in the course of time Zarathustra had to come back again in order to mend that invention, in order to reconcile the good and evil which he separated in that remote age for the first time.⁶ It is true that one would not be able to indicate any thinker earlier than Zarathustra who stressed the contrast between good and evil as a main principle. The whole Zoroastrian religion is based upon this conflict.

The dogmatic teaching is that in the beginning there was one all-wise and all-powerful god called Mazda (which means simply the wise

⁵ St. Damasus I was Pope from 366 to 386.

⁶ Nietzsche said "Zarathustra was the first to see in the struggle between good and evil the essential wheel in the working of things . . . Zarathustra created the most portentous error, morality. Consequently he should also be the first to perceive that error" (Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche's Introduction, *N/Works*, p. 26).

one, something like Laotze) with the attribute of Ahura. *Ahura* is the Iranian version of the Sanskrit word *Asura*, which is the name of the spiritual god in the oldest parts of the *Rigveda*. You know the *Rigveda* is a collection of poems or hymns, part of the sacred literature of the Hindus, which goes back to an extremely remote age, perhaps to the time of the primitive Aryan invaders of India. One of the oldest parts contains the so-called frog songs of the priests and they are supposed to date back to five thousand B.C. though I don't know whether that estimate is correct.⁷ In those old frog songs, as I have told you, the priests in their rain charms identified themselves with the frogs; when there was a drought the priests sang the frog songs as if it had rained. They imitated the frogs as they sing after the rain, because they feel well then in their ponds, but when there is no water there is nothing to sing about—as primitives also, in order to produce rain, imitate the fall of rain-drops, or they sprinkle blood or milk, or they whistle, imitating the sound of the wind that brings clouds. This Asura is the highest god and he is different from the concept of the deva. (*Deva* or *devs*, the plural, is the root word from which, for instance, *Zeus* is derived, and *Deus*, and *Ziu*, and from that our word *Tuesday*.)⁸ The *devs* are the shining gods of the day, of the clear blue sky, of things visible in the daylight, while *Asura* is a god within, a god of chiefly spiritual and moral character. Now in the later development—in the later parts of the *Rigveda*—*Asura* disintegrated into a multitude of *asuras*, and they are demons of a definitely evil nature. And you find the same thing happening with the *devs* in Persia. The Zoroastrians had that concept of *Asura*, the highest god, that very ancient idea of the *Rigveda*, and they chose the name in the Persian form, *Ahura*, as an attribute for Mazda, so their god was called Ahura Mazda.

Ahura Mazda, the greatest god, the wise man, is generally supposed to be Zarathustra's creation, and he came to that formulation probably through inner experiences of which his story tells. These experiences are called in the old literature, "Meetings and Questionings"; that is, he met Ahura Mazda, or his spoken word called *Vohu Manō*, meaning the good attitude. The German word for *Vohu Manō* would be: *die gute Gesinnung*, the good attitude, a good intention, a good word, the right word. We could easily translate it, with no particular philosophical dif-

⁷ The *Rigveda* (Song in Praise of Holy Knowledge) is the oldest and most important of Hindu scriptures, having to do with the *Asuras*, or high gods, collectively. It is variously dated from 2000 to 1200 B.C.

⁸ Besides the Sanskrit similarity, there are the Germanic *Tiwas*, Latin *Deus*, Avestan *Daeva*, all meaning sky, heaven, god.

ficulty, by the Christian concept of the *Logos*; the spoken word represents God in the incarnated form, the *Logos* as incarnated in Christ would be the exact counterpart of *Vohu Manō*. One finds the same concept in Islam in the mystical Sufi sect, where Allah, because he is unnameable, ineffable, and therefore formless, appears in tangible form in Chidr, the green one, who is called "the first angel of Allah," "the Word," "the Face of Allah." "The Angel of the Face" is a similar conception in the Old Testament, a sort of tangible representation of an absolutely intangible and indefinable deity.⁹ So Ahura Mazda, or *Vohu Manō*, became experiences to Zarathustra, the so-called Meetings and Questionings. He had, I think, seven Meetings with the good spirit of the god Ahura Mazda. (There is also a bad spirit of which we shall talk presently.) He received the revelation, he was taught the truth by that spirit. I mention that now because it is a parallel to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*.

The name Zarathustra in Persian is written *Zarathushtra*; *ushtra* is typically Persian and it means camel. There is a family story about him and all the names in his family have to do with mares and stallions, horses and cattle, camels, etc., showing that they are quite native and that he belonged to a sort of cattle people. Also his idea of a perfect reward in heaven was exceedingly archaic. He himself hoped that after a life full of merit he would be rewarded in the land of the hereafter by the good gift of one stallion and twelve mares, as well as by the possession of a perfectly youthful and beautiful body. One finds very similar ideas in Islam still. The Greek version of the name Zarathustra is *Zoroaster*. But the Greeks knew practically nothing of his teaching; to them he was a great sorcerer and astrologer; anything that went under Zoroaster's name was magic and black arts.

Now, besides the manifestation of god in the spoken word or in the good intention of the *Vohu Manō*, there is the corresponding dark manifestation, the evil spirit, *Angrō Mainyush*. (He was later called *Ahriman*, and Ahura Mazda was called *Ormazd*.) These two spirits, *Vohu Manō* and *Angrō Mainyush*, were together in the original Ahura Mazda, showing that in the beginning there was no separation of good and evil. But after a while they began to quarrel with each other, and a fight ensued, and then the creation of the world became necessary. So Ahura Mazda created the world, but he was so upset by it that for six

⁹ Chidr, in Sufi literature, is the first angel of Allah, "the face of Allah." In the *Old Testament*, after Jacob wrestled with the angel, he said, "... for I have seen God face to face" (Genesis 32:30).

thousand years he did not know what to do, and then Angrō Mainyush broke into his creation and spoiled the whole show. And since then there is hell to pay, because all the light got lost in that darkness, and the hosts of devils he brought into this world are now to be combatted. For he had one great success right in the beginning: he succeeded in converting the devs to his convictions and so they became devils (*devils* comes from *devs* of course), just as *Ahura* became *ahuras*, many devils. So the original beautiful gods of the day, the gods of the visible things, beauty and harmony, became evil and nocturnal demons and formed the main body of evil forces, just as the old Germanic gods became storm devils and all sorts of evil spirits when they were dethroned by Christianity. So there was a perpetual fight between Vohu Manō and the hosts of evil led by Angrō Mainyush.

What Ahura Mazda is doing in the end is not quite visible or understandable; he is of course supposed to be on the side of the good—he is with his good spirit, but whether he is with his bad spirit too is not clear. It is the same awkward situation that we have in Christianity, where we are also not quite sure what the relationship is between God and the devil. Is it a co-dominion with God?—or what is it? That Christian awkwardness is an old inheritance from Persia—I could tell you several other things which would substantiate that idea—and therefore the theologians don't like Zarathustra and criticize him. But he is really the founder of the Christian dogma; all the oblique and contrary things in the Christian dogma can be found in the Persian religion as well. The only thing the theologians can say about it is that Christianity is a much higher religion. They point out with great satisfaction that the Persian religion is only a religion of rewards, that people are good only in order to be rewarded in heaven, and the founder himself expected a stallion and twelve mares—"and you see how low that is!" But I don't agree with that entirely; that little difference was in the time of Homer and Greek mythology—not to speak of the Germanic traditions—when the slaughtering of children and eating of human flesh still took place. Those were highly primitive times, so no wonder that Zarathustra had somewhat concretized expectations. Otherwise his teaching was remarkably wise and advanced. He was the main opponent of magic, for example; he tried to uproot magic wherever he met it, and the temples and the priests also had to go by the board. They had no real priests in the beginning, it was like the beginning of Christianity. But soon the same process appeared as it did later on in Christianity—the influx of primitive magic and primitive heathenish ideas—and the beautiful monotheism of Ahura Mazda was split up

into a multitude of gods, like the splitting up of God into the Trinity and then into the many saints and so on. Ahura Mazda had qualities naturally: he was the truth, he was wisdom, he was justice, etc., and those qualities became personified as the so-called *amesha spentas* which are immortal spirits. One was truth, another justice, and so on—abstract qualities like the so-called attributes of God in the Christian dogma. These *amesha spentas* became gods too, and the whole spiritual attitude of the early Zoroastrian teaching changed and became a tremendously specialized ritualism.

The original teaching of Zarathustra, however, was characterized by a real spiritual piety. It was the *Gesinnung*, the moral attitude, that counted, more than the external works. His teaching was that as you commit sin outside in reality, so you can commit sin inside as a sin of conscience, and it is the same thing, just as bad. And think of the eighth or ninth century B.C. which was the *niveau* of such religious teaching! It is an amazingly high level, and this extraordinary moral discrimination points to a most unusual genius.

Now this was the model for Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. It had nothing to do with the Mazdaznan sect. I think it is rather, as he says, that that figure was an experience of old standing; it was the early experience of the old wise man. You know, we often speak of that figure as a personification of the inherited wisdom of the ages, the truth that has become instinctive through experience, one could say, having been lived millions of times, a sort of wisdom of nature that is born in us and to which we owe the coordination of our whole biological as well as psychological system—that old experience which is still visible in our dreams and in our instincts. This is the mental or spiritual aspect of a perfectly natural fact, namely, the teleology of a living system. So Nietzsche chose a most dignified and worthy model for his old wise man, because to him it was that same kind of experience.

You know, Nietzsche in the first part of his life was a great and very intuitive intellectual, chiefly rebellious and critical of traditional values, and you still find that in *Zarathustra*. There was then little of what one would call positive in him; he could criticize with remarkable readiness, but he was not yet synthetic or constructive, and he could not produce values. Then suddenly, like an extraordinary revelation, all which his former writings omitted came upon him. He was born in 1844, and he began to write *Zarathustra* in 1883, so he was then thirty-nine years old. The way in which he wrote it is most remarkable. He himself made a verse about it. He said: "Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei," which means: "Then one became two

and Zarathustra passed by me,"¹⁰ meaning that Zarathustra then became manifest as a second personality in himself. That would show that he had himself a pretty clear notion that he was not identical with Zarathustra. But how could he help assuming such an identity in those days when there was no psychology? Nobody would then have dared to take the idea of a personification seriously, or even of an independent autonomous spiritual agency. Eighteen eighty-three was the time of the blooming of materialistic philosophy. So he had to identify with Zarathustra in spite of the fact that he felt, as this verse proves, a definite difference between himself and the old wise man.¹¹ Then his idea that Zarathustra had to come back to mend the faults of his former invention, is psychologically most characteristic; it shows that he had an absolutely historical feeling about it. He obviously felt quite clearly that the experience of that figure was archetypal. It brought something of the breath of centuries with it, and it filled him with a peculiar sense of destiny: he felt that he was called to mend a damage done in the remote past of mankind.

Of course such a feeling is most uplifting to an individual; no wonder then that *Zarathustra* was the Dionysian experience *par excellence*. In the latter part, that Dionysian *ekstasis* comes in. *Zarathustra* really led him up to a full realization of the mysteries of the cult of Dionysos: he had already ideas about it, but *Zarathustra* was the experience which made the whole thing real. In one of his letters to his sister he gives a most impressive description of the *ekstasis* in which he wrote *Zarathus-*

¹⁰ The wistful little poem that Nietzsche wrote some time between 1882 and 1884 deserves citation in full:

Sils-Maria

I sat there waiting, waiting—not for anything,
Beyond good and evil, enjoying soon the light,
Soon the shade, now only play, now
The lake, now the noon, wholly time without end.
Then suddenly, friend, one became two—
And Zarathustra passed by me.

Nietzsche loved the Swiss Alpine town Sils-Maria, where he wrote Part II of *Zarathustra*. Jung will return to those last two lines repeatedly as expressive of Nietzsche's moment of objectifying, for his creative purposes, what had been an internal unity.

¹¹ Zarathustra as Nietzsche's second personality reminds one of what Jung says about his own recognition of having both a Personality 1 and a Personality 2 (see *MDR*, pp. 44-45/55). Nietzsche often contrasted his own materialistic, scientific outlook with German idealism. Jung picks out 1883 because it was in that year that the composition of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* began.

tra.¹² There are four parts in the book, and each of the first three parts was written within ten days, which is rather remarkable. The first was written on the Riviera, the second in the Sils Maria in the Engadine, and the third again on the Riviera; the fourth was written in different places and took longer. He says about his way of writing that it simply poured out of him, it was an almost autonomous production; with unfailing certainty the words presented themselves, and the whole description gives us the impression of the quite extraordinary condition in which he must have been, a condition of possession where he himself practically no longer existed. It was as if he were possessed by a creative genius that took his brain and produced this work out of absolute necessity and in a most inevitable way.

We will now begin the first chapter, the introductory discourse of the Superman, the last man:

When Zarathustra was thirty years old, he left his home, and went into the mountains. There he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not weary of it. But at last his heart changed,—and rising one morning with the rosy dawn, he went before the sun, and spake thus unto it:

Thou great star! What would be thy happiness if thou hadst not those for whom thou shinest!

For ten years hast thou climbed hither unto my cave: thou wouldst have wearied of thy light and of the journey, had it not been for me, mine eagle, and my serpent.

But we awaited thee every morning, took from thee thine overflow, and blessed thee for it.

Lo! I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it.

I would fain bestow and distribute, until the wise have once more become joyous in their folly, and the poor happy in their riches.

We must first try to construct the psychological situation. As I said, I am going to handle these chapters or experiences like the visions. Here the story of Zarathustra begins. The man who speaks or writes is Nietzsche; it is as if he were the historian of Zarathustra, describing what he had been doing. Zarathustra is obviously objectified here, the writer does not seem to be identical with him. Now, he is said to be

¹² This too is in her Introduction to *N/Works*, p. 16. *Zarathustra* was begun in 1883 and finished in 1885.

thirty years old when he left his home. To what fact do those thirty years refer? As far as I know, there is no definite chronology in Zarathustra's life except the age when he died, seventy-seven years.

Mr. Allemann: It refers to the age of Christ.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the legendary age of Christ when he began his teaching career; that at once creates an identity between Zarathustra and the Christ. This is an identity which is commonly granted historically: namely, it is in the Zoroastrian teaching that every thousand years—which simply means an indefinite world period, about half of a month of the great platonic year—a Saoshyant appears (that is a reaper, a savior), who teaches people a new revelation, a new truth, or renews old truths, a mediator between god and man. This is most definitely an idea which went over into the Christian teaching where it took on a somewhat different form: in Christianity the idea of the *enantiodromia* came in.¹³ After the teaching of Christ has had its effect, then Satan is given a chance, as you learn from the Book of Revelation, “for two times and a half time”—also an indefinite period in which he is allowed to enjoy himself apparently, working all sorts of evil.¹⁴ This is one of the origins of the legend of the Antichrist, which is proved to have already existed in the first century. In practically the same circumstances under which Christ was born, his dark brother, the Antichrist, would be born, and he would work very much the same miracles but in order to seduce mankind. He would be a sort of negative Saoshyant, appearing when the positive reign of Christ was coming to an end. According to the Persian reckoning, the reign of the Antichrist would begin after a month of the great platonic year, about A.D. 1100 or 1200.¹⁵ As a matter of fact at about that time there was a great commotion in the Christian world, because they supposed that the end of the world was coming in the year 1000—according to that old idea that after a thousand years a new revelation would take place, or something would happen to the world. But apparently nothing happened. It is true, however, that in those times the power of the church reached its apex and the

¹³ Jung took this word from Heraclitus, the Greek “dark philosopher” of the 6th century B.C. It means, roughly, “running counter to.” Jung used it to designate the tendency of any state to beget its opposite. As early as 1921, Jung cited the “self-identification of the sick Nietzsche with Christ, and his deification and subsequent hatred of Wagner” as instances of *enantiodromia* (CW 6, pars. 708-9).

¹⁴ See Revelation 12:14 and Daniel 12:7. In Revelation, some commentators identify Nero as the Beast and the Antichrist, Satan's Messiah.

¹⁵ Jung notes elsewhere that the Platonic year has been variously reckoned: for instance, 36,000 years in the time of Origen and 24,120 years by Tycho Brahe (CW 9 ii, par. 136n).

worldly powers were practically subdued. Then soon after, they began to rise again and the church was on its decline; and that continued, its worst blow being at about the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the schism within the church occurred: Protestantism.

Now this idea of the Saoshyant of course also entered the mind of Nietzsche: his Zarathustra is a Saoshyant who comes after the thousand years are once more fulfilled—of course not quite, but *à peu près*. It was only 1883, unfortunately, but the heavenly powers are sometimes irregular—perhaps the clock doesn't work regularly in heaven, one doesn't know exactly—so the Saoshyant came a bit earlier, a reincarnation in the form of Zarathustra. And he enters upon his career very much in the way of the former Saoshyants, Christ or the Antichrist. One knows of course from the writings of Nietzsche—even if one only knows the titles of his works—that he had the idea of an Antichrist very much in mind. He makes of course a great story about his anti-Christianity, and takes himself as being an Antichrist incarnate—by no means as a merely destructive devilish brother of Christ, however, but as a new Saoshyant. He will destroy the former values sure enough, but for something better and more ideal, for a morality much higher than the Christian morality. He feels himself therefore as a positive Saoshyant, in spite of the fact that he accepts the title of “immoralist” and “Antichrist.” In India also there is the idea of the savior or reaper that appears every thousand years, in the series of the incarnated bodhisattvas; for instance, the bodhisattva of the past world, Buddha Amitabha, and Buddha Sakya Muni of the real actual world, and Buddha Maitraya of the coming worlds; and there are many others because there have been many other worlds. Buddha Amitabha is one of the most important ones. Particularly worshipped in Japan, he is the Buddha of clarity, of truth; and Maitraya, who is still to come, is the Buddha of perfect love.¹⁶ It is the same idea of periodicity. And this is based upon such experiences as Nietzsche's of the archetypal figure of the wise old man: that is, an exceedingly historical figure which brings with it the flavor of past centuries, a feeling of the actual presence of remote times, as if time were at a complete standstill, and 5000 B.C. were just in the next room to A.D. 2000. I am quite certain, from what Nietzsche says about Zarathustra, that he experienced him as an identity within himself that had existed many thousands of years be-

¹⁶ The Buddha, Amitabha, is “the protector of our present world period” (CW 11, par. 912). Shakya Muni is the historical Buddha. Maitraya is the Bodhisattva who will be born 5,000 years after the death of Gautama.

fore him, that always had been. When that figure appears, he simply emerges from a background which is always there; he is called out through the need of the time, the emergencies of the actual epoch. That Zarathustra is said to be thirty years old, then, discloses a certain analogy with Christ.

Then we have here a hint as to the place where he lived, "he left the lake of his home." Why should such a little thing be mentioned? It is a most insignificant detail, but if you apply the rules of dream interpretation to this symbol, it is psychologically quite charming. What would be the lake of one's home, and where is one going when one leaves this lake?

Miss Hannah: Could not the lake of his home be the personal unconscious which he is leaving for the collective unconscious?¹⁷

Dr. Jung: Quite so. The lake is limited and confined in contradistinction to the sea which is supposed to be unlimited. The sea, therefore, is always a symbol of the collective unconscious which has no boundary anywhere, while the lake is like being locked into *terra firma* which always symbolizes consciousness. It would be that amount of unconsciousness which is locked in by consciousness, a perfectly controllable piece of unconsciousness. So the lake of one's home is the personal familiar unconscious, that part which links one up with father and mother and brothers and aunts, ancestral conditions, and so on; it is a nice, well-known place with its history that forms the beginning of one's life. Then Zarathustra went up into the mountains. What about that?

Mrs. Crowley: For contemplation.

Dr. Jung: Yes, but you can contemplate near a lake very well. In Tibet the ordinary requirements for a sage are a hill on one side and on the other a lake, *inter collem et aquam*.

Dr. Bahadurji: He wants to be on a higher level, beyond general humanity.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is of course an analogy to the *rishis*, the legendary sages who lived on the heights of the Himalaya mountains in Tibet;¹⁸ those fellows also lived in a desolate, rather dreary place between the water, preferably a lake or a river, and the mountain side, high up above the ordinary people. That feeling played a great role in

¹⁷ Where for Freud, unconscious contents are mainly repressions, as early as 1912 Jung wrote of the "supra individual universality" which he was later to call the collective, as distinct from the individual, unconscious (CW 5, par. 258).

¹⁸ *Rishis*: the wise men, gurus, commentators, who continue to be incarnated as teachers.

Nietzsche's case. When he was up at Sils Maria which is nearly six thousand feet above sea level, he used to speak of being six thousand feet above good and evil—above ordinary humanity, that is. Therefore, he felt so particularly well in the Engadine—it is a very high floor. So it means here that he leaves the controlled ordinary home conditions, the familiar psychology, and lifts himself up to a particularly high level where he enlarges his horizon, as sages go into such places for the sake of enlarging their consciousness and their horizon, to detach themselves from the chaos of events in order to see more clearly. Therefore the saying of Laotze: The one who detaches and sees from afar sees clearly.¹⁹ And there he possessed his spirit in solitude and for ten years did not weary of it. Here is another detail, ten years.

Mr. Allemann: Thirty plus ten makes about the age of Nietzsche when he wrote.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he was thirty when he left and forty when he had accomplished the accumulation of wisdom. Then there is a detail in the history of his life which you would not know, that for the first ten years he had no pupils and was worried about it—and even then he had only one, a young cousin of his. Only very much later did he succeed in converting people to his wisdom. These ten years might easily have to do with that fact, though I am not sure. But there is also the psychological fact that it just makes up the age at which he began to write *Zarathustra*, the moment when he left his mountains.²⁰ It describes here how he is coming to give his message to mankind, his heart having at last changed. And then comes the invocation to the sun. Now how would you understand his invocation? It is the first event, the first experience or adventure. This is not so simple as our visions; there we have a certain code, but here it is uncharted waters.

Mrs. Fierz: If to be high on the mountain would be higher than common human consciousness, the sun would be the symbol of a more than human consciousness, which he has looked at for so many years and to which he now speaks. That is, he would be in a way more than humanly conscious, and greeting the sun would be feeling or realizing it.

¹⁹ *I Ching* (probably 4th century B.C.) teaches that to achieve the Tao it is necessary to detach oneself from the tension of opposites (*enantiodynamia*) to gain the distance from conflict and desire. See CW 6, pars. 358-70, and *The Way and Its Power*, ed. and tr. Arthur Waley (New York, 1958), p. 141 and *passim*.

²⁰ Nietzsche's sister cites a note of his: "Zarathustra, born on Lake Urmi, left his home in his thirtieth year, went into the province of Aria, and, during ten years of solitude in the mountains, composed the Zend-Avesta" (N/Works, p. 14).

Dr. Jung: You would understand this symbol of the sun as an objectification of his own superhuman consciousness, which he has acquired through his life on that high level? Yes, the sun surely is the symbol of the center of consciousness, it is the principle of consciousness because it is light. When you understand a thing, you say: "I see"—and in order to see you need light. The essence of understanding, of cognition, has always been symbolized by the all-seeing of the sun, the wisdom or omniscience of the sun that moves over the earth and sees everything in its light. So it would be quite possible that he speaks here to his personified consciousness. This is a somewhat unusual performance, but if you try to put yourself into the mood of a man who is always alone, as Nietzsche was, you realize that your own consciousness then begins to stare into your own face. You are always your own speaker and your own listener; you are always looking into your own light, into your own eyes. And then you can well personify consciousness as your daily partner, the daily occurrence; you can even curse your consciousness as your only fellow being.

Now, Nietzsche in those years after 1879, when he had given up his academic occupation in Basel, was restlessly wandering about, living in little hotels and pensions, sometimes on the French or Italian Riviera, and in the summer in the Engadine, supported by certain wealthy friends because he had no means of his own.²¹ And always alone, he could not stand people. He was desirous of having friends, always seeking a friend, but when such a poor fellow turned up, he was never good enough and Nietzsche got impatient right away. I know people who knew Nietzsche personally, because he lived in my own town, Basel, so I heard many details of this kind. For instance, in one of his lectures he was talking about Greece and Graecia Magna in most enthusiastic terms, and after the lecture a young man who had not understood something he had said—for those ordinary students were of course not quite able to follow Nietzsche's tremendous mind—went up to the professor to ask him about it. But before he could put in his very humble request, Nietzsche said: "Ah now, you are the man! That blue sky of Hellas! We are going together!" And the young man thought: "How can I go with this famous professor and how have I the money to do it?"—and he receded further and further, Nietzsche going at him and talking of the eternal smile of the skies of Hellas and

²¹ Nietzsche began to teach at the University of Basel in 1869 at the age of 24 and retired, from ill health, in 1879. In his subsequent wanderings he returned to Basel from time to time. He did have a pension from the university.

God knows what, till the young man backed up against the wall. Then suddenly Nietzsche realized that the fellow was frightened by his enthusiasm, and he turned away abruptly and never spoke to him again. That is the way he dealt with friends, he was absolutely unable to adapt to people, and when they did not understand him right on the moment, he had no patience whatever. He was also exceedingly impatient with himself. He was terribly, recklessly impulsive. He liked to be invited to certain social gatherings, but if there was a piano, he played madly; he went at it till his finger nails bled. That is no exaggeration, it is a fact. On his other side, he was quite funny. In Basel it appealed to his fantasy to appear in society as an elegant Englishman. In those days Englishmen were considered the summit of everything marvelous, and they then used to wear grey gloves and grey top hats; so Nietzsche went about in a grey redingote, a grey top hat, and grey gloves, and thought he looked like an Englishman. And with that moustache! We must know about these contrasts in order to understand the language of *Zarathustra*.

We may suppose, then, that this sun he is talking to is really the great light that he received and talked to every day, which is of course the great clarity of his lonely consciousness. And on account of this fact, that the sun is his consciousness, he can say to it: "What would you do without me? I still exist even over against such a consciousness." For when you are all alone with yourself, such a consciousness becomes so overwhelming a fact that finally you forget who you are out of sheer consciousness. Therefore, people who are pathologically conscious of themselves annihilate their own existence, they try not to be; they are always standing in their own light, because they are overwhelmed in their own consciousness. So he is here more than satisfied, he even gets sick of being only conscious and says: "What would you be if I were not with you, I with my animals, my eagle and my serpent?" Now what does that mean? What is he putting opposite the sun of consciousness?

Mrs. Bailward: The instincts.

Dr. Jung: Yes, animals mean instincts, but what would the eagle be?—and the serpent?

Mrs. Schlegel: The eagle would be intuition, and the serpent would be the chthonic powers.

Dr. Jung: What do you mean by the chthonic powers?

Mr. Allemann: The nature spirit, chthonic wisdom.

Dr. Jung: One could say spirit, but we must know what chthonic means. Read Keyserling's new book, *La Révolution Mondiale*, where he

speaks of the *révolte des forces telluriques*.²² That is chthonic. But what is it psychologically?

Miss Hannah: If the eagle is intuition, I suppose it is a sensation.²³

Dr. Jung: That is true; it can also be taken in a very general way as an air being. So the eagle would be the spirit and the serpent would be the body, because the serpent is the age-old representative of the lower worlds, of the belly with its contents and the intestines, for instance. It is the peristaltic movement, it is the personification of the sympathetic system, as it were. Therefore, it is always the personification of whatever comes from the body, sexuality and every vital physical function; also all the facts of reality, that things cost money or that your room is overheated, that your bed is hard, that your clothes are expensive, that you have not received a certain fee: all these things are chthonic. And our relations to all sorts of people who annoy us or whom we enjoy is chthonic, everything that is on the surface of this earth and so banal that one hardly dares to speak of it. On the other hand, the eagle soars high, it is near the sun. It is a son of the sun—marvelous. The bird of light, it is the very high thought, the great enthusiasm. For instance, when Ganymede, the messenger of Zeus, is lifted up by the eagle to Olympian heights, it is the genius and enthusiasm of youth that seize him and carry him up to the heights of the gods. So one could say it was a spiritual, uplifting power. You know, the eagle is said to come down and carry away sheep or even little children; we have such awful tales in Switzerland. That is what the spirit can do—spiritual excitement, spiritual enthusiasm; suddenly, after having hovered over a crowd for a while, the spirit picks somebody out and lifts him on high. And the serpent would be *la force terrestre*. Now what does it mean that, when confronted by his consciousness, of which he is wearying, these two symbolic animals appear at his side? You remember they are often with him in the book.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: He is not aware of being controlled by the chthonic and spiritual forces; he is unconscious of their existence in himself.

²² Count Hermann Alexander Keyserling (1880-1934) was a world traveler and essayist. His *La Revolution Mondiale et la Responsabilité de l'Esprit* was published in Paris in 1934. In his review Jung made fun of Keyserling's proposal to establish cultural monasteries, but still found this a good book (CW 10, pars. 935-45). See both volumes of *Letters* for Jung's correspondence with Keyserling.

²³ For Jung, intuition is that psychic function through which one has a sense, mediated through the unconscious, of possibilities. Sensation is its opposite. See below, 10 Oct. 1934, n. 3, on the four basic functions.

Dr. Jung: Well, they would here be sort of helpful powers. You see, they always play a very helpful role and later on we shall come across a passage where the eagle and the serpent are intertwined, meaning a reconciliation of opposites. When you are accompanied by an animal in a dream, what does it mean? That happens very frequently.

Mr. Allemann: It means that your instincts are with you.

Dr. Jung: Yes, and that is by no means always the case, you know; very often we go against the instincts or are in an oblique position toward them. So when the text says that Zarathustra is with his serpent and his eagle, it means, as in dreams, that he is going parallel with his instincts; he is right, looked at from a spiritual as well as a chthonic point of view. In this case, he is right in what he is actually doing, telling his consciousness that he is getting tired of it; he ought to detach from too much consciousness. You see, that would be the condition of a man who has lived in and through consciousness only, without paying attention to his instincts. Or we would say he was thinking consciously only, living by his conscious wits, without realizing the existence of an unconscious, here represented by an eagle and a serpent. So he is on the side of the unconscious when he can say to his consciousness: I think we had now better part. Then he will follow his unconscious. And if somebody gets sick of his consciousness and chooses another way, what kind of symbolism inevitably follows? What is the next move?

Dr. Reichstein: The moon.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: The going down.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the going down, the setting, when you say goodbye to the sun, naturally the sun sets or you set or both set; it is a going down into the dark night. The moon is all right, you see. So the work of Zarathustra begins with the idea of his setting like the sun, *der Untergang Zarathustras*. Then he necessarily comes down into what?

Mr. Allemann: Into the world of ordinary humanity, of collectivity.

Dr. Jung: Well, it is quite certain that when he leaves the sun of consciousness, he will come to some form of the unconscious. The question is now, of course, will the unconscious then be projected, or will it be in *forma pura*? If in its pure form it will not be projected, he will then enter the unconscious. That would be the night sea journey.²⁴ So as you say, it is the descent into the ordinary world in which unconscious-

²⁴ St. John of the Cross (1542-1592) working on the theme from the *Book of Jonah* of the hero who is swallowed by a sea monster and who, after passing what St. John called the dark night of the soul, is reborn on shore. See CW 9 ii, par. 123.

ness is the ruling factor, for consciousness in the ordinary world plays a very small part; it is chiefly instinctive. But we would not be able to say whether he would descend into the pure or the projected unconscious if it were not for the passage we have read as to his intention. He is going to human beings, to mankind. And there, the text says, he is going to teach the wise ones among men, and the poor ones. "Until the wise have once more become joyous in their folly, and the poor happy in their riches." So what would he teach?

Mrs. Crowley: The opposites.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. He is going to produce the *enantiodromia*, he is going to supply mankind with what is lacking, with that which they hate or fear or despise, with that which the wise ones have lost, their folly, and the poor their riches. In other words he is going to supply the compensation. Now I think we had better take that symbolism on the subjective level, and then it would mean that when Zarathustra, sick of his consciousness, comes down to the lower levels of general mankind, he will be the wise one that is compensated for his wisdom by folly. So we see that in this great light of the mountain he grew very wise and lost his folly—and very poor and lost all his riches.

LECTURE II

9 May 1934

Dr. Jung:

We were speaking last time of Zarathustra as representing the archetypal figure of the old wise man, and I want to say a little more about archetypes in general. The old wise man is a typical figure and therefore we call it an archetype; one meets it in legends and folklore and in innumerable texts and works of art, which shows that it is a generally human idea. Now, such generally human ideas always have their representatives in the history of civilizations, they actually occur as real figures. In primitive societies one finds the wise man usually in the form of the medicine man, and the older he is the more he is worshipped or feared. He is usually an object of fear because it is assumed that he is gifted with witchcraft, magical powers—and that he often makes a very evil use of his uncanny faculties. This institution of the medicine man is worldwide; they existed, probably, in prehistoric times. On higher levels of civilization, the medicine man has undergone certain differentiations; on the one side he developed into the organized priesthood, and on the other into the strictly medical man, the doctor. There are still certain figures which embody this archetype in an almost perfect form: the pope, of course, is the wise old man *par excellence*—he is supposed to be infallible, which means that he is capable of deciding about the absolute truth. Then every archbishop or bishop is a repetition of that archetype, and innumerable doctor authorities are supposed to know everything and to say marvelous things, even to know all the ropes in black magic. So that archetype is still living.

Archetypes in general are images that represent typical situations of great vital and practical importance, which have repeated themselves in the course of history innumerable times.¹ When a primitive man is

¹ In his early works, Jung spoke of “primordial images” but when this expression developed into “archetypes” he began to think of “these definite forms of the psyche” as pre-imagistic, thus admitting of some variety of imaginal expression. Occasionally, though, as here, he continued to speak of archetypes as images. See CW 9 i, par. 89.

in trouble which he cannot settle for himself, he will apply to the wise old men who form the council of the elders; when he does not trust his own competence, the case is referred to them. Or a particularly ticklish case is referred to the medicine man because he is supposed to confer with the ghosts who give him advice and help beyond all possibilities of human power, and therefore one credits him with extraordinary capacities. So in any situation full of doubt and risk where the ordinary mind does not know what to do, the immediate reaction is to apply to the archetypal figure of the wise old man. That is because it is generally supposed that the people who have lived through a great number of years and experienced much of life are more competent than the young people. Having survived certain dangerous situations they must know how to deal with them, so one asks them what one should do under conditions which once experiences perhaps for the first time. An archetype comes into existence, then, because it is a customary or habitual way of dealing with critical situations; in any crisis in life, this archetype or another is constellated; it is a sort of typical mechanism, or a typical attitude, by which one settles typical problems.

Certain situations can conjure up certain constellations in us of which we were quite ignorant; they bring out reactions of which we did not know we were capable—we are astonished perhaps at the way we are able to deal with them. You often think, for instance, that in such and such a predicament you would get into a terrible panic and lose your head completely. Then it happens in reality and you do not lose your head, you are not even afraid, and you go through it something like a hero. Afterwards you more or less collapse, but in the moment of danger there is no bad reaction; you are quite cool and you are amazed at it. The reason is simply that in such a moment up comes a certain mechanism, an instinctive attitude, which is always there; it is as if you knew what to do, you do just the suitable thing perhaps. Perhaps *not*, also, but it is astonishing how often extraordinary situations bring out most suitable reactions from the people caught in them. This is always due to the fact that an archetype has been constellated which lifts you above yourself. It is then as if you were no longer just one, but as if you were many, a part of mankind one could say; as if that situation had occurred innumerable times already so that you reacted not as an ego of today, but like man in general who had survived these situations before.

There are other archetypes which may produce panics or which warn you perhaps unnecessarily and cause trouble, the archetype of the passage of the ford or the pass, for instance. You know, it is the

common experience when travelling in primitive countries to be careful, before striking camp in the evening, that the river is at your back, that you have crossed the river, for a thunderstorm may come up overnight and the next day the river is so flooded that you cannot get across and you may have to wait for weeks; you may even starve to death if you are caught between two rivers. And not only is the river dangerous on account of inundations, but in fording or bridging it, you are almost sure to get into an awkward situation. Of course that fear makes no sense at all here any longer but then it was all-important. Quite unexpectedly, you come to a river forty or fifty yards wide, say; the banks are pretty steep, it is alive with crocodiles so there is no swimming; you have to carry all the loads across and you are in a devil of a fix. Perhaps you have to wander along the banks for hours and hours to find a ford where you can cross more or less safely. Or perhaps a tree has fallen or been cut down by the natives so that it fell across the river, and if the weather is fair you may be able to crawl across through an enormously thick tree, first through the roots and over the trunk and then through the branches, and you wonder how you can get all your loads across; and in rainy weather it is of course hellishly slippery. So without the slightest expectation, you find yourself in a position where you had better make your will. It is perfectly ridiculous: one was in an entirely comfortable situation before and then one finds oneself suddenly facing the risk of slipping off that tree. And nobody can hold you because there is no room, you have too get across as you can, and fifteen or twenty feet below are the crocodiles waiting for their breakfast.

Now that is an archetypal situation which has occurred innumerable times; if it is not just crocodiles, there are enemies waiting to catch you when perfectly helpless in the water. So fords, difficult passes, and such places are supposed to be haunted by dragons or serpents; there are monsters in the deep waters, enemies in the woods, behind rocks, and so on. Fording a river, then, is a typical situation expressing a sort of impasse, so just that archetype is formulated when one is in any dangerous predicament; and therefore many people become quite unnecessarily archetypally afraid: they are caught by a most unreasonable fear. One can say there is no danger—why the devil don't you go ahead?—but they are afraid to cross even a little brook. Or it can be more psychological, a fear of going through a certain risk in life which is really not dangerous, but they are as terrified as if they had to jump over a crocodile, simply because the archetype is constellated. The crocodile is then in themselves, and it is not helpful because it no longer suits the situation. Naturally, to ordinary, normal people such

things would not happen, but if there is a low threshold of consciousness, where the unconscious can easily get across, these archetypal figures come up. Now, there are numbers of archetypal situations and the whole of them make up the world of mythology. Mythology is the text book of archetypes, of course not rationally elucidated and explained, but simply represented like a picture or a story book. But all archetypes were originally real situations.

We are here concerned with the archetypes of the old man. Whenever he appears, he also refers to a certain situation: there is some disorientation, a certain unconsciousness, people are in a sort of confusion and don't know what to do. Therefore these Saoshyants, these wise men or prophets, appear in times of trouble, when mankind is in a state of confusion, when an old orientation has been lost and a new one is needed. So in the continuation of this chapter we see that Zarathustra appears in the moment when something has happened which made his presence necessary, and Nietzsche calls that the death of God; when God dies, man needs a new orientation. In that moment the father of all prophets, the old wise man, ought to appear to give a new revelation, to give birth to a new truth. That is what Nietzsche meant Zarathustra to be. The whole book is an extraordinary experience of that phenomenon, a sort of enthusiastic experience surrounded by all the paraphernalia, one could say, of true revelation. It would be quite wrong to assume that Nietzsche invented such a particular artifice in order to make an impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or anything like that; it was an event which overcame him—he was overcome by that archetypal situation.

Miss Wolff: Would it not be worthwhile to read that description of his inspiration?—he describes it so wonderfully.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he once wrote a letter to his sister in which he said: "You can have no idea of the vehemence of such composition." Then in *Ecce Homo* he describes how the archetype came upon him:

Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century any distinct notion of what poets of a stronger age understood by the word inspiration? If not, I will describe it. If one had the smallest vestige of superstition in one, it would hardly be possible to set aside completely the idea that one is the mere incarnation, mouthpiece or medium of an almighty power. The idea of revelation in the sense that something becomes suddenly visible and audible with indescribable certainty and accuracy, which profoundly convulses and upsets one—describes simply the matter of fact. One hears—one

does not seek; one takes—one does not ask who gives: a thought suddenly flashes up like lightning, it comes with necessity, unhesitatingly—I have never had any choice in the matter. There is an ecstasy such that the immense strain of it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears, along with which one's steps either rush or involuntarily lag, alternately. There is the feeling that one is completely out of hand, with the very distinct consciousness of an endless number of fine thrills and quiverings to the very toes;—there is a depth of happiness in which the painfulest and gloomiest do not operate as antitheses, but as conditioned, as demanded in the sense of necessary shades of colour in such an overflow of light. There is an instinct for rhythmic relations which embraces wide areas of forms (length, the need of a wide-embracing rhythm, is almost the measure of the force of an inspiration, a sort of counterpart to its pressure and tension). Everything happens quite involuntarily, as if in a tempestuous outburst of freedom, of absoluteness, of power and divinity. The involuntariness of the figures and similes is the most remarkable thing; one loses all perception of what constitutes the figure and what constitutes the simile; everything seems to present itself as the readiest, the correctest and the simplest means of expression. It actually seems, to use one of Zarathustra's own phrases, as if all things came unto one, and would fain be similes: "Here do all things come caressingly to thy talk and flatter thee, for they want to ride upon thy back. On every simile doest thou here ride to every truth. Here fly open unto thee all being's words and word-cabinets; here all being wanteth to become words, here all becoming wanteth to learn of thee how to talk." This is my experience of inspiration. I do not doubt but that one would have to go back thousands of years in order to find some one who could say to me: It is also mine!*

This is the way Nietzsche experienced the coming of Zarathustra, and it shows very clearly the symptomatology of the wise old man. Now we will go on with our text. We go as far as his intention to teach the wise their folly and the poor their riches. He continues:

Therefore must I descend into the deep: as thou doest in the evening, when thou goest behind the sea, and givest light also to the netherworld, thou exuberant star!

Like thee must I go down, as men say, to whom I shall descend.

* N/Complete, vol. 17, p. 101.

Bless me, then, thou tranquil eye, that canst behold even the greatest happiness without envy!

Bless the cup that is about to overflow, that the water may flow golden out of it, and carry everywhere the reflection of thy bliss!

Lo! This cup is again going to empty itself, and Zarathustra is again going to be a man.

Thus began Zarathustra's down-going.

He has been up in the mountains with the sun, which symbolizes the intense consciousness that always stared him in the face. And now he makes up his mind to go down like the sun that sets, which means that he was completely identified with his own consciousness, and now feels the need of leaving that condition and going down into the depths, into the underworld which to him is the world of man. How would you interpret that psychologically? What happens when he leaves his consciousness?

Dr. Reichstein: Some new thing would rise from the unconscious.

Dr. Jung: Well, when the ordinary human being leaves his world of consciousness, then naturally the unconscious begins to move, things that have been unconscious appear, as one sees in case of neurosis or psychosis, or in any other case where people intentionally give up their consciousness. That would be true of a normal consciousness, but this is a sort of super-normal concentrated consciousness, and we cannot expect the same thing to occur in such a case.

Remark: He comes to the normal state.

Dr. Jung: Yes, because he is already in the abnormal condition. We are so used to thinking that people in an abnormal condition are in the unconscious that we don't dream that they can be too conscious. But such a spasm of consciousness does exist.³ In our days there are many people who suffer from a pathologically increased consciousness, and then they have to come down to the level of normal consciousness—not to a highly strung consciousness where everything spontaneous is suppressed.

Mrs. Crowley: Would it be first a very abstract consciousness?—and in coming down would it take an opposite, more human form?

Dr. Jung: Yes, it is a de-tension, a relaxation, a more human form; his consciousness was before characterized as sun-like and that is of course far too much, a sort of divine consciousness. Naturally it suggests meg-

³ Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), a writer of importance to both Nietzsche and Jung, describes in part one of his *Notes from Underground* (1864) an ultra-conscious man who is reduced to inactivity.

alomania, and you have in fact to reckon with these megalomaniac assumptions in Nietzsche. Six years later, in 1889, he was already ill with megalomania, on the basis of degeneration of the brain. Of course it is exceedingly difficult to say whether he was already influenced by the oncoming disease, but I think it is very improbable; there are very few things in the actual text of *Zarathustra* which could be hypothetically ascribed to that. This kind of megalomania is due to something else.

Miss Wolff: It is archetypal?

Dr. Jung: Yes, he is identical with the archetype. Of course he makes a difference between himself and Zarathustra; he says: "and Zarathustra passed by me," but he cannot help feeling gripped by that figure and he even *is* Zarathustra at times, and that is an inflation. You see, whenever one is caught in an archetype, one forgets oneself completely, one is in a heightened condition, just inflated; then one lives on and can see later that one has suffered from an inflation. Primitives know that. When a man has been in a great excitement, an uplifted condition—when a man who has been a successful warrior and killed other men for instance—he must go through a *rîte de sortie* in order to disidentify from the archetypal hero, the godlike figure he has become. Otherwise he works havoc, he goes on slaughtering his own tribe perhaps, or becomes so impertinent that he is insupportable. Therefore, in certain tribes the successful warrior is not received in triumph as we would treat him, but is sent to a lonely place where he is fed on raw vegetables for two months in order to thin him down, and then when he is quite meek he is allowed to come back. And not only the man who has been a hero is *mana*, but also his weapon; a sword that has killed contains the secret of killing and is a particular sword; it has worked the extraordinary deed and is *mana*. So when one is told that a king has been murdered by a certain sword or dagger, one looks at it with different eyes: it startles one's imagination because it is *mana*. Now, as I said, Nietzsche cannot help being partially identical with Zarathustra, because that was the time of the culmination of materialistic science and philosophy and nobody had an inkling of psychology, nobody had thought of the possibility of making a difference between oneself and something psychical.⁴ Most of the people of that day would not have been able to conceive of such a thing. Even today, it would not enter the minds of many people, particularly the most educated ones,

⁴ That is, no—or little—psychology of the kind that dealt with the unconscious. However, Charcot was treating hysteria with hypnosis in the 1870s and 80s, and Josef Breuer conducted his well-known treatment of "Anna O" in 1882. There was, of course, a great deal of activity in physiological psychology throughout the last half of the century.

that they were not identical with their psyche. It needs extraordinarily good evidence and persuasion to convince them of the fact; they think that is all bunk. So Nietzsche would not be in a condition to make a difference between himself and Zarathustra; it was quite obvious to him that there was nothing outside him but other ladies and gentlemen. He surely was not identical with Zarathustra, and if anybody made a noise, well, it was he himself under the disguise of Zarathustra. And the language he puts into the mouth of Zarathustra—or which he allows him to pick out of himself—is of course inflated and therefore in many places much too big. Then, there is another reason why the language is so exaggerated. Do you know under what conditions that happens?—the condition in which you do things in a complicated way as if there were no simple way?

Mrs. Fierz: He was identified with his thinking, and when he writes, it is like an influx of a very inferior feeling, a sentimentality.

Dr. Jung: That is true, that is one thing. And why is that feeling flowing in?

Mrs. Fierz: He does not know about it.

Dr. Jung: Of course, but could it not be kept outside by mere instinct? Usually people make the most extraordinary fuss trying to keep their inferior function out of the way.

Miss Wolff: The archetype touches depths where he cannot differentiate between the functions.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. The archetype has absolutely no interest in differentiating the functions because it is the totality of all functions. Then what else might be the reason that the language is so terribly pregnant?

Remark: Anima inspirations?

Dr. Jung: Well, the anima would be the personification of the inferior function; the anima is chiefly fed by the inferior function, in this case inferior feeling, so the inferior function and the anima are one and the same under two aspects; one is the scientific formulation and the other is the phenomenological.⁵ Of course it is a function, in whatever form it appears. But there is a further reason for this language.

Dr. Reichstein: It is quite natural that the archetype should speak in such a way; they all speak such heavy language.

Dr. Jung: That is true to a certain extent, of course, but in Nietzsche's

⁵ For Jung, the inferior function is always the "opposite" of the most developed function, the pairings being thinking/feeling and sensation/intuition. The "attitudes" are also opposed, so that for the introvert, extraversion is typically difficult and somewhat awkward, and vice versa. CW 6, *passim*.

case it is really an exaggeration; there must be certain reasons why it is so.

Mrs. Baumann: It is not a compensation for his inferiority?

Dr. Jung: That is an idea. Whenever one has an inflation, whenever one is identical with an archetype, one has as a human being feelings of inferiority which are not admitted, and then one uses particularly big language. For instance, I once had a case, a woman, an absolutely incurable lunatic in an asylum, who called her own language "technical words of power" and was always trying to make compounds of words that were all-powerful—as if, by combining a lot of words that expressed power or energy, like *powerhouse*, *majesty*, *pope*, *king*, *church*, *bolshevism*, etc., the compound would make a word of power. Lunatics make up these words in order to kill people with them; they take a whole mouthful and spit it out and hope people will be smashed by them, convinced and overcome. Of course it might be said that a great deal of our science consisted of such words of power; they use enormous Latin words and say things in such a complicated way that apparently no devil can understand them. But it is exceedingly simple when translated into simple words; there is no need to say it in such an awfully fat and clumsy way—that is merely to convince people. Of course one gets frightened and overcome if long Latin and Greek hybrids are screaming over you, and thinks, "Well, he must be everything and I am just nothing." That is usually done by people who are more or less insignificant and want to give themselves airs; they make a particularly big noise to express something which is not very likely. "Good wine needs no bush" is an old English saying, but people who produce insignificant stuff need big words in order to be heard at all.⁶ So a certain feeling of inferiority and inefficiency, which was always present in Nietzsche, is back of that language, causing him to choose the big words in order to hit the goal. For to him the world was always exceedingly dull, nobody had ears or eyes or a feeling heart, so he had to knock at the doors with a sledgehammer. But when people locked the doors, he attacked them with such fearful words that they became frightened. His contemporary Jakob Burckhardt, the famous historian, grew quite afraid when he read *Zarathustra*—as I know from people in Basel who were acquainted with them both. It was uncanny to

⁶ "If it be true that good wine needs no bush, and 'tis true that a good play needs no epilogue, yet to good wine they do use good bushes, and good plays prove the better by the help of good epilogues" (Rosalind in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*).

him; it was the language that overcame him.⁷ He shut the door to Nietzsche because he was too troublesome, he made too big a noise. And one always has the impression in reading *Zarathustra*, that it does not really reach people. Nietzsche felt that too and therefore he increased the weight of it in order to make it sink in. If he would only wait, be a bit more patient, a bit less noisy, then it would sink in; certain passages in *Zarathustra* are of supreme beauty, but others are in very bad taste, and the effect of the whole is somewhat endangered by that style. Those are the main reasons for it then, but there is still another point which explains the extraordinary weight of *Zarathustra*.

Mrs. Adler: It is because the aspirations or intuitions are not quite real and therefore they need a particular emphasis, as it were, *against* Nietzsche, as if he were preaching to himself in the first place?

Dr. Jung: That is a very subtle point of view. It is surely a valid argument since there is plenty of evidence that what we would call "realization" had not taken place.

Mrs. Baynes: I don't understand what Mrs. Adler means by their not being quite real to him.

Dr. Jung: It would mean in this case, not quite realized. As a matter of fact when there is an inflation by an archetype, there is no realization: one cannot realize the thing by which one is inflated. First, the inflation must have come to an end, and then one may realize, not before. But there is still another point.

Dr. Reichstein: Perhaps it was because Nietzsche was against the whole world, and so he had to knock very hard.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is quite certain. Nietzsche was in a sort of fighting position against the whole contemporary world and it gave him a peculiar feeling of inefficiency that his words reached nowhere—no echo anywhere. That really was the case; nobody cared, his was the voice of one shouting in the wilderness, and so naturally he would increase his voice instead of lowering it. You see, when one is not understood one should as a rule lower one's voice, because when one really speaks loudly enough and is not heard, it is because people don't want to hear. One had better begin to mutter to oneself, then they get curious.

Miss Wolff: The biblical language may be partly intention and partly coming from the unconscious, because Nietzsche suppressed traditional Christianity.

⁷ Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) befriended the young Nietzsche when he came to Basel and remained a correspondent after Nietzsche's departure. His *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1880) brought him international fame.

Dr. Jung: That is also a very valid consideration, that his emphasis on this style is intentional.

Mrs. Zinno: Is it because there is no compensation from his feeling?—no figure like Salomé in the unconscious to carry his feeling?⁸

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is an important point. We already mentioned the fact that the anima is somewhere in the game, but the absence of the anima as an independent figure surely increases the weight of Zarathustra to a rather considerable degree. We have there a problem in itself, namely, the identity of Zarathustra with the anima, and most probably an identity of the author with the anima, so it is an extraordinary compound.

Mr. Allemann: When an archetype is constellated, it is always something old, historical; that might account for this old language.

Dr. Jung: But old language need not be so emphatic surely; there must be a power behind it that causes a tremendous emphasis and what Miss Wolff said would explain a part of it. One could say Nietzsche himself had another side which needed strong language, and all the sermons are chiefly spoken *to* himself. You must remember that he was the son of a parson and he had some inheritance presumably. I know what *that* means.

Miss Hannah: Is it not just the determination of a parson not to be answered back?

Dr. Jung: But that is not enough. On the one side, of course, one can assume a certain peculiar dull resistance of the powers which have been hitherto valid in Nietzsche himself—he needed strong language in order to overthrow that small fellow who was so overwhelmed by tradition. That would be Nietzsche's shadow, you see, of which there are evidences in certain letters to his "dear Lama," as he called his sister, being quite incapable of seeing that she had not a trace of understanding. Then you understand something about that little fellow who came from the Saxon village near Leipzig where his father was a parson. You see, that also suggested to his imagination that he was an Englishman, he needed some geographical compensation. But I want to know more about the force behind this language. A definite force, the most passionate emotion, betrays itself; there must be a great strength behind that broke through the veil of tradition.

Mrs. Jung: Could it not be that he had too little libido in his life?—all the libido was in the spirit and therefore it might cause the violent expression.

⁸ That is, no powerful anima figure, the personification of a man's contra-sexual side.

Dr. Jung: Yes, one might assume that, but nobody with that particular task could be expected to pay much attention to his personal life; that counts for something of course, but there must be a particular force behind this emphasis, and that should be seen clearly. The whole thing is overwrought, there is too much in it. I am quite certain that if you should find such a figure in one of your own dreams you would know what was happening.

Mrs. Fierz: The urge for individuation.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. The self is in it.⁹ That is the reason why the old man develops such an extraordinary passion and temperament, like Zarathustra. You see, it is not the way of old wise men to be so temperamental; that comes from the fact that something exceedingly electrical is within him, and that is the self, which—inasmuch as it is not realized—is contained in an archetypal form. The self can be contained in the anima, for instance, and then it causes an anima possession and the effeminization of a man's general character, his philosophy, all his convictions, his conduct, etc. Or if it is contained in the archetype of the old man, he assumes the ways of the prophet, say. Or they can be all together in one thing and then the human being is completely devoured by the archetypal tangle. That is a case we have not yet seen—where a human individual is possessed by all the things he has not, chiefly the old man, the self, and the anima. And even the instincts, the eagle and the serpent, are also on the other side. One really must ask oneself now, where is Nietzsche himself? That is really a problem. It is just as he says: he feels himself to be a mere instrument, a suffering body into which these powers have descended. So an inflation is what the word denotes; the body is filled with gas and becomes too light and rises too high and then it needs a descent. Therefore, he is coming down into the world of ordinary people, to the former quasi-normal consciousness; in the end of this first chapter, it is said that Zarathustra wants to become just the ordinary man again.

Now we begin the next section:

Zarathustra went down the mountain alone, no one meeting him. When he entered the forest, however, there suddenly stood before him an old man, who had left his holy cot to seek roots. And thus spake the old man to Zarathustra:

⁹ The self, for Jung, "expresses the unity of the personality as a whole" (CW 6, par. 789). This important idea will be extensively explicated below. So too, the archetypal "old wise man."

"No stranger to me is this wanderer: many years ago passed he by. Zarathustra he was called; but he hath altered.

Then thou carriedst thine ashes into the mountains: wilt thou now carry thy fire into the valleys? Fearest thou not the incendiary's doom?

Yea, I recognize Zarathustra. Pure is his eye, and no loathing lurketh about his mouth. Goeth he not along like a dancer?

Altered is Zarathustra; a child hath Zarathustra become; an awakened one is Zarathustra: what wilt thou do in the land of the sleepers?"

Well now, what about this old man? Who is he? Zarathustra himself is the old man and now he meets another one.

Mrs. Crowley: He suggests the old wise man of the earth, more of the unconscious.

Dr. Jung: But what kind of technique would you suggest to make out who this other old man is? We must find out, not by mere guessing, but by getting at the actual material.

Dr. Bahadurji: They know each other already, that is the old self left behind.

Dr. Jung: Yes, they know each other, they must be related, there is apparently a secret identity. But we don't know exactly what that other form is. Now what tangible method would you suggest to find out?

Mrs. Adler: One must find out his character from what he says and does.

Dr. Jung: Yes, we must see how this old man is functioning, what he says, how he behaves. But the main point I wanted to call attention to is that Zarathustra himself says: "This old saint in his wood has not yet heard that God is dead!" So you can easily conclude who that old wise man is.

Mrs. Fierz: In comparison to Zarathustra he would be Christ himself.

Dr. Jung: Well, it would be more the old Christian attitude, the wisdom of the Christian attitude. He is an anchorite, he represents the early Christian spirit that does not know yet that its God is dead, that he has come to an end. We will see whether this hypothesis fits. First of all, that he is an anchorite fits in with the early Christian ideals. Then he knows Zarathustra and says that many years ago he passed the same place but going in the opposite direction. To what would that refer?

Mrs. Crowley: Would it refer to the original Zarathustra when he received the spirit?

Dr. Jung: Yes, it simply means that the Christian spirit noticed Zarat-

thustra, it knew about him. As a matter of fact the greater part of the Christian dogma is Persian in origin, it comes from the Zoroastrian traditions. And what would it mean that Christianity watched Zarathustra carrying his ashes to the mountains? What are his ashes?

Mrs. Baumann: His death at that time.

Dr. Jung: Well, when a man consists of ashes he is a disembodied spirit, so Christianity only knows of Zarathustra as a being that has gone forever; he is dead, he has carried his ashes to the mountains. And now this same spirit recognizes Zarathustra coming back rejuvenated. So Christianity realizes that Zarathustra has returned and is going the opposite way, coming down from the mountains, meaning that he is being incarnated again, becoming modern again. Now that is Nietzsche's idea. He thought that Zarathustra had been the inventor of the great conflict between good and evil, and that he had influenced the whole mental evolution of the world by this most fundamental concept. And his idea was that he ought now to come back again in order to improve on his former invention; something should be done about the insupportable conflict between good and evil, because the old Christian point of view, represented by the old man in the wood, was no longer valid. That is evident from what fact?

Miss Hannah: That he has lost all contact with the world.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he is no longer in touch with the world. And that Christianity has left the world is exactly the reason why Zarathustra is born again; he must come back because the spirit he created and left behind him has evaporated. You see, that is a repetition of the very important psychological fact that when Christ died he left behind him, or promised, according to the dogma, the paraclete, the comforter, which is the spirit, like the descent of the Holy Ghost at Pentecost; that is the aftermath of the Christian revelation, the spirit left by the appearance of Christ on earth. His appearance was like a bursting shell that leaves the spirit trailing after; it remains for a while and then slowly recedes into the background again. So we could call this old man the paraclete; he is the remaining spirit of Christianity and is about to recede into nature. We shall see now how that is done. He says to Zarathustra:

"Go not to men, but stay in the forest! Go rather to the animals! Why not be like me—a bear amongst bears, a bird amongst birds?"

"And what doeth the saint in the forest?" asked Zarathustra.

The saint answered: "I make hymns and sing them; and in making hymns I laugh and weep and mumble: thus do I praise God."

But this is not correctly translated. He “*brummt*” and that is like the sound a bear makes. You see, he imitates animals’ voices, it is a regressive phenomenon. Christianity and the Christian ritual developed in a time when it was still the custom in contemporary pagan cults to imitate animals’ voices. We know from the old Apologists, those Christian propagandists who fought against the pagan beliefs and the heathenish philosophers and orators—and also from pagan sources—that in the mystery cults round Mithras and Bakcheus and such pagan syncretistic gods,¹⁰ they imitated on certain occasions the voices of the symbolic animals they represented, roaring like lions or bulls, for instance. A certain class of followers of Mithras was called *aetoi*,¹¹ others were called the *leontes*, lions, and the followers of Artemis were called *arktoi*, bears. Others were sort of angels called the *heliodromoi*, or sun-runners. And they are represented on certain old monuments as wearing animal masks; they obviously identified with animals, which then had symbolic meaning. They were no longer the old dancing masks of the primitives; they had a highly philosophical meaning, but we don’t know what their ideas were. We have evidence of the same sort of thing within the Christian tradition also. You have seen those Christian mandalas where Christ is represented in the center, usually announcing the Law like Buddha, or holding the Holy Scriptures with the gesture of blessing, and in the corners are the four Evangelists in the form of their animal identifications. There are plenty of such representations in Nüremberg in the Germanic museum, for instance, and in Norman monasteries or churches you find these mandalas with the Evangelists in their animal forms, the so-called theriomorphic personifications—the angel, the eagle, the bull and the lion. That is a very primitive idea, coming by way of the Egyptian tradition; the four sons of Horus were animals; that is, one son of Horus had a human head, the analogy of the angel or the *heliodromoi*, and the three others had animal heads. It has to do with the condition of the functions in those days, but we are not concerned with that question here. I merely wanted to show that

¹⁰ The proliferation of syncretistic gods among such groups as the Naassenes or the tendency to conflate Osiris, Sophia, Adam, Bacchus, et al., perhaps represents in part the need of travelers to assimilate foreign gods to their own pantheon.

¹¹ *Aetoi*: birds of omen, favorites of Zeus. For Bacchus, see (CW 14, par. 510n, where Jung says that the dirge “The great God Pan is dead!” vividly described in Plutarch’s *Moralia*, was extended to include Bacchus and other gods and demigods in ancient times and then was echoed in Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* and his announcement of the death of God. For Plutarch, see below, 31 Oct. 1934, n. 6.

even Christianity could not avoid these theriomorphic identifications; the eagle or the bull or the lion in the Christian tradition are like the *arktoi* or the *aetoi* or the *leontes* in the analogous heathenish syncretistic cults. They were a sort of concession when Christianity became worldly. Naturally, they don't appear in the first century because the Evangels were not even supposed to be sacred then; they were only supposed to be good literature, good for the believers to read. Then the Christian ritual was invented, the canons of the church, an organized priesthood, etc., and it is natural that the pagan ideas crept in too.

Well, the old anchorite spirit is now receding; he makes a regression, having understood that nothing was to be done with these human beings. He becomes quite skeptical and thinks it best to worship his god in nature, to be a bear with bears and a bird with birds, to imitate the animal voices again, and to sing as a bird would sing. So he is isolated in his wood, a sort of pensioned paraclete, *en pension* at least. The new spirit is now a Christ; therefore, the analogy of Zarathustra with Christ. He comes down from the mountains with new hopes, new expectations, with an new message to man, and he passes the old fellow. And the new message, which the old man does not know of, is that God is dead. You see, to the anchorite God is active, he still believes that there is a God outside of him; but Zarathustra is convinced that there is no god outside of him, God is dead.

Mrs. Baumann: It corresponds with the death of Pan two thousand years before.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. One reads in old Latin literature that two thousand years ago, the captain of a boat sailing from the Grecian islands to Ostia, the harbour of Rome, demanded an immediate interview with the emperor in order to report a most remarkable event which had taken place when he was sailing through the Archipelago. He had passed in the night an island where there was an extraordinary noise; he heard people shouting: *Pan megistos ethneken*, Pan the greatest is dead. Pan was the philosophic god of those days. Originally, he had been a Latin local god of the fields and the woods, a sort of midday demon with no philosophical or universal importance whatever. Only later, when they learned Greek, did they see that the name of the old Latin god, Pan, was the same as the Greek word *pan*, which means "all," the universe. So they had new ideas about their old Pan; he became the god of the world. Then about the second century A.D., rumor spread that Pan the greatest was dead, Christianity had prevailed against him—the last conception of a nature god created by antiquity. And when the god is dead, it means the end of an epoch; therefore, the

9 MAY 1934

great emphasis laid upon that story. In this chapter, then, we have watched the way in which the spirit of a whole historical epoch recedes, disappears into nature, and how at the same time it is renewed in a new figure with a new message. Yet is still the same old figure; the same spirit that taught mankind the difference between good and evil is now informing us of the fact that there is no difference and that God is dead.

LECTURE III

16 May 1934

Dr. Jung:

Here is a question by Mrs. Bailward:¹ “‘Ye creating ones, there is much uncleanness. That is because ye have had to become mothers’: Does this passage allude to his psychic identification (possibly a necessary part of creation) which he intuitively as unclean?”

Well, the identification we spoke of has nothing directly to do with what he means in this later passage; this is a particular problem, the problem of the psychological condition of creativeness, which has nothing to do with the identification of Nietzsche with the old man. For there is nothing unclean about the old wise man, nor is there necessarily anything unclean about the anima, or the *Puer Aeternus*, and so on. The impurity he alludes to in this very much later passage is the impurity of the mixture of spirit and matter which is necessary for creation; without that mixture no real creation can take place. But it is not concerned with the identification we are concerned with just now.

I mentioned last time that recognition of God’s being dead; we met that idea then for the first time. Now, how shall we understand this statement by Nietzsche?

Dr. Reichstein: That the guiding principle which ought to contain the life, is dead.

Dr. Jung: Yes, we can understand God psychologically as a supreme guiding principle. But we must well understand when we make that formulation or any other, that it is always our formula, it is what *we* say or know, it is *our* impression, the picture which *we* paint.² If you paint

¹ In his seminars Jung permitted participants to submit written questions which he would often respond to at the beginning of the following lecture.

² For Jung and Nietzsche alike different perspectives yield different truths. Nietzsche prided himself on his ability to switch perspectives. “I now had the skill and knowledge to invent perspectives: first reason why a ‘revelation of values’ is perhaps possible at all to me alone” (*Ecce Homo*, “Why I am so Wise,” sec. 1, tr. R. J. Hollingdale [Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1979]).

a picture of a landscape, say, you would never believe that it *was* the landscape; it is only what you make of the landscape. You paint a picture as well as you can, but it is probably never as beautiful as the landscape itself. Either you put something in that is not there, or you leave out something; at all events, you never make the mistake of confusing the one with the other. But when we make a formulation about God, everybody assumes that *that* is God. If I say, for instance, that god is an image, or a complex with a very great emotional intensity, or a supreme guiding principle, a psychological principle, then everybody asserts: Dr. Jung says God is nothing but this. A theologian does exactly the same thing when he says God can only be good. And he has no idea of the blasphemy he is uttering. How does he know that God can only be good? He takes half of the world away from him. How can God be everything if he is denied the faculty of being evil too? People make the mistake of assuming that he is nothing but their idea about him, and apparently God never defends himself. He never says: now this is most certainly nonsense! When somebody calls God a devil nobody strikes that man dead: he can live on ever afterwards perfectly happily. One person can say that God is dead, and another one that he is most living, and it makes no difference. Supposing that such an absolutely unimaginable thing as God exists: he must necessarily be beyond our grasp; otherwise, we would not use the idea of God. It must be a thing beyond our mental possibilities. So when we make a mental effort to formulate something about God, it is most obvious that we make a picture with our own means, consisting of our own stuff, and it is a most restricted aspect, because our mind is most certainly incapable of grasping such a fact as God would represent.

Moreover, the experience we can have of a thing utterly beyond ourselves can only be certain effects in our psychology;³ we have absolutely no other material by which to judge. And even in our psychological experience we are entirely restricted to our own condition. You know, when I say something to a person and create a certain effect, then the right conclusion is: Dr. Jung said such and such a thing to me and I had such and such a reaction. Only when in a very bad mood or very resentful will he identify his reaction with himself. In case of a bad reaction, he will consider me a perfect devil, most cruel perhaps, but that is only when he does not see the justification of what I have said, or when he does not want to see that he has such a reaction because his

³ Jung uses the expression "in our psychology" most commonly to mean not the psychological theory that he espoused, but the particular psychological dynamics of human beings.

character is such that it necessarily produces just that. Only very naive people will project such reactions upon each other. Of course it happens all the time; you kick a stone and hurt your foot and then you go back and kick it again. I saw a man do that recently. He stumbled over a pipe in his path and dropped something in his hand, and then he went back and kicked that pipe most violently and hurt his foot a second time. That is, of course, very human but it is perfect nonsense.

We always must keep in mind, then, that what we say about God is made of our own psychology; we cannot get beyond that fact. It is our language, our own brain cells, our individual experience, and we cannot prove that anything in our conception could possibly touch the real being of what we call God. It is almost futile to make such formulations because we never can prove them; we can only ask: Are there peculiar effects in our psychology which we cannot place otherwise than under such a heading? In other words: Are there such things as God-experiences in our psychology?—or what is the thing we call a God-experience? All we can formulate about it is made of our own concepts, and we can only postulate that there must be an unimaginable paradoxical being behind the experience about which we cannot know, *per definitionem*. It is absolutely dark. So when we assume God to be a guiding principle—well, sure enough, a god is usually characteristic of a certain system of thought or morality. For instance, take the Christian God, the *summum bonum*: God is love, love being the highest moral principle; and God is spirit, the spirit being the supreme idea of meaning. All our Christian moral concepts derive from such assumptions, and the supreme essence of all of them is what we call God.

So, when Nietzsche says God is dead, then it naturally means that supreme guiding principle is dead, the spirit, love—Christian love of course—whatever is believed about the Christian God: for instance, that God loved mankind so much that he even allowed his son to be crucified to redeem them from sin, and the idea that his son was himself and at the same time the sum total of all these leading dogmatic ideas. So, you could say just as well that our Christian faith or point of view has vanished; we no longer believe in the Christian dogma, or in the leading principles of Christian morality, nor can we continue our traditional Christian psychology. Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, but this formulation is of course a bit influenced by the idea that God *is* when he is said to be. In calling yourself an atheist, you make that concession to your primitive thinking—as if you could produce something by saying it is. As Kant said, that word *is* is nothing but a copula in a judgment; you need to use a verb that expresses existence,

but you have not produced a thing by it. If you say you possess a hundred dollars, they don't necessarily exist.⁴ But Nietzsche's idea confirms our explanation of the old wise man as the original Christian revelation continued in the idea of the paraclete, the Comforter, withdrawing slowly from the world and becoming a hermit, re-identifying himself again with the natural background from which he came.

You see, the original Christian spirit came out of the unconscious, out of human nature, in a most natural way. The theologians and the historians of the Christian conviction always try to make us believe that Christianity fell from heaven. But it grew very naturally through the course of centuries. Everything was well prepared. We spoke of the Persian origin of Christianity, but a great deal came also from Egypt, something from India even, because already in the second century B.C. there were Buddhistic monasteries in Persia, so through Persia the Buddhistic ideas probably crept into the formation of Christianity. All the Christian ideas and symbolism existed before, and many of the institutions of the Catholic church also. The mass probably derives from the cult of Mithras, and the communion ritual as well.⁵ Monasteries already existed. You know, at the time of the Reformation they asserted that monasteries and nunneries were not foreseen in the New Testament, and then the Catholic church pointed to the fact that monasteries existed in the early days of Christianity, introduced by the first believers in Christ, before the holy scriptures were ever recognized as holy. They claim that the church is an older authority than the holy scriptures since they were collected and declared to be holy long after the church had been founded by St. Peter (who was supposed to be the first substitute of Christ on earth) and to have been put into that place by Christ himself before the Evangels were written. Now, it is an interesting fact that later investigation has shown the evidence of the Catholic church to be not quite reliable. The church pointed to a little book by Philo Judaeus, a Jew, also called Philo the Alexandrian, who was the philosopher of Christianity; he developed particularly the Logos philosophy which is contained in the most philosophical of the Evangels, the Evangel of John.⁶ The little book is called *De Vita Contemplativa* and

⁴ Immanuel Kant (1734-1804) exercised a powerful influence upon Jung. As part of his denial that God's existence could be proved, Kant distinguished between a predication such as "God is benevolent" and the assertion of existence such as "God is, exists." He maintained that existence can never be logically deduced. See *The Critique of Pure Reason*, book II, ch. 3, sec. 4.

⁵ Mithraism will be discussed below, 10 Oct. 1934.

⁶ Philo Judaeus (c. 30 B.C.—A.D. 40), a Jewish Platonist, is often described as a forerun-

in it he described monasteries that existed in his time in Egypt and presumably also in Southern Palestine in the valley of the Jordan. The Catholic church quietly assumed that those were Christian monasteries, because one knew of no others; but the fact is that this book is now known to have been written between 20 and 24 A.D., at a time when Christ had not begun to teach; and moreover in writing about the life in those monasteries, Christianity is not mentioned—quite naturally, because it did not exist!

And just as monasteries were in existence before anything Christian, so the very central thoughts of Christianity had been well prepared for centuries and were already there. Then the whole thing crystallized around that more or less legendary figure of Christ. They said that it came suddenly as a great revelation, and they actually tried to destroy all traces of its sources, to forget how it came about and to make it absolutely unique, like a lightning from heaven. But historically this is an unknown picture: *natura non facit saltus*, nature does not make jumps; it is a continuous development. The spirit which grew through the centuries and appeared before the consciousness of the world in the moment of Christ's teaching, came about so naturally that Tertullian, one of the early fathers of the church, wrote that famous phrase: *anima naturaliter Christiana*, the soul is naturally Christian.⁷ It was there long before people realized it, and the sudden explosion of the Christian faith was nothing but a sudden dawning of the consciousness of it. And as it came from nature, so it went back to nature. For a while it lifted man's mind out of nature and put it in opposition. St. Augustine, for example, said in one of his writings that people went out to marvel at the beauty of nature, the vastness of the sea, the greatness of the mountains, etc., and forgot themselves and lost their souls; he admonished them not to look, to beware of the beauty of nature, because it was all wrong; in everything there was the *admixtio diabolicae fraudis*, the admixture of devilish fraud. A devil was in every natural thing. That idea still exists in the preparatory rites of the Holy Mass. For example, in the *Missale Romanum*, a collection of rites and prayers, there is a particular magic rite called the *benedictio cerei*, the blessing of the wax in the altar-candles, for the purpose of purifying the natural substance of wax as produced by the bees from all *admixtio diabolicae fraudis*. They

ner of Christian theology, especially in his doctrine of the Logos as the mediator between God and mankind.

Evangel: Gospel

⁷ Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (160-?) of Carthage was a lawyer, rhetorician, and Christian apologist.

assumed that everything that came from the life of nature was impure because it contained effects or constituents of evil influence, the work of the devil, so in order to make a sacred use of things, one must disinfect them. There is also the *benedictio salis*, the benediction of the salt. And in the performance of the Holy Mass the choir boys swing their censers to make the incense smoke rise, the smoke being a spiritual disinfectant. Germs of evil nature are in the air but these devils are driven out by the smoke of the incense that surrounds the altar. So in every detail the Christian spirit of the early Middle Ages lifted up something in man, his spirit or soul, till it was out of touch with nature.

But already in about the twelfth or thirteenth century we see the first reactions. It was then that the poet Petrarch climbed a mountain for the first time to enjoy a beautiful view; he climbed Mont Ventoux in Provence, and the expedition was surrounded by all sorts of anticipations and fears because it was then supposed that mountain tops were inhabited by particular nature devils, so it amounted to an almost blasphemous boldness to climb to the heights.⁸ After that, the Christian spirit included the importance of nature more and more. The early primitive artists, who indulged in particularly ugly and unanatomical bodies, were soon supplanted by painters who had discovered the beauty of the flesh and of all natural things; and with this came the Renaissance, the resurrection of the spirit of antiquity, and of the old feeling of connection with nature. We are still in that process of becoming acquainted again with the spirit of nature, in contrast to the medieval spirit. In the time of Nietzsche, this process, which had begun, let us say, with Petrarch, reached a culmination; it was recognized that the Christian principle was dead. That was the confession of the materialistic age which began with the French Enlightenment in about 1730, with the Encyclopedists and philosophers Diderot, Voltaire, etc.

This statement that god is dead is obviously most important. It is, one could say, the exposition of the whole problem of *Zarathustra*. You know, in the beginning of a dream there is a short sentence or a picture which is the exposition of the theme of the dream, and this is such an exposition. Zarathustra makes that statement to the old wise man, the

⁸ Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374) was both a poet and a precursor of Humanism. At a time when mountains were considered merely blemishes and obstacles, he celebrated their beauty in verse. However, he records that his most notable experience on Mont Ventoux was opening his copy of St. Augustine's *Confessions* and coming upon the passage that speaks disapprovingly of those who "go to admire the high mountains and the oceans and the course of the heavens . . . and neglect themselves" (book 10, ch. 8). In CW 5, par. 21n, Jung cites Burckhardt's "impressive description" of this event.

old Christian spirit, who has turned very skeptical and prefers the solitude of the mountains and the woods to life in collectivity. And he gives good advice to Zarathustra: he says to give mankind nothing, but rather to take part of their load and help them to carry it; only then will they be grateful. Yet, he thinks they will not accept the new message.

We are now coming upon certain symbols to which I should like to call your attention. In the fourth paragraph of the second chapter, for example, the old wise man says: "Yes, I recognize Zarathustra. Pure is his eye, and no loathing lurketh about his mouth. Goeth he not along like a dancer?" This quality or attribute of the dancer will occur again and again later, and I propose that someone make a note whenever we come across it. There he is likened to a dancer for the first time and one cannot see exactly why, but when one compares that passage with others, one understands better what he means. In the third chapter the rope-dancer turns up. And the same symbol occurs in the fifth chapter; there the motive of dancing comes again in connection with a star that is born out of chaos.⁹ Other symbolic expressions occur in different connections. Right in the beginning, for instance, there is the motif of the setting of the sun, or the down-going of Zarathustra.

Mrs. Crowley: I have thought a great deal about the meeting of these two wise men. It seemed to me to be the exposition of the whole problem at the beginning of *Zarathustra*. And I wondered whether one could explain it in another way besides the historical one, that Zarathustra is the representative of the dying and resurrecting God. The old wise man would be the spirit of nature, in the eternal, timeless sense, whereas Zarathustra would represent consciousness as a transforming reality. Then I thought it was an important point that he speaks of the imperfection of man, which suggests the idea that the spiritual values come and go, but man, as the animal, inherits that element which is eternal, his instinctive nature.

Dr. Jung: Yes, you are quite right. The old wise man in the woods and the old wise man in *Zarathustra* are one and the same thing. And that is always so. The old wise man is at the same time the one that goes and the one that comes, for everything that is, also is not—and what is today, is not tomorrow. Through that little mental operation of assuming that time is an extension, one knows that what has been, is still, and what will be, is already: inasmuch as things happen in a timeless condition they are always existing. So that archetype of the old wise man

⁹ Given Nietzsche's symbolic use of "dancer" and "dance," all translations prefer this literal rendering of the German *Seiltänzer* to the English "tight-rope walker."

has been Zarathustra in the ninth century B.C. *and* Zarathustra now. He has been Christ, he has been Mohammed, he has been Mani. He went and he came, he died and was born again. It is of course exceedingly awkward and paradoxical, but things happen like that in the unconscious: you come upon such peculiar facts there. And what the collective unconscious is, the world is also. When you look up at the sky and marvel at the beauty of the stars, you don't see them as they are, but as they were, untold millions of years ago. You apparently see a new star flaming up, but that star became incandescent when Tut-ank-amen was Pharaoh in Egypt, and perhaps it does not now exist at all. For if by a miracle all the stars in heaven could be wiped out of existence, you would still go on seeing them for four years: only then would the first star disappear perhaps, and twenty or fifty years later others might go out, but the sky would be there as before, and it would take untold millions of years before the last star vanished. So we live continually in an age where things that have been are still in existence. The disagreeable thing is that we cannot see what is in the future. But our unconscious is somewhat in advance of our eyes, and has a notion of the things that will be, for the future is created out of the remote past.

Mr. Baumann: I want to ask why Shiva is always represented dancing?

Miss Wolff: Dancing is a symbol of creation, according to Professor Zimmer's book.¹⁰

Dr. Jung: Yes, dancing is always connected with creation. Shiva dances the origin and the destruction of the world. The birth of the dancing star out of chaos is a symbol of creation.

Dr. Reichstein: Dancing with the self is always an expression of oneness.

Dr. Jung: Would you say that it was creative to represent the unity of your condition or the union with yourself?

Dr. Reichstein: Yes, it has a creative effect.

Dr. Jung: But upon what? What would be the creative effect?

Dr. Reichstein: It can be very different, it depends upon the kind of dance.

¹⁰ Heinrich Zimmer (1890-1943), German indologist, was a close friend of Jung, and his mentor in Indian myth and religion. The book referred to is presumably *Kunstform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild* (1926), translated into English by Gerald Chapple and James Lawson as *Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India* (Princeton, 1984). Many of the ideas of this work reappear in *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization* (Princeton, B.S. VI, 1946), and in *The Art of Indian Asia* (Princeton, B.S. XXXIX, 1955) which were edited by Joseph Campbell.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. You can dance not only to produce the union with yourself, or to manifest yourself, but in order to produce rain, or the fertility of women, or of the fields, or to defeat your enemy. The idea of an effect, or something produced, is always connected with the idea of dancing. Therefore, it was originally a magic ritual by which something was produced, it was the original idea of work even. When primitives dance they really work, they dance until they are completely exhausted; they can dance for forty-eight hours in succession. For instance, in the stag dances of the Mexican Indians one of the participants puts on the skin of a stag and wears a stag's horns, and is then pursued by the hunters who shoot at him with dulled arrows. He goes on dancing until he is almost dead and then another one takes his place, and that goes on for days in succession. That is a *rîte d'entrée* before the stag hunting season, and it is very clearly done in order to gather up all their energies and to put them into the frame of mind, the attitude, of stag hunting, or to produce plenty of meat supply, or to attract hunting animals. They dance the animals in order to attract them, as the oyster fishers in Scotland sing the oysters. And in Switzerland they sing the cows, the so-called *ranz des vaches*, or the *Kuhreihen*, in order that they may give a lot of milk and produce calves. There are plenty of such primitive rites to produce fertility or for the cure of disease. They dance a disease, they represent the demons of sickness and dance them in order to combat them. So the first ideas of efficiency or effect were due to their peculiar psychological experiences through rhythmic movement: the efficiency mood was developed through the rhythmical repetition that slowly catches the whole system. The native drum, for instance, the tom-tom, has an exceedingly suggestive effect; after a while the whole system quivers rhythmically, and by means of that rhythm they get into the attitude, a sort of *ekstasis*,¹¹ in which the effect takes place, a state in which they may have visions that help them to get up their courage or to concentrate. Then, people who are ordinarily just lazy dogs do things in an amazing hurry and with tremendous concentration.

I once watched an interesting performance in north Africa, south of Tunis.¹² The Marabout in that country is a saintly man who is usually in charge of the poor: he sees that they are fed. His title is "the one who

¹¹ *Ekstasis*, the Greek root for *ecstasy*, may be literally rendered, "to cause to stand apart."

¹² See *MDR*, ch. 9 and appended letter to Emma Jung, for Jung's account of his experiences in North Africa, as well as for his visits to New Mexico where he became acquainted with the myths and dances of the Pueblo Indians.

nourishes the poor.” He naturally cannot feed them all out of his own pocket, so he is entrusted with land to cultivate for that purpose, which is worked in turn by voluntary labor; one year it is this village, and the next year it is another. The men work for two or three days on the estate of the Marabout, and they do it as a sort of ritual. I saw them assembling the evening before with their camels, hundreds of them with green banners, and then in the morning a wild drumming and singing started and the whole crowd began to dance. They had sort of baskets or sacks, and short hoes instead of shovels and spades, and they filled these sacks with sand, a weight of a hundred pounds or more, and danced, carrying that load to another place where they were building dams and making little canals for fertilizing the very dry soil. And all that heavy labor was done in dancing step. Of course towards midday they were nearly dead in the great heat, but I watched them for hours and they were most efficient. In a few hours they had built a huge dam. But I am perfectly certain that if I had hired that crowd for three or four shillings they would hardly have moved; they would have been so tired and hot and hungry.

Now we go on to the next chapter:

When Zarathustra arrived at the nearest town which adjoineth the forest, he found many people assembled in the market-place; for it had been announced that a rope-dancer would give a performance. And Zarathustra spake thus unto the people:

I teach you the Superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. what have ye done to surpass man?

All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man?

What is ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame.

Ye have made your way from the worm to man, and much within you is still worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any of the apes.

Even the wisest among you is only a disharmony and hybrid of plant and phantom. But do I bid you become phantoms or plants?

Lo, I teach you the Superman!

Well, this chapter begins with the continuation of the story. You know, there is always a certain movement, a certain story, going on in all unconscious fantasies. Zarathustra is in the mountains in the beginning,

then he descends and goes through a wood where he meets that old wise man, and now he comes to the city which is near the forest. That is like fantasies in general, a sort of drama which has its own time and place where it is enacted. Of course it is symbolical. The place high up on the mountain is a high level, corresponding, as we have seen, to an intense consciousness, the level of the sun: there one is isolated. And the down-going is the approach to the lower level where one comes together with that man in oneself, the ordinary collective human being. Not in your highest differentiation, your so-called differentiated or superior functions, are you connected with other human beings, but in your inferior functions. You see, the differentiated functions help you to be independent. If you could live entirely in your differentiated function, you never would need any other human being; you would be under no obligations and dependent upon nobody. But where you are inferior, inefficient, you are connected with mankind. The real vital connection is always through the inferior side, the "human, all-too-human," as Nietzsche says.¹³

Now, Zarathustra comes first into the wood, and the wood is dark and doubtful. To primitive people the wood is always a place of ghosts, full of unknown risks and dangers. It is a place where the unconscious is projected. So, from the very high level of consciousness, he has to go down almost into the unconscious in order to reach man, who is separated from a superior consciousness through the fact that he is unconscious of that high level. The mountain is hidden from his view by the forest and by the old spirit that dwells in the forest. And now he comes to the town, the collective place. He has arrived on the level of ordinary humanity and will speak to his fellow beings. The first person he meets is a rope-dancer. If it were a dream or a fantasy, what would you say that meant?

Dr. Reichstein: It would suggest a caricature of the dancer that Zarathustra really is; he dances without connection with the age.

Dr. Jung: You assume that this would be a sort of mirror reflex or a caricature of Zarathustra?

Dr. Reichstein: I think it is a picture of the time perhaps, because people are out of connection with the earth. To dance in the air is just the thing which is attempted by people.

Dr. Jung: Well, in the next chapter, the fourth part, there is a confirmation of this idea; he says:

¹³ Nietzsche's book with this title (1878) describes human psychology. He had come to realize that his early idol, "the divine Wagner," was all too human.

Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman—a rope over an abyss.

A dangerous crossing, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous look-back, a dangerous trembling and halting.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what is lovable in man is that he is an over-going and a down-going.

Down-going is the translation here of the German word *Untergang*, but there is really no English equivalent.¹⁴ This shows that the rope-dancer is an equivalent of himself, or himself under a certain aspect—a shadow aspect of himself, one could say, for he would not be conscious of the identification. It is nowhere clearly indicated that Zarathustra is the rope-dancer, but it is perfectly obvious in the further continuation of the story inasmuch as he is Nietzsche. I doubt very much whether Nietzsche realized it. There is, however, farther on in the book, a quite irrefutable proof that he himself is the rope-dancer, in the prophecy of his own fate, of which he could not have been conscious. So I think I am safe in the assumption that Nietzsche was not conscious that Zarathustra was the rope-dancer. You see, if a figure like that appears in a dream—if you encounter yourself in the form of a certain person, for instance—then you can safely conclude that you are unaware of the fact that you are like that person under a certain aspect. Or if it is an animal, that you are unaware of yourself under the aspect of such an animal. You always assume it must be somebody else. So it would be quite natural if Nietzsche did not recognize that figure. But we have such dreams just in order to meet the thing in ourselves which is strangest to us, and that is the reason why Nietzsche meets that aspect of himself, a sorry sort of *saltimbanque*, a rope-dancer. It is a very flimsy kind of profession, you know, and very risky at that: one easily slips and falls down dead.

Now he begins his sermon about the Superman.¹⁵ Here we encounter that concept of the Superman for the first time. He gives a certain definition of him as the being that can be created by man's making a heroic endeavor to create something beyond himself. Of course, any creation is a creation beyond oneself, because one is already in existence, and if anything is created it must be beyond. The essence, the very principle, of creation would be man-beyond-himself, and that is the Superman. Nietzsche says here, "Man is something that is to be surpassed," that ought to be overcome. Now what is the connection be-

¹⁴ Kaufmann* translated *Untergang* as "a going under."

¹⁵ Most recent translators render *Übermensch* as "overman."

tween the last statement of the chapter before, that God is dead, and this beginning of the new chapter?

Miss Hannah: It means that the possibility of projecting god into a thing outside of ourselves is over. That period is dead, and we have to find it in ourselves—or rather in the Self.

Dr. Jung: Yes, and that practically amounts to the question: What happens to man when he declares that God is dead? Something must happen, because other human beings hold that God lives, declaring by that that they delegate certain of their vital processes into an impersonal sphere which they call God.

Mr. Allemann: It is an increase of consciousness, a breaking of a taboo.

Dr. Jung: Well, not necessarily, but something is increased by it.

Mr. Allemann: The responsibility to oneself.

Dr. Jung: One could say “responsibility” if one assumes that consciousness is increased; without consciousness there is no responsibility of course.

Remark: If he is not guided, he has to depend upon himself.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he is without God inasmuch as he assumes that God guides him. But that is a special case: the gods don’t always guide, they also misguide. For instance, we pray to the Christian God not to lead us into temptation. One of my little daughters refused to say that prayer because God should not be doing such things. We are little ants, not even children, in comparison with God, and that he takes a fiendish pleasure in leading us into traps is really very evil.¹⁶ But there is a definite effect which takes place when you declare that God is dead.

Mrs. Crowley: Inflation.

Dr. Jung: Of course. For you then declare that certain vital processes which you assume belong to a being outside of you, are now dead. They either do not exist any longer, or they have become your own activity. Now, since these processes are untouched by whatever you declare, they cannot die, they are never dead. They happen as they have always happened, but they happen now under the heading of your own fantasy, of your own doing. Instead of saying, “God spoke to me in a dream,” you say “I had a dream, *j’ai fait un rêve*, I produced, I made, a dream”: it is your activity. Then somebody comes along and says: “You terror, how can you produce such a hellish dream?”—and you think you must be an awful fellow to make such dreams! St. Au-

¹⁶ Jung once wrote that “a man can know . . . less about God than an ant can know of the contents of the British Museum” (CW 7, par. 394n).

gustine thanked God for not making him responsible for his own dreams.¹⁷ He still believed in the impersonal activity. He would have gotten into a complete hell if he had thought God was dead, for then his dreams would have been his own, and any evil or any good that God had worked in the worth hitherto would have been his own doing. If a person is conscious of this, his responsibility can heighten to such an extent that he will have a hellish inflation of consciousness. But also if he does not realize it, if he does not know what he has done by saying that God is dead, he can have an inflation of his whole personality. Then his unconscious will get inflated; he will be hampered by the continuous presence of God in the unconscious, which is of course the most terrible thing. Things happen to him, and he thinks he is responsible. Suddenly a thought comes into his head, for instance, and he thinks he must be a most immoral person to have such a thought. We cannot be objective, we are exceedingly hysterical: we think we have done so and so, because we don't assume that those things just happen.

We are like somebody walking through a wood who thinks, when an animal crosses the path, "Why have I caused this animal to cross my path?—why have I created this animal?" But the mind is like a wood in which all kinds of things happen. Formerly, we believed that God could do marvelous things and so could put peculiar thoughts into the human mind, or that evil ghosts played bad tricks, and thus we were rid of the responsibility of certain activities. But if you declare that God is dead and that there is no spook whatever, then it is all your own doing; or worse still, the doing of your wife, or your neighbors, or their children, and so on. That is quite bad. Then God is not only introjected into you but he is also projected into mankind, and then what people do becomes extremely important, because you assume they know what they are doing and that only a devil could do such things. But those people are perfectly unconscious, as you are unconscious: you don't know what you do really, because you are not God. Yet you behave as if you were. That is the inevitable consequence, and then of course you become very important, responsible for a whole world. If you are inclined to be a good Christian, naturally you get the savior delusion. You think you are, in a way at least, a little savior, and that you must missionize the world and tell people what is good for the good cause.

¹⁷ Though he felt commanded to refrain from the "lust of the flesh," Augustine confessed to God that certain thoughts in sleep not only cause pleasure but go so far as to obtain assent and something very like reality (*Confessions*, book 10). But Nietzsche, to the contrary: "Nothing is more your own than dreams! Nothing more your own work!" (*Daybreak*, book II, p. 78).

But your cause is exceedingly bad, because you only try to get away from your own inflation.

So when Nietzsche declares that God is dead, he is confronted with the rope-dancer, and the rope-dancer is what?

Mrs. Stutz: He represents the great risk of the inflation.

Dr. Jung: Well, the rope-dancer is that quantity of energy which has been in the god before. This is the diminutive form of the god in him, and he is a dancer because God dances the world. That a god should be a dancer is of course a very pagan notion, and the Hindu idea is that he dances the creation of the world and its destruction. But God as a creator, as the author, the maker of things, is a Christian idea as well. So God appears now like the rope-dancer who is himself, Nietzsche. And the rope-dancer leads an exceedingly risky existence. Therefore, through his identity with God, he is instantly forced into a heroic attitude, an attitude of possible self-destruction: he is increased beyond himself by that inflation. One could not say that this was very bad: it is the making of a hero. You see, a hero must have a large self-destructive tendency in order to be a hero. We praise a hero, and the hero contains a divine spark, or he would not be a hero. He encounters himself, then, as the hero, this rope-dancer, but that means the maker of his own destruction. For the moment, however, the rope-dancer plays no role. First, Zarathustra tries to teach the people his idea of the Superman.

The idea of the Superman is, of course, the consequence of the God that is dead, for then man cannot remain man. He is lifted out of himself, because all the vital processes that were embodied in God before are now in himself, and he becomes the creator of himself as God creates himself or the world. In the old Egyptian texts, God is the maker of his own egg, the builder of his own nest; he hatches himself out; he is the Phoenix that burns itself and rises out of its own ashes; he is the God that eternally re-creates himself.¹⁸ So, whenever that inflation process gets into man, he becomes the maker of himself. Therefore, Nietzsche continues now to speak about the Superman as able to create himself; Zarathustra is now the expression of man plus God. He can undo himself and create a being beyond man, supposedly a product of man and God. Then he says that "All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves," and that otherwise they would go back to the animals. Here is the interpretation of the old man in the chapter

¹⁸ Osiris at some point seems to have fused with the ancient Goose God, thus the cosmic egg. "The God of All sayeth . . . , I produced myself from the matter (which) I made." E.A.T. Wallis-Budge, *From Fetish to God in Ancient Egypt* (London, 1934), p. 435.

before: he didn't create any longer and so he went back to the animals, to nature. You see, those people who don't create themselves *do* go back to the animal. This idea of self-renewal is a general religious idea. In what kind of historical rites does it express itself?

Mrs. Baynes: In rebirth ceremonies and initiations.

Dr. Jung: Yes, all the rebirth ceremonies in all religions express this self-renewal, and it is always linked up with the idea that man in his self-renewal is doing the same thing that God does. To that extent, he is God himself. For instance, the baptism of Christ in the Jordan is the moment of his generation by God himself. According to the old Doketic teaching, it was the moment when God entered the man Christ. Christ was an ordinary man until his baptism, when God entered him and he became Superman, god-man. And he remained god-man until that moment in the garden before his crucifixion when he sweated blood. There God left him, and it was the ordinary man Christ who was crucified and not God at all. Therefore he said on the cross: "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?"¹⁹ That old Doketic belief was of course a heretical teaching according to the Catholic dogma, but it lasted over many centuries and survives in certain more or less mystical sects still in existence.²⁰ Without the ceremony of rebirth, then, man is generally thought of as an animal. In the Catholic church, people must be baptized to save them from the natural state which is not capable of the vision of God, the special prerogative of that condition. They are then *quasi modo geniti*, as if newly born. And in pagan cults they were clad in white robes and fed with milk like little children for about a week after the rebirth. I was in one part of Africa where they have rather painful and complicated initiation ceremonies, and I was told that when the young men and women evade them, as they do now under the influence of the Christian missions, they are called animals because they have not submitted to the rebirth ritual. All rebirth rituals are a making over of man into something beyond man, and that is expressed in many different ways; for instance, that the real parents are no longer their parents, or that they died and came back again as sort of ghosts

¹⁹ Nietzsche elsewhere writes of Jesus' cry on the cross, that perhaps it gives "evidence of a general disappointment and enlightenment over the delusion of his life" (*Daybreak*, book II, p. 114).

²⁰ Doketics (from *dokien*, "to seem") such as Marcion argued that if Christ died on the cross he must have been only a man. Tertullian represented the orthodox doctrine that Christ was both man and god. The heresy opposite to that of the Doketics was that of the Ebionites who held that Christ was only man.

in comparison to the animal being they were before, and they are given new names, etc.

These many forms of rebirth rites show that it is a *représentation collective*, an archetypal idea, which means that the process in question is a regular quality of the collective unconscious, the original disposition of man.²¹ And because it has occurred everywhere, it always comes back again in one form or another. If we live at all, we will always seek the fulfilment of the archetype of rebirth; one could say it came to pass on the slightest provocation. So when Nietzsche declares that God is dead, instantly he begins to transform. With that declaration he is no longer a Christian, he is an atheist or it doesn't matter what. He immediately gets into the process of that archetype of rebirth, because those vital powers in us which we call "God" are powers of self-renewal, powers of eternal change. Goethe felt that: there is a beautiful verse in *Faust* about the kingdom of the mothers where everything is in a continuous state of self-renewal, a continuous rearrangement.²² And this kingdom of the mothers is the abyss of the deity; it is the darkness of the good, the *deus absconditus*, the *auctor rerum*, the dark father of created things. Also one can say it is the original mother. Now, we have a peculiar sphere in our unconscious which corresponds to such concepts, and we call that "God," the creative or the creating god. And as soon as this projection or this declaration, this creative god (whatever it is) is abolished, instantly that process begins in us. We are caught in those powers. If you don't want to be caught in them, then don't make such declarations; it is exceedingly foolish to make them, because you thus provoke the unconscious. Of course you think it is quite futile whether you make such a declaration or not, that you can say this or that about God and it makes no difference whatever. But I tell you it does make a difference in reality, only you won't connect it with things. You see, the man Nietzsche himself did not realize, when he said God was dead, that it meant that he would get into the mill, into the alchemical pot where he is cooked and transformed. As he did not realize, for instance, that thinking is a most exhausting creative process. He says

²¹ Jung said, "I term collective all psychic contents that belong not to one individual but to many, i.e., to a society, a people, or to mankind in general. Such contents are what Lévy-Bruhl calls the *représentation collective* or primitives" (CW 6, par. 692). Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, tr. Lillian A. Clare (orig. Paris, 1910), p. 35ff.

²² Both Jung and Nietzsche were devoted to Goethe. Jung especially admired the second part of *Faust*, for him a prime instance of what he called visionary art, of which *Zarathustra* is also an example. In *Faust*, see Part Two, Act I. Sc. xvi; and see also CW 15, pars. 89-154.

that all his thoughts jumped out of his brain like Pallas jumping out of the head of Zeus,²³ but on the next page he complained about the terrible vomiting and awful headaches he was always pestered with when working.²⁴ That is generally so; we don't connect psychological and physical conditions. You see, that declaration is a very obnoxious thing: it gets him into trouble right away, but he does not realize it. The trouble is that he has to create the Superman. His first word is: I teach you the Superman, not realizing that he has to give birth to a Superman, that he is confronted with the task of creating the Superman. And what is the best proof that he does not realize it?

Miss Hannah: That he preaches it.

Dr. Jung: Yes, if he realized what a task he was confronted with, he would not teach it; he would keep it all to himself. You see, when one preaches such things, one practically says *you* ought to do it, but *I* am all right. But whether you realize it or not, you are confronted with an impossibly difficult task, perhaps really impossible, for who is courageous or bold or mad enough to suggest that he is capable of creating himself beyond himself, to assume that he is the carrier of a divine activity? That is too big.

²³ In *Ecce Homo*, talking about the time of *Zarathustra's* composition, Nietzsche vividly describes the experience of inspiration. See Lecture II above, pp. 24-25.

²⁴ Nietzsche's health, except for brief periods, was unbelievably bad. In one year (1879) someone reckoned from his letters severe attacks on 118 days.

LECTURE IV

23 May 1934

Dr. Jung:

I have here a question by Mrs. Bailward: "I understood you to say last time that the powers in us, which we call God, are powers of self-renewal. I suppose if this renewal process can take place, inflation does not?"

Yes, inflation is a pathological symptom and it only takes place when the actual creative self-renewal does not come to pass; that is perfectly obvious: an inflation is always a symptom of an inherited creative process.

Then there are two questions by Mr. Baumann. The first is: "Why is dancing a symbol for creation and destruction? Does it mean to be *in the body and in time* (time as the fourth dimension)? *Materia* or form moving and changing in time is creation, or destruction?"

You are asking really for a justification for the interpretation of the creative forces as destructive forces, why dancing for instance, should be a symbol for both creation and destruction. It is because ritual dancing under primitive circumstances is symbolic; it is always a representation of the creative powers in our unconscious. Therefore it often means the sexual act, or the fertilization of the earth, or it is for the production of a certain effect, whether constructive or destructive. And as a representation of the creative act, dancing necessarily symbolizes both destruction and construction. It is impossible to create without destroying: a certain previous condition must be destroyed in order to produce a new one. The most synthetic creation is inevitably also an act of destruction. The typical Hindu god of the creative forces is Shiva who dances in the burial grounds; he is the great destroyer because he is creative life, and as such both creative and destructive. You may have seen those Indian dancers who have been in Zürich; they represented the creative act in a most marvelous way. The many arms of the deity express of course his extraordinary efficiency; he works not with two hands, but with many. Then if you look at it psychologi-

cally, the life of a creative individual contains any amount of destruction, even of self-destruction.

Mrs. Crowley: In that case would not the inflation also be part of that creative process, even though it is destructive in a sense?

Dr. Jung: Inflation is something abnormal and it is not necessarily a part of the creative process, though unfortunately it happens of course to be connected with it very often. But a creative artist, for instance, can create without imagining himself to be a creator. He can create just because it is his damned duty to do so, or because he cannot help doing it. That is, a creative person without self-consciousness. As soon as self-consciousness comes in, there is inflation: you imagine that you are the creator and then you are God, because you feel, of course, like ten thousand dollars if you have time to think of it. If you have time, you have already split off from the creative process; you look at yourself and say: "Hell, what a fellow! Isn't he grand?" And then you are in for it, you are already living in your biography, you see it printed: In the year so and so, on such a day, he had such and such an inspiration. Then you have spoiled your creative process, but you have a most healthy inflation.¹

Mrs. Crowley: You spoke of the tremendous archetypal forces in Nietzsche. How could he produce *Zarathustra* without identifying if the archetypes worked in him?

Dr. Jung: Ah yes, but they would not be working in him, he would be working in them: that is the natural point of view.

Mrs. Crowley: Do you mean in the sense of a dance?

Dr. Jung: Of course. They have you on the string and you dance to their whistling, to their melody. But inasmuch as you say these creative forces are in Nietzsche or in me or anywhere else, you cause an inflation, because man does not possess creative powers, he is possessed by them. That is the truth. If he allows himself to be thoroughly possessed by them without questioning, without looking at them, there is no inflation, but the moment he splits off, when he thinks, "I am the fellow," an inflation follows.

Question: Can it be avoided?

Dr. Jung: Only by obeying completely without attempting to look at yourself. You must be quite naive.

Mr. Baumann: It happens automatically?

¹ Jung was especially fascinated with the visionary poet or other artist whose creativity is a primordial experience, a "dictation" from unknown voices, "a tremendous intuition striving for expression." See "Psychology and Literature" in CW 15.

Dr. Jung: It happens automatically that you become conscious of yourself and then you are gone; it is as if you had touched a high-tension wire.

Mr. Baumann: You cannot escape it?

Dr. Jung: If you are simple enough. Nietzsche of course could not help looking at the thing and then he was overwhelmed with resentments, because the creative powers steal your time, sap your strength, and what is the result? A book perhaps. But where is your personal life? All gone. Therefore, such people feel so terribly cheated; they mind it, and everybody ought to kneel down before them in order to make up for that which has been stolen by God. The creative forces have taken it out of them, and therefore they would like to personify them, to imagine that they are Shiva, in order to have the delight of being creative. But if you know you are creative and enjoy being creative, you will be crucified afterwards, because anybody identified with God will be dismembered. An old father of the church, the Bishop Synesius, said that the *spiritus phantasticus*, man's creative spirit, can penetrate the depths or the heights of the universe like God or like a great demon, but on account of that he will also have to undergo the divine punishment.² That would be the dismemberment of Dionysos or the crucifixion of Christ. We shall come presently to the same problem in Zarathustra.

Mr. Baumann's next question is: "Establishing relation to the crowd requires going down to a lower psychological level. Is it necessary to go into unconscious, medial relation with people, a kind of identification or *participation mystique* with the crowd,³ or has one only to show that one has inferior parts?"

One does not need to show that one has inferior parts, you know; that is generally known. You may be sure that there are people round you who are quite convinced that they see where you are inferior. People have the lovely quality of seeing the shortcomings of other people very well; they only fail to see their own. So we need never be too self-conscious in that respect; our shortcomings are noticed; we don't need to show them particularly. We only need to show them to ourselves; we

² Of Synesius, Bishop of Ptolemais, Jung said: "In his book *De Insomnio*, he assigns the *spiritus phantasticus* practically the same psychological role as Schiller to the play instinct and . . . creative fury" (CW 6, par. 174). Jung means here the reconciliation of opposites.

³ *Participation mystique* is a phrase of Lévy-Bruhl. See *Primitive Mentality* (London, 1923), *passim*. It was much used by Jung to designate the failure, especially but not exclusively among primitive people, to distinguish oneself from various important objects in the environment. See CW 9 i, par. 226.

are the audience that never hears or sees. Now, that going down is only possible if somebody has been on a higher level. You see, Zarathustra is the man or the spirit that, after his going down through the course of the centuries, has now begun to rise. The old man we met in the woods is the traditional Christian spirit that slowly receded into nature where it seemed as if it would finally disappear, but the spirit will not recede into nature entirely as long as there is man in whom to manifest. Therefore, in receding he emerges and the oncoming part of the spirit is Zarathustra. When the other one goes down, the personification of a new spirit comes up. So it is essentially the same spirit. Zarathustra has been up on the mountain and now he is coming down to the level of general mankind.

If we reduce this phenomenon to Nietzsche's personal psychology, it would run about as follows: Nietzsche was a professor in Basel for about ten years, then he withdrew from his profession and lived in Nice and Rapallo, and in Sils Maria in the Engadine; and much of the mountain symbolism in *Zarathustra* comes from such geographical surroundings. He used to walk in the mountains, and he wrote some very beautiful poems about them. So it is a part of his imagination that he felt himself as being isolated on the top of a high mountain where he could look far into the future of mankind, or where he could see life below at his feet. There he gained that new insight, a new gospel as it were. And then he came down like Moses from Sinai, to bring it to people. That is the way Nietzsche felt it, but inasmuch as he did not do it naively, without knowing what he was doing, he was identical with the creative spirit; he knew too much about it and therefore got an inflation. So there is a partial identification with Zarathustra. Now how can such a partially inflated man get down to mankind? Only in the form of a preacher who stands on a hillock and preaches. In that first sermon he is standing on a pedestal talking down to them, saying one *should*, thereby showing that his sermon is really inefficient because he is not on the same level. If he were naive he would not notice his message, but he would simply talk to the next fellow on the street, say how do you do and so on; and in the course of their talk he naturally would mention what his heart was interested in, and the other fellow would be shot to pieces. Then he would have had an effect. But you can say the grandest thing and if you are talking down it reaches nobody; it makes no impression because you talk in such a grand style that only the wrong people get you. So when *Zarathustra* was read in the beginning, only the wrong people understood what he really meant; all the

cranks of Europe were filled with *Zarathustra* and nothing came from it at all.

You see, it is not inapt that we are only now attempting an analysis of *Zarathustra*; we need all the preparation of our psychology in order to understand what it really means. The second part of *Faust*, also, was understood by nobody; it takes a long and most painstaking preparation to get the gist of it: it is most prophetic. And we need the experience of the war and of the post-war social and political phenomena to get an insight into the meaning of *Zarathustra*. Now, if Nietzsche had been unconscious of what he did, he would have been able to come down to earth. But it is not worthwhile really to speak of the man Nietzsche, for he was robbed; he lived only that Zarathustra might speak, and when it came to his own life, it was as poor and miserable as possible, a sick neurotic existence in the *pensions* of the Riviera and the Engadine, and finally in Turin where the devil caught him for good.

Here is a contribution from Miss Cornford: "Zarathustra comes as a dancer since that represents the exact opposite of the Christian monk. Instead of 'mortifying the flesh' as the monk is taught to do, he lives in his body, is fully conscious of it, and makes use of it. So while the ascetic stands like an iron stake planted in the stream of life, the dancer is a plant that responds to every movement of the water. Thus it is natural that the preacher of the new religion should come as a dancer, since he brings movement instead of rigidity."

Yes, the movement in contrast to rigidity is also a point of view, it is another opposition, a pair of opposites which plays its role. There are of course many such sidelights, but they would lead a bit too far.

Then we have a question by Miss Hannah: "I had always thought of the self as a kind of objective though individual God, whom I hoped to *discover*; but when you say '*create* something beyond ourselves' [Well, that is what Zarathustra says, I don't give myself the credit of having invented such a very apt formula], do you mean the self? And if so is it created by rebirth? Is rebirth submitting ourselves to a process of nature by will, or it is a still more active process?"

What do you understand by "still more active process?"

Miss Hannah: I meant, have we got to do something about it or is it done to us?

Dr. Jung: It is a more passive process.

Miss Hannah: If you submit to it, it is passive, isn't it?

Dr. Jung: Yes, but you can also submit by will and very actively. Well now, let us assume that the Superman would be Nietzsche's formulation for the self. He understands that by creating beyond yourself you

create the Superman, by will as it were; he even says one should will it, which shows very clearly that the Superman to him is an active creation by man. But we cannot create beyond ourselves; we would have to be gods to do that. You see, this confusion comes from the fact that he identifies in his language with the creative process. The right perspective in which to see it is that the creative process in you is not your own doing. It simply takes you and uses you; it is a different will from your own. Then you understand that it is something else, something beyond yourself that is creative. It is necessarily beyond yourself, because the creative forces were before and after the act of creation. They were when you were not, when you were unconscious; and what you produce is necessarily beyond yourself because those forces are beyond yourself. You cannot rule them; they create what they choose. Of course, you can identify with it more or less, but that is really childish; then you are like a naughty boy who in spite of your warnings not to climb onto the chair, insists upon doing so and of course falls down. You say: "Now you see!" And he says: "But I wanted to!" It is an illusion when one identifies with these processes. So creating something beyond ourselves is only a formulation which comes from the idea that we are creating. We are not creating. We are only instrumental in the creative process: it creates in us, through us.

Now we will continue the third chapter where the rope-dancer is first mentioned. Zarathustra says here: "Even the wisest among you is only a disharmony and hybrid of plant and phantom. But do I bid you become phantoms or plants?" How do you understand this peculiar expression? In how far is the wisest of mankind hitherto a hybrid of plant and ghost?

Mrs. Baynes: Is he speaking there of the wisest among the preceding Christian wise men or the whole of humanity?

Dr. Jung: It would be the wisest of the people of that crowd, the people of our time. He characterizes the particular kind of wisdom which has been preached to them, and I want to know in how far that is a hybrid of plant and ghost.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: Inasmuch as the earthly and spiritual are divided, people are not unified.

Dr. Jung: But a hybrid is not divided. The point is that it is a oneness but consisting of two things; a hybrid plant is a mixture, but it is a oneness, as a hybrid word consisting of Latin and Greek words is drawn together into one.

Remark: It is just a oneness of the vegetative and the spirit.

Dr. Jung: But he does not say spirit, he says ghost.

Mrs. Adler: The animal is not between, it is missing.

Dr. Jung: The animal would be the contrast, the opposite. Nietzsche will speak later on of the blond beast; that is his idea, the Superman in contradistinction to the plant and ghost-wisdom. But I should like to know why just plant and ghost. You see, he says even the wisest is only a discord, or disharmony, and discord is *Entzweiung* in German, which means something that does not fit exactly. A hybrid is a united discord, so it is an objectionable sort of union of opposites. The plant is completely unconscious and the ghost has no flesh, no body, so it is an absolutely metaphysical ghost connected with a plant and forming a unit, something utterly unconscious and close to matter.

Mrs. Baumann: Doesn't the plant life usually mean spiritual development symbolically?—and insofar as it is plant life, it has natural life, and insofar as it is a ghost it is dead, too far away.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the flesh dies and then it becomes a ghost. So that hybrid consists in a natural growth on one side, perfectly sound, yet something died in between, the animal man: the flesh died, and only the ghost remains. The original natural spirit, *anima naturaliter Christiana*, that flesh in which this natural Christian soul once lived, then vanished; and what remains is this hybrid of plant, a sound beginning, and a ghost, a sad end of human life. I call your attention to this peculiar metaphor because Nietzsche inserts the middle part, he preaches the flesh again. In other words, the blond beast comes to fill the gap there, so that the plant and the ghost are united once more, and he then concentrates upon the middle part which was lacking before. So Nietzsche's whole philosophy can often be seen in the smallest detail of his metaphors.

Now we will continue the text. Here he begins with his real philosophy, interpreting the Superman as the meaning of the earth. "Let your will say: The Superman *shall be* the meaning of the earth." He makes it imperative—you shall make him so. For the earth of course could have other meanings; that the Superman is the meaning of the earth is not the most obvious conclusion to draw. Biological science drew very different conclusions in the days when Nietzsche wrote, for instance. Now, in how far is the Superman the meaning of the earth? How do you understand it?

Mrs. Crowley: The earth is what man makes it; it is what it means to man.

Dr. Jung: That is the implication, that it is left to man to create the meaning of the earth—man should show us that the Superman is the meaning. But why should the earth be given such a meaning?

Mrs. Crowley: Because from his point of view it is a sort of embryonic form; it is always to be renewed, it is a potential.

Dr. Jung: No, you see the question is really: what is Zarathustra's relation to the earth?

Dr. Escher: It is the same as between plant and ghost. In the middle is the earth, flesh.

Dr. Jung: Yes, instead of calling it flesh or animal he calls it the earth, and the earth is the body. So the body is the mediator between the plant and the ghost. You see, the plant is not yet an animal body and the ghost is no longer; the animal body of man is in between. As you know from dream symbols, the meaning of the earth is essentially the body; matter always means something like the bowels or the lower parts of the body. Now, in how far is the Superman the body? We were supposing that Superman to be the self.

Miss Hannah: The meaning is always in what you have lost, and Zarathustra has lost the body, has he not?—he is too high.

Dr. Jung: Well, the one who lost the body is surely the man who receded into the woods. He withdrew, lost the earth; and Zarathustra is going to seek and to preach it. The man Nietzsche, of course, lost his body to a considerable extent. But it is Zarathustra here, so it is a general kind of spirit; our general spirit has lost the earth, lost weight. For the body is a terribly awkward thing and so it is omitted; we can deal with things spiritually so much more easily without the despicable body. If you understand the Superman as the self, then, how does the self express itself—or, if you are only spirit how can you express yourself?

Miss Hannah: The body is the only way in which the spirit can be seen.

Dr. Jung: Of course. You can be anything if you are a spirit, because you have no form, no shape, you are just gas. You can assume any form; you can be this or that; you can transform at will quite arbitrarily into God knows what. "But you should not think like that," or: "You should believe something, that will save you." Believe if you can! You see, that is just the trouble. And why can't you? Because you have a body. If you were a spirit you could be anywhere, but the damnable fact is that you are rooted just here, and you cannot jump out of your skin; you have definite necessities. You cannot get away from the fact of your sex, for instance, or of the color of your eyes, or the health or the sickness of your body, your physical endurance. Those are definite facts which make you an individual, a self that is just yourself and nobody else. If you were a spirit you could exchange your form every

minute for another one, but being in the body you are caught; therefore, the body is such an awkward thing: it is a definite nuisance. All people who claim to be spiritual try to get away from the fact of the body; they want to destroy it in order to be something imaginary, but they never will be that, because the body denies them; the body says otherwise. They think they can live without sex or feeding, without the ordinary human conditions; and it is a mistake, a lie, and the body denies their convictions. That is what Nietzsche means here. The Superman, the self, is the meaning of the earth; it consists of the fact that we are made of earth.

Therefore, when you study symbols of individuation, you always find that no individuation can take place—I mean symbolically—without the animal, a very dark animal, coming up from primordial slime, enters the region of the spirit; that one black spot, which is the earth, is absolutely indispensable on the bright shield of spirituality. Sometimes people have the fantasy that the self consists of particles or molecules of iron or lead or any other heavy substance. That is the same idea; all those heavy metals are the very soul of the earth. The center of the earth consists of heavy metals, and so they become the symbol for the elements that constitute the self. The essences of the body, then, constitute the self. There is no other limitation, and as soon as you enter the world of the spirit, your self evaporates—looked at from the human point of view. Of course, from the other point of view it is eternal and cannot evaporate, but the personal Atman in Hindu teaching is really personal; it is the spirit of this particular body, and it is the body that makes this thing particular.

It is the essential metaphysical meaning of the earth that it gives specification to things, that it makes things distinct. Objects only become distinct in space and time, where they form a mass with different chemical or physical qualities by which they can be distinguished. Otherwise, you can be aware of nothing that exists or is supposed to exist. They say in the East that God was all alone in the beginning, and he didn't feel well at all because he didn't know who he was; so he created the universe in order to see who he was. He created distinct beings in which he could mirror himself. For you never know who you are unless you can look at yourself from without: you need a mirror to see what your face is like, how you look. If you live somewhere in the desert where you have no mirror, and where you never meet anybody who mirrors you, how can you know who you are? The old philosophers always supposed of God that he was without an opposite, without the second one; but he needs that in order to become aware of himself.

Now that means separation, distinctness of things in time and space. And really the essence of differentiation, the idea of the self, could not exist for one single moment if there were not a body to create and maintain that distinctness. We may suppose that if the body vanishes and disintegrates, the self in a way disintegrates, for it loses its confines.⁴ You can observe such things in *participation mystique*; inasmuch as your consciousness is then not fully aware of the reality of your body and all its given facts, your spirit or your psyche overlaps the body and is mixed with other psyches. And then you don't know exactly who you are; you might be something else just as well—you are a bit in doubt. Experience tells us that in many respects we behave as if we were somebody else, our mother or father or brother or anybody else with whom we happen to be in more or less intimate contact.

People who are not consciously aware of the body suffer from a certain unreality of life in that inter-relatedness through *participation mystique*; they don't know when they are hungry, and they neglect the simple functions of the body. I had a case, a girl of twenty-eight, who no longer heard her steps when she walked in the street. That frightened her and she came to me. She dreamt that she was riding in a balloon—not in the basket but on top, high up in the air—and there she saw me with a rifle shooting at her from below. I finally shot her down. She was that girl I have told you about who never had seen her body. I suggested that she must bathe once in a while, and then she told me she had been brought up in a nunnery where the nuns taught her that the sight of the body was sin, that she should always cover her bath tub with a linen, so she never saw herself. I said: "Now go home and undress and stand before your long mirror and look at yourself." And when she came back, she said: "It was not so bad after all, only I think my legs are a bit too hairy!" That is the truth, that is the way people think and feel when they have such symptoms.

Now we will go on to the next paragraph: "I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth." What does he mean by remaining true to the earth?

Miss Hannah: It is just what you were saying, that you can be anything but you must stay in your body.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he is talking here of superterrestrial hopes, and that is of course an attempt to divert attention from the real individual life to

⁴ "More minute than the minute, greater than the great / Is the Soul (Atman) that is set in the heart of a creature here. / One who is without active will (*a-kratu*) beholds Him, / and becomes freed from sorrow—" (*Katha Upanishad* 2.20, Hume*, p. 349).

spiritual possibilities beyond. The spirit consists of possibilities—one could say the world of possibilities was the world of the spirit. The spirit can be anything, but the earth can only be something definite. So remaining true to the earth would mean maintaining your conscious relationship to the body. Don't run away and make yourself unconscious of bodily facts, for they keep you in real life and help you not to lose your way in the world of mere possibilities where you are simply blindfolded. This is of course a somewhat one-sided teaching, and to a person who is nothing but the body, it is all wrong. You must not forget that by far the majority of people are nothing but body. This teaching, therefore, is only valid for those who have lost it, who have been deceived by the spirit—like Klages, for instance, who defined the spirit as the enemy of the soul, the soul being the life of the body, because he assumed that most people had lost the reality of the body as he had lost it.⁵ But as a matter of fact there are plenty of people who are entirely in the body, and to those one ought to preach early Christianity, or heathen gods at least, because they haven't an idea of a spiritual possibility.

You know, a truth is never *generally* a truth. It is only a truth when it works, and when it doesn't work it is a lie, it is not valid.⁶ Philosophy and religion are just like psychology in that you never can state a definite principle: it is quite impossible, for a thing which is true for one stage of development is quite untrue for another. So it is always a question of development, of time; the best truth for a certain stage is perhaps poison for another. In such matters nature shows that it is thoroughly aristocratic and esoteric. It is nothing that our liberal minds would hope or wish it to be: that one thing is true and the same everywhere, and such nonsense. There is an extreme uncertainty about truth; we are confronted with the utter impossibility of creating anything which is generally true. I often think, when I am analyzing, that if another patient should hear what I was saying to this one, he would jump right out of his skin: he could not stand it. I talk stuff that is complete blasphemy to the other, and they often come just after one an-

⁵ Ludwig Klages (1872-1956), a German psychologist and philosopher who developed a typology of character, depending on which of two poles one inclines toward: the spirit (which is the source of all human woes) or the life force. His major work was *Die Geist als Widersacher der Seele* (The Spirit as the Opponent of the Soul) (Leipzig, 1929-1932), 3 vols.

⁶ William James (1842-1910), whom Jung knew and admired, wrote that for pragmatism the "only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us." *Pragmatism* (Boston, 1907), p. 80.

other. So I have to turn right round and talk black instead of white. But it is absolutely necessary. I learned long ago that there are steps, stages of evolution, a sort of ladder. There are different capacities and one has to teach accordingly. If you teach generally you must be mighty careful to put things in such a way that they are either not understood, or if they are, that the understanding tumbles over on the right instead of the wrong side. But even that does not always help. Therefore, it is not a grateful *métier* to teach philosophy or religion or psychology.

Mr. Baumann: Could one not say that new spiritual life has to come out of the natural mind in a way? The natural mind, I understand, comes out of the earth.

Dr. Jung: Well, Zarathustra has something to say about that. He is merely critical here: he says one should not listen to those who preach superterrestrial hopes. But what the Superman says is another question, and he is very strong on this point. He says the most terrible thing is to blaspheme against the earth and to overvalue the unknowable over against things as they are, which is the meaning of the earth. The individuality of the earth lies in things being just so and nothing else. You see, only one who has been too long under the spell of the delusion that things can be quite different from what they are, feels the impact of Zarathustra's message. Only a real Christian mind or an essential spiritualist—no matter whether he confesses Christianity or not—can feel the extraordinary novelty of such a message. And of course he does not welcome it, he hates it. He thinks it is sheer blasphemy against the spirit to say that one should be true to the earth, or that one should value the body more than the spirit. But it is perfectly logical that after an age that has exhausted the importance of the spirit, the flesh should have its revenge and conquer the spirit—perhaps overcome it for a while. Of course we express these things by the terms *spirit* and *matter*, not knowing exactly what we designated by those words. In Chinese classical philosophy you would use the terms *Yang* and *Yin*, and say it was according to the rules of heaven that they changed their positions. Yang eats the Yin, and from the Yang, Yin is reborn; it bursts forth again, and then Yin envelopes the Yang, and so on. That is the course of nature. The Chinese are not so upset, because they have watched this peculiar natural process for a much longer time. But our history is not old enough, so we are astonished to see that the spirit eats the flesh, and then the flesh eats the spirit. It is exactly the same process. We were taught that God sent his son to overcome the flesh by the spirit as a unique event in history; and now we learn the reverse truth that the flesh eats the spirit. And we still cannot believe it, though it becomes

still more obvious than when it first appeared in the time of the Reformation.

Dr. Reichstein: You said that the spirit consisted of kind of indefinite possibilities. But the spirit can also be a very definite law which establishes quite definite facts. I think this kind of spirit here is something that has degenerated.

Dr. Jung: We are speaking of spirit in the pure essence. The spirit that creates definite laws is a human spirit, not the spirit as it exists in our unconscious, where it really consists of absolutely indefinite possibilities. You know, even if one creates quite a number of definite laws—and the number is restricted—there are very few which will not be overthrown in a short time. Also there is an enormous possibility of new laws, new discoveries—new points of view which are latent in us, and that really makes the life of the spirit. It does not consist in a law which is definite forever; the life of the spirit consists of a new life which is forever creating.

Dr. Reichstein: I did not mean a definite law valid for the moment.

Dr. Jung: Can you give me an example so that I can see more clearly what you mean?

Dr. Reichstein: For instance, the Christian spirit had its validity in its time: it chose out of a number of possibilities just one.

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, quite so. Of course that is spirit. There is no doubt that the spirit has its validity but it is a relative validity, and it is either supplanted by another kind of spirit, or it can be supplanted by the Yin, the opposite principle. It can be completely subdued until it disappears almost completely. There was such a time of complete obscurity between the fourth and eight centuries A.D., and there have probably been other times in history. We are little informed about the time that followed and the time that went before the downfall of great empires; we suddenly discover a new civilization, and the events in the preceding period of time are hidden in deep obscurity.

Well now, Nietzsche often speaks of contempt. Here he says: "Once the soul looked contemptuously on the body, and then that contempt was the supreme thing." This idea of contempt is rather strange. It is almost a technical term. He means by "contempt" a negative attitude dramatically expressed. The negative attitude of Christianity was against the flesh—that the flesh should be overcome was the highest ideal even. But he says it reached even the soul; the soul itself became meager, hideous, and famished because it lost the body. That statement does not coincide with the Christian teaching at all, where the more you overcome the body, the more you are supposed to become

beautiful and fat in heaven. But psychologically you find that the soul really becomes thin because it loses its *raison d'être*. What becomes beautiful and big and fat is a certain system of ideas called "a belief," "a conviction," but your soul lives in such a system of ideas only as long as the thing is new, as long as you see the danger from which you escape. It is as if you had passed the mountains with very bad roads and had reached the plain, and you say, "What a beautiful plain!" having in mind still those high mountains behind you. And whenever you think the plain is not particularly interesting, you look back and realize that it was very rough there and the plain is at least a smooth road. But lose sight of those mountains and you will long for them, because the scenery was much more beautiful than the plain, which is horrible, and you are thoroughly sick of it. And when you come to the first foothills where you can climb up instead of going on the level all the time, you praise the moment. So it is with such a truth. As long as the system of Christian ideas worked, the soul lived. The soul itself produced them because those formulations were needed.

One should try to imagine the actual conditions of late antique civilization, the Greek and Roman civilizations for instance, and what their leading ideas were. Usually one has very little knowledge of it, so we cannot value the sayings of Jesus, because we don't know to whom he spoke. We cannot understand certain things at all, because we are unable to reconstruct the conditions in which those words were said. It has been pointed out with a sort of surprise that in the Hinayana Buddhism—the original small school of Indian Buddhism—there were no gods apparently. But if you know that Buddha's first teaching was over against a pantheon of two million Hindu gods, you quite understand why he did not feel the need of inventing new ones. He was already sick of all those gods so he ceased talking of them. Just as a person who hears every day of God, in prayers and all sorts of allusions, will get tired of it; so if one has grown up in pious surroundings, one cannot even say the word *Jesus* without a feeling of disgust and contempt. And Nietzsche was the son of a parson. He heard those words all the time, and that explains why he used the word *contempt*. The early influences of his youth are of course very important. So you must not only keep in mind the condition of the world to which the prophet spoke, but also the condition in which he was himself as a child. Prophets coincide in a way with their time. He would not have gotten the full impact of the spirit of our time if he had not been the son of a parson, the representative of a dying system and a dying spirit. He could taste the thing in its purest substance: he got the essence of his time.

Nietzsche's idea, that with all that theological talk the soul is not fed, is perfectly plain: only the mind eats and the soul is far from being properly fed. On the contrary she is famished and therefore eager for a change, for a new idea that really would give her food. And the new idea came because the original condition, in which the Christian teaching was entirely right, had vanished into an antique world. Out of the background of the Christian medieval world the new idea was necessary in order to feed the soul against the time when the spirit had been over-valued: a teaching was needed that emphasized the body and the flesh again. There is a new book by Keyserling, *La Révolution Mondiale et la Responsabilité de l'Esprit*, in which he speaks of the *révolte des forces telluriques*, the forces of the earth, and he says that man himself consists of 80 or 90 percent of *forces telluriques*. His idea is that this revolution ought to be quenched by the spirit; the spirit should settle that *force tellurique*. Now this is exactly the Christian idea: the spirit says, you ought, but "*hélas! avec combien peu de succès.*" He says himself that it won't help at all, but nevertheless he follows that spirit. What he sees quite truly, however, is the complete reversal: all the spiritual values come down, and up comes the earth and man as he is, not as he ought to be or as we would like him to be. He comes up as he is, inexorably, and if we suppress him he becomes worse, and this being claims recognition. That is the task, and it will lead to an entirely new valuation of man and an entirely new religious idea: the recognition of man as he really is and of the world as it really is over against a background of illusions and projections. And that will last until the world as it is has been more or less accepted, and then that truth will become dry, most uninteresting—and something else will follow.

These waves make the periodicity of history. Presumably they follow the months of the Platonic year, but we have only had the experience of about three months, and that is very little indeed in comparison with the fact that each Platonic year contains twenty-six thousand ordinary years. But man of course has existed for quite a number of Platonic years. The consciousness of man goes back for many hundred thousand years, of which twenty-six thousand is only a small part; so he has gone many a time in a more or less conscious condition through all the seasons of the Platonic year and has therefore the experience of those seasonal changes in his bones. For instance, we have now the change from the spring into the winter sign. That has nothing to do with the stars. It is merely a projection of a peculiar periodicity in man that probably shows itself in this change of religious and ethical values; also probably in a change of temperament or something like that, a change

in the constellation of the unconscious. Now, a bit further on in this chapter Zarathustra says: "Is your soul not poverty and pollution and despicable ease?" What does he mean by "despicable ease"? That is not the translation in the book by the way. There it is "wretched self-complacency."

Mrs. Baynes: He means that people prefer to sleep rather than to take life problematically.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. It is the tendency of people to live and not to bother, and he was confronted with a world which was thoroughly materialistic. It was the eighth century and they did not like to be bothered—as the world never likes to be bothered; it always likes to take things as easily as possible. And people who don't realize this despicable ease never can understand the meaning of the Superman. Nietzsche thought it was a duty, our highest moral obligation, to produce the Superman, that man higher than ourselves. This does not exhaust his idea of the Superman of course, as we shall see later on. Here he gives us a new idea. He says the Superman is the sea: "in him can your great contempt be submerged." What does he denote by this comparison of the Superman with the sea?

Dr. Reichstein: All life comes from the ocean. It is the collective unconscious.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the ocean is always the symbol of the collective unconscious. It is an all-embracing general symbol, and the self, the Superman, is also the ocean, according to Zarathustra. So the self is the whole collective unconscious, the origin and the end of life, the origin of rain and of all rivers, of the whole universe, the end of all distinctness.

Mrs. Baumann: Is it not the same as "smaller than small yet greater than great"?

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the formula of the self: there is a peculiar correspondence with smallness and greatness. The self is all-embracing yet the smallest—a paradoxical concept which is beyond our grasp, as it needs must be.⁷ Well, that shows that Nietzsche does not understand the Superman as a higher, more differentiated sort of man. We are the ape-man, for instance, which would be more human. Often it looks as if he meant just that, but he had intuitions about it, and in such a passage we see that the thing is far more complicated.

⁷ One of the particular attractions for Jung of the early Gnostics was their belief in a god at once before and beyond the opposition necessary for consciousness and still in complex relation to other supernatural beings. In Jung's theory, this condition of containing the opposites—small/great, male/female, etc.—was a description of the self. See CW 9 ii, ch. 4.

LECTURE V

6 June 1934

Dr. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah: "It seems to me so odd that Zarathustra should use the expression 'bowels of the Unknowable One,' as one is more inclined to connect bowels with the earth?"

But this expression seems to me very apt, for "bowels" simply means contents, and in "the Unknowable One," Nietzsche surely refers to the unknown god who, he said, was dead. It is a funny thing, however, that throughout the whole of *Zarathustra* you get a feeling as if this god whom he calls dead were not absolutely dead. He is somehow lurking in the background as the great unknowable one of whom you should not speak; you simply should not take him into consideration: he is too dangerous to be mentioned. So his peculiar expression that you should not be interested in the bowels of the unknowable one means that there is somebody there, only he is utterly taboo. You see, that is explained psychologically by the fact that Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, for anybody who calls himself an atheist is a negative theist; naturally he would not deny a thing if he did not think it was there to be denied. He would not add the *a*. It is an admission of God when you call yourself an atheist, because whether you assert a thing or deny it, you confirm that it is: you cannot deny a thing without giving it a certain existence. It does exist somewhere even if you assume that it exists only in the minds of other people; that it exists in the minds of other people means that it does exist. So Nietzsche's God exists somewhere and has contents but he must be careful not to mention them.

That an atheist is particularly concerned with God is not understood with us because we are still unspeakably barbarous in that respect, but the East is a bit more differentiated in such matters. They have the saying that a man who loves God needs seven rebirths in order to be redeemed or to reach Nirvana, but a man who hates God needs only three. And why? Because a man who hates God will think of him much oftener than a man who loves God. So the atheist hates God, but he is

in a way a better Christian than the man who loves him; Nietzsche is a better Christian and far more moral than the Christians before and after him. You see that explains a great deal of *Zarathustra*, which is a highly moral book. If anybody should try to live that teaching, he would have astonishing experiences. He would certainly feel himself to be a better Christian than all those before him. He could buy a halo for his own private use and make himself the first and only saint of his private church. It is true of course that we use that expression "the bowels of . . ." rather in connection with the earth, and in a psychological sense we mean the contents of the unconscious, which we think of as below. But to the Christian era the unconscious was by no means below; it was a fiery and luminous heaven above. All the heavenly "powers and principalities" of the Catholic church are really the contents of the unconscious,¹ but at that time they projected the unconscious into the world above, and only through the descent which has taken place in the last four hundred years, has it been brought down into the lower regions, the earth, into the real bowels, the intestinal region, the kingdom of the sympathetic nervous system.

Then there is a question by Mrs. Bailward: "Is the artist the person who can frame the here and now of the creative forces? Does the body do the same for the self?—and is the self under the law of the uniqueness of the moment in time?"

That is an exceedingly philosophic question. The artist can of course frame the here and now of the creative forces; his creative force consists in the fact that he can express the actual creative moment because he *is* creative, or the instrument of the creative force, which is synonymous. Through being creative one creates the thing that has come into existence in this moment, that was in a potential existence before. And the body in a way does the same for the self; the body is the expression of a preexisting uniqueness. It is as if built up by a preexisting uniqueness; it is the realization of a unit of life. Naturally, that is not the biological way of expressing it. Biological science tries to explain life through a sort of physiological causality, the causality of the chemical transformations of the body, as we try to explain the evolution of certain forms by certain climatic conditions or other physical or physiological conditions. The success of that explanation is not very great, however, on account of our profound lack of knowledge. Why, for instance, in a certain geological period should a certain species of animal

¹ "For by him were all things created . . . whether they be things . . . or principalities or powers" (Colossians 1:16).

prevail. Of course, there has always been a certain amount of sea, but in one period we had water animals and in another land animals; and we only can assume that the water animals moved slowly out of the sea and became amphibious, and then developed into animals that preferred to be on firm ground. But why and how they could do so remains absolutely dark. We can not imagine how a fish could suddenly change into an animal that walks on four legs and breathes through lungs; an indescribable fact must have taken place that provided those animals with lungs. Even the principles of Darwin cannot explain why they did not just die out instead. If there was a lake or part of a sea, for example, that became more and more shallow and slowly dried up, then the water would become more and more salty and the fish would have perished because they cannot live with more than a certain percentage of salt. In the Red Sea there are no fish, no life can exist with that concentrated amount of salt.² We can assume that the sea was continuously filled with fresh waters and so evaporated slowly, but from what we know, while the lake was drying out, the fish simply perished and they did not develop lungs.

As a matter of fact the strange thing that paleontology now teaches us is that in a new age a huge number of new species appear, perfectly finished and developed; and we can find no traces of the stages where they were half-baked. It seems as if all those animals were suddenly there. So, in most recent times, among the people concerned with those problems—the biologists and zoologists and so on—there is a growing inclination to assume a peculiar creativeness in life, able to produce a new species in an unknown way. We have a certain analogy in the so-called mutation of plants, where a new plant comes into existence, finished, like those famous beeches with red leaves, for example, which suddenly sprang into existence about the middle of the nineteenth century: it just happened.³ And there are other well known cases of mutation of trees. So, such experiences have led modern biologists to think that there is a peculiar creative factor in life.

Now, if we apply that idea generally we come to the conclusion that there is a preexistent uniqueness, or a unit of life, that creates a certain body according to its own peculiar uniqueness, creating it exactly as an artist creates a work of art out of a preexisting vision. And if the body is created by the self, and the self is called a uniqueness, then we iden-

² A slip. In this instance, better Dead than Red Sea.

³ *Fagus sylvatica purpurea*, commonly called the purple or copper beech.

tify this uniqueness with the uniqueness of the moment of creation.⁴ This is substantiated in a way by the very awkward fact that the uniqueness of the particular moment in time in which a thing is created is characterized by certain qualities, as is proved by the fact that the horoscope can give the character of an individual.⁵ If it were impossible to deduce a human character from a horoscope, then of course that whole idea of the identity of the uniqueness of the self with the uniqueness of the moment when a thing comes into existence would not be valid; but as a matter of fact you can deduce from a horoscope, you can show the character of an individual to an amazing extent.

We will now continue our text, the last part of the sermon of the Superman:

It is not your sin—it is your self satisfaction that crieth unto heaven; your very sparingness in sin crieth unto heaven!

The German word for sparingness is *Genügsamkeit*. I would call it frugality: your frugality crieth unto heaven.⁶

Where is the lightning to lick you with its tongue? Where is the frenzy with which ye should be inoculated?

Lo I teach you the Superman: he is that lightning, he is that frenzy.

Here again is this term “great contempt.” He says—several paragraphs before this—that the greatest thing one can experience is the hour of great contempt. He obviously makes rather a point of it, so he must mean some definite psychological fact. What do you think he means by it here?

Mrs. Baynes: Does it not mean reaching a point of view where you are prepared to give up the most precious thing that you have?

Dr. Jung: We will see whether that hypothesis fits. When I ask what they desire the most, the most precious thing, plenty of people will say, to be happy. A whole continent believes in being happy-go-lucky, that is proverbial, we all believe in it to a certain extent. Then, others will say they desire reason the most. You know the Goddess of Reason was

⁴ In the Aitareya Upanishad, Atman, the self as creator, makes a body by ordering fire to become speech; wind, breath; sun, sight; moon, mind; water, semen; etc. (Hume*, p. 274).

⁵ Jung expressed varying opinions about astrology. See below 13 Feb. 1935, for a relatively negative account, but for a much more positive view of astrological phenomena treated not causally but synchronistically, see CW 8, pars. 872-915.

⁶ *Genügsamkeit*. Kaufmann* translates this “thrift”; Hollingdale*, “moderation.”

put upon the throne in Notre Dame instead of God—I think it was in 1796.⁷ Then, virtue is the best you can desire according to certain convictions. And righteousness is surely praised by many people as the very finest thing they can possibly possess; you also can call it respectability, because if you feel very respectable you are quite righteous. And the most wonderful of all is pity, because pity is at the bottom of Christian love. The pity for all things living is the very essence of Buddhism also⁸ It even goes so far that every morning one of the priests in the temple carefully wipes the floor with a broom, not to remove the dust but the insects that might be trodden upon, so they are invited to leave the sacred precincts to preserve themselves from possible injury to their legs or little bodies. You see, we have here a series of very noble things which humanity has always held to be the most precious. So the hypothesis put forward by Mrs. Baynes surely explains this contempt as the contempt of all those virtues. Now why should the hour of this contempt of all the noble ideals, the most desirable precious things, be the greatest moment in life?

Answer: Because these qualities are only the compensation for the shadow.

Dr. Jung: So you would conclude that Nietzsche is really looking for the dark things that lurk behind all these beautiful virtues, as if they surpassed all the good mankind could desire.⁹ This is another hypothesis. He says: Not your sin but your frugality, your niggardliness even in sin, crieth unto heaven. So the contempt really comes from the fact that the shadow is so great and thick that one begins to despise all the virtue mankind has praised in the past. For what is it? It creates in consequence a shadow as dark as hell, so overpowering that it is really not worthwhile to praise all those virtuous qualities; the greater reality is in the darkness and not in those ideas of beauty and light. That he says your frugality in sinning cries unto heaven means that he sees those ideals as a sort of pretext or subterfuge over against the overwhelming fact of the sin in man. Here you see the good Christian but with the *a* in front of him; he sees all that as sin, which is the way the Christians

⁷ Jung, who is said to have given these lectures without notes, was close. This goddess assumed her throne in what the new French Republic renamed “The Temple of Reason” in 1793.

⁸ For Nietzsche pity “is a weakness, like every losing of oneself through harmful affect. It increases the amount of suffering in the world” (*Daybreak*, book II, p. 85).

⁹ In Jungian theory, the shadow is a same-sex personification of the relatively undesirable parts of the personality—ranging from the mischievous to the malicious—confrontation with which is considered essential to development. See CW 9 i, par. 14.

would speak. He is still under the shadow of the church; he is within the sacred precincts, and therefore he feels quite blasphemous. You see, the dark things which are understood to be sin are only sin when you are entirely upon the standpoint of the preceding list of good qualities; if you once imagine that these are really the most wonderful ideals man could aspire to, then naturally everything which is less good seems to be dark and sinful or immoral. So he wishes for a spark of lightning to sting people out of that idea of despicable ease, to wake them up so that they can see the real truth of man. And he holds that this lightning which should lick people with its tongue is the Superman.

One could call that a sort of speech metaphor, conveying the idea of a situation in which everybody was more or less asleep, without realization, and then something suddenly happens which wakes them up, a terrible crash or a stinging pain, and for that lightning would be a good simile. But there is something more in this image of the lightning. This simile turns up, for instance, in a Chinese inscription, which surely was quite unknown to Nietzsche. It is a verse and I cannot quote it literally, but the idea is that from time to time mankind gets into an inexplicable state of sleep or of torpor, exactly like the mood in nature before a thunder storm. The air is heavy and man and beast fall asleep; the trees are without movement; everything becomes like lead. The Chinese text says that something is spread over the earth like a wonder which cannot be explained, and then follows an invocation to the dragon to rise. He is lying coiled in the deep, but he should rise and strike with the lightning of his tail so that the whole of nature would wake up again.¹⁰ It is exactly the same metaphor, but the symbolism is more conspicuous. For that dragon means what?

Mrs. Crowley: If it were Hindu it would suggest the Kundalini.

Dr. Jung: Yes, but what would be the Chinese meaning?

Mrs. Fierz: The Yang principle.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that former condition is the Yin condition, where everything has taken form. Everything is real, concrete, indubitable; and when things have become, they go to sleep. That dormant condi-

¹⁰ Jung frequently pointed out that for the Chinese, the dragon is a positive symbol, one that sparkles in the heavens, a merry creature opposed to evil spirits. See CW 10, par. 939. Zimmer describes how Indra threw his thunderbolt at the cloud serpent and thus released "the flood of life" (Zimmer/Myths, p. 3). The celebrated Nine Dragon Scroll, painted in 1244 by a Taoist artist, shows dragons in waves and clouds. The dragon not only brought rain but symbolized the Tao itself. See Anthony Christie, *Chinese Myths*, (Feltham, Middlesex, 1968), pp. 44-45.

tion means that the Yin principle has swallowed the Yang principle completely. It is like a dark cloud spread over the earth, but within that cloud is the lightning lying coiled, ready to strike. Then the Yang strikes and the cloud opens, the rain falls, the air becomes clear, the rivers begin to move, new plants come up from the parched soil, and new life is created. So that simile most certainly refers to a psychological condition underlying the symbolism, which you see very clearly in the Chinese text. It is a close analogy, as Mrs. Crowley has just mentioned, to the Kundalini serpent which is called the coiled one; the serpent is coiled in a dormant condition in the depths of the darkness, in the cave, and when the moment comes when something has to happen, the Kundalini suddenly rises and hisses and causes something like a lightning flash, a sudden sting. This peculiar quality of the Kundalini describes a psychological moment, the breaking up of an old order, and it starts to break up through a sort of intuitive flash; somebody suddenly has an intuition, and that is the first lightning which then dissolves a whole complicated situation which one thought would last forever.¹¹

Nietzsche understands the idea of the Superman in that sense. He holds that man has gotten accustomed to the idea that it is worthwhile to live for all those virtues, for all sorts of ideals and beautiful things, and would always remain the same. He is in a certain order: he has his position, and it is just as if it had been ordered for eternity. You know, no treaty is made which people don't suppose to be forever; no state, no church, is founded which is not for eternity: everything should last forever. It is an apparently desirable condition which has been brought about and which should always last, in spite of the fact that we know very well how long treaties usually last. But again and again man seeks to establish something for eternity. And that is not ridiculous because it is the essence of civilization or culture that it can and should resist time; it is the characteristic of anything man-made that it is able to resist the continuous dissolving activity of time and nature. That is why we build houses instead of having mere shelters under trees, or tents, or any other very transitory contrivance; we make things as du-

¹¹ Kundalini Yoga, a doctrine and practice of Tantric Buddhism, wherein the "Klesa," or urge to individuation, is symbolized by a snake who awakens and ascends from the base of the spine through seven successive chakras or lotus petals, at each stage evoking energy to a new type of consciousness. Jung provided a psychological commentary to the lectures in 1932 at the Psychology Club of Professor J. Wilhelm Hauer (1881-1962), an Indologist from Tübingen University. The lectures, commentaries, and discussion are preserved in the notes of the Kundalini Yoga Seminar.

nable as possible in order to establish the victory of man over nature and over the transformation of things in nature. If you should make a philosophy with the idea that it was only for the next fortnight, of course you never would make it; you make a philosophy with the assumption that you are going to bring out a truth that will last for several thousand years at least. This tendency to create a form of civilization—any form, religious, political or social—always has that claim of durability, of resistance against the onslaught of time and nature. And it is such a condition, the tail end of the Middle Ages, into which Nietzsche was born.

You see the Middle Ages reached right up to the beginning of the great war; we still had the feudal system, we had kings and feudal princes according to the ideas of the Middle Ages—of course in a somewhat different form, but more or less as it always had been during the last two thousand years. The best proof of that is that we still founded our religious and philosophical convictions upon the New Testament. That is the highest authority and it has naturally created a certain social form and morality, and certain religious and philosophical convictions; even if these convictions have an *a* to them, even in the negation of those old beliefs, they are and have remained as they always were. Nietzsche was born in such a period, as I said, and he felt that it was a dormant condition which had to be exploded by the idea of the Superman, which means that man is not a definite form, a definite entity that remains the same for millions of years, but that he can change, undergo a mutation as it were, and suddenly transform into something else.

Of course, that is again a very Christian idea: it is the idea of Christian conversion. In the early days of Christianity, they held the same conviction, that when a man had undergone the *mysterium* or the *sacramentum* (the two terms are synonymous: in the early church it was called the *mysterium* and later they preferred to call that old mystery ritual the *sacramentum*, but the process was exactly the same), he was made sacred, or *mana*, by a transformation into something else. He was nearly drowned in water and pulled out of it as if out of a womb. The baptismal font in the church was still called the *uterus ecclesiae* in the *Missale Romanum*, and the people who had undergone the transformation were *quasi modo geniti*.¹² It was understood to be a complete and thorough change of man; he was made into something new, no longer

¹² The *Missale Romanum* is the work which contains the service for the mass, in this case for blessing the womb of the church from which all may be born anew.

the old Adam. He put on Christ, the new body, and was made into a child of God, an immortal being. Without baptism or without taking communion, one misses the *pharmakon athanasias*, the medicine of immortality, and is merely mortal like the animals; one has no soul. That belief went so far that old Tertullian was convinced that if a man was baptized he could not sin any longer, and if by chance a man should sin again, something must have been wrong with the baptismal ceremony, so it had to be repeated. He was enormously surprised to find people who went on sinning in spite of the second baptism; then he thought they were children of Satan and utterly lost: they simply had to be dropped. Nowadays, when a person in a religious movement is not behaving according to rules and is not saved, he is called neurotic and sent to the analyst. And then the analyst asks quite justifiably, what can *he* do, is he greater than God?

This belief that through a religious conversion we become quite different beings, is still alive among us. Somebody becomes a Christian Scientist, for instance, and is supposed to be an entirely changed man; formerly, he was a rascal, and now look at him: he does not drink or waste his money running about with women, so Christian Science must be the truth. Then the Methodists and the Baptists and the Salvation Army and the Oxford Movement and four hundred other denominations walk upon the stage and tell you that all their members have become entirely different people. Therefore, they all contain the truth. Now, what truth? It is the old belief that that thing is the living truth which changes people completely; the criterion for the truth is that man is changed, proving that there is some secret magic in these forms or convictions. That was the belief of early Christianity, and it is the same idea which Nietzsche proclaims here: the idea that the Superman would be the lightning which would upset the dormant condition of his world, so that man *could* change. It is not exactly the Christian transformation through the grace of God or baptism. It is due to man, because when God is dead he appears next in the one who kills him; then the divine creative faculty needs must dwell in man. And then man has the faculty of transforming into the Superman, by which is not meant a man of greater virtue but a man who is simply beyond this man of today, a different creature obviously, a man who can deal with the darkness in human nature.

Dr. Reichstein: I think the oldest picture of this idea is the Iranian myth of the original primordial man who sleeps and must be awakened.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is a similar idea, and there are other primitive be-

liefs that the first couple, or the first god, was asleep and had to be awakened.

When Zarathustra had thus spoken, one of the people called out: "We have now heard enough of the rope-dancer; it is time now for us to see him!" And all the people laughed at Zarathustra. But the rope-dancer, who thought the words applied to him, began his performance.

To whom does the rope-dancer refer here?

Remark: To Zarathustra?

Dr. Jung: Well, I must say it is not quite clear. We only know that there is a man who is really a rope-dancer, and when the people call for the rope-dancer he sets to work.¹³ There is a certain confusion between the real and the symbolic rope-dancer here.

Mrs. Baumann: It might be the Superman.

Dr. Jung: Yes. You see, the ordinary man could not be compared to a rope-dancer; he lives in good houses in safe cities that are watched over by the police, and there are excellent laws, and boundaries to every country, and settled conditions. But the rope-dancer walks on a very high rope in the air; it is an acrobatic stunt and if he falls down he is killed. It is a tremendous risk, the symbol of a dangerous *transitus*. So the Superman could be man in the situation of a rope-dancer, running as great a risk as the rope-dancer who risks his life. It is as if there were a misunderstanding here between the audience and the speaker. The people think Zarathustra is speaking of the real rope-dancer while he is really speaking of the Superman of whom the rope-dancer would be a symbol.

Now, we have been reading the sermons or reflections of Zarathustra, and there has been very little action, but here we come upon action again, as in the descent of Zarathustra from the mountain and the meeting of the old wise man. And whenever talk transforms into action there is a reason for it. Do you know what it is? Why should talk suddenly become action?

Mrs. Fierz: If what is to be told is not clear, not conscious enough to be said in words, a sort of symbolical action would take the place of the word.

Dr. Reichstein: Speech is always one-sided, and this action could be

¹³ In her biography of her brother, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche not only tells of frequent appearances of tightrope walkers in their home town of Naumburg but even recounts an instance of one acrobat jumping over another. *N/Life*, vol. I, p. 54.

the reaction from the unconscious brought out by the speech before. He teaches more the Yang side, and the action might be the reaction of the Yin side.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that would more or less coincide with what Mrs. Fierz said. Something is lacking in the sermon apparently; with that statement, "I teach you the Superman," a certain culmination is reached, and for the moment he cannot go beyond. He says he is the lightning and he is the madness, and now of course the sermon should continue and say where it starts, and of what the effect of the lightning or the frenzy consists, and how it shows. But there he seems to have hurt himself against a snag, so the sermon goes underground. It is like a pause in a speech: one's thoughts suddenly leave one and one has to do something about it and then it turns into action, and the action must be expressive, symbolical of the spoken word.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: It would be when he gets tired of talking.

Dr. Jung: Zarathustra is not easily tired of talking.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: But the people get tired.

Dr. Jung: He pays no attention to the people, as we have evidence for in the next chapter where it says: "But Zarathustra, looking at the people, wondered, and then he spoke thus: . . ." You see, he continues; he is not afraid of tiring people with his talk, and it is quite a while before the rope-dancer can get to work, because Zarathustra is still speaking. No, he has hit upon something there, he has hurt himself against an invisible snag, and that is of course the transition over to the question how that idea will work, what it means to man and what it means to himself above all. For instance, when somebody says a whole mouthful and then suddenly stops and cannot find the next sentence, you can be sure that he has hit upon something in himself which caused the hesitation.¹⁴ If a person announces as his sacred conviction that things should always be done in such and such a way, and then doesn't know what to say next, it is because the devil has hooked on, asking: "Do you really know your own conviction?" or "Do you really mean what you say?" And obviously he does not know then what he has said or what his conviction was. It often happens when people say more than they can swallow, that they are suddenly disturbed from underneath; they forget what they wanted to say because the unconscious has withdrawn it. They were just gliding along, it was all plain sailing, and then they

¹⁴ Jung is here drawing on his work in the so-called "Association Experiment," in which, for instance, by observing pauses in subjects' responses to suggested stimulus words, complexes can be detected. See *CW 2, passim*.

struck upon a shallow piece of ground where the unconscious was close to the surface: suddenly the unconscious hooked on. In such cases, the symbolic or symptomatic action follows.

This is such a moment. Zarathustra hesitates, he looks upon the people as if he were wondering about them. As a matter of fact he should wonder about himself, because here Nietzsche touched something that gave a spark for the time being. He is able to go on, but in the meantime, while Zarathustra goes on talking, the symbolic action begins to work. Now, this rope-dancer is quite obviously a relation of Zarathustra—he is his symbolic action—and I think we are quite safe in assuming that he represents Nietzsche's inferior side, because all the preoccupation with the rope-dancer in subsequent chapters shows that he is really concerned with that man and sees himself in him. So we may assume for the time being, as when one dreams of an inferior person, that this is the shadow figure, the inferior man in himself. And it really is the inferior man in him that has hooked on here, saying: "Now what about that transition to the Superman? How can you become the Superman? For it is expected of you, Zarathustra; of you personally, Friedrich Nietzsche. How do you get beyond your migraines, your vomiting and sleeplessness and chloral and all the other narcotics, and your terrible sensitiveness and irritability?"¹⁵ You see that would happen in every one of us. Now he starts again to speak about the Superman, because he begins to wonder what the effect or the idea of the Superman really means to him personally. So he says in the way of reflection:

Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman—a rope over an abyss.

This is the answer he is giving to the doubts as to how man can get across to the Superman, by what means that change can be made, and why it should be made. Those are the doubts of the inferior man, so this is almost in the way of an admonition.

A dangerous crossing, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous trembling and halting.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what is lovable in man is that he is an over-going and a down-going.

¹⁵ "Constant headaches, constant vomiting, all my old ills are back again, wrapped up in a nervous exhaustion which renders the entire machine useless. . . . I am *not* suffering from a disease of the brain" (To Franz Overbeck, 4 July 1888, in *Letters/Middleton*).

In German it is *Übergang* and *Untergang*, which would be literally a going-over or a going-beyond, and a setting like the sun. He says:

I love those that know not how to live except as down-goers, for they are the over-goers.

I would prefer to say: "I love those who live not, save as suns setting, for they are going beyond."¹⁶

I love the great despisers, because they are the great adorers, and arrows of longing for the other shore.

By these words he is soothing himself or explaining to himself why the longing for the Superman or going beyond man is a greater virtue than remaining the ordinary man. He says to himself that he loves those men who don't remain what they were, but who live in order to change, to live beyond themselves in order to become.

I love those who do not first seek a reason beyond the stars for going down and being sacrifices, but sacrifice themselves to the earth, that the earth of the Superman may hereafter arrive.

He denies the Christian idea of self-sacrifice for a thing which is beyond the world, for an extra-mundane spirituality. He doesn't see any merit in killing the body for the sake of the spirit, and moreover, one would never be changed by sacrificing oneself merely to the spirit. His idea is that it takes greater courage, greater virtue, and a greater sacrifice, to *live*, to sacrifice oneself to the earth, to reality; for if one sacrifices oneself to the actual concrete reality, one is changed and thus one prepares the way for the Superman. One occasionally comes across such problems in people in analysis, particularly in cases of transference. You see it sometimes happens to pious people that they get neurotic and unfortunately enough they have to go through an analysis, and then—Oh Lord!—they even fall in love with the analyst. They get a transference which at times takes on a most disquieting religious aspect—the analyst takes on the aspect of Jesus: they would like to kiss his feet and call him Jesus. Then, they develop a most formidable resistance against such a blasphemous transference. But the more they resist it, the more they project—till he is almost overwhelmed by the negative Christian projections. Of course he is then not only Jesus but also the devil himself. Naturally, the conflict is great in such peo-

¹⁶ Another translation: "I love those who do not know how to live except by going under, for they are those that cross over" (Kaufmann*, p. 127).

ple. The thing to which Nietzsche alludes happens to them: they get neurotic because they exaggerate their own spirituality. They identify with the spirits in heaven and imagine themselves spirits and nothing else.

But unfortunately they have a thick shadow. They have a body underneath all that show which won't agree with the spiritual show on top; it revolts against such spirituality, and that causes the neurosis. Then, in analysis, naturally they become aware of the fact that there is such a thing as body, that the spirit does not pay for the whole performance. The body has to pay the damage too. The unconscious insists very much then upon the physical presence of the analyst; and transference has the meaning that they should be brought to recognize the projection of their religious contents into as ordinary a human being as an analyst. Of course, they are mighty glad if he is not quite ordinary. "Such a great man!" His great mind excuses the fact that they have a transference, for if it were on any ordinary human being, it would be insupportable. But mind you, it is not his mind at all, I have known that for many years. At my last lecture at the University,¹⁷ I walked downstairs behind some girls and I overheard their remarks: "I didn't understand a word of what he said today." "You did not understand? It was as clear as a bell." "Then can you explain such and such a thing?" "Oh well, I did not quite get it, but I know he is right, he is so strong and so healthy!"

So it is an awful thing to find all your values projected into an ordinary human creature with a body, particularly all your religious values. And mind you, if that figure has a mind, it is an obstacle, by no means an asset, because you have then to cast away all that mind business in order to see that it is a body. To see great religious values in the body is a very horrible discovery for a good Christian. It is just that to which the Lord himself alluded when he spoke of the possibility that he might be seen in the shape of the lowest of our brethren, that in the lowest of our brethren we would be able to recognize the Lord. A very wise word, but of course a more loathesome word to a Christian. It is not accepted, because they only want to pity the lowest of our brethren; the idea of seeing anything of high religious value in them is much too dangerous. I explained that once to a conference of theologians in Strasbourg and they all averted their eyes and walked round it. It was

¹⁷ Jung resigned in 1913 as Privatdocent at the University of Zürich, a position he had held since 1908. But here he may mean a recent lecture at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, or ETH.

too hot a stew; they would not put a finger into it. Yet, it is of course a most important point; it is the problem of our time, in which of course Nietzsche also was concerned. He understands the acceptance of the man of earth as the self-sacrifice of greater merit than any sacrifice for the sake of spirit. He sees that acceptance of the real concrete man, identical with his body, as the greatest meaning of our time, for such a sacrifice would put modern man before a problem of almost unsurmountable difficulty. We would rather accept anything in the world, any devil or any hell, than accept ourselves in our particular concreteness. That is the thing of which we are most afraid. You see, that being is not even very sinful, not even superb in its sins—just hellishly banal and of a low order, not interesting at all. We would prefer superb sins than to be ourselves with all the banality which we represent. Therefore, he says:

I love him who liveth in order to know, and seeketh to know in order that the Superman may hereafter live. Thus seeketh he his own down-going.

Here is again the famous *Untergang*, the setting of the sun of all his ideals about himself; it is an extraordinary disillusion and an increase of knowledge. Without disillusion you never acquire knowledge, and without knowledge you never acquire a new consciousness, and without consciousness you never change: living unconsciously you remain forever the same.

I love him who laboureth and inventeth, that he may build the house for the Superman,

That is the new man who knows, whose consciousness is exceedingly individual if he can once swallow the fact of himself.

and prepare for him earth, animal, and plant, for thus seeketh he his own doing-going.

He goes down into the concrete reality. He becomes again man and disidentifies with his ideals. In other words, he creates a new ideal which is coincident with the real man, with man as he is in the body.

I love him who loveth his virtue; for virtue is the will to down-going, and an arrow of longing.

Again the virtue of the doing-going, the approach to the earth, to man as he is. And the arrow of longing is the changing, going beyond, because by accepting oneself as one is, one gets a longing to be different

and that moves the whole world forward. We don't want to be ourselves, because we cannot stand ourselves; therefore, we never make progress. We remain as we are because we don't accept the only thing which can be motive power enough to bring it about. Only when we accept the thing which is loathesome to us, have we a real will to change, not before.

I love him who reserveth no share of spirit for himself, but wanteth to be wholly the spirit of his virtue: thus walketh he as spirit over the bridge.

That means that he loves the one who has the intuitions of such virtue, who at least intuitively grasps the meaning of that virtue, and thus in spirit crosses over the bridge.

I love him who maketh his virtue his inclination and destiny: thus, for the sake of his virtue, he is willing to live on, or live no more.

This shows that it is really a self-sacrifice because you risk living on or you risk dying. It is an enterprise which has all the risks of a real enterprise, which includes its specific dangers. It is *amor fati*.¹⁸ This is the attitude now prevailing in Germany. It is the inner meaning of National Socialism. They live in order to live on—or to die. When you hear the really serious people talk, you realize that Nietzsche simply anticipated that style. They praise the attitude of being ready, and naturally any rationalist asks, for what? That is just the point—nobody knows for what. Therefore, they have no program; they have no mapped-out scheme which should be fulfilled. They live for the moment. They don't know where they are going. Very influential and competent people of that party acknowledge that they don't know, but one thing is certain: they are going, there is no return, they must risk it. Then, the rationalist asks: "Risk what?" The answer is, "Risk *it*." They don't know what they are risking; they simply take it as a matter of course that they must have this attitude, that one risks *it*, whatever it is. This is of course pure madness from a rationalistic standpoint, and that is what Nietzsche means. Therefore, he says the Superman is the lightning or the madness. One can say it is all pathological, or that it is a divine or a demoniacal madness, but that is exactly the madness Nietzsche means.

¹⁸ "*Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth" (*Gay Science*, p. 276). Nietzsche's love of fate, like his embrace of "the eternal recurrence of the same," is part of his later philosophy of affirmation.

So Nietzsche is in a way the great prophet of what is actually happening in Germany.

I love him who desireth not too many virtues. One virtue is more of a virtue than two, because it is more of a knot for one's destiny to cling to.

This is a very wise word because the more virtues you are looking for, the more you get away from your real task. There is only that virtue which makes you live what you are.

I love him whose soul is lavish, who wanteth no thanks and doth not give back: for he always bestoweth, and desireth not to keep for himself.¹⁹

This is again the idea of the down-going, pouring life out. You see, we always try to retain, to economize our lives, but he preaches an attitude that is wasteful, that wastes oneself. So it means giving the whole of oneself without restriction, again a self-sacrifice to fate, to the things that have to happen from dark reasons—a complete surrender to life and fate.

I love him who is ashamed when the dice fall in his favour, and who then asketh: "Am I a dishonest player?"—for he is willing to succumb.

To perish. That is clear.

I love him who scattereth golden words in advance of his deeds, and always doeth more than he promiseth: for he seeketh his own down-going.

Again this attitude of out-doing oneself, of doing more than one really meant to do. It means following the impulse which is always behind everything we do, the organic instinctive impulse which has the character of a natural reaction, as all instinct has. It means to go the whole length of the way; you meant to go for two miles, but it carries you along for fifty miles, and you let it happen. Otherwise, there is no going down. You cannot manage fate; you never wind up with yourself if you can manage yourself, if you can say to God, "This and no more."

¹⁹ No Aristotelian, Nietzsche here probably consciously echoes the famous account of the magnanimous man, the sort "to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them, for the one is the mark of a superior, and the other of an inferior" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, [Princeton, B.S. LXXI:2, 1983], 1124b).

I love him who justifieth the future ones, and redeemeth the past ones: for he is willing to succumb through the present ones.

That complete surrender to the present necessities means of course a fulfilment, a redemption of the past generations, and of the unfulfilled lives that are waiting to be fulfilled. If we live completely, we surrender to their lives and redeem them. Also, we prepare for a future generation, because we have lived out our own lives; we have fulfilled them, and we leave no curse for the following generations—the curse of economized life.

I love him who chasteneth his God, because he loveth his God: for he must succumb through the wrath of his God.

You see he is at it again, without the *a* this time.

I love him whose soul is deep even in the wounding, and may succumb through a small matter: thus goeth he willingly over the bridge.

I love him whose soul is so overfed that he forgetteth himself, and all things are in him: thus all things become his down-going.

That would mean going down into reality in the sense of downfall. For he gets entangled; he easily gets wounded; fate takes hold of him and so he becomes complete. This is a complete, very perfect acceptance of what one is, drawing the last conclusion from the fact of being what one is.

Question: From one's own doing?

Dr. Jung: Well, it is a sort of religious teaching: it is very absolute.

I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart; thus is his head only the bowels of his heart; his heart, however, causeth his down-going.

That is a confession. The heart is speaking through Zarathustra, not the mind. This is again exactly what is happening in Germany now, their heart is speaking through their head. And this heart desires destruction, because a world full of old ideas must be destroyed. It is not because the heart has invented the idea of destruction, but because in the heart is the secret source of a will that speaks through the head. But that is taboo to Nietzsche. He doesn't touch it.

I love all who are like heavy drops falling one by one out of the dark cloud that lowereth over man:

Here we have the image of the dark cloud spread over the earth, in which the lightning is hidden.

They herald the coming of the lightning, and succumb as heralds.

Lo, I am a herald of the lightning, and a heavy drop out of the cloud: the lightning, however, is the Superman.

That means the coming man of course. A coming attitude, a new spirit, should fill the human form and make over our hitherto prevailing world and culture. In Nietzsche's mind, the Superman is a new type of man with such an attitude.

LECTURE VI

13 June 1934

Dr. Jung:

There are several questions. Mrs. Crowley asks: "When you spoke of symbolic action interrupting the discourse of Zarathustra, did you mean the flow or progress of the conscious realization was interrupted? In that case doesn't it put a negative construction on the action? Yet if a dream is the messenger of the conscious realization, why isn't such symbolic action another step in the development of the inner reality? In other words, do not the discourse and action serve as two aspects of the same reality? If it is to be looked upon as a negative interruption, that gives one the sense of a break in the rhythm of its growth and I would like to know which you meant."

I did not intend to convey the idea that the symbolic action was in any way inferior to the sermon. It is simply that the sermon has led up to a point where another element must come in; as if you pushed an argument to the very edge where you cannot go any further, and then instead of discussing, you *do* something. For instance, in Voltaire's *Candide*, just at the end, when the philosopher Pangloss has finished his long talk about the world, that it is *le meilleur des mondes* and that everything in it is the best thing possible, Candide calls his attention to his most disgusting venereal disease. But Pangloss proves that even his disease is most respectable, because he got it in a straight line from Columbus through the intermediary of a cardinal and his mistress. (That is true Voltairian style!—I am not responsible.) When he has finished his argument, Candide is quite overcome and says: *Tout cela est bien dit mais il faut cultiver nôtre jardin*, meaning that after all that talk they must do something reasonable because they had nothing to eat: they must plant their cabbages. Now, that is by no means an inferior interruption, it is surely much better to be planting and manuring cabbages; everybody was glad when that long speech was interrupted.¹

¹ In the novel *Candide* (1759), Pangloss, Voltaire's caricature of Leibniz and his opti-

In this case, the sermon stops for the time being and of course it is difficult to see what is now coming up. One usually notices in a series of fantasies that it is suddenly interrupted by something new, a different motive or an action. Or in a dream you wake up and you understand why you wake up: it is because the situation has become intolerable, or because the dream argument is finished. You have reached a certain amount of clarity and so it can vanish, and then another theme comes up. Now, here Zarathustra reaches a real culmination when he says: "Lo, I teach you the Superman: he is the lightning, he is that frenzy." That is the very essence of the idea he wants to convey to the audience. And what would you expect after such a statement?

Mrs. Crowley: That the lightning would fall; it would have to be illustrated.

Dr. Jung: Yes, you would expect that the lightning would now descend and that the audience would be struck by it—like the miracle of Pentecost, where the Holy Ghost descends in the form of tongues of fire.² Nothing of the kind happens, however. But something happens; the rope-dancer starts to work, the lightning has struck, as a matter of fact, but one does not see the effect. Yet, it could be shown that an effect has taken place. It is not visible here in the text, because the whole trend of thoughts is going underground, but it is the real man Nietzsche who writes those words. It is not Zarathustra and it is not the rope-dancer; and as he writes, the lightning strikes him. That will become obvious afterwards.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not also the word *madness* which struck him?

Dr. Jung: Exactly. Nietzsche could not have known his fate, but when he writes those words, the unconscious cries, "Halt!" Then the whole thing goes underground, and a peculiar action begins which symbolizes the coming events that could not be consciously foreseen.

Now Mrs. Baumann's question: "Would you kindly say a little more about the heart being the secret source of a will that speaks through the head? You spoke of it last time in connection with the paragraph where Zarathustra says: 'I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart;

mistic philosophy of preestablished harmony, keeps insisting to the wide-eyed Candide that appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, all is for the best in this the best of all possible worlds, until at the book's end the young man sensibly remarks: "All this is well said, but we must cultivate our garden."

² "And there appeared to them tongues as of fire, distributed and resting on each one of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in tongues as the spirit gave them utterance" (Acts 2:1-4).

thus is his head only the bowels of his heart; his heart, however, causeth his down-going.³ ”

The idea is that his head is contained in the heart and the heart talks through the head. It is simply a sort of metaphor indicating that there is a secret will in the heart, behind the head and superior to the head. It is a well-known idea that people can argue in an apparently logical and rational way while really speaking the wishes of their hearts. I think it is Isaiah, for instance, who reproaches the false prophets for speaking the wishes of their hearts instead of the words of the Lord.³ There, of course, it is a sort of depreciative remark. In this case it is appreciative. It means that there is a will to self-destruction in the heart, which leads finally to the Superman. The heart wills the drive towards the destruction of that lame and tame and despicable being called man, the most contemptible of all things to Nietzsche—the thing which should be overcome. So the will of the heart, that secret will to destruction, forces the head, and no matter what the head may think, it will be forced by the heart which knows that goal. The Superman can only live through the destruction of man as he is. The political analogy to this is the secret will to destruction all over the world, not only in Germany; of course, you see it very clearly there at present, but it is everywhere. Our actual collective unconscious seeks the destruction of millions. Why do they heap up ammunition and cannons? Surely not in order to play chess with them. Why do they invent poisonous gases? To kill of course. And why can nobody put a stop to it, damn it? We can only explain it by the fact that there is a superior will which forces all heads. And Nietzsche says here that he loves that will to destruction; therefore he preaches war. That is of course a sort of horrible nightmare to us, but the Eastern attitude would not see so much nightmare in it. They would say, where there are too many people, the number must be lessened, and so naturally a time will come when people will be exterminated to a certain extent: that simply has to be.

Mrs. Crowley: Is that not the very argument between Krishna and Arjuna in the beginning of the *Bhagavad Gita*?⁴

Dr. Jung: Well, you don't need to read it in the *Bhagavad Gita*. You can hear it in the East from the man in the street who has a natural wisdom in his veins; he is quite convinced and therefore he has no particular commiseration. You see, we make a hell of a fuss in Europe when

³ The Lord warned of the false prophets who “are prophesying to you a lying vision, worthless divination and the deceit of their own mind” (Jeremiah 14:14).

⁴ “When there is increase of unwanted population, a hellish situation is created.” *Bhagavad Gita*, tr. A. C. Bhakhavendanta Swami Probalpada (New York, 1972), text 41.

several hundred thousand Chinamen are dying of starvation, or drowned by the floods of the Hoang Ho or the Yangtze-Kiang. The Chinamen don't bother so much. They say: Too much folk, they must go. But we Christians have so little faith in life that we think we must preserve every little nuisance that has come into existence. Of course, it is not nice for the individuals who are actually under the wheel, but, you know, we shall all be under the wheel when those bombs begin to rain down upon our cities. And we ourselves are continuously bringing that about—nobody wants to but everybody is doing it.

Now here is a question by Mrs. Baynes in reference to a lecture given by a professor of the philosophy of law from Paris. He was speaking about the psychology of power and the so-called antinomy of power, namely, that power is both good and evil, which makes an insoluble antithesis in the very being of power.⁵ She says: "The lecturer at the Psychological Club on Saturday evening seemed to think that his standpoint was in direct agreement with that of analytical psychology. He said that the solution of conflict was by the reconciliation of thesis and antithesis, or in a word, by the transcending function which takes into consideration each of the opposites to be reconciled. But then he put forward the view that Christianity is still our best guide in the conduct of life. Is it possible to deny that Christianity demands the sacrifice of everything to the one principle, i.e., spirit? And has not analytical psychology shown that the psyche of modern man is in open revolt against this one-sidedness and forces to seek a new way that allows him to live the body as well as the spirit? Is not this the sum and substance of Nietzsche's point of view?"

That is, of course, Nietzsche's point of view, but on the other hand we must say that Nietzsche's point of view is exceedingly mysterious to the majority of even highly educated people. They don't understand it. When *Zarathustra* came out, I was living in Basel and I heard them talking about it, and they were all profoundly bewildered; they had not the faintest idea what it was about. It gave Jakob Burckhardt, the famous historian, a sort of shock. He was frightened by it.⁶ And when the

⁵ This was Professor Boris Vyacheslavzetz (1877-1954), a moral theologian and philosopher of law. His 1936 Eranos lecture, "Two Ways of Redemption: Redemption as a Solution of the Tragic Contradiction," was published in a translation by Ralph Mannheim in *The Mystic Vision*, vol. 6 of *Selected Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks* (Princeton, B.S. XXX, 1968).

⁶ For Burckhardt, see above 9 May 1934, n. 7. Jung's years in Basel, where he attended the Gymnasium and the University, extended from 1886 to 1900. Nietzsche died in the year when Jung, a new doctor of medicine, moved to Zürich. After Nietzsche collapsed

rumor got abroad that Nietzsche was in a lunatic asylum, they all said, "Thank heaven!" Then the case was clear: a nightmare was dissolved, and everybody was glad that that man Nietzsche was behind the bars. He had said awful things, but happily enough it was all foolishness, the dream of a madman. Something like that was the mood about fifty years ago, and nowadays it is not very different. Mankind has not become so much more intelligent in the meantime. Of course, we have had some experiences. The world war helped a great many people to realize what *Zarathustra* means, or to what it refers at least. But, for the most part, people were happily asleep in the dream of the Middle Ages and had no idea of such problems, as untold millions are still sleeping. They could live just as well in a time when the sun was still revolving round the world. So for such people the whole problem does not exist, and for them Christianity is still the best guide for their lives, no matter how the Christ symbol is understood. You see, it can be understood in many ways, in the Catholic way, in the Greek Orthodox way—there are four hundred Protestant denominations making a fuss about nothing. And then there are all sorts of nonorthodox and nonorganized ideas upon the subject. But the central figure is still Christ. As long as people are unable to realize what individuality is, what the self is, it is projected and there is nothing to be done about it. If it is not projected in Christ it is projected into another leader or a mythological figure, a Buddha or a new religious system. And, of course, the number of people who are not conscious of the self, who have not begun to realize that there is such a problem, are countless.⁷ Therefore, one has to reckon with the fact of Christianity and to take it quite seriously as the best guide in these matters; for two thousand years, this system has been the best guide for us, as Buddhism has been in India.

As long as people can live in such a system, if it really expresses the facts of the unconscious, then it is good and there is nothing to be said against it; you cannot even criticize it. That means, of course, inasmuch as people are serious and have not simply put an *a* before their creed—instead of theism, atheism. I should not call atheists serious: they don't see that they are still theists in denying God. I understand by "serious people" those who know that such a thing as a religious experience is possible, and that it means the greatest good one could possibly imagine. Such people realize, of course, that the Christian symbol

in Turin he was taken to Basel and then to an asylum in Jena where he stayed only briefly before being taken to his mother's home.

⁷ See CW 12, par. 12, for an account of how religious projection may cut off unconscious content "from all participation and influence upon the conscious mind."

as it is handed down, as it stands now, does not provide a form through which a complete life is possible. And inasmuch as this is again a truth, we have the problem of what we can do or how we can live when that symbol fails us. For instance, we can assume that people who have such a problem are abnormal, that it is a sort of choice of unbalanced minds that simply cannot bow to tradition, who are too abnormal to be expressed by a fairly collective or normal symbol, so that even Christ as a comprehensive symbol, or what Buddha is in the East, is unable to express those particular whims of modern minds. That is the attitude of very intelligent people. They take it that these so-called modern problems are just sort of neurotic protuberances, more or less morbid, because they hold that everything that reasonably can be, is already expressed in the Christian dogma.

I had an opportunity lately to talk to some French people who are Catholic to the marrow of their bones, and for them that whole sphere of psychological or religious experience, which is so conspicuous in primitives for instance, simply does not exist. It does not exist, because it is in the church. But then you would assume that they believed in their Catholicism. Not at all! They are Catholic with an *a*, *a*-Catholics, but they are in the church. When they are positive, they say the soul is a religious problem, dealt with by the church, which has nothing to do with them; only inasmuch as they are connected with the church does the soul play any role at all. If they are negative they say that everything in the church and the whole psychological experience is nonsense. And they have to repeat it very often, with a spirit of insistence, in order to help the stored-up unconscious to abreact. They organize themselves most probably in a free-thinking society or a society for atheist propaganda. But their whole psychology is still in the Catholic church in its positive or negative form. To say anything about Nietzsche, or to mention analytical psychology to such people, is perfectly preposterous—you could talk to the penguins just as well. I felt like St. Malo, only I was not blind and deaf: I saw that they were penguins.⁸ They were only the conscious half of man—the unconscious didn't exist—and the conscious half was the walls of the church.

The Christian symbol is still alive because millions of people are alive who need it very badly even, and for them everything is still contained within it, anticipating, one might possibly say, what we get through the

⁸ In *Penguin Island* (New York, 1909), St. Malo (d. 621) is mentioned, but it is one St. Muel who, seeing but dimly the penguins on the island where he had landed, baptized them as very small men. Jung also discusses *Penguin Island* in *Dream Sem.*, p. 88.

collective unconscious in a certain form. For we constantly need Christian concepts in order to understand the collective unconscious. We apply Eastern concepts as well, but we also amplify them in order to explain what is in the Christian symbolism. It is true that late Christianity has a peculiar one-sidedness which doesn't fit our time, but that so-called spiritual attitude was once perfectly sound—it had to be. The knowledge of the conditions of antique civilization makes you understand why such a religion as Christianity was needed. Every emphasis laid upon the spirit was absolutely necessary; one cannot imagine what the world would have come to if such a reaction had not taken place. You know, when Buddhism first reached the barbarous people behind the borders of India, it came quite naked, without gods, because there were already two million gods in India. They were simply swamped by them, so, of course, as Buddhism was a sort of protest against the prevailing Hinduism, they thought they did not need them. They thought the decisive action took place in the sphere of man and not of the gods; even the gods had to become men in order to be redeemed. But when Buddhism reached Nepal, Tibet, and China, that condition of the Hinayana, the so-called small vessel, did not fit. They found there only the old tribal gods and fetiches and shamans, and all sorts of black magic, like the Bung religion in Tibet. So Buddhism instantly felt the need of gods again, and they had a series of prophets who revealed the existence of the Mahayana deities. The ideas of the bodhisattvas, who became even more important than Buddha himself, originated then, and all the goddesses, like Kwan Yin and the white Tara. They naturally had to invent female gods, of course not artificially, but through special revelation for this purpose, coming from the unconscious.⁹

So when this professor showed a very positive attitude to Christianity, I supported him, because I also have a positive attitude toward it. I could give you, for instance, absolutely psychological proof of certain most abstruse dogmatic concepts, like the trinity, or that point they made against the Arians (the followers of Arius) in the early church, that Christ was *homo-ousios*, of equal nature with God. The Arians said that he was only *homo-i-ousios*, *similar* in his substance to the Father. That looks like pure nonsense to us, but they killed each other over the question, and it is of course of tremendous importance looked at from the

⁹ The early religion of Tibet, called Bung or Bon, a form of nature worship, was replaced by Mahayana (the "great vehicle") Buddhism. Bodhisattvas ("beings aspiring to enlightenment") defer their own enlightenment to work for that of others.

psychological point of view.¹⁰ We can be grateful to the old fathers of the church that they came to the conclusion that Christ must be *homo-ousios*, of the same substance as the Father: such a conclusion was absolutely necessary for our psychological development. Also it was for certain psychological reasons that Gnosticism had to be abolished. I am against the destruction of Christianity, because I hold that for thousands of years, the majority of people will not be able to get beyond the Christian conception; therefore, it ought to exist, one cannot abolish it. One should cease the foolishness of thinking that all people are the same and have the same creed. It is absolutely impossible. We are converting negroes for their own destruction, for example. It would be better to go to Africa and shoot them down than to make them degenerate by becoming Christians. The missionaries preached that they ought to wear clothes, but then the English became intelligent enough not to allow it—well, they couldn't help becoming intelligent after a while, there is no merit in that. In certain parts of Polynesia they give a good thrashing to the natives who wear trousers. They must go naked. But missionaries have unclean sexual fantasies if people are naked, so they tell them they are indecent. People would have far fewer sexual fantasies if they did go naked—but it would be “horrible.”

Here is a question by Mrs. Bailward: “With reference to the prophecy about Christ that he might appear as the lowest of the brethren, does this mean a kind of Valentino, Mussolini, or mediumistic prize-fighter?”

It is exceedingly improbable that Christ would appear in such a form, unless Mussolini, or the prize-fighter, should fall in love with you or you with him. Then it could be. As long as such people are somewhere on the horizon or painted upon the wall, they do little damage. Christ, being the symbol of the self, is the innermost thing and that only reaches you *in* the innermost. Mussolini would never do that. The reason why many people fall in love with fantastic tenors and Valentinos is because they are far away, so they are perfectly innocuous; every woman in love with a tenor knows in the bottom of her heart that he does not care a hang for her. It only becomes dangerous when real love comes in between and then people run away as quickly as they can, for where God is the nearest the danger is greatest.

Mrs. Bailward: Where is the quotation from?

¹⁰ Arius (d. A.D. 336), in preaching that the substances of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were separate and only similar, made the Christ one who came into existence. The Nicene Creed, aimed directly at the Arian heresy, insisted on the identity of substance among the Trinity, thus making the Son, like the Father and Holy Ghost, eternal.

Dr. Jung: Miss Hannah also asks that in her question. The quotation is from the fifth chapter of St. Matthew: "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." That Christ can be the least of your brethren is, of course, very important.¹¹ The same thought is expressed in the more primitive Islamic mysticism, in a somewhat different and more complete way. (I have already quoted to you what my Sufi head-man said to me.)¹² You see, the Self is such a disagreeable thing in a way, so realistic, because it is what you really are, not what you want to be or imagine you ought to be; and that reality is so poor, sometimes dangerous, and even disgusting, that you will quite naturally make every effort not to be yourself. Therefore, the idea has been invented quite suitably that it is even very bad morally to be yourself. You also should not think of yourself; you should love your brother or your neighbor but not yourself. But unfortunately Christ said you should love your brother or your neighbor as yourself, and how can you love your brother if you don't love yourself? Or how can you forgive your brother if you don't forgive yourself? So one of the earliest Gnostic philosophers, Karpokrates, translated a certain passage in the gospel of St. Matthew in a very peculiar way—that passage where Christ says:

Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.

Therefore if thou bringest thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee,

Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift.

But Karpokrates interprets that last verse: If thou bringest thy gift to the altar and findest anything against thyself, go first and reconcile thyself to thyself.¹³ That is a custom in red Indian tribes; when a man is not at one with himself on the day of the council meeting, he doesn't go to the meeting for he recognizes that he is not fit to be just and impartial and true if he is fighting himself. Therefore, Karpokrates

¹¹ Matthew 25:40.

¹² See above, 9 May 1934, n. 7.

¹³ Matthew 5:22. Karpocrates (more commonly, Carpocrates) taught in Alexandria during Hadrian's reign (117-138). He is known to us mainly through the anti-Gnostic writings of the church Father Irenaeus (c. 149-202).

rightly assumes that you cannot forgive if you don't forgive yourself; you cannot love if you don't love yourself. And that is really Christian. But late Christianity, hoping to find a means to get away from oneself, invented this infernal idea that you should love your neighbor and trample yourself underfoot, in contradistinction to the words of the Lord that you should love your neighbor as yourself, supposing that you naturally do love yourself. Otherwise, how can we be impartial, or how can we forgive? Therefore, that Christian love of your neighbor has become most suspect. If anybody tells me that he loves me more than himself and wants to sacrifice himself, I say: what does it cost?—what do you want afterwards? For afterwards a long account will be presented. Nature will present it because it is not unselfish; there is no such thing as unselfishness in that sense. But if you can love yourself, you will be on the way to unselfishness. It is such a difficult and disagreeable task to love oneself that if you can do that, you can love any toad, because you are worse than the most disgusting animal.

Now Miss Hannah also says: "I understood you to say last time that you have to cast the mind away in order to see it *is* the body, and that this was what Christ meant when he said you may find him as the lowest among our brethren. I suppose I am like the Strasbourg theologians, but I can't understand what this means."

Well, not necessarily the body, but the body is naturally under the same prejudice; the body being the lowest in man is, of course, the lowest among the brethren. Those Strasbourg theologians did not understand what I meant, because no Christian of these days understands this point; we are all twisted in our minds through education.¹⁴ We are only told to love our neighbor and that it is wrong to love ourselves. For instance, one of the most ordinary arguments against analysis is that it makes people self-conscious: they only think of themselves. I say that is the very best thing you can possibly do if you do it systematically. You have done it in a dilettante way—you have only made fantasies—but from now on you write those fantasies, and as they are apt to be dis-

¹⁴ "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," a lecture given before the Alsatian Pastoral Conference at Strasbourg in May 1932 and published as a pamphlet in that year, and then in CW 11, pars. 488-538. Herein occurs the famous statement: "Among all my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. . . . This of course has nothing whatever to do with a particular creed or membership of a church" (par. 509). Doubtless the pastors could not understand how anyone could consider a psychotherapist a substitute for a clergyman, could identify a religious problem with the need for life-meaning, or could say that Catholicism is right for one person, a different denomination for another, and none at all for a third.

gusting, they instantly draw attention to themselves. You find then that man is worth studying and also that it is well worthwhile to live with the body. Otherwise, what on earth are you going to live with? You will probably evaporate. Well, if you are going to disappear in a fast train to heaven within the next fortnight, I have nothing to say against it, but you cannot live as a disembodied spirit who by chance got into the body of a woman and doesn't even recognize her own hands.

We will now continue our text. You remember the fourth chapter ends with: "Lo, I am a herald of the lightning, and a heavy drop out of the cloud: the lightning, however, is the *Superman*." Those are almost the same words as in the end of the chapter before and again we have the interruption.

When Zarathustra had spoken these words, he again looked at the people, and was silent.

Waiting, obviously expecting that something ought to happen.

"There they stand," said he to his heart; "there they laugh: they understand me not; I am not the mouth for these ears.

Must one first batter their ears, that they may learn to hear with their eyes? Must one clatter like kettledrums and penitential preachers? Or do they only believe the stammerer?

They have something whereof they are proud. What do they call it, that which maketh them proud? Culture, they call it, it distinguisheth them from the goatherds."

The German word is *Bildung*, which means a sort of education rather than culture.

"They dislike, therefore, to hear of 'contempt' of themselves. So I will appeal to their pride.

I will speak unto them of the most contemptible thing: that, however, is the last man!"

Zarathustra is expecting some effect from the lightning, yet nothing happens apparently, so he assumes that he has not yet said the right word to reach the audience—the word which penetrates—and he thinks that he might reach them if he speaks of the most contemptible of all things. You see, that feeling of not reaching his audience shows that in that inner event which is in the writer's mind while writing, there is a similar situation. He speaks the words and apparently something in him does not answer, something withholds his reaction. Then naturally, as a writer always does, he projects the inner fact outside of

himself into his writings. Now what is the thing which does not react in him? What is so dull?

Mrs. Fierz: He speaks of *Bildung* here but he himself is *gebildet*.¹⁵

Dr. Jung: His conscious conclusion is that they are proud of their culture or education and therefore would not react. But I want to know why it is that when he speaks of the lightning, either the rope-dancer goes to work or nothing happens at all—his audience doesn't react, at least.

Dr. Bahadurji: Because the self in him does not come up to the level of his expectation, it doesn't respond to him. He thinks with his head, but the self in him is not in it.

Dr. Jung: Yes, one could put it abstractly like that. And one could also say that the thing which doesn't react in him is the collective man, because the collective man in the symbolism of the unconscious is always represented by an assembly, an audience, a crowd. And he is standing before the crowd in himself, so it would mean that the man of the crowd, the ordinary collective man in himself, does not react: he is dull. But that man has very much to do with the self; in an integrated self that man is present. He is even the outer fringe of the self; the self is like a crowd, therefore, being oneself, one is also like many. One expresses a totality. One cannot individuate without being with other human beings. One cannot individuate on top of Mount Everest or in a cave somewhere where one doesn't see people for seventy years: one only can individuate with or against something or somebody.¹⁶ Being an individual is always a link in a chain; it is not an absolutely detached situation, in itself only, with no connection outside. It is sort of neurotic late-Christian prejudice that you should not love yourself. It is assumed that you would then be like a round ball lost somewhere in the universe without any reference to anything and with no relation to anybody. But as a matter of fact, if you can think with concentration, you realize how much you are connected with other human beings, how little you can exist without being related, without responsibilities and duties and the relation of other people to yourself. And all that remains completely in the darkness of *participation mystique* as long as you don't think of it.

So if you are, as it looks, an egotist, indulging in your own fantasies, then you are simply indulging in the fantasy of being cut off, all alone

¹⁵ *Bildung* gets translated "education," "culture," "civilization," and so on. As Mrs. Fierz suggests, Nietzsche was another instance of an educated, cultured man.

¹⁶ Jung defines individuation as "a process of differentiation . . . having for its goal the development of the individual personality" (CW 6, par. 757).

with yourself. Of course, public opinion helps you in that prejudice, assuming that anybody alone with himself is necessarily an egotist. When a person is quite modest and does not speak because he thinks he is not competent, people say he is proud; whereas he may be a decent fellow who doesn't want to make the same fuss as the other people, talking about things which they really don't understand. Individuation is only possible with people, through people. You must realize that you are a link in a chain, that you are not an electron suspended somewhere in space or aimlessly drifting through the cosmos. You are part of an atomic structure, and that atomic structure is part of a molecule which, with others, builds up a body. Life is a continuum, and nothing is absolutely severed from man within the living continuum; such a thing would instantly die and be cast away. Inasmuch as we live, we are in the continuum of life. If you think you are separated, it is nothing but a neurotic imagination, and that is of course morbid. But that you are thinking of yourself does not mean that you are morbid. It can be systematic. So if a man feels as the writer does in this case, talking to an audience that does not understand him at all, it means that he is not in touch with his own collective man, or he underrates or overrates something in himself. There is a lack of balance in his judgment.

Later on, Nietzsche explains it by the fact that he has been alone for too long a time, talking to the woods and the brooks and the trees. It is perfectly true that if a man is too much alone, he loses the connection with the collective man in himself and talks about matters which are above the heads of other people; and that is egocentric, too much in his own sphere, so that he does not know the language spoken in collectivity. Of course, that he has a new message is an additional difficulty. Nietzsche did in reality live much alone. He naturally moved in a lonely sphere; then he discovered something new, which one can only discover in solitude, and he tried to convey that new message through language which was absolutely new and exceedingly difficult. He didn't know the collective language, so he naturally would choose the most impressive form, hallowed by age, a beautiful epic or hieratic language. Such people always instinctively choose what we call a biblical style, in order to make an impression on people; it carries a certain authority. It stirs up all sorts of reminiscences of very early youth, and so is likely to strike home.

Even that language does not help in this case, however. It glances off, as it were, and people remain quite dull: the collective man does not react. But a certain reaction has taken place; even the collective

man, though quite impervious to such language, can be reached through the unconscious. So, while he was speaking of the lightning or the madness, something in himself was reached: the unconscious was beginning to stir. It is also possible that in the collective man outside, the unconscious was stirred. That is true historically. One could not say that Nietzsche was completely understood—even those who made a great fuss about him did not understand what he really meant. But he created a stir, he tickled something in the unconscious; for he tried to formulate what is actually happening in the collective unconscious of modern man, to give words to that disturbance. Of course, Nietzsche could not expect an immediate reaction to his sermon because it must first go into the unconscious, into the belly of collectivity, and the reaction will appear in a quarter where he did not expect it at all. Well, he now tries another technique, he tries to speak to them about the most contemptible of all things, the last man.

It is time for man to fix his goal. It is time for man to plant the germ of his highest hope.

Now, how do you understand this? What is on Nietzsche's mind here? That is all spoken out of certain emotion.

Mrs. Baynes: Doesn't it mean that he feels it to be a critical time for himself and for humanity?

Dr. Jung: Exactly. He expresses here his conviction, his great emotion, over the fact that it is now time, that it is even exceedingly urgent. You find that in the chapter where Zarathustra is going to visit the happy islands and down into the volcano: *Es ist Zeit, höchste Zeit.*¹⁷ Nietzsche's feeling was that we are now at a great turning point in history and in the evolution of man. One calls that a "chiliastic mood." This is an ecclesiastical word, having to do with the Book of Revelation, and the idea of the kingdom of God to come, the millennium.¹⁸ And this feeling of the great turning point was not realized by Nietzsche alone. For instance, that book by Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, is in the same mood.¹⁹ There is the same conviction that something is going to happen, that the times have been fulfilled and something new is coming. Therefore, Nietzsche says that it is now time for

¹⁷ "It is time, the highest time."

¹⁸ In Revelation 20, it is said that holiness will prevail during a thousand-year period in which Christ will reign on earth and the ancient dragon, Satan, lie imprisoned.

¹⁹ Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), German historian, is chiefly remembered for his millenarian, pessimistic prophecies in *The Decline of the West*, tr. C. F. Atkinson (New York: 1926-28), 2 vols.

man to think of himself, or to fix his goal; it is time for man to plant the germ of his highest hope, which is of course the Superman. It is the idea that man must be ready to cast off or to change his former external attitude in order to give birth to a new being. St. Paul speaks of casting away the old Adam and clothing oneself or taking on Christ, which is the same idea of a complete change, like a snake shedding its skin and creating a new one; or like the phoenix burning himself in his own nest in order to resurrect again from the ashes in a rejuvenated form.²⁰ These are all archetypal symbols for a time when old things are destroyed in order to make place for the new. Now, whether that is true or not we cannot prove, but, sure enough, Nietzsche had the feeling that some great new revelation ought to take place, and he saw that in the idea of the Superman.

Still is his soil rich enough for it. But that soil will one day be poor and exhausted, and no lofty tree will any longer be able to grow thereon.

Alas! there cometh the time when man will no longer launch the arrow of his longing beyond man—and the string of his bow will have unlearned to whizz!

I tell you: one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: ye have still chaos in you.

He obviously speaks here of the last man in contradistinction to the people of our time who are still chaotic. The unconscious is not yet synthesized; that is, there is still a sort of melting pot in them where the elements can be re-formed, where new figures or new orders can be created. The old alchemistic philosophy tried to do that. The original condition of man was represented by chaotic pieces of elements that found themselves together with no order, quite incidentally; and then by the process of fire they were melted together, producing, it was assumed, a new spiritual development. That was due to a fundamental idea of alchemistic philosophy which expressed itself by symbols of chemistry. They could not use philosophical or even psychological terms, because the church made it much too dangerous to talk of such things. But the existence of chemistry was in itself an evidence of the powers that were breaking loose immediately after the beginning of the Reformation. That movement, however, which was really equal to

²⁰ "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (I Corinthians 15:22). "And so it is written, the First Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam made a quickening spirit" (I Corinthians 15:45).

modern psychology, had to move underground. It has to express itself by intricate symbols, just as early Christianity used mystery terms. Instead of saying "Christ," they used the word *poimen*, for instance. In the whole book of Hermas, which is surely Christian—at least, he was supposed to be the brother of the second pope—the name of Christ is not mentioned at all; he is referred to only as the *poimen*.²¹ And baptism and the communion could only be alluded to by certain symbols, because of the danger of persecution. To have somewhat radical or liberal views was a very serious matter in the Middle Ages: one risked being roasted. Of course, Nietzsche knew nothing of alchemy. I am quite certain that he never read such stuff, for in his time those old medieval philosophers were thought of as being sort of idiots with idiotic fantasies. So that idea of the chaos in everybody is to him like a speech metaphor, but it is apt symbolism for the disordered condition of an unconscious that is not yet synthesized.

This is expressed in every individual by a certain lack of orientation, a vagueness, a feeling of being suspected, and of drifting, finding no direction and no meaning in life. In certain stages of analysis, particularly in the beginning, people realize very clearly that they have chaos in themselves and they feel lost in it. They don't know where that chaotic movement leads: often they don't understand at all what they are doing or what the analyst is talking about. It all looks perfectly aimless and incidental. Now, Nietzsche's idea is that out of that lack of order, a dancing star should be born. Here is the symbol of dancing again. Where have we met it before?

Miss Hannah: The old anchorite says Zarathustra is going his way like a dancer.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. So the dancing refers to Zarathustra, but there are other parallels later on. The dancing star would be in the twinkling star for instance, and the star would symbolize what in this case?

Mr. Baumann: Individuation.

Dr. Jung: Yes, it would be a symbol of individuation, a symbol of the concentration of one living spark, the spark of fire that fell into creation, according to the Gnostic myth.²²

Mr. Baumann: Zarathustra said that one might find the germ of the

²¹ *Poimen*: shepherd, watcher, protector. *The Shepherd of Hermas* consisted in lessons for instruction in Christian doctrine and practice. Hermas was a brother of Pope Pius I.

²² Perhaps the central motif of Gnosticism is the presence in man of a divine spark (*pneuma*: spirit) which at once represents his removal from and his possibility of returning to higher spheres. See Kurt Rudolph, *Gnosis*, R. MdL. Wilson, ed. of translations (San Francisco, 1983), pp. 57f.

highest hope in man. Does that mean that the individuated man is the last hope of man?

Dr. Jung: Well, this germ of the highest hope is the star. Man should plant a germ, which would grow up in the form of plant, and the plant would create a flower which would be the star. It would be what we call the Yoga plant, with the star flower. It is an age-old poetical metaphor to call a meadow full of flowers an image of the sky with its thousands of stars; flowers have those starlike forms, symmetrical structures. So if man succeeds in planting that germ, it is as if he were pregnant with a twinkling star. That explains also the dancing movement, the incessant twinkling of a star symbolizes its peculiar emanating activity. And this idea or feeling or intuition—whatever one calls it—explains the many arms of the Hindu gods. They represent the extraordinary twinkling activity of the divine body. Those arms are all moving. They symbolize an enormous activity emanating from the god. The figure of the creative Shiva, Shiva in his perfect manifestation—particularly in the Lamaistic cult—has thirty-six arms, or sometimes even seventy-two. They form a corona round him like the emanating rays of a sun or a star.²³

Therefore, Nietzsche says later on, speaking to man: “Art thou a new power and a new law, a first movement, a wheel that rolls out of itself? Canst thou force the stars that they turn round thyself?” Here we have that same symbolism, the rotation and also the star. Then again, later: “It is terrible being alone with the judge and the revenger of thine own law; thus a star is cast out into the empty space and into the icy breath of solitude.” That is also a symbol of individuation. Another reference to it is: “But my brother, if thou wantest to be a star”—meaning the Superman. And again, speaking of individuation: “The ray of a star may shine in your life and your hope may be called: ‘I am, I give birth to the Superman.’” Then besides the star and the wheel, there is the symbol of the golden ball. Perhaps you know the German fairy tale about the princess who lost her golden ball in a deep well where the frog prince was watching it. She wanted to get it back, but he said: “Only if you allow me to share your seat at the table, eat from your own dish, drink from your own goblet, and share your little bed.” She agreed very reluctantly, but when he crept into her bed, she threw him out against the wall, and then he transformed into a beautiful

²³ Lamaism is the Buddhism of Tibet, a sect of the Mahayana branch. The multiplicity of arms in the gods symbolizes power and complexity of aspect.

prince.²⁴ Here Nietzsche says: "Verily, Zarathustra had a goal, he threw his ball, now ye others, I throw the golden ball to you," meaning: I, Zarathustra, have accomplished individuation and I now throw the golden ball to you; this is the idea of the Superman again.

Now, Nietzsche speaks here of the last man who is not able to individuate, who has no chaos in himself and therefore no motive to give birth to a star. That would be the man who is completely exhausted, who is absolutely satisfied, and who doesn't know of any further evolution. Therefore he asks:

"What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?"—so asketh the last man and blinketh.

The earth hath then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. His species is ineradicable like that of the ground-flea, the last man liveth longest.

"We have discovered happiness"—say the last men, and blink thereby.

They have left the regions where it is hard to live, for they need warmth. One still loveth one's neighbour and rubbeth against him; for one needeth warmth.

Turning ill and being distrustful, they consider sinful: they walk warily. He is a fool who still stumbleth over stones or men!

What is this? What kind of attitude does he describe in this last man?

Mrs. Bailward: Playing for safety.

Mrs. Fierz: In that book by William James about religious experiences, there is a good passage where he says we must be prepared for everything, we don't know whether God exists or not, so we must make ourselves as if he lived and yet as if he did not live; we must say yes, and yet make safe and say no.²⁵

Dr. Jung: Safe in every case. Yes, it is a sort of opportunism, as what he describes here is a sort of opportunistic attitude. He describes the collective man of his day, hoping to reach them by describing them to themselves; he paints a picture of the last man for them and they think it is far away in the future, but what he describes is simply the ideal man, an ideal rationalist or the ideal opportunist. He hopes to touch them in that way, that they may see, that their eyes may be opened to what they really are. But, you know, it is not at all foolish that people

²⁴ The Grimm fairy tale, "The Frog King."

²⁵ In the concluding pages of his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1902), William James sketches his own modest "over-belief" in a god or gods of limited power (given the persistence of evil) offering no guarantees of salvation or immortality.

should be conservative to a certain extent, or that everybody should have their little pleasures for the day and for the night, and have a regard for their health. Nietzsche himself had no sense of pleasure—well, perhaps he had a certain amount of pleasure out of life, but it was precious little—and as for his health, he lived on bottles. He could not sleep, he took chloral by the heap, so if he had discovered a little happiness, it would not have been so bad. You see, he reviles the collective man who really can live. Of course, if one is doing nothing but that, life is not worthwhile; it is not meant that one should do that and nothing else. But he means the ordinary collective man who unfortunately believes in the righteousness of his principles, his only mistake being that he overlooks the fact that the world has a certain depth, that there are certain things behind the screen, and that the future of mankind already casts its shadow. Zarathustra is very impatient with that poor collective man, which is of course the reason why he does not reach him.

Mrs. Baumann: It sounds as if he were describing the Christian Scientists. Or is sickness regarded as a sin more personal to him?

Dr. Jung: His description would fit Christian Science or any other “ism” because it fits the collective man as he is. Then at the end of the chapter he says:

“And now do they look at me and laugh: and while they laugh they hate me too. There is ice in their laughter.”

That shows his attitude. He feels a tremendous split between himself and the collective man. You see, he no longer talks of the lightning. He realizes that there is a great split, and that he looks to them like a “mockers with terrible jests.” They take what he says as something comical, a sort of cruel mockery. The chapter ends with the recognition of an almost incurable difference between himself and the collective man of his time. Now, that is of course a critical moment. Here he simply gives up hoping to reach them by the lightning, that the lightning could kindle fire in them. He says that he feels them to be cold like ice. There is no warmth, no connection, nothing that would bridge the gulf. That is the key word of the situation, and in that moment the rope-dancer begins; in that moment the rope-dancer is bridging the gulf, going from one side over to the other on the thin and dangerous rope. For the speech now ceases and the symbolic action begins. And the action will show what it means to Nietzsche to establish a connection between the Superman and the collective man—in other words, what individuation means.

LECTURE VII

20 June 1934

Dr. Jung:

I read last time the part in which Zarathustra deals with the most contemptible last man, and I want to ask you how you are impressed by that fellow. Do you like him? I heard a rather interesting reaction about him the other day.

Mrs. Baynes: I thought he was contemptible.

Miss Hannah: I thought that he was all right as a *piece* of an individual but not as a whole.

Mrs. Baumann: I thought he was the boring side of the banal existence of man.

Dr. Jung: Well, somebody who is a great enthusiast about Nietzsche told me that he found the last man not so contemptible after all; he thought he was a fairly acceptable individual and that his ideas were not so bad. For instance, Zarathustra says: "Turning ill and being distrustful, they consider sinful: they walk warily. He is a fool who stumbleth over stones or men!" I would not contradict that. "One still loveth his neighbour and rubbeth against him, for one needeth warmth." That is a perfectly tenable truth. And having regard for health, I should say was not too bad when you remember what Zarathustra says about the valuation and appreciation of the body. Later on there is a chapter where he curses those who despise the body, and these last men surely have high regard for health, which means the functioning of the body. So that last man is a very ordinary and quite reasonable individual, with nothing particularly excessive. Then he says: "One no longer becometh poor or rich; both are too burdensome." Again a very reasonable standpoint. If people did not follow such ideals the world would be even more a hell of a chaos than it is today. If people would be a bit more reasonable, with less passion for being very poor or very rich, perhaps things in general would be quieter and better. You see, he is cursing a fairly normal human being, and if Nietzsche had accepted that man in himself as an indispensable fragment, at least, of his

make-up, he would have been better perhaps. He would not have been so excessive, and he would not have injured himself. Another allusion which is characteristic is: "One still worketh, for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime should hurt one." They don't overwork apparently. Nietzsche, on the other hand, was a man who passionately wasted his energies and no doubt injured his brain through a most uncanny intensity. Of course one can say that if that intensity had not been one of his characteristics, we would not have had *Zarathustra* nor any of his other books. But obviously the two things are true, not only the one.

Now while Zarathustra is delivering that sermon, he again has to realize that it doesn't reach the ears of his audience, and the next chapter begins:

Then, however, something happened which made every mouth mute and every eye fixed. In the meantime, of course, the rope-dancer had commenced his performance: . . .

How do you understand the fact that the rope-dancer has begun his task while Zarathustra was still talking about the most contemptible of men? That is a bit of psychological causality. We must think of the whole procedure here as a process in one person.

Dr. Reichstein: If we take this rope-dancer as the Superman, it would be a contradictory point of view, a contrast to this last man, who is quite entangled in matter, most materialistic.

Dr. Jung: You think that a sort of compensatory process is now beginning. Yes, the sermon is getting thin, one almost feels it. First of all he doesn't reach his audience; then, what he says is pretty thin because it is unjust. He really curses the man on whom he lives, the ordinary man. He lives on health for instance, and he is making just that thing in himself most contemptible. So what he says is contradicted from within by the facts; he says something which has no longer anything to do with the facts. And then whatever one says is thin and ordinary, as if it had been emptied of libido. There is no power in it, or there is only willpower, that miserably small amount of disposable libido which constitutes the so-called willpower of man. It is as if pressed out of him by a concentrated effort of will, but it is not supported by the instinctive truth, by the deeper layers of his personality. They then begin to proceed by themselves, to become automatic; they appear in the rope-dancer in an activity which is no longer Zarathustra's activity. But the rope-dancer is also in a way Zarathustra himself. That does not mean Zarathustra as he is here in the book, where everything is split up into

different figures, but it is a *drame intérieur* of the author himself. While he is talking in the form of Zarathustra, somebody else is going to work in the form of the rope-dancer. Then what kind of figure would the rope-dancer be in Nietzsche, looked at from this basis? Have we any category into which we could put him? Here is Zarathustra and the figure of the old wise man, and now we come to the passage where that terrible jester appears, the buffoon. There are a number of figures.

Mr. Allemann: It is that part of Nietzsche which goes over the gulf to become the Superman.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the rope-dancer is Nietzsche's attempt to become the Superman. You see, that was doomed to come off; he burns his bridge talking about the last man, telling the people they are utterly contemptible in forgetting to become Supermen. Naturally they then want to see the Superman. They call for the rope-dancer, because they cannot believe that it is possible to cross over the gulf, to walk on that thin rope over the abyss which separates them from the Superman. He should show them how one becomes a Superman: that is the urgent question. You see they can say: *Tout cela est bien dit mais il faut cultiver notre jardin.*¹ It is like the sort of empty talk which is going on now in the world. It is in every newspaper and book. They all say, one ought to, one must, but nobody shows how the thing can be done. There are even people who say it would be quite simple to regulate prices, for instance; we have ten thousand good propositions but nobody shows the way to carry them out. They say; *if* only people did so and so, but we have to deal with man as he is, we cannot make a system or a scheme where everybody is doing his duty to the utmost. It never has been done. Well, there have been some particular enthusiasts or particular blessed fools who did their duty to the utmost; they were either great fools or marvelous beings whose pictures were put into chapels and worshipped. But people in general would never come to the conclusion that they ought to do their duty to the utmost, because it has already been done by one and that is enough. Be careful not to imitate it; that is their morality. So of course when Zarathustra talks of the Superman, people are interested in the rope-dancer who is actually going to perform the great feat. This is the reality test. *Tout cela est bien dit*, but now let us see how the thing is done. And Nietzsche comes to an end; he doesn't know, for he is the figure that lives in ideas. Now, that is the archetype of the wise old man, who is a system of beautiful ideas. He consists of a tissue of the most marvelous ideas that have ever

¹ For *Candide*, see above, 13 June 1934, n.1.

been visualized, but nowhere is it said how to do it. It is only sometimes put before you as a sort of ethical program; one ought to. But as soon as you begin to apply it, there is only a spasmodic attempt of willpower. It means a terrible effort, and you feel that it is unreal. Therefore, it is unavoidable, when the sermon becomes thin, that there should be libido running over into another system, a practical system which will show how the thing is done—or how it fails perhaps.² I will read the text:

he had come out at a little door, and was going along the rope which was stretched between two towers, so that it hung above the marketplace and the people. When he was just midway across, the little door opened once more, and a gaudily-dressed fellow like a buffoon sprang out, and went rapidly after the first one. "Go on, halt-foot," cried the frightful voice, "go on, lazy-bones, interloper, sallow-face!—lest I tickle thee with my heel! What dost thou here between the towers? In the tower is the place for thee, thou shouldst be locked up; to one better than thyself thou blockest the way!" And with every word he came nearer and nearer the first one.

And what kind of system in Nietzsche would the rope-dancer be?

Miss Hannah: It is the shadow. Nietzsche does not do it himself, the shadow makes an effort.

Dr. Jung: That is a possibility. The rope-dancer could be the shadow, as we said before, but we must have evidence for such a diagnosis. Have you any evidence?

Miss Hannah: It seemed to me that he was the shadow, because the attempt failed; attempts that one leaves to the unconscious always do, because they are too fragmentary.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that could be called evidence. It is obviously an attempt that is destined to fail and insofar one could say it was a shadow attempt, an attempt left to the unconscious. The whole man is not in it.

Mrs. Baumann: I had an idea that it must be the last man as it is in Nietzsche, because that is the thing which has been left out.

Dr. Jung: Yes, we were dealing with the last man just before, so it is very probable that that figure would play a role here too. The first part is simply the mapping out of the task, making a program, and then the

² After Jung's break with Freud he continued to employ the concept of *libido*, though decreasingly in his later works. However, Jung used *libido* to mean psychic energy in general and not just sexual energy.

question arises about how that is to be carried out, and here the way is being shown. Sure enough, Nietzsche means: get up, ye last men, and try to cross over the gulf; and these so-called last men, these most contemptible ordinary men, are now trying to get across. Now, they are surely shadows. They are not heroic in the least. They are utterly inconspicuous, and chiefly characterized by more or less negative qualities. All heroic attempt has vanished, apparently; you would not call them especially positive natures. It is quite generally true that our consciousness is chiefly in the foreground—our attempts are chiefly conscious—at least we like to say so. Therefore, we call the person behind our backs our shadow, and the assumption is that no particular heroic attempts will be made by this person. The conscious ego is the one for that. The shadow figure has no body; it is relatively inefficient, and we assume that efficiency, willpower, energy, and all that, are in the conscious. So this more or less inadequate rope-dancer would about fulfil the role of the shadow also. And what about that terrible fellow who comes out after him?

Miss Wolff: Is there not a certain complication in this case? Nietzsche's real shadow, that is, the ordinary man in him, was not at all included in the problem. So the rope-dancer is like a sort of surrogate figure. At the same time, the image of the rope-dancer looks to me like a reflection and a criticism on the whole situation. It means to say that the way Zarathustra has just proclaimed of how to become the Superman is an unreal one. It is acrobatic, a sort of circus-stunt. It is a dangerous unreality, and therefore a catastrophe is bound to happen.

Dr. Jung: Quite. So it would be a symbolic demonstration of Zarathustra's psychology; it is performed as a sort of symbol before the crowd. Under ordinary circumstances that rope-dancer would have gone across as he has often done, and it is merely that Zarathustra has made his appearance in the place this disaster happens. He is interfering with the rope-dancer by his presence.

Mrs. Jung: I should have thought that the rope-dancer was the mind or intellect of Nietzsche insofar as Nietzsche is identified with it, and the buffoon would be the shadow who jumps over him. For, that Nietzsche's mind broke down is really the whole tragedy. I cannot see how the rope-dancer can be the last man. It seems to me he is the opposite, because the last man is here described as not at all daring, taking no risks: *he* would not fall down. But Nietzsche himself fell down really.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that could be true too. Well, as a matter of fact it is exceedingly difficult to judge from the beginning as to the real nature of

the rope-dancer. We have to anticipate a little. Later on, we see that the rope-dancer is killed and Zarathustra takes care of his body, but before he dies he says to him: Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body. This is the prophetic word, it prophesies Nietzsche's fate. His soul died in 1889 when his general paralysis began, but he lived on for eleven years more. His body lived but his soul was dead. So the fate of that rope-dancer symbolically anticipates the fate that overcame Nietzsche: Nietzsche himself is the rope-dancer and the same fate will befall him. One could say it was Nietzsche's mind or his consciousness; or I think I would say this rope-dancer symbolizes Nietzsche himself, though in a way he is much less than Nietzsche, insofar as he is a shadow only. Of course, the whole event here is a sort of play of shadows or a writing projected against the wall, which forecasts the fate that Nietzsche the man will experience. So we can say that under the disguise of the rope-dancer, Nietzsche himself appears as a real man who tries to go across that rope. And in that case, who would the buffoon be?

Dr. Reichstein: That is the real demoniacal force which Nietzsche thought the first rope-dancer to be. I think the first rope-dancer was the conscious part of what Nietzsche preaches, and the real demoniacal force which we saw in the speech comes here in the form of the buffoon.

Dr. Jung: Indubitably, this figure that comes out after the rope-dancer is a demoniacal figure; he is characterized as such. We hear nothing more of him here—whether he really goes across the rope. For the moment he seems to vanish into thin air. The whole attention then concentrates upon the body, the accident. So it is evidently not the purpose of the buffoon to show how one gets across. His task seems to be to kill the rope-dancer. That figure returns later on, however. But if the rope-dancer is Nietzsche himself, then what would the hostile figure be?

Mrs. Baynes: Could he not be taken as the negative feeling that Nietzsche has created in the crowd, which makes the crowd determined to thwart his effort?

Dr. Jung: That is indirectly true, but I think this figure really arises from Nietzsche himself. It would be the active shadow, a shadow whose power has been underrated. This shadow takes its origin really in those most harmless last men. Therefore the whole catastrophe is predicted in the last sentence of the chapter before: "But they think me cold, and a mocker with terrible jests." They already see in him the terrible jester, this buffoon that will eventually kill the rope-dancer, be-

cause they hold that what he says of the Superman is well-nigh impossible, and if anybody should try to carry it out, he would fall dead, which happens in fact immediately after. So the buffoon could be called an active shadow. The shadow is as a rule inactive, a mere background, or an indication that somebody has body—three dimensions—since a thing that has not three dimensions casts no shadow. If a person is more or less complete, his shadow is visible; if it is not, you feel that person is as if painted flat upon the wall. With more or less shadow, there is more or less negation or contradiction, and without that nobody is complete. People who have only two dimensions are identical with a sort of persona or mask which they carry in front of themselves and behind which they hide. The persona in itself casts no shadow. It is a perfectly clear picture of a personality that is above board, no blame, no spot anywhere; but when you notice that there is no shadow, you know it is a mask and the real person is behind that screen.

Mr. Baumann: Is that thin quality not expressed by the scene? There is a marketplace and two windows and a rope, but it leads nowhere in particular. I mean, if there were a river or an abyss that one had to go over, it would make the whole thing real, but a rope goes over nothing.

Dr. Jung: That is due to the fact that the whole thing is simply a symbolic show. You think you have gone across an abyss but you have merely crossed the stage, you have gone nowhere. You think you have crossed the Red Sea perhaps, but it is only a symbolic performance, like a play in a theater.

Miss Wolff: What I meant to say is that Nietzsche, in as far as he identifies with Zarathustra, is a rope-dancer. Zarathustra has just preached that man ought to *grow* beyond himself into the Superman. But Nietzsche does not grow, he does not take roots by assimilating his shadow. Instead, he identifies with his vision, and so it all becomes a sort of trick, like walking on air. The buffoon is the shadow which is left behind, "the last man," the ordinary man, and because it is left behind, in the end it overtakes Nietzsche.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the psychology of it; that is just what I mean.

Dr. Reichstein: Is not the symbol of the rope-dancer very unusual for this situation? I think it never could be in itself a symbol for a real surpassing of difficulties.

Dr. Jung: Well, it is a great risk, and for that the rope-dancer is an excellent picture.

Mrs. Crowley: He is able to hold the balance also.

Dr. Reichstein: I think that a symbol must be more connected with the earth than a rope-dancer, in order to fit into a real situation.

Dr. Jung: But that the thing is *not* connected with reality is exactly the trouble; therefore, the rope-dancer is such an excellent symbol, or an arrow over a river.

Mrs. Baynes: It is because he himself has to find the Superman.

Dr. Jung: Yes. You see the idea of bridging a gap is most characteristic for this affair of the Superman. And then, as Mrs. Crowley points out, the necessity of keeping the balance between the two sides.

Mrs. Bailward: Is it the balance between the opposites?

Dr. Jung: Exactly, it is the crossing from one condition to another, which is a symbol of the pairs of opposites, and the way by which one gets to the Superman. And the opposites are connected by the transcendent function; that is beautifully demonstrated by the rope stretched between the two towers. Of course, that the whole thing is in the air is characteristic too.

Mrs. Crowley: I think there is another reason for the symbol. Nietzsche is always referring to the bridge without a goal, and this is just a bridge: there is no goal.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he says man is a bridge between two banks. So the picture is very much to the point in every respect.

Dr. Reichstein: Perhaps in a teleological way it might mean to show Nietzsche that what he wants is not good for him, that he is not on the real way; the symbol would mean that the whole thing is in the air, circuslike, not real.

Dr. Jung: Well, it is like dream symbolism. When a dream picture is impossible or absurd, it conveys the idea that what one does is absurd, but at the same time it shows the way. If one takes it concretely, as it stands in the vision, of course it is absurd, and then of course the catastrophe is due. But if Nietzsche only could abstract it, dissolve it; if he could say, ah, a rope stretched between two towers, pairs of opposites which should be connected, and walk from one side to the other, then he would be on the right way. Then he could say, "I have the conflict in myself, a dilemma, and I should bridge that gulf," and then he would discover the problem of the pairs of opposites.

This is an exceedingly important point, because Nietzsche in a way continues the discussion which was begun by Friedrich Schiller, the first of the German philosophers. Schiller is to me a philosopher. I think little of his poetry, but I think a great deal of his philosophy.³ He

³ Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1757-1805) is best known for his poetry

was the first German to become aware of the problem of the opposites in human nature; that psychological split became manifest to him probably under the influence of the impressions of the French Revolution, which was a sheer horror to the people of that time. It was the first time in history that the Christian god was dethroned. Nôtre Dame was desecrated and *la déesse Raison* put upon the throne and worshipped instead of the Christian god.⁴ There was wholesale slaughter, heads cut off by the score—and killing the most Christian king was a thing simply unheard of. You see, values began rattling down like anything, as they are today, and as they were during the great war. Sensitive, thinking people were tremendously shaken by all those events in France, and it was under the immediate impression of those events that Schiller discovered that problem of the pairs of opposites: the problem that man, on the one side, is a fairly civilized being, and on the other, quite barbarous. He sought a way of overcoming that condition, a way that might lead to a sort of reasonable state; and the only medicine he found was in the vision of beauty, the idea that in the contemplation of beauty you can be united with yourself. Curiously enough, as an example of beauty he chose the *Juno Ludovisi*, an antique bust that has nothing particularly interesting about it. If he had said Apollo, or a head of Zeus, or Homer, it would be more understandable, but just that *Juno Ludovisi* is perfectly foolish. I think he must have had such a bust in his study, and he probably contemplated it and thought it a most marvelous face. So that if everybody would do something of the sort—if they could behold beauty—they could unite the pairs of opposites.

Now this problem apparently went to sleep again, but once touched upon it never goes to sleep really; it keeps on causing bad dreams, and Nietzsche took it up again. After Schiller, the line goes through Schopenhauer, but Schopenhauer was entirely pessimistic as to its solution; also he did not see it in just such a light. He was convinced that the world was a tremendous error. He felt that split as *being*, not psychological, but as a split in the world, as if there was somewhere a profound mistake in the calculation of the world; and he came to the conclusion that the evil was ineradicable. He felt that the world was merely

and drama, but his *Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man* were particularly important to Jung, not least in anticipating Jung's distinctions between introvert and extravert. See CW 6, ch. 2. It is not clear why Jung calls him the first of the German philosophers, since Kant, an even more important influence on Jung, was earlier—not to mention Leibniz. Nietzsche was influenced by Schiller's comparison of art and play.

⁴ See above, 6 June 1934, n.7.

incidental, that there was an unconscious will through which in the course of eternity, at an absolutely unaccountable moment, the world came to pass; that it had not developed historically, but came into existence as a dream image of the blind will. There was no foresight, no intention in the making; it simply happened. He went further than the Gnostics who assumed that there was a creator, the Demiurgos, who was at least half-conscious; Schopenhauer was absolutely pessimistic. But though to him the split was projected into the world and not into man, it is very much the same thing; he unites the pairs of opposites. Then he said it also happened that man developed an intellect which was able to mirror itself. He must hold this mirror before the intellect and it will see its own face and say, "No more of this, we will stop that whole show, make it invalid—and return to Nirvana by a complete denial of life in general."⁵

That is what you do when you project a problem into your relations or friends, for instance: you help them to annihilate each other, to do all sorts of damage to each other, in order to settle your own problem. One represents one side of your character and the other another side, and you try to get them to meet either in a friendly way or to fight each other. This explains the intrigues that always surround neurotic people; they are embedded in a tissue of intrigue. They suffer of course terribly from poisonous projections, but they always cause them; they even instigate them. Other people seem to be sort of actors in their private theater: one laughs and another weeps, and they tell this or that story to put those people against each other—and there they have the play they want. Of course, they pay the expenses in the long run, but the others do too if they are fools enough to fall into the trap. Also, in the history of a patient who is still embedded in his family, you will see that he usually succeeds in getting members of his family into pairs of opposites, dressing them up to play different roles. The daughter projects into the father and mother, for instance, or the parents into the children. Or in political groups, they even project their problems into the political parties.

⁵ Jung, describing in his autobiography the period between the ages of 16 and 19 as devoted to a study of philosophical and religious writing to help him with his personal spiritual problems, says that he was attracted to Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, and Meister Eckhart. "But the great find resulting from my researches was Schopenhauer" (*MDR*, p. 69/76). Nietzsche said of Schopenhauer, "My confidence in him was instantaneous. . . . I understood him as if he had written especially for me" (*Schopenhauer as Educator*, tr. J. W. Hillesheim and M. R. Simpson [South Bend, Indiana, 1965], p. 18). Later, both men had serious reservations about the great pessimist.

The next figure to deal with the opposites after Schopenhauer was Nietzsche, who was also a sort of moral philosopher, and in *Zarathustra* he is actually at grips with the problem. His other works, *The Will to Power* and *The Genealogy of Morals*,⁶ for instance, are chiefly criticisms of our civilization—of course always with a view to the dark shadow behind. So Nietzsche is really a modern psychologist. In our days, he would have made a famous analyst, for he had an ingenious flare for the dark background and the secret motivations; he has anticipated a great deal of Freud and Adler. But Nietzsche had by no means a merely critical mind. He had, of course, a critical intellect, like those French aphorists of the eighteenth century, but he did not get stuck in mere criticism. He was beyond that; he was positive, and in *Zarathustra* he also made the heroic attempt to settle the conflict. And here he encounters the shadow, which he has already clearly shown in his other works. He tries to build up an attitude or a system by which one can overcome that terrible shadow which undermines everything and checks every movement, and it is interesting to watch the development. In Schiller, it was a sort of aesthetic solution, very weak, as if he had not realized the length and the depth of the problem. To try to solve it by the vision of beauty is like trying to put out a great fire with a bottle of lemonade. Schopenhauer made a more heroic attempt, but he annihilates the whole world; he annuls all existence in order to settle the conflict of man, and that is going too far. It is like cutting one's head off because one has a headache. Nietzsche came more truly and more specifically to grips with the psychology of man; therefore, his critical work was chiefly psychological, and he felt that the regeneration of man was needed, a readjustment.⁷

He makes this attempt, and you see it is not only a personal whim of Nietzsche's very personal neurosis; it is really a secular attempt of the human mind to deal with that problem. It has, of course, been dealt with in history many times before in other ways. Up to the time of Schiller it had been sufficiently dealt with by the church, which simply took the whole domain of the unconscious, the shadow part of human-

⁶ See *Genealogy* and *WP* in List of Bibliographic Abbreviations. *WP* is an assemblage of aphorisms and notes (1901), originally by Nietzsche's sister who is now known to have been a bowdlerizer.

⁷ Nietzsche's theory of the "bad conscience" in *Genealogy* is very similar to Freud's "super ego." Also Nietzsche and Freud use the term *das es* for the impersonal part of the psyche. Alfred Adler sometimes cited Nietzsche, but insisted that "individual psychology has erroneously been placed near Nietzsche." See *Superiority and Social Unrest* (New York, 1973), p. 209.

ity, and expressed it in symbols; and they represented the whole thing as settled once and forever. If there should be any disturbance, there were the means of grace of the church. It was, and is still, a most elaborate magic system by which to settle every question. But the moment when that system becomes invalid through historical events like the French Revolution, the problem appears in the psychology of man. People who are still really in the Catholic church have no unconscious. For instance, a book has just appeared, by a Catholic, called *Das Dunkle Reich in Uns*, *The Dark Kingdom in Us*, which is about the psychological problem; and the author says that there is no proof of the existence of the unconscious—that there really is no unconscious—it is merely imagination.⁸ Of course, almost any man nowadays in his normal senses, as we must assume he is, is simply unable to make such a statement; but a Catholic can easily, because he really has no unconscious. It is in the church.

I have talked to very intelligent people in France about this question, and the Protestants and Jews understood what I meant, but the normal French Catholic does not understand at all, because for him the unconscious doesn't exist. Even if he doesn't believe in the church, he is at least an atheist, which means a good Catholic. I once treated a patient who was considered most conservative, the blackest of Catholics—she even had very close relations with the cardinals in Rome—but after I had known her for ten years she told me, “I don't believe in God, I don't believe in the Pope, in the immortality of the soul, in Christ, in the forgiveness of sins. I believe nothing of all that, yet I shall die in the church.” You see, such a person has no unconscious. It is a most remarkable fact, which we can hardly understand. Then a very educated and intelligent Catholic with an academic training said to me, “I really cannot see why you take such trouble with psychology; if there is any question, I ask my bishop and he tells me what to think about it; and if he doesn't know he writes to Rome and there in the Propaganda Fide they tell him exactly; for two thousand years they have sat there and unraveled these matters.” Now even if it were true that the Propaganda Fide⁹ could answer certain questions, if I didn't understand it, if it did not express myself, I could not accept it. But they can accept it because it has never been in them. It is exactly as if it were a matter of

⁸ Alexander Spesz's *Das Dunkle Reich in Uns* (The Dark Kingdom in Us) appeared in this same year. Besides parapsychology, Spesz was interested in Catholic theology.

⁹ A congregation for the Propagation of the Faith was proposed by Ramon Llull in the 13th century and was eventually established in the Roman Catholic *curia* as its missionary arm. *Selected Works of Ramon Llull*, ed. and trans. A. Bonner (Princeton, 1985).

some detail in the life of the Polar Eskimos. I never have seen the Polar Eskimos, but I know there is such a tribe and I know a man who knows about them; so if I want to know what the Polar Eskimos eat for their midday meal, I simply write a letter to that man and he tells me they eat walrus steak, and I think he must know and accept it because I never was in the country. So these Catholics have never had any experience of the unconscious; they were never concerned with it, so they easily can accept what they say about it in Rome. But the Propaganda Fide is in the church, you know, and funnily enough it remains there. Even if they don't believe the whole dogma of the church, they still have it there; they just put an *a* before it: if only a negation, it remains. Those fellows to whom I talked were convinced atheists. Therefore, Bernard Shaw makes that joke about a man in the extremity of doubt who finally breaks down and says: I am absolutely shaken in my atheistic belief.¹⁰

Mrs. Case: Is it not a very immoral position, leaving all those questions to other people?

Dr. Jung: I should say so. Such people ought to be punished. It is really very mean, particularly for other people who get the bad end of it.

Now, we are still concerned with the buffoon, and we concluded that this was really an active shadow. Ordinarily, the shadow is not an active figure, but is only a sort of passive appendage, a background, a mere exponent of the fact that there is a three dimensional body. In itself the shadow has no existence; it follows very closely where the body goes, and that is of course the normal condition, as it should be. But as soon as there is a split, a disagreement with the negative qualities of man, the shadow takes a form, and it even goes so far as to separate itself from the person. That excellent film *The Student of Prague* is an illustration. You remember, he detached from his shadow which then committed awful crimes. The man himself kept his word, he was a man of honor; but his shadow broke his word, and that led to a terrible entanglement and a catastrophic denouement.¹¹ It is a demonstration of a certain psychological condition, where the conscious is merely persona-like,

¹⁰ The father in George Bernard Shaw's *Too True to be Good* (1932) says, "And now look at me and behold the supreme tragedy of the atheist who has lost his faith" (Act 3). The play is subtitled *A Political Extravaganza*.

¹¹ German film directed by Steller Rye in 1913, the first of the horror films. *Variety* in December 1926 remembered it as a "gruesome thriller" in which the devil gives a fortune to a university student, "but in exchange, takes his reflection in the mirror away from him." A combination of the Faust and the "double" themes.

painted on the wall as two-dimensional only. Then the shadow is set apart and leads a life of its own. This is always the case when one does not realize what one is doing. You know, some people don't realize themselves; they don't know what they are doing. And other people know themselves but they don't know what is happening around them—the two types of course. That is the unconsciousness of the shadow.

The shadow is indispensable for making the whole of a personality; nobody is whole without negative qualities. This is lightly said, but in reality it is an enormous problem, looked at from an ethical point of view. It is so difficult that one knows no other solution practically than to shut one's eyes; if one doesn't look at it, one can live. But the moment one sees it, it is almost impossible, an insupportable conflict. If one takes the moral conflict seriously, it becomes insoluble. Therefore, people choose the way of the church or something like that, in order to escape the terrible responsibility. There the church steps in with her means of grace, or with the conviction that somebody has dealt with the problem of our sin, or is going to deal with it, so we are relieved of that awful problem. Numerous have been the attempts of man in that direction. The Gnostics, for instance, made very interesting attempts, but I won't go into that now, as we are here concerned with a very modern problem. If the shadow is separated from consciousness, it always has body, reality: it is a spontaneous and active agency. And inasmuch as the separation of the ego consciousness and the shadow prevents the integration of the whole of the personality—individuation—the shadow also contains the self. Behind the shadow looms up the self, but then in a negative form. In that case, the shadow has a most destructive power; that is the origin of the demoniacal forces of the shadow. Therefore, it is so important to have the right way with it. For without the integration of the shadow there is no individuation, and no reconciliation of the pairs of opposites, because the shadow is the opposite.

Mr. Baumann: There is an interesting picture in Bamberger's *Apocalypse* of a man who is connected with the devil: they are back to back.¹²

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is of course the problem. In medieval psychology it is the innocent little man with a huge devil behind him.

Mrs. Case: That would be connected with the problem of the freeing of the will, wouldn't it?

¹² This is probably Fritz Bamberger (1814-1873), a German landscape painter.

Dr. Jung: Yes. Inasmuch as you cannot integrate the shadow, of course the libido invested in the shadow is not disposable.

Mrs. Case: So individuation is really very much bound up with the freedom of the will?

Dr. Jung: Well, the problem of the will is also connected with it, but that is a side issue. It is one of the handicaps of the individuation process that the more you are split, the less you have free will, and then the process of individuation is inhibited. First, you must gain a certain amount of freedom, and you only gain that by the assimilation of the shadow. You must learn to deal with the shadow to a certain extent at least, and then proportionately you acquire free will. One has no free will in a state of complete dilemma, of complete dissociation or disintegration; that is obvious. So the demoniacal power of this buffoon is due to the fact that, being with the shadow, it is activated by the superior power of the wholeness of the self. For the self is the concept which expresses the totality of conscious and unconscious, and inasmuch as the unconscious is a limitless, indefinable, and irrational concept, the self is necessarily also an only partially rational concept; it covers something which cannot be defined fully. You can define the ego, the extent of consciousness, but you cannot define the unconscious, because it is infinite. You cannot establish a definite borderline which would separate the conscious clearly from everything that is non-ego; you can only say that your consciousness comes to an end here, and there begins the unconscious. But how far the unconscious extends, nobody knows. So the self is an indefinable concept because it covers the whole, the conscious and the unconscious; and inasmuch as the unconscious contains an extraordinary power, the self is an expression of that power. Therefore, one could say in this case, that inasmuch as the shadow, this terrible jester, is a tremendous problem, he must have a tremendous power. Now, under what conditions does the shadow appear in such a terrible form?

Mrs. Fierz: Is it not connected with the appearance of Zarathustra? In a figure like Zarathustra you see only its positive side, so the shadow would be enriched by the unconscious side, the shadow of Zarathustra.

Dr. Jung: That would explain why he appears in such a terrible form, but why should it be so destructive?

Mrs. Fierz: Because the self is so dangerous.

Dr. Jung: And why is it so dangerous?

Mrs. Crowley: Because he has not recognized it, as he must. He has been far away from the shadow, preaching the Superman, and it is as if that lightning had two sides, the constructive and destructive.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the conscious is very far away; it is identified, as Mrs. Fierz pointed out, with the figure of Zarathustra, the wise old man, with an all-embracing, benevolent truth, very beautiful, very meaningful and all that. Apparently there is no shadow in the wise old man, so there is a great distance between that figure and the shadow, naturally. But why should the shadow be so hellishly destructive?

Miss Hannah: It seems to me to have something to do with the will of the heart, which in spite of all disarmament attempts is stronger than we. In the same way, when he talks about destructive powers, he doesn't fully realize.

Dr. Jung: Obviously, because it is then not so bad; one can say that just because we don't realize the destructive powers of the shadow, it appears in a particularly dangerous way. It is so terrible because we are far away and underrate it. It might seem to be a mere appearance, not real, but this case proves that it is real, because it is the anticipation of Nietzsche's fate. It is as if this whole scene had performed itself in Nietzsche's life. Now, assuming that the shadow has jumped over him and killed him, why would that be? Have we evidence for the fact that the other side of the self is so exceedingly dangerous?

Mrs. Bailward: Has it something to do with the former inflation that you talked about?

Dr. Jung: Well, if anyone has a one-sided identity with a certain figure, it causes a certain inflation; that simply expresses the distance from the shadow.

Mrs. Baumann: I think that, inasmuch as it is a part which he cannot accept or get connected with, that part rises up and says: "If you do not accept me I will kill you."

Dr. Jung: Yes, but do you think it is necessary to put the pistol upon his chest? Could it not be said more civilly?

Mrs. Baumann: I was taking it for granted that it had been said many times before.

Dr. Jung: As a matter of fact, these things are said once and not many times.

Mrs. Baynes: Would it not be so dangerous because the shadow carries part of the god powers of the self?

Dr. Jung: Exactly. The point is, inasmuch as you are not Zarathustra or anything like him, inasmuch as you are a rational well-meaning normal being, you are convinced that you choose your life, pick your way in a more or less reasonable way, with a sort of virtuous effort and good intentions, and make something quite nice of it. And you don't reckon with the fact that while you are thinking like that, you are for-

getting that you are under an inexorable law which is a thousand times stronger than man.¹³ You see, we have experienced that. We make contracts with each other and they work for a while, so we make them a bit more certain; we increase the safety of our way of existence still more, until in the end we exclude every kind of interference. And the more we work along that line, the greater our safety becomes; but the greater also the chance that if anything happens, it will be a terrible mess. We increase the size of the ships on the ocean, we increase their means of safety, their speed, and all that, so of course an ordinary storm means nothing; but if there is a catastrophe, which never can be prevented, it is a most horrible one. We try to prevent wars, we make our situation as safe as possible, but of course we create by that the best chance for having a war. We gather a large army and enormous heaps of ammunition to prevent anybody from attacking us, but the other side is doing the same for their own defence, and finally everybody is defending themselves and this means a war with the most wholesale slaughter. Former wars were just Sunday evening rows in comparison with what we can do now with all our means of safety. Thus, our good intentions are always double-crossed by an unaccountable, unforeseen power which one calls chance or something like that. And we call everybody superstitious who is afraid of chance, who assumes that something ought to be done against it; we don't believe that anything can really interfere, because we don't see it. Yet the primitive man is always hellishly afraid of chance, for he knows that whatever he does can be double-crossed by whatever this cunning chance may devise. Some demon may interfere, and therefore he takes quite extraordinary measures of precaution. Certain things which might offend the demons must not be done, for they would take a terrible revenge. This consciousness has become obliterated in us, so we never really think whether God will interfere with us or not. As a matter of fact, he does and we call it chance, but that is simply another name for the same old thing.

Mr. Baumann: "His Majesty, Chance."

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is a recognition of this extraordinary power. Of course, we try to break its power by saying it is blind, it just happens, but if you study it carefully, you finally reach the conclusion that chance is a very peculiar thing. It is as if it had analysed that particular

¹³ Nietzsche: "those iron hands of necessity which shake the dice-box of chance play their game for an infinite length of time: so that there have to be throws which exactly resemble purposiveness and rationality of every degree" (*Daybreak*, book I, p. 130).

case and put this thing just in the right place, like the wasp that in order to lay its eggs in that place, lames the caterpillar without killing it by putting its poisonous sting into the third dorsal ganglia, knowing much better where the motor center is than the zoologists. Zoologists have to work for years to find out. One could say it was mere chance, but unfortunately these things don't happen as if they were chance. There is regularity and enormous teleology. It is the same with the unconscious. In the words you speak by chance, the truth is what you just blurt out. We first think the interfering factor has to do with the shadow; we make a slip of the tongue or something else happens to us and we recognize it and say, "Oh well, that was the shadow, it is due to such and such a complex." And we think we can unravel and eradicate it, and then it will stop and not bother us again. But the further we go, the more we see that behind that shadow is a much greater power, and finally we see it is that totality of conscious and unconscious. Then we again think that we have now come to something which is circumscribed, something tangible, within the reach of human reason. But the self is just as far-reaching as the unconscious; we don't know how far it reaches. We get into an enormous continuity with life in general, not only life in the present; it contains all the ancestral life of the past and intimations of the things to come—all of humanity. So we arrive at a conception of the self which is worldwide, a sort of conglomerate and accumulation of individual minds, and that is simply a conception of a god.

Then when you have arrived at such a conclusion, you naturally begin to realize all the things that humanity in former ages used to think, that the god is very dangerous, exceedingly sensitive, most susceptible to any kind of offence. (I don't speak of the Christian God now, but the god generally.) You must tread very warily in order not to disturb his peace, and you cannot cheat him; you must fulfil his laws, you have to observe all the necessary rites, you must be very ceremonious in the presence of god because he could take a terrible revenge. And it is a psychological fact that the self, the whole of man, is an exceedingly dangerous proposition. Every single individual believes in his own absolute importance, in spite of his weaknesses, his dullness, his unimportance; and we forget that through each human being that universal being is working and can produce the most horrible results. We should learn fear again. We suffer from fear in all sorts of phobias, but the reason that so many people suffer from phobias is because their fear is not in the right place. In the Old Testament, the very first principle is

the fear of God.¹⁴ It has been overcompensated in the New Testament by the idea that God is love and one should not be afraid of him. But God is the one *and* the other. The New Testament is just a compensation for the terrible truth of the Old Testament that in the beginning was the fear of God. If you arrive at the idea that he is also benevolent, it is a sort of secondary experience. Naturally, it depends upon our attitude. We can assume, for instance, that if we fulfil the demands of the terrible god; we don't need to be afraid of him any longer; then he will give us his grace, he will be kind to us. Or we can assume just as well that God is a kind father provided we fulfil what he in his terrible form has demanded of us.

Now this whole aspect is lacking in Zarathustra because his god is dead. And then god appears in the place where one would expect him the least, and that is in the shadow. The shadow is by definition something which seems to be utterly impotent, trailing just behind the body of man, an appendage, entirely dependent upon his existence. It is a most absurd and improper place for anything to appear, and therefore we don't recognize its uncanny power. Of course you can say the shadow in itself is not powerful, but simply an accumulation of all sorts of bad qualities in man; you can always depreciate it. But the curious thing is that if the god is dead and so appears in the shadow, then the negative qualities of the shadow become the armor of a new and terrible god. That is the experience which is still waiting for us. That is just the thing we are going to experience—that God appears to us from the most unaccountable and unexpected quarter. And so this buffoon who suddenly jumps out of the tower after the rope-dancer, represents to us something completely unexpected, nobody would have thought that out of the shadow such a horror could come. We are quite certain in this assumption because later on the buffoon says to Zarathustra that the next time he will jump over him too, degrading Zarathustra to the role of the rope-dancer. This substantiates our interpretation that the rope-dancer is Nietzsche himself in his own form or in the form of Zarathustra; and the buffoon is the part of the shadow that holds divine power, the power over death and life. If he chooses to jump over Zarathustra, he will do so and Zarathustra will be killed in no time, just in order to show Nietzsche himself that he is dealing here with a power as great as any god's power.

¹⁴ Once when Martin Buber (who accused Jung of psychologizing God) was asked why there was the emphasis upon fear in the Bible, as in "Fear of God is the beginning of wisdom," replied that the emphasis there was on "beginning."

LECTURE VIII

27 June 1934

Dr. Jung:

You will have noticed that the psychology of these figures—Zarathustra, the rope-dancer, and the buffoon—is extraordinarily mixed. It is difficult to explain their relation to each other, as well as their position in the psychology of Zarathustra and in Nietzsche's own psychology. Sometimes I speak of the rope-dancer as a shadow, for instance, then of the jester as a shadow, and naturally one becomes confused because it is hard to keep in mind the major proposition. It all depends upon the point of view from which we envisage the problem. I tried to make that actual standpoint clear, but of course it is quite easy to lose the premise if one doesn't quite follow the argument.

Therefore I have made up a so-called *soreites syllogismos*; although dealing with elusive aspects, we can introduce a certain order by using this. *Soreites* is the Greek word for a piece of logic. (You know logic is a science in itself.) The Latin word for this is *acervus*, meaning a heap of something. The German word is *Haufenschluss*, meaning an accumulation, conclusion. *Syllogismos* means the conclusion. There are always a major proposition and several minor propositions, and then the conclusion. The major proposition is the most important, one assumes that to be a sort of certainty.¹ If there are a number of propositions, it amounts to this *soreites syllogismos*, the rational conclusion from an accumulative argument. Now, I will show you such an argument, which is quite necessary in order to clear up these most complicated differences of levels and aspects.

In this case Nietzsche the man is the certainty: Nietzsche himself, Nietzsche the citizen, Nietzsche the anatomical and biological human being. And he is equal to that man, the first rope-dancer, who falls

¹ Jung hasn't got this quite right. "Syllogism," literally "reasoning together," meant for Aristotle, more particularly, deriving a conclusion from premises by way of a middle term. A *sorites* is a series of syllogisms.

dead and so anticipates Nietzsche's own fate; they are identical because their fate is identical. That is perfectly safe, a certainty. Now we come to the second proposition. The figure second in importance is Zarathustra who is equal to the Superman; he *is* the Superman. The third proposition is that the buffoon, the jester, is equal to the shadow of the rope-dancer, because he follows the rope-dancer, he jumps out after him and overcomes him in the typical way that the shadow overcomes the conscious man—as for instance, when I say, "You can assume such an artificial position if you like, but be careful that your shadow doesn't get you by the neck or attack you from behind."

(1) Nietzsche = Rope-dancer			
(2) Zarathustra	= Superman	(3) Jester	= Shadow of Rope-dancer
(a) Superman	= Demon	(a) Rope-dancer	= Nietzsche
(b) Jester	= Demon	(b) Jester	= Shadow of Nietzsche
(c) Jester	= Superman	(c) Jester	= Shadow of Zarathustra
(d) Jester	= Zarathustra	(d) Nietzsche	= Zarathustra
(e) Jester	= Shadow of Zarathustra		

We start the argument with proposition 2, that Zarathustra is the Superman, and under (a) I put: The Superman is equal to a demon because the Superman is a demoniacal man; he is more than man, which would be of course a demon in the antique sense of the word. (b) Then there is another demon in the play; the jester is described as a demon, so the jester equals the demon. And from that follows (c) that the jester is equal to the Superman. You can also say, for instance, that the demon is the jester, and also the Superman; therefore, the jester is the Superman. If A is equal to B and B is equal to C, then A is equal to C. That is a so-called categorical conclusion or judgment.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: Is it the same demon?—are all demons equal?

Dr. Jung: Of course you cannot say that all demons are equal if speaking of different individual demons. I use the expression, as I said, in the antique sense of the word, which is *mana*, demoniacal, the *daimon*. As Socrates used the term, the demon was neither female nor male, neither succubus nor incubus, but was neuter; he called it *daimonion*, which is a neutral thing. In German we would say: *der Dämon*, *die Dämonin*, or *der Incubus*, *der Succubus*, and *das Dämonische*. Socrates used it simply as a concept of *mana*, an uncanny or a peculiarly efficient thing, more than man, in a way superior to man, and in that sense to *daimonion*, the demoniacal. And that applies to the Superman as well

as the jester, in that they are equal. Then another conclusion (d) is that the jester equals Zarathustra, because Zarathustra is equal to the Superman. The Superman is equal to a demon and the jester is equal to a demon; therefore, the jester is equal to the Superman and the Superman is equal to Zarathustra. You see, that follows logically; it is like mathematics. Now comes the major conclusion, the end of this particular argument. One cannot say the jester is quite equal to Zarathustra, but he is equal in his demoniacal aspect, or one could say the shadow of Zarathustra simply, the negative demoniacal side. So the jester would correspond to the shadow of Zarathustra (e). In other words, the jester is the negative side of the Superman. Therefore, it is understandable that Zarathustra says: "But they think me cold and a mocker with terrible jests." He there feels his identity with the jester; namely, his identity with his own shadow.

The major proposition is now that the jester is equal to the shadow of the rope-dancer, and the conclusion of the former proposition is that the jester is equal to the shadow of Zarathustra. So one gets entirely mixed up. That needs to be explained: one cannot assume that identity at first sight—that because Zarathustra is the Superman, the rope-dancer would be a Superman. It is apparently impossible, but we will follow up that argument. The figure in question, the rope-dancer, (a) is Nietzsche himself. Now if the rope-dancer is equal to Nietzsche himself, then it is Nietzsche himself who is jumped over or killed by the jester, inasmuch as the jester follows the rope-dancer as if he were his shadow. So (b) the jester is equal to the shadow of Nietzsche himself, because Nietzsche himself is equal to the rope-dancer; and the shadow of the rope-dancer is equal to the jester. But the jester is equal to the shadow of Zarathustra, the conclusion we reached here (c). Therefore, the end of our argument and at the same time the conclusion of the whole *soreites* is what?

Mrs. Baumann: Zarathustra is Nietzsche, or Nietzsche is Zarathustra.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. Nietzsche the man is equal to Zarathustra. *Voilà!* That is black magic. We can write at the end *q.e.d.* You see, it means that this whole complication starts from the fact that Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, and it would not exist if that were not so. To put the thing in this form helps to keep the picture in mind; one needs such a complicated, magical argument. It is like higher mathematics. One cannot express certain functions or connections or conditions unless one makes a pretty difficult calculus: it is necessary in order to hold the whole argument together. One gets into these complications as soon as there is such an identity; the root of the whole thing is that Nietzsche

is equal to Zarathustra, so the two figures are mixed together. Therefore all the trouble, the whole tragedy. And one can only clear up the peculiar interchangeable aspects of the figures in some such way.

Dr. Reichstein: Do you mean that it is an unconscious identity between Nietzsche and Zarathustra?

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, I mean an identity in fact. He would not be conscious of it. If he were conscious of it, it most probably would not exist, or only partially, so there would still be an identity. The complete consciousness of a projection always destroys the identity; when you are entirely convinced, really understand that a certain thing is a projection, it can no longer be experienced as something outside of yourself. As a symbol is destroyed if it is understood: it is then completely superfluous. You don't need to express yourself through a symbol if you know what it means. Why not call it by its right name if you know what it is? Why make a detour? It is infantilism. You only need a symbol for a thing which you cannot express in any other way. Otherwise, it would be mere allegory, and then one asks why you should talk in such a stilted way.² Why not be natural, why be so allegorical, talking through projections?

Question: Then if one were absolutely conscious, there would be no such figures in the unconscious?

Dr. Jung: Yes, if one were. Of course that is an assumption. If a complete or divine consciousness were possible, there would be no projection, which means that there would be no world, because the world is the definiteness of the divine projection. According to the Hindu myth, inasmuch as God dreams, he creates a world, he produces objects. But a state of complete consciousness obliterates the world. The assumption is in Buddhism that the attainment of perfect illumination, or consciousness, means nirvana, positive non-existence. The perfect consciousness is the complete identity with divinity. Man has returned into the deity, the world has returned to God, and nothing is because there is no object any longer. Now of course we don't know whether perfect consciousness is possible, but we know that with the progression and extension of consciousness, the number of known projections becomes diminished, so we assume that if consciousness were capable of still greater extension, still more projections would enter the field of our vision. We would destroy more of the world, as it were.

² Jung considered his way of conceptualizing *symbol* to be a major difference between Freud and himself. Thus, if a so-called *phallic symbol* "means just phallus and nothing else, it is better called a sign—or in the case of a narrative, 'an allegory'." This saves *symbol* for an untranslatable way of representing. See CW 18, pars. 481-83.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: I don't follow the argument that (a) and (b) are really identities, that the Superman and the jester are both equal to the demon. The demon seems to be a quality of the Superman and the jester, but not an identity.

Dr. Jung: Well, both are superhuman inasmuch as they both have demoniacal quality; therefore, I say you had best express this demon by the term Socrates used, *to daimonion*; the Superman is *das Dämonische* in man.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: They are interchangeable?

Dr. Jung: You can say, "paradoxical aspects of one and the same thing." The proof, as I mentioned, is that Zarathustra makes the remark: "But they think me cold and a mocker with terrible jests." You see, that is the jester, but it is Zarathustra at the same time. So the jester is simply another aspect of Zarathustra, and they have their common root in the *daimonion*. In the case of Socrates himself, the voice of the wise old man, his *daimon*, always advised him, told him what to do or warned him. He told him he ought to make more music, for instance, and then Socrates bought a flute. And he was walking with his friends through the streets of Athens one day, when his *daimon* whispered in his ear: "Take the other road to the right, leave this road." Socrates obeyed and suddenly down the road they had left rushed a herd of swine, trampling down all the passers-by into the mud.³ A nice picture of the conditions of public hygiene in those days! You see, the *daimon* was very careful to forewarn him. That is the prophetic voice of the seer in our unconscious, usually symbolized by the wise old man. So the *daimon* is the Superman, the thing that is greater than man, yet it seems to be *in* man. If you have some vision or premonition, you are tempted to assume that you are perhaps the wise old man yourself, and then one calls it an inflation. Nietzsche himself was in the condition for an inevitable inflation. That explains his almost pathological megalomania, which was criticized during his lifetime, that megalomaniac manner of speech was a considerable obstacle in his way; people thought he made tremendous assumptions. It was simply an inevitable inflation through the coming up of that figure and his identification with it.⁴

³ Diogenes Laertius in *Lives of Ancient Philosophers* says that Socrates in his old age learned to play the lyre (1.4.32). But in the *Republic*, Socrates proposed to banish from his ideal state flute makers and players alike (*Republic* 399D). Something about Socrates' personality attracted an immense amount of gossip and tales, both short and tall.

⁴ Nietzsche himself, in a letter to Lou Salomé and Paul Rée, spoke of "my fits of megalomania. . . . Do bear in mind, you two, that at bottom I'm sick in the head and half insane, completely confused by long isolation" (N/Letters/Fuss, p. 68).

Mrs. Baumann: If Zarathustra is equal to the demon, then would Nietzsche be equal to the demon?

Dr. Jung: Obviously, all that is included in the demon because Zarathustra is the demon; he is the wise old man. Whatever Zarathustra is, Nietzsche is also. Nietzsche is the awful jester so he is also the demon that Zarathustra is.

Mrs. Crowley: If Nietzsche had been quite conscious, what would have happened to Zarathustra? Obviously he would not have been in this form.

Dr. Jung: I am afraid that is like asking what would have happened in the history of the world if the old Romans had known gunpowder and rifles. One can only say, if the same problem should happen to one of us, I hope he would have learned analysis enough to avoid that identity. You see, the *daimon* cannot be completely wiped out by the assumption that it is a mere projection or an identity with a fantasy; on the contrary, you can assume that you have built a certain fantasy and that the identity would not have been if you had not made just that fantasy. But if you detach from the fantasy, from that agency which works in you, then you become aware of the extraordinary reality of the thing; only when you detach, when you make that sacrifice, do you know what it is worth. As long as you hold onto it, you don't know what it means, nor how it functions, and then you cannot develop and it cannot develop. So when I have an idea that the wise old man has had his hands in something, I try to go back to my humble self and make sure that I am in no way identical with him. Then it is freed from my cumbersome presence, and I am free from the awful assumptions of that figure, I don't need to talk in such a stilted way, to produce hieratic language, to establish the truth of the world and the law of life, and to be infallible; I can be quite fallible, an ordinary human being. Naturally, I try sometimes to do my best and sometimes my worst, but I am in no way that marvelous being who talks so beautifully, in such a heavenly way, like the old parson on Sunday afternoon at two o'clock.

Therefore, I always say you had better leave God alone and then you will see what he can do. Most people who are on such good terms with God assume that it is their virtue, but if you leave the whole thing alone you can see how it works. For instance, perhaps you assume that you should not eat salt in your food because you don't understand why you need it. Then don't bother about salt, eat your food without it, and you will soon discover what it does. For heaven's sake, don't believe these things, the wise old man, the collective unconscious, etc. Try it, and see what happens without. It is very simple; don't touch it and you will see

how it works. So if Nietzsche were a contemporary of mine and asked my ideas about it, I would say: "Be your humble self, say you know nothing, you have no ideas, and if you feel that there is somebody who wants to talk, give him a chance, clear out of your brain and leave it a while to the old man. Then make notes of it, take it down and see what he says. And then you can make up your mind whether your ideas fit in with it or not. But don't identify with it." Of course, the thought probably would not enter his mind to ask my advice or anybody's advice about it.

I often meet very religious people who identify with the wise old man and I follow a certain principle in dealing with them. I enter upon their proposition and, according to principle, whatever they want I let them have to the end, so that they finally get sick of it. That is the old principle of Heraclitus, who said to let the Ephesians have plenty of gold so that their viciousness would come to the daylight; without gold they would have to work, but if they have gold enough, they can develop their vices, and then they will become obvious.⁵ So if you have to deal with people who suffer from megalomania, just favor them until they explode—that is the best way. If anybody is convinced that he is very good, let him believe that he is good to the very edge of his existence, for if you tell him he is evil, he will make a desperate *effort* to be good and never get beyond his conviction of his virtue. I always follow that principle with lunatics also—of course people with inflations are mild lunatics and sometimes not very mild. If a man says he is the triple god or the pope or Jesus, I say: "Why not?—anybody can be Jesus." But it happened once that I had another man in the same ward who said he was Jesus too; we had two Jesuses, and how could I make out which was the one? I simply put them together in the same room to let them have it out. About half an hour later I went and listened, but there was no noise, so I went in and one was standing behind the stove and the other tapping on the window looking out. I asked one of them, "Now what about the Jesus? Who is the real one?" And he pointed to the other and said, "Of course that is a mad ass." He saw right away that he was a mad man but that he himself was mad he could not see. So what can you do? Of course, you cannot cure them. But people who have inflations are not lunatics in the sense that their brain is already split and congealed into that form. In cases of inflation it is functional;

⁵ Heraclitus, himself a native of Ephesus, wrote, "May you have plenty of wealth, you men of Ephesus, in order that you may be punished for your evil ways." Philip Wheelwright, *Heraclitus* (Princeton, 1959), fr. 96.

it is still in a liquid condition, and the cure depends upon the attitude people take, whether they take a sort of compensatory or contrasting attitude or whether they agree and submit to the majesty of an inflation. Sometimes there is a very great majesty in inflation, something marvelous. Now we will continue our text:

When, however, he was but a step behind, there happened the frightful thing which made every mouth mute and every eye fixed:—he uttered a yell like a devil, and jumped over the other who was in his way. The latter, however, when he thus saw his rival triumph, lost at the same time his head and his footing on the rope; he threw his pole away and shot downwards faster than it, like an eddy of arms and legs, into the depth. The market-place and the people were like the sea when the storm cometh on: they all flew apart and in disorder, especially where the body was about to fall.

Zarathustra, however, remained standing, and just beside him fell the body, badly injured and disfigured, but not yet dead.

The fact that Zarathustra did not run away, but remained glued to the spot, means that he had a very particular relationship to that event; the rope-dancer who fell down had an intimate connection with him.

After a while consciousness returned to the shattered man, and he saw Zarathustra kneeling beside him. "What art thou doing there?" said he at last, "I knew long ago that the devil would trip me up. Now he draggeth me to hell: wilt thou prevent him?"

"On mine honour, my friend," answered Zarathustra, "there is nothing of all that whereof thou speakest: there is no devil and no hell. Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body: fear, therefore, nothing any more!"

This is the classical passage in *Zarathustra*, the prophecy, the unmistakable anticipation of the final catastrophe, his madness, where his mind or his soul was dead long before his body. And during his madness he was utterly gone—there was absolutely no connection with him. It was an a-typical form of the general paralysis of the insane, and he was quite bad; one could not talk to him. There was no reasonable connection. Occasionally, he ran away. Once he ran away from his sister's house, and was caught naked in one of the gardens of Weimar. Then he had quiet times when she could walk with him but he could not react if talked to; there were only a few intelligible remarks. For instance, he once said to his sister: "Are we not quite happy?"—perfectly reasona-

bly, and then he was gone, confused. People have concluded from that that his madness was a divine mania—what the Greeks called *maniá*, a divine state, the state of being filled with the god; one is *entheos*, the god is within. The remark was quoted as evidence that he had reached a sort of nirvana condition.

You see, we can assume that behind madness there is a sort of nirvana condition. That would explain why in people who are quite mad there are still voices which are entirely reasonable; and when they are physically ill often they become quite reasonable. I remember the case of a crazy woman who was full of the most absurd megalomaniac ideas, but the voices she heard, which she called her telephone, told her the truth. Once she told me something perfectly absurd, a megalomaniac idea expressed in an awfully involved and artificial way. I tried a long time in vain to get at the bottom of what she meant, and suddenly she became impatient and kicked against something, and said: "The telephone always disturbs me." "What did the telephone say?" She would not tell me but finally I wrested it from her. "You are leading the doctor by the nose; it is all bunk, you really belong to the lunatic asylum." And on another occasion when she was very unruly, I said: "But look here, if you behave like that, everybody will think you are not quite in your senses. That is the reason you are here in the lunatic asylum; one must keep such people locked up." She remonstrated and then suddenly was interrupted by her telephone: "The doctor is quite right; of course you are mad, and you need to be locked up." They were voices of perfect normality and insight.

Another case was a man, one of the noisiest individuals in the ward. He usually began at about five o'clock in the morning to be excited and unapproachable. He cursed everybody up and down and was sometimes quite violent, one had to keep him locked up. Then from ten on he was left in the open ward or in the garden, and when I came at that hour he usually shouted: "There is one of that dog and monkey crowd of doctors who want to play saviors and cure lunatics; it is all bunk." It was almost a stereotyped speech. But once when I came, that fellow was perfectly quiet. The nurse said he was quite nice and gentle, and he spoke to me in a normal voice. Then I noticed that his hands were hot and found he had already thirty-nine degrees of fever. They put him to bed and it turned out to be a case of typhoid fever which lasted for about six weeks. During that time he was a gentle simple being, most obedient and never noisy. Whenever I came to his bed, he said, "Thank you doctor, it is very nice of you to look after me." And he always thanked the nurses; he was a soft, charming person, really. We

got used to his complete transformation, but one morning, when he was still very weak he said feebly, "Ah, there is again one of those dogs and monkeys of doctors who play saviors." I thought, "You are getting up, old man," and within a week he could loudly croak his case, and then I knew he was cured. He was back in his normal state from an abnormal condition of health. Now, that man was in a lunatic asylum for almost twenty years and it is assumed in such a case that the brain is somewhat disturbed, that whole layers of cells are atrophied, but during the typhoid he was perfectly all right; then suddenly he fell back. That is a well-known fact. Therefore, originally, if these cases were treated at all, one made them artificially ill by using poisonous ointments or something which would cause an infection, because it was noticed that when suffering from high fever or infection they became relatively normal.

So the idea that there is a sort of normal or superior condition behind the diseased state of consciousness is by no means nonsensical. It is also possible that behind Nietzsche's condition there was a superior self which had no chance to come through. Consciousness was diseased, but the self was sane. For instance, I have just written a preface to a new edition of the works of Dr. Carl Ludwig Schleich, an older contemporary of mine. He had the idea that the soul of man is not at all connected with the brain but with the body, with the sympathetic nervous system, so that even if the brain is disturbed the personality is not necessarily affected.⁶ It was observed in the war that tremendous losses of cerebral matter did not affect the personality at all; there were only relatively slight disturbances of another kind.

Now, Mrs. Case has just asked me this question: "You stated that if there were complete consciousness, the world would no longer exist. Do you hold the opinion that outer reality is nothing more than a projection of the unconscious?"

Of course that is a bit too quick! I cannot say that I have any conviction about such problems. I say such things with an *if*. They are not articles of conviction or faith, inevitable conclusions or scientific truths. It is psychology, and psychology is a world of facts, events, all having their own nature. If you meet an elephant in Africa, it proves nothing about the being of the world. It is just that you run across an elephant in Africa. It can mean your end or nothing at all. It is simply a fact. And

⁶ The essays of Carl Ludwig Schleich (1859-1911), the discoverer of anaesthesia, were published under the title of *Die Wunder der Seele* in 1934. Jung's foreword is in CW 18, pars. 1115-20.

so you run across certain ideas in human heads. They are just there and they don't necessarily mean anything. We must free ourselves from this most unscientific prejudice that our thoughts mean something in the sense of producing something; it is exceedingly rare that a thought produces anything. A thought is a phenomenon in itself; it proves nothing. That a certain crow is flying across the lake at this moment proves nothing and means nothing. It simply flies. There is such a bird. So we have such birds in our heads and they prove nothing as to the real structure of the world. But it is important that we know that our world is a psychological fact; whatever we judge is a psychological fact. For instance, you would say that this matchstand was real. But what is real in the thing? It is what you feel. You see it here but you don't feel here; you feel up in your brain and nobody knows what the brain can do to your sense perception. There are certain waves of air which you call sound, but you call the same waves moving with less frequency vibration, because you feel it as a vibration. With a vibration of ten waves a second you feel the movement of the air; if it is sixteen per second, certain people can already hear a very low sound. So our world is relative to our psyche; therefore it does matter what we say about *the* world, because we say it about *our* world. If there is perhaps another world, what we say means precious little—no more than a louse on the North Pole.

It is an old conviction in Eastern philosophy that if you reach the state of complete or perfect consciousness, the object is abolished; the world enters into God and then it is not.⁷ That of course includes the idea that *our* world is a projection. Inasmuch as we hurt ourselves against such projections, we assume that they are real. So we cannot say the world is *our* projection. It is God's projection; a superior being in man has made the projection. Therefore, in the East matter is called the definiteness of the divine thought. The divine thought can be vague and then the thing is not, but if the divine mind or thought is definite, it is matter. It is quite possible that this is so; we have absolutely no argument to use against such a statement. For instance, you can substantiate the whole of theology from the statement of modern physics, because matter as we have previously understood it doesn't exist at all. It is utterly intangible, utterly immaterial. It becomes, and it vanishes, and the thing that really exists is a sort of energy or radiation. So the Hindu philosopher's statement that matter is the definiteness of

⁷ That is, as individual beings emanate from God and are thus doomed to the wheel of destiny, so enlightenment means an overcoming of separateness.

the divine thought is highly intelligent. You can say, of course, that this is a human projection taken from the experience that the world apparently disappears when we faint or are asleep. But you know the structure of the whole world suggests that it can disappear. It has no substance in itself. It can also be in a condition which is not; matter can dissolve into radiation, and there is nothing, not even mass; the whole thing has gone.

Mrs. Case: But is not radiation just as real as matter?

Dr. Jung: Of course, but it is no longer matter. Naturally, you must assume that there is something, inasmuch as you think about something. You see, with all these problems you wind up with antinomies or *a priori* categories. You need categories of judgment in order to be able to think about something at all; as soon as you think, you have already produced an existence, and if you assume that something is, you already think.⁸ So the idea that a world returns to non-being by perfect consciousness is a philosophical idea which we have to notice; but we cannot say that this makes or destroys a world. It only makes and destroys *our* world. Well, all this is most unsatisfactory, I dislike talking of such philosophic questions concerning the reality of objects. Philosophy has very much to do with the subject, and the more you think things, the more you make them enter yourself—the more you obliterate them. You extinguish things by thinking about them; you make them unreal because you make them enter the self and then they no longer exist. For things are *our* world, not *the* world.

Well now, we will continue our text:

The man looked up distrustfully. "If thou speakest the truth," said he, "I lose nothing when I lose my life. I am not much more than an animal which hath been taught to dance by blows and scanty fare."

"Not at all," said Zarathustra, "thou hast made danger thy calling, therein there is nothing contemptible. Now thou perishest by thy calling, therefore will I bury thee with mine own hands."

When Zarathustra had said this the dying one did not reply further, but he moved his hand as if he sought the hand of Zarathustra in gratitude.

⁸ Immanuel Kant did not hold that thinking created existence, but that the human understanding—not the preexistent world in itself—is the origin of space, time, causality, and other forms of perception and conception, without which the world is unintelligible.

We see here that the dying rope-dancer is very close to Zarathustra, and in how far Zarathustra assimilates him. In which sentence does that become visible?

Miss Hannah: "Thou hast made danger thy calling."

Dr. Jung: Exactly. That shows in how far Zarathustra is the rope-dancer.

Dr. Reichstein: It is an anticipation, of course, but there is a parallel to this burial in old legends and alchemistic philosophy where the spiritual part must be buried in the earth in order to bring out something new.

Dr. Jung: Yes, like the grain of wheat that is buried in the earth in order that it may grow. If we encounter the figure of the rope-dancer again, we can assume that he is here buried for the purpose of a later resurrection. Do you know of any figure similar or analogous to the rope-dancer later on?

Miss Hannah: Is it the ugliest man?

Dr. Jung: It is quite possible that he is resuscitated as the ugliest man.

Miss Hannah: I don't understand: "Thy soul will be dead before thy body." I know it is a prophecy of Nietzsche's fate, but presumably he meant something himself by putting it down.

Dr. Jung: How does it sound here? In what tone does he speak?

Miss Hannah: It sounds like a negation of the Christian principle.

Dr. Jung: I mean with reference to the rope-dancer.

Miss Hannah: It would be to free him from the fear of death.

Dr. Jung: Well, when you are talking to a dying man with that intention, it would be a sort of last blessing, a consolation. The Christian parallel would be: Fear nothing; thy body will die but thy soul will live. And here he says his soul will be dead even before his body, "Fear therefore nothing any more." Just the opposite! But how is that opposite a consolation? I had not intended to enter upon this because it is really the anticipation of the whole tragic problem of Zarathustra which will be unfolded in the course of the drama. It is here in the bud, you can deduce from it the later developments, but it is difficult to demonstrate now.

Mr. Nuthall-Smith: He has already experienced the whole horror of dying when his soul dies; his body does not mean so much. Therefore, he has nothing to fear.

Dr. Jung: Would that be a consolation?

Dr. Schlegel: The rope-dancer said if the devil appeared, he would take him to hell.

Dr. Jung: Well, the rope-dancer was afraid that the devil would drag him down to hell, and then Zarathustra tells him there is no hell—and: “Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body.” So there remains nothing for the devil to take away with him. Now do you call that consolation? It would be as if a person were suffering from a very bad toothache and somebody said: “Don’t worry, I will shoot you.” One could understand it like this. But it is an exceedingly queer consolation.

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not connected with the idea that God is dead?

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is absolutely certain. It is an anti-Christian consolation. Of course, everybody would think it consoling to say: “Now don’t be afraid, man, you must get rid of your body naturally, but your soul will live. As the old Egyptians and the Assyrians and the Christians for two thousand years, and all primitive people have believed.” But here the whole thing is turned upside down and he talks as if that were a consolation. It is peculiar, yet I hold that there is a secret kind of consolation in it—but a consolation which is only to be understood out of the particular condition in which Nietzsche found himself in that moment. Otherwise, for any other kind of psychology, that would be no consolation whatever.

Mr. Allemann: Nietzsche understands that the body, the earth, is all and that the soul is nothing, the soul is meager; so there is nothing in keeping the soul and losing the body. When the body is lost the soul must be lost also.

Dr. Jung: Yes, he even takes it for a sort of consolation to keep the body and lose the soul. He has that prejudice of the late Christian age that the soul of man is nothing, not worth saving. It is even a great merit not to save anything so low down. It needs a tremendous institution to save such a miserable thing; nothing further can come out of man. The good we possess is all revealed. We are quite incapable of producing anything good out of ourselves. We cannot even make our way: it is all the grace of God. You see, in Catholicism there is at least the possibility of sanctification through work, but in Protestantism there is nothing but grace, and if that doesn’t work we are lost forever. We have a very low esteem in our civilization for what one calls soul; we only have words. When it comes to the practical showdown, there is no esteem at all, no patience. If you say to a man that he has to spend a certain time every day for the development of his soul, he laughs in your face. He has never heard of such a thing. It is ridiculous; one believes and that is enough. That one should do something about it is absolutely unheard of.

Dr. Reichstein: I think the rope-dancer has committed a kind of Promethean sin, and therefore his soul will be punished for eternity. So then it would be a consolation if his soul were not a reality.

Dr. Jung: And one could also say that it would be a consolation for the man Nietzsche who is a sort of Prometheus; and inasmuch as he is a Prometheus, he is a rope-dancer. Thus far it is a sort of consolation to tell him his worries will be soon over. For your soul is worry, if you have no soul there is no worry. This consolation coincides with Zarathustra's general teaching of the "blond beast."⁹ Be heroic, like a fair animal. Then you have no soul. It is bunk to have a soul. It means foolish psychological complications; therefore be heroic. Identify with that great figure of the unconscious and get rid of all that psychology, all those distinctions which just mean worry. To get drunk with the figures of the unconscious is Dionysian; if you have read farther, you remember that the feast of the ass is a Dionysian orgy. That is what he advocates as a means against the insinuations of the ugliest man, in order to overcompensate the ugliest man who is a sort of miserable Christian. In the cult of Dionysos it is even the main purpose to be drunk and unconscious, to end the psychological worry, to forget in the embrace of nature all the things that bother you as being too small.

In Schiller's "Hymn to Joy," you find this idea of the compensation of the small misery of man through the greatness of the completely unconscious state of the Dionysian enthusiasm. In that intoxication, the god enters the *mystes*. He becomes a god himself. He becomes the great current of nature, the stream itself, and there are no individual worries any longer. That is a way to deal with worries when they become too great. It is the hysterical way, to use a very cool word in that connection, and it is the way of the alcoholic, who seeks unconsciousness in intoxication. He runs away to the great universe from his personal troubles, as the hysterical individual tries to save himself from his complex. The other way, the psychasthenic way or the introverted way, is to lock oneself away with one's complex, to avoid other people, to avoid intoxication in order to stare into the face of the complex and to do nothing else. That would be the Apollonian way. Of course that is not understood in the term *Apollonian*, but by definition it would be that way in the sense of discrimination, discriminating yourself as marked by a complex in contradistinction to all other beings. Just no embrace to the universe, not one kiss to all beings, focussing all your attention

⁹ The much cited "blond beast" was a phrase Nietzsche introduced in *Genealogy* to mean man as animal.

upon staring into the face of the complex, being a monster in a monastery, settling down to the fact that one is excluded. That is another way, another means of redemption or way of grace if you like to say so.¹⁰

Now here he advocates the Dionysian way. Forget yourself, be dead to yourself; your soul will die before your body happily enough, for then you won't see what happens. You will not worry any longer. You will perhaps enter a dream, or a state of death in the sense of complete extinction, even while the body is living on. Already in the course of *Zarathustra* you see that beginning to operate. Nietzsche tries—or perhaps he was made to try—to rise to a more and more Dionysian condition. More and more the orgiastic hymn comes in. The deeper the worry, the greater the tragedy becomes, the more he loses himself in the enthusiasm of the divine mania. And that is prepared here. To a man like Nietzsche, gripped by an extraordinary suffering, it is a real consolation when somebody says: "All that terrible trouble which burns you now with the tortures of hell, will come to an end; you will go to sleep and not know what is happening to your body." If you have ever experienced such a state of oblivion in your life, where only your body lives, then you know all the bliss of the Dionysian revelation. And Nietzsche had that revelation. There are beautiful poems later on where it becomes quite obvious. He really got out of himself for a moment on the wings of an extraordinary enthusiasm, absolutely disentangled from the worry of discriminating consciousness. He actually suffered from an overintensity of consciousness, which is always the case if one is anachronistic, if one lives in a time when one is not meant to live, because one finds no understanding contemporaries.

Angelus Silesius was such a man; he lived in a time when he simply could not find his equal. Yes, if he had been able to travel to India, he would have found his equal. They would have said his truth was an old truth which they had known long ago. But nobody could understand in the West. And what happened to him? Well, he was a fellow who did not get into Dionysian enthusiasms because, as his fate shows, he locked himself away with his complex. He locked himself up literally in a monastery where he died. He lost all his beautiful poetry completely,

¹⁰ Schiller's (1759-1805) "Hymn to Joy" was of course to gain its musical setting in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. In his first important work, *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche distinguished the Apollonian or serene, orderly qualities from the dark, turbulent Dionysian forces in tragedy. But gradually the Apollonian gave way in Nietzsche's developing philosophy to the Dionysian until, as madness descended upon him, he began to sign his letters "Dionysus."

and produced fifty-six awful pamphlets against Protestantism. He had been a Protestant and he died most miserably in a hell of a neurosis in a monastery. You see, that was the other way round: his body died before his soul, and his soul became a terrible, poisonous demon—the soul of that man who had produced “Der Cherubinische Wandersmann,” that sweet mystic verse. And then fifty-six pamphlets against Protestantism!¹¹ That is something horrible, really satanic. But it is what naturally happens to the introvert, or at least to the one who prefers that mechanism. It is of course only faintly a question of type. I am convinced that even an introvert can use an extraverted mechanism if he uses the way of the inferior function.

Nietzsche had an extraverted mind, so he would use the extraverted mechanism, the Dionysian way. But you see both in Nietzsche’s case. He was first a professor at the University of Basel, but he was not quite understood, so he locked himself away with his complex and lived quite isolated. Then the unconscious came up with all its extraversion, and this time he locked the complex away from himself and dissolved in a tremendous extraversion within his isolation,¹² exactly like old Angelus Silesius—who should have discovered the cellar of the monastery and about a thousand bottles of old wine. His neurosis would have been cured, but he would have died from cirrhosis of the liver.

¹¹ Angelus Silesius (1624-1677), pen name of Johann Scheffler. *The Cherub Wayfarer* begins: “I know that without me / God can no moment live; / were I to die, then He / no longer could survive.” Rilke’s poem “What will do you, God, if I die?” is strikingly similar in idea. See also CW 11, par. 190.

¹² That is, Nietzsche, an extreme introvert, was, in Jung’s theory of compensation, extraverted in his unconscious. It was this, then, that was tapped in his fantasies of Dionysian celebrations of the body.

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October / December 1934

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LECTURE I

10 October 1934

Dr. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: We stopped before the vacation at the death of the rope-dancer, so we will start in now with section 7.

Meanwhile the evening came on, and the market-place veiled itself in gloom. Then the people dispersed, for even curiosity and terror become fatigued. Zarathustra, however, still sat beside the dead man on the ground, absorbed in thought: so he forgot the time. But at last it became night, and a cold wind blew upon the lonely one. Then arose Zarathustra and said to his heart:

Verily, a fine catch of fish hath Zarathustra made to-day! It is not a man he hath caught, but a corpse.

Sombre is human life, and as yet without meaning: a buffoon may be fateful to it.

I want to teach men the sense of their existence, which is the Superman, the lightning out of the dark cloud—man.

But still am I far from them, and my sense speaketh not unto their sense. To men I am still something between a fool and a corpse.

Gloomy is the night, gloomy are the ways of Zarathustra. Come, thou cold and stiff companion! I carry thee to the place where I shall bury thee with mine own hands.

What do you think is remarkable in this passage?

Mrs. Crowley: I think this chapter is the repetition of that scene of the lightning and the Superman. It brings up that point again. But I feel that it is like a preface to the next one, that it cannot be separated, and that chapter 8 again goes back to chapter 2. We can get it only by analogy with the second one, where he is coming down from the mountain.

Mrs. Baynes: To me it is that he accepts the corpse as his companion.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. You see, we could almost expect that Zarathustra, having watched the catastrophe of the rope-dancer, would be rather

disinterested, because it would seem to have really happened outside of himself. He might philosophize about it but there would be no close or intimate connection between the rope-dancer and himself, unless it was the very near connection which we established in the former Seminar—namely, that the rope-dancer is the human form of Zarathustra, Nietzsche himself as the human being. It is just that which explains why he cannot leave the corpse; he has to remain with it, to make the corpse his companion. Now, this is a pretty gruesome spectacle, I should say: that Nietzsche the man should be in any sense the corpse that accompanies Zarathustra, the corpse that is carried by him. This is in fact the gloomy aspect of *Zarathustra*, a cloud hanging over the whole book—Nietzsche being dragged along by that figure of Zarathustra—and it comes to the daylight here for the first time. “Verily, a fine catch of fish hath Zarathustra made today! It is not a man he hath caught, but a corpse.” We must pay attention to this sentence. It is important, because later on comes the realization that he needs other people just because he has not caught a man. He realizes that he ought to have other people instead of that corpse. You see, if the corpse is himself, then he is dead really, and he has to replace himself by the other people he catches—or one could almost say, by other corpses. They must be, then, instead of himself; he hands over to others his human life which he should have lived. Therefore, he says that human existence is uncanny and without a meaning.

The jester, as you know, is the negative aspect of Zarathustra, which means that an unconscious figure, like Zarathustra (we dealt with the different aspects of these figures in the last Seminar) could prevail against the human being to such an extent that the latter would be destroyed. That explains why he calls the Superman a lightning out of that dark cloud, man (lightning is, of course, utterly destructive), and also why he puts himself between a fool and a corpse. For people in general were quite unable to see who Zarathustra was, and so they took him either for a jester or the corpse; either it was Nietzsche himself, the corpse, or it was a sort of malevolent fool—in other words, insanity. People would not see the archetype which Zarathustra represents, the archetype of the wise old man. Inasmuch as this archetype was obvious to them at all, it appeared only as a jester or a corpse, a being which would either make a man insane or kill him. But Zarathustra is not only the archetype; he contains the self at the same time and is therefore an exceedingly superior figure. Now, what about this identity of an archetype with the self? Can that be?

Miss Hannah: No, because the archetype is the general idea, and the self the particular thing in the Here and Now.

Dr. Jung: Yes. The archetype is a collective thing; it is by its definition a content of the collective unconscious. It is an omnipresent eternal figure which one encounters everywhere, while the self is not to be encountered everywhere. The self is, by definition, the most individual thing, the essence of individuality. It is *the* uniqueness. And that one can only encounter where?

Answer: In an individuated human being.

Dr. Jung: Well, only in yourself. You cannot even encounter it in anybody else, only in yourself. The self is the immediate awareness of your uniqueness, and it is a uniqueness which is in a way most personal, most intimate. It is *your* uniqueness. Now, I grant you it is exceedingly difficult to understand such a thing intellectually, because it is most contradictory. Of course, we always have to keep in mind that the self is in the first place the personal Atman—to use the Indian formulation of that concept. But their definition is that the personal Atman, the self, is in everybody; it is the smallest thing, the thumbing in the heart of everybody, yet it is the greatest thing in the world, the super-personal Atman, the general collective Atman.¹ And we can accept that definition. It can be grasped intellectually even by an occidental mind. Yet it is not grasped properly at all, because the super-personal Atman is not the thumbing in everybody. It is the thumbing in myself. There is only the self, and that is *my* self, for by definition the personal Atman is uniqueness.

Now, I cannot guarantee whether the East understands it in this way, but at all events we can be satisfied with the fact that there are mandalas and formulas in the East, ready-made, so we can assume that people have understood this peculiar secret of the self. For instance, take the worship of a mandala, not like these chakras on the wall which represent evolution, but a mandala of completion, a Lamaistic chakra, where in the center there is either the thunderbolt, the *vajra*, the abstract symbol of concentrated divine power, or Shiva and Shakti in embrace.² When the Tantric initiate enters the center of the mandala

¹ In the late *Svetasvatara Upanishad*: "The Self (Atman) which pervades all things, / as butter is contained in cream, / which is rooted in self knowledge and austerity— / . . . This is Brahman . . . / Than whom there is naught smaller, naught greater. . . ." *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, ed. Radakrishnan and C. G. Moore (Princeton, 1957), pp. 90-91.

² Jung writes elsewhere, "Shiva, according to Tantric doctrine, is the One existent, the timeless in the perfect state. Creation begins when this unextended point—known as

through the four gates of the functions,³ it is understood that he approaches the god, which in the philosophy of the Upanishads would be the super-personal Absolute Atman. In other words, the initiate brings the personal Atman back to its divine source, the super-personal Atman. In the end, when he has entered through the four gates and has reached the center, then the climax of the contemplation would be the complete identity of the initiate with the god—if he is a man, with the Shiva, and if a woman, with the Shakti, the female aspect of the god. The two aspects merge finally into one, in the nonexisting yet existing Brahman, the potential world being. Now, in this case an individual self has become the universal self, yet when you approach the universal self through the personal, you carry the individual consciousness into the universal consciousness. Then the universal consciousness is identical with the individual consciousness; there the self in all its particularity, in all its peculiar personal being, is at the same time the universal being. This is utterly paradoxical, just as paradoxical as that old German mystical poet, Angelus Silesius, for instance, when he wonders mildly that he and God are just the same, that there is no difference between himself and God.⁴

You see, we must keep in mind that in our unconscious psychology there are these thoughts, which are evolved as the Tantric system, say, in India, or in Lamaistic philosophy, or as mystical thought in the West, and so we have to talk of them. This is not mysticism, this is psychology. It is simply the scientific consideration of such facts, which are constantly reproduced by our unconscious in this form or another. And here we find such a form in Zarathustra, because Zarathustra is on the one side very clearly the archetype of the wise old man, and on the other side that concept of uniqueness. Therefore, the absolutely indissoluble interwovenness of Nietzsche himself and Zarathustra of which we have spoken. This peculiar identity and nonidentity is in exactly the same relation as the personal and super-personal self, or the personal Atman and the super-personal Atman. Even when Nietzsche is Zarathustra, he is his own uniqueness, his own personal self as it were. Now, this thing should not be an archetype at the same time; the archetype should be differentiated or discriminated from the self.

Mr. Baumann: Could one not say that the archetype stands only for

Shiva-bindu—appears in the eternal embrace of its feminine side, the Shakti” (CW 9 i, par. 631, and fig. 1). Vajra is the symbol of divine power.

³ The functions (thinking, feeling, sensation, intuition) all represent a unique perspective. Thus, only by employing all four does one attain complete comprehensiveness.

⁴ For Angelus Silesius, see above, 27 June 1934, n. 11.

the unconscious, and the self for the conscious and unconscious together?

Dr. Jung: Exactly. The self is always the sum total of conscious and unconscious processes. It comprehends consciousness; consciousness is included in the self like a small circle in a bigger circle. The self cannot be contained in an archetype because an archetype is merely a content, a figure, of the collective unconscious, and cannot possibly contain the thing in which it is contained. The archetype is contained in the unconscious, and the unconscious and the conscious together make the self. "The self" is a concept of totality which contains all the archetypes and individual consciousness at the same time. The symbol of totality is always a circle, and one can say that in the center is the conscious, and around it is the unconscious containing the archetypes, among them the archetype of the old man. And that cannot contain the self, because the whole circle is the self, the totality of the conscious and unconscious. So it can only be a transitory condition in which the idea of the self or the idea of totality appears as a content in an archetype. Now, how would you characterize such a transitory condition? When is it possible for that condition to appear in one archetype, the archetype of the old man? There is one definite situation in which that can be.

Mr. Baumann: I think it can be when the archetype includes something eternal, not referring to the past alone, but including the whole development. The wise man ordinarily implies the old man who has had only past experiences, but he might take a form without time limit, though I have no idea what it would be.

Dr. Jung: Well, you can say the old wise man is surely the figure of the great teacher, the initiator, the psychopompos. And then he can contain the idea of the self for a while as a sort of vision or intuition. He knows about it, he teaches it, because he is the psychopompos who leads the initiate on the way to his completion. As a matter of fact, it is the rule in analysis that when the patient begins to realize the archetype of the old wise man, the self also appears in the figure. That is the reason why men have the tendency to identify at once with the wise old man. Because the self appears then, they are already in the wise old man, so to speak, and then they are sucked up and they become *mana*, important. They have an inflation and walk about with heavy heads, "*les initiés imaginaires*," as Zimmer once said very wittily.⁵ When a man is swelled up with the idea of possessing the big thing, being a hell of a

⁵ "The imaginary initiates" is a play on Molière's *The Imaginary Invalid*.

fellow, getting very wise, it means that identification. And in the inflation which follows, the human being goes to hell. For one cannot possibly live as the wise old man day and night; one would be something between a corpse and a fool. People would think so and right they would be. As I said, people thought Nietzsche was a fool in reality and were always afraid there would be insanity behind it. And he suffered from terrible migraines, he only lived for his health, he was a living corpse; that is the external appearance of a fellow who has been swallowed by the wise old man. But the wise old man ought to have wings, he should be a swan, not a human being. He should not walk about. He should make use of his aeroplane that he carries within himself. You know, in the East they suppose that the perfect wise men are able to fly. That is the criterion—as long as one cannot fly, one has not attained to the summit of wisdom. So let the old wise man be an air-being, a subtle body with wings, and don't identify with it.

This is one of the events which very often happens to the analyst; it is one of the forms of analyst-neurosis. Analysts have very peculiar neuroses. They are infected by all the transferences they get and their heads are twisted. They are poisoned, and as a rule they become sensitive and susceptible, difficult to deal with. That is always the infection of the cursed profession: they are cursed by their perfect old wise man. They should know better but they don't. Therefore, it is important for the analyst to confess that he does not know better, or he will know worse. Then he gives a chance to the patient. But you see, there is always the prestige of the doctor. The public wants to be convinced that the doctor is a sort of sorcerer or magician. The primitive medicine man, of course, lives on that prestige. He is identical with the wise old man, so very often he is sick or insane at the same time. Therefore, primitive people are always afraid of being made into medicine men. It is not an enviable condition.

Mrs. Crowley: I thought the corpse suggested his shadow, that this was where he was first meeting his shadow.

Dr. Jung: Do you remember our great *soreites syllogismos*?⁶ The conclusion there is that everything is everything. So the corpse is also the rope-dancer, and the rope-dancer *is* the shadow sure enough. But Nietzsche himself as a human being is in the same connection with Zarathustra as the rope-dancer with the jester. You see, the rope-dancer is the negative attitude of Nietzsche himself *and* Zarathustra; the rope-dancer is the one who jumps over the hesitating Nietzsche. Then in the

⁶ For Jung's syllogism, see above, 27 June 1934.

next chapter, the jester comes, and in the ninth chapter Zarathustra himself says that he is going to jump over all those that hesitate or are reluctant. "Over the loitering and tardy will I leap."

Mrs. Crowley: But now he is giving up teaching. He has a new attitude entirely after he buries the corpse.

Dr. Jung: Ah yes, the new attitude that will come is that he needs human beings instead of himself. Another quality of the inflation by the wise old man is that one gets a mania to teach, to be a missionary, to tell people all about it and take care that plenty get into the kingdom of heaven. It always creates a sort of missionary attitude, and of course the conviction that there is no other way but this way.

Mr. Allemann: Speaking of consciousness, is it possible, when the self is made conscious, to get over that identification, at least temporarily?

Dr. Jung: Well, as a rule you go through a time when you are identical with the wise old man. Nobody can realize an archetype without having been identified with it first. If you even touch the animus or anima, the most vulgar archetypes of all, you are they, and you cannot realize them without having been thoroughly caught by them. No woman will realize what the animus is without having been identical with him, and no man will realize what the anima is without having been filled by the anima. In speaking of such things, I say: "as if": it is *as if* these archetypes were each of them stronger than the ego. They easily catch hold of you and you are possessed as if they were lions or bears, say—primitive forces which are quite definitely stronger than you. You see, our prejudice is that we are sitting on top of the mountain with our conscious and our will, and nothing can get at us; and then the unconscious catches us from below. People call the thing that is below "the subconscious" instead of "the unconscious"; it sounds so much better. The subconscious is the cellar, something below your feet, and you are St. George standing upon the dragon. That is the medieval ambition, to kill the dragon and stand on top of it. But if you descend into that world, you encounter a figure which is definitely stronger than your ego complex. Therefore, quite naively, Rider Haggard speaks of: "She-that-must-be-obeyed."⁷ Nothing doing otherwise, you have to obey. It is quite self-evident that she is the stronger part. And the complex of the wise old man is a fearful thing. Sometimes the dragon is overcome, so we can assume that it is not always so strong.

⁷ Jung delighted in the character of the mysterious, indomitable sorceress of H. Rider Haggard's novel, *She: A History of Adventure* (London, 1887). See CW 7, par. 303; CW 9 i, pars. 145, 356; CW 10, par. 88.

But there are plenty of whale-dragons that attack and overcome the hero, proving that the dragon is much the stronger—until the hero makes the attack from within. Now we will go on to Chapter 8.

When Zarathustra had said this to his heart, he put the corpse upon his shoulders and set out on his way. Yet had he not gone a hundred steps, when there stole a man up to him and whispered in his ear—and lo! he that spake was the buffoon from the tower. “Leave this town, O Zarathustra,” said he, “there are too many here who hate thee. The good and just hate thee, and call thee their enemy and despiser; the believers in the orthodox belief hate thee, and call thee a danger to the multitude. It was thy good fortune to be laughed at: and verily thou spakest like a buffoon. It was thy good fortune to associate with the dead dog; by so humiliating thyself thou hast saved thy life to-day. Depart, however, from this town—or to-morrow I shall jump over thee, a living man over a dead one.” And when he had said this, the buffoon vanished; Zarathustra, however, went on through the dark streets.

At the gate of the town the grave-diggers met him; they shone their torch on his face, and recognising Zarathustra, they sorely derided him. “Zarathustra is carrying away the dead dog: a fine thing that Zarathustra hath turned a grave-digger! For our hands are too cleanly for that roast. Will Zarathustra steal the bite from the devil? Well then, good luck to the repast! If only the devil is not a better thief than Zarathustra!—he will steal them both, he will eat them both!” And they laughed among themselves, and put their heads together.

Zarathustra made no answer thereto, but went on his way. When he had gone on for two hours, past forests and swamps, he had heard too much of the hungry howling of the wolves, and he himself became a-hungry. So he halted at a lonely house in which a light was burning.

“Hunger attacketh me,” said Zarathustra, “like a robber. Among forests and swamps my hunger attacketh me, and late in the night.

“Strange humours hath my hunger. Often it cometh to me only after a repast, and all day it hath failed to come: where hath it been?”

And thereupon Zarathustra knocked at the door of the house.

He carried the corpse to the woods. Do you remember any historical parallel to this carrying of the corpse? It is typical symbolism.

Mrs. Crowley: The carrying of the cross.

Dr. Jung: Yes, it is a symbol of the so-called *transitus*, the old term which designates the carrying of the cross in the Christian mystery for example, or the carrying of the tree in the Attis mystery, or the carrying of the dead bull which was himself by Mithras. Mithras was the white bull of the beginning of the world, the world bull, Abudabad, in Persian mythology; so he sacrificed his own bull, himself, and then he carried his own corpse.⁸ That carrying of the bull is really the parallel to Zarathustra carrying the corpse of the rope-dancer, the equivalent on a different level. And what is the subtle difference of those two symbols? What did it mean originally that Mithras sacrificed the bull?

Mrs. Crowley: He sacrificed his animal nature.

Dr. Jung: Yes, it would be the impetuosity, the uncontrolled affectivity of the primitive man. Therefore, Mithraism is the religion of the Roman soldiers. The remains of the Mithraic temples were found chiefly near the garrisons along the German Lines for instance; and quite recently a well-preserved Mithraeum has been discovered in the Syrian desert, where the French are making explorations in cooperation with Yale University. They have now asked the connoisseur of Mithraism, Cumont, to help in the excavations. It was the religion of the imperial house of Rome and of the soldiers because it was a religion of discipline. And this discipline was expressed in the bullfight by the toreador who, with a most marvelous self-control, showing no sign of nervousness or fear, kills the bull in the critical moment. Mithras was a deified toreador, so the god was represented in the position of the antique toreador. He did not face the bull with a sword, but jumped upon his back like a cowboy and killed him with a short sword which he pushed in near the shoulder blade. Therefore, the bull had a sort of belt round the chest to help the bullfighter leap on his back and to cling to in case of need. Usually, the toreador is depicted with a most peculiar face of hysterical sentimentality, like a Guido Reni.⁹ There is a very wonderful head of Mithras in the British Museum in London, where you can study this strange hysterical expression, like that of a person who ought to do something which he doesn't like, so that his mind is split. He is not at one with what he is doing. Therefore, the god is al-

⁸ For Mithraism Jung especially draws on Franz Cumont, *Textes et Monuments* (Paris, 1896-99), 2 vols., and *The Mysteries of Mithra*, tr. Thomas J. McCormack, 2nd rev. edn. (New York, 1956).

⁹ Jung elsewhere describes the Mithraic sacrifice of the bull and the depicting of agony in the face of the carrier as like Christ's carrying the cross in Guido Reni's (1575-1642) *Crucifixion*. See CW 11, pars. 342-43.

ways turning his head away when he pushes his knife in. It is exceedingly psychological, as if the overcoming of his emotions were not entirely shared by the whole individual, as if a part of the individual were for it and a part against it. We don't like to control our emotions because we enjoy them. It is a sort of partial suicide when we control them. We regret ourselves, we are sorry for ourselves; and the god expresses that in his peculiar face.

Now, after the bull's death it is carried somewhere, but this part of the Mithraic mystery is unfortunately absolutely dark. Cumont says, however, that this is the *transitus* part of the mystery, in which things are carried from one place to another, and he draws a parallel with the carrying of the cross of Christ.¹⁰ But in the Christian religion it is no longer a question of killing the bull. Christ as a lamb is sacrificed, and one calls that symbolical but it is really allegorical. It really means that Christ as a man is sacrificed, or one can also say that God himself has become man in order to sacrifice himself for the redemption of mankind. So the cross carried by Christ would be the symbol of man, and truly it is, for standing with the arms outstretched, the position of the figure on the cross is the gesture of complete acceptance. It means, there is nothing to be done about it, do what you please, one is defenceless. It is the complete surrender of man. The Christian symbol of Christ carrying the cross means that he carries his own body, his own corpse. We have here a sort of Christian symbolism, therefore. Zarathustra carries his own humanity, his human body, Nietzsche, as the rope-dancer who has been killed, a kind of paraphrase of the Christian sacrifice. As I have said before, Nietzsche was in a secret way more Christian than anyone would expect.

Mr. Baumann: It has been said that in Christianity there are no more heroes, only martyrs: they all have to die.

Dr. Jung: Well, the martyrs are just the witnesses. The Greek word *martyros* means witness. They overcome fear and so on, but it has nothing to do with the *transitus*, which is a symbolical mystery transformation.

Mr. Baumann: The hero does his work and afterwards is in heaven, but in Christianity man has to suffer in order to accomplish.

Dr. Jung: Yes, but the principle of the church was *imitatio Christi*.¹¹

¹⁰ In making sacrifices the votary held a bundle of sacred twigs in hand. Mithra was born from a rock in the shade of a sacred tree. His greatest deed was to capture a wild bull and drag it backwards over many obstacles. This is his "journey" or *transitus*.

¹¹ The date of *The Imitation of Christ* is uncertain and is only doubtfully ascribed to Thomas à Kempis (1380-1471), an Augustinian monk. It is a medieval expression of

They carried on just by witnessing, not by being heroes. The hero is always original. Christ did not carry on anything; as a symbolic figure, he was original and creative. When a martyr was killed in the arena, he was killed for Christ or for his creed, but not for himself. He was simply a witness for the Lord. That has nothing to do with what happens to the hero.

Mr. Baumann: That is what I meant: there are no more heroes in Christianity.

Dr. Jung: Ah yes, that is true. Of course, one does call martyrs heroes of the church, but they were heroes *for* the church and not for themselves. But Christ is the hero for himself; he did not sacrifice himself for the glory of any church. It was the natural expression of his own life, of his individuality. Now, here we have the symbolism of the *transitus* again. What is the difference between this *transitus* and the *transitus* of Christ for instance, or Mithras?

Miss Wolff: The bull which is killed by Mithras is a god, apparently a chthonic god. After he is sacrificed by Mithras, the world is created out of his various organs. The corn, the vine, and all the animals spring from them, and his soul becomes a celestial shepherd. And Christ is a god. He is the incarnation of god in human form, and he dies as a god. But with Nietzsche, Zarathustra is a sort of god, but he is not sacrificed, and he merely carries a corpse, the corpse of a very inferior man. So here the god remains alive, there is no sacrifice. Only the corpse of Nietzsche's shadow, his own collective human side, is sacrificed, necessarily inferior because all values are concentrated on the superhuman aspect.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. The difference is that Christ carries the cross to his own execution. The cross is the instrument by which he will be killed. He will be killed by man and the god is sacrificed, while Zarathustra is carrying the body in order to bury it, merely. The *transitus* in the cult of Attis is a better analogy, where the fir tree is carried into a cave, into the earth, the cave being a burial place or a mystery place—they are indistinguishably the same. Therefore, the first Christian cult took place in the catacombs. It was by no means to escape persecution, for everybody knew the access to the catacombs—they were public burial grounds. They simply worshipped in the burial ground. And the Christian medieval churches are still burial grounds. One walks on tombs; the whole place is filled with corpses just as it was in the begin-

what many—but certainly not Jung or Nietzsche—have thought to be the best life for mankind.

ning. So carrying the burden into the grotto, the so-called *spelaeum*, means carrying it into the place of tombs. Human dwellings were also burial places originally, particularly in the Near East. In Mesopotamia, for instance, houses have been excavated where the corpses of the ancestors were buried under the floors. That was done to keep the ancestral spirits in the house, or in the family, as the Eskimos often preserve the corpses in their huts in order to keep the ancestral spirits with them. It is most unfortunate when the host of ancestral spirits leave the ground, because then the living no longer have the support of the spirit world, and that is very dangerous under primitive conditions.

This aspect of the *transitus*, carrying something to the burial place, played a role probably in the Mithraic cult as well, but the relationship of the cult of Attis to Christianity is very close, perhaps even closer than Mithraism. For instance. Hippolytus, an early father of the church, says that the grotto in which Christ is said to have been born was, according to tradition, the sanctuary of Attis.¹² And quite recently a very interesting proof has been brought to light: recent excavations in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem have shown that below the Christian church, which dates from early in the fourth century, is Roman masonry, the remains of a temple of Attis built by the Emperor Hadrian in about 136; and this was erected in order to desecrate the place of the Christian cult.¹³ This proves that before the cult of Attis the Christians had already worshipped in that place. There must have been a very early local tradition that Christ was really born in this *spelaeum*, and that it was actually a *spelaeum* of Attis is shown by the fact that Hadrian again erected the temple of Attis with the purpose of desecrating the place of Christ's birth. You see, these traditions obviously have a great similarity, and there are other remains which prove the relationship. Just where the Vatican is standing today, for example, there was a temple of Attis, and the head priest of that cult was called *papas* in Greek, and the priest who is still ruling there in the old place is the *papa* or pope; *papa* is the Latin form.

Here, then, we have a very peculiar *transitus*. Zarathustra was be in the place of the god of the antique mysteries, in the place of Christ the man-god, or Mithras the hero god, or Attis the son god, the son of Astarte. He is carrying the human body, the corpse—or the humanity,

¹² Hippolytus (c. 230), contemporary of the more famous Origen, wrote *A Refutation of All Heresies* and was excommunicated for his pains.

¹³ Hadrian (76-138) built the Temple of Attis, the symbol of Autumn and Spring, given to dying and returning from the dead, as befits the son of Cybele, vegetation goddess.

one can say—which really carries him. You see, there is a peculiar twisting of the facts. The archetype has its life in this world of consciousness through the fact that it appears in a living body, so the living body carries the archetype of the wise old man. But here it is represented as if the archetype were carrying the man, which is of course true inasmuch as an archetype is greater in size than the ego complex and therefore able to swallow it. And when the ego complex disappears in the archetype, man is the victim. He is injured, that is; his life is taken from him by the archetype of the wise old man. Now, if you take that as the symbol of a mystery cult, like those in antiquity, it would express the fact that man was sacrificed to an archetypal idea, or an archetypal spirit—which is true—and it would be at the same time a sort of admonition to the believers of that cult, as the killing of the bull, for instance, is an admonition to the believers of Mithraism. It meant: that is *you*; you ought to kill your own bull as Mithras the god overcomes himself in his animal aspect. Or as Christ is imitated in the Christian mystery. He goes to his own sacrifice carrying his humanity, dragging his humanity along to that divine sacrifice. And that is of course very interesting, and quite different from the Mithras or Attis idea. So here again we can say this is a sort of admonition: Let the Superman carry the ordinary man as if man were a corpse. You see, there is absolutely nothing of the Christian idea that the god is proceeding to his own self-sacrifice. Zarathustra is not going to sacrifice himself at all; he is going to live on. He is only going to bury the man, thinking that he is thus overcoming the thing which has been so reluctant, heavy, unwilling, too clumsy, too conservative. Therefore, Zarathustra's identification with the jester who jumps over the hesitating rope-dancer.

Now, that amounts to a teaching of inflation, one could say. It would mean that you *should* identify with the archetype even if you sacrifice your humble humanity; you should sacrifice your humanity to the life of the archetype. That is exactly what happened in Nietzsche's life, and the question is whether that should go as a general symbol. If it would work as a collective symbol, such a passage would become dogmatic. It would become the contents of a mystery; you would see the holy figure of Zarathustra carrying man to his rest, going to bury man, and that would fill us with a particular emotion. It would put something on fire in us as the Christian mystery did formerly. I am sure that the believers of Mithraism followed the *peripeteia*¹⁴ of the divine mystery with great emotion, probably with tears and lamentations, or with shouts of joy.

¹⁴ A sudden change of fortune.

It was a sort of passion play, and it would not have worked. It would not have gripped people if it had not gripped their emotions, touched their actual psychological condition. If people were in a state which could be expressed by such a symbol, they would most certainly be deeply and emotionally fascinated by it, and it would work like a *transitus* symbol in a mystery cult. And you know there has been that pretension. There have been people who considered *Zarathustra* as a prophetic revelation, a teaching of profound wisdom. It has had a sort of religious value. I remember when I was a student, there were quite a number of young people in Basel, even certain professors of the younger generation, who studied *Zarathustra* and made a cult of it. Now, apart from this *transitus* symbol, what would arrest your attention the most in this chapter? Did you notice anything impressive?

Miss Hannah: His hunger.

Dr. Jung: That is decidedly a point, for later on, quite at the end of *Zarathustra*, this hunger and thirst business comes up again, but we will postpone it for the time being. There is something before that.

Mrs. Stutz: The devil.

Dr. Jung: That *Zarathustra* is going to steal the devil's meal? Well, yes, but that is already contained in the jester. One must contemplate the sequence of events here, as in a dream, as if it were a causal sequence. That is the principle of science: science looks at the events of the world which follow in a sequence as a causal sequence. One must try to establish a causality. Science thus produces sense. So for an explanation here, one must assume a causal sequence.¹⁵ Here, then, by the gesture of carrying the corpse on his back, he causes the jester to appear, and that is really causality. It is not a mere incident or chance; the jester is called up by *Zarathustra*'s gesture. He only went about a hundred paces before the jester came along. He cannot go very far with his victim without making the jester appear. Now what is the jester in relation to *Zarathustra*?

Mrs. Crowley: The shadow.

Dr. Jung: Yes, we could say the very actively negative aspect of *Zarathustra*. That jester is an evil demon. As *Zarathustra* is supposed to be the superior wise man, so the jester is correspondingly destructive and evil, and he comes up now. You see, when you take a certain stand, when you make up your mind to something which is one-sided and

¹⁵ Jung contrasted scientific causality, often taken as the only genuine kind of explanation, with synchronicity, a noncausal but meaningful—not merely coincidental—connectivity. See CW 8, sec. 7.

therefore strike against an obstacle, then the opposite is conjured up from the unconscious, and the opposite is here symbolized by a fool—and a destructive fool at that. In Nietzsche's case it means insanity. If anybody behaves like Zarathustra—if a man allows himself to be swallowed by an archetype—then he will be swallowed by the unconscious. In other words, he will be insane. It will be a psychosis, a case of schizophrenia perhaps. So no sooner does Zarathustra start to carry that corpse than he conjures up insanity in the form of the jester who kills the mind of a man long before his body. It is the jester who jumps over the rope-dancer and injures him, so that Zarathustra then says to him: "Be quiet, don't worry, your mind will be dead long before your body." This was Nietzsche's case in reality, as you know. He was insane for about eleven years; he had literally predicted his own fate. And this jester is the personification of the insanity. The archetype of the wise old man is understood to be the sum total of human wisdom, and the shadow is necessarily the personification of all human foolishness. Therefore, wisdom and foolishness are so exceedingly close together. One is often not quite certain whether a man is wise or whether he is a great fool; and one must recognize that in foolishness there is a great deal of wisdom. The fool has sometimes been the typical wise man. Till Eulenspiegel, for example, is the fool and the great wise man at the same time. And the primitive medicine man whom they consider so wise is really often insane. Or an insane man is often thought to be wise because he is not understood.

Mr. Baumann: The king's jester would be a case.

Dr. Jung: Yes, and he was the only one who had intelligence. Because he was considered a fool he was allowed to say things which nobody else would dare to say to the king. The medicine man is usually uncanny and feared, but in the Pueblos they have a special clan that is entrusted with the function of the carnival. They are sort of professional clowns. It is an important office, and they are called delight-makers.¹⁶ The medicine man and the delight-maker come together in the figure of the medieval jester, the merryman who was very often the secret councillor of the king and gave him the best advice.¹⁷ The coming up

¹⁶ Pueblo Indians belong to one of three groups: Dry Food People, the general populace; the Towa-e, tribal administrators; and the "Made People," a small, elite group that oversees ceremonies and rituals. See Alfonso Ortiz, *The Tewa World: Space, Time, Being, and Becoming In a Pueblo Society* (Chicago, 1969).

¹⁷ Jung's informant about the Pueblo was Antonio Mirabal (= Ochwiay Biano = Mountain Lake), chief of ceremonies of Taos Pueblo. See Adolf F. Bandelier, *The Delight*

of the jester, then, is very clearly the next fact in the sequence after Zarathustra carries away the human being as a corpse.

Prof. Reichstein: Is not the jester here in quite a helpful role?

Dr. Jung: Well, he has that peculiar ambiguity of the medieval jester. He gives advice to Zarathustra. He advises him to leave the town, and he even says it was good fortune for him that the people thought he was talking like a jester, for if they had really understood, things would not have gone so well. And it was good fortune for him that he went away with the dead dog. He had better make use of the opportunity to disappear; otherwise he—the jester—would jump over Zarathustra exactly as he had jumped over the man. If Zarathustra remained in the town, that is, he would make such a fool of himself that he would be insane himself.

Now, is that really good advice? You see, I would say that if Zarathustra remained in the town, he would remain in collectivity, in human society. He might be found and killed, but also he might be able to convince people of his wisdom, and if he leaves the town he won't be able to do so. At all events, Zarathustra remaining in the town would be forced to be conscious of his ordinary human existence, because those other people would reach him by his humanity, by the body, the corpse. And then he would soon be aware that he was not a man, that he was merely a fantasy or an archetypal image and not a reality. It would soon come about that when he looked at his hand, he would say: "By Jove, this is not my hand at all, like spirits when they are made conscious of the fact that they possess a foreign body." You know, there are cases of people who are possessed by spirits; and to de-possess such a person one must conjure that ghost through the aid of a medium, and then, like the Masters in *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, one must tell the ghost that he is dead, disembodied. He won't believe it, he will insist that he has still a body. So one must say: "Now look here, you say you are a man and have a man's body, but look at your hand." (It is a medium's hand because he speaks through the mouth of a woman medium.) Then he says: "This is a woman's hand, how awkward!—how did I get into this strange body?" And it is further proved by telling him to go through a wall, for of course no man was ever seen doing that; so when he goes right through it, he has to admit at last that you are right.¹⁸ There is a doctor in California who cures his neurotic or

Makers, 2nd edn. (New York, 1918). Jung and Mirabal had exchanged letters two years earlier. See *Letters*, vol. I, pp. 101-2.

¹⁸ In *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, the officiating lama "advises (the corpse) to partake freely of the food offered, warns it that it is dead and that its ghost must not haunt the

10 OCTOBER 1934

psychotic patients in that way. His wife is a medium, and he simply gets all the spirits which are supposed to exist in the patients into his wife. Then when a ghost talks through his wife's body, he says to him: "Look at your body, you are a man but this is a woman's body." And the ghost is so thoroughly shocked that he jumps right out of her and quits for good. Not always though!

place or trouble living relatives" (*Tibetan*, pp. 14-15). The book contains a "Psychological Commentary" by Jung, reprinted by CW 11.

LECTURE II

17 October 1934

Dr. Jung:

Before we begin today I have a proposition to make. I wish that a committee of members of the seminar would occupy themselves with research about the archetype of the wise old man. We used to make such researches in former seminars: you remember perhaps the very excellent "Moon" paper that Dr. Harding and her committee worked out.¹ The moon is of course the archetype of the inner mother, the faint light of the dark earth. We encountered that figure of the earth mother in the *Visions* also.² Since that is a predominant, prevailing archetype of the woman's unconscious, the ruling aspect, it is characteristic for the particular development of fantasies; therefore we made a special investigation into the phenomenology of the archetype of the mother aspect of the moon. Now we are occupied with a man's psychology, so I want a report made about the phenomenology of the archetype of the wise old man. He is the sun but a sun within, an illuminating factor, the sun of understanding, the light of the Gnosis for instance; in the Gnostic texts you always find that light symbolism associated with the wise old man who is the initiator, the bringer of light, the real Lucifer with all the implications of that name.³

Concerning the method, you have a number of sources for your researches. First of all you have the comparative history of religions, and the figures of the founders of religions; then you have the mythology of all races, and folklore and fairytales where there is the figure of the sorcerer, for example, in many forms, great and small; then literature, *belles-lettres*, and particularly poetic art. And besides the great official

¹ Dr. Esther Harding (1888-1971), who was born in Britain but practiced Jungian analysis in the U.S., presented her "Moon" paper, "The Symbolism of the Crescent and Its Psychological Meanings" in an earlier seminar. See *Dream Sem.*, pp. 367-81, and also her *Woman's Mysteries, Ancient and Modern* (New York, 1955).

² See above 2 May 1934, n. 1, for the *Visions Seminars*.

³ Lucifer (Latin): light-bearing, morning star.

religions, there are minor ones, primitive religions, tribal customs, and the noncanonical traditions—the heretic traditions—in which a lot of psychology is to be found. Psychology has often been exiled from official religions because it is awkward, so one finds there material of an extremely philosophic nature. In our Christian world, for instance, you have the historical traditions of the Gnostics which is heretic philosophy, both early and medieval Gnosticism, the new Platonists, and the later medieval philosophy in the form of alchemy, the Rosicrucians, etc. In literature you encounter the figures of the anima and animus, of course, but you will have great trouble to find suitable examples of the more remote figures that are beyond. The animus and anima are in our immediate experience while these great figures are not—they are always far more projected and therefore less easily recognizable—but they do exist in literature. The earth mother is an exceedingly rare symbolism just because it is highly symbolical, but the wise old man is rather more frequent—there are definite examples because the wise old man has become an institutional figure while the earth mother is no institutional figure, of course. She has always been terribly awkward; she does not fit into a man's institutional world because she is always upsetting institutions. I think this investigation is highly worthwhile in order to make ourselves realize the general aspect of the archetype, so that we may not labor too much under the impression that Nietzsche is such a particular case, that it is only possible for such a figure as Zarathustra to live in the mind of Nietzsche. This research will show beyond question that it is really a *représentation collective*.

Now we return to our text. You remember we touched upon the problem of the hunger. Zarathustra suddenly becomes aware of that symptom and says: "Hunger attacketh me like a robber." This theme of being overcome with hunger as if it were a robber is anticipated in the passage where the grave-diggers meet him and make jests about him: "A fine thing that Zarathustra hath turned a grave-digger! For our hands are too cleanly for that roast. Will Zarathustra steal the bite from the devil? Well then, good luck to the repast! If only the devil is not a better thief than Zarathustra!—he will steal them both, he will eat them both!" One reads such a passage and hardly notices it; it sounds a bit queer, and one doesn't stop to marvel about it and ask oneself what the devil it means, whether it is a mere figure of speech or has any deeper meaning. I emphasize this passage because it is really characteristic of the style of *Zarathustra* in general. You see, it is a sort of joke—one could almost say that the jesting way the grave-diggers talk

to Zarathustra should have a comical effect—yet there is something, not exactly uncanny, but painful, about it. There is a certain brilliant yet peculiar, painful aspect. Now this painful aspect is pathological, and a pathological joke has a marked difference from a normal joke in that it doesn't help one to laugh from the depth of one's heart because at the same time one feels a stabbing pain somewhere. This is due to the fact that in that joke there is a breaking line, a sort of split on account of the pathological interference; something which is not a jest at all, something gruesome, horrible, is mixed up with it. And that is the case throughout the whole of *Zarathustra*: there are many attempts to be funny but always with a peculiar split in them, always with that painful admixture of poison as if something awful were behind.

We will try to understand what that is. Obviously, in the allusion made by the grave-diggers it first touches Zarathustra; then in the form of hunger it really comes to him. He says, rightly, that it overtakes him; it has been behind his consciousness and then it catches him—suddenly he is made to realize that he feels very hungry. Also, it is anticipated when still unconscious in the hungry howling of the wolves. Animals always denote unconscious instinctiveness, and it is still projected into the wolves in the woods as if it were their hunger. As, for instance, when you have a pain, a toothache perhaps, you sometimes dream that somebody else is in the same bed and that he or she has the pain. In the dream it is delegated: you are split in half and the other half has the toothache. You are sort of projecting away the pain which threatens to disturb your sleep. The supposition, then, is that Zarathustra's hunger, which appears in the end, was there all the time; he was hungry all day long even when he didn't know it. Now, under what condition does one not notice that one is hungry?

Mrs. Baumann: When one doesn't know that one has a body.

Dr. Jung: Yes. It often happens with intuitive types. That *doesn't* happen to me. I am very intuitive but I know when I am hungry—I never was short of such a realization. But there are people who do not know it, who think hunger is a psychological problem, and Zarathustra represents such a person here. Where is the evidence for it?

Miss Hannah: Because he is burying it.

Dr. Jung: Exactly, the body is the corpse; it is Mr. Nietzsche himself, and he is going to bury Nietzsche. Even a ghost, if he wants to make any effect on this earth, always needs a body, a medium; otherwise he cannot ring bells or lift tables or anything that ghosts are supposed to do. And so Zarathustra needs the man Nietzsche. If he is going to bury the corpse Nietzsche, then he has no body or he is unconscious of it;

then he is stepping beyond Nietzsche as the jester threatens to step beyond him: we read that passage where the jester threatens to jump over Zarathustra as he had jumped over the rope-dancer. You see, the jester is a terrible danger. If he should jump over Zarathustra, what would be the result?

Mrs. Baumann: You said last week it would be insanity.

Dr. Jung: Yes. You see, Zarathustra is a ghost. He cannot die in the body; he can only fall off the rope, fall off his synthetic mind—and then it would be a psychosis, not the death of the body but the death of the mind. Now, under what conditions is Zarathustra particularly threatened by the jester?

Miss Hannah: By staying in town, remaining with humanity.

Dr. Jung: Yes. If Zarathustra remains with Mr. Friedrich Nietzsche, then Friedrich Nietzsche can say something to him, can realize when he is hungry; he can feed his body, and then the danger is not great. As Mr. Nietzsche, he is only saddled with the problem of the wise old man, which presumably does not fit into his psychology. Sure enough, he wouldn't follow his suggestion. He would not yield easily to that old wise man of the 9th century B.C. That was a rather unexpected feature of his life. Therefore, if Zarathustra could remain in the town he would remain with Nietzsche—and Nietzsche would remain. But since Nietzsche is threatened with death, it means he is overcome by Zarathustra, he is as good as a corpse. He is dead as the rope-dancer; he cannot play his game any longer. And then Zarathustra simply carries a corpse and has no relation to life; he is without physical feet, a *pied à terre*, and therefore he loses reality. As a man, he loses touch with earth, he is always threatened by insanity. There is no reason why he should not dissolve into infinity, for such a man as a rule does dissolve into infinity. You see, the body inasmuch as it is alive is hungry. Nietzsche is hungry for physical substance: he needs that in order to sustain life. So the body announces its need to be fed, in order that he may form a sort of opposite to Zarathustra, a balancing weight to the mad enthusiastic impulse which Zarathustra gives. But Zarathustra doesn't realize it. Or only a faint realization of the fact that the body has its claims comes through in an indirect way, in that allusion of the grave-diggers.

Now we will try to understand further what the grave-diggers suggest, what their joke really means. They say first that the corpse he is carrying would be too unclean for their hands. That is an immense depreciation of the body. This carrion is only good for hell; it is what the devil would eat; and as the devil is the principle of utter destruction, this morsel is only good for utter destruction. And Zarathustra will

perhaps steal this morsel from the devil—he will play the role of the devil in eating that carrion. This idea is logically continued. They say: “Well then, good luck to the repast,” which means that the devil stealing the morsel of carrion will devour it—implying of course utter destruction of the body. If Zarathustra steals the corpse from the devil, he steals it for the sake of an anthropophagous or sarcophagous meal; therefore, they congratulate him on that repast. You see here a very peculiar old anthropophagical idea is coming in, and of course there are historical reasons why it comes in just here. I hope that is clear! I will repeat it: The idea is that the devil will fetch that carrion, it is his morsel; the devil means utter destruction, so utter destruction will devour the morsel. But Zarathustra is apparently going to steal it from the devil, as if he were another devil also meant to devour and thereby destroy the carrion. And because they assume it is so they say: “Blessings on the repast.” They congratulate him that he has stolen it, but they think it is pretty dangerous to deceive the devil and to take a morsel out of his teeth; the danger then might be that the devil would out-thieve Zarathustra and steal both, eat both. For it is perfectly obvious that if Zarathustra succeeds, he will eat the body. You see, that is what we said before: he has overcome the body. But it is a sort of anthropophagous act: he becomes a carrion eater, like a sarcophagus. (The name of a coffin means the eater of flesh.) He becomes the sarcophagus of Mr. Nietzsche. Now that is the awful joke; it sounds like a sort of battling with empty brilliant words, yet at the bottom of it is the terrible allusion to an anthropophagous tendency of Zarathustra, the tendency of the wise old man to be a vulture.

Miss Hannah: Was there a chance that Zarathustra would get back the body by eating it?—having killed it, I mean?

Dr. Jung: No, he would play the role of the devil and completely destroy the body. That is the utterly destructive quality of the spirit if the body doesn't resist it properly. Where have we an excellent example of this truth?

Mrs. Baynes: The saints who retired into the desert.

Dr. Jung: Yes, in the history of the saints one sees what the spirit can do. Cities of many thousands of inhabitants in the East were depopulated completely; all the inhabitants went into the desert because they were eaten by the spirit. And think of the martyrs who voluntarily went into the arena. Even the holy Christian church, which is the incarnation of divine love, burnt more than a hundred thousand of her own children alive. Think of the heretics who were burned in Spain, and the witches who were burned, and the terrible things religious wars

brought upon mankind. And all the "isms" in our day are man-eaters, not only wolves but lions and sharks. In our actual politics, human life counts for very little indeed; one of the means of persuasion is bullets and hanging. We approach social conditions that are similar to those of the Middle Ages. We have tyrants and secret police, execution without trials, and all that is done by a certain spirit, a certain "ism," or a certain conviction in the name of truth. It is a nice picture. You see, that is the spirit when it breaks away. Zarathustra is a very wise and beautiful spirit in a way, and then he is the devil himself; therefore, I say *Lucifer* with every implication of that word.

You know, the German philosopher Klages is a great enemy of the spirit: he accuses the spirit of strangling life, of being murderous and depleting life of blood, and to a certain extent that is perfectly true.⁴ If the spirit prevails against the body, there is destruction; it has an almost infernal power. Nietzsche often played with that idea; for instance, in the *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, one of his earliest works, he says that one spark fallen from the eternal fire into the soul of a man searching after truth suffices to devour his entire life.⁵ You see, in that sentence he expresses very clearly the descent of the Holy Ghost: that is a fiery spark of the eternal fires, and this most holy ghost is able to devour the whole of a human life. We think it is beautiful, but we cannot deny the fact that all this beauty and grandeur can also produce most horrible destruction. Of course, you can put yourself on the standpoint that it had to be; obviously it would not have happened if it had not been necessary. But that is perfectly meaningless: it does not do away with the suffering. If it happens to you, you will soon discover the other side of it. To be devoured by the spirit is just as bad as to be devoured by a wild animal: it is an act of destruction. That aspect of the spirit is absolutely strange to the Christian standpoint, where if you speak of spirit you are admitted to the company of the righteous ones. Nobody doubts that the spirit is a marvelously good thing. Yet it is by no means true; the spirit has a gruesome aspect and that comes through here indirectly in this joke.

Now, when Zarathustra says: "Hunger attacketh me like a robber," the choice of that word shows how he feels the appetite of the body; it apparently takes something away from him. Anything that does not go into the spirit, any life of the body, seems to be a minus for the spirit.

⁴ For Klages, see above, 23 May 1934, n. 5.

⁵ *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1876), a collection of four early essays. This passage occurs in the third essay, "Schopenhauer as Educator" (ch. 3).

If the spirit has any actual claim, it will invariably claim all the rights of the body—quite irrespective of the fact that it has no feet without the body. He says: “Among forests and swamps my hunger attacketh me, and late in the night.” It is just there, in the woods and swamps, when he is lonely and should have a companion in the night, that he becomes aware of the fact that his body suffers pain or no longer exists. For there he would need a body relation. Otherwise, he is like a will o’ the wisp. “Strange humours hath my hunger. Often it cometh to me only after a repast, and all day it hath failed to come: where hath it been?” That this need of the body is not perceived regularly shows what the case is. It apparently only appears as a symptom—when one doesn’t expect it; or after having eaten, it is realized—showing of course that it is also a psychical need. That kind of hunger is like a hysterical symptom.

Mrs. Crowley: I would like to understand why it would have been better if he had stayed in the town.

Dr. Jung: Well, better! I say *if* he had stayed in the town, he would have remained with the body; he would have had a chance to resurrect the body. But these symbolic facts are not so definite; they can be changed any time. The body is not definitely dead, only relatively; only the rope-dancer is dead.

Mrs. Crowley: But in the town he is playing the role of the Superman in speaking down to the people, so I don’t see how it can help him.

Dr. Jung: It would not help him in the least. He would have made himself a complete fool; nobody would have understood. They would say, Oh, that is just Mr. Nietzsche! He would defeat his own purpose; as long as one remains with human beings one defeats the purpose of the spirit. You see, it is logical that he gave it up and went away, because he did not want to make a fool of himself. He had to become a dweller in solitude. He could not possibly have remained in town without having the position of an ordinary citizen. Everybody would have taken a snapshot of him, would know where he lived, how he shaved, where he bought his clothes, who his acquaintances were—and that would have taken away all the glamour of the spirit. For nobody among mortals believes that the man whom he sees every day is a genius or a spirit. Can you believe that the man living next door is Jesus? Live a while with him and you will be convinced that he is altogether too human. So it is destructive to remain, but a certain amount of destruction is very healthy for a human being; man is then able to live normally and persist, and the spirit can be held at bay. But that is of course ignominious

from the Christian point of view, very heathenish. Now we will go on with the text:

And thereupon Zarathustra knocked at the door of the house. An old man appeared, who carried a light, and asked: "Who cometh unto me and my bad sleep?"

"A living man and a dead one," said Zarathustra. "Give me something to eat and drink, I forgot it during the day. He that feedeth the hungry refresheth his own soul, saith wisdom."

The old man withdrew, but came back immediately and offered Zarathustra bread and wine. "A bad country for the hungry," said he; "that is why I live here. Animal and man come unto me, the anchorite. But bid thy companion eat and drink also, he is wearier than thou." Zarathustra answered: "My companion is dead; I shall hardly be able to persuade him to eat." "That doth not concern me," said the old man sullenly; "he that knocketh at my door must take what I offer him. Eat, and fare ye well!"

Thereafter Zarathustra again went on for two hours, trusting to the path and the light of the stars: for he was an experienced night-walker, and liked to look into the face of all that slept. When the morning dawned, however, Zarathustra found himself in a thick forest, and no path was any longer visible. He then put the dead man in a hollow tree at his head—for he wanted to protect him from the wolves—and laid himself down on the ground and moss. And immediately he fell asleep, tired in body, but with a tranquil soul.

What is the remarkable thing in this new passage?

Mrs. Crowley: The anchorite?—meeting again the same old man?

Dr. Jung: Have you evidence that it is the same man?

Mrs. Crowley: He is transformed, but it seems to me the same figure. For one thing, when he appears in section 2, he asks why Zarathustra must drag his body as he is now doing, as if it were a prophecy. Then Zarathustra says he is going to preach this message of the Superman to the people, and the old man rather laughs at him and says they really wouldn't want his wisdom at all; it would be better for him to carry part of their load. And in this last part he again gives him something to eat and drink.

Dr. Jung: Yes. And you remember what we said about that former old man?

Mrs. Crowley: Zarathustra said that the old man did not know that God was dead, and the interpretation was that he was the old idea of

Christianity. He was mumbling in the forest, making hymns and so on, but at the same time he seemed to contain something which Zarathustra lacked, and that was the soul part. Zarathustra is on the spirit side. And now he seems to come back to nature, not the spirit side but the soul side.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. It is indeed the same old man to whom he comes in this moment. Now, this moment also is characterized by the hunger; he is in need of something. He realizes that all is not well and so he approaches, as it were suddenly, former convictions; it is rather doubtful here apparently, like a sort of regression, and that is the reason why he meets the former old man. You remember Zarathustra experienced the sad fact, when he preached in the marketplace, that people did not understand him at all. He had no success and so he left, and then there was a great fatality. Now he is hungry and has nothing to eat. He has had the experience of this world which he doesn't know how to cope with, and so he naturally approaches a former point of view, as if something in him said: "Well, don't you think that was perhaps more reasonable than what you are trying now?" So he has to beg the old man to give him food, and he is giving him bread and wine. To what does that point?

Mrs. Crowley: Communion.

Dr. Jung: Yes. In going back to the old man, he naturally goes back to the central mystery of late Christianity, the only thing that has retained a certain living symbolism. This makes it clear that the old man is the old Christian spirit. He is the wise old man inasmuch as he has taken form or been incarnated in the spirit of the Christian church. So what he really seeks for food is the communion. And why just the communion?

Mrs. Crowley: Would it not be that he is now coming to himself, so it would be more the inner reality, the inner experience? Before, everything was projected and you might say it was more as if he were giving communion, as if he were the priest.

Dr. Jung: Well, there is a more definite reason.

Mrs. Brunner: Doesn't he feel lonely?

Dr. Jung: Yes, he has lost the body. You know, from the primitive's point of view the spirit that is always about with no body is forever seeking one, and as soon as they touch a body they go into it and imagine that it is their own. But they only cause possessions. Spirits crave food in order to be active in this world. Therefore, in Homer, Ulysses kills the sheep and pours out the blood for the ghosts; and only those to whom he wants to talk does he allow to drink of it—the others he

wards off with his sword. And as soon as the ghosts have drunk blood, they can speak with an audible voice. They become active. They make themselves understood. They are tangible, visible when they add material substance to their spiritual existence.⁶ Now, all spirits want bodies; they are crazy without bodies. And that is what Zarathustra wants: he wants material substance in order to communicate with people. Having no body he cannot convey his meaning to them; he is practically invisible. And this substance is at the same time communion. The real meaning of the communion is the flesh or the body, the blood. You see it is not in vain that Luther defended the *estin* ("is") against our Swiss reformer Zwingli, who in a somewhat lame way said the communion was a sort of symbol.⁷ But Luther defended the primitive point of view, that it was the real body and the blood, because it is utterly important that the primitive instinct of man, the anthropophagous instinct, should be satisfied. For the real communion with the qualities of human beings, particularly the psychical qualities, only takes place when you can eat them.

So when the red Indian wants to acquire courage, he eats the heart of the enemy; or to acquire cunning, he eats his brain. That is the way in which they understand assimilation, by projection. He naturally assumes that his enemy's magic is better than his—as one is convinced, for instance, that the doctors abroad are always better than those at home. And as the English papers say, the universities abroad are remarkable, while their own are nothing, only institutions to preserve old prejudices. Or as primitives say, the tribe on the other side of the mountain have good magicians, big medicine, and much better weapons, because they have mana. That is all projection and they try to get it back by eating their enemies. They also eat their uncles and aunts and grandfathers in order to retain the family mana. On a higher level, they are quite content if the tribe contains mana, and then they delegate the eating of the dead to the next village. For instance, in Bugishu, on the western slope of Mt. Elgon, where they have only very recently come into contact with the white man, they were only relative anthropophagists: they did not eat the enemies caught in war. They were quite nice, gentle people, but they had the somewhat peculiar custom of eating the dead. So when there is a sad loss in the family, an uncle perhaps, they send a message to the next village: "We are bereft of our

⁶ *Odyssey* 9. 35-50.

⁷ In opposition to Luther's doctrine of transubstantiation, Ulrich Zwingli (1440-1531) said the wine and bread were to be understood symbolically. He was killed in a Swiss battle between Catholic and Protestant armies.

dear uncle," or, "It has pleased God to take our uncle and tonight we put him into the Bush, so will you pay attention to it?" Then the people in the next village prepare all sorts of presents—food, drink, beer—and they carry them into the Bush and exchange loads; the mourners take over the presents, and the people from the other village take the body and chop it up and boil it for two or three hours. And in the morning it is eaten and the bones are cleared up by the hyenas. That is the way they get rid of their dead. As a matter of fact, they say that is no longer done. My head-man, who was from the south side, said they never would dream of doing such a thing; but we never found the dead, and I was by no means sure that the uncles and aunts were not eaten.

Miss Hannah: Why did they not eat it themselves?

Dr. Jung: Perhaps because it is not so nice; they try to get away from it and to let the others do it. When somebody died in the other village they themselves had the same duty, however. I don't think they liked it so much. I had the impression that it was a sort of politeness—because I am your cousin, I will eat your uncle. People say that they are very keen on eating human flesh, but I doubt it. Of course, terrible things happen. There was a case in West Africa where in one night they cleared out the whole cemetery of a hospital and ate them all—something simply incredible. Nobody ever has explained why they did it, because usually they prefer fresh food—a fat prisoner of war fed up for the purpose, for instance, as they do in the South Sea Islands. They say human chops are one point better than pig. But that they should eat such awful filth means that there must be something behind it; we don't know, the whole thing is exceedingly deep and mysterious. They know it is filth. They like fresh meat, particularly in the tropics, and they say of hyenas that they are horrible because they eat carrion. So it had quite certainly a magic purpose. This a true case. It is reported, I think, in that book by Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*. At all events it is quoted by Sir Wallis Budge in *Osiris and the Egyptian Religions*.⁸

The symbol of communion here, then, means Zarathustra's attempt to reconcile himself with the body; or one can say it is the need of the body that Zarathustra should become reconciled to it. Therefore, the return to the old ways, which silently take into account the insistence of the needs of the body. An old religion, which one even might call somewhat degenerate, is more human in that respect than a later one;

⁸ This is not in P. Amaury Talbot's *The Shadow of the Bush*, but see E. A. Wallis-Budge, *Osiris and the Egyptian Religions* (London, 1911), vol. I, pp. 167ff. 181, 184.

a new religion is always apt to disregard the body. Protestantism is much more dangerous than Catholicism, which is the older and takes the body into account. That is a matter of reproach from the Protestant side, but it is also a title of honor; an earthy Catholicism is much better because, without seeking it really, it reconciles the spirit and the body. It doesn't exaggerate the spirit, the body is taken care of. There is an extraordinary tolerance in Catholicism concerning the body; and if you study the origin of the rites of the church, you will see that the church has taken over many ceremonies from the pagan cults, the mass for instance, and the robes of the priests. And that funny square black cap they wear, folded into four corners with one black pompom on top, is the original cap of the *Flamines*, the priests of Jupiter in Rome. Then the bells in the Mass, and the host with the cross marked on top are Mithraic, and our Christmas day is the birthday of Mithras. And naturally much of the antique point of view was also taken over; the standpoint of the church in certain legal matters, or in reference to sex morality, is very like the antique point of view, a bit stricter but not a bit moral in the way we would feel morality. So the relation between the life of the spirit and the life of the body is very critical. Too much of the body and the spirit dies; too much of the spirit and the body dies. There is a sort of changing equilibrium between the two factors, and a bit too much of one means the destruction of the other. You see, if Zarathustra returns to the old ways, he gets into a sort of *modus vivendi* that guarantees at least a minimum of existence to the body; and he is no longer alone because through communion he has relation to humanity, his body is fed. He can add substance to himself. But it is at the expense of his own spiritual standpoint.

Now, the anchorite regards the corpse, not as a corpse, but as a companion rather; and he says to Zarathustra that he should get him to eat and to drink. Zarathustra then explains that that fellow is dead, so one cannot persuade him to eat, wherewith the old man is grumblingly satisfied. He doesn't insist upon it, it doesn't concern him. Naturally it would not, because he personifies a sort of traditional attitude which has no activity in itself, all the activity being in Zarathustra. And it depends entirely upon him whether he is willing to accept the body in his system or not. After this, he continues his way, and something is said about Zarathustra's being a good walker in the night and one who loves to look into the face of sleeping things. What does that mean?

Mrs. Crowley: Walking in the night is a reference to the unconscious.

Dr. Jung: Yes, Zarathustra is first the unconscious side; inasmuch as the spirit is not born, it is the archetype living in the unconscious. Then

it is born into consciousness and takes a modern shape. So old Zarathustra reborn in Nietzsche takes on the shape of "Thus Spake Zarathustra." This Zarathustra has nothing whatever to do with the old Zarathustra—the only thing they have in common is the name—but in a way this Zarathustra carries the message of today. When the archetype appears, it always carries first a message of remotest antiquity apparently, very strange; and then inasmuch as the conscious listens to the message and assimilates it, it will give a modern form to it. It will give it rebirth in other words. And the message, as you know, always appears in the moment when it is absolutely needed by the time. Whenever an old system of *représentations collectives* has become overdue, when its life is ebbing away so that it doesn't carry life any longer—then that archetype is constellated, then it brings its message out of the dark. But until then it has been a walker in the night, or "a caller in the desert," as the prophet says. Nobody hears him, he talks to empty space. So as long as the archetype is unconscious, his only preoccupation would be to walk about in the night, in the unconscious, and to study sleeping things; therefore, to be in the darkness is a thing to which he is used. Finally, he finds himself in the deep forest and no way is visible. Where would that be? What does the wood mean?

Mrs. Sigg: It might be the realm of the earth mother, because he buries the dead in the tree, and the tree is the mother. It would be to give him rebirth.

Dr. Jung: Yes, it is the depths of the unconscious. The wood in this respect is simply another symbol like the sea; it is the darkness. One is projected, one can conceal oneself in the wood as if buried in water. Also, a wood has the same mysterious impenetrability as water, and it is full of living beings that suddenly appear and disappear, especially primordial forests which are exceedingly uncanny: no paths and anything is possible in it, particularly that one loses one's bearings. That is the most horrible thing of all; it instantly calls up the collective unconscious and causes one to revert to the animal. Now, Zarathustra is moving into the unconscious in order to bury the corpse there. What would be the consequence, or the purpose, of Zarathustra in burying it in the unconscious?


Remark: To forget it.

Dr. Jung: Yes, one hides it there. Then he can move easily because he has not to remember that corpse all the time, He is no longer burdened with that preoccupation. The last trace of heaviness has gone and he becomes light, a dancer. Zarathustra often calls himself that; he insists upon his light step, the step of a dancer, as if he had no weight what-

ever; he tries to get rid of the weight of the body because he cannot live the life of the spirit with the body.

Mrs. Baumann: Is that not contradicted by the next sentence? He wanted to protect it from the wolves.

Dr. Jung: But the wolves are the hunger. Those are the robbers and the robber is in himself in order that he, Zarathustra, can no longer eat the body. You see, Zarathustra is almost afraid of his own craving for a body. To the primitive mentality, ghosts are immensely hungry things that walk about the whole night crying: "Where is my body? I am seeking my body." They suppose that the wandering spirits are terribly keen on bodies because they have lost their own, and when somebody is sick in the kraal, perhaps lying unconscious and unable to defend himself, the spirit sees it and in it goes to *his* body. That is the way they describe it. Have I told you about the little ghost houses they build to keep the spirits away from the kraal? Well, you know, all the native trails leading from the jungle to the kraal are very serpentine, many curves with a short radius. I will draw you a picture of one. You see, it winds down from the bamboo forest above, where the ghosts are supposed to live, towards the kraal below where the human beings are. Then at a particularly sharp angle or at a likely spot where there is a clump of trees perhaps, the people in the kraal who are supposed to be haunted, make another path with a flatter



curve, a sort of trap trail. This is paved and outlined with stones on each side, like the way to the burial place—or in one case I heard of, to the chief's house where the stones indicated the number of people he had killed. (One still sees such stone avenues in Cornwall leading to holes in the ground which were dwelling places in the neolithic age.) This little decoy road branches off the main path and leads to an open space like a real kraal, and in that clearing they build the ghost house, a hut about as high as your waist. Inside is a bed of mats, and sometimes a clay figure on the bed. And they put in food, corn or sweet potatoes, and outside is a jar in the ground filled with water. The clay figure is a sort of bait, of course. Then in the night the spirit comes swinging and swerving down the path into the decoy trail, and he says: "Nice hut here, much good, I stay here in the hut. I get into that body; now I am at home, I have much mealy-mealy, I have much seed water." Then suddenly the sun comes up, and he jumps out of the body and runs back to the bamboo forest.

They tell that story in such a vivid way that one sees at once that it is absolute truth to them. They protect the body by those traps, and you can be almost certain, when walking along a primitive trail, that you will come across one. They don't call it a trap. They call it a spirit house, and of course negroes would not go that way; they would say it was very bad. We had such a case near our camp: a young woman fell ill and the Gandu, a sorcerer who is a particular authority, smelt a ghost. He went round the kraal in ever-widening circles, sniffing like a dog exactly, till he touched a certain spot, and then he said: "Here they come, this is the trail where the ghosts come in the night." And then they built a trap there. This girl had been left an orphan very early; the parents died when they were quite young people so they were terribly sad and angry that they had lost their bodies so early, and were minded to do all sorts of evil to that kraal because their little girl was harbored there, and they wanted to have her with them.

Even in Homer you find that same psychology: the shadow people in Hades are very sad. They are always wandering aimlessly about as disembodied shadows; it is a dim and shadowy world, and as soon as there is blood anywhere, they go like vultures and drink it in order to get substance, to have a body again.⁹ Practically all primitive people are convinced that that is a truth—if they have developed a spiritualistic system at all. So one can understand this wolfish hunger of Zarathustra—that it is represented by wolves. You know, wolves howl very peculiarly, and hyenas are particularly like ghosts because they eat the bones of the dead and so are supposed to have their bellies full of ancestral souls. One must handle them with the utmost care; if one kills a hyena it means trouble. They really are spooky, I never have heard anything so demoniacal as a pack of hyenas; they lend themselves to that superstition. They do their level best to represent disembodied spirits. When they are hungry, that whining and laughter is just awful. Naturally they are taken for ghosts by the primitives. If it is heard in a place where hyenas are not supposed to be, or if there is anything in the least unusual about it, then it is probably a ghost. Hyenas are not feared in themselves, but if it is a ghost, that is something else. Ghosts are supposed to imitate, not only hyenas, but any other animals; and it is recognized by its extraordinary behavior. The Red Indians call certain animals "doctor animals" when they behave in a way which is not according to rule.

So Zarathustra's idea, in burying the dead in the wood, is to forget

⁹ *Odyssey* 9. 23-33.

him altogether, to give him a decent burial, which means to lock him in somewhere so that he cannot get out. We piously put a stone upon the graves of our ancestors, but that was originally to keep the dead in the hole. There have been such customs as nailing the body to the ground by driving a pole or a nail through the belly in order that the body should not rise again; or a lot of stones were heaped upon the grave in order to prevent the dead from escaping. In Switzerland, I think it was in Canton Aargau, in the 19th century the custom still prevailed that when somebody died one opened the windows and said to the soul of the dead, *Fahre hin und fladere*, "Farewell and flutter away," thus inviting it not to return. On a certain South Sea island they have the most elaborate ceremonies to inveigle the soul of the dead to leave the body, so that they may be sure it will never return: a boat lands and then the medicine-man takes the corpse by the hand and leads the soul very politely to the boat and puts it on board and it sails away. So the meaning of the hollow tree was surely a burial place. Of course in reality bodies were put into hollow trees for protection against wolves or foxes, partially because of a certain belief in bodily resurrection, and partially because of the fear that the dead would be badly offended by not having had a decent burial—that is the most frequent reason.

There were Christian societies in Rome in the first century, sort of insurance companies, which guaranteed a decent burial; they were called *thiasotai*, and some of them were to guarantee to members one meal daily also.¹⁰ There was a tremendous traffic congestion in old Rome. The streets were exceedingly narrow and there were no buses or cars except slow horse-carts which were all needed for the transport of food. Rome had a population of about two million people at that time. A great many people went to town every day for business and there was no time to go home at midday for a meal. There were no trains to the suburbs; it was all plain walking, and they had to eat their meal in the town, as we do. So they formed societies. They took a room or a basement and had a man there to cook meals, and it was the custom to name the society after a patron saint, the Society of Theseus, or Heracles, for example. The cook, who prepared the meal, had already eaten when the society arrived; and while they ate, he read the gospels to them—which were not then considered to be inspired truth, only very good books. Or he told them stories, or read the epistles that came from abroad to that particular society. You see, that is the origin of the

¹⁰ *Thiasotai*: The name of these Greek and Roman societies originally referred to a company of Bacchic revellers.

idea of the mass; the altar is the cooking range, the hearth, where the magic or spiritual food is prepared, and the priest is the cook who gives it to the people. There is the same custom in monasteries; one of the monks reads the sacred texts or other good books while the others eat. They had such insurance companies for decent burial, because otherwise the soul would begin to work havoc and cause no end of trouble. Even today, Italians are exceedingly careful to bury their people well. They go to great lengths to get monuments; the cemetery of Genoa, for instance, is full of monuments of awfully bad taste but touching in their naiveté. To primitive people, as to the unconscious, the dead mean a tremendous lot. So, as we are moving here on the fringe of the collective unconscious with the figure of Zarathustra, it is by no means strange that he should observe a primitive custom and bury the corpse in such a way that he would have no reason to return. For it would not suit Zarathustra if that spirit of heaviness should come back and burden him with the banality of an ordinary human life.

LECTURE III

24 October 1934

Dr. Jung:

We spoke last time of the old man who lived in the woods and gave bread and wine to Zarathustra, and we explained him as being the old man we had already met in the second chapter. But I failed to mention another point which is also a sort of evidence for this interpretation. You remember the text is: "And thereupon Zarathustra knocked at the door of the house. An old man appeared, who carried a light, and asked: 'Who cometh unto me and my bad sleep?'" Now the English text says he carried *a* light, but the German text says: *Er trug das Licht*, "He carried *the* light," and that of course makes a great difference; it is not just any light, it is *the* light, which surely means a definite specific light. It is nothing indifferent, so that one could characterize it by using the indefinite article *a*: he is really the carrier of *the* light. Now, Zarathustra has a light too, but it is not *the* light, which would of course refer to the definite, revealed light. So obviously that old man represents the spirit of the past which was the light. And, you see, that fits in beautifully with the attributes of the old man here, his giving the bread and wine, meaning the spiritual super-substantial food.

Then we mentioned the symbolism of the communion, but I think I did not speak of the interesting fact of the new revised texts of the Greek and Latin versions of the New Testament. You know there is an old Latin version of the New Testament with the Vulgata which is the official text in the Catholic church. And there is now a new text, *Novum Testamentum Graeci et Latine*, in which both versions have been revised according to the best available sources. Now the time-hallowed form of the Lord's prayer in Matthew contains the famous passage: "Give us this day our daily bread." But in this very carefully revised text one finds: *Panem nostrum supersubstantialem da nobis hodie*, which means: "And give us the *super*-substantial bread today." The Greek text says: *ton arton ton epiousion*, meaning "the super-substantial one." In German it would be, in the pure style of Master Eckhart: *das überwesentliche Brot*.

Ousia is the being, the being of the world that is, *das Sein der Welt*; and *epiOUSion* means that which is beyond the world. The concept of a metaphysical world would exactly correspond, but the most plastic and fitting German translation is: *das überwesentliche Brot*. It would be very beautiful if we had in the Lord's prayer: *gebe uns Heute das überwesentliche Brot*. That is the true meaning, you see.¹ But naturally to the coarse mind, to have one's food every day is most convincing. Unfortunately it was not exactly what Christ meant. Many things happened to the text of the New Testament; we shall presently come to another little trick that was played in the wording.

Then at the end of the chapter Zarathustra buries the corpse in a hollow tree, and we spoke of that as a protection against the wolves. Do you remember what we said about it?

Miss Hannah: He put it there in order to forget it entirely.

Dr. Jung: Yes, because wolves are the personification of hunger—one is hungry as a wolf. So when he protects the corpse from the wolves, he is protecting it from being eaten by the appetite in himself which he tries to forget. You remember he says of his hunger before, "And all day it hath failed to come: where hath it been?" This means that he did not realize his hunger for his body; he forgot his body altogether. Therefore, the body died; he overcame it. But the hunger ought to convince him that he should eat his body; then he would return to humanity and become an ordinary human being. If you want to be an extraordinary human being, don't eat: people who eat become vulgar. Therefore, many people make a point of not eating before others.

This was a particular idea of the disciples of John the Baptizer, the Mandaeans or the Sippahs. Three or four thousand of that sect are still in existence, I believe, near Kut-el-amara and Basra in Mesopotamia. They are considered to be "people of the Book" by the Arabs and therefore inspired. They are called that because they received revelation from a sacred book, (the Jews, the Christians and the Mohammedans are all "people of the Book") and the *Koran* says that they must be spared; they are not considered heathenish and therefore are not massacred. They are supposed to be sort of inferior Christians, but as a matter of fact they are the remnants of a pre-Christian Gnostic sect, followers of John the Baptist from whom Christ received his initiation,

¹ "Super-substantial" is a metaphysical rendering of *EpiOUSios*, which in the King James Version is translated *daily*: "our daily bread." In both English and German, "Give us this day our super-substantial bread" is "very beautiful."

according to the evidence of the New Testament. The Sippahs still possess their holy writings, but they no longer understand them because all knowledge of their language was lost. It was southern Babylonian Aramaic, and recently Lidzbarski, a German scholar, has succeeded in translating certain texts, which turned out to be the remains of those Mandaean books.² (*Manda* means "gnosis.") They are quite independent of the sacred books of the Christians and Jews, but they resemble them very much in some ways; they are records of teachings and sermons by John, really sort of revelations, and he is considered almost a semi-divine figure, a real shepherd of men. He plays about the same role as Christ in the New Testament. The traditions concerning those books are post-Christian because there are two chapters in which Jesus is mentioned, but he is there always called "Jesus ben Miriam," the son of Miriam, and he is called "the deceiver" because he betrayed the mysteries, which is also the tradition in the Talmud, the Jewish book of mysteries. It was a mystery teaching quite obviously, and Christ is said to have thought he would be doing good to humanity in giving the uneducated masses the light he had received through initiation in that teaching of John. But John was against it; he said the people would not be able to understand it and would use it for evil purposes. Then Christ pointed to the miracles he was working, and all the good which came from them. It was a long discussion and without any conclusion. They never came to terms; it was left open whether John was right or Christ was right. It seems as if both were right because in the end God said to each party: "Well, I see you have spoken the truth." I think it is most dramatic to see that this conflict between the mystery religion and the popularized religion never comes to an end, so one cannot say what the ultimate truth about it may be. We shall be forever in doubt whether Christianity was good for the world, or whether it has been a bad thing that the mysteries were betrayed.

Well now, these Sippahs believe that it is indecent to feed before each other, so they turn their backs when they eat, or find a place where nobody sees them. To them it is just as indecent as the opposite functions of the body. Eating before others is understood by many people as sort of taboo; there is mana in it which can easily turn into its own opposite. And here Zarathustra protects his body against the wolves because he tries to make sure that his sanctity or his superiority shall not become injured through the vulgarity of eating, which would put him down to

² Mark Lidzbarski compiled and translated *Das Johannesbuch des Mandäer* (Giessen, 1915). Sippar was an ancient Babylonian city. See *Dream Sem.*, p. 240, 240n.

the level of common humanity. To fill himself with physical matter would make him heavy and he could not dance any longer. He could not fly, he would be fettered to the earth. Therefore, in ascetic forms of religion people refrain from eating in order to attain spirituality; in a certain season of the year, or on a certain day of the week, they make themselves light by not filling the stomach. They assume that in eating they consume all the dirt of the earth and are fettered to the earth by the heaviness of the belly. So eating is made into a sort of symbolism, as the eating of the Host for instance. The little saint Thérèse of Konnersreuth is said to have lived upon the Host alone.³ People who were in a position to know reported that as a fact; they were absolutely convinced of it. I cannot understand it, but I would not deny it; it is possible that such things might happen. Other things happen which are equally marvelous. We cannot say anything is impossible except a logical contradiction, but there is no logical contradiction there. You know, it is important that the perfect saint should be able to rise, to perform the miracle of levitation; many of the great saints have been seen rising into the air before the altar, as Elijah was carried in the fiery chariot to heaven, or as Christ in his transfiguration ascended into heaven.

Mr. Baumann: It was the sign of divinity in Egypt that the kings wore feathers for clothes.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the transformation into the bird, just as our souls have been supposed to transform into birds after death, into angels with golden wings. There are many people still on earth who feel the little wings beginning to grow on their backs and they let you know it in time! And in the Gilgamesh epic, you read of those sad places, a sort of Hades, where the souls of the dead dwelt, and they wore the plumage of birds and ate their own dirt; they were sort of carrion eaters or feces eaters, evil birds.⁴ Now all this refers to the lightness of the subtle body, that body of breath which would become heavy if filled with substantial food. Therefore, food must be of a super-substantial nature, that the body may also lift itself. In India the perfect wise man is always understood to be able to fly—that is the criterion of the wise man. We shall see later on, when Zarathustra goes down into the underworld, that he also can fly; again such an *enantiodromia*. He has then attained to the state of *hamsa*, the swan, which is the term for the state of the winged

³ Presumably St. Teresa of Lisieux (1873-1897) who was often called "the little" (minor) compared with St. Teresa of Avila (1515-1582).

⁴ *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, ed. R. Campbell Thompson (London, 1928), Tablet Seven. This edition, unlike most, contains material from different manuscripts.

in India; therefore, each wise man has that for a title of honor.⁵ The swan also figures in the legend of the Holy Grail, and the Holy Grail itself is held in a state of suspension. It is held by angels suspended between heaven and earth. Suspension is also an aspect of crucifixion, the unconscious aspect of transfiguration. It is the state of transformation, but it is the fate of the body while transfiguration is the fate of the subtle body. So the subtle body appears here in a sort of crucifixion, the martyrdom of the body; and here it is a state of suspension which precedes birth or creation. You find that symbol very beautifully in the Edda, in the first verse of the chapter called *Runenkunde*, which tells how Odin invented the sacred letters, or runes, while he was suspended on the tree.

I know that I hung on the windswept tree
 Nine nights through,
 Wounded by a spear, dedicated to Odin
 I myself to myself.⁶

That tormented state of suspension is the incubation of the subtle body. Christ is supposed to have been seen after his crucifixion by his disciples and by many other people; his subtle body appeared after the state of suspension. Either one dies in that suspension, producing the subtle body through death, or one produces superior knowledge, like the runes.

You know, letters, the art of writing, was an amazing discovery to the primitive mind. If primitives have never seen writing they marvel at it. Whenever a negro brought me a letter or a written message, they all crowded round while I opened it, and looked at it from below and above, and they listened because they said the paper was speaking to the white lord; they assumed that I must either see something in it or that something talked to me. They cannot get away from the idea that it is only possible to receive a message by mouth; the discovery of the letters, those hooks and circles, black signs that talked, is sheer magic to the black man. They can understand when one makes a picture of something—yes, one sees it—but that those hooks could convey any

⁵ Certain Brahman mendicants were likened to the swan, *hamsa*, in having no settled home, but equally "at home" in water or air or on earth.

⁶ In the Icelandic *Edda* we read of the god Odin (Othin), who while hanging on the world-tree hatched the rune, a secret, magical, benign distillation of wisdom inscribed in a distinctive script (Henry Adams Bellows, *The Poetic Edda* [New York, 1923]). See CW 5, par. 399.

sound or thought is beyond their horizon. Only a god could invent such things in the state of divine torment.⁷

Mrs. Crowley: Is that not really the meaning behind the idea in the East of not eating? For the saints and the fakirs anyway, isn't it in order to attain that state where they can receive a message? It would not be the idea that it was vulgar, but that only after fasting are they able to receive.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the positive understanding of it. But so many people don't eat because it is vulgar, or they fast or eat special food because they have resistances against ordinary food; then behind that is the idea that by fasting they will receive something.

That is like the magic use of the sacred symbols. Of course there is the right use and the wrong use. You see, mandalas were first discovered by some old wise guy who lived in a cave or in the woods because he was bored with the crowd of fools that humanity consists of, and had discovered much more interesting things than the ordinary small talk of the villages. He sat apart and studied the miracles in his mind, and he had funny dreams also, and he came to the idea that things must be somehow in a circle like the horizon round himself. So he made a circle, that was one thing; then he made a point in it, and thus he got nearer to the truth, and he went on filling the circle with pictures of the world. Then he made four points for north, south, east, and west, and thought to himself, "Now everything is nicely arranged." But then he was disturbed by curious, ordinary people who have spiritual appetites, and young people came along saying: "What about this?" and "What about that? He thinks in circles." And he said: "Don't get excited about that, just let things go as they naturally go." They thought this was exceedingly wise and so he was called the wise man. Then certain people thought: Now could one perhaps acquire that wisdom?—we want to be as wise as he. So they asked him about his wisdom. He said, "Well, you see the world is like this," and he began to explain with circles and squares and all sorts of triangles, and they thought: "Now that is grand! We must only make such squares and triangles and that will turn the trick, that will carry." Therefore, they made mandalas and they stared at them, they contemplated them, they put themselves into them: Yes, it is true, the old man has filled them with truth. And it is of course most convincing, because one believes that in stepping into those mandalas, one steps into the truth. Yet, they didn't know that they had stepped out of the truth. That is the terrible

⁷ Here again Jung is referring to his time in Kenya in 1925.

thing: when one thinks a thing is obviously the truth, most convincing, and steps into it, then one steps out of it. You see, they omitted one thing, the great rhinoceros of the alchemistic process: namely, that *they* are the truth, not the circle. The old man made the circle out of himself: *he* is the truth. And they think it is the circle. But they have stepped out of their truth. The old man has never stepped into the circle: he made it, he is the circle. It is a bit like the secret in Nietzsche's lamentation over the lost god, in his poem called: "The Lamentation of Ariadne." You see, Ariadne is dissolved in pain and sadness when she discovers that Theseus, her lover and rescuer, has disappeared in the night, leaving her on the island of Naxos alone. Then the god Dionysos appears, and he takes her by the ear and says:

Ariadne, Du hast kleine Ohren,
Du hast meine Ohren,
Steck ein kluges Wort hinein,
Ich bin dein Labyrinth.

Meaning: "Thou hast small ears, / but thou hast my ears; / put a cunning word in, / I am thy labyrinth." Now that is Zarathustra.⁸

Well, the protection of the corpse in the hollow tree is, as we said, a primitive burial; corpses often have been buried in or upon trees in order to protect them against the onslaught of wild animals. Of course such things are done only in tribes where there is a certain belief in the body, the belief that it should be protected and its actual appearance preserved, a sort of embryonic Egyptian belief in the importance of the physical substance of the body. The Egyptians were so anxious about it that they put numberless statues of the king into his grave and into the temples—everywhere—in order to remember the countenance of the dead. I think there is even a prayer to that effect, that it should not be permitted that their looks should be forgotten. They gave the sarcophagus the traits of the dead in order to make certain that the memory of the countenance was not lost. Then this burial in the hollow tree has another meaning. The sarcophagus, shaped according to the form of the mummy and with the face of the dead, means that it is meant for rebirth; that form would have absolutely no

⁸ Ariadne was Nietzsche's name for Cosima Wagner, his secret love. "Lamentation for Ariadne," a late poem of some hundred lines, ends with Dionysos appearing in a flash of lightning in his emerald beauty, saying: "Be clever, Ariadne! . . . / You have little ears, you have my ears: / Put a clever word into them!— / Must one not first hate himself, if one shall love himself? . . . / I am your Labyrinth . . ." (Very often, as here, the dots, for Nietzsche, do not signify elision.)

importance if it were not a preparation for rebirth in the body. Therefore, we must assume that other forms in which the body was preserved also contain the symbolism of rebirth. We have parallels in Germanic mythology. As Nietzsche is writing out of his particular avenue to the unconscious, he would naturally use Germanic archetypal material, and in Germanic mythology the tree plays a great role. Do you know an example?

Mrs. Jaeger: Yggdrasil.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the world-tree. The first human beings were supposed to be born from the ash and alder, and the last human beings before the world-hell breaks loose enter the tree again and become a tree, the world ash. The tree first gives birth to man, and then it is the sarcophagus, as the earth is the mother that gives birth in the dawn of humanity—and in the evening is the sarcophagus: she eats the dead.⁹

Mr. Baumann: I think there is a similar myth in the Persian religion.

Dr. Jung: Yes, in the Persian holy book, the *Bundahish*, the first parents, Meschia and Meschiane, were also represented as trees. That is Indo-Aryan. This idea was in the air generally, but it is most suggestive in Germanic mythology, in this reentering the tree which is the symbol of the mother. And the *mater sarcophaga* is very beautiful Etruscan symbolism, which I mentioned in *The Psychology of the Unconscious*.¹⁰ That statue of the *Déesse de Mort* is in Florence, where it is called the *Dea Matuta*, an Etruscan word. It is made of terra cotta and is hollow—one can lift it apart—and the ashes of the dead were put inside, into her belly: so the dead were buried again in the mother. That is a human figure instead of a tree. The burial in the tree, then, has also the positive meaning of preservation of the body for a later rebirth. Therefore, we can conclude from this symbolism that a day might come when the body suddenly would resurrect from the tree. That tree is in the wood, and out of a wood the body would rise. One could say that this body was in the place of the old man, the bearer of the light, sleeping in the woods waiting for the day of his resurrection. Here we can anticipate a later part of *Zarathustra*.

⁹ "The gods give judgment every day at the foot of the ash: Yggdrasil, the greatest of all trees and best; its limbs spread over all the world." Joseph Campbell, *The Masks of God: Occidental Mythology* (New York, 1964), p. 458.

¹⁰ The story is told of the first man being killed by the dark god Ahriman, but from the man's semen a double plant was formed with a single root. These stems were the primordial man and woman. "Bundahish," in *Pahlavi Texts, Sacred Books of the East*, vol. I, tr. E. W. West (Oxford, 1880-1897). For *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, revised, see CW 7.

Mrs. Baumann: I have been reading an interesting book about a tribe in central Africa who call themselves "tree men." They get all their knowledge and magic rites from the trees, which are supposed to be so old that they know everything about existence. They know that life is a circle which repeats itself.

Dr. Jung: That is very interesting. One reads similar things in Talbot's *Shadow of the Bush*.

Miss Wolff: We spoke the week before last about the *transitus* which is so very different in *Zarathustra* than in the Mithraic or Christian myths. Here the corpse is elevated by Zarathustra into the tree, and Zarathustra lies down on the grass; but there is a kind of faint analogy with Christ on the cross.

Dr. Jung: It might be a state of suspension.

Miss Wolff: Yes, and the cross is a tree, a symbol of death and rebirth.

Dr. Jung: And there is the old tradition that the cross is made of the wood of the tree of paradise, the tree of life and knowledge, so he is represented as hanging on the tree of life, which is naturally the same thing. The cross is the mother of the dead, the *Dea Matuta*.

Mr. Baumann: I want to ask another question about Nietzsche. About twenty years ago this idea of rebirth played a great role. It made his book famous; everybody talked about that idea of *die ewige Wiederkunft*. Why did it make such an impression at that time?

Dr. Jung: Oh, that *ewige Wiederkunft* was in the nineties. It was published by Horneffer from the Nietzsche archives when he was already insane. Horneffer collected his manuscripts and put them into a brochure containing Nietzsche's idea about the return of things. You know, Nietzsche had a sort of revelation about the external return of things; he was struck by the idea that the world must be finite and therefore the number of possibilities was necessarily finite and so must repeat themselves. After a certain lapse of time, of course an immeasurably long time, the same combination must return, and then one would say again, "Yes I want the eternal things, once more, *noch einmal*." This is the main idea in the idea of the eternal return, which is a peculiar way of talking of rebirth.¹¹ It belongs of course to the great *Ja sagen*, the yea-saying to life, *admitting* life, positivity, in reference to life, which plays such a great role in the second part of *Zarathustra*. It be-

¹¹ Nietzsche referred to "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same" as "the fundamental idea of my work," and as having come to him in August 1881 while wandering through the woods alongside the lake of Silvaplana. See *Ecce Homo*, "Thus spake Zarathustra," sec. 1.

longs to the Dionysian stage of his initiation; it is the feeling of rebirth which always accompanies the revelation of Dionysos.

Mr. Baumann: Why was it taken up so tremendously?

Dr. Jung: Because it was the problem of the time. You know, that was the time where everything got stiff with Victorianism, and so everybody hoped for the great outburst of fire, of movement, enthusiasm, and so on. Then happily enough the war came, the great feast of death, then people could decorate themselves with flowers, you know. As it is with the termites when their great *joie de vivre* comes: when all the young termites are hatched they throw open the doors of the termite hill and out they come and are eaten in no time by birds and animals. Everything is wasted; it is a vast hecatomb, a sacrificial offering to the gods. It is a mighty symbol. And those rodents in Norway, the lemmings, do the same thing. When they are too courageous on account of being too many, they eat up whole towns, and then they wander away to the west in great enthusiasm and all go into the sea and die. Well—sad! [Dr. Jung then read Chapter 9, *The Preachers of Death*.]

There are preachers of death: and the earth is full of those to whom desistance from life must be preached.

Full is the earth of the superfluous; marred is life by the many-too-many. May they be decoyed out of this life by the “life eternal”!

“The yellow ones”: so are called the preachers of death, or “the black ones.” But I will show them unto you in other colours besides.

There are the terrible ones who carry about in themselves the beast of prey, and have no choice except lusts or self-laceration. And even their lusts are self-laceration.

They have not yet become men, those terrible ones: may they preach desistance from life, and pass away themselves!

There are the spiritually consumptive ones: hardly are they born when they begin to die, and long for doctrines of lassitude and renunciation.

They would fain be dead, and we should approve of their wish! Let us beware of awakening those dead ones, and of damaging those living coffins!

They meet an invalid, or an old man, or a corpse—and immediately they say: “Life is refuted!”

But they only are refuted, and their eye, which seeth only one aspect of existence.

Shrouded in thick melancholy, and eager for the little casualties that bring death: thus do they wait, and clench their teeth.

Or else, they grasp at sweetmeats, and mock at their childishness thereby: they cling to their straw in life, and mock at their still clinging to it.

Their wisdom speaketh thus: "A fool, he who remaineth alive; but so far we are fools! And that is the foolishlest thing in life!"

"Life is only suffering": so say others, and lie not. Then see to it that ye cease! See to it that the life ceaseth which is only suffering!

And let this be the teaching of your virtue: "Thou shalt slay thyself! Thou shalt steal away from thyself!"—

"Lust is sin,"—so say some who preach death—"let us go apart and beget no children!"

"Giving birth is troublesome,"—say others—"why still give birth? One beareth only the unfortunate!" And they are also preachers of death.

"Pity is necessary,"—so saith a third party. "Take what I have! Take what I am! So much less doth life bind me!"

Were they consistently pitiful, then would they make their neighbours sick of life. To be wicked—that would be their true goodness.

But they want to be rid of life; what care they if they bind others still faster with their chains and gifts!—

And ye also, to whom life is rough labour and disquiet, are ye not very tired of life? Are ye not very ripe for the sermon of death?

All ye to whom labour is dear, and the rapid, new, and strange—ye put up with yourselves badly; your diligence is flight, and the will to self-forgetfulness.

If ye believed more in life, then would ye devote yourselves less to the momentary. But for waiting, ye have not enough of capacity in you—nor even for idling!

Everywhere resoundeth the voice of those who preach death; and the earth is full of those to whom death hath to be preached.

Or "life eternal"; it is all the same to me—if only they pass away quickly!—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

We have just dealt with the different aspects of the burial, but one point concerning the motif of suspension was not clearly indicated in that chapter, namely, the creative aspect of suspension—also the crea-

tive aspect of the hunger and the fasting. It is not only in order to avoid something or for a magical purpose that one sacrifices, buries, fasts, and so on; it is also a sort of symptom or a necessary accompaniment of a creative condition. The creator will necessarily identify with what he is going to bring forth. He will identify with the condition of the contents of the unconscious, which are *in statu nascendi*, in the state of being born. They are suspended, they are in the labor pains of birth, and the creative consciousness is identified with that condition. Therefore, the creator will put himself into the state of suspension, of torment, in order to embody or incarnate the unconscious contents. This is an important idea and we must be clear about it in order to understand what will follow. The condition which Zarathustra has gone through, the burial, is the sacrificial suspended condition which is at the same time the incubation of the birth to come. The tree was at his head as he slept, and that is a symbolic position indicating that, as the corpse was contained in the tree, so the tree with its contents was contained in—or above—the head of Zarathustra. You can imagine that he is standing like a man in an upright position and the tree with its invisible contents, the corpse, is on top of him, representing the contents that are to be reborn. A corpse is buried with the idea of resurrection. That is, of course, primitive mentality. One fertilizes the mother by putting a corpse into her and she will transform it and give it rebirth in time. It is as if one put a seed into the ground, like the age-old symbolism in all church hymns; it vanishes into the ground, and rises as a new plant: green wheat will appear instead of the buried grain. So the burial is at the same time a preparatory sacrificial rite which induces the mother, or the unconscious, to give birth. It is as if one fed the carnivorous mother earth with human flesh so that she may create, give body to the suspended potentialities of the unconscious contents.

Our unconscious contents are potentialities that may be but are not yet, because they have no definiteness. Only when they become definite can they appear. Nothing is definite in the unconscious; as long as a thing is unconscious nothing can be said about it. Definiteness only appears where matter appears. According to Tantric philosophy, matter is the definiteness of the divine thought, the thought of the creator. That is merely a psychological projection however, because as long as one's thought has not attained a body it is not definite. To give body to one's thoughts means that one can speak them, paint them, show them, make them appear clearly before the eyes of everybody. When one speaks, one translates one's thoughts into vibrations or waves of

sound, which means movement of air; one moves particles of air in the way of sound waves. The idea is thus conveyed, and it appears in the word spoken. To make a picture, one takes different minerals called colors, and water or oil, and makes a shape which expresses the idea; or one can say that the idea assimilates or attracts matter and thus appears. So when a thing becomes clear in my head I assume it is the same process; the idea that has been vague and indefinite before suddenly begins to attract perceivable particles, understandable things, with visual associations, or auditory associations, associations of touch, of smell. The idea usually becomes visible as a visual image, perhaps a picture; or some people have sound associations, so to them it is auditory. With others it is a motion: they can express the idea by certain movements, dancing for instance. Others have several different associations together. Therefore, primitive ideas in their origin are almost tangible things.

There are plenty of examples. In chemistry, you have Kékulé's vision of dancing couples, which led to the discovery of the famous Benzol ring.¹² One can oneself realize, whenever one discovers some idea, that it is just a sort of visualization, another reflection, say of the body. Even certain diseases of the body can portray the character of the idea; perhaps they represent the idea of something which simply cannot be swallowed. A thing which one cannot accept is represented by a spasm of the throat for instance, and that can go so far that one cannot eat. I once treated such a case; the man was reduced to a skeleton. He could only swallow two cups of milk a day, and for each cup he needed two hours, because whenever he took a drop which was a bit too big it simply refused—he could only take the smallest sips. He got quite tired out and was afraid he would die. Nobody knew what to do about it, so that poor fellow landed finally with a sorcerer. You see, I am only called in as the last resource when a man is practically dead. I am so utterly unscientific that I can only cure such a case. When that man eventually got into my hands I inquired into his dreams. I knew, of course, that he could not swallow something, and naturally he had the greatest resistances in getting at it; but his dreams led me to it. His fiancée was represented as a sort of whore in his dreams, so I told him to go home and ask a friend what he thought about the girl. And the first man he asked said, "Why of course, everybody knows it; she is just

¹² Friedrich August Kekulé von Stradonitz (1829-1896), German organic chemist, was presented in a dream with the ring structure of the benzene molecule. See CW 13, par. 143, and CW 16, par. 353.

a fast girl." She had had sexual relations with two other men while she was engaged to him. That was what he did not want to know; he was convinced that she was the purest of virgins from the best of families. Well, after he had been away a week I got a letter from him and it sounded very bitter, saying: "I can eat now! You were quite right. I had to give up that relationship. I think I am cured. Yours sincerely." One saw his emotion: he did not like that idea, but it is what you have to pay for a cure. So such suspended ideas can express themselves easily in the body, in certain skin troubles, for instance, or superficial nervous troubles, anesthesia perhaps; also very frequently troubles of the stomach and intestines, fits of diarrhoea or constipation. People who don't want to give something away produce an extraordinary constipation. There are very funny things like that, quite comical, so obvious that one doesn't believe it. For we are quite disinclined to believe the obvious things; we always think the truth must be very complicated, very subtle. If one says something quite simple, everybody thinks it is not true. Bismarck's great art was to say the plain truth, which nobody would believe, so he got them all into his pocket.

Well now, this suspended condition has the effect upon the unconscious contents that they can assimilate matter as it were; they eat the sacrificed body and can then incarnate or impersonate. So one sees that a creative person will easily neglect or forget about his body, and devote his entire body to the service of the suspended contents. He will repress everything, practically, as Freud would say. All his troubles and preoccupations vanish as if they did not exist: only that idea remains. Like the French artist Palissy who invented the glaze on the surface of pottery.¹³ For years he had tried and failed and he had spent every cent on it. Finally he thought of a way to produce that enamel: it only needed a certain degree of heat. But then his wood gave out. So he burned his furniture, every stick in his house, and when he had pushed the last leg of the last chair into the stove, the enamel was there. That is an example of the way the creative brain works—the last leg of the last chair must be pushed into the oven before the desired result is reached. But of course one has sacrificed a lot; one has sacrificed perhaps the happiness of one's life. If one studies the lives of very successful people—I mean their real lives, not the so-called biographies which are usually lies—one sees that they pay very dearly through loss of human happiness.¹⁴ Or the reverse: people who are not particularly suc-

¹³ French artist and potter (1515-1589).

¹⁴ "Often one has the impression that a creative personality grows at the expense of

cessful have often very nice lives. They can be very happy. Everything that is beyond the ordinary is paid for. You make no mistake if you never envy any kind of success, for every success is dearly paid for. If you think it is not, you simply don't know; somebody has paid.

So the suspended ideas which should come forth, which should reach the daylight, can only appear when one takes away from the other side—the side of the body—so that the idea can produce a body to appear in for itself. The idea is like an autonomous being that wants a body so much that it even incarnates in the body; one begins to play, to perform the idea, and then people say one is completely mad. The idea has taken possession of one till it is as if one were out of one's mind. Such a state, then, is necessarily followed by a certain product. If people can be forced to neglect the body—bury it, in other words—they are most likely to produce a body in their mind, thoughts that have the value of really concrete objects; one can concretize thoughts. There is a magic means in all the old religious initiations. Fasting is a necessary part of any initiation procedure, and flagellation, and all sorts of torments, in which the primitive fantasy is very fertile. They inflict terrible suffering upon young men when they are undergoing their initiation, in order to drive the body into a sort of despair, to corner it, so that the ideas which are taught at the same time shall take on body, existence, and because they are associated with the torment, never be forgotten.

If you get a good thrashing from your school master at the same time that you have learned something, it will remain. That was part of the old system. I was brought up in the country and the teacher had a marvelous way of teaching the alphabet. There were eight boys sitting on a bench, and the teacher had a whip consisting of three willow wands nicely woven together like a plait. He used to mark an A on the blackboard, and say, "Now this is A!"—and then down came the whip over the eight backs. All through the Middle Ages the elementary school teaching consisted in thrashing things in. With primitives it is still worse; they inflict a cut at the same time. The primitive education has to be cruel in order to prevent their forgetting, because they so easily forget. By this procedure the idea becomes associated with the body. It incarnates, it comes down into reality like the runes which were hatched out by Odin when he was hanging on the tree. He fell down with them like a ripe apple. They were the apple that grew on

the human being. . . . Creative powers can just as easily turn out to be destructive" (CW 17, par. 244).

the tree and he was the apple. He was the word, the thought, as Christ is called the *Logos*; he was identical with the word. So this whole ninth chapter shows again the transformation of a human being into a thought, the transformation of Nietzsche into Zarathustra and the burial of Nietzsche the man. It would be the old Adam and the resurrection with Christ according to the Christian formulation, but here he becomes a ghost-being. Primitives teach the young men, when they are taken into the men's house in the Bush, that they are killed there; they go through the procedure of being killed and are told that they have died on this night. Then they are reborn and are taught that they are no longer ordinary human beings but sort of ghost-beings, and they get new ghost names, secret ritual names. And they have peculiarly altered relations to the family when they come back: a mother is not allowed to look at her son, nor the son at the mother. It is like Christ's attitude to his own mother and to the mothers of his disciples: "Let the dead bury their dead," etc. One is no longer the son of man but the son of God. In all mysteries, the idea is that one is reborn as a sort of ghost.

So Zarathustra here has gained a ghost body by the burial of the human being; he wakes up in a new world and he marvels at it. He is like the sailor who has discovered a new land. And the great light that appears is the idea that one could replace one's body by companions, by friends and helpers, that one is no longer isolated, but one could have others as companions. You see, if people are nothing but body, then there is only the connection through the body; but if they are reborn as ghosts, they become aware that there is a sort of air connection. In primitive secret societies, the ghost-man is represented. Later on there is a church, a sort of community, which is based upon the presence of a certain ghost. What we call a religious movement comes from the psychology of the early primitive secret societies. Zarathustra realizes here not only the need but also the possibility of replacing the loss of the body by spiritual community. This is of course an exceedingly characteristic Christian idea; they burn the old Adam, the corpse, and then they have a new family, a new ghost relationship, a relationship in the spirit. And then Zarathustra says he needs, not dead companions, not corpses clinging to him, but living ones who follow themselves, which is what he wants them to do. Now what is the importance of this formulation?

Mrs. Fierz: Christians must follow Christ and here they must follow themselves.

Dr. Jung: Yes. And Mrs. Kirsch says that each shall take his own cross, not the cross of another. The fact is, one always must make that

difference between the faint traces still in existence of an early Christianity with very different ideas, and the historical Christianity which is the real psychological fact we are confronted with. People often ask me why I paint such an unfavorable picture of Christianity; they say it is not a true picture. But look at it! And when I paint a true picture of our actual economic condition, they ask why I make it so awful. Their idea of a true economic condition is of course prosperity. Sure enough, that is what I also understand by it, a very favorable condition, a full pocketbook and a nice bank balance, but that is not the poor stuff we are producing nowadays. This formulation is exceedingly important, because it elucidates with one stroke the whole meaning of *Zarathustra*: it says that each one shall follow himself, and in so doing they follow him. Compare this saying with the age-old formulation of the Catholic church, *Imitatio Christi*—you know that famous little book by Thomas à Kempis—following Christ, not oneself.¹⁵ And in the Protestant church it is exactly the same. One gives oneself away wholesale. That is called the sacrifice of yourself, giving up your ego standpoint, giving up your life and taking on Christ's life. That is, you climb upon his back and you give up your task, your own interests or problems, and simply travel with him, which is of course relatively easy. At all events, it is far more respectable and that always pays: it is nice, everybody is doing it—at least, they say so.

But if you should really imitate the life of Christ, you would land in an impossibility. Try it and you will see. There are people who really do try, even to the extent of getting the *stigmata Christi*. And in the lives of the saints, one sees that they really did their best to imitate Christ. But if we did that, where would we be? We would have to work all day to imitate Christ, we would have no time to do anything else; we wouldn't propagate, mankind would come to a happy end after one generation, all saved. Such a thing is completely unthinkable, yet they taught that stuff: Don't live your own life, don't take up your own cross, take Christ's cross, do as he did, not as you would do. Now, in opposition to that Zarathustra says, "I don't want human companions who do what I do. I am following myself and I hope that my friends and companions will do the same. Then they will be doing what I want them to do." You would say this was an entirely new idea, but it is not: this was really Christ's teaching but it was not understood. There were a few people who understood it, but they were considered exceedingly heretic and if they could have burned them in those days they would

¹⁵ See above, 10 Oct. 1934, n. 11.

have done so. Later on, when they were in power, they burned and flayed them alive. You know, old Hippocrates said that you cannot be redeemed for a sin you have not committed.¹⁶

The New Testament should be read subjectively. When Christ spoke of what you should do to your brother in the Sermon on the Mount, he really meant that you should do it to yourself. And when he said the kingdom of heaven was within yourselves he really meant that. He did not say the kingdom of heaven was *between* yourselves, as the theologians today want us to believe.¹⁷ I talked with a well-known theologian who insisted that the kingdom of heaven was something in between ourselves, a sort of medium in which we were swimming. I pointed out that the Greek text says *entheos*, which means inside of one, and the whole of Greek literature corroborates that translation. But in this particular case he said it should be translated as “between.” That is the way things are falsified; that is what they did to the New Testament in general: they clipped things off or twisted them a little too much, and so the whole thing took on a different aspect. But *entheos* means “within” and that is what Christ said: the kingdom of heaven is within, and there is no use seeking it outside.

So each shall take his own cross, his own individual problem, his individual difficulty and suffering. If I could take the suffering of somebody else, it would be relatively easy. People sometimes suffer from perfect nonsense—how to secure a certain position, or become acquainted with certain people, or write a certain book for instance—and if I carry that it makes no difference to me. Just like that and it vanishes. Quite easy, no trouble. Yet it fills their whole lives and they never reach it. Sure enough, there are things which I cannot reach; I am just as poor a fool as they. But if I take their problem, there is no problem left. There is only a real problem when the problem comes to yourself—that you carry your own life. Christ really meant that each one should take his own cross, live his life to the bitter end. That is initiation. That is the way, not to perfection—we can’t be so ambitious—but to completion at least. And that is what Zarathustra meant: it is the kernel of his teaching. No matter about all sorts of pathological complications, this is the important message to our time. And mind you, the important message is never new; it has always been the truth wherever

¹⁶ The Antinomists held that since there is no redemption without sin, one need not abstain. The Enkratites, on the other hand, were extreme ascetics. See CW 6, par. 25.

¹⁷ The “social Gospel” interpreters read “within you” as within or among the group, not the single individual.

24 OCTOBER 1934

you touched it, and therefore you can say it is the oldest truth. It is as a matter of fact much older than man, because every snail, every bug, every plant is living that truth; each is living its own life. And if they don't, well, they just are not good plants, or bugs, or tigers, or fishes: they go to hell, they have spoiled God's own creation.

LECTURE IV

31 October 1934

Dr. Jung:

Here is a question by Mrs. Baumann: "In the fourth chapter, Zarathustra preaches the value of the body. Now that he buries his body for the sake of being a free spirit, does that mean that he didn't realize what he said before, or is it simply a swing back? It seems to me it is one of those complicated places. Nietzsche didn't realize what he wrote himself, and so Zarathustra was unable to emphasize the body more."

It is not so complicated in reality. Sure enough, it is part of the message of Zarathustra to preach the importance of the body, otherwise his message would have no basis; the idea of individuation, as he preaches it in that chapter, implies the body. You cannot individuate if you are a spirit; moreover, you don't even know how spirit feels because you are in the body. So if you speak of individuation at all, it necessarily means the individuation of beings who are in the flesh, in the living body. It is of course meant to become a reality, or it would remain only a good idea in the mind—one would be individuated because one had such an idea in one's head. People ordinarily think that a right thought must be throughout, not realizing that it is only a very small noise in the attic, and the rest of the house is as it always was, nothing having happened at all. The head, the brain is only a small part of the body. It is just an illusion when you think the right thought in your head means a reality; it is a reality as far as a thought reality reaches; the thought itself is real, but it has not become a reality in space. It has not been expressed by the whole of you. So Zarathustra has the right idea no doubt: he includes the body in the process of individuation, and he emphasizes it because without the body there would be only a disincarnated spirit. But inasmuch as Zarathustra himself is a thought-being—he is really just an archetypal spirit who has the right idea—it is not the man Nietzsche. Nietzsche is not the Superman, but he identifies with Zarathustra naively because he is so swallowed up by that archetype from the collective unconscious. He in-

tuted it because it is a figure of such mighty attraction; his whole life was sucked in by it and the body could go by the board. That special body, the man Nietzsche, simply disappeared behind it. Therefore, there is nobody left to receive Zarathustra's message. Zarathustra speaks his own message, using the means of the body of Nietzsche, and the ordinary human being Nietzsche does not exist. He could not stand up against Zarathustra; he was completely dissolved.

He ought to take a stand against Zarathustra and then something else of course would happen; he would be able to realize the message. He would not speak as if Zarathustra or the Superman were talking. He would say: "A spirit has spoken to me." The real prophet does not identify with Jahveh. He only stands for his word. He receives the word and says Jahveh speaks, not he himself. Nietzsche does not think for a moment that Zarathustra is a spirit in its own dignity and right. He always interpenetrates. He is that spirit somehow. The perfectly good message Zarathustra delivers does not reach the man Nietzsche because he is in no relation to that teaching; he is not a part of the audience. Nowhere in *Zarathustra* can you find a place where Nietzsche really appears; he is nowhere among the audience. He is the preacher, but he does not listen at the same time. The man Nietzsche should appear among the friends or disciples of Zarathustra. We should encounter a passage where he says, "I met Zarathustra, I saw him," or "He spoke to me." Then we would be sure that he made a difference between himself and Zarathustra, and then only could he realize Zarathustra's teaching. He would look at his own body, and would ask himself how he could translate Zarathustra's teaching into his own life. The whole thing would have taken an entirely different course; we would behold an entirely different spectacle, and not the tragic fate brought about through that identification. No matter what the teaching of a spirit may be—a spirit may teach all sorts of things—the question is always whether it reaches the preacher himself or not, whether there is anybody who can make it real. That is, of course, the problem. You see, Zarathustra has not been made real; you must search far for anybody who has made Zarathustra's teaching real. It is tremendously difficult to make it real because it reaches you in your most personal life, and sure enough, you cannot reach high tones any longer when you are concerned with that problem.

Mr. Baumann: There are certain examples. Dante, for instance, experienced everything with Virgilius.¹ There were two in that case.

¹ In *The Divine Comedy* (1318), Virgilius (or Virgil) is Dante's guide—until the approach to Paradise, which no pagan could enter: thence Beatrice.

Dr. Jung: That is a good example. He makes a difference between himself and the *dynamis*; he is not identical with the psychopompos. Virgilius is to him of course this same archetype, but it is a different kind of teaching. It is the message of the Middle Ages. But the future idea is already appearing when Dante reaches Paradise, for at the very summit of Paradise is the mystical rose in which individuation is indicated. That is the end of the Christian mandala, the highest realization of the time, and the mystical rose is the future. And it is Nietzsche, or Zarathustra, who continues, who takes up the eternal thread and carries it further, bringing the idea of the mystical rose down into the being of man. Of course, there were other expressions of it in the meantime: medieval alchemistic philosophy, and Master Eckhart, and Faust, and many other stepping stones led to that transformation of the human mind or the human psychology.

Now, here is a question by Miss Hannah: "When Zarathustra, in the last paragraph of section 9, says 'I will o'erleap them that loiter and delay,' is he not identifying with the jester and giving away again the whole positive meaning of the chapter?"

He is most certainly identifying with the jester there; as Zarathustra, he is also the jester. You remember we made that out in our famous equation. He is the jester and he is destructive inasmuch as he is going to jump over the man Nietzsche, for that loitering one is the body he has buried. The ordinary man who is in the body is inert: he loiters, he hesitates, he cannot follow those high intuitions. Therefore, Zarathustra will jump over the man Nietzsche, as the jester jumped over the rope-dancer. Miss Hannah continues: "It seems to me that the chapter contains, as well as the extremely positive perception 'follow yourself,' a very good description of why no human being could live up to being a friend of Nietzsche's, including himself."

Inasmuch as Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, of course nobody could possibly be a personal friend to him; nobody can deal with such an identification because it means an inflation. One cannot form a personal relation with a person who has an inflation; anybody with an inflation is neurotic, and it is absolutely impossible to form a relation with a neurotic, because one never knows with whom one is dealing. A neurotic is always a yea and a nay. One thinks one is perfectly safe in assuming this, and then one discovers something else, so naturally all relations are upset in the long run. One can of course deceive oneself for a certain length of time; one can live under an illusion, having a relation only to the positive side of the neurotic, but after a while one will be confronted with the negative side and then one will see the

mistake. And so Nietzsche, inflated by that archetype Zarathustra, was inhuman; a person who is assimilated by such an archetype is necessarily not human. He is a Superman, and how can one have a friendship with a Superman? Absolutely impossible. One can only worship him as a superior being. But I wouldn't drink a glass of beer with a Superman. One cannot eat at the same table; one can only hold communion where he is the lord. Is your question answered, Miss Hannah?

Miss Hannah: Yes, quite. But what I really meant was: was it not his impatience that really destroyed his relationships and his own life?—the impatience of intuition?

Dr. Jung: Well, that impatience expresses itself very strongly in the figure of Zarathustra. He is urgent, pressed by time; he wants to deliver his message, he cannot wait. I mentioned that later chapter where he is seen descending to hell through the volcano and where a voice says: "*Es ist Zeit, höchste Zeit.*" That shows how impatient he is to tell his message, as if he felt his impending doom, the degeneration of the brain which began soon after. In *Ecce Homo* you already see traces of it, the first symptom occurred only four or five years later.² So it was really immediately before the gate was closed that Zarathustra was able to deliver his message.

Dr. Howells: You don't put that to his own nature? You put it rather to the doom that was awaiting him?

Dr. Jung: I would say it was also an intuition of the doom. We are almost forced to such an assumption on account of the clear indication of the catastrophe in the death of the rope-dancer; there Nietzsche predicts his own fate.

Miss Hannah: Would it not have been possible, if he had curbed that impatience, to have avoided the doom?—if he had been more considerate to the human animal?

Dr. Jung: Then the case would have been quite different; we cannot say what would have happened if the old Romans had had rifles and gunpowder.

Mrs. Baynes: I think you said at the beginning of the Seminar last spring that it was a question whether the events were going to transpire in the pure collective unconscious or the collective conscious. If he has

² Jung seems here not to have the dates of the works straight. The last part of *Zarathustra* was finished in 1885. Then after a torrent of books, the last, *Ecce Homo*, was completed just before Nietzsche's breakdown in 1889.

parted with his body as a human being, could we say the rest of the book transpires in the pure collective unconscious?

Dr. Jung: One could formulate it like that. But it is happening really in the collective consciousness. Inasmuch as *Zarathustra* is written and spoken, it is already part of consciousness. You see, as long as it is the collective unconscious, it is as if contained in the person or individual; but inasmuch as it becomes spoken, manifest, it is in the collective consciousness. So whatever happens now is happening in a collective consciousness because it is the life of a personified idea. It is no longer in the collective unconscious; if it were there we would not know of it.

Mrs. Baynes: I thought that he was just speaking as if through a loud-speaker from the collective unconscious.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is true, but through the speaking, it becomes collective consciousness. That transformation of the collective unconscious into the collective consciousness is what one calls revelation, and any revelation that really comes from the collective unconscious is like a megaphone because it is a message spoken to many; it reaches a crowd because it expresses a collective thought. So inasmuch as *Zarathustra* has expressed the collective thought, he has become part of the collective consciousness.

Mr. Baumann: Does that mean that it wouldn't necessarily go into his individual consciousness?

Dr. Jung: It can be quite aside from the individuality. It is often as if Nietzsche did not exist, or did not know what he was saying. Therefore, many revelations take place through completely unconscious individuals; they speak through a trance. It is even the primitive assumption that a revelation always takes place through an unconscious body, in a sort of trance. Suddenly a spirit seizes the person and he becomes unconscious or gets into a state of *ekstasis* and utters the revelation. He speaks the divine word, and afterwards can remember nothing of it. It is even a criterion of the revelation from the collective unconscious, that the individual is put out completely while it is happening; the typical medicine-man often behaves like that.

Well now, we spoke last time of the nature of the message, the continuation of the Christian idea. It is an absolute law of the development of religious thought that it evolves as it were out of itself. On a certain level of consciousness religious thought is expressed by many gods, say, or by demons, or by images; and they have their individual biographies. They are generated in such and such a way; they are born of such and such parents; they do such and such things; and are for such and such a purpose. And it is all assumed as a sort of concrete event

which has taken place or is taking place—that the gods live on Olympus, for instance, or in certain trees, or any such idea. Now, this concrete manifestation of the gods contains the next step—the next religious form that is—in a symbolic way. In what the gods do or in what happens to them, is given at the same time the symbol of the subsequent stage; so one could say that the subsequent stage of religious thought is always the interpretation on the subjective stage. It is like a dream where there is a sort of concrete action, a concrete performance of concrete people, yet the whole thing represents a thought. If you analyse it, integrate the imagery of the dream, and understand that Mr. & Mrs. So-and-So who appear in the dream are only aspects of your own psychology, then it becomes clear that you have been enacted as a play in the dream in order that a thought could be performed which is not your thought, but one that has come to you which ought to be realized. So the end of the dream interpretation is that all the performances are understood as concretizations of a thought which existed before and which caused the dream; through that play on the stage of the dream consciousness, this particular thought was conveyed to your waking consciousness. One sees the same thing in the continuous revelation of religious thought, which is a sort of dream of the collective unconscious as a whole, different scenes being on the stage at different times. For instance, for the time between 2000 B.C. and 100 B.C., the dream—what we might call the divine thought—is staged in such a way. In the mythology and religions of that age, you find the manifest dream which they took for the real thing. Then another age comes when all the old gods decay, when they are no longer true, and there we have a new setting; the stage is now formed and a new play takes place. And this play contains the interpretation of the former one, apparently an entirely different play is enacted, yet it is an interpretation of the former one.

Egypt, for example, was the foremost cultural power in the Near East. It lasted longer than Babylon, which was destroyed by the Persians while Egypt was still guarding the old traditions. Egypt is chiefly responsible for the drama of the collective unconscious between 4000 and 100 B.C. The main religious thought which was handed down through the ages was the divinity of the Pharaoh, the king; and the god-man, the savior, the Osiris, the image of the soul. Osiris was an original god of Egypt, just as old as Ra, yet he was always different from Ra, the sun god. He was a sort of god-man, the dying and resurrecting hero god. He was first understood to be a god and then he became the soul, the Osiris, of the Pharaoh. As the king was in a way Ra,

he was also Osiris, the dying and resurrecting hero. So Osiris became the mediator between the gods and men. Therefore, the surface of the walls of the temples are covered on the outside with representations of the worldly feats of the king, and inside with pictures of the god-king having intercourse with the gods. Outside, he is the great figure of the land, the political hero, with little warrior figures round him, little soldiers to slay his enemies; and inside the temple, he is the god-man who converses with the gods. He receives the blessing or the sign of *ankh* from the hands of the gods, or he offers the *ankh* to the gods. They receive life from him through the royal offering.

Now, this figure of Osiris is very clearly an anticipation of Jesus or of the *Christus* idea, so clearly that even the Catholic church—which is rather hesitant in such matters—permits the theory that Isis and the Horus child are an anticipation of Mary and the Christ Child, as Osiris is an anticipation of the Lord Jesus. The Christian idea was chiefly influenced by the mystical ideas of Egypt; there were similar ideas in Babylonian culture, but I think the main origin of Christianity is to be found in Egypt. So the figure of Christ, to us an entirely symbolical figure, is the interpretation of that old Osiris myth of Egypt. But he was not a symbolic figure to the early Middle Ages or to antiquity. He was a real fact, as the mother Mary was of course a virgin. All those things happened in reality, and in the Catholic church you are still forced to believe in the absolute fact of the virgin birth. Of course, we cannot help seeing that it must be symbolic. Even if the man Jesus existed at all, the story of his life is not historical. It is clearly mythology, like the mythology of Attis, or Adonis, or Mithras; that was all syncretistically put together into the figure of the *Christus*. We are not quite imbued with the conviction that the crucifixion, the virgin birth, and the story of the temptation is symbolism, and therefore we know something which former ages have not known.

Our problem now is: what does it mean? what is our interpretation? *Zarathustra* is, to a certain extent, an interpretation of our Christian idea. And individuation is now our mythology. Then what is individuation? It is a great mystery, a boundary concept: we don't *know* what it is.³ We call it the uniqueness of a certain composition or combination, and beyond that we can say nothing about it. To us it is a reality, yet it is a reality just on the boundary line of human understanding, and in

³ A boundary or borderline concept is one which does not admit of a precise definition, not because it is meaningless, but rather because it has too much meaning. Nietzsche said, "Only that which has no history can be defined" (*Genealogy*, no. 13).

two thousand years they will probably say that the whole idea of individuation was nothing but symbolism. And then they will have some new idea to tell about: there will be another *Zarathustra* perhaps, or any other attempt. A sort of revelation will take place which will suddenly put an entirely different light upon the hitherto prevailing theory. You see, if Zarathustra had appeared two thousand years ago, if he had been a Buddha in the first century, for instance, when Buddhism began to spread over Tibet and Southern China, he would have been one of the great teachers of the Mahayana with a red or a yellow hat. We are still too close to have any relation to it, any historical perspective, but at a future time—assuming that people continue as they have done hitherto—they may say Zarathustra is the great teacher, the red hat teacher or something of the sort. They will perhaps invent a name.

Miss Wolff: I have just looked over a book by Herder in which he gives the myths of all people.⁴ And in speaking of Zoroaster, he says his great idea was that man was perfection of creation. It is remarkable that this idea has been seen by Herder, who knew, of course, very little of the Persian religion. I thought Nietzsche must have read it and perhaps been affected by it somewhat.

Dr. Jung: Yes, Nietzsche considered the choice of the name to be of great historical importance, because he held that Zoroaster the Persian was really the inventor of the moral conflict between good and evil, a fact which is hardly to be denied. As he lived in about the eighth century B.C., he probably had the priority of that idea. So Nietzsche says that Zoroaster must come back in order to make restitution. Therefore: his aspiration to be beyond good and evil. This is of course the idea of liberation from the pairs of opposites which is indispensable for the integration of the individual. Individuation is impossible as long as one is split into pairs of opposites. They must be overcome; how, of course, is the great question, but it must be done from a standpoint which is beyond good and evil. Nietzsche himself felt that symbolically when he wrote an important part of *Zarathustra* in Sils Maria, "six thousand feet beyond good and evil." He felt raised to the seat of the gods, above all the conflicts of the low plains where the herd dwells. From that height he was able to unite the pairs of opposites, to be free of doubt, to create a standpoint which is the reverse of old Zarathustra's moral conflict. So it is quite certain that Nietzsche knew about Zoroaster and was strongly impressed with the fact that he was really the first one to make man conscious of himself. For nobody becomes conscious

⁴ Johann Gottfried von Herder published his *The Myths of All People* in 1774-76.

of himself without the conflict: we *need* the conflict. As long as we are not living according to our own choice we cannot know of ourselves. We must be able to choose for ourselves.

Miss Wolff: In other mythologies the gods played an important part, but with Zoroaster man is the important thing. He perfects creation.

Dr. Jung: Quite so. That corresponds with the idea of the integration of the moral conflict, for in the moral conflict man takes on a sort of divine role. It is not left to God alone to fight the devil, or, as the Persian religion expressed it, it is not left to the light alone to fight the darkness. Man enters the battlefield: one could say as the living god, as the manifestation of god in the flesh. All these ideas are exceedingly old, but they formerly expressed themselves in peculiarly concretized forms. Each new level of civilization has given a new interpretation, and there is a sort of progress; things are getting more and more to the subjective stage of interpretation. It is as if we were concerned with a dream that had an exceedingly impressive surface, a very convincing picture with strong emotions, so that we have great difficulty in getting away from the impression of the complete situation. But after a while we are able to discover the thought behind it all and then we can integrate the figures of the dream. For instance, you dream of somebody who seems to be far below your level, a person, say, who is despicable, simply impossible, a person entirely different from your tastes, and you cannot see how you are that person. But if you meditate long enough about the dream, you discover the secret doors leading to yourself, where you can see the spot in which you are identical with him. Then you can integrate the figure; then you arrive at the subjective stage of your interpretation. Formerly the devil was outside. If anyone did something bad it was because a devil had tempted him. Or a spirit had possessed him and forced him. Nobody was responsible: there was no moral responsibility. But now nobody can use that excuse. Now he has to say: *I am the devil, I am the sinner.*

Mr. Baumann: I think this process by which the figure of god becomes symbolical is like the idea of the god going back into the sky, or the stars, or into any idea of remoteness; it happens in every religion to a certain extent. For instance, the Greek gods lived on the earth, on Olympus, and then in the Roman Empire came the idea of the pantheon of the gods. They were removed to the sky.

Dr. Jung: That is true. You know, there were attempts in antiquity to transform the absolutely concrete gods of Olympus into more mental beings. They became ideas. Jupiter, for instance, was made into a philosophical concept. And at the same time, in their concrete form, those

primitive gods degenerated completely. They became ridiculous and were neglected. They just decayed and vanished, and were then superseded by Eastern religions imported from Palestine, Asia Minor, Egypt, etc. This process happened everywhere at that time. The Egyptian priesthood had become highly philosophical, so that a god of the fifth or fourth century B.C., say, was no longer concrete; it was already a philosophical idea. Naturally for the vulgar people it was still a concrete god, as is the case in India today. For instance, Professor von Glasenapp, a German Sanskritist, told me of meeting a Brahman in a temple where the people were worshipping a gorgeous and thoroughly barbarous sculptured image of Vishnu.⁵ The two men were walking up and down in the courtyard, talking of the Upanishads, and von Glasenapp asked the priest why he allowed those people to worship such an image if he believed in that philosophy. And he replied: "But can they grasp the Upanishads? Let them worship the image, because in this the whole philosophy of the Upanishads is expressed." That is a very superior point of view, and I am certain that the Egyptian priests had such a philosophy too, but it was so well guarded that it never was betrayed. Surely the subsequent world of ideas, the apparently sudden explosion of that enormous fantastical philosophy called "The Gnosis" is due to the ideas of the Egyptian priesthood. They were no longer held sufficiently within the precincts of the temples; something filtered through the walls. But the main body of their ideas died out simply because they were never betrayed. We know precious little of them.

So I am convinced that early Christianity originated in the secret teaching which somehow filtered through when the temples became obsolete and the religious forms of Egypt began to degenerate. The fact that there was, in the time immediately before and after the appearance of Jesus, an enormous development of thought of a very new and different kind, is too unaccountable otherwise. Plutarch, who was an Egyptian initiate, gives in his book about Isis and Osiris the philosophical interpretation of their mysteries. And Herodotus, many centuries before, was an initiate, but he was not allowed to speak about them.⁶ The initiations probably consisted of a sort of philosophical

⁵ Professor Helmut von Glasenapp, author of *Buddhism—Non-Theistic Religion*, which appeared in English in 1966.

⁶ Both Herodotus and Plutarch traveled to and wrote about Egypt, the former in Book II of his *History*, and Plutarch, five hundred years later, in *Isis and Osiris*. Plutarch, who is known to have been a priest at Delphi, wrote approvingly of his distant predecessor's discretion with respect to religious secrets, quoting him repeatedly in such ways as, "Regarding the rites of the mysteries, let my lips be sealed, as Herodotus piously says. . . ."

teaching in which the secret meaning of the images, the sacred signs, and names was explained. There are many very obvious symbolic allusions on the Mithraic monuments, for instance, which must have been explained to the initiates. The rites were always secret because the secret meanings were spoken or alluded to. And the early Christians also had their mysteries. Baptism and communion belong to the mysteries: baptism was initiation.

Mr. Baumann: Would one not say that Christ had turned into a philosophical idea?

Dr. Jung: As soon as we say of a thing that it is symbolic, it is already a philosophical idea, whether it is formulated or not. The idea of Christ is only just becoming a philosophical idea, for there are people who still think he is personal, a real man, a real presence, and they grow quite afraid when one says otherwise. The Lord Buddha was a man like Jesus; he was real, but he has become a symbol. He is not even called by his real name; that is a ritual name. Or he is called the *Tathagata*, meaning "the perfect one, the accomplished one." He is a symbol; he is the idea of perfection. And so Christ is for us the *idea* of a human individual that has attained to the state of perfection.

Prof. Fierz: He was named Jesus and we call him Christ.

Dr. Jung: Yes, by giving him a ritual name, we have already declared him to be a symbol. *Chrisma* means ointment, and Christ is the anointed one, the baptized one; he is the symbol of the initiated one. His real name is most ordinary. Jesus is a name like Müller or Smith.

Mrs. Crowley: Would you not say that, in the main, the more philosophical these gods have become—the more they have become abstract ideas—the less vital they are as gods? They seem to be so bloodless and lifeless. That image of Sophia is nothing compared with Isis.

Dr. Jung: Yes, they evaporate into thin smoke, but then the idea itself takes a new form which is exceedingly vital. For instance, the old idea of Osiris being one complete god evaporated and became the Osiris of the king. Then it was the Osiris of the grand vizier, and the high priest, and the treasurer, and so on; and finally it was just everybody. Smith and Jones and everybody had their Osiris. The Osiris of Mr. Smith was a perfectly good Osiris, but with that the whole idea was banalized. Osiris became a sort of immortal genius of everybody and no longer had any particular value. So that symbol vanished and was replaced by a new idea, namely, a new man. And the new idea suddenly became

"Obsolescence of Oracles" in *Plutarch's Moralia*, tr. F. C. Battitt (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1936), #14.

exceedingly vital, because he was a man and a king at the same time; the great point was that, though he was a king, yet he was from the low ones. He was even of disreputable birth; human misery was a cradle for the divine man. That of course was a great message. But now the idea of individuation, as portrayed by the symbol of Christ, the divine man, is thin smoke because it is abstract; while for Mr. Smith to discover that he is an individual is at least two million volts. You know what it meant for all the low ones, the prostitutes and the tax-collectors and the illegitimate children and the illegitimate mothers, to know that from among them the god-man had come; so you can appreciate what it means when Mr. Smith discovers that he is an individual.

Now, Zarathustra rightly wants to find his companions; it is a mistake only if he seeks his companions *instead* of himself, instead of his own humanity or his body. If Zarathustra were a real man and had accomplished the Superman in himself, it would be quite natural that companions would come to him. He would not go to seek them. Have you ever heard of gold running after people? The gold is hidden in the clefts of the earth and is just waiting; it is always gold in itself and will always be sought for. If there is really a good thing, it is sought for: that is the characteristic of the good thing. The mountain comes to the prophet, the prophet never goes to the mountain. If any prophet is seen going to the mountain, you may know he has made a mistake. He had much better stay at home and leave the mountain to itself. Therefore, all this missionary talk here is of course the hunger. If anybody wants to "missionarize" the world and to tell people what is good for them, it means that he is hungry; he wants to fill his belly with the corpses of other people. His own ideas are hungry, his own soul; and other people are feeding his thoughts and appetites because he is unable to feed them himself.

If you discover what you call a truth, you should test it, try to eat it. If it feeds you it is good, but if you cannot live by it and only assume it ought to feed other people, then it is bad. The real test is that your truth should be good for yourself. Not one dog is coming to sniff at it if it doesn't feed yourself. If you are not satisfied with it, if you cannot enjoy it for twenty, fifty years, or a whole lifetime, it is no good. If you are hungry, if you think your companions must be redeemed, and that they must be grateful to you on top of all, then you make a mistake: you may know the idea is no good. So don't play the missionary. Don't try to eat the goods of others. Let other people belong to themselves and look after their own improvement: let them eat themselves. If they are really satisfied, then nobody should disturb them. If they are not

satisfied with what they possess, they will probably seek something better; and if you are the one who has the better thing, they will surely come and get it from you. It is an exaggeration, therefore, that Zarathustra wants to entice many away from the herd. He would quite rightly be called a robber by the shepherd. The sheep want to be with the shepherd, for otherwise the wolves eat them. He says he doesn't want to be the shepherd dog of a herd, so he should leave them with the shepherd; they are much better off with a real shepherd than they would be as companions of that hungry wolf Zarathustra. If he wants to have companions, let him go with the wolves; then he can hunt in a pack. With the sheep it is much too easy.

You see, that is the attitude one ought to take with reference to the problem of individuation: no mission work, no preaching, and no enticing little children from their nurses, or sheep from the shepherd. Let them be with the shepherd, it is much better. People accuse me of a particularly characterless attitude as to religious convictions because I say if anybody wants to be in the fold of the Catholic church, let him remain there. Or let him remain a Protestant if he finds his way in it and his life. That is a contradiction to them, but it is no contradiction. Some people want twenty degrees, and others want twenty-two degrees. Why not? Let them have it. Some people don't like to eat meat, others want to live on it. Well, do so, it doesn't concern me. For to be Catholic simply means that one is Catholic, and to be Protestant means that one is Protestant. Or if you believe in Islam, it simply means that you are the kind of man who believes in Islam. You could not possibly believe in Islam here because it doesn't suit our climate in the least, but down on the Red Sea and thereabouts, you understand why those people can believe in Islam, why it is so much better than Christianity. Christianity is most degenerate there. When I saw the mosques and compared them to the Greek Orthodox church, I understood; I would have gone with Islam by all means, if only in order to clear out that whole *lampisterie*.⁷ The Christian churches in the East are filled with bunk, and the dirty priests are awful; you wish they had a basin in which to wash themselves. And the hypocrisy and the lowdown barbaric worship of images! It makes you feel like Christ when he drove all those money-changers out of the temple. Islam is a decent religion in comparison. We get the wrong side of it because only theologians

⁷ *Lampisterie*: a lamp house. This is possibly an allusion to Meyrink's *The Golem*, tr. Madge Pemberton (London, 1928, orig. 1915), a favorite novel of Jung. The double of the narrator lives at "Last Lamp House," a resplendent but other-worldly castle. See CW 6, par. 205; CW 7, par. 153; and CW 17, par. 289.

are interested in religions, and they are of course against religions other than their own, so they paint them black. I was amazed to find Islam so much more spiritual than Eastern Christianity, which is only a degenerate remnant of Christian Gnosticism.

You see, certain countries, certain climates, make you naturally prefer a certain way of dealing with the great secrets. If you live in India, for instance, and are not infected with the Indian spirit, then you are just a sad specimen. A missionary living in the East, who wants to convert Indians or Chinamen, and is not sensitive enough to be affected by the specific spirit of the country, is a very melancholy spectacle. Men like Richard Wilhelm or Hauer were instantly open to it, for it is greater and better than our views in certain respects.⁸ Of course, it would be stupid to seek technology in Shanghai or in India, and it is stupid to believe we can bring them any religious ideas. We can bring them a certain amount of sentimentality, but their inner development is much greater than ours. Of course, it does not express itself outwardly, but does our Christianity express itself outwardly? Can you show anything that would prove the particular influence of our Christianity upon politics for instance? Not a trace of it.

Mr. Baumann: But I think India and China expressed something several centuries ago.

Dr. Jung: Well, moderately. But we had better not try to prove by external manifestations the truth of internal development. Things were always a bit tough everywhere, so I would not lay too much stress on it. If you know how the first Christians behaved—who were supposed to be such marvelous people—you become modest. It is surely better not to insist upon moral achievements. Of course, it is in a way the criterion if they do *not* show. Things that don't show are usually better than those which do; people who show are always a bit questionable. They don't *do* really, they only show.

Well now, the idea of being active and violating others also shows in Zarathustra's idea of the decalogue, the tables of values. He says: "Behold, the good and just! Whom do they hate most? Him who breaketh up their tables of values, the breaker, the law-breaker:—he, however, is the creator." But he is the destroyer! No good breaking the tables of values, they are weak enough already; you had better hold that little bit

⁸ Richard Wilhelm (1873-1930), German sinologist, was Jung's friend and mentor on Taoism. He is best known for his translation of the *I Ching* (see List of Bibliographic Abbreviations). Professor J. W. Hauer lectured at the Eranos conference in 1934 on "The Symbols of Experience of the Self in Indo-Aryan Mysticism." See above, 6 June 1934, n. 11.

of value together. They need no particular wildness because they will break up all by themselves and altogether too early; we know from history that values begin to break up long before there are new ones to take their place. Therefore, we always go through a time of destruction when people are without orientation and without laws. Usually only the greatest misery forces people to create new laws and new values. If Zarathustra were not so impatient, the man Nietzsche could follow him. He could give Zarathustra the right rhythm, prevent him from being too impatient. Then he would not talk of breaking the tables of values. They could be preserved a little longer. They are weak enough: they will break up without our help. It is not necessary to destroy churches. Nobody attacks Islam, but the mosques are empty; nobody attacks Protestantism, but innumerable people never go to church on Sundays. To break up things is merely the impatience of inflation.

Now, just at the end of this section he says something which is remarkable: "To the lone-dwellers will I sing my song, and to the twain-dwellers; and unto him who hath still ears for the unheard, will I make the heart heavy with my happiness." This is not well translated in the English text, but you get it in the German. *Einsiedler* is one man alone, the one-dweller, literally; and *Zweisiedler* are the two-dwellers. But that is not a real word, it is something funny in his style; and that always indicates a secret thought behind, which did not come through properly. It is like queer things in dreams; a peculiarity or a disturbance of the image betrays the interference of a secret thought behind. You see, it would be enough if he said: "I am preaching to the lonely ones. They shall be my companions, for the lonely ones can appreciate my teaching. They are not satisfied and are seeking the Superman together with myself; as they are lonely, I am lonely, etc." That would make a perfectly nice end to this chapter. But no, it must be: "*Zwei-siedler*"; there are couples apparently, two alone together. Of course one can have a romantic idea about it—he and she—but that is surely not what Nietzsche is thinking of. It must be two lonely people together. Now why the one and the two?

Mr. Baumann: Is it like Nietzsche and Zarathustra, the splitting up of one person?

Dr. Jung: No, there is a great problem behind. One alone would be good enough for Zarathustra, the lonely one, the anchorite; two is already society, a relationship. When I am one I am this man; when I am two I am another man. As soon as you are with somebody else you are different, you are the collective man. So he makes here the attempt at

preaching to the collective man, the thing which he had just refused to do. He said he never would speak to the herd again. But here two of the herd come in; he cannot get away from it. That is an important problem and there is historical proof of it. You know, the theory is that the *Evangelists* were originally derived from the so-called Aramaic collection of sayings of Jesus. But in the excavations at Oxyrhynchus those famous fragments of papyrus were found which contain sentences and anecdotes of Jesus, just as if they had been put down from hearsay; and they are all parallels of the sayings in the New Testament. They were written without the knowledge of the *Evangelists* and are therefore older—just as Paul did not know the *Evangelists* when he wrote—so they date presumably from the very early years of Christianity. Now, in the New Testament, you remember, the text is: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” But the text in the papyrus is: “Jesus said: ‘Whenever there are two they are not without God, and wherever there is one alone I say I am with him; raise the stone and there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and there am I.’ ” You see what has happened. His teaching was really: “Where there is one alone I am with him most definitely. Whatever you do I am with you; raise the stone and there you shalt find me; in your activity, in what you do, in whatever your individual occupation is, I am found, I am present in it.” It is the idea of individuation obviously, because no matter how humble the thing you may do, it is yourself expressed in the way in which you do it. Jesus is in it; you find him in it: “Cleave the wood and there am I.” “But when there are two they are not without God.”⁹ Yes, the collective man is not without God, but when you are alone, then Christ is within. So the original teaching was that it is an entirely individual affair.

That is proved by another fragment, the famous fragment about the animals. Jesus said: “Ye ask who are those that draw us to the kingdom if the kingdom is in heaven?”—meaning obviously: who can pull us up over the horizon with our heavy bodies, how can we reach the kingdom above? “And Jesus answered: ‘The fowls of the air and all beasts that are in the earth or upon the earth, and the fishes of the sea, these are they which draw you; and the kingdom of heaven is within you; and whoever shall know himself shall find it. Strive therefore to know yourselves and ye shall be aware that ye are in the city of God, and ye are

⁹ Bernard Grenfeld and Arthur Hunt, “Oxyrhynchus Papyrus I,” as cited in Mead*, p. 601.

the city,'¹⁰ You see, it is as clear as daylight: this is the idea of individuation. Of course, modern Christianity fights against that point of view. Their idea is that when there are two or three together in Christ's name, He is with them, but when there is one alone, then the devil is with him. They believe one's own society is always bad. We have arrived at a complete depreciation of the human soul: it doesn't pay to look after your soul. Be a sheep in collectivity, for when you are alone the devil is with you. Now, the teaching of Zarathustra is again the teaching of the original revelation.

¹⁰ See *Apocrypha*, p. 28.

LECTURE V

7 November 1934

Dr. Jung:

Last week Mrs. Baynes asked a question which apparently I did not understand and now she corrects it: "I asked if one could say that from now on, i.e., after the sleep at the foot of the tree, the events could be said to transpire in the collective *unconscious*. You understood me to ask if the events were not transpiring in the collective *conscious*, and you said this was a correct formulation and explained why." You see people read the book; it has become conscious matter. There is nothing unconscious about it. As a matter of fact, you yourself prove my point here. You say, "Now my argument was this: Nietzsche as a man disappears from the picture, we said, with the burial of the body, and that leaves us with Zarathustra, a disembodied spirit. He goes to sleep at the foot of the tree and awakens in the world of the collective unconscious. The sun would then be the midnight sun and the snake and eagle cease to represent instincts, and are symbols of earth and heaven, or nature and spirit, or Yin and Yang. The rest of the book would then be a record of a night journey under the sea. I can now see that this is an incorrect view because Zarathustra is attempting to present new values to humanity and a night sea journey would not deal with *values*, but experience of the inner world."

That is exactly the case. *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is not a series of experiences of the inner world; there are very few of those. The book mainly consists of the thoughts and values Nietzsche develops from them, the experiences themselves being left pretty much in the dark. We don't know exactly what he experienced, because he translated it right away into thoughts and values. Now, if it were a night sea journey—if Zarathustra were really a disembodied spirit, in other words—then a quite different book would have resulted. If it had been written at all, it would have contained that experience under the sea. But as a matter of fact, Zarathustra is not a night sea journey. It is written by a man, Nietzsche. Zarathustra is just not a disembodied spirit. If he

were, Nietzsche would be confronted with Zarathustra, but he is identical with him; and that of course causes the whole trouble. Nietzsche speaks, yet Zarathustra speaks through the medium of Nietzsche; they are not clearly separated. You probably have read in my books, in "The Relations between the Ego and Unconscious" for instance, that one should make a difference between the conscious ego and the figures of the collective unconscious.¹ If the archetype of the wise old man appears, then naturally the ego is just caught—one is always caught by unconscious contents. Then you find yourself in a peculiar alienated condition; you see things and say things and feel things as you wouldn't before. It is a sort of new experience of yourself. You see yourself in a different light, and people perhaps react to it and make remarks about it, that you look funny or say funny things: "What was the matter with you the other day?" From such experiences you begin to notice, if you are at all introspective, that something has happened to you. You begin to reflect about your condition, to think about what you say; and you confront yourself with the question: "Why did I say such a thing?" "Out of what psychology was it said and done?" And then you come to the conclusion that it was not exactly yourself: *you* would not speak like that.

Now you can do the same thing with all the contents of the unconscious. I will tell you a very striking example, this time of the animus, which is also an archetypal figure, of course. You can take this case as a general, most suitable example, valid for all cases of archetypes. I once met a lady at a social gathering. She was my hostess, and she talked to me for about one and a half hours uninterruptedly, so that I had absolutely no opportunity to squeeze a word in between. Then suddenly she stopped the flow of her talk and said: "Now tell me, what did you observe? What do you think of me?" "I think you are a bit nervous." "Oh yes, I know that—that is nothing new to me." So I said, "Well, if you insist on knowing, I must say that you don't think." With this of course she went right up into the air like a sky-rocket, because she had been telling me very difficult philosophical problems; my head almost burst and I had difficulty in following her. It was, in a way, intelligent and highly intellectual talk, so that a listener would have said, "God, isn't she a terror!" Naturally, it seemed to her simply grotesque that I should say she did not think. She said, "But you must explain what you mean! We have discussed the most difficult things." *Discussed*, you know! That is what women call discussion. It was a complete animus

¹ CW 7.

projection. "Well," I said, "I *can* explain it to you: about five minutes ago we 'discussed' such and such a problem, and you made the most marvelous formulations about this very difficult question, but I could read what you told me in any philosophical text book or dictionary just as well." She said: "But that is the way my mind works. I fix it on a certain spot, and it jumps into my mind ready made." I said: "That is all very well, but if you are talking to me, if I am interested at all, I really want to know what *you* think, and not what the books say." And then she said: "If you want to know that, I must think about it first!" Quite naively! It was perfectly true that it was all ready made; it jumped into her mind in a miraculous way and she simply blurted it out. It flowed out like a river. But that was not her thought. It was thought which was floating in the air, in the libraries and philosophical papers and the halls of universities; but it was not what this particular woman had to say about such a problem. She made no difference whatever between herself and her animus; she naively identified with that river of thought which was flowing out of her. And that is what Nietzsche does. He is simply identical with old man Zarathustra, and the flow which comes out of him is Zarathustra himself.

But mind you, while you admit that you are identical with the archetype, obviously imbued with its contents, you must also remember that you are in existence too; and you interpenetrate, you impregnate that spirit with yourself. You are something, you don't disappear. And when you analyse the flow which comes out of you, you will discover not only what the old archetype says, but what you say. So in all the talk that woman produced, she also was all over the place, but in a way which was absolutely invisible to herself. She herself talked but through the medium of the archetype. And so both were wrong; the archetype was wrong and she was wrong, because one was falsifying the other. Therefore, I say to a man: you must make a difference between yourself and your anima, between yourself and all that is contained, thought, or felt through her influence and emotionality. To a woman I say: you must make a difference between yourself and the flow of thoughts which goes through your head: don't assume that things are so because you think so; or don't assume that other people think like that because that thought is in yourself. Criticize it and see whether it is your own. When a bad animus case produces a marvelous opinion, I say: "Now come! is that yourself? Do you really back up this thought? Are you convinced that things are like that?" "When I come to think of it, no!" "Then why the devil should you talk like that? Whose opinion is it?" Then perhaps she finds out that her father has

said it or any other authority; or she has read it in the newspaper. And so Nietzsche preaches any amount about the body, but ask the man Nietzsche what he thinks about the body and he will tell a different story. It is a possession when people preach things which they don't make true in their lives. They simply run away with a disembodied spirit who talks marvelous high stuff, but they are not confronted with it in their lives. It never becomes a problem. They never even think of making it true, but simply accept it as a fact and behave entirely differently. I complain that they talk and think in one way and behave in another, but people are even quite proud that they can think differently from the way they feel. They don't see that this is a split which goes through the whole condition, and that it is a morbid condition, a lack of wholeness, a lack of integrity.

It is perfectly true that if Zarathustra were a disembodied spirit, the eagle and the snake would become, as Mrs. Baynes says, world principles. In man they would be conflicting instincts. But the difficult thing is that Nietzsche is so interwoven with Zarathustra that it is almost impossible to separate the two. They are so entangled, so utterly identical, that they influence each other all the time. You see, the old man would tell him something about the inner world; he would be the psychopompos, the great initiator who would lead Nietzsche to the understanding, or to the vision at least, of *pleromatic* things, the things which are below our level of consciousness.² And then Nietzsche might have made a record of what he had experienced and would perhaps have presented it to the world. But it would then be the story of a traveller on uncharted seas, and not a book of new values or philosophic thought. Or if he wrote a book of philosophical thought, it would not be Zarathustra who was speaking. He would say, "Excuse me, my name is Friedrich Nietzsche, and *I* hold such and such opinions. I judge things in such and such a way." And he would take the responsibility for what he said. He does not, however. He says that Zarathustra is speaking, and there is the entanglement. This is, of course, most upsetting. If a case comes to me with such an identification, I consider it my duty to say, "Now look here, you must see what you are doing. It is really better for yourself and for your work if you look at it critically." So I might have prevented Nietzsche from writing *Zarathustra*, but he

² Jung took *pleroma* and *pleromatic* from the Gnostics, for whom it signified that from which all creation derives. Compared with the created world it is Nothing, yet it is the Fullness that contains *in potentia* all that can arise. Its analogy to the unconscious is evident. These ideas are especially prominent in Jung's "Seven Sermons of the Dead," appended to *MDR*.

would certainly have written something else, something entirely different. He might have written a book where in one chapter he wrote his own ideas, and in another he would have recorded his experiences with the unconscious.

Mr. Baumann: Does such an ideal book exist?

Dr. Jung: No, but we have records of such experiences in the unconscious. The "Shepherd of Hermas," for instance, and perhaps the Book of Revelation, to mention old literature.

Prof. Reichstein: Could the stories of being tempted by the devil be compared to such experiences?

Dr. Jung: The experiences of the saints? Well, in those cases there was always the elaboration through the influence of the church, for they would not be recorded if their stuff was not translated into the language of the church. If St. Francis had not been taken over and worked out by the church, he would have been stamped out; plenty of saints disappeared in a fire or a dungeon, simply delivered over to oblivion because they either did not like to translate their experiences into the church language or were not able to. If the church did not agree with them, they were stamped out as heretics. That collection of mystical confessions published by Buber would be examples of experiences of the unconscious.³ And I quoted a case in *The Secret of the Golden Flower*. Edward Maitland, the biographer of Anna Kingsford and himself a mystic, describes such an experience. There you find a true confession as you can tell from the fact that it is not in agreement with the dogmatic ideas about the nature of God.⁴ Also in that little book which I have reviewed, the visions of Nicholas von der Flüe, the Swiss mystic, there are a number of visions of the unadulterated kind.⁵ But such experiences are usually translated into the dogmatic conventional languages of the time.

Dr. Schlegel: Is it not more or less the same thing as *Faust*?—the experience of the unconscious, and the conscious views?

Dr. Jung: Yes, but there we have also a sort of elaboration. Goethe worked a lifetime on *Faust* in order to get it into shape, so we are not quite certain about the amount of immediate experience and what he

³ Martin Buber, *Tales of the Hasidim*, tr. Olga Marx (New York, 1947).

⁴ In his introduction to Richard Wilhelm's translation and explanation of *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (London, 1931), Jung cites pp. 104-6 of Edward Maitland's *Anna Kingsford, Her Life, Letters, Diary and Work* (London, 1896). It has to do with how, in reflection, ideas can become visible. For "Shepherd of Hermas" see above, p. 106n.

⁵ Nicholas von der Flüe, or Brother Klaus (1417-1487), a simple, unlettered mystical hermit, was canonized in 1947. Jung's review in 1932 of Fr. Alban Stoeck's *Visions of the Blessed Brother Klaus* is reprinted in CW 11, pars. 474-78.

as a poet put into it. That will remain in the dark forever. We have clear indications from Goethe himself, however, that he put many things into it quite intentionally. We could not know how much original experience there was without making the attempt to analyse very carefully what he could have drawn out of his knowledge of mystical literature, and what he only could have experienced. There are quite certainly primordial experiences in *Faust*, but others are taken from his wide mystical reading.

Dr. Schlegel: But is one sure that there is no elaboration in Nietzsche?

Dr. Jung: Oh, there is *any* amount; we have indications of relatively few cases where we are certain of being confronted by the immediate experience. That premonition of his own death is a primordial experience; that is a shot from the unconscious and no elaboration. But *Zarathustra* is nearly all elaborated; it is just not a record of primordial experience.

Mrs. Sigg: Has not Spitteler in his work very often quite immediate experiences?

Dr. Jung: Well, there also is an enormous amount of elaboration. A primordial experience was the instigator of the work—all the trouble he took in order to produce it—beyond that it is very difficult to make out. I analysed his *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, but I never touched his *Olympische Frühling*; only by analysing it as we are analysing *Zarathustra*, could we make out which is the genuine experience and which is elaboration.⁶

Mr. Baumann: What about Joyce?

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is a great question! In Joyce there are indubitably parts which are quite genuine, and besides that there is an unaccountable flow of associations which are drawn from conscious experience. Nobody could say that *they* were absolutely genuine. You see, thought and judgment are entirely excluded: it is chiefly sensation, parts of intellect, also intuition, but there is a complete absence of rational material. The flow of consciousness is quite certainly the main body of the book, and a certain amount of unconsciousness flows into it. To use a comparison, we speak of the Rhine valley, in which flows the river Rhine. Yet it is a double phenomenon really. The actual Rhine valley where we see the Rhine flowing is a perfectly obvious, visible phenomenon; yet about sixty to ninety meters below is a much older valley

⁶ Carl Spitteler (1842-1919), Nietzsche's contemporary, a Nobel laureate in literature. Jung dealt with *Prometheus and Epimetheus* in a number of places—in *Psychological Types*, as the conflict within one individual of introversion and extraversion. See CW 6, pars. 175-326.

from a former ice age in which another river is still flowing, also the Rhine, but that is completely invisible, and it is usually completely separated from the river above. You see, that is our condition: our consciousness is like a river, yet underneath another river is flowing which is much older, dating from times immemorial; and in between there is a separation, the threshold of consciousness. Occasionally, the two waters meet and then they separate again. Now, Joyce is that river of consciousness, and occasionally you get the idea that another river is underneath, which is in no connection with the river on the surface. Therefore, Joyce contains very little symbolism, because there is no attempt at synthesis, and if a symbol is anything, it is synthetic. So he represents the flow; he flows with it, and occasionally some intuitions come from the depths, but they are not worked into the whole thing, nor is there any confrontation with that material, none whatever. Therefore, those peculiar things in his book, the relation to the organs of the body for instance; such things only come in with lunatics, and then it is quite against their intention and it causes the most curious associations. But that can only happen where there is no confrontation with the material, no difference between the author and his material. He is just the event, utterly identical with it. Joyce appears nowhere. James Joyce is the flow himself; and Ulysses appears nowhere, the flow is Ulysses.⁷

Prof. Fierz: In his other book also, the biography, the *Portrait of [The Artist as] a Young Man*, nobody appears.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the funny thing: nobody appears, yet the whole thing is always himself. Well, that is of course a different case; it is not like *Zarathustra* where we have definite figures. Joyce is separated by almost a hundred years from Nietzsche, he is after-the-war while Nietzsche is pre-war. That is the great difference. It would be an interesting problem for a speculative mind to discover why, before the war, though there was little confrontation, there was at least a certain amount; but since the war there is none whatever: things are simply happening. If artists are really prophets of the time, then it is a peculiar prophecy. There is a continuous decrease of confrontation, which means a continuous decrease of reflection, of distance, and a continuous identification with the flow—which means that we are like ants trying to cross a river, who cannot resist the power of the running

⁷ Jung was at first largely negative in his judgment of James Joyce's *Ulysses*, but came to regard its artist as a true prophet—"the unwitting mouthpiece of the psychic secrets of his time. . . . Compared with *Zarathustra* or the second part of *Faust*, it shows an even stronger purposiveness and sense of direction" (CW 15, pars. 184-85). The beginning words of *Finnegans Wake* are, "river run."

water. So perhaps they are all going to drown. Or they may land somewhere, I don't know. But for a while everybody will be just floating, drifting, like a log in the river. And I must say the political development looks exactly like that. Nobody understands the situation; everybody suffers from profound disorientation. Things are happening in a completely uncontrolled way. All the countries are arming themselves. Everybody wants to prevent war, but it is all talk, talk, talk, and things take their course.

Now we will go on to section 10:

This had Zarathustra said to his heart when the sun stood at noon-tide. Then he looked inquiringly aloft,—for he heard above him the sharp call of a bird. And behold! An eagle swept through the air in wide circles, and on it hung a serpent, not like a prey, but like a friend: for it kept itself coiled round the eagle's neck.

"They are mine animals," said Zarathustra, and rejoiced in his heart.

Here something happens. Not many things happen in *Zarathustra*, but occasionally something does happen. We are informed that the sun is now at noontide. Why should Zarathustra mention this fact? Is the sun ever at noontide for Zarathustra inasmuch as Zarathustra is the wise old man?

Miss Wolff: No, it would not be for him—he is an eternal figure—but for Nietzsche it is.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. Here we have an example of how these things work practically. You see, Zarathustra the archetype is typically beyond time. His wisdom is beyond time. First of all, it is old like the world, and secondly, it is always looking beyond the given moment. In the descent of the sun he sees midnight, and at midnight he sees the sun rising, because that is the character of wisdom. As Till Eulenspiegel laughed like mad when he went uphill, and wept when he went downhill. People could not understand it, for wisdom is never understood by ordinary people, but to him it was perfectly clear. In going up he thinks of the descent and that makes him laugh. He rejoices in the idea that soon he will be able to go downhill. But when he goes downhill he foresees that he will soon have to climb again and he weeps therefor. And that is the nature of Zarathustra. So it is the man Nietzsche who discovers that he is at the noon of life. He was born in 1844 so he was just thirty-nine when he started to write *Zarathustra*, and that is the noontide, the beginning of the afternoon. In his case,

it was of course particularly important to see that, because he had only six years left before the atrophy of his brain began in 1889.⁸

Now he discovers his two animals, which were formerly explained as symbols of instincts. Usually the eagle, as an animal living in the air, has the quality of spirit, because spirit is understood to be a winged being, like an angel, a floating volatile being, or like the subtle body of a ghost, a *revenant*. Birds live on top of the highest mountains where nobody can go, or travel through the air, and that is always characteristic of the spirit; to become spiritual one must rise out of the depths of heaviness, fast, and lose weight. And the snake is the symbol for the heaviness of the earth. It has no legs; it cannot jump or fly, but can only creep on its belly in the dust of the earth. And snakes often live in holes and in rocks, and some are nocturnal animals, uncanny. They lead a hidden existence and are met with where you expect them least. So the snake would be a symbol of the earth, for things chthonic. More psychologically, the eagle is like thought, a messenger of the highest god; thought is also understood to be a winged being and a product of the brain, which is on top of man, on top of the world. It is Mount Meru where the city of light lies, the light of consciousness.⁹ While the snake, on the other side, chiefly consists of a vertebral column, and is therefore a personification of the lower motor centers of the body, of the spinal cord and the corresponding centers of the brain. As a personification of the physiological instincts, it is also associated with sexuality, or with the low instinctive cunning of the primitive or animal mind of man.

Zarathustra sees those two animals together, representing pairs of opposites, because spirit is always supposed to be the irreconcilable opponent of the chthonic, eternally fighting against the earth according to the dogmatic idea and the idea of old philosophies in general. For, wherever you go in the world, if you compare the highest philosophical views of a certain period, say two thousand years ago, you find that nearly everywhere people came to the same conclusion: namely, that matter is low and bad, and spirit is good and beautiful and high—and that matter ought to be subjugated by spirit, and not the reverse. And from this standpoint, you discover that we went through a peculiar development in Europe as a result of the idea which we invented, that

⁸ To Carl von Gersdorff, on Dec. 20, 1887, a year before his collapse, Nietzsche wrote, "My life has just now reached high noon: one door is closing, another opening" (N/Letters/Fuss). For Jung, "high noon" symbolizes the beginning of "the second half of life," the time of reflection upon life's meanings.

⁹ A fabulous mountain 86,000 leagues high, in the center of the earth, where Vishnu dwells.

spirit was mind, and that mind was dependent upon the brain and its functions. We built up a materialistic science, the philosophy of which was the primacy of matter, the predomination of the material principle. That is in contradiction with the vast majority of philosophical and religious views all over the world, but we cannot criticize these views properly because we belong to the same period of time. You see, that accounts for the fact that the development of art or science or philosophy, inasmuch as it was contemporaneous, has been along similar lines all over the earth. Even the Mayan or Aztec civilization developed, as far as we can make out, in a way that was parallel to the development everywhere else in the world. The classical periods in art are about the same in China as in Europe; Gothic art in China was contemporary with our Gothic art; and our Baroque and Rococo appeared at the time of the same development in China. These facts show that there tends to be a general synchronicity of events. So we can only say that in the last two thousand years humanity as a whole has passed through an age when the spiritual principle predominated over the material principle, or the eagle predominated over the serpent. And so we come back to our symbolism. You are probably impressed with the fact that the serpent has coiled itself round the neck of the eagle. What is the usual presentation of this symbolism?

Mrs. Sigg: That the eagle has the snake in its claws.

Dr. Jung: Yes, showing that the spirit has overcome matter, or that the eagle, personifying the light, has overcome the powers of darkness or the devil. For instance, you remember having seen the so-called lecterns in churches, sort of reading-desks on which the Bible is supported by an eagle. The eagle is the symbol of St. John the Evangelist, whose philosophy is the idea of the Logos, the word, or the light that comes from God and shines into the darkness of man. Antique fantasy ascribed the eagle to John because the eagle was the messenger of Zeus, the god of the sky, the messenger that comes from heaven, the personification of light. Therefore, the symbolism on the lecterns, where the word of God as given to us in the Bible comes down to the earth supported on the wings of the eagle. Now, the eagle is in a way predominating here, he carries the snake but not in its claws; the snake is coiled round his neck. How do you like this picture?

Mrs. Crowley: In the Mandaean Book of John¹⁰ there is a very defi-

¹⁰ The Mandaean (*Manda*: knowledge) Gnostics were those from Mesopotamia. Adam and Eve were "incited to transgress the orders of the creator by the Savior Himself, who says, 'I manifested myself in the form of an eagle, upon the Tree of Knowledge . . . in

nite picture of the eagle coming down as the messenger of God, but making obeisance to Myria; he becomes her messenger, so he is really the messenger of earth there.

Dr. Jung: That is the Gnostic idea, but this is a further development of the Gnostic symbolism. We won't go into that now, nor into the eagle symbolism in alchemy. Nietzsche had no knowledge of Gnosticism nor of medieval philosophy. He was a classical philologist and therefore had a profound contempt for anything later than the year one; his paradise was between 600 and 100 B.C.

Mrs. Jung: Does the snake symbolize the instinctive side of Zarathustra the archetype, too? Does it belong only to Nietzsche the man?

Dr. Jung: Well, that is a question. As far as I know we have no proof that the eagle and the serpent played a particular role with Zarathustra himself, but it is a fact that Zarathustra was a philosopher or teacher whose aim was to establish the predomination of the spirit. In the centuries before Christ we find traces everywhere of the effort to make the spirit predominate over matter. So one could say Zarathustra was already such an eagle, overcoming the earth principle. Now, the question whether the eagle and the serpent symbolize the instincts of Nietzsche is just what I was asking. How do you like this symbolism, where the snake appears to be coiled round the neck of the eagle? This is a very unusual formulation, not at all classical; as far as my knowledge goes, it is usually wriggling in its claws, overcome by the eagle.

Mrs. Baumann: We have seen the picture of Nietzsche as man being overcome completely by the figure of Zarathustra, but this seems to be almost the opposite picture; it is as if the snake were going voluntarily, or as if Nietzsche were going voluntarily with Zarathustra.

Mrs. Mehlich: I think it is a bit paradoxical. The eagle is the master of the situation. He lifts up the serpent. But on the other hand he may be overcome.

Dr. Jung: You think it is rather dangerous for the eagle to have such a necktie? It is. I would not like it.

Mrs. Brunner: It is dangerous for the serpent too: it might fall down.

Dr. Jung: Well, if he clings to the neck of the eagle he won't fall down, but it is not a pleasant situation. I don't think the serpent likes such airplane stuff.

Mrs. Strong: Is it again the symbolism of suspension before rebirth?

Dr. Jung: There is surely the motif of suspension in it.

order to teach them. . . . " Jean Doresse, *The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics*, tr. Philip Mairet (New York, 1960). See "The Secret Book of John," p. 207.

Miss Wolff: The image is to me disgusting. Nietzsche says the serpent hung on the eagle, “not like a prey but like a friend.” That is horrid sentimentality, for those two animals just don’t go together; they don’t make a union. It is very much against what they would do in reality, so that must be considered too in the image. It is a very paradoxical situation.

Mrs. Sigg: I think, as Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant minister, he surely would remember that no other animal in the Bible was under a curse; the snake got a special curse from the creator: Thou shalt go on thy belly. Nietzsche is always inclined to react against such things and to say the opposite, so this opposition might have been in the thing too.

Dr. Jung: That is a good point. Of course, the most impressive thing in this picture is that the snake is lifted up out of her usual abode into a medium in which it depends entirely upon the good will of the eagle. It is a hellishly uncomfortable situation. After a while the eagle will certainly become very hungry and eat the snake. You know the secretary bird—who looks exactly like an eagle only the legs are a bit too long—is the classical eater of snakes. There are many eaglelike birds, in fact, that are the typical enemies of snakes. So the snake is in a very precarious situation and Mrs. Baumann is quite right when she points out that it is really the image of Nietzsche’s own predicament. He is just lifted out of the ground, and as a material man, as a man of the earth, he is in the power of that enormous bird. The eagle is the archetype, you see; the wise old man is the wise old bird. The Hamsa, the swan, has lifted him up. Then there is a classical parallel which we must not forget, because Nietzsche is a classical philologist. What is it?

Miss Wolff: Ganymede.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that beautiful boy who was fetched by the eagle of Zeus to serve at the table of the gods—a homosexual interlude, one of the little scandals of Olympus. So Nietzsche the man is surely portrayed in this picture, and we always notice the personal influence in symbolism when something is not according to rules, not quite right. In this case it is surely not quite right that the snake is coiled round the neck of the eagle. The snake might have a fantasy and squeeze his neck so that he couldn’t breathe, which would be very bad for both; it is most risky, it could go wrong in many ways. That is substantiated by the subsequent remarks of Zarathustra, namely: “More dangerous have I found it among men than among animals; in dangerous paths goeth Zarathustra.” He finds his peril in the wrong place; he is afraid of the perils amongst men. Of course there are relatively small perils among

men; the perils among beasts, particularly one's own beasts, are much greater. But he feels the danger-tension manifested in this peculiar symbolism.

Now, as Mrs. Baumann has also pointed out, the serpent is here represented as a friend of the eagle, and that would be explained from the personal side as a demonstration of the fact that the relation between Nietzsche and Zarathustra is a friendly one. He doesn't feel as if he were the victim of Zarathustra; he feels the claws of the eagle as a loving gesture, so one could say that the serpent, by free will, coils or embraces the neck of the eagle. This would indicate that it is not at all a hostile situation, but a union, a reconciliation obviously. The fact remains, however, that the snake is carried up into the air, away from its usual abode, and this would be the man Nietzsche carried off his feet by the Hamsa, the bird of the archetype, and he doesn't defend himself against it. On the contrary, he gives himself voluntarily to that kind of travel. As we were saying in the beginning, it is the attempt at a journey in the air, not a journey under the sea; whatever flies through the air is visible. It is absolutely in the open, while a night journey under the sea happens in darkness and is invisible. So in a way, if looked at from the personal point of view of Nietzsche himself, this vision of Zarathustra is really what Nietzsche also might see and, confronted with the facts, he would ask himself: "Now why does Zarathustra see that picture? What should it convey to Zarathustra-Nietzsche?"

You see, the instincts always come up from the unconscious and give us a hint, perhaps in a dream. For, suppose I am identical with an archetype; I don't know it and the archetype of course won't tell me, because I am already possessed and inundated by the archetype. If it is the wise old man, he will seek only to express himself, and the human instrument he is actually using, say in the year 1883, doesn't count at all. It might be any other century, any other man, any other instrument. Just as I pay no attention to the hammer I use; I use it and afterwards I throw it away. It is not a personal hammer. That is the way the archetype uses man, simply as an instrument, as a tool of a most transitory kind. We make a fuss about our lives, but nature makes no fuss whatever; if nature likes to wipe out several million people she quietly does so. In a war we wipe out the best of men by the million. Well, that is quite natural, that is war. We can do it because we are used by an archetype: people are all possessed and wiped out by each other. And that is what nature does. So the man Nietzsche counts precious little to the archetype. He just happens to be the tool. But the man is of course in an awful situation. He is possessed, and he cannot defend himself,

for he doesn't even know that he is possessed, and that is a wonderful opportunity for the unconscious. Inasmuch as everyone has instincts, the archetype of the old man is not the whole unconscious. It is only one of the many inhabitants, and therefore there are other helpful spirits or powers about, which will appear. So if a man is possessed and does not know it, he will have perhaps a dream which tells him something, or something will be shown to him which elucidates the situation.

To a man like Nietzsche, for instance, a dream will appear which contains this image of the eagle and the snake. If such a case should happen in reality, I would explain it in this way: the light of heaven, the eagle, the divine word has caught you; naturally, how could you resist? So you gave yourself to it. But you must know that it is exceedingly dangerous; we don't know how it will turn out in the future. I should say it was a precarious situation for that serpent—probably less for the eagle, because the serpent is chiefly under the illusion of friendship. You see, if the eagle were under that illusion, he would have been persuaded by the serpent to stay on the ground and to hop about while she crept up and sat on his back. He would have to hop along carrying the snake—or some other grotesque arrangement could be thought of. But it is clearly the serpent that follows. It is Nietzsche who follows the insinuation or the intimation of the archetype and is carried into the air. That is *ekstasis*; it is the typical miracle of levitation. These things happen in stories of the saints; during the mass, while they are praying before the altar, they are suddenly lifted up: it is a real *ekstasis*.

Mr. Baumann: Professor Rousselle showed us symbols like that; he had a whole series of small Tibetan mandalas, and one was a serpent with huge wings flying up into the sky. And in the next picture the serpent had disappeared and there were only the wings left flying to the sun.¹¹ That is a picture of *ekstasis*.

Dr. Jung: You bring the discussion to the motif of the plumed serpent, Quetzalcoatl, the Mexican symbol of the so-called savior god. The plumed or feathered serpent is a union of the bird and serpent, but a sort of organic union: the serpent is flying and creeping at the

¹¹ Erwin Rousselle of Frankfurt-on-Main lectured at the Eranos conference in 1933, 1934, and 1935 on Taoism and Chinese Mythology. "Us" presumably means "members of the Psychology Club." Indra threw his killing thunderbolt at the cloud serpent and thus released "the flood of life." Zimmer/Myths, p. 3. Rousselle's 1933 lecture, "Spiritual Guidance in Contemporary Taoism" is published in *Spiritual Disciplines*, vol. 4 of the *Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks* (Princeton, B.S. XXX, 1960).

same time. We would call it a dragon. The Chinese idea of a dragon is also very much like that. It is an exceedingly chthonic and aquatic animal, and then it takes to the air and becomes fiery. We also have legends of flying dragons, sort of feathered serpents.

Mrs. Crowley: And there is the Hindu idea of the cloud serpent that fertilizes the earth.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is also usually represented with wings. It is, of course, an attempt at the reconciliation of the pairs of opposites, as this vision is also, and as such a symbol would be if it occurred in a dream. But here the serpent is too much on the side of the eagle, flying through the sky. Also I should criticize under all conditions this peculiar fact that the snake is coiled around the eagle's neck; it is again a sort of premonitory picture. I should not like it. It is not aesthetical, and it is not according to the rules. The artist Klinger made a bust of Nietzsche, using this symbol of the eagle and the serpent; the four corners of the bust were shaped like the claws of the eagle, and the eagle holds the snake in its claws.¹² You see he corrected Zarathustra's vision, as the artist does; he insisted that the snake was overcome by the eagle because they are eternal enemies. Whenever we encounter such a disturbance of a traditional age-old symbolism, we must always go back to the individual who uses it, and there we will discover that something has happened which, in a way, is unavoidable. It should happen, but the way in which it happens is not right.

Zarathustra's purpose is of course to cure the problem of the time: that is why the old man appears. As Nietzsche himself says, he took the figure of Zarathustra because the original Zoroaster brought the moral conflict into the world; and as the moral conflict is now at its culmination, he must appear again in order to do something to cure it. The pairs of opposites which were separated through the moral conflict ought to be brought together again. So that image is really Zarathustra's attempt to bring them together. "Beyond good and evil" means beyond eagle and serpent and their moral meanings; by that formula, Zarathustra is trying to mend the trouble of our time.¹³ The old moral dissociation has apparently lost its cosmic importance and a new problem has presented itself, the problem of the reconciliation of the pairs of opposites. Yet the body represented by the serpent is lifted up from the earth. How would you explain such a case?

¹² Max Klinger (1857-1920), German painter and sculptor.

¹³ Nietzsche was by no means anti-moral in general but only anti-moral in the Christian, Buddhist, or any other strength-denying senses. He wanted to go beyond Good and Evil to reach the valid (as he thought) opposition, Good and Bad.

Mrs. Crowley: Inflation?

Dr. Jung: No, I would not call that inflation. When you have to solve such an important problem which is really new to the age, you will be tremendously influenced by the way in which this problem has been answered hitherto—that is the most probable thing. You hardly can get away from the solution proposed hitherto. And the solution that was proposed by old Zarathustra was: Let the spirit overcome matter, let Yang overcome Yin, and then the trouble will be settled forever, because the existence of matter will be wiped out. You see, that was the idea of redemption which really began in Persia, appeared to a certain extent in Egypt, and worked through Judea, particularly in Christianity, where hell-fire comes at the end of our days and the whole world is burnt up, everything that has been matter disappearing for eternity. Also it appears in the primitive Germanic religions, where in the end the ferocious wolf will appear and the world will be devoured by fire. The idea that the spirit would win out in the end was the way in which the problem was solved, which accounts for all the conclusions drawn by Christianity concerning the neglect or destruction of the body. To the saints, everything which was concerned with the body was low or vulgar. There were special taboos to prove the inferiority of bodily things; and everything that could be called mind or spirit was marvelous, good, divine.

In the course of the centuries, however, we made very much the same discovery which they made in China, where a printed letter or hieroglyph was holy—until they discovered that all sorts of obscenities, vulgar and evil things, could also be printed. But formerly everything, every scrap of printed or written paper was carefully preserved and protected as sacred; paper carrying the sacred letters should not be touched by the feet. We have the same notion; there are still people who think a thing is true because it is printed. We believe in the saving faculties of the mind, of the spirit. Our belief in science is the same thing: this is the truth, and reason and truth must save us in the end. This is our savior. You see, it is the same old prejudice. We don't know what truth is, and we particularly don't know how it works; we have only learned that sometimes a lie is as good as the truth. There is a play in America—not here unfortunately—where for twenty-four hours nothing is spoken but the truth, and it shows what the truth can do. If you tell the truth for twenty-four hours you create such a hell of a mess in the end that nobody can find his way out of it.¹⁴ We have grown

¹⁴ Countless stage performances and no fewer than four film versions of J. Montgomery's farce *Nothing but the Truth* have appeared, dating from 1920.

doubtful obviously; we are confronted with the problem: shall we tell the truth or maintain a certain illusion?—and we know cases where the illusion was surely better than the truth. Therefore we run into all sorts of collisions of duties; we should tell the truth. But it is much better to tell a lie in some cases, and then we are all at sea and there is a catastrophe. Perhaps we discover that what people call sin is sometimes exceedingly decent, or what other people call a virtue can be a most horrible vice—really an infernal thing, most cruel. So we are shaken by doubts, and have therefore begun to look at things from a different point of view.

For instance, formerly we thought it was a good thing to punish the criminal, but now we know cases where it is not a good thing. Or perhaps we know a criminal, and if we study him, we realize that in his situation we would have done pretty much the same. And people who are careful to avoid something which is not quite correct, quite marvelously get into an awful mess, while people who are not quite correct get along much better, and they are less offensive to human society than the correct people. Therefore, we cannot help being exceedingly doubtful as to the validity of those two ideas. Moreover, we know that what we have called matter, stuff, which we thought we could ridicule or despise, is just as spiritual as spirit, and spirit is perhaps as corporeal as matter. Even there we become exceedingly doubtful as to which principle we should give the greater value. So the sum total of all these doubts and deliberations has put us up against the question: How can that conflict between Yang and Yin, or between good and bad, spirit and matter, be solved? And it is more than natural, if we make an attempt to solve it, that we are strongly influenced by the values of the past.

It is most probable, therefore, that the eagle would take the serpent for a ride in the air; it is a concession, as Nietzsche's life itself was a concession. There is little difference between Nietzsche's life and the life of a saint; he forsook his ordinary life, and went into the woods. The woods were called Rapallo, the Engadine, Nice, and so on, but he was alone, a hermit. He lived entirely in his books. He devoted himself to spiritual practices, one could say, and he lost the connection with the world of the flesh. He really became a sort of modern saint; the spiritual side caught hold of him more than was good for the solution of his moral problem. For to solve the problem one must give equal value. We cannot say the side of the spirit is twice as good as the other side; we must bring the pairs of opposites together in an altogether different way, where the rights of the body are just as much recognized as the rights of the spirit.

LECTURE VI

14 November 1934

Dr. Jung:

We were occupied last time with the symbol of the eagle and the snake, and we said that it was rather unusual and a bit abnormal that the serpent should be coiled round the neck of the eagle. They are usually represented as opponents and the eagle holds the serpent in its claws—it is the general idea of the conflict between Yang and Yin, or between spirit and matter. And as a rule, during the age of the fishes and perhaps earlier, reaching back to 2000 B.C., the result of the battle is that the serpent is overcome by the eagle: the spirit wins out against matter. But one learns from Chinese philosophy that that is not always so; it might be reversed. We are inclined to believe that the spirit is much better than the flesh, and that the flesh or matter deserves to be eaten by the spirit; but one comes across cases where it is rather doubtful whether that is commendable. One even concludes from certain experiences that it is not really desirable.

I have here two interesting cases where that symbolism of the eagle carrying the serpent round its neck was discovered by other people besides Nietzsche. The first contribution I owe to Mr. Baumann who is generous enough to let us see some of his pictures, where the fate of the serpent—or the achievement of the eagle—is demonstrated. It is the story of the relationship of the spiritual and the material principle as a part of the inner development, the *drama intérieur*. One can call it a sort of initiation process. Or one can also express it in a reversed way, that all the initiation processes we know from history or by experience are the external manifestation of a natural inner process which is always happening in the mind. And our dreams are like windows that allow us to look in, or to listen in, to that psychological process which is continually going on in our unconscious. It is a process of continuous transformation with no end if we don't interfere. It needs our conscious interference to bring it to a goal—by our interference we make a goal. Otherwise, it is like the eternal change of the seasons in nature,

a building up and a pulling down, integration and disintegration without end. No crops are brought home by nature; only the consciousness of man knows about crops. He gathers the apples under the trees, for they simply disintegrate if left to themselves. And that is true of our unconscious mental process: it revolves within itself. It builds up and it pulls down; it integrates and disintegrates—and then integrates again. It is like the seasons, or the eternal sunrise and sunset, from which nothing comes unless a human consciousness interferes and realizes the result. Perhaps one suddenly sees something and says, "This is a flower!" Now we have reached something. But left to itself the process would come to nothing. You can see that in cases of schizophrenia. If you follow the dreams of a person who is definitely insane, you see the treasure growing up to the surface, almost to integration, and you realize that if in this moment that fellow could grasp it, or only lift a finger, he would have it and everything would be all right. But in the next moment it sinks down again for nine years, nine months, nine weeks, and nine days, and it is gone. Nobody can reach it. It is exactly the same in a normal person; there are the same revelations without any issue if the conscious doesn't interfere and grasp the treasure brought up on the wave of the unconscious. [Slides are shown.]

Mr. Baumann has looked in through the window and painted some of the pictures presented by the unconscious. Here is the eagle with the snake, and the figure of a boy is hovering over the water seeking the heart in the water. This is of course a particular case; the discovery of feeling in a man is a special problem. The heart in the water cannot be discovered as long as the snake is also in the water. To enable the boy to find the heart, the snake has to be brought up into the sky or the air. If the two are together, then the heart is the heart of the snake, the feeling is identical with the snake. Therefore, Yin must be taken out of its element, the cold, waterlike condition of the unconscious. Afterwards follows a fight between the eagle and the serpent as of course they are not on good terms with each other.

An almost identical symbol exists in Indian mythology. Mrs. Zinno was so kind as to call my attention to the myth of the Garuda and the Naga, and I have here a picture of Vishnu enthroned upon the Garuda, the snake-killing bird. The Garuda is the mind bird, a sort of demoniacal eagle, usually represented with feathers and wings. The Nagas were probably not only serpent-demons; they may also have represented the snake worshippers, a lower stratum of the population, probably of Dravidian origin, autochthonous inhabitants of India who

were uprooted or wiped out by the Aryan invaders.¹ The Aryans would be the eagles, the air, heaven people that fell upon the dark colored, rather primitive Dravidic population. Other autochthonous tribes also have such a chthonic form of worship: the Hopi Indians in America for example, who are not nomadic but town-building, or Pueblo Indians, the forefathers really of the Aztecs. The Spanish word *pueblo* means town; it comes from the Latin word *populus* meaning people, but has changed its meaning and become the name of a place where there are people. Those tribes are called Pueblo Indians simply because they build the villages in which they live. And the Hopi Pueblo Indians have such a chthonic cult of snakes. They even perform their snake dances in the Christian church, for they are also Christians. They have Christian Spanish names and receive the Catholic baptism. But they always retain their Indian names as well, which are important on account of their mystical meanings. So something similar may have been the case in India; those Naga people were probably snake-worshippers.

But the myth is of course purely psychological. It is the struggle between the air principle—the strength which is in the air, light, and wind—against the chthonic Yin principle represented by the serpent. The Garuda is said to have extinguished all the Nagas except one, which he put round his neck and wore as a neck ornament. You see, in this case it would not be an encumbrance, nor would it be a sign of particular friendliness. It would simply be a sign of his victory over the serpent. Now, it is a curious fact that the ladies of old Rome really used to wear in hot weather a living snake as a neck ornament—of course a harmless snake. The neck was cooled by the body of the snake, and the snake loved to be coiled round the neck of its mistress because her skin was warm. So the idea of the neck ornament was also a sort of fashion, and I can easily imagine that Rome was not the only place in the world where snakes were used for that purpose. You know, children like to carry their pets around with them in just such a fashion.

Now we will continue. In the last part of Chapter 10 he says: “More dangerous have I found it among men than among animals; in dangerous paths goeth Zarathustra. Let mine animals lead me!” This shows that he is not going in the path of the animals, which he thinks would be less dangerous, but means to go amongst men. His enterprise is of course dangerous, because through Nietzsche’s identification with

¹ Hindu myths often speak of Garuda as a general name for serpent genii. For the tale of Krishna, Garuda, and the serpent king, see Zimmer/Myths, esp. p. 856 and pictures.

Zarathustra, he is lifted up out of his element into the world of the spirit. If we forget that we also consist of living body, and try to live in an entirely spiritual medium, the body is going to suffer; and inasmuch as the body suffers the mind will be affected too. It is a terrible strain on our minds when we are not right with our bodies. The mind then becomes as overstrained as the body. So though he hopes that his beasts will guide him, it is very questionable whether they will. We often express such wishes when we are at bottom quite doubtful whether they will be granted. He would surely need the helpful animals in his enterprise.

When Zarathustra had said this, he remembered the words of the saint in the forest. Then he sighed and spake thus to his heart:

"Would that I were wiser! Would that I were wise from the very heart, like my serpent!"

You see, he suddenly remembers the old man in the wood who doesn't believe so much in spiritual enterprises, and has therefore withdrawn to the woods, which means to the animal, the Yin principle. Zarathustra doubts his way here. He feels that it is not particularly wise. It would need a great deal of wisdom in order to make it a safe way. He would need the wisdom of the serpent, the chthonic wisdom of the earth, but that he cannot contact when he is out of his body; when he is going with the Garuda bird he is necessarily hostile to the serpent. Therefore, quite logically after Mr. Baumann's picture where the bird is apparently carrying the snake in that friendly fashion, a very bad fight takes place between them, for they are like dog and cat. Of course there are certain examples where a dog and a cat have become friends, but those are domestic miracles; and a wild bird like an eagle and a wild animal like a serpent are never domesticated and no such miracle can happen. They are on different planes altogether and therefore hostile to each other. Now, with this pious wish the introductory chapter ends, and we come to the real text of Zarathustra.

Mrs. Baynes: May I just ask why Nietzsche identified pride with the eagle?

Dr. Jung: It is always a symbol of pride, but here it is a sort of interpretation. He was worried with that symbol of the eagle and the serpent. That came out of the original stuff in him, just as Mr. Baumann chose the symbol of the eagle and the serpent to express his inner experiences, as one would—as always has been done—therefore, the identity of these symbols. When Nietzsche is faced with such a problem he quite naturally will choose that symbolism. The serpent creeps on

its belly in the dust, and the eagle flies on high, very marvelous and imperial, like the Prussian eagle for instance; so it is of course a symbol of pride. But that is psychologically absolutely insufficient. If he had gone further, he would have struck upon the problem of the relationship of spirit and matter, and then his Zarathustra would have taken an entirely different turn. He would have given body to Zarathustra. But it is just his peculiar attitude which doesn't allow him to take that experience of bird and snake seriously.

You see, you only begin to think decently about such symbolism when you ask yourself, why the devil a snake and a bird? Why not anything else? But he was so overcome by it that he didn't even wonder about it. We are all like that. There is a Christmas tree on the 25th of December. Of course! We all have Christmas trees. It is what one does at Christmas to give pleasure to the children. You simply float along on the Christmas mood. You wear a Christmas face and you have a Christmas tree because one has a Christmas tree: you are identical with that mood. But if you really ask yourself why the devil just a Christmas tree, you suddenly discover that this has nothing to do with the birth of Christ. There were no pine trees in Palestine, and there is not one single thing about it which has to do with Christianity. Yet we think it is the most Christian symbol. To this extent do people never think, never question themselves as to why they do such things—why that hell of a nonsense, the Easter hare and the colored eggs, and so on. In making a Christmas tree, one is not one but many. The mother who makes the Christmas tree is an eternal mother who for centuries has done that. Formerly, of course, they made something else I suppose, but always with the same feeling of the eternal figure. It is such a wonderful moment because it has always been so; you are in the olden time again. The great lure of the archetypal situation is that you yourself suddenly cease to be. You cease to think and are acted upon as though carried by a great river with no end. You are suddenly eternal. And you are liberated from sitting up and paying attention, doubting, and concentrating upon things. When you are once touched by the archetype, you don't want to disturb it by asking foolish questions—it is too nice. We are all like Parsifal when he sees the Holy Grail. It is too good, too marvelous—why should he spoil the situation by asking questions? The suffering of the old man is all right, as it ought to be. It is so good to be in the miracle; don't spoil it. So you become identical, naturally. And that is the way Nietzsche becomes identical; to encounter the old man, perhaps to be the wise old man, is such a great discovery and so sweet,

that he doesn't stop to ask questions. He just slips into it and is gone without noticing it.

When the archetype comes up and touches you, you are gone in a wink. You become eternally valid. You can act and perform and it just goes on by itself. I always quote the story of King Albrecht who was murdered near Zürich at a ford where the river Reuss empties into the Aare. His suite, his nephew and several other knights, had made a conspiracy to kill him. They were riding behind him, deliberating whether they should do it or not, and they could not decide, for it was a crime, parricide. But the moment the king rode into the ford, which is the archetypal place of danger, the nephew pulled out his sword and said, "Why let that carrion ride before us?" And they fell upon him and killed him.² It was the archetypal situation, and therefore there was no hesitation. Then you can act, no doubts any longer. Then you are the dragon, and the murder must happen there; killing is indicated. Either you are the victim or you are the killer.

So when the old wise man touched Nietzsche, he did not bother when the animals came up. The Hamsa comes with soft wings and lifts one up and one doesn't notice it and then one is gone. But then naturally the animals are there; one becomes conscious of the presence of instincts which would inform one that the *hamsa* is a bird, not a man, and the snake rises and cries: "He is my enemy." And they could be helpful. Nietzsche could disidentify from the wise man if he listened to the cry of the eagle. That was a cry of warning. But being the wise old man, he knows all about it of course, and he interprets the eagle as his pride, and the serpent as his wisdom—it is like the Christmas tree. So the bird and the snake are no longer valid. They are interpreted according to what the old wise man might say about them. Through the identification with the archetype one falsifies the archetype and then it is no longer reliable. It is only reliable when one separates oneself, when one resists that temptation to the uttermost. That is the meaning of Jacob's fight at the ford with the angel of God. He fought against God in order not to identify with him; in that way only could he bring out the real meaning of the whole situation. To identify with the archetype is unavoidable under certain conditions, however; and Nietzsche's case was unavoidable. He did not know; it was his fate. In reading Nietzsche, one must always keep in mind that he was also a vic-

² King Albrecht of Hapsburg was killed in 1308 after a six-year reign. See *C. G. Jung Speaking*, ed. William McGuire and R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, B.S. XC VII, 1977), pp. 293-94.

tim, and inasmuch as he was a victim he falsifies the true function of the archetype. The old wise man never would have talked in this way if Nietzsche were not mixed up with him. There is a lot of unrealized sexuality in Nietzsche. He was taken out of his body and had not lived a proper life.

Mrs. Baumann: In the last line, isn't the word *folly* one of those twisted, uncertain places where he could have had a hint of his situation?

Dr. Jung: Ah yes, because he really understands that his enterprise is folly—that is the wise old man. But Nietzsche himself does not sit up and say, “Why do I say ‘folly’? Is it because I am going on a fool’s errand with that book?” He *plays* with that word; it is a Christmas tree. If I had written such a passage I would have asked myself, “Now come, *folly*! What does that mean? Am I going to do something foolish?” I would have spoiled, of course, the whole joy of the ride, sure enough. But I am a doctor and that makes a difference. I am too little a poet.

Mrs. Sigg: I think behind the picture of the eagle and the snake there is really another picture which has a near relationship with it, the vision the lunatic saw which you have mentioned in your books, the sun disc with a pipe hanging upon it. That is quite a dangerous symbol, and it seems to me that it has something to do with this because Nietzsche said the snake was hanging onto the eagle, and Nietzsche was really identified with the sun in the beginning of *Zarathustra*.

Dr. Jung: No, I would not make that analogy. The vision of the lunatic is utterly different and has to do with this only in a very remote way. That has to do with the generative meaning of the sun. It is the sun generating the word in man, the birth of the soul from the sun; it is really a sort of antique vision like the analogies in the great magic papyrus, the so-called Mithraic liturgy, which is very clearly of antique origin. It is a concretization of the beginning of the Evangel of St. John, where it is said that the word is the light which shines into the darkness, the Logos.³ We would go pretty far astray if we considered this a parallel. That was a case of *dementia praecox* where one cannot expect very modern symbolism; usually such people, particularly the uneducated ones, start from a medieval Christian level of consciousness and simply fall into the collective unconscious which then has a chiefly

³ Jung several times in his published writings recalled his early encounter with a schizophrenic patient at the Berghölzli, who told him that the sun had an erect phallus which waved to produce the winds. Jung was especially interested in the close resemblance of this vision to the description of the sun in an ancient Greek text which the patient could not have known. See CW 9 i, par. 105; and CW 5, pars. 220-21.

historical character, as our unconscious has when we first contact it. The unconscious first produces aspects of the historical symbolism which becomes modern or advanced, or anticipates the future through the interference of a definite consciousness.

Mrs. Dürler: I want to ask about the very last word. Why does he not say going upwards instead of "down-going?" Is it a premonition?

Dr. Jung: There may be a sort of premonition in it, but all through the introductory chapters he describes his movement towards the world as his down-going, his *Untergang*, which of course is also spoken out of the archetype, because the Hamsa is the bird of the great heights. And when the spirit comes into the world, it comes down. The Logos comes down from heaven to earth, and God descends upon the earth in order to be born. Yang is sun or light and is always above; if a reconciliation is attempted, the Yang principle comes down to matter, because matter cannot rise. And then it lifts matter up. In Christian symbolism this would be the transfiguration of Christ. He was in a state of levitation, thus showing how the spirit overcomes matter, how matter can be completely undone. You know, our mind begins with the downfall of antiquity, and it was first a theologically speculative mind, scholastic philosophy. We were all up in the air. We thought up the most abstruse things, absurd things really. We were only concerned with unempirical problems. Then, very slowly we began to discover nature. Albertus Magnus, although a Scholastic, made observations on nature in the early thirteenth century; he was interested in botany.⁴ And through alchemy, chemical interests came in. Towards the sixteenth century such interests developed rapidly, and at the same time the Gothic style, where everything was vertical, began to spread out, and there was a sort of regression to antiquity because antiquity was nature. The horizontal movement began and they discovered the way round the world. India and America were discovered, and so on. It went on in this way until in the nineteenth century our whole point of view became realistic. That means that the light which was in heaven and a god on earth then went into the earth, into matter. One could say that Christ was then buried in the earth. Our mind, our whole mental development, wound up with complete materialism. The celestial world entirely disappeared and only a few idealists were left crying for help, for support for their shaking ideals; and with the war the whole





⁴ Albertus Magnus (1206-1280), teacher of Thomas Aquinas. In his *De Vegetabilis*, as in his work on zoology and physical science, he depended primarily upon his own and others' direct observations, rare for the time.

thing tumbled down for good. But now we make an extraordinary discovery. What has the mind done in the ground?

Mrs. Baynes: The new physics has turned the ground into spirit.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the new physics has done the trick, exploded matter altogether, and the most recent development is reported in an article by a very modern physicist, in which he shows how modern physics becomes psychology; they climb in at the bottom of the collective unconscious.⁵

Mrs. Baynes: How did they get into the collective unconscious?

Dr. Jung: Through the fact that when you observe the phenomenon of the interior of the atom, you find that your observation disturbs the thing you observe; and if you go on observing, you observe the thing that disturbs, you discover the psyche.⁶ They are now dealing with the telepathic phenomenon, namely, the fact that the collective unconscious—what *I* call the collective unconscious—is a factor which is not properly in time and not properly in space. Before long you will read that article on these questions in a very scientific paper. So the spirit that descended into the earth has exploded matter, and comes up again in the form of psychology. That is what the Garuda has done. The thing has happened which is always foretold in Chinese philosophy: Yin increases till it overcomes Yang. Yang disappears into utter darkness. It is completely gone. But then Yang is seeking the heart of darkness and overcomes the darkness from within, and suddenly out of the power of Yin appears the Yang again. That transition is also in the time calculation of China. In the time when everything consists of whole lines or Yang lines, suddenly towards the end of that period we get a new picture. Here we have full light, it is all Yang.  Then the first line of darkness appears in the next sign:  and so on, until there is complete darkness:  And then it begins again, the Yang comes up:  You see, we have reached that stage where everything is a derivative of matter, the Yin condition. But now physics has done the trick. The Yin

⁵ For information about modern physics, Jung relied heavily upon C. A. Meier, whose "Modern Physik—Moderne Psychologie" was published in the Festschrift for Jung's 60th birthday: *Die Kulturelle bedeutung der komplexen Psychologie* (Berlin, 1935). Jung was later to join forces with W. Pauli, Swiss Nobel Laureate in physics in *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche* (New York, B.S. LI, 1955).

⁶ Werner Heisenberg (1901-1973), founder of quantum mechanics and Nobel Laureate 1932, showed in his Uncertainty Principle a fundamental limitation to subatomic perception: namely, that the introduction of light itself disturbs the objects being examined.

condition is exploded and the first Yang line is appearing. There is no return to material matter now, no chance. It is completely gone. For the last thing you really can observe is the mind. You disturb whatever there is by means of your mind, and what you are able to disturb, you can observe: you can perceive your disturbance. As when you look into a black hole where you see nothing, after a while you see yourself.⁷ That is the cognitional principle of the Yoga: you create the void and out of the void comes the beginning of all knowledge, all real understanding.

⁷ Not, of course, the black hole or gravitational collapse of a star that has subsequently become known. Jung here describes the process by which the Yang hexagram changes into its opposite in the *I Ching*.

LECTURE VII

21 November 1934

Dr. Jung:

I have still another contribution to the symbol of the eagle and the serpent. I happened to come across it in the *Gilgamesh* epic. It is a different kind of symbolism, yet the meaning is particularly clear. You probably remember the two important figures of the *Gilgamesh* epic. There is the hero Gilgamesh, two thirds of whose nature are divine and one third human. He is a sort of superhuman being with a tremendous spirit of power. In building his town, called Uruk, he forces everybody to join in slave work, so the women complain to the gods who proceed to do something about it. They create a peculiar counter-figure to Gilgamesh, a man of equal size and strength, also a sort of superhuman creature, named Enkidu. (These names are not quite certain because proper names are particularly difficult to decipher in the cuneiform character on account of not having the comparative material which they could accumulate for other words. Formerly, one read *Gilgamesh* as *Izdubar*, and *Enkidu* was read as *Eabani*. It was always explained as a sort of conventional rendering; they did not know exactly how to read them so they were named rather arbitrarily in order to give them a name.) That new creation of the gods was half animal, his hair long; he lived and fed with the animals, and he drank from the same water holes as the gazelles. He was caught by the aid of a *hierodule*, a temple prostitute. He is an inferior man, a sort of ape-man, a shadow but of equal strength. He simply personifies the inferior psyche of man. One could say that inasmuch as Gilgamesh represents the will, consciousness, the spiritual attitude, Enkidu represents the lower parts of the psyche as expressed in the sympathetic nervous system—for instance, by the lower centers of the brain and the spinal cord. It would be the motor quality of the mind, the corporeal or bodily aspect of the psyche. In contradistinction to Gilgamesh, there is a highly physical quality in Enkidu. He is very emotional and tremendously subject to moods and intuitions. He suffers from various conditions, and he has

bad dreams or very intuitive dreams. There is even a passage where Gilgamesh puts Enkidu to sleep intentionally and asks the gods to give him a dream to advise them about one of their heroic feats—killing the terrible giant Khumbaba, who watches the mountain of the gods. Then Gilgamesh himself had a premonitory dream which showed him that he would in the end conquer that enemy, that inimical brother, who had been created by the gods in revenge in order to overcome him.¹

Enkidu being overcome by Gilgamesh would mean, then, the lower mind or psyche overcome by consciousness and will, and thus it is a representation of a problem which in those centuries was, of course, of the highest importance to man. The myth itself is of a very great age. The form in which it is handed down to us in the Gilgamesh epic was established in the seventh century B.C. It was excavated in the so-called library of Assur-bani-pal, a king of that time. But there is ample evidence that it is of very much earlier date, probably about 2500 to 3000 B.C. This is before Hammurabi, the great law-giver of Babylon, who lived about 2000 B.C. That was the age of the second month of the great Platonic year, the month of Aries, the ram, and the dawn of consciousness took place at the beginning of the month before, the month of Taurus, the bull. Taurus is the spring sign, and it was also the springtime of consciousness, for we date consciousness from the time of written records.

You see, there can be no consciousness without continuity. If continuity is lost, consciousness is practically valueless; it is a mere representation of the moment. Without the continuity of memory, there are no means of comparison and therefore no possibility of judgment. That may be seen in people who have so-called progressive amnesia, where the memory fades so that there is no recollection of anything farther back than a few days. Also in senile atrophy of the brain or in general paralysis of the insane, where memory fails progressively, the unconscious condition is such that conscious judgment becomes utterly impossible on account of the lack of comparative material. One can only judge by comparing situations. If former judgments cannot be remembered, if nothing remains of consciousness but a little memory of present conditions, no judgment can be passed, and one feels that people in such a condition are practically unconscious. For instance, I remember the case of an old woman of about eighty. I called her by name

¹ For Enkidu's and Gilgamesh's dreams, see the R. Campbell Thompson translation cited above, 17 Oct. 1934, n. 4.

and, as if offended, she replied: "But that is not my name. I am Miss Smith." She was many times a grandmother in reality, so I suggested that that was her maiden name, but she insisted that she was not married. "But you have grandchildren." "You are quite wrong. I am Miss Smith." Then I asked her if she had known Mr. So-and-So, which was the name of her husband, and she blushed but said she didn't know him. "But that is your husband." "Oh no, what do you think!"—and she became coquettish. "Don't you know him? Haven't you heard of him?" I asked. "Yes, I saw him the other day." "But how is that?" I said, "I thought he was dead." "No, no, he is not dead, and I am in love with him." "Ah! Will it be an engagement?" "Yes." I found out that she was engaged when she was not quite twenty, so her memory had faded down to nineteen years of age—she returned to that consciousness—and from there on backwards her memory was continuous, but all the later years were gone: she could remember nothing. She was of course unconscious; that a woman of eighty should have the consciousness of nineteen means that she is unconscious of her condition.

In those early days of history, therefore, it was important that the continuity should be established, that people should have a conscious memory. They should know how old they were, for instance. It is still a great difficulty with primitives to establish their age. I asked a girl in Africa of about seventeen how old she was, and she got very much embarrassed and said she was four. I was a hundred years old to them because I had white hair. Nobody could tell me his age because they cannot count years, which of course gives them a sort of unconsciousness, a lack of orientation about themselves. Now, in the past when enough people were able to count their years, to be thus far conscious of their continuity, they began to realize that humanity should have a continuous memory, that they should have written records, in other words. So writing was invented, and that was at the beginning of the first month of consciousness, the age of the bull, about 4200 B.C.; the oldest traces of writing we possess date from about that time. Soon after this, in about the third or fourth century B.C., would be the origin of the *Gilgamesh* epic. And there the divine mind is the one who has will and intention and energy and can dispose of his own libido, concentrate upon a work, having the ability of carrying a thing through in a reckless way. But he is an offence to the gods and they take their revenge in trying to break that Luciferian or Promethean hybris. So they invented the figure of Enkidu, which means that they caused the conflict to be personified in the man *Gilgamesh*, the conflict between his mind, soaring on high, and the lower inferior man in himself, Enkidu.

Now, those two heroes working together performed a series of tremendous feats for a while, but more and more Enkidu had uncanny dreams and suffered from his civilized condition—from his subjugation to his superior will, that is—and finally, immediately after their greatest triumph, he had this dream, which is on the seventh tablet. (The story is printed in cuneiform characters upon clay tablets which are actually preserved in the British Museum.) The German text says that Enkidu is reclining, resting after their deeds, and has these dream-visions. Whereupon he gets up and narrates them to Gilgamesh thus:

“Why have the great gods come together in council? Why are they planning my path? Oh friend, it was a peculiar dream which I saw and its end foretold misfortune. An eagle took me with iron claws and flew upward for four hours. Then he said to me: ‘Look down upon the earth, what seest thou? Look down upon the sea, how doth it appear to thee?’ And the earth was like a mountain and the sea looked like a small body of water. Again for four hours he flew higher and then he said to me: ‘Look down upon the earth, what seest thou? Look down upon the sea, how doth it appear to thee?’ And the earth was like a garden and the sea was like a water course in a garden. [An irrigation canal.] And again for four hours he flew higher and then he said to me: ‘Look down upon the earth, look down upon the sea, how do they appear to thee?’ And the earth looked like dough made of flour, and the sea looked like a trough full of water. Then he flew higher for two hours, and then he dropped me and I fell and fell and finally I lay upon the earth crushed. This is the dream, and hot with terror I woke up.” And when Gilgamesh heard the words of Enkidu his looks became dark and he said to Enkidu his friend: “An evil spirit will take thee with his claws, woe unto thee, the great gods have decided upon misfortune. Lie down because thy head is hot.” And Enkidu went to bed and a demon leaned over him, an evil spirit of fever took him by his head and he became delirious, and on the twelfth day he said to his friend: “Utnapishtim, the Lord of the living water has cursed me, oh my friend, like one who in the middle of the battle, curses his enemy. Oh my friend, whoever is slain in battle is dead. I was slain in the battle.”

You see, here we have that symbolism. The lower inferior man is taken by the iron claws of the spiritlike consciousness which is detached from the ordinary corporeal human being, and is carried up

into the air very high, but in the end he is dropped and killed. This is exactly the fate of Zarathustra, or Nietzsche, as you know; this is the rope-dancer who behaves as if he could not fall, as if he were a bird upon the rope, winged, but he is pushed down by an evil spirit that comes upon him and he lands upon the earth crushed. Enkidu is of course a human figure, but he could also be represented by a snake, for the serpent symbol is a concretization of the inferior psyche. Inasmuch as it only reaches the lower ganglia of the brain, it is a sort of vertebral mind or psyche. You know, the brain is a relative conception; in former periods of the earth there were animals like the megalosaurians, for example, where the size of the lumbar intumescence of the nervous matter was bigger than the brain. The brain would measure about three inches in diameter while the lumbar region of the spinal cord was four or five times that size, which means that the brain—if you can speak of a brain at all in such animals—was in the lumbar region instead of in the skull. The psychical life was largely an accumulation of motor reflexes. Now, inasmuch as we have still a spinal cord we have a psyche, and it has a certain independence which is usually concretized as the serpent. Then the eagle on the wing is something like a representation of the brain, which is united in the center by that famous commissure consisting of fibers that spread out into the two hemispheres of the brain.

Many of these symbols are due to introspection, and that can go so far that inner anatomical formations, certain anatomical details, can be perceived by sensitive people. For instance, the *Visionary of Prévost* who has been described by Kerner, perceived by introspection the crossing of the optical nerve, the so-called chiasma which is behind the eyes.² Such symbolism is always peculiarly apt and expressive. You see, the most impressive thing about the snake is its elongated form, which is exactly like the spinal cord. And that the seat of consciousness, which is practically identical with the cortex of the hemispheres of the brain, should be represented as a bird, is also a very apt symbol, particularly because of the commissure which functionally unites them. That would be the body of the bird, because you don't feel the two hemispheres, you feel only one consciousness. The characteristic of consciousness is that it is a unit, a particular oneness; you have only one ego, you never think of having a double consciousness. Of course you

² Justinus Kerner (1786-1862), German physician, poet, and parapsychologist. His *The Seeress of Prévost* (orig. 1829) was subtitled *Revelation concerning the inter-diffusion of a world of spirits in the one we inhabit*. See CW 1, pars. 102f. and 181f.

can find that empirically—it is a pathological fact—but then you are astonished and speak of a person with a dual consciousness as remarkable; it is a duplicity of consciousness. The normal fact is the oneness of the conscious, and that oneness is the body of the bird, it is the commissure. Consciousness really has its seat—supposing always that there is such a thing as a seat of consciousness—in the commissure, the bridge that connects the two halves of the brain, as if the naive human mind had had an intuition of the oneness inside the two hemispheres. You see, you would not feel so much the actual anatomical detail, as we see it from without in the spreading wings or the two halves of a brain. Through introspection, you would get into a different kind of body, namely, into a living functional body that consisted, not of anatomical detail, but of the *function* of the brain; so you would get a different picture, not exactly of the brain, but of the functioning of the brain. It is of course a fact that the two halves do function together in such a way that you don't perceive that your brain consists of two parts. You are not in the least conscious, for instance, that your speech is chiefly directed by the left side of the brain; you think you speak out of the whole if you speak out of the brain at all. (Well, that is also a question you know; certain people don't speak out of the brain: some speak out of the heart, and some out of the belly.) So Enkidu would be a more developed form of the serpent, and it is interesting that when the gods saw that Enkidu had failed, they then made an animal, a horrible heavenly bull, which they sent against Gilgamesh. That means a step lower. It is also interesting that no serpent appears in the whole *Gilgamesh* epic until the end, when it finally defeats the hero. Do you remember what happens there?

Miss Wolff: Gilgamesh tries to find the plant of eternal life and finally does so, but then the serpent comes and takes it away from him.

Dr. Jung: Yes, in the end the serpent appears. Now after Enkidu's death, Gilgamesh feels a horrible loss; you see, he would then be in the position of a man who consists of consciousness only. And that is something which we feel in our civilization: we suffer very much from the fact that we consist of mind and have lost the body. So suddenly, when he is left by Enkidu, Gilgamesh begins to realize the fear of death. He says: "Now I also, I myself, shall die like Enkidu; my innermost is perturbed by pain, I grow afraid of death, and therefore hasten to the prairies. [He is riding over the prairies on his horse.] I take my way now to the powerful Utnapishtim, the one that has found eternal life, I hasten to reach him. When I see lions on the prairies in the night, I become fearful; I lift my head and pray to Sin, the moon, and to Nin-

Urum, the lady of the castle of life, the luminous one among the gods. To her my prayers are going. Preserve my life unharmed!" You see, he feels instantly the lack of life and grows afraid of death. And that also is very characteristic of our civilization. You will find in studying the psychology of other civilizations that those people are far less afraid of death than we are. They take things in a different way; they don't put so much store on life as we do. To them, life and death are a matter of course; to us, it is awful that there could be such a thing as death. The white man in Europe is afraid of death because he has lost the body—he has lost his friend Enkidu.

Now, when everything else fails, the brain of man invents a way. Gilgamesh knows of Utnapishtim, the Babylonian form of Noah. (That is a myth of immense age, dating from more than a thousand years before the Bible.) Utnapishtim was a mortal who crossed over the waters of death and landed in the blissful western land where he lived the divine life as an immortal. And Gilgamesh really succeeds in reaching the western land where he finds Utnapishtim who gives him the herb of eternal life, a sort of *pharmakon athanasias*, a medicine of immortality; so he returns believing that he possesses the means by which to be immortal, thus cured of the fear of death. (The *pharmakon athanasias* means there exactly what the Host means in the Christian church.) But then the snake comes and steals the herb from him while he is sleeping, so death becomes inevitable. It is again the inferior man that takes his revenge; he must finally come down to him. So he is now dwelling in Hades, in the bowels of the earth.

That is a parallel to *Zarathustra*, so you can see what an enormous problem Nietzsche dealt with. It is a problem which has extended over thousands of years, the problem of the origin and fate of consciousness, which is absolutely synonymous with civilization, or with the psyche, or with human existence in general. For civilization is nothing but a widening out or intensification of consciousness, and the fate of increasing consciousness is threatening everybody. Now Mr. Allemann has just drawn my attention to the fact that the bird-form symbolizing the supremacy of consciousness is visible in other symbols which have very much the same significance; for instance, in the famous Egyptian symbol, the winged disc of the sun which was declared by Amenhotep IV to be the supreme symbol of the deity.³ And another similar symbol

³ Amenhotep IV (14th century B.C., 13th Dynasty) or Ikhnaton—the Pharaoh whom Freud credited with being the source of the monotheistic religion which Moses, himself an Egyptian, brought to the Hebrews. On *Ajna chakra* see below, 2 Nov. 1938, n. 4.

is the ajna chakra, the center of supreme consciousness in the Tantric system of the chakras. There the division into halves is not anatomical, however; the two wings are two petals of the lotus, but the main value is still in the center. Ajna is the counterpart to muladhara where the god is absolutely dormant; he is there hidden by maya, the building material of the world, while in ajna he is white, radiant, which means that he is visible as supreme divine consciousness, detached consciousness which is not dependent upon illusion.

Well now, I think we can go on with our text. You know, in the introductory section of the Prologue there was a good deal of actual performance, showing how Zarathustra first liberates himself from humanity, and then from his own isolation. He returns to humanity and is then up against his real task. For then, of course, comes the question: What are you going to say? You know, he talked to the people before as if he could simply *tell* them, and he made the discovery that you cannot tell people. Of course, everybody says they want to be told, but if you try, you discover that you are wholly mistaken, for you find no ears, so you must find another way. And then it is as if he found that Christ also could not tell people; only the fishes he miraculously created found their way into the bellies of the people, not his words, so he had to be content with his twelve disciples. He had to make up his mind to find friends, helpers, who would take his meaning. That, of course, restricted the number of ears considerably, and moreover it brought about a peculiar necessity, which is also inevitable. You know, when a man is in the most fortunate condition of being able to say something which will be accepted by everybody, when he can tell something to a great crowd and they lap it up, then he is liberated from a certain most odious task which would come to him if he had only a few listeners. And what is that?

Miss Hannah: That he must understand and act upon it himself.

Dr. Jung: Well, the problem comes to himself, for they will look him over. When he appears before a public of two thousand pairs of ears, wearing a tail coat and cutting a very nice figure in the pulpit no matter what he says, then he can be what he damn well pleases. He only needs to be a voice and people lap it up and think he must be a hell of a fellow; and nobody sizes him up because the distance is too great. But if he only talks to a few people, if they are not complete fools or hypnotized, they will most probably size him up, and then he must not only tell them what he has in mind, he needs must *be* it—and that is, of course, very difficult. It is much easier to preach. Therefore, so many people preach in order to escape being. Therefore, we all want to be

missionaries. You see, when a missionary goes to Africa he is, as we say, a stag. He has white man's clothes, he has chop-boxes, he has a watch, and so he is a great man, very good and wonderful; and he doesn't need to *do* anything: he is great from the very beginning. You feel like seven kings when you are in Africa, for you are royal. Those black children look at you with big eyes and naturally are tremendously impressed. If you pull out your watch, they stare at you and think you are a sorcerer; if you give them a pill they think you are a great doctor. But they don't think that here. It is the cheapest way on earth to fix up feelings of inferiority: when you live among an inferior crowd, you easily can be great. You see, you naturally start with preaching. If you have a good idea, you want to preach it. But then you discover that there are no ears to receive it, and because it seems as if *somebody* ought to get it, you feel that you must be the person and you apply the same principle to yourself: you begin to preach to yourself. And that is a very useful thing, which I advise every preacher to do. Go and preach Christ to yourself; that is where you should begin—you are the very first. For, the man who wants to preach is one who wants to run away from his own problem by converting other people. You may know that story of the negro who said he had a marvelous dream, which consisted of three letters, *g.p.c.* And he thought it meant: "Go preach Christ." He wanted to be a missionary with a tail coat and white necktie. But the other negro said it meant: "Go pick cotton."

So Zarathustra is obviously confronted now with that problem: if he wants to find friends he must be what he preaches, more or less. He must be real, because mere talk won't do it. And that forces the idea of transformation upon him, so the next part is devoted to that idea. The first chapter is called "The Three Metamorphoses." He says:

Three metamorphoses of the spirit do I designate to you: how the spirit becometh a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.

Many heavy things are there for the spirit, the strong load-bearing spirit in which reverence dwelleth: for the heavy and the heaviest longeth its strength.

What is heavy? so asketh the load-bearing spirit; then kneeleth it down like a camel, and wanteth to be well laden.

What is the heaviest thing, ye heroes? asketh the load-bearing spirit, that I may take it upon me and rejoice in my strength.

Is it not this: To humiliate oneself in order to mortify one's pride? To exhibit one's folly in order to mock at one's wisdom?

In reading this you must keep in mind that he is talking to himself; it is a sort of admonition. He introduces himself thus to the idea of his task, as in a difficult situation you would say to yourself more or less unconsciously: "Well, you must realize that the strength of the spirit demands the heaviest burdens." Or, more likely, you speak like that to your friends in trouble: "You must make up your mind to deal with this difficult situation; yes, it will be a very heavy task. You will find it exceedingly tiresome." And so on. If you listen to your internal conversations, you will hear such things. Nietzsche brings this to the daylight here; it is a sort of dealing with one's own willingness, or with one's own unconscious wisdom. You see, every one of these sentences contains an important aspect of his own task. There is the idea, for instance, that the task means abasing or humiliating oneself, chastising one's pride. Nietzsche thinks what he is going to say might be something like folly, and probably it is good to mock one's own wisdom:

Or is it this: To desert our cause when it celebrateth its triumph?
To ascend high mountains to tempt the tempter?

Or is it this: To feed on the acorns and grass of knowledge, and
for the sake of truth to suffer of soul?

That is the result of the emptiness of a new condition; when you get to a new point of view, you come as it were into a new country with no means of support.

Or is it this: To be sick and dismiss comforters, and make
friends of the deaf, who never hear thy requests?

That is a doubt of the friends.

Or is it this: To go into foul water when it is the water of truth,
and not disclaim cold frogs and hot toads?

Here comes in that idiosyncrasy from which Nietzsche suffered; he always was obsessed by the idea that he ought to swallow a toad. You remember he once told a lady at a dinner table of his dream that his hand was transparent—the sinews and nerves and muscles were beautifully clean and clear—and then suddenly a toad stood upon his hand and he had to swallow it. That idea often occurred to him: it is the expression of the loathsomeness of life, or of the lower man. Frogs and toads are a first attempt of nature towards making something like man—a most ridiculous, absurd attempt, of course—so they are symbols for human transformation. First there is the transformation from tadpoles, and then it is a tailless animal with arms and legs, and that, of

course, impresses itself very much upon the naive mind. You know when a baby is in the bathtub the mother sometimes calls it in a tender way her little frog. The meaning of the frog to Nietzsche was of course the inferior man living in the swamp or mire. And it is quite clear that he feels the connection with that primitive man here, because he is going to face again the conflict with the interior man; it is still the same problem of the rope-dancer.

Or is it this: To love those who despise us, and give one's hand to the phantom when it is going to frighten us?

All these heaviest things the load-bearing spirit taketh upon itself: and like the camel, which, when laden, hasteneth into the wilderness, so hasteneth the spirit into its wilderness.

In this passage it becomes clear that the camel means a certain attitude which he should adopt in order to accept the heavy task. And it will lead him into the desert because, through its acceptance, his spirit will become like a camel that is meant to travel in the desert. It is an exceedingly frugal animal. It has that famous double stomach where it stores water and is therefore independent of water to a great extent; so it is needed for transport there. It is a sterile place where nothing grows, and where people are threatened by thirst and starvation. Translated into psychological language, it means a dangerous expedition which demands much endurance and strength, and where one is quite alone, deserted. That was so in reality. When Nietzsche published *Zarathustra*, instantly people began to squirm and pull away from him; only a few rather morbid characters cocked their ears. *Zarathustra* came out when Nietzsche was very much connected with Basel, and of course everybody spoke of it and I know what the reaction was then.

But in the loneliest wilderness happeneth the second metamorphosis: here the spirit becometh a lion; freedom will it capture, and lordship in its own wilderness.

Its last Lord it here seeketh: hostile will it be to him, and to its last God; for victory will it struggle with the great dragon.

What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call Lord and God? "Thou-shalt," is the great dragon called. But the spirit of the lion saith, "I will."

There is a theme in these passages referring to the camel which remains the same throughout. What is this characteristic idea, the thread which leads through all of these sentences beginning: "Or is it this?"

Mrs. Crowley: The opposites?

Dr. Jung: Well, there is always a question of accepting the opposites. We have to love those who despise us, for instance, or to shake hands with the ghosts that cause the fear, meaning the thing you would naturally run away from. Throughout, there is the idea of overcoming a resistance, accepting the thing which is loathsome, difficult, terrifying. But what does that mean—if you translate it into more psychological language, if you take it out of this moralistic style?

Mr. Allemann: The acceptance of one's own shadow.

Dr. Jung: Of course. It is the famous theme of the negative shadow, the opposite, the other side of the story. You see, consciousness is always the upper end of the pillar; the upper end is ajna and the lower end is muladhara, which is dark and in every way contrary to the clearness and radiance of complete detached consciousness. So he realizes here that he should burden his camel with a load which is very difficult to accept. One has to accept one's own negation, the side which is against one. Now, how does he come to such a conclusion? Well, you remember at the end of the introductory chapter, he realizes that he is going on a dangerous way where he will need guidance, and the old man in the wood, who withdrew from life, comes to his mind. But Zarathustra wants to go forward, so he is immediately confronted with the task of the time. And what is that? Is it that consciousness should continue to overcome more and more the shadow or the lower man?

Miss Hannah: No, it is accepting the animal, the lower man.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the only thing possible. We have come to an end on the side of consciousness and will power and concentration and intention and so on; we cannot go on in the same course, so we must find something else. And we can only find that which is beyond all that characterizes the former condition, and naturally whatever is beyond or behind the present condition is the shadow; that is absolutely unavoidable if you step beyond our actual world in any way. Suppose, for instance, that you are a scientist and go in for further research; then you must go out of the known into the unknown, out of the light into the shadow. If you are religious or philosophical, and can no longer believe in the hitherto valid values of your life, you leave the recognized truth for the absolutely unknown. It would be easy to step out of a known truth if the other truth were already known, but it is just not known. There is nothing; you step into empty space and it is dark and cold. You touch nothing, you see nothing, nothing meets you; it is just as if you were emigrating from your own country to an unknown undiscovered land. That is what he describes here. He burdens his camel

with the task of accepting the thing of which one is really afraid, for we are naturally afraid of the things we don't want to accept. But if you are through with the things you have believed in, if your life has become sterile, if your ideals don't feed you any longer, then you must make them something else, and that something else is what you fear—you step right into what you fear. In the Catholic church you have the light, the symbol—everything is provided for you—and if that is no longer satisfactory and you go beyond, into what do you step? Of course, you can step into Protestantism, but if you are born in Protestantism, what do you do then? Well, you can step into Buddhism, say, or theosophy, or something of the sort; and if that leaves you dissatisfied, what remains? Nothing but your shadow, all the things you don't like. And because there is nothing else, the darkness that is in you, round you, is the only thing you can see. Everywhere it is dark.

So Nietzsche mentions things here which might mean the regular food of science, for instance—the regular truth—and beyond is starvation. It may seem quite nice and beautiful here, perhaps things are fairly acceptable; then if you have to step beyond, you come to things that are unacceptable, inevitably: it is a sort of *enantiodromia*. Therefore, you should be very careful to declare yourself satisfied with existing conditions, because otherwise you burden the camel with the task of bearing you into the desert. If you are not satisfied with the porridge you eat at home, you have to eat sand in the Sahara. Now, if you have made up your mind to do that, you are something of a hero. Zarathustra is a hero. He makes up his mind to go into uncharted country where he is free, but quite alone. Yes, there is no limitation; you can do what you please in the Sahara and quite alone, but nothing will please you very much, not even yourself. When he has accepted that role of the camel, then he can travel into the desert. And there he is liberated from all restrictions; there he realizes that he becomes a devouring animal, a lion. When you step beyond a given order of things, you are naturally in the utmost freedom, but you are isolated; you can say you are god in your own desert, or that you are a victim. If you are courageous, you say you are the lord of your own desert. Nietzsche says he seeks his last lord there; he no longer wants to be a subject, he doesn't want anything beyond or above himself. He really wants to overcome everything by himself, even a god. So he will fight his last god, the great dragon. You see, God would be the last enemy, the last thing above himself; and God is the great dragon.

Then he asks: "What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call Lord and God?" And he explains that this dragon is

"Thou-shalt." That gives us the key, but it is really difficult to understand the symbolism. It is again a passage which one reads through smoothly without realizing what it means. You take it as a sort of speech metaphor which just slips down, and afterwards you don't know why you have some disturbance in your digestive tract. You don't know what you have swallowed. I read *Zarathustra* for the first time with consciousness in the first year of the war, in November 1914, twenty years ago; then suddenly the spirit seized me and carried me to a desert country in which I read *Zarathustra*. I did not understand really, but I made marks with my pencil at every place where I slightly stumbled, and I felt that it grated a bit when I went over the dragon. Something was not quite smooth there, but I didn't know what. There are still those marks in my German edition, and invariably I have found that these places are things that grate, that don't go down really. Now what do you know of this?

Miss Hannah: Is it not the need of the projected god, of the possibility of obeying?

Dr. Jung: Very much so. But can you explain it? Intuitions are nice but the human mind doesn't live on intuitions alone. Sometimes one needs more substantial food.

Mrs. Baynes: Could you not say that the Christian religion can be summed up as "thou-shalt" as it has been crystallized in the church, and "thou-shalt" will consume you if you pay attention to it?

Dr. Jung: Well, in a metaphoric way you can say that the principle of "thou-shalt" is characteristic for a certain mental attitude, which can become a dragon that devours you. But you can also say it is an avalanche which will finally cover you, or a flood, or an oppressive weight that will eventually crush you, or a lion that will eat you, or a tyrant. You can use any other kind of symbolism where one is overcome by "thou-shalt." So we must go a bit further; we must keep in mind that the dragon is a specific symbol and that Nietzsche has not invented that metaphor merely in order to express the idea that somebody was overcome. The selection of just that word was not a conscious intention of Nietzsche himself: it was an unconscious choice as it is in dreams. We never can assume that the dream says a thing quite accidentally and that it cannot be explained; that simply shows that one is only on the surface with one's explanation. One really ought to understand why that symbolism is nothing else, why the symbol the unconscious has chosen is the very word which should be pronounced in that place. So we must put the question: why does he say dragon?—why would not anything else do equally well? That predominating "thou-shalt" could

be expressed in many different ways; the dragon symbol gives some characteristics which ought not to be overlooked.

Mrs. Baumann: Are there not two “thou-shalts”—the dogma of the church and the inner law of the self? The dragon would be coming up because Nietzsche does not see that it has another significance in the personal individual law of “thou-shalt.”

Dr. Jung: Well, we cannot assume that there are two “thou-shalts” here; it is a psychological truth that anything can say, “thou-shalt,” and we speak chiefly of a traditional “thou-shalt” and the individual “thou-shalt.” But Nietzsche makes no such difference here. Only *we* have an indication in the dragon of another power which one cannot connect with the “thou-shalt” of the Christian church.

Mr. Baumann: I think the dragon means the entire past, because he is a mixture of animal, fish, amphibian, all kinds of things.

Dr. Jung: Yes, the dragon is a mythological monster.

Mr. Baumann: And out of the past comes this “thou-shalt.” Whether it is Christianity or another belief does not matter—anything—but out of the past comes a command and he opposes this. The lion spirit says: “I will, I don’t care what the dragon says; it is not what I *shall* do but what I *will* do.”

Dr. Jung: Yes. Well, the situation is this: he obviously tries to establish a condition in which he is free to say, “I will,” over against that “thou-shalt.” And that “thou-shalt” is put equal to the dragon, and the dragon is equal to God; and naturally he means the God of the Christian church. When the priest says “thou-shalt,” he surely means to speak with the voice of God, for where would he get the competence to say that otherwise? Only God’s law can say “thou-shalt”; it is a superior command, which must always come from an authoritative source. The authority of the church and the authority of the Holy Scriptures are the word of God, and he compares that word of authority to the dragon.

Mrs. Zinno: Is it not the power of the archetype?

Dr. Jung: It is an archetypal figure, a monster sure enough, but why is it expressed by that archetype?

Mrs. Baynes: Could it not be that he is making again one of those cycles that he likes to make? For instance, in the Christian tradition St. George killed the dragon and that time the dragon was Satan. Now he says God has become Satan.

Dr. Jung: Exactly. It is an *enantiodromic* cycle. The thing which has been good has become bad, the thing which has been true has become untrue. Now when he makes that equation: God “equals” the dragon,

the dragon "equals" "thou-shalt," he is affirming that the standpoint which was considered the supreme moral principle and identical with God has now become Satan himself. For a dragon is the leviathan in the sea according to the Book of Job, or the devil in hell. Satan is an old dragon, a destructive power. In other words, it means that the authoritative principle of the church, or the principle of any traditional morality or ethics or conviction, has become a devil to us. So this God has transformed into the old dragon. You see, the dragon is specific symbolism because it is the counterpart of God; the dragon with us is definitely a symbol of evil. Of course, it is not so in China; there the dragon is the symbol of heaven.

Mr. Baumann: I don't understand why you limit this dragon to Christianity. It can be any traditional power.

Dr. Jung: Yes, but we must reckon with Nietzsche. To Nietzsche the idea of God is essentially Christian. He was a parson's son, and wherever you find passages that refer to God or anything spiritual, it always means a kind of Protestant Christianity. That is quite definite. You know, anybody with a mystical understanding of God never would say "thou-shalt." It has nothing to do with the life of the spirit. All mystics have, therefore, entirely different conceptions of God. I can tell you a funny story about a cousin of mine who suddenly had qualms about his life and went to consult the son of old Pastor Blumhardt. You know Blumhardt was a famous man in his day. He once healed a case of spirit possession, a very interesting case. And the son continued the ways of the father and was the spiritual medicine-man for all the theologians of my set and my time. Well, my cousin had a very bad conscience and made a full general confession, told Blumhardt all his sins. Then he looked at him expectantly and thought now the lightning would descend upon him, that the great man would say something. And the great man said: "Do you really think God takes notice of your dirt?" That was all he said. You see, he had a different conception of God; to him God was not at all "thou-shalt," but something entirely different.⁴ This "thou-shalt" is always a codified divine word. It is traditional morality which is of the devil.

Once before the war I treated a Lutheran pastor, a pretty hard analysis. He was very typically theological, and I did not know what would become of that fellow. Then the war came and I did not see him. After

⁴ The elder Pastor Blumhardt—his son was also a pastor—became famous for his exorcism of the devil, who was in possession of two sisters. This is reported in F. Zundel, *Pfarrer J. C. Blumhardt: Ein Lebensbild* (Zurich and Heidelberg, 1880).

the war, I met him again and asked him how he was getting along with the church, and he said: "Oh, of course the church is the work of the devil, but if you want to live you must even make use of the devil." Now that was a parson! You see, he very much believed in the living god that is not a "thou-shalt" in that sense: he is not codified. But anybody who is on the standpoint of an artificial code of morality, who thinks that people only keep in form on account of "thou-shalt," will naturally identify the principle of "thou-shalt" with God. Then God is nothing but a taskmaster, or a ruler that helps one to make straight lines, something hard and stiff and unnatural, but nothing living. In the case of that Lutheran pastor the real reason for his neurosis was a great inner rebellion against that principle of the straight line, and the devil got loose in him and literally raised hell with him. He fought me like the devil himself, but finally he came round. He left before he could tell me what had really happened, and also it was not clear to him. It took him a year to digest everything he had heard in analysis, and then he slowly worked round that terrible block and came to the conclusion that neither the decalogue nor any other code of morality could be identified with God. Most theologians know exactly what it is all about. They tell you that God can only be good and such damned nonsense. They deny his omnipotence therefore.

Well, Nietzsche says "thou-shalt" is the name of the great dragon, and over against that he tries to acquire the quality of the lion, the royal animal that says "I will." He creates a new moral standpoint; over against the traditional prison which only creates unfree immoral creatures, he invents a responsible morality, the morality of the ego that says: "I will"—and takes the responsibility. Of course, he does not mean a sort of arbitrary, meaningless wishing or willing: he means a will or a decision which includes responsibility. You know, Nietzsche was not a mean mind or an absolute fool. He was a highly gifted man, and you can see on every page of *Zarathustra* that his morality is a thousand times sharper than the traditional morality of the pulpit. A thief that is in prison is not less a thief because he cannot steal; let him be the cashier of a great bank and see what happens. If he doesn't steal then you can say he is probably not a thief. So "thou-shalt" is a sort of prison where people hold to a certain rule, but are always thinking: "If I were rid of that rule I would do God knows what!" They never know what they would do if they were free. There is no morality, no moral decision, without freedom. There is only morality when you can choose, and you cannot choose if you are forced.

LECTURE VIII

28 November 1934

Dr. Jung:

I have brought you today a picture from the *Mythology of All Races* where the Garuda is represented with a human body and a bird's head and wings.¹ And also a design taken from the Dresden Mayan Codex, where there is a Garuda and a serpent; it is a time symbol as well. Now we spoke last time of the dragon, and the text goes on:

"Thou-shalt" lieth in its path, sparkling with gold—a scale-covered beast; and on every scale glittereth golden "Thou shalt!"

The values of a thousand years glitter on those scales, and thus speaketh the mightiest of all dragons: "All the values of things—glitter on me.

All values have already been created, and all created values—do I represent. Verily, there shall be no 'I will' any more." Thus speaketh the dragon.

We have already seen that the dragon is a symbol of the deity, a form of the god, and here we see that it is when the god, the living spirit, has become a "thou shalt," a system of values, that it appears as a dragon. In this case, it would not of course be like the Chinese idea of the dragon; it would be a negative form because with us the dragon is a sort of serpent, an unfavorable animal. It is not the bird, the unfolding into the two wings or hemispheres. It represents, rather, the lower parts of the nervous system. As soon as a god becomes a system of values, it is a sort of codified god, an institution, a church building, a printed book, or a series of prescriptions. Thus, all life has vanished from the deity. It is caught in images and rites, in values and in laws. Of course, the more the institution prevails, the less there is life; and above all, the more there is "thou shalt," the less there is freedom.

¹ A work of 13 volumes, ed. J. A. MacCulloch and L. H. Gray, reprinted in New York, 1964. (The original volumes were published 1916-1932.)

Without freedom there is no real morality; there is only law abidingness, more or less complete obedience based upon the principle of "thou shalt." And this is not ethical; it is called morality but surely it is not real ethical responsibility.

Now Nietzsche's revolutionary ideas, of course, go right against this dragon that slowly eats up every new decision, every new responsibility, until it is all-powerful. Therefore, the dragon in mythology always represents the thing which must be overcome or killed in order that something may be liberated; it is always guarding a stolen treasure which really should belong to man. Then the hero has to overcome the dragon in order to liberate the treasure. So a very frequent myth is the virgin sacrificed to the dragon or guarded by him, and rescued by the hero, as in the story of Perseus and Andromeda.² The treasure, like the virgin, is a symbol for value and life. And the virgin would be an anima symbol, meaning that the anima is caught by a system of values incorporated in the dragon; she has lost her freedom. Or the dragon guards the jewel that has been lost, the jewel being the symbol of the innermost value of man, individuality or the self. That myth is to be found nearly everywhere in the world. The great jewel in Buddhism, the *mani*, is of course of Brahmanistic origin; it was originally the magic jewel which was hidden in the sea and then brought up to the surface by the gods. Buddha himself is called the *mani*, as in that famous formula: *Om Mani Padme Hūm*.³ This humming sound is exceedingly primitive and we are always much impressed, but never understand what the Hindu really means by it. Recently, however, it came to my mind in connection with the very peculiar sound primitives make to express assent or admiration. If I said to a negro: "How do you do?" or "Look at that nice child," he said, "Mmmm." You can hear that sound also when you stand at a window and see a particularly nice girl passing by. Or when you eat something that is especially good—so you always say to children, "Mmmm, isn't it good?" That most primitive sound, which mankind has probably forever produced in primitive circumstances to express admiration, is surely this mystical sound: "Mmmm, such a jewel! Isn't it beautiful?" So Om is one of the titles of

² Tied by her father to a rock as a sacrifice to a female sea monster, Andromeda was rescued from on high by Perseus, who beheaded the monster and married the girl.

³ Sometimes, transliterated *Aum*, *Om* is of course the most sacred and potent of words, deserving of intense meditation and regarded as equivalent to the self. Jung tells elsewhere the story of how at the feet of the Bodhisattva there grew an immense lotus. Stepping onto the lotus he scanned the world. Hence the Tibetan prayer: "Behold the jewel in the lotus." CW 6, par. 298.

Buddha, the jewel in the Lotus, who would be a representation of the self, as Christ is most clearly a representation of the self, the greatest value.

Now this value is hidden in the dragon, inasmuch as it is replaced by the principle of "thou shalt." Whenever an external law assumes higher authority, then the self in man is the hidden treasure, then the anima is sacrificed to the dragon, and then the world waits for a hero who will fight the dragon and force it to render up the treasure it has devoured. Here, Nietzsche obviously feels what Paul felt when he spoke about the freedom from the law of the children of God. Paul says that the law is overcome, that we are not children of the servant but of the free man; we are as if freed from slavery. We have overcome the law because higher than the law is love. There are several quite wonderful passages in the Epistle of Paul where he praises the new condition which follows the overcoming of the dragon of the law. His hymn to love, for instance, is a sort of triumph; and that is also expressed in the famous passage where he triumphs over hell and death. You see, that is the fight against the dragon and the subsequent feeling of liberation, together with the feeling of *apokatastasis*, the restitution of the original state, in which man is the redeemed child of God, enjoying the eternal freedom of the deity. To Paul, this was of course quite literally the liberation from the law, the institution, as Christ was understood as a fulfilment of the law. He overcame the law by fulfilling it and going beyond into a state of freedom.⁴

This is of course a sort of *amor fati*: what one understands must be, one *will do* because one wants to. One says "I will" freely, not forced by "thou-shalt" which is mere authority that may be perfectly meaningless. For nobody can invent a law or system of authority which can be followed under all conditions. You can have very wonderful laws, yet remain utterly immoral. No penal code has ever produced moral beings: "thou-shalt" is only a sort of rail which helps you to keep straight when you are wobbling. But you have learned to walk straight only when you can walk without a rail: only then have you learned the true obedience and responsibility. As long as you walk between two high walls where you simply cannot deviate, there is neither freedom nor responsibility nor any other particular virtue; you can be quite

⁴ "There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Jesus Christ. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and death" (Romans 8:1-2). "And (an angel) laid hold of the dragon, the serpent of old, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years" (Revelation 20:1-2). The "Hymn to Love," I Corinthians 13, Jung movingly cites in the conclusion of *MDR*.

drunk and still you walk straight. You simply cannot go in a zigzag when you are walled in. Now, that condition of a safe road with safe walls may prevail during many hundreds of years in an established civilization, but a time will come when those very walls fall down, and then we suddenly need the dependence upon ourselves. Everything becomes questionable, and we need a guidance within because external values won't give it to us. Then the stability of the world is based solely upon our own reliability, the safety in ourselves.

Mr. Baumann: Kant points out very clearly that there must be freedom in the philosophical decision.⁵

Dr. Jung: Of course. One cannot imagine a morality without freedom of decision. As we were saying last week, the imprisoned bank-cashier, who doesn't steal because there is nothing to steal in his cell, is not moral. Let him have his freedom, let him have his millions every day, and if he doesn't steal under such conditions, one can be sure he is not a thief. Well, these are the ideas Nietzsche is dealing with here in symbolic and poetic language. Naturally, when there is such a body of laws, it has the tendency to develop more and more, to increase its weight and size until nobody is left who could possibly say "I will." Everything then is duty, "thou-shalt." Such a condition can last a long time if everything goes smoothly, but if the whole building should be shaken by an earthquake, then there would be nobody there with an orientation from within, nobody who would have the reliability which comes from freedom of choice. Now he goes on:

My brethren, wherefore is there need of the lion in the spirit?
Why sufficeth not the beast of burden, which renounceth and is
reverent?

To create new values—that, even the lion cannot yet accomplish: but to create itself freedom for new creating—that can the
might of the lion do.

To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty:
for that, my brethren, there is need of the lion.

That means that one needs the strength of the royal lion to be able to say nay to one's duty, to negate that "thou-shalt." It is a sort of sacrilege

⁵ According to Kant, man must attribute to himself freedom or autonomy of the will in order to choose what is required by the moral law. See *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, IV, 446. Jung discusses the point below in Lecture II, 23 Oct. 1935. Cf. Nietzsche: "We, however, want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves law, who create themselves" (*Gay Science*, p. 335).

not to obey the given laws and to do something according to one's own wits on one's own responsibility, to put one's own law, in other words, above the given law. But any creator is forced to do so; any creation in the last analysis is immoral because it breaks a tradition—it is a criminal act. Whenever I discuss these matters with theologians, I say we never should forget that Christ really was a criminal, and in our days also he would be a criminal. It would not be an offence if we should break the taboo of the sabbath, but in those days the dragon said: "Thou shalt observe the sabbath day, and if you don't you are cursed." Christ broke several laws and therefore he was executed. He belonged to the lowest stratum of the people. The whores in the days of Christ were in no way mythological; they were no better than our prostitutes. If you were to meet Christ anywhere in Zürich, it would be in Niederdorf in a saloon. When he spoke about the adulterous woman, he really meant an adulterous woman. We always forget that Christ was an illegitimate child and Mary was an immoral woman; we paint everything with gold. That is the institution, the glittering scales of the dragon. In reality it was a poor miserable thing, in no way respectable. So all that we have made of it is the golden scales of the dragon; there Nietzsche was quite right.

Mr. Baumann: Nazareth was even a place of very bad reputation.

Dr. Jung: Yes. "What good can come out of Nazareth?"⁶ We would say such a man could not be good on account of the awful conditions in which he lived. But that was Christ's origin, and he was not merely unconventional, he was a breaker of laws. So we can understand that Nietzsche needs such emphatic words, and to give a holy "Nay" even to duty in order to create freedom for himself. "Therefore, my brethren, there is need of the lion." It needs the royal courage and the royal character of a lion, apparently, to be able to say nay to one's duty, for it means to be courageous enough to do something which is against order and against the law. Later on, you will find the particular psychology of the antinomic point of view. You see, a bit of the Gnosis comes in here; Nietzsche is not consciously influenced by the Gnosis but unconsciously all the more. The Antinomists were a particular set of Gnostic moralists who were convinced that you could not be redeemed without having sinned. If you commit no sin you cannot be redeemed naturally, because there is nothing you could possibly be redeemed from; therefore, in order to be redeemed you must commit sins.⁷ As a

⁶ "And Nathanael said unto him, Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth? Philip saith unto him, Come and See" (John 1:46).

⁷ According to the Antinomians only faith and love are necessary for salvation. Thus right and wrong conduct are regarded as matters of opinion. The Enkratites, on the con-

Catholic must commit sins in order to have something to confess. The priest who takes your confession will admonish you that you ought to confess something; surely you must have committed some sin somewhere. So conscientious people often put down everything they have done on a little sheet of paper, an unkind word to so-and-so for instance, and work up artificial notions about it all. Of course, they do not think of their real sins, because they have no particular feeling for them—they live in them. A man who lives in sin has no feeling about it, no relation to it. He only knows certain offences against laws, which to other people would not be sins at all. Without freedom and responsibility one even loses one's sense of sin, one only knows that one has offended against the law. The more an institution prevails, the more one comes back to the standpoint of the late Egyptians who, in their confession, said: "I have *not* stolen the goods of the orphans, I have *not* robbed the widow, I have *not* cheated the tax collectors of the Pharaoh." But of what they had done they said nothing; that was simply indifferent. Naturally, if one can keep straight just by not giving offence, one lands with the conviction that one can do anything as long as it is not noticed.

People really think like that, only it is of course very crude to say so; sophisticated people would not admit it. Their standpoint merely comes from the fact that they have walked between walls; there are certain police regulations against which one must not offend, and otherwise everything is all right. I remember an instance. When I was travelling to America one time, I sat at a table with some New York business men who never in their lives had even seen a book, not to speak of reading one—quite nice, illiterate people. One man took a fancy to me, so one night after dinner he said: "Say, you are a pretty wise-looking chap. I want to ask you something. I know a fellow who has been married for twenty-two years and has six grown-up children, and the other day he fell in love with a girl. Now should such a fellow divorce or not?" "You mean yourself?" "How did you notice that?" "Well," I said, "if you should marry the girl, then what about your wife? What do you do with her?" "Oh, that is simple. I am regularly married by law and I can divorce by the law. That is O.K., and then I can marry the girl." I said: "That is perfectly true, but consider that this woman has really been your wife for twenty-two years, and you have had children by her. Then by law you simply give her the slip. Do you think

trary, were strict ascetics who required of their followers a literal interpretation of Christ's strictures and living example.

that this is very human? Haven't you any kind of relation to your wife besides the law?" He said he never thought of that, and the next day he was not so sure whether he could divorce her. You see it would all be in the regular way, the law could have nothing against him, so he would come out perfectly white. No human consideration whatever. Of course that is utterly immoral: it is just "thou-shalt." When he goes to heaven, he will say "I have not," and then we shall see whether Peter opens the door or not. He might. Therefore, heaven is so terribly boring.

To assume the right to new values—that is the most formidable assumption for a load-bearing and reverent spirit. Verily, unto such a spirit it is preying, and the work of a beast of prey.

He puts it very strongly, a beast of prey. In our society it is criminal to break the law, to give offence, and one cannot create new values without giving offence, that is perfectly plain.

As its holiest, it once loved "Thou-shalt": now it is forced to find illusion and arbitrariness even in the holiest things, that it may capture freedom from its love: the lion is needed for this capture.

But tell me, my brethren, what the child can do, which even the lion could not do? Why hath the preying lion still to become a child?

Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea.

Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: *its own* will, willeth now the spirit; *his own* world winneth the world's outcast.

Here I think it is clear why Nietzsche needed the lion to symbolize an attitude which can break laws. It is the royal self-will, it is the antinomy.

Mrs. Baynes: You did not finish saying how Nietzsche was influenced by the Gnosis.

Dr. Jung: Oh, by the antinomistic point of view that one must break the law, must give offence, otherwise there is no redemption. The so-called Enkratites are the opposite. The Antinomists are law-breakers, and the Enkratites are those who abstain from everything, so that nothing happens. They simply keep everything at a standstill; nothing is done, not even a sin. They are also called the Continentes.⁸ They hold everything in, storing up life so that nothing can happen. The

⁸ Jung discusses these Gnostic sects in CW 6, par. 25.

river is blocked up and no water flows. Nobody can say that something evil has been done, because nothing has been done. Now here we come to the transition from the lion to the child. Why should the lion transform into a child? And what does Nietzsche gain if his attitude is child-like instead of like a rapacious lion?

Miss E. Taylor: He wouldn't think so much of "thou-shalt" and he would be open to the new thing that will come. The lion only finds the old thing.

Dr. Jung: But the lion can say "I will"; he is royal.

Miss E. Taylor: Yes, but the lion cannot choose the new thing. But the new thing will come and he must have a childlike attitude to see it.

Dr. Jung: You mean a child is the absolutely creative thing. Yes, the passage immediately before tells us that even the lion is not able to create new values. He is only able to create for himself freedom for a new creation; for this his strength is sufficient. As a rapacious beast of prey, the lion can tear down and destroy, on account of his great strength he can break through barriers, crash through a hedge, break into a herd of cattle and cause a stampede. He can upset things thoroughly, but he does not create anything new. Nietzsche realizes here that it needs more than mere destruction to create new values, a new attitude is needed. And the new thing is now symbolized as a child, an innocent and oblivious child, a new beginning, a play.

Then he uses a very peculiar symbol here, a self-rolling wheel; it is of course a literal translation: *das aus sich rollende Rad* is better because it means a wheel that is moving out of itself. The center of the impetus of the wheel being in itself, it is self-creative. And Nietzsche means that the attitude of the child is self-creative. You see, a child is in a state of development, still growing, and it is able to nourish itself, to help itself in its growth.

Mr. Baumann: I don't see creation in the symbol of the child as much as an unspoiled and unprejudiced attitude towards everything which is coming.

Dr. Jung: Yes, provided that the thing for which one is waiting, under such conditions, is really coming from the outside. But outside is the dragon. A mere childlike attitude which is expectantly waiting for something invites dragons. Therefore, the child must be self-creative in order to put something into the place of the dragon that has been overcome; it must create a new subjective, individual value. And for that the child must be playful. It must be like the creator of the world that played with world fantasies until they became. The child is always creating a world of its own; in its play it creates new values. New worlds

never come from the outside because there are no worlds outside: there is only an old dragon.

Prof. Fierz: Is not what Mr. Baumann means, the saying of Christ that we must become like little children in order to enter into the kingdom of heaven?

Dr. Jung: But that is not exactly what Nietzsche means. You see, the innocence and oblivious nature of children causes a peculiar lack of prejudice which does not preclude new experience. This is, of course, absolutely indispensable for a creation, but even so something must be produced from within in order to make an experience a new one. For the new thing is not to be found outside; the world outside is just the world in which we have been, and if anything new comes into this world, it must come from within. Of course, in order to be able to create we must not preclude new experiences: we must be open to them. You see, that is what he means by the wheel rolling out of itself, moved by itself and not by external conditions. As soon as the wheel is moved by external conditions it is "thou-shalt"; then somebody has given a kick to the wheel to make it roll. But Nietzsche's idea is that a child can move out of itself. It will be creative because the condition of the child, even the physiological condition, is creative.

Now, the symbolism of the wheel suggests of course a mandala. In other words, this argument—the camel, the lion, and the child—is obviously the expression of the process of individuation, for which the universal dragon is killed. Then all the general laws are obliterated, and you must have values of your own for your orientation. You must have a guidance from within, and for that you need the attitude of the child in order to be humble and obedient, and not conceited, not having better ideas, so that you can obey the impulses that come from within. You are then like the wheel that moves out of itself. And that wheel is the sun symbolism, it is a mandala. The wheel has not only been since time immemorial a symbol of the sun, the sun itself has been a symbol—that wheel which moves over the sky with nobody moving it, the wheel moving by itself. So the sun has forever been a symbol of individuation, a symbol of the man who can stand by himself and move out of himself without being pushed.

With primitives it is the rarest thing to find initiative. Usually only the chief or the medicine man have initiative, and they are recognized to be the great inventors or promoters of the tribe. The ordinary man is lazy, inert, exceedingly conservative, and does things only inasmuch as his fathers and forefathers have done them; he will not move unless he is kicked into action, and it takes a great deal of kicking to make a

primitive active. I told you the story of what one must do in order to send off a letter carrier. And also the story of the ceremony of the Australian bushmen to make men angry, to kick them into action.⁹ Nobody is excited when a man has been killed, so they have a special ceremony which will insinuate rage into them; only then can they make up their minds to do something about that murder. Then they get their weapons and gather together, but if by chance they don't find their enemy that day, they go home and the war is finished. To excite them again, one must again have the ceremony for making men angry. But that hardly ever happens; if they don't find the enemy they go home, and nothing is done. Well, we come now to the end of the three metamorphoses:

Three metamorphoses of the spirit have I designated to you: how the spirit became a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.—

Thus spake Zarathustra. And at that time he abode in the town which is called The Pied Cow.

There is this one reference to the city called "The Dappled Cow."¹⁰ Have you an idea about it?

Mrs. Crowley: Is the cow not in a sense the counterpart of the camel? It is also an enduring animal, patient, but instead of carrying people to the desert, it would be more the physical side that gives nourishment, that carries them more into the body, as it were.

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is quite possible, but we must try to find out in what sense Nietzsche used the word and in the next chapter, "The Chairs of Virtue," the text says: "But I think of what I have done and thought during the day. Thus ruminating, patient as a cow, I ask myself: What were thy ten overcomings?" Very often when you encounter a rather striking word, you find it again in a different connection; it is as if that word *cow* had been coming up from the unconscious, hovering below the threshold of the conscious, and then coming up again

⁹ The Swiss psychotherapist, Charles Baudouin (1893-1963) tells in his journal of hearing Jung describe the young East African who remained impassive in the presence of an offer of reward for delivering a letter until an incantatory ritual made visible to him his destination, at which point he is off, "as if shot from a sling." *C. G. Jung Speaking*, ed. William McGuire and R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, B.S. XCVII, 1977), pp. 79-80.

¹⁰ Zarathustra's favorite town, "The Motley Cow," is a literal translation of the name of the town, Kalmasadalmyad, visited by the Buddha on his wanderings. It is known that Nietzsche read and admired the Buddhist scripture *Sutta Nipata*. See Freny Mistry, *Nietzsche and Buddhism* (New York, 1981).

after a while in a new connection. That sometimes helps one to elucidate the meaning of a word. So I think one should lay stress here upon the rumination. The cow is to him chiefly a patient and ruminating animal. And that refers to the general theme of the next chapter, which is sleep. Now, the city is called "The Dappled Cow," so the city would be particularly representative of the good sleep which comes from a good conscience. To what town would that refer?

Mrs. Fierz: To Basel!

Prof. Reichstein: The cow plays a great role in Persian religion; there is a myth about the first cow, as there is about the first man.

Dr. Jung: That is true, but I rather think we have here a very local reference on account of that association with the ruminating cow. You see, the chairs of virtue are to found in Basel, and this particular chapter has little to do with Persia. It is not so far away.

Miss Hannah: He wrote it at Sils Maria and there are a fearful lot of cows there.

Dr. Jung: Well, many people from Basel go to Sils Maria, and he went up there from Basel, you know! I think if we assume that this town refers to Basel, we are not far from the truth, because in this chapter he says something which strikes right into the eye of that good old town. They believe very much there in traditional morality, and on account of that there is little real morality. There are rails, and it is just another rail that at the time of carnival there are none. It is like marrying and getting divorced according to the rules. The pigsty is well locked up during the whole year, but during carnival time the doors are open and because it is according to the rules, nothing can be said against it. And at that time, the beginning of the 80s, it really was ruminating on the values of the past. Not very long ago there was an article in the newspaper here about Gibbon, who, when he was living in Switzerland, went to Basel and was much impressed by the fact that the people there were still living in the time of Erasmus. That was in 1755 or thereabouts, but the same thing could have been said in 1870 and '80 and '90.

Prof. Fierz: We have a proof. Jakob Burkhardt, when he was inspired, always played the same song by Schubert and always wept at the same parts.

Dr. Jung: Yes, tremendous conservatism and a particularly rigid set of values. If you gave no offence you were accepted; you were right—just by giving no offence. That was the best you could do. If you did better it was worse: one should not do better. Now, Nietzsche lived in that atmosphere, and he spoke like that right in the face of his Faculty,

his department at the University, and to Jakob Burkhardt for instance, and the other important people. That surely took the better part of his available courage. No wonder that immediately after such heresy, we come to a chapter dealing with the Chairs of Virtue, which would be very much the university set of people against whom he was speaking; and in that chapter we find an apology for the opposing powers.

Miss E. Taylor: I think cows are very inquisitive animals and interested in one's ideas.

Dr. Jung: They occasionally even eat hats!

Miss E. Taylor: So I think it refers to the chapter where he was ruminating—through this rumination he got all those ideas about the camel.

Dr. Jung: Oh you think he was the dappled cow lying in the meadow and ruminating his ideas about the camel. But that must have been a pretty restless sleep; otherwise, he would not have used such emphatic words. You see, when you are going to break through centuries of respectability, you surely cannot compare yourself to a ruminating cow. It would have to be a mad, stampeding one, breaking through all regulations. You must put yourself in the place of a poor professor at Basel University who had to say such terrible things. After this book, they said he was mad. Jakob Burkhardt got a chill when he touched it; he squirmed away from the awful thing. They didn't know when that fellow would be going crazy. Not that they would have been able to diagnose insanity in that book—not even alienists in those days would have been able to do that—but the ideas which he expressed gave them a sort of cold fever because the unconscious began to stir in them. They felt the coils of the snake in their own bellies. It gave people a feeling like something creeping up the spine, a sort of cold Kundalini feeling¹¹—quite naturally, because their world of values was threatened. Therefore, for decades to come, if anybody committed suicide they said, "Oh, he has read Nietzsche. Those are the Nietzsche ideas. Of course, when one reads such books the world must go to hell." One heard that sort of thing in the world war; the German psychology was explained by Nietzsche. As if German politics were due to Nietzsche! Hardly any of them had ever read his books. Nietzsche had a thoroughly bad reputation, not on account of his aphorisms—nobody with a certain amount of *médiance* will have anything to say against those—but he will have a hell of a lot to say against *Zarathustra*. For *Zarathustra*

¹¹ In Kundalini Yoga a serpent is said to slumber at the base of the spine; awakened it crawls upward.

is an exceedingly decent book, while the aphorisms are partially *méd-isanee*, partially malevolent; everybody will quote certain aphorisms with a chuckle as a sort of *bon mot*, like "the great Chinaman of Königsberg," meaning Kant. You can stand such things. They don't disturb your sleep. They give you a good digestion.

But reading *Zarathustra* is upsetting because you don't understand it. You read smoothly through the chapters and lap it up as a sort of poetical metaphor, and you don't know what you are eating. You swallow sugar-coated pills with all sorts of poison inside. Most of the people who read *Zarathustra* never bother to go into the detail in order to make out what is really said, so they get a revolutionary thing into their unconscious without noticing it. Therefore, all respectable people must have a natural reaction against it, and if you ask why, they always quote something quite wrong. They cannot keep his actual words in mind. *Zarathustra* is difficult to keep in mind because it becomes associated right away with the unconscious. That happens to me sometimes: I remember that Nietzsche's Zarathustra has said something—now what is it? And then I find I have quoted it wrongly. It is associated with my own unconscious because it came up from that dark place.

I think we can now end this chapter about the metamorphoses and go to the next, where we have a new movement. *Zarathustra* as a whole is a sort of *enantiodromic* movement, it is the river of the unconscious and the chapters are like pictures of the waves of that underground current. I assume that Nietzsche sat down every day and wrote out the river that flowed into his consciousness, and thus he represented what was going on in the unconscious. In a certain way *Zarathustra* is written like Joyce's *Ulysses*, but Joyce wrote from the conscious material and *Zarathustra* was written from the unconscious material.

People commended unto Zarathustra a wise man, as one who could discourse well about sleep and virtue: greatly was he honoured and rewarded for it, and all the youths sat before his chair. To him went Zarathustra, and sat among the youths before his chair. And thus spake the wise man:

Respect and modesty in presence of sleep! That is the first thing! And to go out of the way of all who sleep badly and keep awake at night!

Modest is even the thief in presence of sleep: he always stealeth softly through the night. Immodest, however, is the night-watchman; immodestly he carrieth his horn.

No small art is it to sleep: it is necessary for that purpose to keep awake all day.

Ten times a day must thou overcome thyself: that causeth wholesome weariness, and is poppy to the soul.

Ten times must thou reconcile again with thyself; for overcoming is bitterness, and badly sleep the unreconciled.

Ten truths must thou find during the day; otherwise wilt thou seek truth during the night, and thy soul will have been hungry.

Ten times must thou laugh during the day, and be cheerful; otherwise thy stomach, the father of affliction, will disturb thee in the night.

Few people know it, but one must have all the virtues in order to sleep well. Shall I bear false witness? Shall I commit adultery?

Shall I covet my neighbour's maidservant? All that would ill accord with good sleep.

And even if one have all the virtues, there is still one thing needful: to send the virtues themselves to sleep at the right time.

That they may not quarrel with one another, the good females! And about thee, thou unhappy one!

Peace with God and thy neighbour: so desireth good sleep. And peace also with thy neighbour's devil! Otherwise it will haunt thee in the night.

Honour to the government, and obedience, and also to the crooked government! So desireth good sleep. How can I help it, if power like to walk on crooked legs?

He who leadeth his sheep to the greenest pasture, shall always be for me the best shepherd: so doth it accord with good sleep.

Many honours I want not, nor great treasures: they excite the spleen. But is it bad sleeping without a good name and a little treasure.

What do you think about this? Could you confirm it? Or have you any argument against it? Is anybody sleeping badly here?

Dr. Schlegel: It is doubtful whether it is meant seriously.

Dr. Jung: Oh no, it is not doubtful. It is obvious that he makes fun of the teachers of such wisdom. For Zarathustra does not seem to be in favor of such teaching, so it sounds as if his speech had a double bottom. Now, if you criticize these thoughts carefully, can you contradict them? Don't you think it is perfectly good sense? For instance, "A good name and a modest treasure." Is that not a welcome thing to everybody? Or: "Sleep is no mean art." Well, if you suffer from bad sleep

you think good sleep is something marvelous; you would give anything to have a good sleep. Then, "Ten times must thou laugh during the day and be cheerful; otherwise thy stomach, the father of affliction, will disturb thee in the night." That is perfectly true; a good laugh moves the diaphragm which is very healthy for the stomach, good for your digestion. Then, "Ten truths must thou find during the day; otherwise wilt thou seek truth during the night, and thy soul will have been hungry." Or, "Ten times must thou reconcile thyself again with thyself; for overcoming is bitterness, and badly sleep the unreconciled." What is better than to be reconciled to oneself? Then you are at one with yourself and sleep well. And, "Conquer yourself." Sure enough, we have to conquer ourselves many times every day; without that nobody could live decently. He would be unhappy and have a sleepless night and have to overcome himself then—so better do it in the daytime. That brings on wholesale weariness and is like opium to the soul. That is quite true. Is it not perfectly sound teaching?

Mrs. Crowley: It is not exactly lionessque.

Dr. Jung: But very wise.

Miss Hannah: It is very much what he said about the last man. He is again objecting to the ordinary man in himself which was his downfall.

Dr. Jung: That is true. It is almost the same voice speaking exactly the same kind of thoughts. And we have encountered that voice in another place, not the voice of Zarathustra or Nietzsche, but the voice of a certain wise man, a professor of good sleep.

Miss Wolff: The old wise man.

Dr. Jung: Yes. He says, for instance, not to bother about human beings; one had better return to the woods and worship one's god with the voices of animals. So this teacher also says very wise things. And if you remember that Nietzsche himself suffered very much from sleeplessness and always had to use drugs in order to sleep, you understand what secret passion is revealed in this chapter. He went to the lectures of that famous professor of good sleep because he himself needed it very badly. Then there is a possible psychological explanation for Nietzsche's sleeplessness. What would that be?

Miss Hannah: He identified with the spirit which did not need any sleep.

Dr. Jung: That would be the consequence; it would not be a psychological cause. Though of course one might identify with the sleeplessness of the spirit, and that would lead to the idea that one didn't need sleep. There are such fools. They think that people in the future, through diet and training, will come to a condition in which they can

get along without sleep. They think that would be a sign of the progress of man. They train themselves to have only two or three hours of sleep, or one hour preferably, but when they come to no hour they are dead. That is the identification with the spirit. But what would be the real cause for the sleeplessness?

Mrs. Stutz: It is coming from the unconscious.

Dr. Jung: Of course. One of the most ordinary causes of sleeplessness is the agitation of the unconscious; it is like a stormy sea.

Mr. Baumann: He did not realize what he was writing, so the unconscious got overcharged.

Dr. Jung: That would be the primary cause; when moved as he was when he wrote *Zarathustra*, his unconscious would be just seething. Moreover, if he listens to his unconscious, if he is more and more forced to pay attention to the things which come surging up, he will associate himself with the unconscious too closely. And then there is always the danger, as the wall between the conscious and the unconscious becomes thin, with holes here and there, that there will then be no real defence against that movement. The unconscious may then break through those holes and cause peculiar conditions in the conscious. One finds very often in people who come into a sort of collision with the collective unconscious without knowing what is happening to them, that they get a hole in the partition through which the unconscious can come through, like a sea that washes in and out. And naturally they don't know what it is. That happened to Nietzsche because he did not know what it was; he tried to catch it, yet it caught him, and the evidence is his identity with Zarathustra.

Mr. Baumann: Does this happen to analytical patients?

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, that is a particular danger of analysis which one should not undervalue. If one touches upon an unconscious which is full and ready to burst forth, one may cause a most terrible explosion—insanity really. Whenever one finds traces of an unconscious in that condition, one must handle the case with the utmost care. It is exceedingly dangerous.

Mr. Baumann: I remember Professor Heyer showed a picture of such an explosion.

Dr. Jung: Yes, those fiery bulls breaking through a barrier. He was so frightened that he overlooked the fact that there were very positive signs in it which showed that the thing could be reconstructed. But if he knows the danger, a man can lose his nerve. It is a shattering experience. I never had such a case, happily enough [knocking wood]. The unconscious bursts forth and you cannot stop it; it is awful, just run-

ning away. I tried to stop such a case which had been handled by an inexperienced lay analyst; I came across something like an abscess which ran out and the man finally committed suicide. I could not stop it. Another time, a young woman doctor came to me in despair and asked if I would take over a patient as if I had analysed the case, so that she would be free of the responsibility and people would think he went crazy under my care. We weighed that out and I decided that my back was strong enough to carry it, so we put him into a lunatic asylum after a while, and I saved that woman's reputation. She had just started her work as a doctor and it would have caused a great scandal. It was, of course, carelessness that she had analysed such a case at all, but one needs a great deal of psychiatric knowledge in order to recognize the condition. You see, the analyst is able to carry such a responsibility; he can say the person was crazy when he came but didn't know it. It is a general prejudice that analysis makes people crazy. Send a patient to Burghölzli and the layman will assume that the doctors there made him crazy—or even that he was sent there for the purpose of being made crazy.

Sleeplessness, then, has its cause in the unnaturally agitated unconscious which is excited through new ideas. Of course, that would not happen to a person who was dull to the experience of his time. Such an unconscious would be only mildly excited and quite settled by several glasses of wine or any other nonsense. But Nietzsche was exceedingly sensitive to the spirit of the time; he felt very clearly that we are living now in a time when new values should be discovered, because the old ones are decaying. For no sooner does a doubt become obvious than the symbol is gone. If even one man dares to confront the church, to argue with its authority, a sensitive person is done for if he cannot refute his argument. He realizes at once that the whole system is gone, because there is one tiny hole in its authority. If it no longer works, then God has become vulnerable, and all the life has gone out of it. Nietzsche felt that, and instantly, naturally, the whole symbolic process that had come to an end outside, began in himself. Then he had that terribly tense, threatening unconscious, and it began to wear the partition wall thin, to break through here and there. And that, of course, upsets the sleep. So naturally he looks back with a certain regret upon a time when he could sleep, when he was not bothered.

I once discussed certain psychological problems with a professor, a very good Catholic, and he said: "I don't see why you should bother about such things. If anything is doubtful or problematic I simply ask my bishop and he tells me all about it, and if he perchance should not

know, he writes to Rome where they will tell him what he ought to think about it. There they have the authority; for two thousand years the most intelligent heads in the world have studied these problems. Why should I imagine that I can settle them? I am not a specialist." And so he has, I am sure, a very good sleep and a very good digestion; he is not disturbed because there is not even the tiniest hole in the authority. But that was not so with the poor man Nietzsche.

LECTURE IX

5 December 1934

Dr. Jung:

We began last time the sermon called, "The Academic Chairs of Virtue." You remember we discussed its wisdom and came to the conclusion that that professor of the virtues was by no means stupid, that the sermon contained very commendable truth. Now we will continue:

A small company is more welcome to me than a bad one: but they must come and go at the right time. So doth it accord with good sleep.

Well, also, do the poor in spirit please me: they promote sleep. Blessed are they, especially if one always give in to them.

Thus passeth the day unto the virtuous. When night cometh, then take I good care not to summon sleep. It disliketh to be summoned—sleep, the lord of the virtues!

But I think of what I have done and thought during the day. Thus ruminating, patient as a cow, I ask myself: What were thy ten overcomings?

And what were the ten reconciliations, and the ten truths, and the ten laughs with which my heart enjoyed itself?

Thus pondering, and cradled by forty thoughts, it overtaketh me all at once—sleep, the unsummoned, the lord of the virtues.

Sleep tappeth on mine eye, and it turneth heavy. Sleep toucheth my mouth, and it remaineth open.

Verily, on soft soles doth it come to me, the dearest of thieves, and stealeth from me my thoughts: stupid do I then stand, like this academic chair.

But not much longer do I then stand: I already lie.—

What is your chief impression of this second part?

Prof. Fierz: It is ironic.

Dr. Jung: Yes, one feels that he is even rather sarcastic over it. But without taking into consideration what Zarathustra would say, what

about the thoughts themselves? For instance: "Well, also, do the poor in spirit please me: they promote sleep." Or: "A small company is more welcome to me than a bad one; but they must come and go at the right time. So doth it accord with good sleep."

Dr. Allemann: It is common sense.

Dr. Jung: Yes, it is not at all stupid, particularly when we know how Nietzsche suffered from insomnia; it would be a sound admonition. If Nietzsche had consulted me, I would have given him such advice and he would have thought I was a good teacher of the virtues that conduce sleep. One cannot help thinking that Nietzsche sympathized with the teacher; otherwise, he could hardly have reproduced his sermon so well. So the general tendency here is quite clear, it indicates a sort of attitude which would lead the way to a healthy and normal condition. Now we will see what Zarathustra does with it:

When Zarathustra heard the wise man thus speak, he laughed in his heart: for thereby had a light dawned upon him. And thus spake he to his heart:

A fool seemeth this wise man with his forty thoughts: but I believe he knoweth well how to sleep.

Happy even is he who liveth near this wise man! Such sleep is contagious—even through a thick wall it is contagious.

A magic resideth even in his academic chair. And not in vain did the youths sit before the preacher of virtue.

His wisdom is to keep awake in order to sleep well. And verily, if life had no sense, and I had to choose nonsense, this would be the most desirable nonsense for me also.

Now know I well what people sought formerly above all else when they sought teachers of virtue. Good sleep they sought for themselves, and poppy-head virtues to promote it!

To all those belauded sages of the academic chairs, wisdom was sleep without dreams: they knew no higher significance of life.

Even at present, to be sure, there are some like this preacher of virtue, and not always so honourable: but their time is past. And not much longer do they stand: there they already die.

Blessed are those drowsy ones: for they shall soon nod to sleep.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

We said last time that this wise man was another form of the old wise man we met in the woods, who is left over out of a time Zarathustra has

left behind him: he represents the spirit that has been. Now why is this spirit so much associated with sound sleep?

Mrs. Crowley: It would seem to me, if we compare this chapter of the virtues with the one following, as if Zarathustra sees this old man in the woods in rather a caricatured fashion. I mean he sees him in opposition to his own point of view, but he is always influenced by him in an extraordinary way. He always absorbs something from the contact with him that influences his attitude immediately, though he is unaware how it is brought about. So wouldn't you say he represents the unconscious or shadow side of Zarathustra in a psychological sense, as well as in a symbolical one—the earth elements, the powers of nature that are eternally present, felt or at work even when they are not realized? The old man of the woods therefore suggests that capacity to receive or accept, as nature receives; and that constitutes the struggle in Zarathustra's soul. The spirit or conscious attitude alone cannot evoke the new value; it emerges out of the dual play. My point is that the message of the old man of the woods retransforms in Zarathustra, and that each time they meet there is an attempt, however unconscious, at reconciliation, as if a new focus or new perspective had been established.

Dr. Jung: That is perfectly true. Zarathustra is in opposition to the wise man, as any new truth is in opposition to the old truth. It is impossible to create without being in opposition to the thing that has been; the spirit of the time past is necessarily in opposition to the coming spirit, as the spirit prevailing now is in opposition to the one of the past. So we could say the spirit of the past forms the shadow of the spirit that is or that is to come. As in a time when the spirit of the past was still uppermost, still a ruling picture, the spirit of the future would be the shadow, because it would not yet be in the actual light. Inasmuch as Zarathustra exists, the light, the moment of greatest intensity, is embodied in himself, and the old wise man of the woods is the shadow. But as far as we can see here, the wisdom of the old man is in a way perfectly valid: that we keep awake in order to have sound sleep afterwards is also a point of view. One cannot say that sleep is of no importance, or that it should not be an aim in itself. As I said last time, there are certain fools who imagine that one could live without it, but anything that exists makes sense and is sought for or desired; since man has to sleep, it can be a goal, and particularly for a sleepless person.

Now, the fact that Nietzsche was sleepless is explained through that intensity, that excess of light, that identity with Zarathustra, who is of course sleepless. Zarathustra is a figure of the unconscious that not only lives during the night, but during the day as well, because any ar-

chetypal figure is in a timeless condition—or at all events in a condition which cannot be compared to what we call *time*. Therefore, all archetypes have the particular quality of eternity, which is simply another word for timelessness; or it may be a different quality of time that is typical for archetypes. And therefore Plato said that the archetypes, or the *eidola*, the images, were eternally preserved in a heavenly place because they had that character of timelessness; they are forever there, they never change.¹ So, when you identify with an archetype in an inflation, your sleep is very often disturbed. One sees that in cases of mental derangement, in schizophrenia particularly, where people become identical with the unconscious and hardly sleep at all. They can be sleepless for weeks and weeks—I don't know how long—if drugs are not given them; and even when drugged, they exhaust themselves by that inner intensity which eats up their brains. They instantly share the wakefulness of the unconscious, which is always active. That condition of identity with an archetype naturally makes the old standpoint, which would allow one to sleep, particularly precious; and therefore, inasmuch as you want to hold to your new insight, you must fight the old, despite the fact that it is perhaps right, that it is common sense. And you particularly have to fight the continuous longing to return to the condition in which you were protected against the identity with archetypes.

You know, that identity is a torture, and naturally everything in you aches for liberation, and tries to go back to the protected condition where the archetypes are caught in symbols, in dogmas or in forms. That is the reason, for instance, why a man like Angelus Silesius, the German poet and philosopher, having realized the relativity of God (which was remarkable for his time), finally regressed into the Catholic church; he could not stand the extraordinary wakefulness of the idea, that devouring light. He was simply forced to seek shelter in the Catholic dogmatic forms where there seemed to be peace for him. But he forgot altogether that, having touched a new truth, retreat would mean the denial of the divine light and the return into darkness, into the thing which should have been overcome. So he was really denying his best. It was as if Nietzsche should say: "Oh, that damned Zarathustra makes me sleepless and excited, I cannot stand this new thing,"—

¹ Jung here is apparently confusing, or more likely conflating, *eidolon* and *eidon*. The former is an image in the sense of a copy—therefore, not fully real. It is the *eidon*, Idea or Form, which is the timeless, absolute reality—the archetype—though Plato does sometimes speak of the wondrous beauty of the Forms that appear only to the eyes of the psyche, and have no sensory quality.

and make a regression into the Lutheran church or, still farther, into the Catholic church. Then what would become of Nietzsche? Then he would make no point any longer; he would be settled forever, though he might think that he could sleep then. But he would simply become hellishly neurotic. He would destroy himself quite certainly, like Angelus Silesius, who began as a Protestant, then went far beyond Protestantism in his vision, and then, unable to stand it, returned and regressed into the Catholic church, where he became a bad neurotic, really a fiend. He lived in a monastery where his sole occupation was to write pamphlets reviling Protestantism, and that was his end.

If Nietzsche had denied Zarathustra, he would probably have come to his end much sooner, he also would have become an awful neurotic, and *Zarathustra* would never have been written at all. He fights that danger though he always craves for it; it is quite excluded that a man who suffers from such terrible sleeplessness should not crave for any kind of drug which puts him to sleep. And here he ridicules the teacher of sleep despite the fact of seeing that if he could only apply his advice to himself, he would be able to sleep. Being identical with Zarathustra, he sees too clearly; he cannot help seeing and he cannot help being Zarathustra. Therefore, he is in a terrible conflict all the time between that new being, Zarathustra, and the old thing which would be needed for the peace of his soul. In the next chapter we shall see the same struggle going on, the attempt at liberation from the standpoint of the past which recommends itself all the time. He constantly looks back to the past and yet his very life consists in keeping himself away from it. Now, that is the characteristic attitude of Protestantism. *Zarathustra* simply exaggerates it in a most extravagant way, but that is inevitable. Or could you conceive of another way of liberating himself from the spirit of the past?

Prof. Fierz: He could become Catholic.

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, but that would be no solution. He must keep his *Zarathustra* ideas and by becoming Catholic he would deny them, and then that whole explosion of light would have been in vain. Well, I must say I would not know any other way; the only thing Nietzsche can do under those circumstances is to go with his *Zarathustra*, with that attempt at liberation from the spirit of Protestantism, by applying the rule and mechanism which Protestantism always has applied—by kicking itself away from Catholicism. Something else can come only when he is entirely separated—when he has overcome the Protestant attitude, that is. But he must first be clearly separated from the Christian idea in general; only then can he adopt another attitude. He has to be

a super-Protestant. So we can call the Superman a super-Protestant just as well.

We will now go to the next chapter: "Backworldsmen." The German word really is *Hinterwäldler*; Nietzsche makes a sort of pun in using the similarity of the word *Wald*, which means "wood," and *Welt* which means "world." You see, people who live "behind the wood"—i.e., in a remote forgotten corner—would be backwoodsmen, *Hinterwäldler*; and *Hinterweltler* (a word which does not exist) would mean "people who didn't live in the world of the present day."² He says:

Once on a time, Zarathustra also cast his fancy beyond man, like all backworldsmen.

This means that he projected his dreams beyond man, beyond the human sphere, like all those people who believe in other worlds. That is not, of course, exactly Nietzsche's wording; the word *backworldsmen* can be translated as "metaphysicians," people who don't know the world and are out of tune with the history of the day.

The work of a suffering and tortured God, did the world then seem to me.

The dream—and diction—of a God, did the world then seem to me; coloured vapours before the eyes of a divinely dissatisfied one.

Good and evil, and joy and woe, and I and thou—coloured vapours did they seem to me before creative eyes. The creator wished to look away from himself,—thereupon he created the world.

Intoxicating joy is it for the sufferer to look away from his suffering and forget himself. Intoxicating joy and self-forgetting, did the world once seem to me.

This world, the eternally imperfect, an eternal contradiction's image and imperfect image—an intoxicating joy to its imperfect creator:—thus did the world once seem to me.

Thus, once on a time, did I also cast my fancy beyond man, like all backworldsmen. Beyond man, forsooth?

Ah, ye brethren, that God whom I created was human work and human madness, like all the Gods!

A man was he, and only a poor fragment of a man and ego. Out of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me, that phantom. And verily, it came not unto me from the beyond!

² Kaufmann* renders this "afterworldly."

Here Zarathustra begins to fight the metaphysical idea, the idea of a trans-subjective reality which would be embodied by gods or demons or angels or anything one puts into the beyond.³ He begins to introject God, whom he supposes to be dead. This is the super-Protestantism where the idea of God is beginning to evaporate; already in Church Protestantism of the liberal brand, one observes that God is becoming more and more an abstraction. So a friend of mine used to say, speaking of the difference between the liberal and the more orthodox theologian, that the orthodox theologian thinks of God as an old German train conductor with a long beard; and the liberal theologians think he looks the same only a bit more gas-like. You see, this is a tale-telling joke: it shows that old-fashioned idea of the old man with the beard sitting upon the throne, or snapping tickets and controlling the train for those that have not paid. It is the moral point of view; he looks out for order, and is either benevolent or thunders like God. And “gas-like” means a thinner substance, which shows a certain influence of natural science upon the more liberal element in theology; the god evaporates to a certain extent. That is a very true description of the infantile image, and naturally you will discover nothing of the sort in theologists’ books; it is only an underlying image they have for their private use, utterly different from their books. But in reality, it is not so different, because their God always appears as a being who can only move within the limits they give him. They know exactly what God can do and what he cannot do: what he is and what he means and what his purpose is. So it appears that God is a limited being who also has to be omnipotent, even if on the same page the same professor shows that he cannot be omnipotent.

For instance, to quote Gogarten, a famous theologian of our days: “God can only be good.”⁴ But that means that he can only do half the work, because the other half of the work is surely bad, and that is a fearful limitation. If I should set you the task of being only good, you would discover it to be well-nigh impossible; you would suffer like hell if you tried to be good only. That is just our trouble. You see, they make a neurotic of God, for he must suffer terribly if he cannot also do the bad things of the world; this is such a violation of the idea of the god that he needs must evaporate. So it becomes very clear, even talk-

³ Nietzsche: “Metaphysics: the science . . . which deals with the fundamental errors of mankind—but as if they were fundamental truths” (*Human All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, tr. Marion Faber with Stephen Lehman (Lincoln, Nebr., 1984).

⁴ See Friedrich Gogarten, theologian, *The Reality of Faith: The Problem of Subjectivity in Theology* (Philadelphia, 1959). See CW 11, par. 480.

ing theologically, that they have created a vapor which cannot contain God—a powerful, dynamic thing that never would come down so far as to be good only. That is absolutely excluded.⁵

Prof. Fierz: The devil is the other part, and they don't see that it is exactly the same.

Dr. Jung: Well, they don't talk of the devil so much. That is not quite good form. I gave my own father very bad hours talking about the devil. You find very little of the devil in their books. They want to hush up the fact of the darkness—they don't know what to do with it. Too much of it will disturb their sleep and they are teachers of good sleep.

Mr. Baumann: There is a saying that you must not paint the devil on the wall, or he will come.

Dr. Escher: Is not the vision of Nicholas von der Flüe the counterpart of this picture?

Dr. Jung: That was not a train conductor. That was an appearance of the devil quite obviously. Well, Nietzsche here tries to cut all that down for his own time and for our time still. Theologians have created such a picture of God that it can only be cut down; it is nothing but man's work. As soon as somebody tells me God can only be this or that, I know this is man's work; it is as if a louse should say Goethe or Mussolini could only be or do certain things. It is perfectly incongruous and absurd to even try to make limitations or definitions. For instance, the Catholic church holds that you can only attain the forgiveness of sins or redemption through the sacraments, by the means of grace of the church. Of course that is man's work; it is a limitation of the powers of God. As the idea that you can only be saved through faith is man's work, it is a limitation of the possible intervention of God. If God chooses to save a man against his faith he can do so if he pleases. You see, if I want, I can do something against my own principles apparently. If people say that I am bound by what they think are my principles, I am not free if I comply. Instead, I shall do everything in my power to prove to them that I am not what they suppose I am; I shall do just the contrary because I am a free being. The more you create such constructions, such images and limitations, the more you drive out the living spirit, and then the living spirit will appear in an entirely different place.⁶

Now, Zarathustra is here doing the necessary destructive work on

⁵ Jung's *Answer to Job* (CW 11) has been excoriated by many theologians for attributing to the deity a shadow aspect.

⁶ Cf. Dostoevsky's protagonist in *Notes from Underground*. See above, 9 May 1934, n. 3.

those conceptions which still infest our late Christianity. But he is doing even more. We could not say that the idea of a suffering and tortured God was our only idea of God. That would refer to only one third of the deity, it would be only in his form of Christ; another third would be God the Father who does not suffer at all, and neither is the Holy Ghost tortured in any way; he is not the tortured hero. Also, the explanation of the world as God's imagination is not exactly a Christian point of view. Here, surely, is an Eastern thought coming in via Schopenhauer, who took up that idea of the world as imagination, a dream of the primordial will in a sort of drunken self-forgetfulness. Of course, in Schopenhauer's world there was no such thing as a self that forgets itself: there was no self at all. It was a dream that just happened, a most irrational fact. Once in the aeons, the primordial will happened to stumble into a dream of a world; it could have stumbled into anything else but it just happened to be a world. It was absolutely incidental, having no meaning whatever. Therefore, he says man must apply his intellect in order to mirror to the primordial will what a world of nonsense and suffering it has created. A most pessimistic view in a way.⁷

Now, that idea comes in here under the element of intoxicating joy; and that will play a great role later in the idea that the creator of the world was a sort of Dionysos who, with a drunken imagination and a drunken joy, revelled in producing fantasy pictures of the world. The Dionysian idea came from the East by way of Asia Minor, probably from India. He would be an equivalent of Shiva the dancer who, in a sort of drunken *ekstasis*, dances the world and all the ten thousand forms of existence, the joy and the suffering of such a world, its creation and its destruction. Therefore, he is always represented as dancing upon corpses amidst the horrors of the burial ground, the idea being that this world is a paradise which grows luxuriantly upon the corpses; but soon this form also will decay and become corpses or a dung heap. Schopenhauer reduces all that to the imagination of man, which is absolutely consistent. It is super-Protestantism. He not only protests against the dogma of the virgin birth, for example; he also protests against the last remnant of dogma in the Protestant church, the belief in God.

In the history of the Protestant church, you will find that the Lutherans have still preserved certain integral and essential parts of the

⁷ Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* was a powerful influence on both Nietzsche and Jung. See Introduction above.

Catholic dogma, the idea that you cannot be saved without the means of grace of the church for instance, that it needs the intercession of the church. Or that you cannot enter the kingdom of heaven without partaking of the communion, the body of Christ, as administered by the church. This was the cause of the conflict between the Swiss Reformer Zwingli and Luther. Zwingli said that the communion was symbolic and not the real body of Christ. It only meant the body of Christ, a metaphor in other words. And against that Luther wrote on the table at which they were sitting during the discussion the Greek word *estin*, because in the Greek text it says, "This *is* my flesh, this *is* my blood," and not "This *means* my blood." But Zwingli was already more liberal and insisted that it was only a memorial meal and was not to be taken literally—with that, of course, exploding the means-of-grace idea, the particular metaphysical magic which Luther wanted to preserve in order to save the church. For the church makes no sense whatever without the sacrament.

You see, if the church doesn't administer the magic means which cannot be obtained anywhere else than through that apostolic succession, then it has no existence at all. It means nothing, but is just a place where people meet and somebody talks: all the magic, all the appeal to the unconscious is gone. You can imagine what it means to be in the place where the actual magic is happening which can happen nowhere else; of course your unconscious is gripped, you are caught. For instance, if I should imagine that, in Notre Dame de Paris or in St. Stephan's in Vienna or in any other beautiful old church, there would be a priest of apostolic succession, who had received the blessing coming in direct line from the very first blessing bestowed upon the head of St. Peter by Christ himself and so handed on through the centuries, and that such a priest could perform a rite of magic value which could not be repeated anywhere else, which could not be imitated, which could not be bought, or produced by any other means—well, sure enough, I would gladly be a Catholic. I could not avoid being Catholic. Only knowing it would mean that I was already Catholic. I would be in the fold. The liberal Zwingli, a very common-sense and sober man, did not believe in that magic. He laid all the weight upon the human mind, thereby showing that he was already super-Protestant; he protested against Luther and went one step further, destroying the legend of the magic performance in the communion. It really meant the destruction of the communion, and so, piece by piece, all those symbolic forms were destroyed.

Protestant parsons of today take little interest in the Trinity and the

equality of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, or in the virgin birth, etc., but the Catholic church still insists upon them. And that is quite logical, for they express the unconscious just because they are irrational. The sacrifice of the intellect demanded by the Catholic church is absolutely consistent with the idea of a church. Inasmuch as Protestantism, with an increasingly liberal point of view discusses these matters, they lose their magic and fade away. The very last dogma is the fact of God's existence, and that is already undermined. We speak lightly of *der liebe Gott*, we say, "Oh, the lord knows!" "God has become far too much a sort of *bon mot* to have any particular magic still. So *Zarathustra* doesn't need to explode that idea. And then, naturally, that whole metaphysical or animistic world turns in to ourselves. Then where is the virgin birth, or the Trinity, or anything of Christian metaphysics? Well, that is all in my imagination; it is made of my own stuff. It comes back to *me*. I am the whole show. Then I think, "Now this is pretty poor. I have made such a tremendous enterprise and what is the result of it? I cut the whole performance down, and I find only ashes and remnants and debris in myself." You see, you assume that those old things have collapsed into fantasies and imagination and forget entirely that they once had an extraordinary intensity and life. And you don't know that you secretly canalize a huge river into your unconscious. You think all the time that you have only gathered up the remains, those nails and screws and door-handles and so on which belong to you. You store them away and if nothing happens you forget entirely that an enormous manifestation of life and libido went into all that. And you now have the whole thing in your unconscious, where it causes a tremendous tension. That is the tension, the *dynamis*, which is pushing *Zarathustra* up to the surface, so that even the sleeplessness cannot convince Nietzsche that he should dismiss that figure. *Zarathustra* is too strong for him—not even sleeplessness counts.

Mr. Baumann: Certain modern theologians have tried to give more metaphysical substance to God.

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, naturally, but they disregard entirely the fact that when a metaphysical form has lost substance, man cannot put artificial substance into it: that is absolutely excluded. So when a theologian tries to show that God is very substantial and still working miracles, it is only a man-made god: that parson has invented an idol. He found that the idea of God had become depleted, so he puts up an idol of his own make instead of the living god, or instead of trying to discover where the living god has disappeared. He doesn't follow after God and seek him everywhere; he is simply satisfied with the fact that God has

gone and that something ought to be done about it—so he puts up an idol. You see, you may try to create a god in a trans-subjective world, but he would surely not be of that trans-subjective reality; he would be an entirely subjective reality. When Nietzsche says here that he has created a god, it means such an idol, and he realizes in this sentence the content of his god-image. He says, “A man was he, and only a poor fragment of a man and ego.” In other words, his God was a man-made projection and nothing else: “Out of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me, that phantom. And verily, it came not unto me from the beyond!” He recognizes that in that image of God he has believed in, nothing has come from beyond, and that whatever the beyond may be, it is a trans-subjective sphere. You see, the existence of a trans-subjective sphere is not discussed here. The statement is merely that nothing of a trans-subjective nature has come to him: he recognizes nothing objective in his divine experience.

This is very much the condition which prevails in our actual times, a condition which has been brought about in the course of the last centuries, having begun at the time of the Reformation. More and more people felt that nothing from beyond came to them, that they were safely cut off from beyond, that all things divine were on this side of the river, in the visible church for instance, in man-made images, ideas, rites, and so on. And they missed the beyond, the trans-subjective fact, without which no religious experience is possible. So one can say their religious experience was *nil*; it was *Anempfindung*, a sort of aesthetic feeling into, an imagining that one has experienced, but it was not the real experience. If you study the quality of a real experience, like that vision of Nicholas von der Flüe, you see it is of a very different and very peculiar nature. The experiences of Francis of Assisi, of Jakob Boehme, or of Angelus Silesius,⁸ for example, were not within the dogma, and it would take any amount of diplomatic work to squeeze them somehow into the building of the church. I realize that such a statement would be most offensive in certain milieus, yet I am thoroughly convinced that it is so. And Zarathustra here simply gives voice to that generally prevailing conviction.

Of course, nobody would insist upon faith if they were sure in their faith. A man who has had immediate experience of the trans-subjec-

⁸ St. Nicholas of Flüe, 1417-1487: See above, 7 Nov. 1934, n. 5. Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan order, lived from 1181 to 1226. Jakob Boehme, German mystic, lived from 1575 to 1624. For Silesius see above 27 June 1934, n. 11. Boehme was a particular favorite of Jung, who devoted extensive discussion to him in CW 9 i, CW 9 ii, CW 11, CW 12, and CW 14.

tive reality never speaks of belief or faith because he *knows*. You would not insist upon believing in the existence of Mussolini because you know he does exist, as you know America exists. So, for anybody who has had an experience of trans-subjective reality—whatever that is—to preach of faith, what you ought to believe, would be as utterly futile as preaching the existence of London or Paris. No preaching is needed, no faith is needed, because it is a fact; to such a person it was an overwhelming experience. The very fact that Protestantism insists so much on faith shows the weakness of their situation. It shows that nobody has actual experience, for the trans-subjective reality in which you *ought* to believe is exceedingly doubtful. It is nice if you can, but it is really nothing you could experience—particularly when they say, like that very modern theologian Karl Barth, that there is an absolute god.⁹ I don't see how one can experience an absolute thing, for *absolutus* means completely detached, and if a thing is completely detached from us, how can we experience it? How can it touch us? For instance, to know whether the planet Mars is inhabited or not is completely detached from us. If there are any humanlike beings there we don't know it; at all events, we have no connection with them. They are to us absolute. If a thing has relation to us, it is relative to us and we are relative to it. And so the experience of an absolute god is excluded: that is only a man-made word.

If I were God, I would not be absolute. I would relate myself to human beings, for I would like to do something to them and I would like them to do something to me. To be absolute means that there is no creation. Before the creation of the world God was bored to tears, the old records say. He got awful headaches and finally contracted until the first light came forth because he simply could not stand his immense worldwide loneliness. You know, all the symptoms of modern Christian conviction are very doubtful. If anybody insists upon his absolute reliability and honesty, I know he lies; for why does he insist upon it? Why cannot we take it for granted that he is an honest and reliable being? Obviously he himself does not, so he preaches it. When I was a child it already sounded very queer to me to hear: "You ought to believe." I always said: "Do you *know*? Have you had any experience?" Otherwise, you can say what you please: it carries no conviction whatever.

⁹ Karl Barth, Swiss Protestant theologian, professor at Basel. The doctrine that God is "Wholly Other" was put forth first in his revolutionary *Epistle to the Romans* (1918) in his *Church Dogmatics* (*Kirchliche Dogmatik*) (Chicago, 1932-1962). In response to a storm of protest, he somewhat modified this view in his later work.

Now, the statement which Nietzsche makes here is not a subjective whim or his personal point of view. He simply gives voice to the general fact that our modern conception of religion completely lacks primordial experience. So I think he quite rightly says: "it came not unto me from the beyond." This "coming from the beyond" is most impressive in its brevity; you might easily read past it without paying particular attention, but it is of the utmost importance. You see, belief or faith is your own activity, as what you touch or see, what you experience, is all your own making. You are entirely in the world of known things even if you approach God, which is the strangest thing you can imagine. You discover that you believe in God and if you did not he would not be. God would be nowhere, he could do nothing. You must believe and then he begins to operate. Your belief instigates such a phantom; you can inflate the phantom till it exists, but it is all your own body, your own make. So you are completely cut off from the beyond by your very faith. I say to people: "For heaven's sake, don't *believe*; we know nothing, we have no experience, so in what and why should I believe?"¹⁰ If it is a thing which I create, I then simply envelop myself in the cloak of my own imagination. I blindfold myself by a self-created veil. The beyond is the trans-subjective, and this is the experience of something within that sphere you call *psyche* or *mind*, which is not your own make, which is very clearly an *intercessio divina*—an intervention of something which is not yourself and which is not a part of our external world. It must be an effect within your innermost self, where you are quite alone with yourself, where certainly nothing else exists. Then if something happens there which is clearly not yourself, you know it is from beyond. It is trans-subjective.

This may come to you in a very banal form, in an almost imperceptible way, and if you are not in the mood, you will not see it at all; it may be in a dream, or it may come in the way of a fantasy. I think I told you of that Catholic woman who discovered in her fantasy, after long vain attempts, that there was some moisture in the air. That was the turning point, that did it. She suddenly came across a fact which she had not created. It simply was there. You naturally think that a fantasy is all your own make, so if something comes into it which is most certainly not your make, and not your ego, that is a trans-subjective experience. Suppose you were quite alone in a room, and suddenly something

¹⁰ Jung always took "I believe" to be an instance of having an opinion, in contrast to real knowledge. Thus, in an interview for BBC television in 1959, in answer to the question, "Do you now believe in God?" Jung's answer was "Now? (pause) Difficult answer. I know. I don't need to believe. I know" (*C. G. Jung Speaking*, p. 428).

stirred, something which could not be accounted for and which you have not moved; you can say it is a ghost or it might be a human being or an animal—God knows what—but you instantly have the feeling of not being alone in the room. And so the experience of a trans-subjective reality gives you suddenly the feeling that you are not alone in your psychology. There is something else that seems to come from outside, yet you clearly know it is nowhere outside.

Question: Is this not just the unconscious?

Dr. Jung: Oh yes, you can call it “the unconscious.” Just what the unconscious is we don’t know. To call it “the unconscious” is merely *façon de parler*. You can call it “the dark continent,” or “heaven,” or “hell,” or anything you like: it is simply something from the unknown. When you recognize the unknown as a really existing thing, you have had the trans-subjective experience. Now, neither Zarathustra nor Nietzsche have had that experience yet, though Nietzsche had an opportunity for just that. What would it have been?

Mrs. Brunner: He might have noticed that Zarathustra was not himself.

Dr. Jung: Yes, you see that was a great chance. He himself said, you remember, *Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei* “. . . Zarathustra was passing by,” which means that Zarathustra was an objective reality.¹¹ But he did not realize it. He was identical. If he had stopped at that verse and asked himself what it really meant, he would have seen that Zarathustra was a free agent and not exactly himself, and that would have been his first trans-subjective experience. Otherwise, such a thing becomes identical with one: one falls into it. Therefore, it is a principle in analysis that we always try to dissociate from the unconscious, to make a difference between ourselves and the voice, or the influence, or the mana, or the archetype—whatever you like to call it. And you can make that difference by criticizing carefully whatever your experience may be. But if you take it for granted in a general way that of course your thoughts, for instance, are all your own, such an obscurity prevails that you can discern nothing. Make the simple experiment of criticizing your own thoughts. (I am now talking chiefly to the ladies.) You have a certain opinion about something, and when I ask you if that is what you really think, you say, “No, I must think what my idea of it really is.” And then you come to the conclusion that you think something quite different. Now, how did you come to that other opinion? Did you make it? “No, it was just there.” Who then produced

¹¹ See above, 5 Dec. 1934, n. 11.

it? Who had the intention or the will to create such an opinion? If you can realize that, you have had a trans-subjective experience. Therefore I say, don't identify with your animus. That is not yourself, that is a trans-subjective reality. And mind you, the animus is as terrible a reality as the anima.

If a man takes it for granted that his moods are just himself, he has an anima inflation and makes a fool of himself. But if he can criticize his moods, he asks himself, "Is this really my feeling?" By no means. His real feeling is even suppressed in favor of that nonsense, an emotion which is really strange to him. And if he can make this a real experience, he has realized a trans-subjective reality. That is the way I came to the conception of the anima. I criticized my emotions and came to the conclusion that they were not myself. They were simply made *for* me, so I asked myself, "Now who on earth can produce such things in me?" I was almost inclined to believe in witchcraft. That was of course the origin of witchcraft and why men still say they are bewitched; they naively feel that their emotions are not their own. A man who is bewitched is filled with intense feelings which he thinks must come from somewhere, and then he discovers a red-haired girl and thinks she is responsible—and then he could kill her for witchcraft. But if he had a philosophical mind, he would understand that this is a trans-subjective reality which he must not project into a red-haired girl.

Prof. Fierz: What you have just said reminds me a little of Buber. He said that the real prophet did not even know what he was saying when he spoke. He was simply the medium. He spoke with his tongue and not with his head. It was unconscious.¹²

Dr. Jung: Yes, that is the thing.

Mr. Baumann: If anybody had spoken about such a trans-subjective experience ten or twenty years ago, he would have been declared a schizophrenic.

Dr. Jung: Naturally. It depends on how you tell it. You might rouse the most terrible mistakes in a naive mind. For example, a girl of about twenty-six once came to me and said: "Doctor, I have a black snake in my abdomen and it is asleep." I looked at her and thought, "Now, now!" Then she said: "I see you think I am crazy, but I am not; what I tell you is symbolic. I don't think that there is really a black snake in my

¹² Martin Buber does not seem to say quite this. His main point about prophets is that whereas in Greece the diviners babble and the prophets translate this into Logos, the Hebrew Nabi exists as the mouth of God, in his whole being. "Symbolism and Sacramental Existence in Judaism," *Tales of the Hasidim*, tr. Maurice Freedman (New York, 1948).

abdomen." Now, if she had omitted to tell me that she was only using a sort of metaphor, I would have been under the impression that she was mad, because she would have been stating something which was absolutely inadmissible. Nobody has a black snake in the abdomen unless they are crazy. Since she knows that this sounds crazy, I know she is not. She conveys that idea to me, and then she can go on talking about it, and it is understood as being a subjective psychological phenomenon. You see, a crazy person would talk about that snake as if it were a reality, disregarding the impression it makes upon the audience, while this girl tried to establish an understanding, or a feeling *rapport* with me about it. So I always say to people on the borderline. "As long as you can explain yourself and feel the need of explaining yourself to a human being, and succeed more or less, you are not crazy." But it is characteristic of insane people that they go on talking without caring or knowing whether they are understood, disregarding the *rapport*, disregarding the impression they make. If a woman declares to me that she is the queen of the world, it can be exceedingly witty if it is understood that she means her power complex; otherwise, it is a case of schizophrenia. Insane people never realize that anybody could be shocked by what they say. People who disregard the effect they have on other people are on the way to insanity, even if they are still within the normal. In other words, as soon as they become unconscious of what they do and what it means, they are on the way to insanity because they cut the human relation and then there is no guarantee that they won't get lost.

Mr. Baumann: If Nicholas von der Flüe had not tried to build his vision into his conscious in a symbolic form, might he have been insane?

Dr. Jung: Yes, because any trans-subjective experience is of such a nature that one can easily go crazy. But he showed his humanity in the fact that he tried to translate the whole thing into the language of the church, into the Trinity conception; by that he established his *rapport* with people. The vision itself had an absolutely segregating effect, however; it is said that he appeared terrifying to people. He had been so frightened and had such a look of horror in his eyes that he infected them with it. He realized that, or he would never have taken the trouble to establish a human *rapport* concerning it. Otherwise he would have been just an ordinary schizophrenic, he would have degenerated because he had cut the human relation. That is the arch sin. One often finds very basic trans-subjective experiences at the bottom of cases of insanity; they are of such an impressive nature that people are spell-bound and forget all about humanity, they simply fall into the arche-

typal experience and disappear. So any archetypal experience which is trans-subjective has that dangerous quality of segregation, separation, cutting the human relationship and isolating the individual, all the more when the experience is of a more or less inexplicable nature. One could say it was also a characteristic of the trans-subjective experience that it offers the greatest difficulties to explanation—as a dream cannot be explained unless one knows a good deal.

Mrs. Brunner: Would you call the traditional animus also trans-subjective?

Dr. Jung: Not in itself, it is not a trans-subjective reality if you have not experienced it as such; you must criticize your experience and know what in the experience belongs to yourself. Moreover, this should be not only an intellectual criticism, it should also be a feeling criticism; you should take the experience as a whole and react to it as a whole, because your mind will naturally make the attempt to assimilate that experience right away within the human sphere. If Nicholas von der Flüe had had a mind—which he had not—it would have told him that the vision was the Trinity, for instance, and so he would have assimilated it in spite of the trans-subjective character; it would have been extinguished, killed. And the same thing might be done by feeling. You see a feeling type can harmonize a trans-subjective experience by the power of his differentiated feeling, put it into a nice frame with other curious things which are also a part of himself, and create such a feeling soup about it that the thing can swim among the other pieces of meat or bread. The more one-sided the type the more certain it is that the experience will be killed, because the superior function is then so powerful that it simply assimilates everything; whatever happens, such a person will declare it to be all in his world, and if it is something too extraordinary he simply says it is not true. There are surely so-called occult phenomena, those peculiar psychic phenomena, and they are strange, trans-subjective. What can you do with them? Well, you simply say they are not true and the case is settled. It is like the famous story of the rabbi: When he was travelling he always drove four white horses, because he was the so-called Jewish pope. And there was a very powerful count in the same country, who travelled with four black horses and who had a driver called Johann, because the driver is always called Johann. Now unhappily enough they both approached a river at the same moment from opposite sides. There was a narrow bridge over the river, and the great rabbi thought: I am the great rabbi, I go over the bridge first. And the count thought: I am the great count, and I go over the bridge first. So they both drove onto the

5 DECEMBER 1934

bridge and then naturally there was not room for them to pass each other, and when the horses shot together the count jumped up and said: Johann, give me my pistol that I may kill the horses of this damned Jew. And then the rabbi got up, and he simply spoke the magic word. Thus the whole situation was no longer true.

LECTURE X

12 December 1934

Dr. Jung:

We have today the report which I asked for at the beginning of the term. Professor Reichstein has been kind enough to make it for us.

Prof. Reichstein:

THE ARCHETYPE OF THE OLD WISE MAN

In handling this subject I have picked out single examples more or less arbitrarily which I will explain as briefly as possible. I could not of course attempt a general summary on account of my ignorance of the ancient languages and an insufficient knowledge of religious history.

Mrs. Fröbe-Kapteyn kindly sent me a lot of material.¹ As I only can speak about a small portion of it, I have just treated the whole of it as an appendix, which will be in the library for reference. For further material, especially about Egypt and Hermes Trismegistos I wish to thank Mr. F. Allemann. And I wish also to thank Mr. Felix Fierz for the translation of some Greek texts. Also Mrs. Baynes, Miss Hannah, and Mrs. Baumann for their helpful translations into English.

Out of the rich abundance of possible examples I have had to choose those which were in a measure known to me. The choice is therefore necessarily very one-sided.

For the discussion of the function of the symbol of the Old Wise Man, we will consider:

¹ Mrs. Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, a sometime member of this seminar, was the founder of the Eranos Conference center on Lake Maggiore in Ascona, Switzerland, at which, in Autumn each year, Jung and a gathering of other scholars presented learned papers, mainly on religion and myth. For the history of this institution, see William McGuire's *Bollingen: An Adventure in Collecting the Past* (Princeton, B.S. CI, 1982).

- (1) The function of the old man in human society.
- (2) The Gods or superhuman beings in whom this function is expressed, according to myth and tradition.

1. *The old man.* I will deal with this first point very briefly.

(a) First of all, we can bring forward the extraverted side, which emphasizes those qualities of old men growing out of experiences accumulated over a long period of time. Old men play a special role as judges, lawgivers, regulators generally, teachers, guardians of tradition, masters, sometimes also as rulers. The old man has steadiness, is less inclined to lose himself in his surroundings. One sees this in individuals as well as in whole nations. The primitive, for instance, loses himself and degenerates in foreign surroundings far sooner than a representative of an old civilization.

(b) The old man possesses an introverted side also: he is the one who has the secret knowledge. He knows the goal, in that he stands nearer to death, to the secret side of the world, the invisible. The near relationship between spirit and death is very far-reaching. The old man is therefore also magician, sorcerer, medicine man, doctor, priest, and initiator. He can become the embodiment of the supernatural or the deputy of a God or Demon.

In those stages of civilization where the inner and outer world (perhaps not yet distinguished) are not separated, the extraverted and introverted aspects of the wise old man appear in one individual. Thus the priest is also judge, the chief role being played by the divine judgment, which is based on the ordeal by fire, water, etc. The social order springs from the taboo laws and totemism. The taboo laws also supply the morals. They tell me, for example, which girl I may not marry, as well as which animal I may not eat. Taboo is everything which is charged with mana. The sorcerer receives the necessary mana (like an electric charge), by a special ordination and is thus set apart from ordinary people, and possesses power insofar as he is possessed by the spirit. Also through contact, for instance with a corpse (hunting, war, burial), man becomes taboo (susceptible).

The ambivalent nature of the mind is very much in evidence in primitives' forms of thought. In the common expressions, white and black magic, this ambivalence is specially emphasized. It is difficult to find a definition which really hits the mark. We could perhaps say that white magic works in the service of the "self," black magic in the service of the "ego." Quite apart from whether these definitions are correct, they do not explain very much in any special case. The old wise man

cannot escape the fate of those Gods who are not allowed to enter the temple and who transform into Demons (perhaps sink back into a primitive form). He can, therefore, appear as good or evil sorcerer, but even that does not decide the question as to which of the two forms possesses the efficacy (the light). This depends on the situation. Every living symbol can become convention, dogma, etc., lose its divine light, and sink into darkness. In this case, the black holds the light, and this *can* be the cause for it to change color again. Usually, however, it is said that the light must be snatched from the black sorcerer again. (Compare for instance, the fairy tale of Aladdin and his miraculous lamp, in the *Arabian Nights*.)

To sum up, I would like to say that the old man is he who knows what is to be done (in a difficult situation) and understands how to perform the magic rite. In the most civilized as in the primitive form, the outer and inner aspects of the wise old man appear together in one individual. The most highly developed form is perhaps that of the inspired teacher, called by the East the "Guru." (With us this social role has for the moment no acknowledged representatives; perhaps the burden of carrying it is not infrequently offered to the psychiatrist.)

2. *The old wise man in Religion and Myth*

Among primitives. It would be extremely interesting to be able to examine more closely the archetype of the old wise man as it appears among primitives. Here, in all probability, we would have the closest contact with a living survival of the first form of the archetype. Unfortunately, I have no knowledge of this field. But in order not to omit this important stage altogether, I have given a rough sketch of the probable development of the religious views that throw light on this question. (I have taken my material in part from a short chapter by E. Lehmann, "Die Religion der Primitiven," appearing in P. Hinneberg's *Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Die Religionen des Orients*. Page numbers refer to that.)²

The primitive form of religion is magic. To the primitive, the mysterious life force, "mana," is more important than purely physical force, and the chief aim of religious practices is the preservation and increase of life force. On the lowest level, the increase is obtained by simply taking the power away from a fellow man, as for instance in cannibalism. At a less barbaric stage it is done by the sacrifice of animals, as, for instance, by the eating of the totem animal. Magic is not necessarily connected either with gods or spirits; a magic *rite* suffices, and

² Professor Reichstein's rather esoteric footnotes have not been included here.

anyone who knows how to practice magic already possesses the desired power. He draws directly upon the secret springs of power in nature, and needs no intervention from supernatural beings. In Australia, for instance, *all* old men understand the practice of magic (p. 13).

Mana is that which has immediate and direct effect. Anyone who knows how to use it can destroy his enemies and help his tribe. The ambivalent nature of mana is expressed in the fact that everything which has mana or is under its spell is taboo (the medicine man, the chief, etc.), and this means that it is either holy or impure. The all-important thing to a primitive is to know how to handle mana.

Among very primitive peoples the spirits do not appear in personal forms, but quite undifferentiated; they are material, but invisible. They are the force that makes things live. The primitive is to a high degree under the spell of this mysterious force. He lives in constant fear of it and never knows when a trap may be set for him by a secret enemy against whom the best counter-magic is impotent.

The art of magic can be said to show some progress, therefore, when these forces are differentiated and recognized as real spirits. The ordinary man does not know the name of the spirits, but the priest-magician does and if a misfortune occurs, it is his task to find out the spirit that has caused it (p. 15). As soon as he knows its name, it is a small matter to exorcise the spirit, or to overcome it by a more powerful demon. (Thus, knowledge is mana.)

The cult of the soul seems to be a later extension of the belief in spirits. The souls of the dead are honored as spirits. After death, at least one soul of the dead man continues to exist. In magic, the fact that the soul can be brought under the sway of a foreign influence is of great importance. The souls of dead ancestors are especially significant. Thus, for example, any important new events must be immediately reported to them. (The cult of the soul probably leads directly to the rites of sacrifice.) Junod says that the gods of the Ba-Rongas are for the most part the dead ancestors (p. 17).

For the purpose of comparison with the examples which follow, it is interesting to note the primitive's belief about the origin of the world. The primitive picture of the world is taken from the features of the locality in which the particular tribe and its neighbors live. There is the dome of the sky set with sun, moon and stars, and there are rivers or mountains that mark off the boundaries. Behind these borders lies the fabled land of the gods, or the dead.

Egypt (Thoth). Here we have to leave a wide gulf unbridged and turn to Egypt for our next example of the old wise man. One of the best ex-

amples of a culturally highly developed form of the old wise man is the Egyptian God Thoth. He really plays the role of the doctor among the Gods. Thus, for example, in the Osiris myth when Horus avenges the death of his father (he overcomes Seth, his evil brother in a dreadful struggle in which both gods are wounded, Horus in one eye and Seth in the testicles), Thoth heals both of the gods again.

Here he shows also his adjusting and equalizing role. As this is very important I will quote a passage from Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes*, vol. 1, p. 58.³

The names of the God of Light and the God of Darkness change, but what does not change is the name of the arbiter, the mediator, whose duty it was to see that neither god destroyed the other or gained a decisive victory.

It was Thoth who performed this function of keeping the opposites in equilibrium. Thoth was originally a moon-God. He was usually pictured with an Ibis-head with the crescent moon above, or as a dog-headed ape. Often, both forms are given side by side. The dog-headed ape plays a special role in the judgment scene in the *Book of the Dead*. Here he sits on the top of the support of the beam of the balance, in which the heart of the deceased is weighed. His duty is to watch the pointer and tell the Ibis-headed Thoth when the beam is exactly level.

This ape is a form of Thoth as the god of "equilibrium." Perhaps it is a symbol of the equinoxes. The figure of the ape has, perhaps, a significance similar to the one ascribed to the frog, i.e., it is a hybrid form between man and animal.

Thoth was considered to be the wisest of all gods. In many places his power was held to be greater than that of Osiris and even than that of Ra himself. He was also called the heart, or the tongue of Ra. For a very long time in Egypt he was held to be the teacher of all secret wisdom as well as the author of the holy writings.

It is easy to understand how later on this god played a very dominating role in the gnosis and in various secret teachings. In the syncretistic era he became identified with the Greek god Hermes and was called Hermes Megistos, or Trismegistos. In hermetic philosophy he played an important role up to the late Middle Ages, and when its decline set in, his name was transformed into Megistophiel and from that became Mephistopheles. But he rose again from this depth even, and

³ G.R.S. Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes* (London, 3rd edn., 1949) vol. 2.

took his place from time to time on the forefront of the stage on which the fate of the soul of man is played. (Compare *Faust*.)

Iranian Conceptions and the God Ormuzd (Primal Man, Anthropos). Out of various fragments, especially out of those coming from the syncretistic period of antiquity, we can reconstruct, not very clearly to be sure, an ancient Iranian folk myth. It does not follow the orthodox Zarathustra tradition, but deals with a god named Asonakes ("the knower"). (This God is mentioned by Hermippos as the teacher of Zoroaster.) The myth probably originates in a time when the strict dualism so characteristic of Persia was not yet developed in its final, clearly marked form. Asonakes created both the principle of good and the principle of evil, something which to a later time would have seemed out-and-out blasphemy.

A reconstruction of the sort indicated is given by R. Reitzenstein in *Das Iranische Erlösungsmysterium*:

The serpent-shaped son of the Prince of Darkness desires the daughter of the King of Light, and finally obtains her. (He represents matter and she, the Psyche, the soul.) He has promised her a magic palace, and there he holds her prisoner. After a brief period of joy, her misery begins. While she is in this state there comes to her an invisible, divine messenger whom she only recognizes by his voice. He reminds her of her descent and of the home she has left.

Psyche breaks the power of the evil demon and escapes from her prison, but when she is left alone she is overtaken by sorrow, fear and perplexity. She wanders through the whole realm of matter and thus endows it with soul, but she can never find the way out—the border always stops her. Finally the god appears again, and leads her up to a heavenly marriage.

The Iranian Cosmogony is dominated by similar fantasies. Parts of it are reminiscent of the dragon myth and the night sea journey:

A theme which is afterwards interwoven with this myth is contained in the teaching about the Primal Man, the God Ormuzd, who, at least in the fragments from the syncretistic era, is identified with the "psyche." According to Reitzenstein this word which is given here as *psyche* ("the soul"), is in many cases best rendered by "essence" or "self." No wonder, therefore, that it could be identified with the God Ormuzd, the Primal Man, which psychologically means the same. It is the *pu-rusha* of the East.

The myth has certainly exerted a strong influence throughout the

ages, and can be said to have affected our own culture even. The ideas hidden in it can be followed in a direct line through most of the so-called secret doctrine of the Western world. They had a marked influence on Christianity, not only directly but through Judaism also. The strongest imprint is the one appearing in various gnostic teachings. I need only mention the Manichaeism and the Mandaean.

These teachings are dominated by a well-defined dualism which divides off the World of Light (God) from the World of Darkness (Matter, Hyle). The soul of man takes its origin in the World of Light, and in a struggle with the powers of Darkness is sent to the dark world where it is fettered and narcotized (deafened and stupified). According to the Cosmogony, the soul had been sent to the dark world in order to combat that world from within. The soul, asleep in the World of Darkness, is intoxicated or blind. (It is comparable to the condition of *Muladhara* in Indian philosophy.)

The primal God (or primal man) sends a messenger who awakens the soul. (The fettered, primal man has his eyes opened; it is "the great vision," *megiste dea*.) The messenger—once more primal man in another aspect—appears as the wise man, the leader, or as the Virgin of the Light, who afterwards can take on the form of the wise leader. It is said that she or he is the heavenly counterpart, the heavenly image of the fettered soul. He leads the soul (usually after a waiting period), as well as its five elements, into the World of Light, and the rest is left to Darkness.

It is somewhat confusing at first to find that the primal god, the primal man, and the divine messenger, all three, have at times, the same name, Ormuzd. But after all, it is not so very strange because it indicates that all three are in reality *one*; that is, they consist of the same "substance." Frequently also, primal man appears as the son of the primal god, which is another way of saying that the two are of the same substance.

At the awakening of the sleeping Ormuzd, two more gods often appear on the scene. They are *Chroshtag* ("the call," in German *der Ruf*) and *Padwahtag* ("the answer"), and these two are companions of the wise leader. Chroshtag personifies his first form in the world of phenomena. (He is the voice, the Logos.) Apparently this symbolism arises from an inner experience, according to which one hears the wise old man call out, or speak, before one sees him. The immediate, creative power of the call is quite evident in German—for example, the word *hervorrufen*, "to bring forth." The figure of Chroshtag as a messenger is also often represented by a letter, etc. Writing is an invention of the old

wise man. The important moment, which represents the beginning of the release, is paralleled in Indian Yoga by the moment when Kundalini is awakened. Here Chroshtag awakens the sleeping Ormuzd.

There are also versions of the myth in which Padwahtag (the answer, i.e., the self of primal man) is the only one to mount upward. The five Light Elements (the robe of primal man that is his manifest form) at first remain behind and only follow later on.

The goal is the return home of primal man (of the soul or the self of man) to the World of Light, where he again receives his robe of light.

An important way in which the myth is applied is to be found in the Cult of the Dead. Abbreviated versions of it were apparently recited in order to help the soul of the dead man at his resurrection. (Just as in a case of snakebite, the story of a god who had been bitten by a snake and made well again was recited.) The great experience of divinity is given to man in a picture. Applied to the living person, the myth shows him how it is possible for the soul of a man to unite with its origin, to return to the paradise from which he has fallen. The messenger of the god Ormuzd, the wise old man, shows him the way.

One of the most beautiful and best preserved of the fragments that have come down to us is the "Hymn of the Soul" from the *Acts of Thomas*. I have chosen as an example another Manichaean fragment which, though not of so much value from a literary point of view, is better suited for presentation here, because it is not so extensive.

The destructive devils made an uprising in behalf of their own spirit. And out of the excrements of the devils and the offal of the witches, he brought forth this impurity (matter), and he (the Prince of Darkness), settled himself therein. Then he captured from her place among the five elements, the body-guard of the god Ormuzd, the beautiful soul (gyan) and fettered her in the impurity. Because he made her blind and deaf, she had no consciousness and was confused so that at first she did not recognize her origin and the primal cause of herself. He made the impurity for her (the body) and the prison, and locked up the soul within it.

And devils, witches and all the elves threaten me the prisoner.—She grew evil herself.—But the god Ormuzd had pity.—He frightened the blind devil of greed away from her, and made her to see with her eyes, and showed her clearly all that was and will be. Quickly he made it clear to her that the god Ormuzd had not created this fleshly impurity (the body), nor had he fettered the soul. Resurrection came to the soul of the blessed one, she be-

lieved in the wisdom of Ormuzd etc. She divested herself of the impurity of death and was eternally redeemed, and taken up to Paradise, to that realm of the blessed.

Afterwards the end of the world is announced. This is typical and also logical for a point of view which believes the world to have been made by the devil.

Probably Indian and Chinese sources would yield still better material for the symbol of the old wise man. Clearer examples could be found perhaps, and ones showing more human proportions too. As this field was too foreign to me I had to renounce it. Moreover, I believe that we have here at least one advantage, that of touching upon our own territory because, as I have said above, it seems to me that these ideas are deeply imbedded in the soul of Western man.

In order to give only a brief example of how similar ideas are depicted in the East, I join, without commentary a song of Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa.

MILAREPA I am Milarepa, great in fame,
the direct offspring of Memory and Wisdom;
Yet an old man am I, forlorn and naked.
From my lips springeth forth a little song,
for all Nature at which I look,
serveth me for a book.
The iron staff that my hands hold,
guideth me over the Ocean of Changing Life.
Master am I of Mind and Light;
And showing feats and miracles,
depend not on earthly deities.
(*Tibet's Great Yogi Milarepa*
by W. Y. Evans-Wentz)

Poimandres. I will give a resumé of the most important chapter of this treatise which dates roughly from the first century after Christ. *Poimandres* means "shepherd of men." The *Poimandres* Community was a Gnostic sect whose teaching had a great influence on early Christianity (compare the Pastoral Hermas) and especially on hermetic philosophy (the Alchemist Zosimos was a member).

The text gives a cosmogony and contains a great mixture of the most varied elements which makes a clear summary very difficult. It may seem odd that I chose again a cosmogony for an example, but such cosmogonies often contain the teaching in a condensed symbolical form

and are better than long descriptions. It is an old idea that the process of transformation consists in having to repeat the work of the creation of the world. He therefore must first know how this was done. Only then the micro- and the macro-cosmos correspond to each other again. It is very significant whether someone imagines that first there was chaos, or first the light, or whether this world was created by Jahveh as the Jews believe, or by the devil as was believed in Iran.

This correspondence is the chief point. It is best expressed in the so-called "Logos from the gospel of Eve" in G.R.S. Mead, ed., *Thrice Greatest Hermes*.

I stood on a lofty mountain, and saw a gigantic Man and another, a dwarf, and I heard, as it were a voice of thunder, and drew nigh for to hear; and he spake unto me and said: I am thou and thou art I; and wheresoever thou mayest be I am there. In all I am scattered, and whencesoever thou willest, thou gatherest Me, and gathering Me, thou gatherest Thyself.

Poimandres appears to the pupil in the meditation as a giant of tremendous size and asks what he would like to know. (Poimandres says he is always with him and knows what he desires.) The pupil wishes to learn the very essence of existence and to know God. Poimandres says: "Hold that in mind and I will teach thee." These words are followed by the vision. (The great vision means here again the awakening of the divine part in man, by the revelation that his very essence is of divine origin.) In the vision we can distinguish distinct sections which correspond to world periods. In order to make it clearer I will designate them as follows: creation of the primal world; creation of the material world; creation of man as mediator between them; the separation of male and female, and at last, the ascent of man to God.

The creation of the primal world is described as follows: At first, all was light (the Spirit, or God the Father). Out of it came the darkness coiling down like a snake. From this darkness (the earth) came the water. Now, out of the light a holy word came (the *Logos*) which provoked pure fire to leap up from the moisture, and rushing air followed it. Earth and water remain mingled as lower elements, fire and air are nearer to God. Here the creation of the primal world seems finished. Poimandres says: "The logos which consists of light is the son of god. Know that what sees in thee and hears in thee is the Lord's Word." And through the mind of Poimandres the pupil sees the light divided in innumerable living forces.

Then follows the creation of the material world. The "nature" (will,

mind, reason) of God who wanted to copy the primal world united with the Logos and begot with him the elements of nature as children. The male-female primal god created the demiurgos and he created the seven planets, the visible world and fate. Out of the lower elements rose the Logos and united with the demiurgos his brother, so the lower elements are abandoned by the Logos and are purely material. Out of them came the dumb animals. (The demiurgos, the creator of the world, is called here: he who holds the fire.)

Creation of the Primal man. The all-father mind brought forth primal man in his image. Primal man saw the creation of his brother (the demiurgos) and broke through the partition of the spheres (fate and the evermoving wheel, are other conceptions of this symbolism), breaking the power of the bad demon, and thus showed to lower nature god's beautiful form (himself). (We see only in this passage that the demiurgos is supposed to be an evil demon.) Nature and primal man were longing for each other in love and primal man took his home in the unintelligent form, in the body.

Therefore out of all the living things on earth, man alone has a double nature, mortal through the body and immortal through his essence, primal man. Although immortal and with power over all, yet he suffers as a mortal, subject to fate. Although above the spheres (fate) he stays within them, has become their slave. Male-female, descended from the male-female father, though sleepless descended from the sleepless one, yet he is overcome by the longing of love and by sleep.

In a new world-period all female things are separated from the male. Poimandres teaches that he who recognizes himself will attain salvation, that is, he who recognizes the primal man in himself. But he who is seduced by love and is content with the body wanders confused in darkness, suffering the fate of death in the sensual world.

Now the pupil wants to know how the ascent is accomplished. Poimandres gives him the following advice:

Thou surrenderest the body to the demon, The senses to their sources, Passion and desire thou givest back to nature. Then thou traverses the seven spheres (Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn) returning to each its malevolent influence.

Completely stripped, man enters the eighth sphere and from there he can ascend directly to god and become divine.

The meaning is that everything must be given back to the source it came from. Then a perfect state is reached which is in some way comparable with the primal one.

ALCHEMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Example 1 (Franz Kieser, *Cabala Chymica*, Mühlhausen, 1606). In a treatise in the form of a vision and dialogue between pupil and Master (Hermes), the master gives at first instructions on the "natural things" in the form of a cosmogony.

The pupil sees the firmament with the seven planets, the earth in the middle as a great sphere, in the center of which is the water as a small white sphere. Everything however is dark and at a standstill. With thunder and lightning the red fire breaks forth. Through the rays that it sends forth, everything begins to move. The part of the rays which reaches right into the innermost sphere (water) gives it the strength to produce minerals, plants, animals, and men. Hermes explains all this minutely and calls the red fire the star of wisdom and the eternal light. He says, "This fire awakes nature" (p. 106).

Then they proceed to the "supernatural." (He calls it the key of the insight into all things.) The pupil meditates and has the following vision: He is in a deep valley and hears something behind him. Startled, he looks behind him and sees a very old man, with a long snow-white beard, in a black robe, with a compass and square. The old man approaches the globe and becomes gigantic. There he draws the lines and calls a magic number spell with a horrible voice. On the top of the quadrangle appears a dove. This he calls the spirit of conjunction and vivification. A flame of fire shoots down from above, a white star rises up from below, and where they come together a brilliant red star remains. It is the symbol of the philosopher's stone which illuminates everything. Its rays are stronger than any former ones. Everything becomes red and is burned up at last; neither sun nor moon remains. But from the star arises a new world in a complete form. The earth is green as an emerald; the sun, the moon, and the stars are brighter than before, only they are standing still, immovable. The old man cries: "Praised be God that for once evil is put down and the truth revealed. Rejoice that the darkness has an end, the sun will not set again but will shine eternally." With that he vanished.

Through the magic of the old man, the turning of the wheel of the world is stilled, or, from the star there appears a new world, that is not subject to the eternal rotation of nature. (This is in peculiar harmony

with the first state which is pointed out in the Cosmogony, where too everything is standing still, only now everything is full of light, while in the first state it was dark.)

Example 2. As a second example I would like to mention *The Chymical Marriage of Christian Rosenkreutz in the Year 1459* (written anonymously by Joh. Valentin Andreä about 1602, first edition, Strasbourg, 1616).

This is a treatise written in allegorical form and with a great deal of humor. In part it is very difficult to understand, so that it was possible for some of the author's contemporaries to take it as mere persiflage. The whole action transpires within seven days which represent the seven stages of transformation. I give the resumé of the first day only, and would like to call attention to the striking analogies with gnostic tradition to be found in this story.

On the day before Easter, there appeared to Christian Rosenkreutz a heavenly virgin who brought him a letter (this is the divine messenger, the awakening). This letter is an invitation to the heavenly marriage which is to take place only under certain conditions. As he reads what these conditions are, he breaks into a cold sweat of terror because he does not believe he can possibly fulfil them.

The following dream comes to him then in his sleep: He is with some other people in a dark tower and they are held fast by heavy chains (compare Ormuzd fettered in matter). After a long period of suffering, they hear music; the roof of the tower is opened so that light falls in, and a man hoary with age calls out that his mother (nature, corresponding to the Mother of the Living in some gnostic teachings) had commanded a rope to be lowered seven times. Those who could hold fast to it would be drawn up to the light (liberated). A wild struggle then ensues, because all want to be saved and the result is that most of them drag one another down and only a few are able to cling to the rope. Some of them, who were too heavy and yet who refused to let go, had their arms torn from their bodies, so great was the desire to get out. Finally the dreamer himself succeeded, by chance, in getting out and then had to help, as the others had done before, with the final pulling up of the rope.

Then the tower was closed up again. The old man spoke words of comfort to the prisoners remaining behind, but that did not prevent them from breaking out into a bitter lament. Those who

had escaped were freed of their chains. Then the dreamer awoke and understood that he could now start off for the wedding.

As in this story, in alchemistic writings generally, the old man often appears only at the beginning of the story. A striking feature of this piece is the complete helplessness of the imprisoned people—not only is a way shown to them, but they must be literally pulled out of their predicament.

Dr. Jung: Thank you very much. You have gathered a great deal of interesting material. It is perhaps a bit difficult for some of you to follow, because it is chiefly collected from literature of which you may not be aware and from spheres of experience which are probably very strange to you, but it gives you a certain impression of the universality of the old wise man. And you noticed, of course, that this archetype appears under particular conditions—when a man is in a hole, for instance, or when he is fettered or in prison, or in a situation where he needs help. What would that denote?

Mrs. Crowley: That he is a redeemer, a savior.

Dr. Allemann: The helper.

Dr. Jung: Yes, or the medicine man simply, who is called in when something is wrong. So the wise old man and the complicated or dangerous situation belong together; one could say that when man is in a difficult situation, there is a chance of this archetype appearing. He hardly ever comes just out of the blue, but only in a moment when he is really needed. Then you also noticed that it was in particular periods in real history that a man who embodied this image made himself noticeable. When would that be?

Prof. Reichstein: In a time of disorientation, when there was no great living symbol; in the beginning of our era for instance, and in the Middle Ages at the time of the Reformation. Perhaps also at the time of the Egyptian Thoth.

Dr. Jung: Yes, but we are too little informed about the history of the Egyptian mind to know under what conditions Thoth came to the foreground; that figure extends over a period of three to four thousand years. You mentioned another example, however, where we can observe how a religion originated: the calling and enlightenment of Zarathustra would be an instance. Of course we also know very little of those days, but we can gather from his teaching that he appeared when the religion of the time had degenerated into ordinary vulgar black magic, such as Taoism became in China. In recent years there has been

a revival of Taoism in China, but it had deteriorated previously into sort of street magic—soothsayers, and astrologers who made horoscopes, even the oracles of the *I Ching* were cast in the streets. The priests were mere jugglers, and the classical Taoist philosophy was practically gone. Zarathustra encountered such a condition in Persia, and his teaching had chiefly the purpose of destroying that luxuriant weed of superstition and popular magic. Religions have always had the tendency to degenerate into those low magic rites and customs, like the Catholicism of the 15th century, when they made money out of the grace of heaven. This was a most disturbing fact to the people who still had some idea of a decent religion, and was indirectly the cause of the German Reformation. They broke loose from the church which had declined so far as to sell the grace of heaven; it was a sort of regeneration brought about through the degeneration which had existed before. So even in the time of Zarathustra, about the ninth century B.C., we can observe that archetype. The wise old man has probably forever played its part in human history, and has become collectively manifest whenever the supreme ideas which regulate our lives have turned into dirt.

Mr. Baumann: The creator of the world, a demiurgos, might be an example.

Dr. Jung: That is true. You know, the primitive idea of the creation of a world is the creation out of the mind. The old cosmogonies are really sort of symbolical representations of human thought; they represent a mental creation, in other words. That is very clearly seen in the Vedic hymns, in the *Rigveda* for instance, where it is said that the world took its origin from the prayer of a sage; it was a sort of invention hatched out of the head. You see, this symbol comes from the fact that the world does not exist if there is nobody who is conscious of its existence; no statement could be made of the existence of the world if there were no consciousness to make the statement, and without that no world exists. What exists unconsciously might just as well be non-existent. That is, of course, the character of the world as understood by Hindu philosophy: it is existent nonexistent.

Now we have here a question by Mr. Allemann. He says: "I am a little bewildered by the fact that on the one hand many of the texts concerning the old wise man insist on the fact that teacher and pupil are *one*, and on the other hand I see by the example of Nietzsche, Steiner, Inayat Khan, and others, how dangerous it is to identify with this archetype. Is it that the identification can only take place while man is on an

exalted level, and this identification has to be very clearly broken in ordinary life?

“Example of texts: ‘An invocation to Hermes’ (Mead, *Hermes*): ‘Mayest thou come into my mind and heart for all the length of my life’s days and bring unto accomplishment all things my soul desires. *For thou art I and I am thou.*’

“‘Logos from the gospel of Eve’ (Mead, *Hermes*): ‘I stood on a lofty mountain, and saw a gigantic man and another a dwarf; and I heard as it were a voice of thunder, and drew nigh for to hear, and he spake unto me and he said: *I am thou and thou art I*, and wheresoever thou mayest be, I am there. In all I am scattered, and whencesoever thou wilt, thou gatherest me, and gathering me, thou gatherest thyself.’ In the mysteries of Isis the *mystes* became Helios.”

That is, of course, not quite the same thing, because Helios is a god. Well, the mere fact that it is so easy and almost normal to identify with an archetype is clearly shown by Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*. It is obvious that Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra because he takes him as a sort of poetical figure, a creation of his own mind; unknowingly he assumes that he is producing an archetype while in reality the archetype exists by itself. It is just the peculiar thing about an archetype that you have the feeling of having produced it, yet the archetype is always self-existing and you are simply the victim of the illusion that you have made it. That is the disastrous thing which leads us astray. So it is of the highest importance, practically, to learn that there are things in our minds which are not of our own make.

For instance, suppose you have an intuition about a certain fact or condition; then you have the feeling that you are somehow the creator of that intuition, as when you see a thing, you can, of course, say it is your seeing it that causes this kind of experience. So when you have an intuition of something, it may be that you cannot apply it to anything outside of you, and therefore think it is mere fantasy which you have created, because it clearly came up in yourself. You can see that in experiments in telepathy, for example, particularly with untrained mediums; a professional medium, of course, knows that such a telepathic intuition is a perception. But an untrained, naive person doesn’t assume right away that he can be aware of something real outside himself. He is only aware of a certain thought which comes, and he just thinks it is funny that his mind is occupied by such an idea and wonders how the devil it got there. That is what he *says* at least, but he means all the time that his mind has created the idea, not knowing that this is projected upon him by somebody in the next room who is con-

centrating upon that object. The one who perceives, that is, wonders why it is in his mind as if it were his own doing. You see, when the light suddenly comes on in a room, you don't wonder that you see the light, and you don't think it is your own invention. You quietly think somebody has switched on the light. But if you feel suddenly as if a light had been switched on within you, then you wonder how on earth you have come to that idea, why do you think that somebody has switched on a light in you? Now, the real cause for it is that somebody has in fact switched on the light; somebody has concentrated upon that idea and wanted to transmit it into your mind. But you handle it as if it were your own invention. That often happens, and I observe it in myself.

For example, I see a patient and say, "Good morning, how do you do, please sit down," and in that moment a thought is crossing my mind, a vivid image of something, and instantly the patient begins to tell me a dream containing just that. I simply *got* it from her. Or it may be that a case is in a particular condition and when I get up in the morning, I think, "Oh, so-and-so is coming today. I must not forget to tell him or her such-and-such a thing." That seems to me of great importance, so the moment the patient sits down I begin to talk, and it happens that I speak of things that occurred in dreams she has had the night before, or two nights before, which I thought I had invented. I once had a most peculiar dream from Sunday to Monday. I dreamed that I was in my consulting room with a patient, an unknown youngish person, and was quite bewildered by what she told me, but finally discovered that it was the most complicated father complex I had ever observed. I asked myself, "What on earth does that mean? Is my anima under such a father complex?" I could not make head or tail of it. Now I had a consultation marked in my book for five o'clock, but I had forgotten entirely who it was, such an appointment being made a fortnight before perhaps. Well, I came into my waiting room and there was a youngish woman whom I had never seen before. I took her into my room and she began to talk. I thought, "Damn, what is she talking about? I have no idea what she is driving at," when suddenly I understood that it referred to the father and that it must be quite a particular case. Then instantly my dream jumped into my memory, and it was really exactly as I had dreamt it the night before. You see, I wondered why I made such a dream—as the Frenchman says, *J'ai fait un rêve*—as if it were my own invention. As a matter of fact, of course that girl thought: tomorrow I am going to Dr. Jung. She broadcast it, and as I am a sensitive receiver I got it.

Mr. Baumann: I think I have told already how Mark Twain saved a

postage stamp: He wrote the letter and took it near the postbox but he didn't have to mail it; he only thought about it, and then he went home and the other person answered it.

Dr. Jung: Well, I would not swear that it was exactly like that, but such things do happen, as you all know. But the point is this, that when you have such an intuition you are always inclined to think you made it yourself. So with dreams we should always leave a door open: it might be a telepathic effect. I have observed in numbers of my own dreams most absurd facts which I could not place anywhere in my life, and a few weeks later they happened in reality. From that I learned that one has intuitions about things which are really outside of ourselves and we simply imagine that we are responsible for them. It is the same with that wise old man or with any archetype; when it comes up in us, we are identical with it to begin with and then we must learn to detach ourselves from it. Therefore, one should always say, "I am not thou."

But if a man says: "For thou art I and I am thou," as in Mr. Allemann's quotation, it is a very different situation. That is a magic incantation. He is making an incantation to the Logos or to the wise old man, announcing himself as a relation or a son to the other side of himself. It is exactly like contemplating the Eastern orthodox mandala: you put yourself into the god, saying, "I am thou, and thou art I." But that can only be in a situation which is already ritualized. The psychological experience is just the reverse. I told you recently how mandalas have been invented: the old wise man wanted to know what things were, so he began to draw circles, and then disciples came and thought *that* was it, and they also drew circles and thought they had it. But making circles means nothing; you must have an experience which can be expressed in forms of the mandala or otherwise. Just making drawings does not mean that you have gotten it. You see, those dogmatic representations, those rites in the religious world, are often expressions of experiences, and later on they are used in order to remember them, to bring the experiences back into the human mind. But that is already the process of feeling into, what we call *Anempfindung*. That word cannot be translated; it means creating a situation in which you *make believe*, as if you yourself belonged to it. For example, suppose you build an antique house. Of course, you must have central heating, but it is hidden behind marble work of some kind, and you wear an antique toga and recline at the table when you eat, although what you eat is cooked on an electric cooking range, and you feel exactly like Plato or any one of those old sinners. That is *Anempfindung*. There are any

number of examples. If you know something of the life of the poet Maeterlinck, you get it—an old monastery, madonnas, moonlight nights—you feel very medieval.⁴ Now, that becomes inevitable when the original experience is lost, when the pupils don't experience what the master has experienced. They ought to *know* really in order to make circles. So this "Thou art I and I am thou" is a magic invocation to force the Logos, or whatever name is applied to the old wise man, to come down and admit the one who is praying to him to be raised to his social status.

But the original experience, becoming aware of the objective presence of the archetype, is just the reverse. Nietzsche's poem proves that originally he had the experience of Zarathustra as being different, split off even from himself, so that he could not say, "Thou art I." He could only say: "You are Zarathustra and I am Professor Nietzsche." But then there was no Mr. Zarathustra living anywhere near Maloja in the Engadine, nor was he in Basel. Nietzsche was not true to his original experience; he had no *pistis*, no loyalty, no confidence in it. He said to himself that it was hardly possible that Zarathustra should be a reality who really had separated himself from him. You know, the Bible teaches us that the woman was taken out of the body of Adam, having been one of his ribs. That shows a reality that became a separate reality from Adam, though made of his flesh and his blood and his bone. And so it is with that experience of the wise old man; if Nietzsche had been true to his original experience, he would have understood that Zarathustra was somebody else with a life of his own, a separate being. For an archetype has a life of its own; the life that is proper and peculiar to the archetype shows its autonomy by the fact that it can swallow one's own life. It is so strong that one can be swallowed up into it and be nothing but that archetype. Of course, one does not know it but other people can see it.

Well now, if that fact is accepted, then naturally an intercourse begins between man and the personified archetype, from which it becomes finally obvious that that archetype is in a peculiar way man, as man is an archetype; that is, a widening out of consciousness comes about in which the archetype is included. That is why we analyse the unconscious. We try to bring it into our scope. We try to extend consciousness even over the sphere of the unconscious, and finally we see

⁴ Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949), Belgian playwright (*The Blue Bird*, *Pelleas and Melisande*, et al.), was interested in accounts of unconscious phenomena and various forms of spiritualism.

that the psychical experience includes those archetypes. And then it is not that I am the wise old man, or that the wise old man is myself, because there is no longer that "I myself"; the wise old man is not contained in the "I myself," but is contained in the self. So you can say—and we see it with Nietzsche—that the wise old man is also a personification of the self. But the self is still more powerful because it is not only inclusive of the wise old man but of that young stupid fool, man: the self contains both. So the identity with the archetype forms an experience which only takes place after a long intercourse with the archetypes; such a pupil becomes master only when he has been long enough a pupil. He acquires mastership in the moment when he understands what kind of experience the master represents, when he has the same experience practically.

Mrs. Baynes: I would like to push it one step further and ask how it comes that the wise old man is identified with God?

Dr. Jung: Well, the wise old man is always a personification of God. That is why we represent God with a long white beard sitting upon a golden throne. I have brought you a book where you can see a picture of this wise old man in his medieval alchemistic form; it is the book of tears and flames, passion and repentance. Here is the wise old man being the image of God: he is the Word. Thoth for instance, is the anticipation of the Logos, so he is also the anticipation of Christ inasmuch as Christ is the Logos. Now peculiarly enough, the temple of Thoth is called the house of the net—the fisherman's net—and the Babylonian Marduk is the Logos and his attribute is also the net. Then the Pope, as the head of the church, is the living impersonation of the Logos, the church being the body of Christ. He is in the place of Peter who is the representative of Christ, endowed with the apostolic blessing, the grace or the mana that has emanated from the Lord himself. And the Pope's attribute is the fisher ring upon which is carved the miraculous draft of fishes with the nets. You see, the Logos worked like a net which gathered in mankind like a swarm of fishes; the power of the word, a concept, an idea, a point of view, is really like a net. It constellates, it brings together, it unites. You learn once that two things are the same and they will remain the same forever. This is the creative power of the mind.

So this Logos quality of the old man puts him right *in loco dei*, as Christ is the visible face of God; he is in a way like the Old Testament conception of the Angel of the Face.⁵ In Islamic mysticism the Sufi god

⁵ See above, 2 May 1934, n. 9.

is the same idea; Chidr, the green one, is the visible element or god. My Somali headman explained to me that Chidr is the first angel of God, meaning the visibility of Allah who is without form, without appearance, without quality. But Chidr is visible; his mind can be seen as man can be seen, as light can be seen or a blade of grass. He has shape. The old wise man, then, is a sort of visible god because he is the word of god—the word that became flesh. You see, according to our biblical ideas, God is sitting on his throne surrounded by his angels, with his orchestra playing on harps and trumpets and so on, and he has a long beard exactly like the old fellow in this book. And it is a curious fact that the same figure occurs in an entirely different book, *Les Tableaux des Riches Inventions*.⁶ This book was published in Paris in 1600, a reproduction of a much older one, but the frontispiece dates from about 1589. And here is a German book of 1588, printed in Basel, in which there is the same figure, of course with certain variations. This shows that there must have been a tradition—there were typical symbols. In both, you find the lion with its paws cut off, for instance. We don't know where they originated, but one thing seems to be certain: there is hardly a trace of these symbols before the 15th century. As a rule, they date from the time of the Reformation.

My idea is that they are another manifestation of the wise old man who was again teaching symbols, having appeared in a time when there was particular need of him. And that great need simply came from the fact that, until that moment, everybody had had the great advantage of confession and absolution; then, that suddenly became obsolete, and instantly people discovered an impossible moral conflict from which there was no redemption, no absolution. Nobody told them that they were absolved—they were never absolved—and that created an intolerable tension. Therefore, the old man came and told them they should make images in order to solve their problems by the priesthood within. The whole church became introverted, and the institution of the church became introverted, and that brought about these series of pictures. They are exactly what you can observe in your own drawings; we have such picture-series again in our days because we also are confronted with moral problems which we cannot solve, which are impossible—much worse than those in the year 1500. But, of course, their problems were as bad to them as ours are to us in the present time.

⁶ A member of the seminar, Linda Fierz-David, was to publish *The Dream of Poliphilo*, first in German (1947) and then in an English translation by Mary Hottinger (Princeton, B.S. XXI, 1956). Jung wrote the foreword for this work of interpretation.

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January / March 1935

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LECTURE I

23 January 1935

Prof. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: We were speaking a while ago of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus. Do you remember in what connection?

Mrs. Fierz: The *Ein-siedler* and the *Zwei-siedler*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, I said that Nietzsche, by this play of words, brings in the idea that if there are two together—not just one alone—they also can produce the Superman. And I said that this idea was expressed in the New Testament where Jesus says: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” But in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, which is probably older than the first conception of the Gospels, that saying is quoted as follows: “Wherever there are two they are not without God, and wherever there is one alone I say I am with him.” There, you see, the emphasis is on the *Ein-siedler*, the hermit, and where there are two together it is of secondary importance, though “they are not without God.” You remember I read from the Greek text the original publication by Grenfell and Hunt, and I pointed out that the hand of the church had wiped out the very passage that is particularly emphasized in the original conception, “where there is one alone,” and only the remaining passage is left in, “where two or three are gathered together in my name,” which means that only in a community is God present, but when there is one alone the devil knows what happens to such a fellow. In other words, outside the walls of the church there is no salvation, for one alone cannot make a church. That is the way the church has backed up her claim of being the means of grace, the *intercessus divinus*, the *mediatrix* between God and man. Our theologians have never wanted to know about these papyri apparently, despite the fact that they are at least of equal authority with the New Testament. And now Mr. Allemann has just given me a very remarkable *document humain*, a book by a theologian who does know about them, called *Die Ersten Christen Quellen*, quotations from ancient pagan writings concerning the sources of Christianity. Here he

quotes from the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, 1897-1914, by Grenfell and Hunt: "Wherever there are two together they are never men without God."¹ But "wherever there is one alone" is not mentioned. You see, it is just a downright cheat, a four-square cheat, and that happens in 1935! He has entirely misquoted it. It is a conscious fraud. Eberhard Arnold is the man's name, Leipzig.

Miss Wolff: Is he a Catholic?

Prof. Jung: No, a Protestant. Oh, Catholics won't quote it at all; they are not so stupid. But this Protestant thinks he can pull wool over our eyes.

Well now, we began before Christmas with the chapter called "Backworldsmen," and we spoke of the play of words in the title. Then I read you the first part but I think I had better go over it again. You see, in reading *Zarathustra*, one is apt to just slur over it. It sounds like something and one simply ceases to think: it is like wine.

Once on a time, Zarathustra also cast his fancy beyond man, like all backworldsmen.

.....

Ah, ye brethren, that God whom I created was human work and human madness, like all the Gods!

We must think a little more about this picture he is painting of his idea of theology. Is this a Christian picture? What kind of theology does it presuppose?

Miss Hannah: You said last time it was the super-Protestant.

Prof. Jung: And what kind of theology is that?

Mrs. Brunner: Indian.

Prof. Jung: It would be more Indian and Gnostic than Christian. Now he says, "The work of a suffering and tortured God, did the world then seem to me." What is that exactly?

Miss Hannah: Schopenhauer, is it not?

Prof. Jung: Schopenhauer is in it. But does the blind creative will of Schopenhauer suffer?

Miss Hannah: The suffering crucified God is Christian.

Prof. Jung: Well, Christ is the son of God, he is not the creator. Elohim or Jahveh are the creators of the world, according to Christianity, and Elohim did not suffer, nor did Jahveh. He was very angry at times,

¹ This is Eberhard Arnold's *Die ersten Christen nach dem Tode der Apostels* (Leipzig, 1926). It has subsequently been translated as *The Early Christians After the Death of the Apostles* (New York, 1970). For the *Oxyrhynchus Papyrus* I, see above, 31 Oct. 1934, n. 9.

but only other people suffered from it—that was his purpose. The next source for that suffering idea in Nietzsche is Schopenhauer, but do you think that the blind creative will to existence suffers?

Prof. Fierz: No, the will doesn't complain about the suffering. Schopenhauer complains.

Prof. Jung: Yes, man complains, and man is the result of that will. The will had a bad dream, which just happened to be a world in which there were suffering beings; but they knew they were suffering, and inasmuch as they were manifestations or incarnations of the preexisting will, they had the possibility of holding a mirror to the face of that will, showing him what he was: that in his endless desirousness, he was creating evil and suffering. And Schopenhauer's idea of salvation is that when the will, through man, through the intellect, sees and understands that he is creating evil and suffering, he will desist, and then the world will come to an end. Now this is of course an Eastern idea. In what kind of Eastern teaching do we encounter it—with this specific idea of suffering?

Mr. Allemann: It is more in Buddhism than in Hinduism.

Prof. Jung: Yes. You see, in Schopenhauer's time the knowledge of Eastern religious systems was very restricted. Schopenhauer only knew a few Buddhist writings which had been translated, the *Oupnekat*, a very corrupt form of the Upanishads, and a collection of about fifty Upanishads translated into Latin by Anquetil du Perron.² Otherwise they were unknown in Europe. The main source, then, for his philosophy was this knowledge of Buddhism, and there, as you know, the central teaching is that *concupiscentia*, desirousness, is the sole cause of suffering; if one can bring one's desires to an end, one brings the suffering of the world to an end. So redemption, or salvation, consists in leading the created back into the non-created, the non-existent. For instance, in the epic description of Buddha's death, the Nahaparimbana-sutra, the great disappearance, Buddha returns to the utter non-existence which is called nirvana or nibbana. But that is not what we would understand by "not being," which is a mere negation; Nirvana is a positive non-being, which we cannot render in our language because we have no conception of a thing which is positively non-existing. To the Buddhist it is as if non-existence were just as much a quality as existence.

² His Latin translation of fifty Upanishads, *The Oupnekat* (Secret Legends) (Strasbourg, 1801-1802), was a major source of Schopenhauer's knowledge of Hinduism and Buddhism.

That is because the original Indian idea was that there are two forms of existence. The one is a *potential* existence expressed in Tantrism, for instance, as the Shiva bindu, the unextended point in which the god is dormant before his expansion, or his manifestation. The other is an extended or *actual* existence expressed by the Kundalini coiled three and a half times round the linga, as you see it in the *muladhara* chakra. That is the first manifestation of the god; he already appears, but he is still in a dormant condition. The latent or potential existence of course cannot be depicted, but it is always contained in the Shiva bindu, that little point from which a bridge is usually shown leading to the two inset medallions, the second one containing the corresponding divinity Shakti, the form which is characteristic for the state of Shiva in that particular chakra. But the god himself and with him the whole manifestation of the world, is latent inside that one bindu, because the world, according to this particular branch of Eastern philosophy, is always existing and non-existing at the same time. Inasmuch as there is existence, there is non-existence.

So this full expanse of world that we see is at the same time non-existent. Therefore they call it Maya, illusion. The meaning of illusion is thoroughly negative to us, but in the East that is not so. The word *Maya*, as you heard in the Hauer Seminar,³ comes from the root *ma* which means *mater*, *materia*, and *maya* means building material; so the illusion is building power. If you have an illusion you have built something; something exists which is different from yourself or different from the creator. Illusion is not negative, therefore; it is the positive appearance of the world, or really the positive existence. We have here, then, a philosophy which came from India through the medium of Schopenhauer by whom Nietzsche was much influenced. This passage: "The dream—and diction—of a God, did the world then seem to me, coloured vapours before the eyes of a divinely dissatisfied one" is more or less the Schopenhauer viewpoint. But there is one point which is not Schopenhauer. What is that?

Mrs. Brunner: The personality of God. It is a personal God who suffers. He says his god has eyes and looks away from himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that he has eyes and is discontented shows that he must be different from his creation, whereas Schopenhauer's blind will is in *participation mystique*. It is the unconscious itself. Therefore, after Schopenhauer, von Hartmann appeared, with a philosophy very much like Schopenhauer's only he called this blind will "the uncon-

³ See above, 6 June 1934, n. 11, on Hauer's Kundalini seminar.

scious.” He used that term.⁴ But it was the same metaphysical factor that created the world, an unconscious creator that could not possibly be discontented because all eyes were his eyes. He saw nothing beyond himself because he was in everything. Would that be a Buddhistic idea? Is God discontented in Buddhism?

Mr. Allemann: God does not exist really.

Prof. Jung: Well, he is a *sous-entendu*.⁵ But I never heard that there was anything like a discontented god in Buddhism.

Mrs. Baynes: I think you told us that the Gnostic idea was that God got horribly bored with the situation and created a world.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the Jewish Gnosis God suffered from headache because he discovered that he was all alone. There was nothing but himself and he was tremendously extended, so he pulled himself together and formed a cloud, and the tension grew till suddenly lightning burst out of the cloud, and that was the first sun, the first light. There is also a Hindu parallel in the Upanishads. There again you find the idea of that lonely suffering god who is so intensely bored with himself that he must do something about it, and so, like a toy, he creates a world—he dreams a world to relieve his loneliness, to have an object.⁶

Now this is an intensely male philosophy, while the Tantric philosophy assumes the coexistence of an equally important female creative principle, the Shakti of the god. And the female principle is so strong that Shiva himself is represented at times as a female. I have a Tibetan picture of him dancing on the burial ground in his female form, the form of his own Shakti. So in Tantrism the idea of creation is a different one; the Shakti really creates through her own will. Of course, Shiva enjoys his creative ideas in the creation of the Shakti, and Shakti realizes the creative thoughts of her husband in the form of the abundance of the world. Shiva in himself is always in a creative dream, but his dream would not come off if the Shakti did not realize his dream and therewith create the beauty and the suffering of the world. You

⁴ Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), a disciple of Schopenhauer. His *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1869) went into eight editions in six years. In the CW, Jung often alludes to von Hartmann as one of the discoverers of the unconscious before Freud.

⁵ “Understood.”

⁶ “In the beginning this world was Soul (*Atman*) alone in the form of a Person. . . . Verily, he had no delight. . . . He desired a second. [Being himself both man and woman, he split in half and the halves copulated.] . . . Thence arose creation.” *Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad* I, 4, 1-5, in Hume*, p. 81. For the Jewish Gnosis, or Kabbalah, see below, 23 June 1937, n. 8.

see, that is an entirely different conception, and it is most characteristic that Nietzsche emphasizes the masculine form, the loneliness of the suffering creator who created the world in order to relieve his infinite boredom. Therefore, he says, "Intoxicating joy is it for the sufferer to look away from his suffering and forget himself."

Then he says, "This world, the eternally imperfect, an eternal contradiction's image and imperfect image—an intoxicating joy to its imperfect creator:—thus did the world once seem to me." Here he lays stress upon the imperfection of the world. You see, in the Old Testament the idea is that the creator is perfect and creates a perfect world, and the only regrettable and damnable thing is that man makes a mistake. Of course, one could ask why man was made in such a way that he made the mistake, for which a clock-maker has made a bad clock, the clock is not held responsible. Now where does that idea of imperfection come from?

Prof. Fierz: It is Gnostic.

Prof. Jung: Yes, specifically Gnostic, though I don't know whether Nietzsche ever studied Gnosticism or whether it is his own invention. The demiurgos was by no means a universal god, but a sort of sub-god, a secondary god, an angel or demon who in his vanity created a world.⁷ It was only a material world though he was quite satisfied with his work and thought he had made something very wonderful and perfect. Then he looked up and saw a light which he realized he had not created, so he lifted himself up to see what it was and came to another world, the world of the spiritual father, the real God, and thus he understood that he had made a mistake. And then the father of the spiritual world took pity on those half-conscious worms, human beings, whom the demiurgos had made without consciousness enough to see their own imperfection; and he sent his son in the form of the first snake in Paradise to teach the first parents to eat from the tree of knowledge. So despite the evil invention of the demiurgos, when they had eaten they could understand the difference between good and evil, and that was the way to salvation.

Now whether Nietzsche got this idea from the Gnosis, I don't know. As a boy and during his early years Nietzsche read a good deal, but

⁷ Nietzsche would have known little of the Gnostics, but much of Plato. This notion of the *demiurgos* draws heavily on Plato's *Timaeus*, which was very influential throughout the Middle Ages. For Plato, this creator-god, the artificer, is clearly below the level of the eternal Ideas. In Gnosticism, the serpent symbolizes mind, which is the means by which the first humans were freed from the dominion of the Creative Power, who had required of man ignorance of good and evil.

later he read astonishingly little, because his nerves and his eyes gave him no end of trouble. His neurosis began really when he was a very young man; I think he was about twenty-four when he became a professor at Basel and he soon became neurotic. So it is quite possible that he had not read about Gnosticism, particularly because it was then in ill repute. He would have asked his friend Professor Overbeck, a professor of religion, who would most certainly have told him that it was only imagination, unsound thinking, and all that. And then, you see, he came to the conclusion that that image of God—the kind of theology which claims the metaphysical existence of a God—was all man's work and man's madness. He cut the whole thing down.

Prof. Fierz: I think the conception that man has made God, instead of God having made man, came from Feuerbach.⁸

Prof. Jung: It is possible, but I assume he would not have been particularly delighted with Feuerbach even if he had read him. But that idea was in the air generally. You see, Darwin became known then, and he was most horribly shocking to late Christianity and caused many people to lose their faith. I remember that time very well, and know how Darwin's views were received in my set; it was whispered that there was a dreadful person who said that man came from the monkeys; and it was quite particularly awful because the scientists seemed to back him up. It was the age of materialism, and though Nietzsche's philosophy is of course not a banal materialism, he understood that it was necessary to have that kind of critique. The time was not ripe for a psychological conception of the deity; either a thing was real or it was not. Anything so subtle as analytical psychology was beyond the mind of those times. So for Nietzsche the dilemma was: if there is a god, he must have a metaphysical existence as concrete as this table, or he does not exist. And he came to the conclusion that he did not, though that conclusion was less rigorous than is usually supposed—we will find a passage later where Nietzsche leaves a door open.

Now we will go on:

A man was he, and only a poor fragment of a man and ego. Out of mine own ashes and glow it came unto me, that phantom. And verily, it came not unto me from the beyond!

⁸ Ludwig Andrew Feuerbach (1804-1872), an important link between Hegel and Marx, developed in *The Essence of Christianity* (1841) a naturalistic interpretation of religion. Nietzsche would have approved this approach, but his only written mention of him had to do with Feuerbach's "healthy sensuality" as an influence on Wagner. *Genealogy*, #3.

What does he convey by the sentence: "From mine own ashes and flame came that phantom"?

Mrs. Dürler: It is a contradiction.

Prof. Jung: One is the outcome of the other; the ashes are the result of the flame.

Mr. Allemann: It is the living body, a process of combustion.

Miss Wolff: In German it is *Asche und Glut*. That means the flame has burned down—it is not an actual flame—and out of what is left God is made.

Prof. Jung: Well, as Mr. Allemann rightly pointed out, the living process of the body is a combustion, and out of that God is made. The living body is the originator of the god. Now how is that?

Dr. Escher: It is the living energy.

Prof. Jung: Yes, living energy is in the body in the form of combustion, oxidation, but how does that living process form the god?

Mrs. Jung: Suffering might be understood as combustion. Then as the world is created by the suffering of the creator, so God is created by the suffering, the combustion of man.

Prof. Jung: Ah, yes. You are right.

Prof. Fierz: I think *Asche* means his body and *Glut* his spirit, *Körper und Geist*.

Prof. Jung: No, they are more or less the same; the one is still hot and the other no longer hot. One uses that kind of simile when one wants to express conflagration and the outcome—that a great passion has burnt itself out, for instance, and what remains are glowing embers and ashes. So I should say that he refers here to a conflagration that has taken place in himself, and out of the result he has made his god. You will find in the next paragraph, "I carried mine own ashes to the mountain; a brighter flame I contrived for myself." So there must have been a fire, and then he invented a new flame. Nietzsche often uses that fire simile, and to him it seems to always mean a passionate life, a passionate conflagration of emotions and interests, a passionate understanding of the pathos of life. That is what he expresses here. If we reconstruct the underlying idea, it is that he had the idea of fire or a conflagration in his mind, and the intensity of that process had a destructive influence, and then out of that came that former idea of God. In other words, he projected his own suffering into God. And his God is metaphysical; he did not put God into himself, he put him out in the extra-mundane existence, into the cosmos, and assumed that his own suffering was that God's suffering.

Prof. Reichstein: He says "only a poor fragment of a man and ego,"

which would mean that this God is made of his ego standpoint, the material standpoint, and the expression "ashes and embers" explains this.

Prof. Jung: It is synonymous. The ashes and embers would be that poor piece of humanity. It is Nietzsche the man himself who has undergone a passionate conflagration, and he projected this experience into a metaphysical suffering God. In other words, he made the attempt not to accept that suffering as his own.

Remark: Is it not specially the resignation of man that is the ashes?

Prof. Jung: One could say it was a sort of resignation, in that he assumes it is God's suffering, and is incapable of accepting the truth that it is his own. That is the reason why there have always been suffering gods, not only at the beginning of our era, but long before. Osiris, one of the oldest gods of Egypt, was a suffering God; they have existed for an eternity, quite apart from the god-kings, who, when they were old or when the crops failed or the cattle died, were put to death because their mana or medicine power had gone wrong. There were many suffering gods in Asia Minor. Christ is only one of them. Prometheus is also a divine sufferer, for instance. So there has always been a tendency to project the suffering into a divine figure. Why is that so? Why can't one accept it as obviously one's own?

Mrs. Sigg: I think Nietzsche's whole life was looking away from himself. He created his work and totally neglected his own existence, and so he was identical with the creator.

Prof. Jung: A creator would say it was his own suffering; but no, he projected it into a metaphysical creator. He was identical and just did not know it.

Mrs. Baynes: Would it not be true to say he swung between two poles, the psychological and the philosophical? First he looked over the past to see how the idea of God had been taken. He made a philosophical critique and repudiated it. Then he looked within himself and found the same psychological situation that created the gods before, as we have just said, and called it by a new name.

Prof. Jung: That is rather complicated, but there is something in it.

Dr. Schlegel: I should say he projected it in order to be able to tolerate it better.

Prof. Jung: Yes, to *endure* it; that is what I wanted to hear. For example, if you try to sleep when suffering from toothache or any other painful ailment, you are apt to dream that somebody else is in the same bed and has that toothache; you make a difference between yourself, quite comfortable, and somebody else who suffers. You see, our psychology is easily disintegrated. It disintegrates every night; one part of

the system is suffering and another is not, because they are separated from each other. It is quite a usual occurrence that we simply split off the suffering part. The phenomenon of the so-called *Hexenschlaf*, the witches' sleep, is an example. You also see it in the *Malleus Maleficarum*, in the Middle Ages, which is about the diagnosis of witches.⁹ When they were submitted to the torture, it often happened that those women just fell asleep, or they fainted away. They got into a state in which the body became absolutely anaesthetic, no sensation whatever. And you can hypnotize suitable subjects to such an extent that they lose the sensation of the body completely. I made an experiment once with a young girl at the *Polyklinik*. She was a bit hysterical, and I told one of my assistants to entangle her in an interesting conversation. He was a nice young man and it went beautifully, and then I went up behind her and pushed a needle into her neck about a centimeter deep. It would naturally be painful and she did not even wince, but her pupils contracted. The physiological person felt the pain, but her whole libido was in the man and withdrawn from the surface of the body, so she felt nothing consciously. That explains why in war a wound received during action is not noticed; only when there is a lull is it suddenly discovered. In the excitement of the moment it is not felt because the libido is concentrated on something else.

This is a general mechanism and it looks as if it underlay Nietzsche's philosophy; his idea that man has created the suffering God is in order to get rid of the acute realization of his own misery. There is a great deal in that. If you study the suffering of the Christian god, you will see that this explanation fits the situation. We are even taught to put our suffering upon him and that he will carry it for us; we leave all our sorrows for him to take care of. He redeems us from the eternal pain in hell through his self-sacrifice; he undergoes the excruciating agony of a terrible death on the cross in order to save us from an analogous pain. Therefore, we cling naturally to that hero-god, for then we are unconscious of our suffering. It is a fact that one is quite capable of being unconscious of suffering, and particularly can one be unconscious of moral suffering. For instance, you can say your stomach is ailing, but in reality it is a moral situation which you cannot stomach. Or perhaps you have a pain which you call rheumatism, but if you had that pain in connection with the real cause, if you realized what that so-

⁹ *Malleus Maleficarum*, or *Hexenhammer* (Wicked Hammer of Witches) is a work published in 1489 by Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Kramer, Dominican inquisitors, on how to detect and punish witches.

called rheumatism meant, you would undergo a most acutely painful moral or psychological problem. So the more people are in the church, the more they escape psychological suffering—to such an extent that they have no problems when they are good Catholics; and good Protestants can economize a good deal on moral problems by putting their suffering upon the Lord. They say, “It is a very peculiar situation and I don’t know what to do, but I don’t need to worry; I put everything upon the Lord and hope that he will do his job. I am glad in Jesus, *fröhlich in Christus*; he will take care of it.” This is surely very nice as long as it works, but it doesn’t work always.

We will continue our text:

What happened, my brethren? I surpassed myself, the suffering one; I carried mine own ashes to the mountain; . . .

What is the meaning of this?

Prof. Reichstein: Can it refer to the beginning where Zarathustra is quite alone on the mountain?

Prof. Jung: Quite so. He is alone with himself in his retreat. And according to this passage he carried his own ashes to the mountain. How do you understand this?

Mrs. Sigg: I think that is the western way of looking at one’s own illusions; he has had illusions and they burned down and became ashes.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one says an illusion has burned itself out or collapsed, like a house after a conflagration; and that process of conflagration is the acute suffering which has been projected into God. Now, by the understanding, or the confession, that God is dead, all the suffering which has been in God, returns to him, and so he carried his own ashes to the mountain. And he says,

a brighter flame I contrived for myself.

Again a fire. What is this new flame?

Mr. Allemann: That is the idea of the Superman.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, because as soon as he says God is dead, he is God and then the inflation begins. The Superman is the deification of the ordinary man, and that is the new flame. Therefore, he says,

And lo! Thereupon the phantom *withdrew* from me!

This means of course that the projection came to an end. You see, the former condition, despite all the allusions to Hindu or Buddhist philosophy, was also a Christian situation in which the suffering was projected onto a suffering God; and now, by denying the extra-mundane

metaphysical God, that whole so-called illusion has collapsed, and the suffering returns to him. That is the inevitable consequence. Is that right or wrong?

Mrs. Sigg: It might be a natural process, because first Nietzsche accepted the conventional God, and then Zarathustra grew out of his own material, one could say, out of his own soul; it is his own god really.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is an interpretation of Zarathustra. I want to know whether this process is legitimate, or if there is any cheat about it.

Prof. Reichstein: The cheat is his saying that he has invented the flame. But it might be a beginning of something else.

Prof. Jung: I am glad you have pointed out that he says "I invented." You see he has invented before also. He said he invented a god, and that is man's work, man's madness; it is an artificial product. It shows that he trusts his mind with almost uncanny powers. If he criticized such a statement carefully, he would soon see that was impossible, for the idea of a god existed long before Nietzsche. It did not originate with him. What happened to him was that, being human, born in the herd, he adopted the ways of other people. He quite naturally accepted his metaphysical fate, the prevailing belief, and so participated in the general good of humanity. And then he says man invented it; that it is an illusion or something of the sort. You see, the fact that he comes to such a conclusion suggests to him that he can invent something else, invent that flame, as if it were his own activity. Now what is the psychological danger of such a formula?

Prof. Reichstein: It is identification, and it would create an inflation.

Prof. Jung: If somebody in practical analysis said he had invented such and such a thing, I would jump upon it with both feet instantly. You see we must be accurate in these matters; we cannot slur over them. If it is a matter of one's bank balance and one thinks like that, there is soon trouble. Or if it is a matter of a book and one assumes that one invented it, it is as if one claimed to have invented the Bible. That is just cheat. Nietzsche did not make "God"; that idea already existed. Of course, when one studies carefully how the idea of God came into existence at all, one can say that somebody once made an idea of it. But the fact was there long before. For we know that the primitive man sets out—not with the conviction, he does not need to have a conviction about it—but with the fact that his world is animated, full of spiritual life. Gods are in every tree, in every animal; the demon's voice is everywhere. So the existence of the divine presence was an original fact with

which man was confronted. In the moment when he was confronted with any physical object, he was also confronted with the fact that this object was animated. The profound original fact is the divine presence. Then very much later people came to the notion that one can *make* an idea about it—that one can say, this is such and such a god, having such and such a quality, and one must do such and such things. But first of all, it was simply an animation, a presence, and they did not break their heads over what the presence was; they could hardly give a name to it. Or they simply called it *numen*, which is the Latin word for a hint; it is the nodding of the head, the divine presence or the divine power, like *mana*. One doesn't know what *mana* is; *mana* is an impression one gets, or it is the magic quality of the thing that impresses itself upon one. It has no form, no personality—there is no concept that would formulate it—yet it is an absolute fact.

So God has never been made. He has always been. Then slowly, with the increase of consciousness, when people discovered that they could make different ideas about the deity, they came to the conclusion that it was nothing but an idea, and they quite forgot the real phenomenon that is behind all the ideas. You see, they became so identical with the products of their own conscious that they thought there was a god; and of course God was there so they thought they had created him. But such abuse brings its own revenge. The more people created ideas about God, the more they depleted and devitalized nature. And then it looked as if that primordial fact of the world had only taken place in imagination. Of course, by that process we create consciousness, but we have built up a thick wall between ourselves and primordial facts, between ourselves and the divine presence. We are so far away that nobody knows what one is talking about when one speaks of that divine presence, and if anybody discovers it suddenly, he thinks it is most amazing; yet it is the most simple fact. But we are no longer simple enough on account of that thick wall of ideas; we have so many preconceived ideas about what the divine presence ought to be, that we have deprived ourselves of the faculty of seeing it. Yet the primordial facts are still in the world; they happen all the time, only we have given them so many names that we don't see the wood any longer on account of the trees.

Nietzsche easily is led into that error, therefore, of thinking that man has invented God and so can invent something else—therefore the inflation. For God is a fact that always has happened; it is just a mistake to think that God can be created by a magic performance or by calling magic names. Naturally, he is led in this way to the assumption that he

can create a Superman. You see, he has readily undergone an objective psychological transformation, and he should see that as an objective fact. The moment you understand that the suffering of the God is your own suffering and that it ought to be—that it is simply primitive to leave your very personal suffering to a god—in that moment you are transformed: the suffering god has come into yourself. Then you are confronted with a terrible dilemma: Am I a miserable worm that suffers, or am I now the suffering god? And the one saving idea doesn't come into your head, that God is also a suffering worm. That is too paradoxical. For we have such an idea of what God ought to be that we cannot possibly conceive of the divine presence in a very small isolated fact.

But the primitive can easily conceive of the fact that God is this particular locust, or that particular bird, or particular flower; that is entirely acceptable to the primitive mind. It is the way they think. Therefore those three ways of the apparition of God in the Sufi religion, where God can also appear as a leaf of grass if he chooses. This is a psychological truth: that peculiar phenomenon which is called God, the experience of the divine intervention or presence, can be connected with anything. It is just a fact and the primitive mind acknowledges it, but we have ideas about it and think it is not possible; we think that God can only appear in certain prescribed ways. The fathers of the church were very strong in that respect; in order to make suitable differences between God and the devil they had to be careful to make a sort of casuistic wall about the ways in which God is allowed to appear. The primitive man is of course not disturbed by such considerations, because he never would extend his moral conceptions to the deity, who is to him beyond human conceptions. Of course, the more he extends his ideas, the more civilized he becomes: the more God is put into the prison of ideas. Nietzsche here decides obviously for the identification with the God and so he creates the Superman. He could have created the idea of the inferior man just as well, and that such an idea was in his mind too is shown towards the end of *Zarathustra* when the question of the ugliest man comes up. You see, the ugliest man is just as much the divine man as the Superman.

To me the convalescent would it now be suffering and torment to believe in such phantoms: suffering would it now be to me and humiliation. Thus speak I to backworldsmen.

He obviously means that it would be humiliating to him to assume that he could project his suffering into a god. For instance, suppose that a

divine being really were living among us and that you could project your personal suffering into that man or woman, and he would be willing to carry every damned trouble you have. Then I hope you would be ashamed to do so, because by getting rid of your own trouble and your own responsibility, you would not grow up; you would remain a little child. You can only grow up when you say, "This is my business, my life; my suffering is my own and it cannot be projected into anybody else." Perhaps you project it into your father and say, "I am your son; you can carry the whole load. I cannot work and earn money because it hurts me. I cannot get along with people; you must get along with them for me." That is terribly infantile, but there again you have the theologians.

For instance, you remember in the *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*, I say the Christian teaching is that you must sacrifice your own childishness, for how can you become like unto a child when you are still a child?¹⁰ First, you must overcome your childishness and then, after you have been an adult, you can become a child again. That is very clearly the teaching of Christ. But I got an article from a theologian which he had published in the *Archives de Théologie* in which he said that I, in flagrant contradiction to *la parole du Maître*, said that one should not remain a child; one should give up *le sentiment filial*. I did not trust my eyes! I simply gathered some quotations from the Latin text of the New Testament, and I put them on a postcard and sent it to that man. Then I must say he had the decency to put a little paragraph in the next edition of the "Archives de Théologie," in which he said, "Notre article sur le rôle du sentiment filial nous a valu la critique suivante de la part de Dr. Jung," and then he reproduced my postcard with the quotations. I am sure not one of the readers understood it, because they believe that you should always remain a little infant and then, out of your childhood, you simply slur over into the church, where you are still a child, or a sheep.

Dr. Escher: But that is the real standpoint of the clerical hierarchy.

Prof. Jung: Of course it is. And it is so unspeakably immoral that it needs a man like Nietzsche, who philosophizes with a hammer and smashes the whole damned lot.¹¹ It is immoral to keep people below

¹⁰ *The Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia*, on its initial publication in 1912, made clear the important differences between Jung's and Freud's conceptions of the symbol. As revised, the work appeared as CW 5.

¹¹ In the last year of his productive life, Nietzsche used for a subtitle to his *Twilight of the Idols; How to Philosophize with a Hammer*. No doubt he imaged both the sledgehammer for destruction and the carpenter's constructive tool.

their level; they must assume their responsibility and not project their doubts and God knows what into the Lord. Projecting our own difficulties onto God reminds me of the story of the sleepless man, which is a very good psychological example. There was a man who had to pay a debt the next day, and as he hadn't the money, he could not sleep. It was one o'clock and then it was two o'clock and then it was three, and he still could not sleep. It was a very cold night, and he made up his mind he must do something about it. So he got up and went to the house of his creditor and rang the bell, and after a long time he came to the window and said: "Who the devil is there?" And the man said: "I am, and I ought to pay you my debt tomorrow." And the creditor said: "Tomorrow morning is early enough to pay me." "But I have not the money," said the man. "You can tell me that tomorrow; why do you disturb me now?" "But I cannot sleep." "What the devil do I care for your sleep?" "Well, now I have told you, and I can sleep and you can't." So what you would not do to any human being, don't do to God.

LECTURE II

30 January 1935

Prof. Jung:

We spoke of the suffering god last time, and I have brought you to-day a vision given me by a patient which is interesting in that connection. He is a youngish, educated man, who was originally a Jew, and he has also been a Catholic, but he has almost forgotten that. As a matter of fact, he believes in nothing in particular; he was not especially interested in religious problems, and was hardly bothered with such ideas at all until suddenly he had this vision of the *crucifixus*. He was very much gripped by it, so that he got into a state of *ekstasis* and heard a voice saying: "But Christ is not able to redeem you. If you could redeem yourself, he would be bleeding less. When men in general are able to redeem themselves, he will cease to bleed. It will then be like a song that has lost its significance." The vision was particularly important because it happened in a time when the man was not concerned with such problems. I have his dreams before and after, and there are very few that indicate anything of the kind; occasionally, certain hints occurred but nothing was really visible, when in came suddenly this amazing experience, a sort of short *ekstasis*. He is capable of having such moments; later on, he had similar syncopes of consciousness, trancelike conditions which did not last very long, and at those times he sometimes heard such a voice. There is nothing schizophrenic in the case; they are truly psychic phenomena—what one calls mystical experiences. I quote this case because it is similar to the psychology of Nietzsche but with a certain difference. Nietzsche is definitely anti-Christian—he wrote a book as you know, called *The Anti-Christ*—and he is intentionally destructive, while this vision is very much more human because it shows pity.¹ It is very clear that the voice means that if you

¹ *The Anti-Christ*, written just three months before his break, may be counted more anti-Christian than anti-Christ. As with *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche said, "This book belongs to the very few."

as a personal being are doing your duty, if you carry your own burden, you will relieve the suffering of God. Instead of casting all your burdens on him and letting him bleed, do some of the bleeding yourself. I mentioned this also because in the continuation of our text we shall come to the bleeding, which is of course important Christian symbolism. Now we will go on:

Suffering was it, and impotence—that created all backworlds;
and the short madness of happiness, which only the greatest sufferer experienceth.

In the main, it is the suffering that creates the other worlds, but occasionally it is also that brief illusion of happiness, because it is the happiness of one who suffers. So the idea of this passage is again that man has created through his imagination another world, a fantastical world of refuge against the suffering in this world, against the fire which burns him to ashes. Therefore Nietzsche speaks of “carrying mine own ashes to the mountain”; that is, of course, the hill of suffering, and the suffering itself is the flame of passion. You see, the word *passio* means suffering, and the German word *Leidenschaft* has been explained by a poet in a very nice way: *Leidenschaft ist das was Leid schafft*, passion is that which creates suffering. *Leidenschaft* is really sufferingness.² That is the Buddhistic explanation too: the desirousness, the *concupiscentia*, of man, creates the great suffering of the world. This *passio*, then, is the flame which turns man into ashes if he exposes himself to it. But Nietzsche did not. He avoided it, and I cannot blame him, for if anybody can avoid the fire he is very wise to do so.

Now, there is another saying of Jesus, similar to those found at Oxrhynchus, which is not in the Canon. It runs: Whoever is close to me is close to the fire.³ That means that whoever is close to Christ, is close to Christ's *passio*, and is apt to have Christ's own psychology and the same fate. He was the one who took up his *passio*. He submitted to it and suffered correspondingly, and whoever is close to him will do the same. This is exceedingly intelligent and exceedingly true, and would therefore have been abolished if the father of the church who quoted it had not been too stupid to understand it. Other things which were less intelligent and less hidden have also been destroyed, and they

² “Passion is what creates suffering.” In English the pun of the proverb is lost.

³ Jesus says: “He who is near me is near the fire, and he who is far from me is far from the Kingdom.” See *Apocrypha*, for Origen on *Jeremiah*, p. 35.

would be equally interesting but perhaps not so profound. Now we go on with the text:

Weariness, which seeketh to get to the ultimate with one leap, with the death-leap; a poor ignorant weariness, unwilling even to will any longer: that created all Gods and backworlds.

It looks here as if Nietzsche shared the belief of his time, a materialistic conviction that other worlds—metaphysical matters—have no existence except in the imagination of man. He is paying a tribute to his age, not seeing what the imagination of man really means. When anybody says a thing is merely imagination, he is really saying something quite formidable; for whatever our imagination may be, that is our world, unfortunately. If people imagine that you are the archfiend, they will kill you; whatever the mere imagination was, the end is a corpse and it happens to be your own corpse, which is a very disagreeable fact. The imagination which was apparently nothing at all has wound up with downright murder. One should say, “This is imagination and now look out!” as one would say, “Be careful in handling that gun! There is a cartridge in it.” For any imagination is a potentiality. The chair upon which I am sitting and the house in which I am, have once been the imagination of a builder; first he made a drawing of it and then he built this house, and if it comes down on my head I shall be crushed. There is nothing in our civilized world which has not been imagination. So imaginations are potential realities, exactly like a loaded revolver, a shot that has not gone off yet; but some ass might pull the trigger and I would be dead.

With the point of view of that time, then, Nietzsche assumes that those other worlds have been *only* the imagination of suffering people, while the point is just that suffering people *have* such imaginations, and that they are as real as they can be. You see, there are plenty of situations in life where your imagination about it is far more important than the situation in itself. Usually the world is what you imagine it to be, and we don’t know to what degree that is true; it might be that our world would be quite different if we had a different imagination about it. I am certain, for instance, that the primitives live in an entirely different world from ours; we assume that it is the same, but that is by no means true. They have different impressions, different imaginations about it; it functions in an entirely different way. Only a short time ago, any educated Chinaman—not a modern Chinaman—was quite convinced that magic worked, and he was equally convinced that it did not work with a European because a European is not built that way. It does

not grip him anywhere; he is not accessible to it. But with them it really does work; it is not mere imagination, because they live in a world and they have a psychology where such things are possible. We are not accessible—apparently—but I have my doubts about that. At all events in our conscious personality we are not accessible. I have seen so many effects that I have come to the conclusion that it is also imagination to imagine that such things have no access to us. We like to overlook these facts and prefer, from sheer fear, the so-called rational explanation, because it would be too awkward to introduce magic effects, as rational, into our calculation of the world.

Believe me, my brethren! It was the body which despaired of the body—it groped with the fingers of the infatuated spirit at the ultimate walls.

This is not an easy question, so we had better stop at it. Can anybody give us a commentary on it?

Prof. Reichstein: I think it is explained in the next sentence where he speaks of “the womb of being.” This would be the female part of God, just the opposite of the flame which he invented himself; this is something which he just accepts as mere being.

Prof. Jung: Well, I think we must here try to formulate Nietzsche’s thought, and separate it from the psychological vocabulary for the sake of clearness—then translate it into psychology afterwards. Can you explain to us that concept of “the womb of being” from the standpoint of Nietzsche’s philosophy? You see, it is quite certain that to him there is no such thing as a female aspect of the deity because he admits no deity. So to him, “the womb of being” has nothing to do with a metaphysical deity.

Prof. Reichstein: But here it is the first time, perhaps, that he accepts anything as beyond his invention.

Prof. Jung: Ah well, we are perfectly certain that he accepts his world as being. Being, to him, is not a metaphysical concept, and so “the womb of being” cannot be a metaphysical concept. He is trying to abolish all metaphysical concepts as mere wish-fulfilments. Therefore, we are really forced to assume that “the womb of being” is here a sort of figure of speech, a metaphor; we cannot go farther in the interpretation of it as long as we remain with Nietzsche’s philosophy. But when we come to psychology, that is something else; then the figure of speech becomes an important hint. What I want a commentary upon first, however, is the sentence, “It was the body which despaired of the body—it groped with the fingers of the infatuated spirit at the ultimate

walls.” That simply means creating another world, creating the beyond.

Mrs. Baynes: I think he was hitting again the Christian point of view, saying: here are people who are such fools that they don’t appreciate the meaning of the body. They turn their backs upon it, and go to work to create a world which they could find within the body if they had the sense to do so.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is here attacking the Christian standpoint which neglects the body. He says it is just the despised body which creates the reality of other worlds; from the body is taken that substance by which the substantiality of the beyond is created. You would not see a super-human divine figure if you did not repress or suppress your body; it is the non-recognized reality of your own body that gives body to metaphysical creations. That is Freud’s point of view in his *The Future of an Illusion*.⁴ It is also the materialistic and rationalistic idea that the reality of a metaphysical being is chiefly due to the fact of the repression of the body. So Nietzsche says it is the despised body which has created the body likeness, the reality of the things beyond.

Believe me, my brethren! It was the body which despaired of the earth—it heard the bowels of existence speaking unto it.

You see the repressed, despised body took its revenge and made metaphysical figures more real than human beings; the body took revenge on man and made him believe that reality lay beyond, and that nothing here was worth while, that they are illusions. So he hits, not only Christianity, but Buddhism and all those religions which recognize the futility of secular existence.

And then it sought to get through the ultimate walls with its head—and not with its head only—into the other world.

That is perfectly clear. When the reality of the body is repressed or despised, you naturally seek for the essential world, and that seems to be the world beyond; so you naturally will treat this world as merely *passagère*, an illusion, a futility, or a mistake, and you just wait for your redemption or your transition to a divine world.

But that “other world” is well concealed from man, that dehumanized, inhuman world, which is a celestial naught; and the bowels of existence do not speak unto man, except as man.

⁴ *The Future of an Illusion* (1927) contains Freud’s claim that the godhead of all religions is simply a projection into supernature of a father-figure who protects and judges.

So the womb of being is really, one could say, the essential truth, the essential being. To Nietzsche, “the womb” is a speech figure: it means the innermost. The essence of being is naturally where one has the greatest interest, that is the most real thing, and if one assumes that the divine place for mankind is another world, then the womb of being is there, and from there it calls upon one. Therefore, he says that the womb of being, which is the essence of being, speaks not unto man save as man. That means that only inasmuch as one assumes the ultimate and divine and essential reality to be in man, is the womb of being in man, speaking in the form of man. In that case, naturally the other world would be a celestial nothingness, a dehumanized world. Inasmuch as body is banished, man has gone; he is a mere question mark, a triangle or square, an abstraction of man. He is dehumanized, and he moves in a world of non-being; there is no matter, no stuff, no substance. Reality for Nietzsche is entirely linked up with the visibility, the tangibility, the definiteness of the body.

Verily, it is difficult to prove all being, and hard to make it speak. Tell me, ye brethren, is not the strangest of all things best proved?

Yea, this ego, with its contradiction and perplexity, speaketh most uprightly of its being—this creating, willing, evaluating ego, which is the measure and value of things.

You see it is most improbable that the ultimate reality should be the “I,” for the “I” is a most confused and contradictory thing. Yet to him this “I” is the measure and the value of things, the ultimate reality. Is there any justification for this point of view?

Miss Wolff: I don’t know whether one should point to the next chapter where it is no longer the “I”!

Prof. Jung: *Knicken Sie nicht die Pointe!*⁵ You see, when we have made the mistake of believing it is the “I,” then we are suddenly slapped in the face. It is interesting. It shows how Nietzsche’s ideas grow in the text of *Zarathustra*; for it looks here as if the “I” were really the ultimate essence, the absolute being. Now, is there any justification for such an assumption?

Mrs. Adler: I think it is the compensation for the Christian standpoint.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is a compensation and therefore it has definitely its justification. The Christian point of view is that the ultimate reality is

⁵ “Don’t blunt the point.”

God, and only inasmuch as there is God is there existence at all; but the other reality, the empirical reality from which Nietzsche draws his conclusions, is obviously only created by the immediate awareness of the existence of the "I." And that I am, that I am aware of being myself, is such an immediate fact that it needs no other justification. On the contrary, you can derive from this reality of man every other so-called metaphysical reality, as he has just done; he says the other world is nothing but a derivative of the suffering ego of man. There is no substantiality to such metaphysical figures except through the absolute reality of "I"—the "I" exists and suffers and has imagination and so on. Now, of course, this is all egocentricity over against the Christian idea of a metaphysical universality, of God.

Mrs. Jung: Does he not mean consciousness by this "I"? I think that in this conception he is influenced by Schopenhauer.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the justification in Nietzsche's case is of course not only an empirical one; it is also dependent upon Schopenhauer's philosophy, where the "I" is the indispensable mediator for the redemption of the world. For if there were not an "I" capable of some ideas of its own, there would be no mirror to be held up to the face of the primordial will, in which to behold his own countenance and the nonsense he had created. And also, as you say, "I" means man's consciousness. What is "I"? Merely awareness, it is consciousness. When something is a reality to myself, or when I know there are contents which are related to a center, then I can say "I"—I do, or I think, or I hear, for instance—then only have I an awareness of myself. This ego consciousness is to Schopenhauer the turning point of the whole history or development of the world; if that did not exist, the world could never be redeemed. So Schopenhauer introduced an important change in the conception of the world. And it is interesting that he is really a Buddhist missionary, the first influence from the East, which is changing our conceptions in the most extraordinary way. Then after Schopenhauer comes Nietzsche with the background of natural science, materialism. The whole metaphysical importance has now shifted onto man, but one could say it was really the Buddhist influence upon the West; by that subtle and secret infection the idea is brought in that man is capable of doing something for himself. Of course we have an idea in the West that man is capable of a certain independence; the Catholic church assumes that, but the strict Protestant church assumes that everything is dependent upon the grace or the mercy of God. If man does not encounter the grace of heaven, there is nothing within him but darkness. Inasmuch as the Protestant

theologian assumes that man can do something towards his redemption, even in the most modest way—that he has at least a certain capacity in himself to receive the grace of heaven—then it is already an approach to Catholicism. But even in Catholicism it needs the means of grace, the holy communion, and so on.

Miss Wolff: I would say that in Catholicism he has a disposition to get saved but he can do nothing without the grace of the church; it goes further than the Protestant point of view.

Prof. Jung: You see, the Catholic church believes in the justification through work; thus far the Catholic church gives a possibility to man. While the strict Protestant, Karl Barth for example, denies absolutely that man can do anything for himself; if the grace of God doesn't descend upon him, nothing doing. This is the actual conflict between Brunner and Karl Barth; Brunner compromises but Karl Barth makes no compromise.⁶ Psychologically, I am on the side of Karl Barth. Not philosophically of course—I am no theologian—but psychologically I think that is right: the Protestant ought to insist upon man himself as being absolutely devoid of all means vis à vis God. That is psychologically very important.

Miss Wolff: Doesn't Nietzsche go a step beyond Schopenhauer? For Schopenhauer emphasizes merely the mind or the intellect, including art or anything which is a cultural achievement of man, while with Nietzsche there is apparently consciousness or awareness of the body, of the earth.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, with Nietzsche we come into a new sphere; Schopenhauer is really a classical philosopher while Nietzsche is something else: with Nietzsche it becomes drama. You see, Schopenhauer's philosophy had little to do with his own existence, while with Nietzsche, the man, his life and his philosophy were tragically the same. Schopenhauer makes a wonderful philosophy about the suffering of the world, and then every day he goes to his hotel and has an excellent lunch. Of course, with such a philosophy, one should deny existence, one should vanish into Nirvana. Some people once watched Schopenhauer while he was taking a walk on a hill behind Frankfurt. He was walking up and down, always murmuring to himself, and they thought he must have great secret thoughts in his mind. Then somebody went up be-

⁶ For Karl Barth, see above, 5 Dec. 1934, n. 9. In 1932 Emil Brunner published a book called *Nature and Grace*, to which Barth responded with a little book succinctly titled *Nein!*. He was saying no to the conjunction *and*: that divine grace is entirely outside of nature. These works are reprinted in Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, *On Natural Theology* (London, 1946).

hind and listened to him, and to his great amazement he heard: If only I had married Ann So-and-So fifty years ago! Nobody knew that name but they investigated and found out that this Miss So-and-So was the daughter of a druggist who had sold the best pills against cholera, and with his death the recipe was lost. Voilà! That is Schopenhauer.

Miss Wolff: There was a story about one of his landladies. She was really very mean and he went to all possible courts, finally to the Supreme Court, in order to fight her. But he did not get his rights, and that was terribly important to him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he was full of contradictions. His human existence was quite apart from his philosophy, while in Nietzsche the two began to come together and in a very tragic way. So he goes really further than Schopenhauer whose philosophy is merely a mental affair, while Nietzsche feels that it concerns the whole man; to him it was his own immediate reality. It is impossible to be this on the one side and something entirely different on the other, to have a philosophy which has nothing to do with one's reality. Schopenhauer's philosophy is in a way also a Christian philosophy, because he accepted the likeness of Buddhism and Christianity where they coincide in the conviction that this world is a futility, the thing that should be overcome, and that the other world is the reality—whether it is called heaven or the positive non-being in Nirvana. He still believed in the non-importance of this world. But Nietzsche begins to emphasize the importance of the body by losing his belief in other worlds. As soon as the transcendent goal of life fails, the whole importance is of course in the ego consciousness and in the personal life. That is inevitable.

And this most upright existence, the ego—it speaketh of the body, and still implieth the body, even when it museth and raveth and fluttereth with broken wings.

Always more uprightly learneth it to speak, the ego; and the more it learneth, the more doth it find titles, and honours for the body, and the earth.

A new pride taught me mine ego, and that teach I unto men: no longer to thrust one's head into the sand of celestial things, but to carry it freely, a terrestrial head, which giveth meaning to the earth.

Here he continues to attribute the essential reality to the "I," and the reality of the "I" consists in the obvious reality of the body. The body is the truest thing; this is indubitable and undeniable even if it should

fabricate poetry and philosophy or other illusions and delusions—the fluttering with broken wings.

Dr. Escher: The “I” of Schopenhauer is the conscious “I,” and the “I” of which Nietzsche speaks is between our psychological “I” and the self.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, but just wait! In the next move Nietzsche gives a new definition of the “I,” but for the time being we must share his insufficient formulation—especially since this is the mistake which has also been made historically. As you know, with the collapse of metaphysical convictions, the “I” of man really became important. That was the age of individualism. Individualism has nothing to do with individuation; individualism is an inflation of the ego of man, because suddenly the ego finds himself in the position of the Kontra-punkt of God himself. You see, the great ego of the world was God and we were nothing but the thoughts of God, and now we find that God is a thought of man. Therefore, man in all his modesty becomes a cosmic factor of the very first order, because he is the maker even of gods. And mind you, man is forever in the funny position of the religious atheist, whose psychology has been beautifully characterized by Bernard Shaw in one of his plays: the atheist complains and laments over the fact that he has lost his atheistic belief—all his highest convictions have been lost, he can no longer believe in atheism. Of course, it is exactly the same whether a man is a theist or an atheist; it is only plus and minus. But that has been the preoccupation of man forever.

You see, Nietzsche speaks here according to the prejudice of his time, the materialistic individualism of the eighties: if the ego has everything it wants, everything is all right. Our modern socialistic philosophy is still that; Karl Marx is of that time. It is the enlightened individualism called socialism, the idea being merely that every individual should be granted a decent existence. That is the individualistic ideal sure enough, because if all individuals are not granted a decent existence one doesn’t feel well. If I have no friends with decent homes, I cannot be invited to dine with them, and if I have not a decent home I cannot give *them* nice dinners. So it is assumed that a certain number of human beings must have nice homes.

Now inasmuch as that formulation of the “I” is a mistake due to the inflation of the ego, at the end of the nineteenth century it began to be overcome. Soon Nietzsche brought an entirely new point of view which was more up-to-date. He was, in a way, a prophet. “Always more uprightly learneth it to speak, the ego; and the more it learneth, the more doth it find titles and honours for the body and the earth.” That is, the

more you enter the mood of this ego consciousness, the more you will find how important the body is for that reality. You see, the ego consciousness is exceedingly narrow; it contains only a few things in the moment and all the rest is unconscious. You need to gallop from one continent to another in order to have a survey. And you must make abstractions in order to have a total vision of things, because you cannot imagine all the details of things and at the same time have a view of their totality. Your consciousness is so restricted that you must economize, make abstractions; it is really the exact opposite to what people suppose to be the universal consciousness of the deity. One could say that man has come home to himself after travelling in God's consciousness in the cosmos, and finds that the origin of the whole business is the very small and narrow house of the human mind, the narrowness and restriction of consciousness. And he finds that the reason for that restriction is very obviously the body.

You cannot be conscious of many things simply because you are not where they are; I am not conscious of what is happening in the library, for instance, and I cannot hear what somebody says in the library because my ears are here and not there. If I could do without my body, then my ears might be anywhere in New York or Stockholm. I could hear and see all things, God knows what. But as a matter of fact there is the body and the body is in time and space; if it were not, there would not be that restriction of consciousness. Also, if there were no restriction, there would be no consciousness, for if you are conscious of millions of things as it seems to you, you are conscious of nothing: your consciousness is then exceedingly blurred. And the distinction, the real essence of consciousness, is exclusiveness.⁷ You must be able to exclude many things in order to be absolutely conscious. So restriction is the very being, the very character, of consciousness. And the reason for that distinctness, that particular capacity of acuteness of consciousness, is the body, which restricts you to a certain place in space and a certain moment in time. It protects you against the elemental quality of cosmic indistinctness. Without consciousness, how can anything be distinguished, how can anything happen? There can be no world if nobody is aware of it. If there is nobody to speak of the existence of a world there is none. And how can there be an acute consciousness without the restriction of the body?

So it comes home to us that the body is the ultimate reason of every-

⁷ More commonly Jung speaks of the discriminating (or Logos) feature of consciousness as against the unconscious, which is characterized by fusion and merging.

thing which can be represented in and by consciousness. The great realization of the end of the nineteenth century is that the body is extremely important, at the bottom of the whole business, and any change which happens to the body will influence the mind. People believed that even hysteria had to do with the body, and that there was no such thing as a psyche. This was, of course, the extreme reaction against the metaphysics of the preceding time. "A new pride taught me mine ego, and that teach I unto men: no longer to thrust one's head into the sand of celestial things, but to carry it freely, a terrestrial head, which giveth meaning to the earth!" That is exactly what I meant: it is the head of earth which gives meaning to the earth. The body is the guarantee of consciousness, and consciousness is the instrument by which the meaning is created. There would be no meaning if there were no consciousness, and since there is no consciousness without body, there can be no meaning without the body.

A new will teach I unto men: to choose that path which man hath followed blindly, and to approve of it—and no longer to slink aside from it, like the sick and perishing!

This means: Since man—or his ego consciousness—is a living body, his body is ultimate reality. And that is right: it has to go its own path. It is a good path, and any deviation from it is wrong, just morbidity—wrongness in the biological sense. You see here something very important. This passage would justify the criticism one often hears of Nietzsche, particularly of *Zarathustra*, that he preaches a ruthless egoism or individualism. If Nietzsche had written nothing else but this sentence, that surely would be true: one could accuse him of it. But it all comes from the fact that he speaks the language of his time. He says "I," the ego consciousness, without clearly examining that concept of the "I." He never asks what the "I" is really, he has no psychological criticism. The moment he began to criticize it psychologically, he would see that the statement "I," or the expression "ego consciousness," is too limited, it is a mistaken concept; it is wrong.

The sick and perishing—it was they who despised the body and the earth, and invented the heavenly world, and the redeeming blood-drops; but even those sweet and sad poisons they borrowed from the body and the earth!

To what do these blood drops refer?

Miss Hannah: To the communion.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the redeeming blood-drops would be the blood of Christ. And he says they drew even those from the body and the earth.

Mrs. Jung: Wouldn't it be the bread and the wine?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the red wine is the blood, and the substance of the earth is the bread, and that is the body and the blood of Christ. He calls them sweet and poisonous, because he says our morbidity comes from the fact that we live by the metaphysical instead of the physical principle—we live by the spirit but the spirit is nothing but our imagination. There again he is lacking in psychological criticism, for what is imagination?

From their misery they sought escape, and the stars were too remote for them. Then they sighed: "O that there were heavenly paths by which to steal into another existence and into happiness!" Then they contrived for themselves their by-paths and blood draughts!

This is of course a blasphemous desecration of the communion.

Beyond the sphere of their body and this earth they now fancied themselves transported, these ungrateful ones. But to what did they owe the convulsion and rapture of their transport? To their body and this earth.

That is plain. They were not grateful to the body, allowing themselves to be transported in their *ekstasis* away from this earth to a heavenly place. But the very *ekstasis* is due to a convulsion of their humble servant, the body. If the body did not help them, they would not have an *ekstasis*. How can an *ekstasis* be brought about otherwise? If they are in the body, then they can step out of it; the body indirectly helps the *ekstasis*. And of course if you ill-treat the body, it can throw you out of the house entirely, out of your body.

It is like ill-treating objects. You know, objects are inanimate things; they lie about heavily, have no legs or wings, and people are often quite impatient with them. For instance, this book would like it very much better, I am sure, if it were lying near the center of the table where it is safe, but I have put it on the edge. It is an awkward position for that poor creature of a book. It may fall down and get injured. If I am impatient, if I touch them in an awkward way, it is a lamentable plight for the poor objects. Then they take their revenge on me. Because I ill-treat them they turn against me and become contradictory in a peculiar way. I say, "Oh, these damned objects, dead things, despicable!"—and instantly they take on life. They begin to behave as if they were

animated living things. You will then observe what the German philosopher tells about the *die Tücke des Objekts*. And the more you curse them, the more you use speech figures which insinuate life into them. For instance, "Where has that book hidden itself now? It has walked off and concealed itself somewhere." Or, "The devil is in that watch, where has it gone?" Objects really take on dangerous qualities with people who are particularly impatient with them: they jump into your eyes, they bite your legs, they creep onto a chair and stick up a point upon which you sit—such things. You will find many beautiful examples in that book by Vischer. What spectacles can do, for instance! If there is a chair with a concealing pattern, my spectacles will seek it and become invisible, the contours merging with the pattern. And, of course, buttered toast will never fall on the unbuttered side. And the coffee jug will most certainly try to get its spout under the handle of the milk pot, so that when you lift the coffee pot you pour out the milk. But such things only happen to people who are impatient with objects—then the devils go into the objects and play the most extraordinary stunts.⁸

Gentle is Zarathustra to the sickly. Verily, he is not indignant at their modes of consolation and ingratitude. May they become convalescents and overcomers, and create higher bodies for themselves!

Neither is Zarathustra indignant at a convalescent who looketh tenderly on his delusions, and at midnight stealeth round the grave of his God; but sickness and a sick frame remain even in his tears.

Many sickly ones have there always been among those who muse, and languish for God; violently they hate the discerning ones, and the latest of virtues, which is uprightness.

Here we see much of the personal experience of Nietzsche himself. You know, when you have overcome a prejudice, for instance, you are inclined to be tolerant. You say, "Oh, God, yes, one can understand things that way; people don't know yet." But those people who remain in a prejudice, with their half knowledge that it *is* a prejudice, get quite resentful against those who have given it up.

⁸ The German philosopher Friedrich Theodor von Vischer wrote about the mischievousness of inanimate objects in his novel, *Auch Einer* (Leipzig, 9th edn., 1902). Jung discusses this idea in CW 6, par. 627.

Backward they always gaze toward dark ages: then, indeed, were delusion and faith something. Raving of the reason was likeness to God, and doubt was sin.

Too well do I know these godlike ones: they insist on being believed in, and that doubt is sin. Too well, also, do I know what they themselves most believe in.

Verily, not in backworlds and redeeming blood-drops: but in the body do they also believe most; and their own body is for them the thing-in-itself.

What does he mean by the godlike ones?

Mrs. Brunner: He means the priests who think they know what is right.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, but why are they godlike? Or why should they behave like that?

Miss Wolff: I think he means the people who in a certain drunkenness thought they knew what godlikeness was; he speaks of the Middle Ages or the old times.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is sure that they are looking back towards dark times, obviously the Middle Ages, when their delusion and belief was a different thing. So the mania of reason could be understood as a disoriented state of mind. I think that interpretation is right—a disordered reason is God Almighty-likeness, and doubt is sin. And that is perfectly true. He means by those godlike ones, then, people with a medieval mind. But why should he think that they are godlike? There must be a sort of psychological justification for calling them godlike.

Prof. Reichstein: Perhaps he means that they live in the other world; he speaks here of the godlike people, and of the people who live in this world.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the psychological justification for such an attribute is that the condition in which such people live is a godlikeness. If you assume that there is a metaphysical god and that people live a metaphysical existence, then they are like God; and psychologically the metaphysical place would be the unconscious. People who live in the unconscious are like the unconscious; they are also unconscious. So, in as far as you can call the reality of the unconscious the deity, they are like the deity: they are like unto God. This shows itself in reality through the fact that they have a peculiar self-evidence in life, they feel justified; it is certain that their way is right—or wrong. There is no doubt about it: they have the natural self-evidence of an animal. Therefore, an animal is godlike in a way, because it fulfils the meaning

of its pattern. And this is a metaphysical thing to the animal. It is not conscious of its pattern—as little as the Pueblos know that they are living in a Pueblo, or the elephant knows that he is an elephant—though he knows perhaps *better* that he is an elephant inasmuch as he has to do with man. But we usually do not know what we are. You know, perhaps the story of the knight in the thirteenth century, who was caught by his enemies and put into a dark dungeon, and finally, after years of suffering in that cave, he got impatient and beat his fists upon the table, saying, “If only these damned Middle Ages would come to an end!”

Miss Wolff: Doesn’t Nietzsche here make an allusion to certain historic facts when he uses this word *Gottähnlich*? He means those who believe in God are *Gottähnlich*.⁹ There must be the association of epileptic people here, who were considered to be particularly in touch with God, as the dancing dervishes and such people were also, according to those medieval beliefs. So I think he probably compares the godlike people to them—since those who were mad, who had no ego, who were dissolved, were supposed to be particularly near to God.

Prof. Jung: According to primitive people, crazy people are possessed by spirits.

Miss Wolff: Yes, and as he puts the emphasis on consciousness and the ego, he criticizes them particularly.

Prof. Jung: But now he says, “Verily, not in backworlds and redeeming blood-drops: but in the body do they also believe most; and their own body is for them the thing-in-itself.” You see even for those other-worldlings, the body is the absolute thing, even they believe most in the body. We were assuming just the contrary. How is that?

Miss Hannah: That is just true. Nobody worries over his health like a theologian.

Prof. Jung: Well, there is something in the idea that people who are too metaphysical are bothered by their bodies. For the more the mentality or the psyche leaves the body to itself, the more the body goes wrong. The two ought to live together. That explains the bad state of health of intuitive people who don’t even need to be metaphysical; it is enough that they are a bit too intuitive. They live too much in mere possibilities, and then the digestion begins to suffer, they get chronic diseases, ulcers of the stomach or the duodenum, for instance. Or they may get other disturbances of the body of an infectious nature; many organic diseases are due to this peculiar lack of attention. People who have lived too much upon spiritual ideas should bring their attention

⁹ *Gottähnlich*: God-like.

back to their bodies. So one can say it is always a wise thing when you discover a new metaphysical truth, or find an answer to a metaphysical problem, to try it out for a month or so, whether it upsets your stomach or not; if it does, you can always be sure it is wrong. It is necessary to have metaphysical ideas—we cannot do without them—but it is also necessary to submit them very seriously to the test whether they agree with the human being: a good metaphysical idea does not spoil one's stomach. For instance, if I hold a metaphysical conviction that we live on after death for fifty thousand years instead of fifty million—if that is a solution—I try what it means if I believe in fifty thousand years only; perhaps that is good for my digestion—or bad. You see, I have no other criterion. Of course, it sounds funny, but I start from the conviction that man has also a living body and if something is true for one side, it must be true for the other. For what is the body? The body is merely the visibility of the soul, the psyche; and the soul is the psychological experience of the body. So it is really one and the same thing. Therefore, a good truth must be true for the whole system, not only for half of it. According to my imagination, something seems to be good—it fits in with my imagination—but it proves to be entirely wrong for my body. And something might apparently be quite nice for the body, but it is very bad for the experience of the soul, and in that case I have a metaphysical enteritis. So I must be careful to bring the two systems together; the only criterion is that both are balanced. When life flows, then I can say it is probably all right, but if I get upset I know something must be wrong, out of order at least. Therefore, people with one-sided convictions of a decidedly spiritual nature are forced by the body to pay attention to it. I have seen many people who suffered from all sorts of ailments of the body simply on account of wrong convictions.

But it is a sickly thing to them, and gladly would they get out of their skin. Therefore hearken they to the preachers of death, and themselves preach backworlds.

Hearken rather, my brethren, to the voice of the healthy body; it is a more upright and pure voice.

More uprightly and purely speaketh the healthy body, perfect and square built; and it speaketh of the meaning of the earth.

Here you have it. He trusts to the reaction of the healthy body. The healthy body is the healthy life, and the healthy life is the life of the soul of man as much as his body, because soul and body are not two things. They are one.

LECTURE III

6 February 1935

Prof. Jung:

I have a contribution by Mrs. Baynes. "Here is a curious parallel between the last verse in the chapter on the Backworldsmen and one of Wilhelm's commentaries on the *I Ching*. Nietzsche says: 'More uprightly and purely speaketh the healthy body, perfect and square-built: and it speaketh of the meaning of the earth.' "

You probably noticed that peculiar expression, the "four square" body. The body is of course very much the earth, and "it speaketh of the meaning of the earth" means that inasmuch as the body has produced consciousness, it produces the meaning of the earth. If you could give consciousness or a creative mind to a book for instance, or to any kind of object, it would speak its contents; give consciousness to wood and it speaks the meaning of wood; give it to stone and it speaks the meaning of stone.

Then Mrs. Baynes goes on. "Wilhelm is commenting on the second line in the hexagram Kun, the Receptive, Earth, and he says: 'Heaven has a circle for its symbol, and the earth a right-angled quadrangle. Thus right-angledness is an original attribute of the earth.' "

Kun is the sign of Yin, and the absolute Yin hexagram with six weak lines is the receptive sign; Kun is the conceiving earth. The first line of that hexagram is:

If you tread on frost, firm ice is not far away.

The hoar-frost is not quite solid, it crumbles, but ice is solid. That is the quality of the Yin: it is cold and solid, the northern side of the mountain; it is night, humidity, the earth. Then going on with the description of the earth, the second line is:

Straight, right-angled, large.

Even without purpose, nothing remains unfurthered.

This means that even without purpose things move or are helped to move. Then the third line:

Hidden lines, we can remain steadfast.
If perhaps you are in the service of a king,
Seek not works, but bring to fruition!

This shows that if one remains persistent in the hidden, unspoken purpose, then the very nature of the earth, the hidden lines in the earth, will lead you. You are as if in the service of a king; you have no purpose because the king has the purpose. The hidden king, the king dormant in the earth, is the ruler or the leader. And "Seek not works but bring to fruition" means "Don't go about as if you didn't know what to do, seeking works out of your own invention, but follow up the thing which is there already and accomplish it." It is all blind doing; it is the doing in the night, following dark intimations, the concealed lines.

The fourth line says:

A tied-up sack. No blame; no praise.

The idea is that one is as if tied into a dark sack. You cannot escape, you cannot see, you are entirely passive, and therefore no blame and no praise attaches to your position. And the fifth line is:


Yellow undergarment brings the highest good fortune.

Yellow is the color of the earth and the desired middle way. So it means the correct inner attitude, which would be an adaptation to oneself; as an outer garment is an adaptation to the world. If you have a correct attitude to the things within, it brings good fortune. The German word is *Heil* which originally meant a bit more, almost salvation. But good fortune in the *I Ching* usually refers to worldly good fortune; it is often used for direction in an entirely worldly enterprise. Before a person starts a business, for instance, he asks one of the Taoist soothsayers to cast the *I Ching* oracle, and in that case what is called the judgment at the beginning of each sign is chiefly used. That is the oldest interpretation—dating from the eleventh or twelfth century B.C., the time of King Wen and the Duke of Chau—and there it is said whether a sign is in general good or bad. It might say: "Great good fortune without blame," for example, or, "It is now a good time to cross the great water." Such indications are all the person who asks the question wants to know, as a rule. The deep moral implications of the subtle lines which follow are usually not mentioned. But of course anybody with a subtle mind would ask the oracle less for his worldly than for his spir-

itual good—in order to find the right way through the chaos or labyrinth of his own soul.

Mrs. Baynes particularly calls my attention to the second line, “straight, right-angled, large,” which refers to the earth. Wilhelm worked out the Commentary on the *I Ching* with the help of Lau, that old Chinese sage who initiated him, and concerning this line, it says: “Heaven has the circle for its symbol and the earth the right-angled square. Thus the four square quality is the original or primordial quality of the earth.” In the old symbolism of the cosmogonic forces in Chinese philosophy there is a center which is called Kian, (“heaven”) from which four elementary forces—all with special names—emanate into the spaces of the earth, which is square like this:

And around this quadrangle are the moving qualities of Yin and Yang as even and odd numbers, which are at the same time the qualities of the elements: fire, water, earth, metal, etc. These form a sort of vortex; the whole system



is rotating. That is the idea of the basic structure of the world. “On the other hand, movement in a straight line,” the Commentary goes on, “is an original attribute of the creative power, and quantity (greatness) is such an attribute. All four-square things have their root in the straight line and in their turn form corporeal entities. Now the Kun, the receptive, conceiving quality of the earth, adjusts itself to these qualities of the creative power and makes them its own. Thus out of the straightness of the creative power, the straight line, there develops a square, and out of a square, a cube. That is the surrender of Kun, the conceiving earth, to the original intimation of creative power.”

In other words, this creative power which is just a straight line, like an arrow or the course of a projectile, is translated by the three dimensions of space into bodies; that is the origin of bodies. From all this, one can appreciate the depth from which Nietzsche drew his speech symbolism. Probably he himself was not conscious of the meaning of that four-square; if somebody had criticized him severely for using such an expression, and asked just why the earth should be four-square, it is possible that Nietzsche might have yielded and said, “Oh, let that expression go, it is not absolutely indispensable.” But it is indispensable in a deeper sense. For the idea that the earth is four-square has been found at a tremendous depth in the collective unconscious, here as well as in China, and probably all over the world.

Mr. Allemann: The four square is in the *muladhara chakra*.¹

¹ The *muladhara chakra* is the place where the Kundalini serpent sleeps. This repre-

Mr. Baumann: The Egyptians had the same idea about the form of the world: there were four principles.

Prof. Jung: Do you mean the four monkeys and the four toads that watched the creation of the world?

Mr. Baumann: There were different conceptions about it; there were four gods, and four couples of gods, and then they have four principles which mean time, space, *materia*, and power.

Prof. Jung: There is also the idea that the four-square quality of the temples really meant the earth: the four-square altar was understood to be a symbol of the earth. But I am not so certain about these interpretations. The only source for the philosophical interpretation of Egyptian symbolism is Plutarch. Jamblichus is not absolutely reliable, he is a bit fantastical sometimes; unfortunately it is not on a sound basis. That the old Egyptians had philosophical interpretations we know from Herodotus as well as Plutarch, but we have very little material to prove what the interpretations actually were.² The Greeks were the main source. The later speculations are quite unreliable, based upon mere air or intuition—which is of course not a recognized scientific principle. Now we will go on to the next chapter: “The Despisers of the Body,” where Zarathustra continues to preach the paramount importance of the body. He elaborates upon the meaning of the body and makes some very curious discoveries.

To the despisers of the body will I speak my word. I wish them neither to learn afresh, nor teach anew, but only to bid farewell to their own bodies—and thus be dumb.

“Body am I, and soul,” so saith the child. And why should one not speak like children?

But the awakened one, the knowing one, saith: “Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the name of something in the body.”

This statement sounds entirely materialistic, as if the soul were really nothing but a derivative of chemical processes in the body. It is unfortunate that Nietzsche always uses the word *body* instead of saying “the living body,” for the dead body surely never produces a soul; and what

sents the most elementary form of life. See above 6 June 1934, n. 11 for Hauer’s lectures. Cary F. Baynes did an English rendering of the monumental Richard Wilhelm translation of *I Ching* or *Book of Changes*, for which Jung had written an extensive Foreword. It is likely that Nietzsche would have traced “four square” to Pythagorean sources rather than to Chinese.

² For Plutarch and Herodotus, see above 31 Oct. 1934, n. 6.

a living body is we don't know exactly. We only know that there is such a thing and that it has decidedly different qualities from a dead body. The dead body has the disagreeable quality of decomposing very quickly; it suddenly becomes the physical process of chemical decomposition or oxidation. While the living body is always striving against decomposition, it is in the highest degree synthetic; from simple chemical bodies in the foodstuff, it builds up extremely complicated synthetic substances, which are kept on that level without being destroyed by oxidation. So there is an additional secret in the living albumen which science does not know, and it is that living body which produces something like a psyche. You see, if he said: "Living body am I entirely," it would be correct and the materialistic mistake would not be possible. Of course, it makes all the difference in the world whether a body is living or dead. Now, one can say that psyche is an accompaniment of the living body, or even that it is produced by the living body, that it is a derivative; this is, at all events, a perfectly workable hypothesis, and you know science for a relatively long time now has proceeded upon that assumption. Of course, it is sound materialism for people to take it for granted that they know what a living body is. But no intelligent man would believe that he knows what life is; only idiots believe that they know, in the way of a *sous entendu*, or a silent premise.

The body is a big sagacity, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd.

This is a very important and interesting statement. You see, inasmuch as the living body contains the secret of life, it is an intelligence. It is also a plurality which is gathered up in one mind, for the body is extended in space, and the here and the there are two things; what is in your toes is not in your fingers, and what is in your fingers is not in your ears or your stomach or your knees or anywhere else in your body. Each part is always something in itself. The different forms and localizations are all represented in your mind as more or less different facts, so there is a plurality. What you think with your head doesn't necessarily coincide with what you feel in your heart, and what your belly thinks is not what your mind thinks. The extension in space, therefore, creates a pluralistic quality in the mind. That is probably the reason why consciousness is possible. Different things are represented, and these are always supposed to be in a field of consciousness, in a sort of extension, that is. Yet you feel that the whole, that plurality, is drawn together and referred to something you call "I"; it is referred to a center which you cannot say has extension, as little as you can say of a

thought that it has extension. Thought is a disembodied something because it has no spatial qualities. So "I" is as if it were something abstract, yet in a vague way it coincides with your body; when you say "I" you beat your chest for instance, to emphasize the "I."

You see that with primitives: whenever they speak of themselves, they say "Me! Me!"—emphasizing their body. They even go as far as to be very particular about their shadows which they think belong to the body; they are just as offended, they consider it as much an outrage, when you step upon their shadow as when you give their body a kick. To that extent is the body identical with the ego consciousness in primitive man. We don't include the shadow, and our ego is more detached from the body, but our ego concept is for that reason abstract, and therefore less spatial: it has almost no spatial quality. To say "My body is myself" sounds to us like a metaphor or a plastic manner of speech; when you say "I" you don't usually mean this unworthy body that sits here. But the primitive is weighed down by the fact that the "I" is chiefly the body, and that expresses itself in an entirely different way also; namely, he only refers to that center of the ego which affects his body. For instance, a thought which does not affect the working of his stomach or the act of breathing or the palpitation of his heart, does not exist. The only thought which he has consciously, is one which affects him physically, through the skin, or the muscles, or the position of his body, or the function of his intestines. It is as if a thought which did not upset the regularity of the respiration would be *non-arrivé*, not psychological.

That explains why a primitive is quite unable to fill his whole day with consciousness, there are hours on end when he is just sitting, gazing into space, and thinking nothing at all. Of course, all the time a psychological movement does take place in him, but such thoughts are subliminal; they don't reach consciousness because they are not underlined, or supported, by physical disturbances. Therefore, certain negro tribes hold that thinking is done in the stomach exclusively; so only thoughts that upset your digestion would be authentic. The Pueblo Indians say thinking is done with the heart, and that the people who believe they think in the head are obviously mad: so all Americans are of insane mind. I had to correct myself very quickly in order not to be reckoned as American, to agree that only that is thought or consciousness which affects the heart or the breathing, the *anahata* region. Of course, there are numbers of ideas or emotions or representations or perceptions which definitely upset the act of breathing. Watch the curve of your breathing, and you see that if something is said, or you

hear a sound, or if there is any other disturbance, your breathing is instantly affected, particularly when you are just starting to speak, when you are gathering up breath to have the necessary volume of air to produce the sound.

The next stage is the throat where the sound is made, speech, and there are a vast number of people on the level of thinking in words only; when there isn't a word to designate a thing, when they cannot hear it or see it printed, then the thing doesn't exist. Because they see a word, they think there must be the corresponding thing in existence. For instance, Kant says in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that because people say "God," they think God *is*.³ The psychical center of millions of people is in the throat; somebody shouts a string of tremendous words and they all think, "Now something has happened, isn't it marvelous? It must be true." Yet the words mean nothing whatever. If they would only use this thing up in their heads, this inexorable light, they would see it was perfect nonsense. But somebody has produced a world, made a reality, by making a string of words, and they accept it; they take it seriously without hesitating one single moment as to whether it makes sense or not. Of course, it cannot be denied that a number of people have climbed a bit higher and arrived at the level where even words don't produce worlds, but they are rare, a very small percentage of the population.

Mr. Baumann: Some psychological tests were recently tried on me, and I discovered that unless words were associated with a sight or a sound, I could not remember them.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is of course necessary to associate things with the body in order to keep them. You have to visualize them, to project things out into the field of vision as if they were optical realities. Or you have to project them into the sphere of sound, as it were, and you do that best by using the word. Otherwise you cannot stabilize things. It is exceedingly difficult to think in absolutely abstract terms; even the most abstract mathematician uses signs—letters and numbers and formulas—in order to give body to utter abstractions which could not be kept in mind at all if not translated into something like a body. So what Nietzsche is saying here about the importance of the body is quite correct. His point of view that the soul is a mere derivative of the body is true insofar as we are unable to establish anything psychical without the aid of the body, without the aid of the connection with physical things. A complete abstraction is really impossible. It is wordless; it has

³ See above, 27 June 1934, n. 4.

no affinity with anything that could be called matter, and therefore is well-nigh non-existent. The highest center in the chakra system, *sahasrara*, would be the complete abstraction. It is utterly beyond any physical likeness or affinity. It is really non-existent because any kind of existence is always linked up with extension or body.

Now, we must consider this phrase "a war and a peace." You see, a plurality of things only exists or can exist because they contradict each other. For instance, if you have a peculiar sensation in your hand, and at the same time in your foot, there is a conflict between the two; one is above and the other below, and you don't know whether you should look first here or there. So all the pluralistic elements of your mind can be the cause for a conflict, if it is only the struggle for the priority of attention—you don't know to which you should attend first. It is also like a flock and a shepherd; the flock consists of a plurality, and if the units of a flock disperse, the shepherd must gather them together. And so the ego consciousness is the shepherd of a flock of psychical units, and if the shepherd is killed, the flock disperses. That would be schizophrenia. The splitting of the mind is a separating of the units, and then each unit behaves as if it were a little ego consciousness, and if there is a remnant of the shepherd left somewhere, if his ears at least remain, he will hear voices. The units behave like little egos and they speak with sheeplike intelligence.

One observes the same phenomenon in mediumistic experiments, where certain fragments of the mind are split off. The psyche is exceedingly dissociable. The fact that the mind really is based upon a plurality makes this a serious danger. One also observes very frequently in schizophrenics that as soon as the flock disperses, as soon as the war breaks out, the fragments of consciousness are projected into different parts of the body, so that they begin to speak with a certain amount of consciousness. I would call the attention of those among you who read German to that book by Staudenmayer called *Experimentelle Magie*.⁴ He had voices in different parts of his intestines, for instance. It is a very frequent thing that patients localize their voices somewhere in the body. We say quite normally, "It was as if my heart said to me," or, "as if I heard a voice within." But schizophrenics hear voices coming out of their feet or head or eyes. I have a patient who says: "Today I have voices in my upper lip." Or, "Now they are occupied with my navel." The voices are also personified as infinitely small men, who in thou-

⁴ Ludwig Staudenmayer, *Die Magie als Experimentelle Naturwissenschaft* (Magic as Experimental Natural Science) (Leipzig, 1912).

sands, like ants, walk over the body. That famous case, Schreber, was such a fellow.⁵ He found dozens of little men upon his eyelids, trying to raise or lower them, or walking upon his skin; and time and again one of the little men lost his independence and merged with the patient's consciousness. He always got angry and cursed when that happened. That would be a relative dissociation—the parts are not all absolutely independent; at times they join on again. It would be as if the frozen surface of a lake were broken up so that fragments were drifting on the surface, and then occasionally two pieces would join and freeze together and become a unit again. That is the moment when the little man says "Damn it!"—and merges with consciousness.

An instrument of thy body is also thy little sagacity, my brother, which thou callest "spirit"—a little instrument and plaything of thy big sagacity.

From this sentence you can see that Nietzsche treats the spirit very much on the same basis as the mind: he makes little or no difference between the two. That is the fatal mistake which was made in the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. They identified mind and spirit, which came from the fact that they had lost the empirical understanding of what spirit really is.⁶ The spirit descended to the level of mind, and particularly the mind which consists of words. That vast majority of people whose minds consist of words conquered the small minority whose minds consist of thought—and they in turn conquered those whose minds consist of spirit. So the spirit slowly descended from its celestial place to the level of intelligent thought, which of course was not as it should be, but better than when it descends still further and becomes mere words.

That idea is not my invention. It occupied very different minds in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Mauthner has written a philosophy on the basis of the mind being speech; he thinks that mind is derived chiefly from language, that mind is speech.⁷ You find these

⁵ Dr. D. P. Schreber, a German judge, published his *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* in 1903. Freud, without ever seeing the person, made a detailed study of this case in "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" (1912), std. edn., vol. 12.

⁶ Jung often blames this confusion on the ambiguity of the word *Geist* which means mind, spirit, ghost, etc.

⁷ Friedrich Mauthner, *Wörterbuch der Philosophie: Neue Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (Dictionary of Philosophy: a New Contribution to a Critique of Language) (München und Leipzig, 1910). Mauthner claimed that if Aristotle (for instance) had spoken Coptic

connections in the Upanishads also. And Anatole France says: "What is mind other than sound, an utterance, *L'aboiement d'un chien?*"⁸ You see, that is the bodily basis of the mental phenomenon, and the bodily accompaniment from which what we call "psyche" develops. So in coming down from the heights of the spirit, you get first into the plurality of thoughts, then into the vaster plurality of words, and you wind up with the barking of a dog—the utterance of mind in its origin was of course like the barking of a dog. That has led to the philosophy of Klages who identifies spirit and intellect, or mixes them up with mind, till spirit has become utterly unrecognizable; he fights the spirit as a destroyer of life. If he knew what the spirit was, he never could assume that, for spirit is originally a most effervescent thing, like the opening of a champagne bottle. It is most emotional, really a culmination of life.⁹

The German word *Geist* expresses it; the etymology of that word points to an effervescence, a welling up. The Latin word *spiritus* means just wind, and the Greek word *animos* has no spiritual meaning; it also means wind. Therefore, in the miracle of Pentecost, the descent of the Holy Ghost, there was the phenomenon of a great wind.¹⁰ Then the word *pneuma* in antiquity meant chiefly *prana*, the breath of life, and *prana* is characteristic of the living being. The living being is filled with the *pneuma*; there is no life without it. And it is by no means a mistake that the concept *pneuma*, which originally had no spiritual meaning whatever, later on under Christian influence took on that meaning. That was logical because spirit is a culmination of life, by no means destructive. But the intellect, this demon of words, is a destroyer of life; the more the mind becomes words the less there is life substance. It becomes just thin like words—or inasmuch as words are sound only, *flatus vocis*, a breath of voice.

Miss Wolff: Doesn't "to mind" also mean to memorize? "I mind" means I remember.

Prof. Jung: Well, that also hangs together with the fact that abstract

or Dakotan instead of Greek, his logic would have been different. Mauthner once said of Nietzsche that he was seduced by his own language.

⁸ He gives elsewhere a fuller quotation from Anatole France's *Le Jardin d'Epicure* (Paris, 1895), p. 80: "What is thinking? And how does one think? We think with words. That in itself is sensual and brings us back to nature. Think of it! A metaphysician has nothing with which to construct his world system except the perfected cries of monkeys and dogs" (CW 6, par. 40).

⁹ For Klages, see above, 23 May 1934, n. 5.

¹⁰ "And when the day of Pentecost had come, they were all together in one place. / And suddenly there came from heaven a noise like a violent, rushing wind" (Acts 2:1-2).

thoughts, in order to be kept, must be associated with the body; that is minding or remembering something.

Mrs. Jung: I think we got this idea of the word as being spirit from the Bible, where the world was created through God. And in the New Testament, in the Evangel of St. John, it says the Word was God and God was the Word, which seems to put the word very high indeed.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but the German *Wort* does not mean Logos exactly. Logos is the original conception, and the Logos has a peculiar quality; it is a higher concept than *nōus*, the Greek word, which can be translated by "mind," but both these words designate a sort of cosmogonic principle. In Gnosticism the cosmogonic principle is the equivalent of the Logos. In the more differentiated philosophy of Philo Judaeus, who is the real originator of the Logos philosophy,¹¹ the Gospel of St. John, that same principle is the Logos, and the Logos is divine. It is God. Now the Logos surely originally had to do with the word and therefore could be so translated, but the word was considered the creative factor in Egypt. Therefore, the inscription on the temple of Ptah: "What he speaketh becomes."¹² I should say that peculiar exaltation of the term *Logos*, meaning word, comes from the idea that it was the word which expressed the spirit. But the fact was, that they were filled with spirit and then they made words; while we make words and assume that we are filled with spirit. That is just the difference. They only spoke when the spirit filled them. When they were gripped by the effervescence of the spirit, they spoke even in different tongues, even in unintelligible words, according to the account of the glossolalia in the New Testament.¹³ And in that, the word is like matter. It is the definiteness of the divine impulse, the divine creative spirit. That inscription on the temple of Ptah shows very clearly this creative, becoming reality of the divine impulse, which is in itself beyond words and beyond bodies. It is prior to all creation, having no form; but as soon as it comes into the space of the world it takes on definiteness. It creates matter. Therefore, in the Tantric philosophy, matter is defined as the definiteness of the divine thought.

You see, ancient philosophy really started from a different reality

¹¹ For Philo Judaeus, see above, 16 May 1934, n. 6.

¹² The Egyptian Ptah, like Jahveh, created by speaking. In the *Pyramid Texts*, Ptah is said to create through "heart and tongue." See *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, ed. James H. Breasted (Philadelphia, 1912), pp. 44-47.

¹³ "Glossolalia" is normally translated into the vernacular as "speaking in tongues"—that is, speaking in no known language but in what, without inspired interpretation, is gibberish. Jung here gives the passage a more general interpretation. See Acts 2:3-4.

than ours, from a very different psychology. Speech was very unwieldy then. You can see what trouble Plato had to express certain ideas which to us are now definite conceptions; he had to use parables and all sorts of means in order to express his philosophical thought. The famous parable of the cave belongs to the theory of cognition, we say nowadays, but he had to express it by that clumsy apparatus. In reading medieval philosophy, one has to struggle with an extraordinary clumsiness of language. The original German was unspeakably heavy and difficult. There is the same trouble in reading the very elegant Latin of Stoic philosophy or the New Platonists; that language was just not differentiated enough to express subtleties. Greek was in a way much subtler, but in comparison with a modern language, that also was exceedingly archaic. So they always were under the pressure of spirit, which made it a very real thing to them, and they felt the word as the visible face of the spirit. Therefore, it was to them divine.

There was the same feeling in old China where every scrap of written paper was carefully collected by special people in order that it should not be soiled or lost, because the hieroglyphic or the writing was sacred. A written book was magic because it was the apparition of the spirit. That was the antique point of view, but in the subsequent differentiation of speech, the original phenomenon of the spirit was more and more lost sight of, and the word was then in place of the spirit. One sees that in the development of the Christian church; the real spirit is almost extinct, and only the printed word is left. Therefore, we cling to the word of the Bible. In the first centuries the four gospels were not even considered as a revelation of God. They were supposed to be useful books of an uplifting character, good to read, but nobody thought that they were the word of God revealed by immediate divine inspiration. That was a later invention, when they were seeking an authority instead of the spirit which was lacking. Read St. Paul and you can see how the spirit works. He was still under the pressure. His words are the stammering of the spirit; but we took it as the refinement of the spirit, the word itself as spirit—a great mistake. The word is merely what is left of the spirit after the spirit has passed. So modern development led first to the descent of the spirit into mind, and from mind into words, and then the spirit was utterly gone, so that we don't know what spirit is. We must make an effort to remember what it was. But anybody who has the faintest knowledge of spirit knows that it is the culmination of life. It is even the greatest intensity of life.

Dr. Escher has just asked me about a very complicated philosophical problem, the question of the relationship between spirit and mind or

intellect, which I cannot explain fully. This is exceedingly disputable ground and much depends naturally on the definition given to the phenomena. You see, I propose to call spirit such and such a thing, and mind such and such a thing, and with such a proposition we can discuss, but if “mind” can mean anything and “spirit” can mean anything, it is impossible. That is just the trouble, just what I was saying. Mind and spirit are nowadays so confused that the words are used interchangeably, as in German you use the word *Geist* for simply anything. It has also the connotation of *esprit* for instance, and one speaks of *esprit de vin*, *Weingeist*, the “spirit of alcohol.” Of course, alcohol was called *spiritus* because it is a volatile substance detached from a liquid by distillation, it is the volatile substance which goes over into the alembic. *Geist* is also an expression for a psychological concept, but we have to separate these terms: otherwise, we get entangled in all the nonsense which is happening now. For example, Klages thinks the spirit is the destroyer of life, which is *contradictio in adjecto*, the spirit has always been the creator of life. The orgiastic madness of antiquity is *prana*, the breath of life. A god fills you with his *prana*, or his *pneuma* or wind, and you become an air-being, which is of course a ghost or a soul; even body becomes breath. That was the original concept.

Prof. Reichstein: Could one not say it depends upon which side the libido is at the moment? For instance, we could say that nowadays people don't need to become more airlike than they are already. When the chthonic part is more emphasized, the libido is withdrawn from the spirit side and it drops down and becomes less differentiated.

Prof. Jung: Well, it has dropped down, that is the devil. You see, we have to detach from that intellectual thing.

Prof. Reichstein: It seems to be quite necessary, because otherwise the earth would not have enough force.

Prof. Jung: Quite. That we should emphasize the body is Nietzsche's message, and it is also the message of materialism, that is granted. We should emphasize the body, for thus we give body to concepts, to words. And we should insist on the fact that they are nothing but words since the spirit is gone, that there is no life in them—they are dead things, outside life. We should return to the body in order to create spirit again; without body there is no spirit because spirit is a volatile substance of the body. The body is the alembic, the retort, in which materials are cooked, and out of that process develops the spirit, the effervescent thing that rises. Nietzsche returned to himself, isolated himself from the whole world, crept into his own retort and underwent this process. Then suddenly he discovered that he was filled with a new

orgiastic enthusiasm which he called his experience of Dionysos, the god of wine. You see, that is the spirit. Dionysos is the god of prophecy, of prophetic dreams, and he is the god of the body. In the latter part of *Zarathustra* there is a beautiful poem where Nietzsche describes how he was digging down into himself, working into his own shaft; there you can see how intensely he experienced the going into himself, till he suddenly produced the explosion of the most original form of spirit, the Dionysian.¹⁴

Mr. Baumann: In the beginning of *Faust* there is a monologue where he was considering which was first, spirit, the word—or the deed, the action.¹⁵ Wasn't he putting the spirit into the body there?

Prof. Jung: *Faust* is already modern in that Goethe felt that the word alone was not enough. But it is the only available term to translate *Logos*, for Logos is most certainly not action. For the antique man, however, it *was* action, the word was the action of the spirit.

Mr. Baumann: Wasn't the word more a command?

Prof. Jung: Later on it became a command, but at that time it was the *pneuma*, which means the face of God, the Angel of the Face in the Old Testament. The Sufi conception of Allah, Chidr, is the Angel of the Face. It is the visibility of God, the face of the *pneuma*. The angel of the word, or the god of the word, is the visibility of the word. Therefore Christ, being God's son who became flesh, is the word.

Mr. Allemann: For many people I think there is still the word of power; the *mantra* has spirit or energy behind it.

Prof. Jung: But reversed energy. The *mantra* is the word which is supposed to open the magic door and is used in order to produce magic effects. It is a piece of old memory. It once was the face of God, and for those people in whom a bit of the old spirit is still alive, it can produce magic effects; but to us it means nothing. It is a word.

Mrs. Fierz: Originally the word was not at all clear; it was dark, and therefore it carried the secret meaning.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the words of God were the words of an oracle, for instance. And the words were dark; they were not concepts but the expression of the divine power. It was not necessary to understand. One had only to accept the divine word and one had accepted God. But you see, we expect words which we understand, and then they are just words. So a *mantra* means a world to people to whom it means any-

¹⁴ See Part IV, ch. 74, "The Song of Melancholy"; ch. 76, "Among the Daughters of the Desert"; and ch. 79, "The Drunken Song."

¹⁵ In *Faust*, Part One, "Faust's Study," Faust changes "In the beginning was the Word," to "In the beginning was the Deed."

thing at all, but to us it means nothing. For we simply judge by the words, or we judge by the extraordinary aspect of symbols. We find Mithraic symbols in a grotto, and ask what they mean, or think perhaps that they are foolish or poor. We don't know what spirit has created them, nor what spirit is behind them. Those symbols were expressions of a tremendous phenomenon. In themselves they are just traces, the footprints of something that has passed. But the footprints, of course, are not the being; you see, those people really beheld the being and therefore paid little attention to the footprints. Only when the thing had passed, when people were asking if there was anything left, they said, "Ah, here are footprints," and then they made a great story about them. So our situation is exactly reversed: we are now in the age where there is nothing but words, footprints—but we can do nothing with them, they are dead. Therefore, we must turn away from them and go back to the source where the whole thing began originally. And here is a message: Zarathustra says to go back to the body, go into the body, and then everything will be right, for there the greatest intelligence is hidden. Out of that living body everything originally has come. Well, that is true. One can say nothing else.

"Ego" sayest thou, and art proud of that word. But the greater thing—in which thou art unwilling to believe—is thy body with its big sagacity; it saith not "ego," but doeth it.

Here Nietzsche or Zarathustra prepares our minds for a very important insight; namely, it is not "I" that is intelligent. When we say "I," we mean our minds and think that whatever we can know of ourselves is known. That is a very curious prejudice. Only yesterday, for instance, a relatively intelligent lady was in my consulting room—apparently she has read many books—and she told me of her peculiar neurosis. Then she said, "And the most interesting thing is that my neurosis has no cause whatever, absolutely none; it has no meaning and no reason." I said, "Then it is a present from heaven, for I never heard of a neurosis that was without cause." "Yes," she said, "it must be something like that because really there is no cause for it, I know everything about myself." Perfectly harmless and innocent! She is absolutely aware of her psychology! There is a mountain, but she has not seen it. At the end of the hour she knew that something had been done in her which she had not done. She has been done; she has lived something which she did not understand, which she did not know—and *it lived her*.

It is a great discovery that below or aside from one's psyche, or consciousness, or mind, is another intelligence of which one is not the

maker, and upon which one depends. You see, Freud's great fear is that there may be something outside which is not "I"; to say there is a greater intelligence outside of one's own mind means that one must be crazy. Like Nietzsche. Unfortunately for Freud, Nietzsche was not the only one who had such thoughts; it was the conviction of all the thousands of years before Nietzsche, that man's intelligence was not the last word, that even his mind was the result of something behind the screen—that we are not the makers, but we are made. Your mind is not the creative god that makes a whole world jump into existence out of nothing. There is a preparation. There is, prior to consciousness, an unconscious out of which consciousness once arose, and that is an intelligence which surely exceeds our intelligence in an indefinite way.

LECTURE IV

13 February 1935

Prof. Jung:

We have a series of questions this morning. The first is by Mrs. Baumann: "In speaking about the spirit I cannot help thinking of Germany today and the 'high wind' blowing there. You once spoke about it in the seminar and in that connection I would like to ask if the backward movement of the swastika cannot be linked up with the backward movement of the Platonic year? I mean that since the manifestation is collective and racial, the swastika symbol might be turned backwards to mark the movement into Aquarius. It might be collectively valid for the tree of mankind, instead of the sun-moving swastika."

This is a bit involved. Of course I did not mention the swastika but was there something in particular in what I said last time which prompted this question, except that I was speaking of the spirit?

Mrs. Baumann: Only in the sense that so many people are talking about the backward movement of things.

Prof. Jung: By the backward movement, do you mean the so-called regression in Germany—going back from Christianity to heathendom for instance?

Mrs. Baumann: Yes, and the swastika itself is running backward. And you were saying that the meaning had gone out of spirit, descended to the mind, and then to words.

Mrs. Leon: You said that the spirit had to go back into the body.

Prof. Jung: That is it. The main emphasis is entirely on the body, and the descent of the spirit into the sphere of the body; in those paragraphs we dealt with last time, Nietzsche says that the spirit is reduced to a mere plaything of the body. And looked at from a spiritual point of view that is terrible regression, a movement backwards quite definitely. Ask any good Christian and he will say so. Therefore, Nietzsche has been accused of every unspeakable crime; he has even been made responsible for the world war. So the idea of the backward movement is quite justified, and I am glad to enter upon your question.

Mrs. Baynes: It seems to me the picture is terribly confused by hitching up this backward movement to the constellation of Aquarius.

Prof. Jung: Now wait! We are jumping enough already. Mrs. Baumann asks first about the actual spiritual movement in Germany, and she links this movement, which is a regression, to archaic symbolism and an archaic point of view in general; and she asks whether this movement is expressed also in the swastika which is moving backwards. You know, according to Buddhism, the movement to the left is not so much a backward movement as it is a wrong movement. It is a general idea in India as well as in Tibet, that in going round the stupa or what they call the *tchorten* (a sort of shrine, the equivalent of our cross, or those little chapels in the country with a picture of a saint), you must move round it in the way the sun goes; otherwise it is wrong. So the rotation in mandalas, expressed, say, by the swastika or a spiral or a vortex, must be in the sense of the hands on a watch; that is the way in which the light must rotate and the way you must move. If you move against it, it is evil, for you undo the regular course of things; therefore, it is associated with black magic. The way of spiritual differentiation or improvement is understood as the path of the right hand, and the opposite is the path of the left hand. Those two expressions are used in Tantrism for instance. The *chakra-puja*, where certain peculiar rites are practiced which are in bad repute, is called the path of the left hand, and that is also associated with magic, the left hand being the reversed sense, the way against the sun. Now curiously enough, one does not know how that originated. And those rather competent National Socialists to whom I talked in Germany did not know that their swastika was turning the wrong way. Somebody called their attention to it rather indelicately, and they suddenly said, "Dr. Jung, do explain to us why the swastika is turning the wrong way." A most embarrassing question! Sure enough, they hoped to get me into a fix. But you see, though it moves the wrong way when you look at it, if you put yourself *into* the National Socialist swastika, it moves the right way. The symbol is far-reaching; it has a certain psychological meaning, of whatever kind it is. So I think it really means something that the swastika is moving the wrong way.¹

Mr. Allemann: The swastika is the color of the sun, so I think it also means something that the National Socialist swastika is black.

¹ The swastika (Sanskrit for Good Luck), related to both the wheel and the cross, has been found, *inter alia*, in Greece, Tibet, Peru, Israel, and among American Indians. Jung was later to write that the left-turning swastika of the Nazis indicates regression to the unconscious. 7 Oct. 1946; *Letters*, vol. I, p. 444.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. It ought to be golden. That is most interesting—as interesting as the fact that the Soviets, who really cannot be accused of spiritual symbolism, have chosen the five-rayed star. The five-rayed star is the pentagram, and because it is the sign of earthly man, it is the sign of evil magic. You see, David's star is six-rayed, but the Soviet star is not only five-rayed, it is also red, the color of blood, so it is an intensely evil sign. Of course, the people who chose it for the Soviet had no idea of that. We can speculate—make a fantasy about it—and say that a master of the black arts was behind the whole show there. But I don't believe in such stunts, as little as I believe that the Mahatmas have whispered in my ear. (You know, the theosophists say that inasmuch as I have said anything good, it has been whispered into my ears by the Mahatmas living in Tibet, and the rest is rubbish.)

Mrs. Baynes: Going back to the point about the clockwise and counterclockwise, you remember in *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, the movement is counterclockwise, but it is supposed to be good. Also the Kundalini is supposed to be counterclockwise in the beginning.

Prof. Jung: That is the path of the left hand.

Mrs. Baynes: But you would not put it under black magic.

Prof. Jung: Well, it has that association because anything dark is of course associated with black magic. But that is not a valid statement; it is merely a fact that people associate it with black magic. And it is interesting that, if you go the wrong way round the *tchorten*, if you go against the sun, you have done something which is not regular, which is against the ordinances of heaven; if you want to be in a decent connection you must take the natural course: you must move with the sun.

Mrs. Adler: How is it in the horoscope? There are two movements there I think.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we have the peculiar astrological statements of the progressive movement of the sun through the signs of the zodiac, and the retrograde movement of the spring point in the zodiac. The horoscope has of course much to do with the mandala, and in mandalas also you often have the two movements at the same time; you see, that has to do with the union of pairs of opposites. I have already given you a lengthy explanation about these two movements in the horoscope. The one is the correct movement of the sun, beginning in the spring sign of the zodiac, in Aries the ram, then going on to Taurus the bull, and Gemini, etc.; and the other is the retrograde movement of the spring point (the position of the sun on the 21st of March) and that is called the precession of the equinoxes. And this movement is the basis for an entirely different calculation of time. The movement of the sun

clockwise makes the year, for the sun completes its course in one year and then returns to Aries, to the spring point; but the way of the precession of the equinoxes is the opposite, against the clock, and it takes twenty-six thousand years to return to the spring point, it takes 2,150 years to make one month, and the total, twelve months, takes twenty-six thousand years. That is the Platonic year, and that is the movement of the left hand, one could say.

Now Mrs. Baumann refers to the curious astrological statement that the position of the spring equinox is characteristic of a period of time. Of course this is a hypothesis, as it is a hypothesis that the position of the sun, or another planet, the so-called rising sign (that zodiacal sign which is just rising above the horizon at the moment of birth) is characteristic for the individual born at that moment. I cannot explain how people came to such assumptions; one must just take that for granted. The whole of astrology is based upon such an assumption. And I can't help mentioning again that, peculiarly enough, astrologers have clung to this statement even since it has become obvious that, on account of the precession of the equinoxes, the horoscope does not fit the actual constellation in the heavens. For instance, if you say the sun is in Aries, and then look at the sun with a telescope, you find it is not in Aries: it is sixty degrees back of Aries, it is at the end of the Fishes. So the astrological statement that because your sun was in such and such a sign, you have therefore such and such qualities, is not based upon astronomical facts; yet the astrologer goes on talking in that style. You see, our time calculation is entirely artificial. Those are only names which have nothing to do with the actual position of the planets or the sun or the moon in certain constellations. But the calculation of the Platonic year—when we say, for instance, that the spring point is now moving out of the last degrees of the Fishes into the sign of Aquarius, the water man—is a true astronomical statement. There we have a coincidence with the actual astronomical position of the spring equinox.

It is a very curious fact that enlightened astrologers of our day say the horoscope has of course nothing to do with the position of the stars, but it has to do with the dynamics of the seasons—spring, summer, autumn, and winter. That is valid. It is understandable that animals born in spring are different from those born in the fall; that is a fact which is generally known. And if applied to man, that can have an influence upon his constitution also, mental as well as physical. But those enlightened astrologers who know that the horoscope has no longer any parallelism with the actual position of the stars, now deny the efficiency of the actual astronomical position; they say that the

precession of the equinoxes has absolutely no influence on the human constitution. They deny that also because they are enlightened. You see, the whole matter is something about which one should not be enlightened; there are certain things which one understands ever so much better if one is not enlightened. Why that is so is a very great and very profound philosophical problem, and I had better not go into it. But, you see, that is what Mrs. Baumann means—that this backward movement of the swastika is in a sort of magic or sympathetic correspondence with the backward movement of the spring equinox, and this becomes particularly important in our times. We are in a time of transition, no doubt, and that is coincident with the transition of the spring equinox from the Fishes into Aquarius. According to astrological definition, that should produce a peculiar change in our human mind, which means in our attitude. So if one likes, one can parallelize the actual psychological development of man with this peculiar astronomical fact.

It is really remarkable that one sees everywhere, practically the same thing. Between Bolshevism and National Socialism there is only a very slight difference. And there is practically none between National Socialism and Fascism, just the difference of Italy and Germany, as the difference between Germany and Russia makes the difference between their two political movements. But *au fond* it is the same thing, so much so that enlightened National Socialists told me that this is of course the German form of Bolshevism. One sees the same movement in other countries where it has no such name. Roosevelt's New Deal is the same thing, and Lloyd George looks to Germany for his ideas about a new deal. He declared quite recently in the *Manchester Guardian* that he admired the Germans for their excellent ideas; his proposition for a new deal is really influenced by them. What Roosevelt is trying to produce is of course in harmony with the technical and businesslike character of America, so it takes on a sort of economic aspect, but *au fond* it is exactly the same thing again. These mass movements all over the world—on a small scale the Oxford Movement even—are always the same. It is a sort of collectivity on a low level. Therefore, one can really say there is a tremendous transformation going on throughout the world, and it is coincident with the approach of Aquarius.

Aquarius has always been characterized as an aerial sign, and it has to do with the wind of spring which brings the rain clouds; it is the sign of this actual time, which is the rainy season in those countries where the old Babylonian zodiac originated, in Mesopotamia for instance. At this time the wind rises, bringing the winter rains from the sea. Later

on comes the spring and the first evidence, the inundation, would be Pisces, and then comes Aries, the first fertility, the first shoots—the pushing Ram is the push of the first green leaves. Now Aquarius, being a wind sign, is of course a pneumatic sign, a sign of spiritual movement, of atmospheres and atmospheric disturbances. Moreover, modern astrology has associated the planet Uranus with Aquarius, and Uranus is the planet of unforeseen incidents or accidents, a most electric planet, causing thunderstorms and irregular and unforeseen events.

Now, in choosing the black swastika turning to the left, the Germans have surely expressed the backward movement in many ways. First of all, the swastika is a pagan sun symbol in spite of the fact that it is found in early Christianity, in the catacombs for instance—though probably it was in that case simply left over from pagan times. It is found all over the earth; it is an exceedingly archaic sun symbol. Then secondly, its backward movement, and thirdly the black color, the color of evil. Those are regressions into archaism, into the path of the left hand, which is the dark unconscious side. So one could say the sun is now transformed into a counter-sun, a sun which is not above but below, which is not bright but dark, which does not go clockwise but counter-clockwise. It is a revolution against the old trend of things, and therefore progress is arrested: there is a regression. People are asking, what about the German universities, what about the further progress of science, and the further progress of justice, of equality, of democratic rights? Everything has become questionable. International commerce, for instance, and all the laws to provide decent international dealings have now gone to the wind. Of course, you can explain the German inflation through the extreme misery of those people after the war, but you cannot explain why America has gone off the gold standard; that was a crime, highway robbery, just as black as the swastika.

Mrs. Sigg: I think one could have a bit more optimistic ideas about it. The flag we had in Prussia was black and white, and the first Reich was black, white, and red; so there is now less black in the flag at any rate, and also it has a more differentiated shape.

Prof. Jung: Well, we are not judges; we simply make statements. You know that there is nothing so evil that something good could not come out of it. We can only look at things as they are just now, the way they look from the outside. If one could be inside Mr. Roosevelt's mind, I am quite certain it would not look like that; he would think a great deal of his New Deal, and Mr. Lloyd George also, no doubt. One cannot help admitting that Fascism has done any amount of good for Italy; it

is a different country. And so there are plenty of people, foreigners (the Germans themselves are inclined to be prejudiced), who have seen and praised what has happened in Germany, and even in Russia, as a higher tendency. So it is exceedingly difficult to judge. From one aspect things are positive, and from another, quite negative.

*Mrs. Sigg: Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter.*²

Prof. Jung: It depends upon whether we give credit to the vitality of the European race or not. There were certain *reculements* in history where no better jump followed, the Romans did not jump any higher after Rome had gone down. And think of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria—all the great empires! But as long as there is vitality left in a race, the *reculer* is surely *pour mieux sauter*.

Dr. Escher: If one is in the Southern Hemisphere, the sun is going against the watch hand; it is then going the opposite way.

Prof. Jung: Yes, south of the equator, but from our point of view it always goes clockwise. We must not be too enlightened about these matters. This going clockwise is relative, of course. If you put yourself on the South Pole, or at Cape Town, it moves the other way naturally. Or if you turn your back to the sun, it is going the wrong way too. You see, that whole thing has been invented north of the equator; these statements are only true within the sphere in which they are made.

Now we come to the second question by Mrs. Baynes: "Is it possible to define the connection between spirit and (a) the archetypes, (b) the collective unconscious, (c) the self? Or, must we think of spirit as a psychological variable which we can recognize by its effects upon us, but which baffles all attempts to attach it to any of the phenomena we can observe in the psyche?"

This question touches upon a very ticklish problem, one quite difficult to elucidate; it is very much a matter of definition, you know. We have a certain idea of spirit which is chiefly traditional; originally spirit, *pneuma*, meant wind, or breath, therefore something semi-substantial. This is quite obviously an archaic point of view, however. Within the sphere of religious dogma the old idea of the spirit or *pneuma* can easily be applied. One can imagine that God's grace is something semi-substantial, like the fire that came from heaven in the miracle of Pentecost. But when it comes to a psychological understanding of the spirit one naturally must make an end of these ideas and then one is confronted with the necessity for a decent definition of that psychological phenomenon called spirit. The German word for spirit is *Geist*, which as I

² "To jump farther, one must fall back."

told you last week originally meant a sort of effervescence, a welling up. Probably the word *geyser* has to do with it, because in the etymology of that word, the root would be found in the Gothic word *usgeisjou* which means an effervescence or a welling up, exactly like the Swiss word *uf-geiste*. This latter means very much what *énergé* means in French; when one is *énergé*, one is irritated beyond measure, so that at any moment an explosion can take place. People who are filled with spirit are excited—they gesticulate and talk a lot. After the miracle of Pentecost, the disciples were said to have been as if drunk with sweet wine.

So the word *Geist* describes more definitely a psychological condition than the word *spiritus*, “wind, breath”; and the Greek word *pneuma* meaning wind, which in the later religious rites came to mean spirit; then the Latin word for mind and spirit, *animus*, is a cousin or a replica of the Greek word *animos*, meaning wind *tout bonnement*. Now these words are far more objective, they are sort of objective definitions or abstractions of a psychological condition; while the German *Geist*, being more primitive, remains stuck in the psychological *Ur-phänomen*, and describes an emotional condition. True to this history of the concept, then, we must assume that the phenomenon of spirit or *Geist* is a peculiar experience which has at the same time intellectual or mental contents, and emotions—it is an intense awareness coupled with emotion. For instance, an important revelation, an inspiration (which has to do with breathing into) would be *Geist*, so the real meaning would be an illumination, an enlightenment, accompanied by a more or less vehement outburst of emotions. Now, that is clearly a sort of mystical experience, and all the other forms of *Geist* are more or less derivatives from such a condition.

This concept has finally degenerated, however, into what one would call “mind” or “intellect” which is no longer a mystical experience. It is now a function of man. When man experiences his own function as an objective event, the word *Geist* would be used: inspiration or spirit. The same thing used as a function would be called “mind” or “intellect”; it would no longer be spirit. Spirit is an objective spontaneous event; it is nothing one can make. It is something which has an overpowering influence, so one should reserve the word *Geist* for those moments when we are in a sort of effervescence, a heightened or exalted condition. Taking *Geist* as a designation or term for such a condition, then, it must be a matter of a thought, say, or an idea, which is of a greater intensity for the time being than one’s subjective consciousness. It must be an autonomous content which catches hold of one. This coincides with

the use of the word *spirit* in certain cases. One says, for instance, "It is not done in the spirit of your late father. *Es ist nicht im Geist deiner Eltern.*" Or, "It is not in the spirit of such and such a political or religious movement." That means that one is guided by the superior principle or thought, of one's father, or the church, or the Pope, or the Christian idea, or the political idea. *Der Geist des Nationalsozialismus* means the general attitude caused by certain central ideas, slogans, or whatever they may be—a general idea which has the effect of a leading principle. One can use here a term from psychology: *eine führende Obervorstellung*.³ That is also *Geist*, but it is always connected with the idea of a sort of super-imposed or superior principle which has a guiding effect, or the effect of forcing one to something.

Now, if you take *Geist* in that sense, of course you can link it up easily with archetypes: the archetypal idea can be the leading force, the superior psychological fact, or content, which forces you to a certain way of acting. It is also the collective unconscious, which is then practically the same as the archetype; for when an archetype has forced you to act in a certain way, you are of course under the domination or the influence of the collective unconscious. And it is also the self, because the self works through the archetypes and the collective unconscious, the self being at the same time a most archaic factor and the goal. You see, that has very much to do with the peculiar timelessness of the collective unconscious, where the oldest thing is the most recent thing, or the future—or it is in no time at all. The collective unconscious is the foundation of life, the eternal truth of life, the eternal basis and the eternal goal. It is the endless sea from which life originates and into which life flows back, and it remains forever the same. That is, of course, expressed in terms of philosophic speculation. We have no means to prove such a thing, but that is the way the collective unconscious appears to us. Thus, we can say the connection of the spirit with the archetypes, with the collective unconscious, and with the self, is perfectly clear and evident if we understand spirit as a sort of attitude characterized by the fact that one is, as a subject, an ego, under the domination of a leading idea.

Mr. Allemann: Is not spirit rather the energy which is behind the whole thing?

Prof. Jung: It is the emotional power.

Mr. Allemann: It is not an idea in itself, then, but the power behind it?

³ "A guiding idea or overview."

Prof. Jung: Exactly. Therefore, I said it must be an idea and emotional at the same time; otherwise, it has no power.

Mr. Allemann: Then one should not say "spirit"?

Prof. Jung: But when people talk of *Geist*, that word also produces nothing; it is perfectly powerless!

Prof. Reichstein: Is not the ghost the most primitive idea of spirit?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and a ghost is also a derivative of the wind idea.

Prof. Reichstein: The personal ghost is more concrete while the wind is more abstract already.

Prof. Jung: That would be like the primitive idea: the last thing which leaves the body is the soul, and the last sign of life being the last breath, that breath carries the soul out into space where it becomes a ghost. And the ghost, they explained to me, is nothing but a puff of wind; one cannot see ghosts but one feels them, and the arch-ghost is a deity of the night without shape, the maker of fear. They described it very dramatically as a sudden puff of wind which makes one so afraid that one dies of fear. You know, it is a peculiar fact that in a spiritualistic séance, one very often notices, just before something happens, a cool draught of wind, together with a smell of ozone.

We come now to question No. 3, by Miss Hannah: "In connection with what you said last time about Logos and the difference between intellect and spirit, I should like to know how you understand the word *Logos* used as the Logos principle?"

You are asking for a definition of the concept of the Logos, and there I must say what I have already said: it is not a scientific concept, but an intuitive concept: you must allow for that. There are certain psychological concepts which are based upon the logic of facts, the fact of the introverted type for instance, or the libido concept, and they are in a way effective. You can make them evident. Whereas an intuitive concept is an *attempt* at a concept; it is a provisional formulation. Sometimes it is a mere symbol for something you don't know. Just as an intuitive type doesn't create a fact—he creates the ghost of a fact. Now, of course, if one happens to be an intuitive, one likes to handle the results of one's own intuition as facts. For instance, with the telescope of your intuition you gaze on the top of a mountain, and there you see a little stone, and then you assume that you have been on the top of that mountain. And curiously enough, you leave a trace—a tin can—so although you have not been there, you have spoiled the show for the poor sensation type who is actually climbing up. Nobody had been there: you have just fired the tin can up there with your telescope. I can tell you other stories about intuitives; that is not the worst by a long

shot. Mind you that is no caricature; I am simply telling a parapsychological fact. Any intuition is an icicle which is shot without noticing that it causes, perhaps, intense pain in the stomach of the victim. An intuition is by no means nothing, but it is not the fact which many people assume it to be; they say they know all about something but they have only glanced at it. The opinion may be right; if you are optimistic the chances are about fifty-fifty, but one is often 50 percent mistaken. An intuition amounts to nothing if it has no positive results, and it has not always positive results. One thing is certain; if you have an intuition about a thing, you have not been there. You still have to make the way.

So an intuitive concept is just a shot at something which we cannot grasp or formulate otherwise than by such a lucky shot; it is like trying to hit the famous silver thread suspended in a cloud. You don't see it in the cloud, but you aim at it and you might cut the thread by your arrow. That is intuition. Now, an intuitive concept is necessary, it is unavoidable; but it is not a welcome thing really. It is always embarrassing because it is a trap for yourself and for your intellect; you are easily trapped thereby. Somebody will come along most certainly and ask, "What did you mean exactly by that thought?" You see, you have engaged yourself, you talked your mouthful about it; you said Logos and Eros and everybody thought you knew what you were talking about. And then there you are! You can only stammer because you don't know. So Logos can only be described with the aid of an apologetic smile—that is the only thing you can do. Logos, if you are pleased and benevolent, might be such and such a thing.

For instance, give me a definition of *Eros*. One has a hunch but one is in the same hole. So one asks oneself, "What have I to say about Logos? The nearest I can get is, that it is a certain peculiar quality in a man's being which leads him to discriminate, to reason, to judge, to divide, to understand in a particular way." And one cannot understand all this without also thinking of its antithesis, the equally intuitive concept of *Eros*, which would be, then, a principle of relatedness, seeing things together, gathering things together, establishing relations between things—not judging things, not looking at them properly, but rather attracting or repelling them. That is *Eros*. You see, it has neither legs nor feet nor hands nor a head nor anything; it is a helpless thing. It is an intuitive point of view which cannot be brought down to earth. It is a bird on the wing, a pigeon on the roof; and your scientific or intellectual concept is the sparrow in the hand. The pigeon on the roof can fly away any time; nevertheless, the pigeon is a reality. So there is an indefinable something about man which in this or another way, can

possibly be grasped. Logos is an attempt at a concept and it characterizes a certain quality which seems to be a general quality of man.

Logos also contains the idea of the word; *legein* means to talk, to speak. It is another characteristic of man that he insists upon giving voice to an idea, designating it, giving a name, making a concept, expressing it, while woman, characterized more by Eros, can leave things *in suspenso*; they have not necessarily to be said. A man says, "Why the devil don't you say so?" but a woman doesn't need to say so, and usually she doesn't. Or she says something else, and a man is always convinced that she has said just the thing she should not have said, for to his mind she does not designate, does not put her finger on it, doesn't make the word. Therefore, men's ideas about women—about their talk, you know: gossip and afternoon tea, that intricate talk, the indirect vague way of women. If he carefully follows up such a conversation, however, he sees that she is like a spider weaving a web, relating things by secret threads, and some fly suddenly flies into the net and wonders how the devil it got there. The talk of women, being roundabout, doesn't consist of words but of spider webs, and they have a purpose different from that of a man. He means, "This is a chair, damn you, and it is not a footstool." This is interesting to him; he establishes this particular distinguishing factor. But it is not interesting to a woman: if this is not a chair it is a footstool and one can sit on a footstool if there is no chair. As my uncle used to say, "If man had not invented a spoon by which to stir the soup, you women would still go on stirring the soup with a stick." To a woman it doesn't matter so much. It only matters inasmuch as a difference must be covered up or related; a bridge must be made in between, and that is the weaving of plots.

The natural mind of a woman consists chiefly in weaving plots. That is no joke, but a fact. It is not a libel against women. It is just so: in their natural mind they establish spider webs, threads leading from here to there which connect them up. Eventually a woman gets herself in it as well; it is a very serious business. Many a woman who has woven a plot was the fly in the spider's web. They are natural spiders, because they can thus find out about connections. You see, that is Eros. But such a description should be poetic, really, in order to be convincing. An intuitive concept can be excellently described by a poet but not by a scientist. He is almost too masculine, in a way, to give a name to it. Therefore a man, in order to be definite, very often cuts a thing away from life; he does not understand its living function. Only very late in life does he arrive at an understanding of natural groupings or natural formation. For instance, old Linnaeus made a botanical system—so

many petals, so many parts and divisions and so on—classifying everything according to a rigid, almost arithmetical system.⁴ But look at the way modern botanists now assemble plants naturally in families: they observe plant life in natural symbiotic groups. It is topographical. A plant is in a living symbiosis with the rock upon which it grows, and with other plants, and with animals. But that was arrived at very late; first of all, science insisted upon just making straight lines through nature by arithmetical laws. That is the designating character of the Logos.

Had it entered woman's sphere at all, if she had been called upon to produce a system of plants, she would naturally have made a huge plot about them: how this kind of flower was intriguing against another one and so on. It would have been a romance. They would have married, or they would have made most wonderful bastards together, such and such a bastard coming from such and such a lady flower. There would have been natural families quite certainly from the beginning. The genetic point of view would have been considered, which man only discovered very late, for the genealogical instinct of woman is tremendous—who is the grandson of whom, who is the great grandaunt of this one. That is an important item of female conversation, and it is another application of the same principle. Of course, not when women with great minds are gathered together!—but ordinary women's conversation. They are always informed about an entirely different world from man's world; man's world is strange to that kind of mind, as a woman's world is strange to a man. He simply does not see things under that aspect. Therefore, Anatole France is quite right when he says that when men have worked things up to a fix, they must call in an intelligent woman, a saint, to solve the riddle, to untie the Gordian knot; you can read this in *L'Isle des Penguins*, a very instructive book.⁵

The Logos, then, is an intuitive concept that covers tentatively a large field of observational experience which cannot be summed up in any known form; with no forms in which to catch it, it is the nearest we can get to it. If anybody else has a better idea, I am only too glad to accept it, but I know nothing better. One has to go very warily with such concepts. I should advise you to use these terms as little as possible, because they are always a trap. Of course occasionally, for the sake of brevity, one has to use them and provided you know what I mean by it, then I have said something in a few words. But you must know what

⁴ Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1775), Swedish classifier of plants.

⁵ For Anatole France see above, 13 June 1934, n. 8.

kind of experience is behind it. Well, we have spent nearly all our time over it, but we rather needed to clarify these concepts. The next verse is:

What the sense feeleth, what the spirit discerneth, hath never its end in itself. But sense and spirit would fain persuade thee that they are the end of all things: so vain are they.

To what does that refer?

Mrs. Baumann: In this translation, *Sinn* is called “mind.” Is that right?

Prof. Jung: Well, unfortunately it means sense too, and the word *sense* surely is not identical with mind. It is definitely what we call sense. And *Sinn* can also be translated by “meaning”; Wilhelm translates *Tao* by *Sinn* for instance, while others call *Tao* “meaning.”⁶ *Sinn* often means *Gemüt*, and *Gemütlichkeit* is most definitely an emotional feeling which by a peculiar lack of differentiation is mixed up with sensation, *Empfindung*, so the sense quality comes in there too. That is due to the fact that in the Germanic mind the functions of feeling and sensation are not properly differentiated yet; one sees it all over the place, being everywhere obvious. *Gemüt* or *Gemütlichkeit* is an unfathomable soup of sensation and feelings and emotions. And *Gemütlichkeit* is pregnant with all sorts of objects and associations; it smells of beer and tobacco and blood-and-liver sausages and sauerkraut. There are people sitting around a stove in a warm room with a low smoke-blackened ceiling, and there is a coffeepot, and they drink and talk slowly, and it is evening and very nice and comfortable. All these things belong and must be mentioned in order to know what *Gemütlichkeit* means. It is a wonderfully primitive concept. There is no word in the world so pregnant as *Gemüt*. It is amazing what happens when you say that word. It is as comprehensive as a mantra; you draw in realities. When you say “sense,” God! that is poor; when you say “mind,” the meaning is too definite; when you say “meaning,” you ask what meaning, you draw nothing in; but if a German says *Gemüt* or *Gemütlichkeit*, he does not need to ask what or where or who.⁷

Mr. Allemann: Would it be “homely” or “homelike” in English?

Prof. Jung: Well, that is not the same by far. They just don’t possess

⁶ Richard Wilhelm’s introducing Jung to *I Ching*, or *The Book of Changes*, proved to be crucial for Jung’s work. See *MDR*, appendix IV. For Wilhelm on *Tao* as *Sinn* see above, 31 Oct. 1934, n. 8. However, the opening lines of the *Tao Te King* say that the true *Tao* cannot be named.

⁷ *Empfindung* is usually translated as “sensation,” “perception,” or even “sentiment”; *Gemüt*, as “feeling,” “heart.”

such a word. It is still primitive. I am sure there are such words in Russian, or any other primitive languages, words that describe plastic situations. So the Germans still have words of power: they produce. For instance, when men come together and it is not particularly interesting and there is no particular point in it and something ought to be done about the situation, they say: *wir wollen gemütlich sein*. There it is. Somebody speaks the mantra and he has created something. So, as I say, *Sinn* has an emotional aspect and then it is a sort of *Gemüt*; it has a sensation aspect and then it is *Sinnlichkeit*; and it has an intellectual aspect which is meaning.

Mrs. Baynes: It seems to me, if it were translated "What the sense perceives," "perceives" would take care of both feeling and intellect.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that would be better.

Dr. Schlegel: I think in the second sentence, *Sinn* and *Gemüt* have another meaning than in the first one. They are objective, whilst in the first sentence there is a subjective meaning.

Prof. Jung: But it says afterwards: "Instruments and playthings are mind (or sense) and spirit," and it is obvious that he means two mental factors. The word *spirit* or *Geist* is here about the same as "mind"; "and mind feeleth" so it can be intuitive; or it can be *Gemüt*; or you can say "sense" if you like. But the important thing here is in how far they persuade us that they are the "end of all things" or ends in themselves. Now are they ends in themselves? Or in how far do they try to convince us that they are? That is the point and that is the object of his criticism.

Mrs. Fierz: They lead to a certain oneness; they can be taken together again and again, until you have the feeling that you have reached a certain unity. That is not quite true, but the materialistic mind at least thinks it can lead to oneness.

Prof. Jung: You mean the materialistic mind thought of it as one principle.

Mrs. Fierz: Yes, the monistic idea.

Miss Wolff: In a measure, the only purpose in people's attitude is to recognize, to reach the meaning. Then that is a purpose of life.

Prof. Jung: Well, I would say that either awareness, or sense, or mind, or intellect, or spirit in a metaphysical sense—always try to persuade us that, by their results or their statements, the ultimate truth could be established—and that that would be the meaning of life altogether. For instance, the scientific intellect makes it a purpose of its existence to establish a truth, as if that were the real goal of life; and as mentality could be made the goal of life, so another function can make another goal, create another meaning of life, and try to persuade us

that *that* is the only thing. You see, when functions are differentiated in a one-sided way, when you are always living on one function, then that function gets the better of you and insists that the whole meaning of life is nothing but that. But if you know that you are not identical with a function—if you are the subject of your functions, not the object—then you can say, *my* goal is so and so, and the function is subservient. That is what Nietzsche wants to bring about. Naturally, if you are identical with one function, that function tries to persuade you that its data, its realities, are the meaning of your life. Therefore, you should see that you are the master of your functions, that you are the *subject* of your functions, and not the object.

LECTURE V

20 February 1935

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question which is not exactly a question. An anonymous writer who signs herself Mrs. Spider-web has sent me this contribution: "Prof. Superman's suggestion that the black swastika is the earth turning away from the sun connects with the four-square aspect of the earth (since the swastika is square) and with the Chinese *I Ching* discussion in which you described the Chinese square as having motion—a vortex. As the earth is also body, the swastika is also man, which also links up with Aquarius, the Water-carrier. I am also tempted to mention Pegasus, the square constellation, which has to do with inspiration and which would connect with the golden sun swastika. Therefore the swastika symbol contains all the elements with which *Zarathustra* is dealing."

That there is a connection is undeniable: there is the synchronous connection, and then that Pegasus business is a most interesting allusion. Mrs. Spider-web must know about the maps of the sky. It is true that above Aquarius is the square constellation of Pegasus, as I mentioned in a former Seminar. That it would connect with the golden sun swastika, I don't see. If the writer had elaborated a bit on these allusions, it would help us to understand it better. There are too many jumps in it. It contains a lot of good intuitions, but a bit more meat would be desirable.

We are still in the chapter, "The Despisers of the Body." We got stuck in that paragraph, "Instruments and playthings are sense and spirit." There we had some difficulty with the German word *Sinn*. In summing up, I would say that this German concept of *Sinn* in connection with spirit is a sort of antithesis, *Sinn* and *Geist*; and one could use here the word *Gemüt* to express the meaning of *Sinn*. Also one could say the emotional psyche and the spirit, *Seele und Geist*, obviously express a totality. Now these are, he says, tools and playthings, which would mean that they are not things in themselves but rather applications or func-

tions or epiphenomena or appendixes, because "behind them there is still the self." In other words, they are phenomena or manifestations of an underlying entity, which would mean an absolute definite reality, and that would be found in the self.

In the concept of the self we enter the sphere of our psychology which also has arrived at the conclusion that the total psychological being of man consists not only of consciousness, but in addition, of the unconscious. Obviously the ego, the personification of the center of consciousness, cannot be the whole of our psychical existence: the unconscious is needed to make a total. And if the unconscious is added to the conscious, then the central being, or the resultant of the two, would be the alter ego. For when one discovers the unconscious one discovers oneself too, but under an entirely different aspect; one discovers another self within oneself. This causes, as you know, a tremendous conflict, because we are not at one with our unconscious, that alter ego which is also designated as the shadow; as a rule, one has the greatest trouble to accept the shadow, the fact of one's own negation. For that other one in us is so utterly different from the conscious ego that one can say it amounts to a negation of the ego, particularly when one is in doubt which of the two ought to be; the shadow is so strong that you can be honestly in doubt as to what you really are.¹

For instance, to have the fantasy of killing your enemy is sufficient for certain people to assume that they are potential murderers, to believe themselves wholly wrong, children of the devil; and then they get depressed, as if the possession of something against their grain would mean that they were nothing but bad. Such people are inclined to think that a man who kills another man, or who lies or steals, is entirely black, with nothing good in him; and naturally they are utterly intolerant of the weaknesses of other people because they cannot stand their own. It is one of the foremost tasks of analysis to bring these two sides together, to make it palatable to people that they are not only a resplendent ego which is always in a most suitable condition, newly washed and fit for the drawing room, but that they have also another side which is not acceptable and which cannot possibly be shown in public. Such a fact does not mean that the whole mixture is spoiled; it only means that the cake contains not only sugar but some salt also, and that the substance of which one is generally composed has its flaws. It is not quite pure.

Now, since the whole of the human being is something different

¹ For a definition of *shadow*, see above 6 June 1934, n. 9.

from the conscious ego, it deserves another name, particularly because, when you assimilate the unconscious, you feel a certain objectivity about yourself. As a matter of fact, you cannot assimilate yourself, you cannot live with yourself, unless you understand yourself as a sort of givenness, a datum; you are an objective fact. If you assume that you are only the conscious ego, then it is as if you had *wanted* to bring about certain events, or had done certain things intentionally; but you cannot deny that it also looks as if they had just happened to you, as if you had encountered them, or perhaps as if you had been overcome by something strange and objective. So if you can assimilate your shadow, you then appear to yourself not only subjective but as something objective as well. You see, in assimilating the unconscious, you increase the circumference of your being to an unknown extent; moreover, you are including something in the totality of yourself which is not under your control: you can only control what is in consciousness.

It is as if you were ruler of a land which is only partially known to yourself, king of a country with an unknown number of inhabitants. You don't know who they are or what their condition may be; time and again you make the discovery that you have subjects in your country of whose existence you had no idea. Therefore, you cannot assume the responsibility; you can only say, "I find myself as the ruler of a country which has unknown borders and unknown inhabitants, possessing qualities of which I am not entirely aware." Then you are at once out of your subjectivity, and are confronted with a situation in which you are a sort of prisoner; you are confronted with unknown possibilities, because those many uncontrollable factors at any time may influence all your actions or decisions. So you are a funny kind of king in that country, a king who is not really a king, who is dependent upon so many known quantities and conditions that he often cannot carry through his own intentions. Therefore, it is better not to speak of being a king at all, and be only one of the inhabitants who has just a corner of that territory in which to rule. And the greater your experience, the more you see that your corner is infinitely small in comparison with the vast extent of the unknown against you. You get the entirely new idea that the Self is obviously something exceedingly influential and very strange and that you are just a part of it; you don't know how infinitesimal a part—or perhaps you are a considerable part. But at all events, you have to assume the attitude of somebody who has established his little kingdom in a continent of unknown extension, and beyond the indistinct borderline of your conscious king-

dom is the absolutely unknown. Now, if you assume that this whole continent in which your little kingdom is to be found is ruled by a central power, then that central power would be your own king also; you would be a subject of that unknown grand power. And that would be the self, about as we think of it in psychology.

Of course I knew that Nietzsche had such a concept because I read *Zarathustra* for the first time when I was only twenty-three, and then later, in the winter of 1914-15, I studied it very carefully and made a lot of annotations. I was already interested in the concept of the self, but I was not clear how I should understand it. I made my marks, however, when I came across these passages, and they seemed very important to me. Yet I could not make use of it because one misses in *Zarathustra* the concept of the unconscious; there is only the conscious. *Gemüt* and *Geist* would be contents or qualities of consciousness. Therefore, there was the possibility—which I saw even then in *Zarathustra*—of the mistake which Nietzsche actually makes; namely, he identifies the ego with the self and therefore with the Superman. His ego simply merges into the Superman, as we have seen. That would be an incarnation of the self. But the self is much too big; you cannot possibly identify with it without incurring the risk of a fatal inflation. Therefore, the fatal end of the whole story—the stone that is thrown high falls back upon oneself. Such an identification can only lead to an explosion.

The concept of the self continued to recommend itself to me nevertheless. I thought Nietzsche meant a sort of thing-in-itself behind the psychological phenomenon. That is obviously expressed in the passage, "The self seeketh with the eyes of the senses, it hearkeneth also with the ears of the spirit." The self uses our mental and psychical phenomena as a sort of means of conveyance; that is, our psyche is used as a means of expression of the self or by the self. I saw then also that he was producing a concept of the self which was like the Eastern concept; it is an Atman idea. I don't know whether Nietzsche was influenced by anything Indian that he read, but I rather doubt it; it looks to me as if it were a very original invention. Naturally, the fact that there is a collective unconscious in which all these concepts are contained and from which the East has taken them, is a reason why one finds many Eastern parallels in Meister Eckhart's writings also, and even in Kant. Now, I have brought you today an Eastern text which shows this parallel beautifully; it is from the English translation of the Talavakara Upanishad,

one of the series of the *Sacred Books of the East*.² I will read the first Khanda:

The pupil asks: "At whose wish does the mind sent forth proceed on its errand? At whose command does the first breath go forth? At whose wish do we utter this speech? What God directs the eye or the ear?"

The teacher replied: "It is the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of speech, the breath of breath, and the eye of the eye. When freed (from the senses) the wise, on departing from this world, become immortal.

The eye does not go thither, nor speech, nor mind. We do not know, we do not understand, how any one can teach it.

It is different from the known, it is also above the unknown, thus we have heard from those of old who taught us this.

That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

That which does not think by mind, and by which, they say, mind is thought, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

That which does not see by the eye, and by which one sees (the work of) the eyes, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

That which does not hear by the ear, and by which the ear is heard, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

That which does not breathe by breath, and by which breath is drawn, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore."

Then there is a little paragraph in the second Khanda:

He by whom it (Brahman) is not thought, by him it is thought; he by whom it is thought, knows it not. It is not understood by those who understand it, it is understood by those who do not understand it.

This way of putting it is, of course, specifically Eastern; it is most descriptive, most plastic. You see, that which is behind and uses the ears

² *The Sacred Books of the East*, ed. Friedrich Max Müller (Oxford, 1879-1926), 50 vols., vols. 39-40.

and the eyes and the mind is Brahman, the self, the unutterable primordial substance of existence; and those who understand it do not understand it, but those who do not understand it, who cannot think it, understand it. If you desist from any attempt to understand it, therefore, you are about right, because that thing is utterly unthinkable. You cannot conceive of a thing in which you are contained; you can only conceive of the thing you are or of a thing that is like you, but not of the thing which is greater than you and which contains you. It is utterly futile even to attempt to describe that which is the sum total of conscious and unconscious; it is incomprehensible, beyond the possibilities of our thought. We only can suggest it by antinomies; it exists and does not exist, for instance. This Indian text is entirely to the point, therefore; it very clearly shows that this is a borderline concept beyond which there is no possibility for us.

You see, the concept of the self is a true symbol. We use a symbol to express something which cannot be expressed by any other means; the moment you have a better expression it is no longer a symbol. A symbol immediately collapses when you can see behind it. For why should you be complicated, why should you use allusion, when you can say it in a more simple way?³ Of course, the idea of the self can be thought, inasmuch as it is a manifestation, a phenomenon—you can make a drawing of it if you like. The chakras, for instance, are stages of the self, the self in its different manifestations. Or take a very complete mandala, the Tibetan mandala of the four-square stupa, a vajra mandala; that is absolutely abstract. It is a symbol, yet you can talk about it, you can explain it. But you never can explain what the self is, because the self in itself is unthinkable. Now, that is not so here; to Nietzsche it is far more definite. He handles it as if it were explainable, and he identifies it with the body:

Ever hearkeneth the Self, and seeketh; it compareth, mastereth, conquereth, and destroyeth. It ruleth, and is also the ego's ruler.

Here you have it; it is the thing in which the "I" is contained, to which the "I" is subject.

Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage—it is called Self; it dwelleth in thy body, it is thy body.

³ See below, 20 Feb. 1935, n. 3.

And here he explains it and here he falls down because you cannot say it is this or that, it is always *néti-néti*. (The Indian formula which is usually translated, “neither this nor that.”) But he knows it is the body and that is the mistake; if he identifies the body with the self, he brings the self into the body or the body up into the self, and that produces an inflation of the body. It is a most curious fact that Nietzsche, an intuitive, should overestimate the body to such an extent. Of course, the body is extraordinarily important but that is an overrating. And it is quite interesting that he calls it a “mighty lord,” for that word is taken literally, one could say, from the texts of the Upanishads and the Tantric philosophy. In the system of chakras, the lord appears when consciousness is developed as far as *anahata*. There, the two principles of the body are divided, the *prana* and the spirit, the heart containing the fire of *manipura* from below, and the lungs the ethereal thin substance from above. And there the understanding of the self appears as the reconciling principle, the mighty lord, called in this chakra the *Ishvara*; in *anahata* the *Ishvara* first becomes visible as the thumbing in the center of the triangle, the lord, “an unknown sage.”

That the self is understood to be an old sage is also an Eastern idea. There is a Chinese text for example, handed down in Japanese philosophical literature, which says, “If thou thinketh thou art alone and canst do what thou pleaseth, thou art forgetting the old sage that dwelleth in thy heart and knoweth of all thou dost.”⁴ That is the self that dwells in the *anahata chakra*, the heart center, and it would of course be the archetype of the old wise man. For to one who has attained only to *anahata*,⁵ the archetype of the wise old man still covers the symbol of the self. It is as if the self were contained in him, as on a certain level the anima contains all the subsequent figures, like the wise old man and the self. Then naturally the anima is “She-that-must-be-

⁴ The Chinese source was Wang Yang-ming, who said, “In every heart there dwells a sejin (sage). Only, we do not believe it firmly enough, and therefore the whole has remained buried” (CW 6, par. 370). Jung is citing an article by Tetsujiro, “Die japanische Philosophie,” in *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. W. Wundt et al. (Berlin and Leipzig, 2nd edn., 1912), p. 85. In turn, Wang’s principal teachings are available in English translation as *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings*, tr. Wing-tsit Chan, in *Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies*, no. 68 (New York and London, 1963).

⁵ In Kundalini Yoga, *anahata* is the heart chakra or lotus, which represents a stage in which one is lifted above the material level. As Jung puts it elsewhere, “But in *anahata* a new thing comes up, the possibility of lifting himself above the emotional happenings and beholding them. He discovers the purusha (self) in his heart” (“Notes on the Kundalini Seminar,” 19 Oct. 1932, p. 174, unpublished typescript).

obeyed," as Rider Haggard put it quite blindly. And that figure, "She-that-must-be-obeyed," she that represents the wisdom of the past, that understands all the secret arts and is practically immortal, would also contain the sorcerer; and inasmuch as she represents the almost divine principle, she contains the self. All these figures of the unconscious are as if shining through the figure which one actually perceives. Sometimes the anima has an almost hermaphroditic aspect; there is an archetype of the hermaphrodite in between the anima and the wise old man, which simply comes from the fact that the anima contains also a masculine principle. It is as if the anima had an animus—one could put it like that—but the animus is spirit. It is the wise old man. If one is at the stage where it is possible to realize something beyond the anima, then the feminine aspect of the unconscious more or less fades away and instead there is that masculine animus aspect: the wise old man who is now practically divine because one is a step nearer to the apparition of the self.

You see, the anima can appear in the *anahata chakra*, because in the heart region, where you become conscious of feeling, you begin to discriminate and to judge. Then you know what is your own and what belongs to somebody else; you not only recognize the difference in yourself, but also the difference between yourself and other people. So you have a chance on that level to realize the anima, and then through the anima one gets the first inkling of the *Ishvara*. Then the next center, *visuddha*, which is in the throat, is the Logos center. It says in the Tantric texts that those who attain to that level are given the power of the word, and that is the realm of the wise old man. And in *visuddha* you have the apparition of the white elephant, the great divine power which is also contained in *muladhara*, the equivalent of the earth—namely, a sort of wisdom which keeps the earth *in suspenso*, which balances your reality so that you can be honestly in doubt whether this or that is reality, or merely a veil. Then, of course, the next thing is *ajna*, where you have a more or less clear vision of the self. But the self only really appears in *sahasrara*, the thousand petalled lotus, that is the symbol of the self.

It is as if you were coming up from below, like the primordial Pueblo Indians who came up through all those caves, climbing up from the darkest cave to the topmost one where it was still dark, until they at last came out on the surface of the earth. That would be *anahata*, in the diaphragm region. The word *diaphragm* comes from the Greek word *phren*, which means mind. At this level consciousness begins; there is discrimination. But below is only *participation*, *manipura*; and

the still lower caves correspond to *svadhisthana* and *muladhara*. Then above the diaphragm you rise into the kingdom of the air, where the light of the self begins to appear. That is also according to the famous text in the Upanishads about Yajnavalkya, the sage at the king's court. They have a long talk and the king asks him, "By what light do human beings go out, do their work and return?" And the sage answers: "By the light of the sun." Then the king asks, "But when the sun is extinguished, by what light will human beings go out and do their work and return?" "By the light of the moon." So it goes on; when the moon is extinguished, they will go out by the light of the stars, and then by the light of the fire, and when even the fire is extinguished, "by what light can they then do their work and still live?" And the sage replies, "By the light of the self"—the ultimate light.⁶

Now, all this is lacking in Nietzsche, which indicates that he had no particular knowledge of Eastern philosophy; if he had, he could not possibly have identified the self with the body. Of course, one has to link the body to the self, because the distinct body is the distinct appearance of the self in three dimensional space, yet it is of course again a function like the mind. You cannot say that the mind is a function of the self without admitting that the body is also a function of the self. Otherwise of course, you make the mind a function of the body, and then the psychical principle would be a sort of epiphenomenon of the chemistry of the body. We are now sufficiently informed of the hypothetical nature of matter, however, to know that it is practically the same whether we say that the body is a function of a psychical function, or that the psychical function is no function at all but only an epiphenomenon of the body, a secondary phenomenon—the body being the primary phenomenon. But the body is, of course, also a concretization, or a function, of that unknown thing which produces the psyche as well as the body; the difference we make between the psyche and the body is artificial. It is done for the sake of a better understanding. In reality, there is nothing but a living body. That is the fact; and psyche is as much a living body as body is living psyche: it is just the same. Formerly, when one said "body" one assumed that one had expressed something; nowadays we know that this is only a word. Zarathustra continues.

There is more sagacity in thy body than in thy best wisdom. And who then knoweth why the body requireth just thy best wisdom?

Thy Self laugheth at thine ego, and its proud prancings. "What

⁶ The *Brihad-Aranyada Upanishad*, Third Brahmana. Hume*, p. 65.

are these prancings and flights of thought unto me?" it saith to itself. "A by-way to my purpose. I am the leading-string of the ego, and the prompter of its notions.

The Self saith unto the ego: "Feel pain!" And thereupon it suffereth, and thinketh how it may put an end thereto—and for that very purpose it is meant to think.

The Self saith unto the ego: "Feel pleasure!" Thereupon it rejoiceth, and thinketh how it may oftentimes rejoice—and for that very purpose it is meant to think.

To the despisers of the body will I speak a word. That they despise is caused by their esteem. What is it that created esteeming and despising and worth and will?

The creating Self created for itself esteeming and despising, it created for itself joy and woe. The creating body created for itself spirit, as a hand to its will.

What he says about the self here is absolutely to the point; the self even creates esteem and contempt for itself. That is an understanding which is typical of the East; it is not Western. But it is typically Nietzsche, and there Nietzsche is very great; he draws from very deep sources. In the East they knew it long ago; so to them the love of God and the hatred of God are essentially the same. And rightly so, for if it only matters that you are concerned with a thing, then it does not matter whether you are concerned by hatred or by love. Therefore, they have the saying that if a man loves God he needs seven incarnations in order to reach him, but when he hates him he only needs three. As a rule we are really far more concerned when we hate than when we love, and in that Eastern saying one recognizes this kind of psychology. So it does not matter to the self whether you love or despise; it is only important that you are concerned.

But here again Nietzsche makes the one-sided identification of the self with the body, and of course that is not satisfactory; he endows the body with a creative faculty or a meaningful faculty, which, even with a tremendous effort of imagination, cannot be put into it. For we know too well that the body is a biological function, having seen how it behaves in experimental biology. It is really not the body which restores damaged tissues; it is a peculiar vital principle which does the job, and it should not be put down to the chemistry of the body. For instance, you cannot explain by the particular chemical constituents of a body how it can produce tissue which is entirely strange to the tissue from which it is taken; yet that is the case. A very interesting experiment has

been made on the eye of a salamander, for example. The lens of the eye was extracted, and it was then substituted for by the growth of a new one. But the ectoderm, the embryonic tissue from which the lens was taken, is entirely different from the mesoderm, the tissue of the iris from which the new lens—one could call it the artificial lens—was produced. So one particular tissue of the body can be used by a living principle in the body to produce something of an entirely different tissue. You see, we have learned that the tissues of the body are so differentiated that from the cells of a gland, no other tissue than gland tissue can be made, that it can multiply but will never become muscle tissue, for instance. Yet there in life we find that it is possible, and it cannot be explained by the inherent qualities of the tissue. Therefore, the idea of a sort of neovitalism is introduced, which is still a matter of discussion; one must imagine a kind of living principle which has the faculty of using the tissues of the body as it sees fit, not dependent upon the quality of the particular tissue. Of course, these things were quite unknown in Nietzsche's time, and even if they had been known, he probably would not have read that kind of literature. So he overrates the body. But he finds it necessary to say "creative" body, and in that one sees a concession to a creative principle.

Even in your folly and despising ye each serve your Self, ye despisers of the body. I tell you, your very Self wanteth to die, and turneth away from life.

No longer can your Self do that which it desireth most:—create beyond itself. That is what it desireth most; that is all its fervour.

But it is now too late to do so:—so your Self wisheth to succumb, ye despisers of the body.

What is the meaning of this passage?

Prof. Reichstein: I think the principal meaning is that the goal of life is death, but perhaps some of Nietzsche's personal psychology is intermingled. The sentence before suggests very much the scene with the rope-dancer and the buffoon, and in just this passage there must be a lot of personal psychology.

Prof. Jung: Quite so.

Miss Wolff: I thought it was probably also a historical problem of his epoch. Before this, the body was not really discovered; it was the unknown thing, and therefore it stands on the side of the self as the unknown part of the psyche. So of course the body gets too much weight, because it is a change which must first be assimilated. And then it is also a symbol.

Prof. Jung: Because it has been unknown and therefore contaminated with the unconscious?

Miss Wolff: On the side of the unconscious and therefore it gets the importance.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a sort of symbolic importance. But why should it be death? "So your self desireth to succumb" means death.

Miss Hannah: If the ego won't live as the self wants it to, live its life completely, then the self usually does seem to want to die. I mean, if it cannot get an individual to accept the individual problem or task, it is then as if it wills death—as if by killing, it would get a chance to try again.

Prof. Jung: But can you explain it?

Miss Hannah: I think it is just sick of the way he went, fed up.

Prof. Jung: Would there not be another way?

Mrs. Baumann: Accepting life means also accepting death in the ordinary course of things.

Prof. Jung: Well, it has not quite that meaning here. He says. "For ye can no longer create beyond yourselves." That is something new, it belongs to the epoch. "But it is now too late to do so, so your self wisheth to succumb." You see, he obviously assumes that in another time the self did not desire to perish, but desired to live; it is just now that he "wisheth to succumb."

Mrs. Fierz: Is that not also an Indian aspect—the creation and then the undoing of creation?

Prof. Jung: That is very much what Mrs. Baumann alluded to, but according to my idea it is a bit too academic or philosophical. Nietzsche is far more concerned with the actual time than with the general aspect of the world that lives and dies—after birth, death, and then birth again. That is characteristic of *Upanishad* philosophy and later on you find it in Nietzsche too, in his idea of the eternal return of things. But here he speaks of a definite time; it is now that the self desires to die.

Miss Wolff: It must be a Christian idea. In Christianity, one is supposed to go beyond one's actual condition in order to reach again the primordial condition where one was like God.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the cause. The scornors or despisers of the body would be the late Christian point of view, according to which one must despise the body because it is awkward and always teaches a different truth from that of the spirit; the body must be repressed or controlled, pressed into certain forms, and one must not listen to its teaching. Therefore, the persecution of the body in the church, the glorification of the spirit through the mortification of the body. When

a saint was rotting away in his lifetime, stinking with putrefaction, and when the hermits and the fakirs went into the desert and dried up with thirst, it was a sign of the glory of God. And in the New Testament we have that famous passage where Christ speaks of those who have castrated themselves for the kingdom of heaven.⁷ He probably alludes to the Galloi, the priests of Astarte, who used to castrate themselves officially; those not very savory symbols were carried at the head of a special parade. The fact of the castrated Galloi was public knowledge all over the near East. Fortunately enough, we know nothing of Christians who have castrated themselves for the kingdom of heaven, but Christ must have been referring to some well-known fact. It would have been a most hellish sin among the Jews, so we cannot assume that he refers to them; and there were no Christians then, but only his disciples. However, we know that later on Origen did castrate himself for the kingdom of heaven, and probably such a case occasionally happened. It was the general Christian idea that the world was vain and would perish like Christ and that the kingdom to come was the desirable thing. We only live for a short time here and must prepare for the eternal mansions.

That the body should have no meaning is, of course, a contradiction of the Semitic temperament which believes in the glorification of the world; it is a prophetic impulse to create, not a kingdom of heaven, but a kingdom on earth where peace and justice reign. The Jew has the temperament of the reformer who really wants to produce something in this world; when the Semites spoke of a kingdom of perfection, they meant it to be here, the glory of this earth, and of course that excludes the mutilation of the body. Nothing must be mutilated. The whole world must come to a state where the lepers will be healed and the lion will lie down with the lamb; that is all prophesied in Isaiah, a state of paradise. As the Cabalists, for instance, have the idea that after the sin of the first parents, God removed paradise into the future, which means that paradise is to come; it is to be produced upon this earth. But Christ's words are in flagrant contradiction with this teaching. His kingdom is not of this earth. It is a spiritual, transcendental kingdom in the future, and he says it is nowhere else than within ourselves; the emphasis is on the spiritual side. The body will be curtailed. That continued to be the case throughout the Middle Ages, but finally the body has asserted itself. The first attempt was the Renaissance, where it appeared quite visibly; one sees it in the art of those centuries. Look at

⁷ Matthew 19:12.

the so-called primitives—the primitives in paint—with those peculiar heads and miserable mutilated bodies, starved and diseased, leprous. Then one century later the flesh was blossoming in a marvelous way, in the cinquecento, the life of the earth was glorified. Of course, it led right away into the great Reformation. Because the body had made that attempt to break through, the severe moral restrictions in early Protestantism followed. So the experiment proved pretty doubtful, but slowly it grew again, and in materialism we have the full triumph of matter.

Nietzsche in that respect is a sort of materialistic prophet, but he saves some spiritual substance. It is not exactly the body he seeks but the Superman, the man who is even beyond the actual body, a new creation that is not this coarse body, a new being in whom, perhaps, the body will be completely subject to the will. You see, that is again a sort of spiritual principle. He is a prophet of the will, even a will beyond oneself, and that is a kind of transcendentalism; he does not get away from it altogether. But here it is quite clear that he means by the scorn-ers of the body those that despise the principle of the body and believe in the principle of the spirit exclusively; and he says that the self of those people desires to die. The reason is that when we deny an important part of ourselves the right to existence, when something is continuously, for many years, repressed and macerated, then that thing always takes its revenge in the form of a suicidal wish. For, every form of split in ourselves after a while becomes personified.

For instance, if you find in a certain respect you are stupid, you hate it and try to avoid all those occasions where the stupidity could come to the foreground, because you know you will make a stupid ass of yourself. And if it appears in spite of yourself, you say, "Excuse me, there my stupid ass came out again. I am an ass in a certain respect and it has gotten the better of me." That is personification. Then you have a stable in which you keep your ass, but you live upstairs and are a respectable gentleman. We have done that with the body; we put it into the stable, feeding it very poorly—at least we say so. But by mistake, in a marvelous way, it has been fed time and again. If anybody catches you in the act, when you are down in the stable with fodder for the ass, you say, "I beg your pardon. I have such a weakness. I am sorry and I will repent." And then you go to church and fast and repent that you have fed the ass. Now, that of course is not proper; it is not very helpful to the mental and physical development of the ass. But the lower self is happily enough a greedy animal which you cannot always hinder from feeding; if it is not done legitimately, then illegitimately. So mankind

has helped himself through a great deal of unconsciousness. Perhaps you left the stable door open and out walked the ass in the night and ate the cabbages in your neighbor's garden, and then it was discovered and you had to pay the damage. Or it was not discovered and you were glad to find the ass very full.

But we soon made the mistake of developing consciousness to such an extent that we began to have a psychological criterion. We developed insight, and then we could not deny that we had left the stable door open and had not fastened the ass securely; we had to say it was *our* ass that had eaten the neighbor's cabbages. So we cannot say it is no problem, and that we can do entirely without. But there are still plenty of fatherly men—when they are parsons they have their little girls whom they are confirming, and they say afterwards, by the marvelous grace of God the ass has eaten. Ten thousand things have happened which apparently never happened; they are blissfully unconscious about what has been done for the ass. The more we pay attention to our psyche, however, the more we are aware of the things that happen, and we know unfortunately for what purpose they were done. So the body becomes a moral problem with us. What about the ass in the stable? It is no real way to leave the stable door open. That cannot work in the future; we must buy a meadow where we can feed the ass in a legitimate way. It must be acknowledged that there is such a thing. For if we don't acknowledge it, then with an increasing amount of morality, of consciousness, we find very efficient means of locking the stable door, and then the ass dies, naturally. If we don't let him live, he prefers to die. And then we develop a suicidal wish.

Of course, with our power to keep things locked up and concealed we don't realize that it is a suicidal wish. It may begin with an upset of the stomach, or continuous constipation, or you are terribly tired, or cannot walk. Probably it is already a lack of will to live, the beginning of the suicidal wish; most of the neuroses have that character. In agoraphobia, you don't dare to cross the street, or you may be afraid of a big crowd of people, or afraid of being fenced in: that is all the suicidal tendency. It means that your will to live only goes so far. It does not risk itself in crowds, in the open spaces of life. You are already partially lame and you seek a situation in which you can fall down, a threshold over which you can stumble, or a car that will run over you; people have little accidents which are simply preparatory for a great catastrophe, where they get into an avalanche or something of the sort. And nobody has ever known, because we can quite easily hide things from our own consciousness and from the consciousness of other people.

Now, Nietzsche explains that it is the self, really, that doesn't want to live, because one thus deprives the self of its own experiment. Let us assume for the sake of argument that there is such a thing as the self, that living potentiality which accounts for the existence of our spirit as well as our body—both being essentially the same. Sure enough, our ego-will is not identical with the self-will; our self-will does not want what the ego wants. Why has the self created the body? I don't know why we are not wind; we might be forms made of air and beyond sex or appetites or digestion and such nuisances, but it is a fact that we have bodies which have been created by the self, so we must assume that the self really means us to live in the body, to live that experiment, live our lives. And the ego should not choose whether we are to live this or that; we must have a different criterion. I don't doubt that certain things are meant not to be lived, but we must find out what they are. Contradictory taboos and laws are not given by the ego, nor by an assembly of egos, nor by the church or the whole state; those are only police regulations—including our morality, which is also a police regulation. But there is one law which is much more severe and much more accurate than any other, and that is the law of the self.

So you must inquire what experiment the self wants to make. Everything that disturbs that experiment must be avoided and everything that helps must be lived, and you will see the consequences on the spot. If you do something which disturbs the experiment you will be punished, much more severely than in a police court. And if you do something which rather serves your experiment, you will have the blessing of heaven and the angels will come to dance with you. You are helped along. You have ungodly health, and you develop powers which you have not had before because you have obeyed, not the ego, but that will of the self. Mind you, it is not the ego that wants to make that experiment. Often the ego says, "For God's sake I only hope that this thing is not coming to me!" If you have a fundamental dread somewhere, you can be sure just that is the experiment of the self. You see, the body is meant to live; it has to be served, and your self has a very particular purpose with it, presumably. Of course, nobody can say what the individual experiment is; for one it is this and for another that, and it is for nobody alike. It is an entirely individual question. Inasmuch as we are individuals our experiment is individual, and the point of life is that this particular individual should fulfill itself. For it makes no point in life to create a crowd of beings who try not to be themselves. It is just as if a potter had created a hundred vessels which didn't want to be vessels and always tried to be something else. But why have you been cre-

ated a vessel? Obviously you must be a vessel since you are created as a vessel, and every vessel must be what it is and function like a vessel.

Now, if the experiment is denied to the self, the self is fed up after a while and says, "Well, the experiment is not worthwhile, I prefer to disappear." As its purpose has been thwarted or starved, so you will be starved of life; your libido just steals away and leaves you high and dry, and you remain like that young dreamer I am dealing with in my Polytechnikum lecture;⁸ you are left as a mere wall decoration, two dimensional, flat, casting no shadow. Then you are a mere husk of yourself; the real life has gone because the experiment has been denied to the self. And then it is just as Nietzsche says, the self wants to perish—no use to continue that experiment. That is one thought in this passage, but there is also the thought alluded to by Mrs. Baumann, Mrs. Fierz, and Professor Reichstein, namely, that it belongs to the nature of life, to the nature of the experiment, that it is carried through into death. Of course, from a certain point of view that is perfect nonsense. One can ask, what is the use of an experiment which is made for the purpose of destroying itself? But the nonsense is in the way in which we look at it. It is obvious that an experiment is meant to come to an end; otherwise, it is no experiment, but a static condition. An experiment only makes sense when there is an end in sight. You see, an experiment does not make itself, but is made; the self, that potentiality, makes the experiment, and the potentiality does not come to the end by having made it. According to Eastern philosophy, the experiment can be repeated innumerable times—all the more the more it has failed. But the ambition of the East is to reach such a condition that the experiment does not need a repetition—that it is final, all questions answered.

Well, there is something in favor of the idea that there is a vital potentiality which makes one experiment after another; and inasmuch as such a potentiality exists to make the experiment, it must see that it comes to an end. Looked at from that standpoint, it does not seem to be a mere running down, a mere collapse; it is really a meaningful carrying through of an experiment, and the end yields the result. The end is the thing you are looking for. You undergo the whole thing in order to reach that conclusion. The experiment is not made in order to let something run down. It is a question and you look for an answer. That you look for the end and do not resist the end, that you live with

⁸ Jung lectured in German on children's dreams in 1936-37 and 1938 through 1941 at the Federal Polytechnic Institute (ETH).

the certainty of the end, is obviously the way life wants to be lived. Then it is properly lived, because you are accepting the conclusion at the end of the experiment; and that is right, it is healthy. If you live with continuous resistances against what might come to you, of course you are simply resisting the execution of your own experiment. So the idea that death is a goal, that it is the inevitable conclusion of your experiment, also comes in here. And it fits in with Nietzsche's profound optimism that you must say "Yes" to the eternal return of things. He puts it that way: he says you must have the courage to repeat; you must love life to such an extent that you can even say, "Once more!"

To succumb—so wisheth your Self; and therefore have ye become despisers of the body. For ye can no longer create beyond yourselves.

And therefore are ye now angry with life and with the earth.
And unconscious envy is in the sidelong look of your contempt.

Here a bit of the unconscious comes in. You see Nietzsche *au fond* already knew of the unconscious; he was aware of the shadow, and that is of course the deepest reason for what he is.

Mrs. Zimno: I want to know how the self can possibly perish; I should think it would be something between the ego and the self.

Prof. Jung: Oh, it is not meant that the self would perish. That is seen from consciousness. But if the self cannot carry through the experiment, then it kills the body.

Mrs. Zimno: I thought if one was in contact with the self, that was the creative side.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, you see the mistake he makes is that he identifies the self with the body. And here the self wants to destroy the body. That is the tragedy of the rope-dancer and the buffoon at the beginning of *Zarathustra*; the rope-dancer, Nietzsche the man, is overrun, cast away: he is no good. That Nietzsche identifies the self with the body is of course illogical, for you then come necessarily to the conclusion that if the body died, therefore the self wants to die. That is his conclusion. But if you take the self in the way I propose, it is of course somewhat different. I don't identify the self with the body. Then the body is just one of the experiments in the visibility of the self,⁹ and then you can say, "If that thing won't function, it will be cast away; it is no

⁹ For Jung the self is represented as both spirit and body. The alchemist, in creating the philosopher's stone, is making a visible, palpable form of the self. See CW 14, par. 649.

good.” You can see how these things really happen in human life. A man who does not obey when he hears the message—and it also can be a woman, you know—always reminds me of what a wild elephant once did. On banana plantations they have little houses, erected on poles against ants and rats and other vermin, where they store their bananas. And in such a little storehouse an old negro woman was asleep on top of the bananas, when a wild elephant broke into the plantation. Of course, he smelt the ripe bananas in the hut, so he tore open the roof and pushed his trunk in and he simply took that old woman and threw her away, and then ate the whole bunch of bananas inside. She fell shrieking into the branches of a tree but was not killed. That is what life does. Life wants to get at its result and if you don’t chime in, then you are cast out like nothing at all, as if you never had been. And then the experiment is made again.

LECTURE VI

27 February 1935

Prof. Jung:

We have a series of questions here, aroused apparently by our discussion about the concept of the self last week. Sure enough, this idea of the self is most mysterious. It is a symbolic concept: one cannot say what it is; one can indicate what one understands by the concept but what it is in itself one can never say. It covers a fact of which there is only a partial awareness and which is only partially thinkable. The partial awareness of the self is consciousness; the ego consciousness is that part of the self which is elucidated and which is immediately accessible to our reasoning and judgment. But the unconscious is merely noumenal and we have no immediate access to it. It is as indirectly accessible as, for instance, matter, or nature as a whole. We need microscopes and most complicated physical and chemical apparatuses in order to disclose the nature of things, in order to penetrate the secret of the transcendent object. Our sureness about material and physical phenomena is a mere illusion; we touch the surface of things but we know nothing about the inside. Naturally, science has discovered a number of methods that allow us to penetrate the secret to a certain extent; but the ultimate object is transcendent. It is beyond our grasp, simply because the nature by which we grasp, by which we attempt to understand consciousness or the psyche, is different from the object. Now, that is a hypothesis. Perhaps it is not so. But if the transcendent object were equal to the psyche, then of course we would have an absolute understanding though we would never know it. And why would we never know it?

Mrs. Baumann: Because we would be identical with it.

Prof. Jung: Of course. So we never could say whether the transcendent object really consisted of psyche or not. Since we know that we are our understanding, since the cognitional process is psyche and what we find is psyche, we naturally are unable to grasp it. We simply project; we assume that what we perceive is psyche, yet that is no proof

that it is so in reality. The material object might in itself be something different from what we call "psyche"; since we never get out of the psyche there is no chance that we ever will get any security in our judgment about the transcendental object. No wonder, therefore, that the discussion of the concept of the self, which covers partly our consciousness and partly what is beyond our consciousness, arouses many questions. Now, here is a question by Mrs. Strong, "In the discussion of last time when you pointed out the superiority of the self-will to the Ego-will, you seemed to assign a negative value to the ego-consciousness in its relation to the totality of the individual. But would it be true that at times the Ego makes a very positive contribution to the creating self—even acting as a check or conditioning factor on the form of the creation?"

I am sorry if I gave you the impression that I underrated consciousness or that I made any attempt to emphasize its inferiority; I thought I had indicated that consciousness is, on the contrary, absolutely indispensable to the self because it is the organ of awareness of the self. The question shows how careful one should be in discussing such very intricate philosophical matters. When I said the ego consciousness was a very narrow area in comparison with the great indefinite area of the unconscious, that did not mean that I belittled its value or importance. The ego consciousness is a smaller circle contained in a bigger one, but that is not an undervaluation or depreciation of consciousness, for that very small circle may be of an extreme importance, even of sublime importance, in comparison with the vast expanse of the unconscious psyche. If the unconscious psyche is deprived of acute consciousness, that would only be obtainable in what we call ego consciousness. You see, my idea is that whatever we can make out about the unconscious—whether it is personal or impersonal or super-personal—it is all the same in that it seems to be very weak. If there is any consciousness at all, it is blurred and dim. That would explain why nature felt the need of the acute consciousness; it was a tremendous achievement of nature to have produced it. If we want to pat nature on the back for anything, it would be for producing consciousness. It was awfully nice of nature, really an achievement!

For only since the dawn of consciousness has there been a world; before, there was nothing, because nobody knew that there was something. We can assume that God knew of creation, but that is a mere assumption. Only since we have attained consciousness are we sure that there is a world—at least I know, and every one of you knows, that

there is a world. Since that moment, a world exists, because it has known that it existed. You see, if the world can be criticized from a philosophical point of view, if there is a need in man to look at the total phenomenon of the world, then he must make such speculations. He will begin to philosophize, and he will inevitably ask the question, "Why should there be consciousness?" And he must come to the conclusion that nobody would have had the need of producing consciousness if he had not felt pretty blurred and obscured. Nobody would turn on a light in this room now because it is daylight; only if it were dark would one produce an illumination. It is like old Diogenes who went with a lantern over the marketplace in Athens in the daytime; people were astonished, but he had made that light in the daytime in order to seek men, because there were no men in Athens.¹ So if nature produces consciousness, we must assume that it was on account of the need for light, and that it was most probably quite dark before.

That can be put a bit nearer to common sense by picturing the primitive man as being in rather a quandary over that general darkness. They stumbled very often and felt the need to kindle a fire in the night. They needed to have a certain amount of consciousness, because they found out that the people who had it were better off than those who had none. So it became more or less fashionable and the fashion increased till now we have the general fashion of wearing consciousness: there is a general need of consciousness because it is too dark without. And so the creator was in need of light or acute awareness and therefore made a being who has consciousness and is aware of three-dimensional things which also have the quality of time. Now, if that is the case, if the only light of the world which we know of is our awareness of the world, then we can say human consciousness is metaphysically of an enormous importance. It is the only seeing eye of the deity. Therefore, in every Catholic church and even in Protestant churches, the deity is represented as the radiating eye in the center of a triangle, the mirroring image of human consciousness. By that we declare God as an eye, and that our consciousness is that eye; in other words, God has made man so that he might see in the darkness.

I don't want to go into metaphysical speculations—I only do so because they belong to our psychology; it is a psychological fact that man

¹ The legend usually has it that Diogenes was looking for an honest man, but Jung follows Diogenes Laertius: "He lit a lamp in broad daylight and said as he went about, 'I am looking for a man.'" *Lives of the Philosophers*, vol. II, tr. R. D. Hicks (The Loeb Classical Library), p. 41.

speculates in this way, that our consciousness functions in this way. In every individual it is the same; we have a large indefinite unconsciousness and only a part of it is definite; whether it is central, we don't know; presumably not. Perhaps it has the same relation to the center as our earth has to the sun. The center of our solar system is the sun, and our center, our world, is revolving round the sun; we are the children of the earth, and so our consciousness is eccentric relative to the center, as the earth is eccentric relative to the sun. That is possible, our consciousness may also be like a planet revolving round a central invisible sun, namely, round the presumable center of the unconscious, which is called the self because that is the center of the unconscious and the conscious.

So the contribution of the ego consciousness is absolutely unique, yet it is of course restricted; under certain aspects the ego is not at all powerful. Only as far as the affairs of three-dimensional space go, and in as far as time is concerned, is the ego on top of things. But wherever anything reaches beyond such limited conditions as space and time, the collective unconscious is probably of much greater importance. And there the self also is of a greater importance. It is characteristic that the more you are identical with consciousness, the more you try to neglect the self, the more you resist it, the more you feel it even as a hostile power—while in reality it is the center of your very life. You see, detached consciousness—detached in a wrong way I mean, when you identify with your consciousness—always tries to turn on a sort of strong electric light and shut out the light of the sun. But only a fool would shut out the light of the sun, because it would be most unhealthy to live by an electric power, by a compensatory artificial sun.

Mrs. Baumann: You said last time that man should make an experiment of life. I see a certain contradiction in the idea of the “provisional life.”

Prof. Jung: Of course, there is a very strong contradiction. First, we must understand what I designate as provisional life. I mean by that, that one lives under a certain assumption. The typical case is the *filis à papa*, the young man whose father has the necessary amount of capital so the boy lives under a sort of silent assumption that father will pay for everything. He does not need to work or be responsible because he has the necessary bank account. So he can live—God knows what—all sorts of things which he never would dream of living if he knew that he had to pay for the whole thing out of his own pocket. He lives in a sort of dream. Now of course, such a young man is not making the ex-

periment of his life, but the experiment of *a* life, any life, a sort of imagination. He imagines that he is a hell of a fellow. He speculates on the Exchange and of course falls down, but he can easily do it because he always lives on his father's money. Or he might imagine that he is a great sportsman or an artist, and again he wastes years and money on an assumption. So he never arrives really at himself; he never begins to live as if he had no money. Now, take something away from him, or make him conscious of the fact that money prevents him from living his own life, and instantly he will be forced into his own life, into what he would do if he had to depend upon himself alone. Then he would choose the type of life which you might call his own experiment. But that is not yet *the* experiment of life; it is only *his* experiment of life as far as his consciousness reaches. You know, our consciousness, being a restricted affair, suffers from all sorts of weaknesses, illusions, and such things, so we can really imagine that something is our task, or that a certain way is ours, when in reality it is not. It may be a sort of error due to inheritance or milieu for instance. Then in the course of life you have to find out whether the way you have chosen is backed up by the unconscious or not. For very often you have the experience that even if you live according to your best conviction, you still find yourself checked or interfered with by your unconscious. Then you know that your line is not exactly the line of the self, and you have to correct it so that your way fits in with the way of the self. This falling in line with the self is such an important psychological experience that it has a most significant name. What would that be?

Mrs. Zinno: Tao.

Mr. Baumann: Could we not call it individuation?

Prof. Jung: Yes, they are synonymous. Now we will go on to Miss Hannah's question. "Is the death of the body always willed by the self? Or can it occur from a cause outside the solar system (so to speak) of the self and the body? For instance, you have often said the 'ice projectile' can kill." (That is the icicle shot out by the medicine man.) "Would you say it would only be effective where the self already willed the destruction of that body, or could the self's own purpose be defeated by an outside cause?"

That is a question which is well out of my reach. I am not the self. I am not initiated into the secrets of the divine will, you know. That question is too metaphysical to be answered. But, of course, we have certain significant experiences; one often gets the impression, for instance, that people die at the right time, that it was logical that they should die

then: they were at the end of their rope. Or one can say that their self agreed that it was for many reasons the moment. An important reason may be that the body is no longer fit to stand a great change, and then the individual is just lifted out of his body as the old negro woman was lifted off the heap of bananas. Then it makes no sense to live on, because one is really overdue; the time has changed, conditions have changed and one's work, or one's functional importance, has become superfluous. Such people easily die. It seems as if circumstances, often in a miraculous way, arranged themselves to place a trap for them. But that is only a matter for conjecture; it is hypothetical, a speculation. These things are just beyond our knowledge. You can sometimes see in people's horoscopes that a certain negative position of their stars is very conspicuous, and makes it probable that at such a moment they would die; or perhaps a dream from long ago fulfils itself by death. Such things hint at a secret attempt by the self to finish man when he is no good any longer for the purpose of the self. But I cannot give you any definite answer.

Miss Wolff: Was not the question rather whether there were causes extraneous to the self that could cause death? Could you not take for example certain cases of suicide or accident which an outsider would say might have been avoided if that person had known more—if he had not had a depression or if he had listened to his dreams? Could one not say that death occurs because that person is associated with the ego side? An immediate cause of death would look to me as coming from the ego complex.


Prof. Jung: Well, we could also ask the question, how is the ego complex able to kill a person? It is not strong enough; it has not those sources of power which the self possesses. And concerning extra-mundane or extra-solar causes of death, how do you know about their nature? It is merely speculation. I admit that there are cases where the attitude of the ego is: Now if that is going to continue, something awful will happen! But that is where the self finally gets sick of that fool, the ego—the case of the old negro woman sitting upon the bananas.

Miss Kaufmann: There is a beautiful book dealing with this, *The Bridge of San Luis Rey*.²

Prof. Jung: Yes, when the bridge fell, the people on it were all at the end of their rope; that was very convincing from a psychological point

² Thornton Wilder, *The Bridge of San Luis Rey* (New York, 1927).

of view. Now we have here this mystical diagram made by Mrs. Baynes. Will you be kind enough to explain it?



- E = Ego = cent of partial psyche.
 S = Self or cent of total psyche.
 C = Consciousness
 Arch = Archetypes.
 o
 o Phenomenal world.
 o

Mrs. Baynes: I was just trying to sum up in diagrammatic form what I thought you meant about the self. And the question I wanted to ask is, "Would it be correct to say the self is composed of two factors, the psychological factor that is the combination of consciousness and the archetypes, and a metaphysical factor which I have written down there as Brahman?" Of course, I could not show in my diagram that Brahman comes into the whole business. Would that be correct?

Prof. Jung: Well, that belongs to this whole discussion about the concept of the self. It is a very difficult problem; probably I have to repeat the whole story. You know, the self is a borderline concept, which I call a symbol because it expresses something which we cannot express otherwise, because we simply don't understand it. The idea of the self

is really unknown ground. The psychological definition is that the self is the totality of consciousness and unconsciousness, and that sounds pretty definite: we seem to know what consciousness is and to have a fairly clear idea about the unconscious. But to say we know the unconscious is going much too far; we only know *of* it. The unconscious has an extension that can reach anywhere; we have absolutely no means of establishing a definite frontier. As we cannot say where the world ends, so we cannot say where the unconscious ends, or whether it ends anywhere. A concept that contains a definite factor like consciousness and an indefinite factor like unconsciousness is not scientific; moreover, it is metaphysical in its nature *per definitionem*: it overreaches itself. Therefore, I call it a symbol.

A symbol to me is not a sign for something of which I know, like the winged wheel on the cap of a railway employee, or the Freudian symbols, or the Freemason's so-called symbolism—those are simply signs for something we know very well. A symbol is an expression for a thing of which I only know that it does exist. I don't know *it*.³ So the self is a living symbol because it designates something which we know exists; we know there is a totality of consciousness and unconsciousness because we are the living examples of it. The self expresses our acknowledgment of a thing that is actually in existence, but of which we don't know enough. It overreaches us, it is bigger than we are. Therefore, I call it the concept of the self; it is the best expression I know. Formerly, there have been other expressions. The self has been expressed by the figure of Christ, for instance; in medieval philosophy it was the *lapis philosophorum*, or it was the womb, or the gold, or the *Tinctura magna*, the *quinta essentia*. And the Grail was a symbol of the self, and the cross. On more primitive stages the king was the symbol of the self, because he was always of divine nature at the same time. Or certain gods. Since the beginning of history, the self has nearly always been represented by the god-man. Then of course, on lower primitive levels it is a fetish, an object that is inhabited by the divine breath, or my mana, or by extraordinary magic effect.

This concept is, as I say, an acknowledgment of the experience of a being that is bigger than we are; we cannot comprehend it. In German that would be called *ein Erlebnis*, an experience. Such an experience is

³ A sign can be fully translated, being a substitute for its referent. Thus he often said that what Freud called symbols were really signs, for symbols are irreducible to literal explanation.

not scientific because it is not intellectual; it is an utterly irrational fact. Psychology is a peculiar science in that the function of cognition is there identical with the object of cognition, for the object of cognition is the psyche, and cognition is a part of the psyche. So one uses the same system to recognize the system. In any other science, you are in a much more favorable position, because one had the limitation of the object. In mineralogy, for example, the minerals are the object of cognition, because one defines them as being different. If one goes further, if one gets into the interior of the atom, then one falls into doubts, for then there is no difference between the object and the psyche. But mineralogy does not need to go into the detail of the psyche; it is sufficient to know about the uses and application of minerals. The subject matter of mineralogy is different from the psyche and therefore one doesn't need to worry: one can use one's mind in order to understand minerals, which are quite different. But how would it be if one had to use minerals in order to understand minerals? Then the method of cognition would be the object of cognition at the same time, and one cannot see how that would be possible. Therefore, people have asked, "Is it really possible that there is such a thing as psychology?"—and that is really a legitimate question.

Now, by a certain limitation, just as by not going into the question of the interior of the atom mineralogy is possible, so in psychology, provided I look at certain psychological processes under a certain aspect, I can then pass a judgment—I can really say something about the psyche or physical processes. But I must mention my premises, the standpoint from which I am talking. Inasmuch as I don't go in for the inner structure of the atom I can deal with mineralogy, and inasmuch as I don't enter upon the being of the psyche I can make sense of psychology. But if I enter upon the actual being of the psyche, I must acknowledge the psyche is an irrational experience. So in such subtle concepts as the self you have both sides; on the one side it is a psychological concept which you can define perfectly neatly, and even use in a scientific way; but on the other side, you must acknowledge the irrational fact of the psyche which is an experience, a state of being. It is like trying to make a science of elephants, say. You can write a chapter in zoology about elephants, but to be actually under the feet of an elephant is quite different. In the one case you are sitting in your study writing, and in the other you are in a damned unfortunate situation. That is so with the self. You talk about it in a perfectly friendly, scholarly way. Nobody is hurt. It is all nice and warm and afterwards you are going

to eat your dinner. But if it should be an experience, well, you are just under the elephant. Not always though.

So these things have to be considered in making such a scheme as this one of Mrs. Baynes. And I have another diagram here by Mrs. Baumann which also belongs to the nature of the self as an experience. We need such speculation and formulas as soon as we discuss the concept of the self. Inasmuch as the self is a scientific concept, of course circles and Brahman and such things are not needed; for the scientific concept of the self comes to an end with the statement that it is the sum total of consciousness and unconsciousness, and then everybody shakes hands and goes home and sleeps. And that is right, that is as it should be. But if anybody asks, "How far does the unconscious reach? What is the unconscious?"—then you are in pitch, you are stuck, and then you must confess that here the elephants begin, and they are real.

Miss Kaufmann: I think there is the same difficulty with philosophy.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is the eternal trouble with philosophy that the world is man's experience, and then they go and talk about it. It is much safer to talk and therefore they prefer it. Well now, as soon as you deal with the self as an experience, the whole thing changes and wild things come up, because you are then confronted with mountains of obscurity; it is just like being actually in the jungle in the midst of an excited herd of elephants. So you try all sorts of things to conjure up the danger and to express what you see. Since the earliest times—I am thinking of old Pythagoras, for instance—those people who took the existence of the world and the psyche to heart, made such diagrams: circles and squares and triangles. They invented the queerest ciphers in order to express that peculiar experience. And always again, consciousness overlapped and would not accept it, said it was all bunk, nonsense, and made up a conscious philosophy or conscious science which was just talk and useful rules-of-thumb. For instance, philosophy inasmuch as it is talk is a useful rule-of-thumb: how to become a professor. And science or scientific investigation is a way to invent or discover useful new rules-of-thumb for practical purposes, either how to become a professor or how to become practical and helpful to people, as in medicine, say. There are all sorts of applications for either objective or subjective rules-of-thumb; you can even divide learned people according to this scheme. On the one side are the subjective ones whose rule-of-thumb is how to become famous, how to say something which makes people sit up and cock their ears and exclaim, "How wonderful!"—and on the other side are those who really produce some-

thing of value. But that is all science, a world of words, a two-dimensional world. Beyond that is a world where you actually experience that the world exists, that you are the psyche—the psyche becomes your existence.

Now, in making such a chart you denote the self as an experience and that brings in a lot of things which are exceedingly questionable; you feel that they exist, but you cannot grasp them. So no end of such things will be produced. Then science becomes the desperate attempt of man to designate the root of things, the things which are not just in the head, but *forces intérieures* perhaps from below the earth. There is a Latin text which says these roots are below the earth, meaning that they are in the unconscious. So when you follow up the life of the living self, it leads you into an experience which is below and above, or before and beyond, our day. I am sorry if this is too damned obscure, but we all get obscure as soon as we talk of the experience of life, because anything that is, is always beyond; if it were not, we would be gods. Life is beyond, our world is beyond, our whole being is beyond-ourselves. Experience it and you begin to make these desperate attempts. (I call them desperate attempts, and the club that is preoccupied with such things is a club of desperados.) You necessarily get desperate when you touch upon the thing that is greater than yourself. Mrs. Baynes' system as far as I get it, is correct, I should say this is a fair.

Mrs. Baynes: A fairly desperate attempt!


Prof. Jung: But I would not give the ego that central position. I would change those two points around, I would call this central point the self, an indivisible point, and I would put the ego on the outer circle, as a sort of planet revolving round the self, in order to remain in tune with the harmony of the spheres which you begin to hear as soon as you get below the water. If you cock your ears you will hear it; and then you will put the self in the center, and the ego would be on the larger circle. You see, the ego in the three-dimensional sphere necessarily seems greater than the self, because the self is not three-dimensional. The concept of the self implies a space-denying existence; the four-dimensional is the denial of the three-dimensional, so to speak of four-dimensional space is complete nonsense. It is a denial of space. Therefore, the self is best indicated by the *bindu* creative point, and the ego would extend outward into three-dimensional space; so you can make it bigger, as the earth to us seems to be bigger than the sun though in reality the sun is much bigger. The things which are smallest in the self or for the self are the biggest in space, and you can safely conclude that

all the big mighty things in the outside world are just nothing in comparison with the self. So the more you are looking upon the self, the less the big outside things matter, and that is what they always hate. That is the reason those desperados who look into such experience always hide themselves away, make secret brotherhoods. They go into the woods and caves—not into the churches but into secret places below the churches—expressing by that that they can turn their backs on the big things. And as the big collective things mind it, time and again they accuse the secret societies of all sorts of things, like the hue and cry against the Freemasons. In Italy they really killed a number of them; all the leaders of the Italian Freemasons are assumed to be arch-devils and banished to a certain island, because they do not believe in the collective path, the big things. Of course, the visible powers of the earth become *nil* if you approach the center. So it is quite a dangerous enterprise, of which one can only warn people who approach this time-and space-annihilating something. The scientific concept is perfectly safe, but take it as an experience and it is unsafe.

Well then, with the self in the center absolutely unextended, and the ego revolving around it, the objective world in which the ego moves would be limitless extension, just space. Now Mrs. Baynes had indicated her Brahman by this vertical line, which would be the side elevation: it would really be at right angles to the plane. That would be a fourth dimension which is always a vertical upon space. Of course one cannot imagine such a thing, because space simply does not suffer a vertical upon itself, but that would be the mathematical definition as the third dimension is a vertical upon a plane. A vertical upon space is space-denying at the same time, because space only has three dimensions; if there were a fourth dimension there would be no space. There would be instead something absolutely unthinkable, unimaginable. Therefore, by putting that Brahman there you deny space, and Brahman is just that, a potentiality of a world—a world in itself perhaps—but a world of unknown quality, bearing upon our world like an indivisible and therefore an invisible point. It is an absolute potential. So that Hindu metaphysical concept of Brahman which symbolizes the totality of existence, contains in itself that quality which denies existence; therefore, Brahman is the eternal non-existent existence. To indicate it by a point is practical because it has absolutely no extension, and we cannot conceive of a thing that has no extension because it is not in space.

Mrs. Baumann: Professor Hauer represents it as making one world by this diagram: one circle is the visible world and the other would be the invisible archetypal world, and the point of the self is in the center where the lines cross.

Prof. Jung: Yes, does not convey It is not Hindu diagram obviously



one also can show it like that. But that the idea of the annihilation of existence. philosophy to which Mrs. Baynes' di- relates, where it is indispensable to think

of existence as being non-existent. And as one of the peculiar qualities of the self is that it is existent non-existent, you can call it a merely virtual center. In a way, it is as if it did not exist; in another way, it is as if it were the only existence. Of course, one could say it was perfectly futile to make such speculations. Yes, from the horizontal point of view, the world of words; there it is absolutely morbid and unsound. But if you experience the psyche, you cannot help speculating about it; you are simply forced to do so in order to defend yourself against the experiences that crowd in. Since you are confronted with them, you have to invent certain forms to try to express them. For instance, if you go into a man's bedroom and find that he has put the legs of his bed into washbasins full of oil, you think he is mad; but if you see that in the Bush, you know it is an excellent idea because he can then sleep. That is the only way to protect himself against the ants, which would otherwise eat him and his bed too. If you live in a country where there are no such things as mosquitos or migrating ants or termites, you don't need any particular methods of protection—you don't need an adaptation system—but if you happen to live in central Africa, it is a different story. And so it is with the question of the self. As long as you find the world livable, the world of newspapers and concerts and books, the world of lectures, drawing rooms, how-do-you-do, five o'clock teas, and so on, to talk of the self is perfectly ridiculous, utterly futile. But if you take the self as an experience, then these efforts become suddenly exceedingly important and vital, and if you don't succeed in making the right kind of cipher, you may pass a sleepless night, or your stomach will be upset; while if you happen to hit the right cipher, you are relieved, you can digest and are friendly to everybody, and the world and life seem to be worthwhile again—all of which is of course quite ridiculous looked at from the horizontal. Now here is another living attempt. Will you be kind enough to explain how you came to this, Mrs. Baumann?

Mrs. Baumann: It is sort of mixed up with the star map. At the right is Aquarius; and on the left the *taigitu* design stands for the Fishes because it is also the age of opposites; and Pegasus is above as the ruling principle of our time, the age of transition.

Mrs. Baynes: Above what?


Mrs. Baumann: The swastika which is the whirlpool of disorientation of the present moment between the two ages. But Prof. Jung ought to explain it.

Prof. Jung: This is not my attempt. I have made no swastika in the sun! But the idea here apparently has to do with the transition of the Platonic year; according to old astrological philosophy the precession of the equinoxes is now preceding into the sign of Aquarius, coming from the sign of the Fishes. Now, if you look at the sign of Aquarius on the star map, you find above it a constellation which is almost a square called Pegasus. The precession is really oblique, it comes down out of the horizontal second Fish and then Pegasus is just above. Could you explain to us how you connect this idea of the Platonic time with our problem in question, the self?

Mrs. Baumann: The self, of course, underlies it all. But I was thinking first of Nietzsche's relation to the time, that he was influenced by the time in writing *Zarathustra*. Also it has to do with our present time, and with what is happening in Germany.

Prof. Jung: But more closely in connection with the self. Do you mean Pegasus would be the idea of the self?

Mrs. Baumann: I would say it had to do with the development of man. But may I first explain the diagram as a map of time? As Pegasus is the ruling principle above, it seemed to me to also have something to do with the throat center, inspired speech and enthusiasm. Then the earth down below is the opposite creative thing; also the earth is the material which the sculptor molds, and there is another constellation down below the Fishes and the first part of Aquarius called the "Sculptor." As Aquarius is in the future (on the right), I call that the age of increased consciousness; and the past, the Fishes (on the left), is the age of relative unconsciousness. In the center is the golden swastika turning to the right. That is the constructive aspect. Then if you turn



it the other way, man is moving backward and the swastika turns to the left. Aquarius would then be on the left as the unconscious future, and the Fishes (on the right) would be, from that point of view, the conscious past. And the swastika is black, destructive—the emphasis on the black. Then Pegasus, the ruling principle could also be called the “animal libido,” and the square is the Trinity plus the devil, making all four functions.

Prof. Jung: How would you explain this cross below?

Mrs. Baumann: I just used this as a sign for the earth.

Prof. Jung: Referring to the *I Ching* symbolism I suppose.

Mrs. Sigg: You spoke last time of the creative self and I thought that was an enormous relief; and you also spoke of the vital principle that was beyond everything, ruling over all. And I think if you connect the self with the creative idea, the forming principle, that makes it much easier for us to accept the idea of the self, much easier for living. Now in Pegasus, Mrs. Baumann suggests something of that forming principle, and she also spoke of the Sculptor, the constellation below, as a creative sign.

Prof. Jung: I did not quite understand what you said about Pegasus and the relation of the word, Mrs. Baumann.

Mrs. Baumann: I meant inspired speech, as in the creative poet, so it seemed to me it could be connected also with Nietzsche.

Prof. Jung: You mean connected through synchronicity—that the actual place of the spring equinox would coincide with the time of Nietzsche?

Mrs. Baumann: I mean with his intuition of the ruling principle to come.

Prof. Jung: Pegasus is a fixed place in the heavens, and in the stream of time the birth of Nietzsche would occur somewhere under Pegasus. And that Nietzsche would therefore coincide with that symbolism would be of course according to the idea of astrology, where a birth coincides with a cosmic factor and is unfluenced thereby. Would that express your idea?

Mrs. Baumann: Yes.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is possible. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Baumann: I felt so terribly shy about showing this. I did not want to be identified with it. It was absolutely not my own activity.

Prof. Jung: I am very glad that Mrs. Baumann has told us this, because she thus gives us a very excellent demonstration of what I was saying: that this is not a creation from the world of words, but from the world of experience. She naturally felt shy in talking about it and has

not her usual certainty; it is a particular kind of experience which she has tried to formulate in cipher. I assume that this is more or less a definite experience, otherwise we could not explain why she took the time and trouble to seek out and bring together all sorts of situations and parallels, in order to express or substantiate her particular experience, which is in itself utterly inexpressible. You will admit that one experiences a peculiar difficulty if called upon to explain such a thing. Now the very character of the things she has gathered together to make her point clear, shows that one could also bring in God-knows-what other comparisons or analogies, which would contribute equally well to the same idea. This whole scheme, for instance, suggests the cross, and the cross was a very important time symbol already in antiquity; it has always been explained as the position of the spring equinox, the intersection of the equator with the so-called ecliptic. It has also been said that the Greek letter X in Platonism represents that spring equinox, but I don't believe it; I think it is the visible cross in the sky which one sees in certain latitudes, not the constellation of the Southern Cross, but the intersection of the Milky Way with the zodiacal line. I saw it in the desert in North Africa, but I assume one can see it on clear nights in Greece because it is the same latitude.

Prof. Fierz: We saw it in Rhodes.

Prof. Jung: It is a very old idea of course, belonging to that myth, for instance, where the demiurgos created a round universe which he cut into four parts and then stuck together again; and to the myth where man was made as a perfect form, a globe with double sex, which had to be cut asunder. In that case, it was cut into only two parts. But since the dawn of time it has been assumed that the living unit consisted of four. That was the idea of Pythagoras, and one finds in all medieval philosophy that the self consists of four elements, which were either identified with earth, water, fire, and air, or with the four kinds of temperament, just as we compare them with the four functions. It is an archaic truth that the essential thing consists of four, and therefore this cross symbolism is also linked up with time. The intersection of the ecliptic with the equator is such an association with time, and from that comes the cross symbolism of the early horoscope, which can be drawn in a square, as the ancients conceived of it, or in the form of a circle.

So this diagram is a sort of horoscope, but of the Platonic year, and though it apparently has to do with the most cosmic matters, yet it also expresses our psychology; and according to Mrs. Baumann, it would express the psychology of Nietzsche and Germany and Europe. As a matter of fact, one could say that it does represent it, which does not

mean that events in the world are so because we have such ideas! This is not an explanation. It is utterly illogical, utterly irrational; it is merely an expression of the fact that our psychology is actually such that it has to produce this sort of thing if the psyche is experienced. That is, of course, the necessary condition; without that, nothing of the kind happens. And the best way of expressing it is surely to link it up with the peculiarities of the time, because there is presumably a synchronicity between the psychological events in ourselves and the events in the sphere of life in which we live. Of course, much more could be said about this peculiar symbolism. For instance, you have here the so-called four correspondences very beautifully. In Pegasus one sees the four points quite clearly, and they are included in the square below in a different arrangement, in the form of a cross. Here the points are connected, while in Pegasus they are disconnected. Then in the *taigitu*, corresponding to the age of the Fishes, there is a duality; and opposite, in the age of Aquarius, there is also a duality but of a different kind. The symbol for the Fishes is static because it revolves in itself, and the Aquarius sign is flowing. It has no beginning and no end. I am glad that Mrs. Baumann has given us this chance to see how such symbolic expressions come into existence, and why they come. They are always an attempt to formulate the immediate experience of our time. Of course, that doesn't mean that nobody experiences the time who does not make such a scheme; we can experience our time in many forms. It can be in the form of the word, also. As long as it is experienced in the form of the word, however, we are personally not really shaken. But if it reaches us within, in our own essence, we need an expression and we will seek an expression. We will eat dust to get that expression. People eat the most incredible things—Eastern philosophy, and anthroposophy, and I don't know what besides—in order to find the stuff which would allow them to express the experience of our time, the actual condition of our collective psyche.

LECTURE VII

6 March 1935

Prof. Jung:

I think we can today go on to the next chapter, "Joys and Passions."

My brother, when thou hast a virtue, and it is thine own virtue, thou hast it in common with no one.

To be sure, thou wouldst call it by name and caress it; thou wouldst pull its ears and amuse thyself with it.

And lo! Then hast thou its name in common with the people, and hast become one of the people and the herd with thy virtue.

Better for thee to say: "Ineffable is it, and nameless, that which is pain and sweetness to my soul, and also the hunger of my bowels."

What does he mean by that first sentence? If I have a virtue, justice for instance, then surely I have it in common with other people; I cannot assume that I am the only one who has the virtue of justice.

Miss Hannah: Does he mean by that the virtue of being yourself?—because a long way back (Prologue, sec. 4) he uses *virtue* in that sense.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in those passages he means by "virtue" the value of personality, or one can say the self. For the real value of a personality is always symbolized by a jewel, a treasure or something of the sort, because everything is centered round that central value which would be the self. And that value can be called "virtue" because "virtue" has almost the meaning of magic power. Therefore, the Latin word *virtus* was used to designate specific magic qualities, like the *virtus* of a medicine, or a metal, or a stone, for instance. The *virtus* of the amethyst is that it protects one against intoxication, and the *virtus* of the horn of the rhinoceros is that, when made into a goblet, it protects one against poison. That is a Chinese idea; they imported rhinoceros horn from Africa for that purpose. There was the same idea in Europe in the Middle Ages—you have probably seen those horn drinking cups. Then *virtus* later on became simply the same mana quality of a brave

and courageous warrior. And later still it was supposed that people who followed a certain way, who observed certain laws or rules, acquired a virtue; for instance, if one lived an ascetic life, or performed certain ceremonies, one acquired the virtue or the man or the magic quality of a saint or a sorcerer; that was a new significance of the "virtue." Nietzsche takes it more in that sense, as effect, *mana*.

You see, another definition of *mana* is the idea of the quite uncommonly efficacious, and virtue would be an excellence or an efficacy of uncommon nature. A man with *virtus* is an outstanding man, who has quality, value—one cannot say what it is exactly. It is simply *mana*. So Nietzsche's idea would be that virtue is the thing which one has in common with none, because the highest virtue or *virtus* of a man is that he is himself. Individuality, self-ness—not selfishness—is the one quality which he has in common with none, because the self is utterly unique, and inasmuch as the self is realized in an individual it means uniqueness. And uniqueness means isolation, and it means also loneliness looked at from a human point of view, for it is differentiation, and a thing which is different is all by itself and not in any sort of *participation*; it is not connected by underground channels where the real life comes from. It is really and properly isolated, and therefore comparable to none. Now the passage: "To be sure, thou wouldst call it by name and caress it." What about that?

Mrs. Adler: Is it not the rationalizing action of consciousness? He brings it to the ego.

Prof. Jung: You mean he would make it a conscious quality and thus a quality of the ego?

Mrs. Adler: A rational quality, just that, and not something he has to do.

Prof. Fierz: He says, "When thou hast *a* virtue" he does not say "virtues." It might be justice or any other virtue, and that is not what you mean by "personality."

Prof. Jung: Not exactly; that is the interesting thing.

Mrs. Leon: You spoke of the principle of justice as being a virtue, but if that is formulated in laws it would have a collective aspect and lose its *mana*.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is something else. You see, when I speak of *a* virtue and call it "justice," I simply take one example, and by that I am giving you the name. Nietzsche starts with the idea that one has *a* virtue—usually when one speaks of a virtue one means a specific one—and then he goes on, "And it is thine own virtue"—which means specific to yourself. You must realize that this is a virtue which you have in

common with nobody else; it is an individual belonging, and he implies that you had better *not* give it a name. He says, "To be sure, thou wouldst call it by a name"—meaning, naturally, that you are inclined to speak of a specific virtue, but as soon as you call it by a name, "Then hast thou its name in common with the people, and hast become one of the people and the herd with thy virtue." So don't designate your virtue by a name, for you thus make it specific: it becomes just one of the virtues.

Mrs. Fierz: It is making it exoteric instead of esoteric.

Prof. Jung: You can put it like that. For if you bring a thing which is nameless down into the sphere of the collective, you become part of collectivity, a herd particle; you have impoverished or reduced a uniqueness to a collective thing. Then the highest value has sunk to the level of a coin that can be found in anybody's pocket. So this idea, as he expresses it, is, "Better for thee to say: 'Ineffable is it, and nameless, that which is pain and sweetness to my soul, and also the hunger of my bowels.'"

Let thy virtue be too high for the familiarity of names, and if thou must speak of it, be not ashamed to stammer about it.

By giving a name to your virtue, you will disenchant it, lower it, deteriorate it to a collective level; and then it would not be your individual accomplishment. It would be just a character quality and no longer the excellence of your uniqueness.

Miss Wolff: I think he explains also in the second sentence that giving a name and displaying an interest is to be on too intimate terms with it, and that can have the same effect upon himself. For if he is familiar, then it is a possession which he can put in his pocket, no longer a thing greater than himself. He becomes it.

Prof. Jung: That would be practically what Mrs. Adler said: it would be assimilating it to the ego. If one can call it by a name and put it in one's pocket, the ego would be on top—I have a virtue. Giving a name to a thing generally has the peculiar effect of familiarizing it. It is as if it were depotentiated; as by giving a name to a demon, one has power over the demon. Therefore, one reads in the *Book of the Dead* that the Egyptians always put a book in the coffin of a dead king, containing the names of the gates and doors of the underworld, for they were only opened if he could call them by the right name. So in Grimm's fairy tale, that demon Rumpelstiltskin¹ comes and works mischief until he is

¹ Rumpelstiltskin, from *Grimm's Fairy Tales*. The name suggests a mischievous little man.

called by his name, and then he gets so angry that he immediately explodes and is finished because his real name is known. Therefore, primitive kings or sorcerers have secret names: the name by which they are known generally is only a cover which conceals the real one. If anybody should know their real name it might have an effect upon their life and welfare, so they hide it. We have much the same custom. As a rule we have two, and often three, names: first our family name and to be called by that is not injurious, but when you are called by your private or Christian name, you can be injured because that person has an immediate hand in your psyche. For instance, if somebody suddenly calls out your Christian name in a crowd of apparent strangers, you will immediately be hit as if by an arrow. Therefore, one has a family name and if possible a title, which is most protective; a family name is already a bit specific but you can hide any amount of God-knows-what vanities behind a title and are not injured. For ordinary people a family name is quite good enough, but with the Christian name, the devil begins, particularly when the other sex calls you by it. This is not true in America where I was amazed to find that anybody called anybody by the Christian name, and it is even made into a belittling diminutive. That simply proves that the individual has been too highly familiarized there. A lot of trouble arises on account of it; one is secretly undermined by it.

Prof. Fierz: I remember when I was in a big powder factory in Wilmington, the man with a broom who opened the doors called, "Hello, Charlie," to the director, who was a very big man. It is as if one said to the President, "Good morning, Otto."

Mr. Baumann: You spoke of people bringing their virtue down to the collective level, and I think it also happens that people put it into their personas. For instance, a man thinks he is being frank when he always tells every nonsense without thinking.

Prof. Jung: That would be the effect of the familiarization of a virtue; you call it by a name and then you talk of it—you paint yourself with that war paint. A man who always insists that he is exceedingly truth-loving and honest, lies at the slightest provocation because he had familiarized his virtue. Nietzsche is quite right when he says one should consider a good thing in oneself as an excellence of one's own, as one's uniqueness; one should not call it by a name. For it does not matter what name one gives to it; if there is an excellence, it will be shown in many forms. A just man will have value in many different quarters, not only in exercising justice; but if he says his keynote is justice you can be sure he is lying. He says it in order to cover up injustice. So it is quite

right to say, “Ineffable is it, and nameless”; it is something greater than oneself. It is one’s own uniqueness. One reads in the *Upanishads* that when Prajapati is deliberating about the creation of certain parts of the world, he usually consults with his own greatness, as if his own greatness were something different from himself, some super-quality, not the quality which he can name and put into his pocket. And that is the self. So even Prajapati, the Atman of the world, has a self, something greater than himself; then his own greatness speaks to him.²

Thus speak and stammer: “That is *my* good, that do I love, thus doth it please me entirely, thus only do *I* desire the good.”

Here he expresses the idea that having a virtue means a general indescribable good, a value that presides, one could say, over the whole of oneself; and you should not name it in order not to create the wrong appearance—as if you could put that good into your pocket and use it when it pleases you. It should appear, even in your formulation, as something which is in your being generally. It is always there and it will act when it pleases. You see, that is at the same time a formulation for the relation to the self, as an everlasting presence that cannot be disposed of and that cannot be named—that is there self-evidently, and will work by its own virtue. Then he says,

Not as the law of a God do I desire it, not as a human law or a human need do I desire it; it is not to be a guidepost for me to superearths and paradises.

An earthly virtue is it which I love: little prudence is therein, and the least everyday wisdom.

The only quality he gives to it is that earthly quality, which is, of course, analogous to his calling the self “the body”; he wants to include the body as the visible appearance of the self. He wants to make a whole of it, not only “a guidepost for me to superearths and paradises.” Not only a soul meant for paradise, that is; he also means the body, the living unit. And naturally if you take virtue as being a quality manifested in the whole of yourself, including the body, then there is little prudence in it and still less common sense. You know, common sense always advises us to give names to things in order to control them; it is as if you could take a thing into your hands, make it small, and grasp it. While if you deal with things to which you cannot give a name, you are

² Prajapati (the progenitor) was a god whose loneliness and desire to let his substance overflow led to his creating the world. See Hume*, pp. 81-86.

confronted with an unknown quantity, and that always arouses your fear. It is uncanny, particularly in insisting upon less prudence and common sense. But prudence is an exclusion of certain ways. It is our own foresight, and you know how far foresight leads us—not very far. By prudence and common sense we might exclude a way which would lead us to the right place. Of course on the other hand, if it is a matter of uncommon sense, then you need common sense. Usually people with common sense are lacking in uncommon sense, and alas! people with uncommon sense lack common sense—and that is equally bad.

But that bird built its nest beside me: therefore, I love and cherish it—now sitteth it beside me on its golden eggs.

What kind of picture is this? What does it mean?

Mrs. Baumann: It is the uncommon sense idea.

Prof. Jung: This bird obviously means that earthly virtue which has so little prudence and common sense. But I would like to know the meaning of this peculiar symbol. Why just such a funny picture?

Mrs. Stutz: It is sent by God, coming from heaven, but it develops out of nature itself.

Mrs. Adler: A bird is a spiritual fact, so this virtue does not come from the earth; it is an opposite conception.

Mr. Allemann: This earthly virtue has spiritual power in it, and it is a creative thing. It sits on golden eggs.

Mrs. Leon: But nesting also suggests that weaving quality of women; they sometimes weave nests instead of plots.

Mr. Baumann: Has it not the quality of a rebirth, a resurrection?

Prof. Jung: Now you are getting warmer!

Mrs. Sigg: It has something to do, perhaps, with the Holy Ghost and its motherly qualities.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, it has very much to do with the Holy Ghost. You see, when Nietzsche, a parson's son, speaks of a bird with golden eggs, it has surely never the American meaning of "business."

Dr. Strong: There is also the idea of self-perpetuation—going from bird to egg and then the bird again.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the gold itself suggests permanency and duration.

Miss Wolff: Quite simply, it shows again that it is absolutely not his own doing; the bird came to him and Nietzsche just waits until the eggs are hatched.

Prof. Jung: So the bird would mean what? You are speaking of Nietzsche himself.

Mrs. Fierz: Zarathustra. And in as far as he is the wise old man, he can also be depicted as bird. It would be the *hamsa*.

Prof. Jung: Well, the *hamsa* is a miraculous bird sure enough, and it is also a sort of phoenix, because the old wise man knows of the elixir of life. He can give himself rebirth, always rise again from his ashes. He is a great sorcerer, and he is a bird because he is a spirit. You see, we could say that this bird is quality, virtue—made visible in the figure of Zarathustra, the greater one in Nietzsche. So this is a symbol of the self appearing in the form of a wise old man; in other words, the idea of the fact of the self is still enveloped by the symbol of the wise old man, in this case by the wise old bird, the *hamsa*.

Mrs. Fierz: Professor Zimmer quoted an Indian legend in his Berlin Seminar which I think illustrates this. Markandeya, who is a very great saint, is wandering all over the world, and at the same time the world is the body of the God, so that actually he is *inside* the God's body.³ Wandering thus through many countries and kingdoms and meditating about the marvels of the earth, the saint happens to arrive at the God's mouth and suddenly stands on the surface of his body. But he cannot recognize this because of the God's maya. What he sees instead is an endless ocean and in this ocean a mountain-like sleeping giant. And just as Markandeya is going to ask the giant who he is, he is swallowed up again by the mouth of the god, and is wandering all over the world inside the god's body. Then, after a long time, Markandeya without his knowing arrives again at the god's mouth and is again suddenly standing on the surface of his body. This time he sees a baby playing under a tree, and the baby says: "Hello, Markandeya! Come here, my child, and be not afraid." Markandeya is terribly angry that a mere baby should be allowed to call him "child" and by his first name, instead of respectfully giving him his saintly titles. But then the baby says: "I am your father and creator"; it reveals its eternal godhead to Markandeya, so that the saint now knows. But again he is swallowed up by the god's mouth—and the interesting part of the story is this: that being inside of the body of the god again, Markandeya remembers him not as the god, but as the swan, as *Hamsa*. So, what on a superpersonal level is the god, on our everyday level seems to be the swan, the bird of the wise old man.

Prof. Jung: That is very interesting. Well, because that memory is wisdom, it is the wise old man who remembers back through the ages

³ Markandeya, a kind of Indian "Wandering Jew," ponders in his endless journey the problem of what is real and what is Maya. See Zimmer/Myths, pp. 38-53.

into the time before man, when there were only the gods; so it was a memory of a divine world. Professor Lévy-Bruhl alluded to that *bugari* world of the Central Australian aborigines, a mythical period in the past of mankind, a sort of heroic age when men were demigods and animals; and it was like a dream. They call dreaming by the same name.⁴ So in the dreams one is in that original divine world, the world which is eternal, which lasts during the transitory world in which we are actually living and forever after. It is always the world outside time and the sage is supposed to have the memory of it, and it is interesting that this memory is represented by an animal. You see, it is necessary to pass through the stage of the animal in order to reach the absolute memory, because the ancestors are animal-like; therefore, it is always represented by a snake or a bird or another animal, according to circumstances.

Mr. Baumann: But has not the bird rather the special quality of pointing to the future? In other Seminars we talked about birds bringing new ideas to people, showing them what they have to do.

Prof. Jung: That is the bird considered as a messenger. But this bird functions rather differently. He says the bird has built a nest in him; it is now firmly rooted. When a bird builds his nest in your room, it means to stay. So this bird has established itself in Nietzsche; it is his other psyche. This memory, or the wise old man, the connection with the world outside time, is now within him and is going to hatch the golden eggs. "Gold" generally means value; also the virtue of gold is that it is in a way beyond time. It does not oxidize, but remains the same. That the eggs are golden, then, means highest value, greatest luck; and a number of them would mean fertility, many golden possibilities for the future. They have nothing to do with the well-known hen that lays the golden eggs, meaning riches—spiritual riches are meant here, quite obviously. And it is interesting that he speaks of the earthly virtue, meaning the virtue of the body, yet in the next sentence uses this spiritual symbol, an air being, a bird that has built its nest. It would denote a sort of intuition in Nietzsche that the body of which he speaks is not without spirit; it is not a contradiction between body or matter and spirit, but is a body that lives, a spiritual body.

You see, this is really the old idea of the breath body, the subtle body, which is always represented either as bird or ghost, because it is smoke-

⁴ The *bugari* world is that of a past period, a heroic age, which can be entered and dwelt in, under special circumstances, by a person of the present. It is also called the *al-cheringa* world. See Lévy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality* (London, 1923), ch. 3.

like and has no weight. It rises out of our coarse body and floats in the air, like a flying bird or a wreath of smoke. You can find all these ideas in the psychology of the primitives, that gives real substance for such a peculiar paradox. We must respect the fact that when Nietzsche speaks of the body, he does not exactly mean what we understand by a substantial or material body, but something that is spirit as well, and there is also that middle thing which the primitives call "the subtle body." Nietzsche was in a sort of trance condition when he wrote *Zarathustra*—we spoke of it in the beginning—and we have come across many places where such primitive images have simply welled up from the depths of the primitive unconscious. Therefore, it is no wonder that *entre autres* we meet this most important concept of primitive psychology, the idea of the subtle body which is spirit as well as body. It is the union of the two by this thing between. And we cannot speak of psychical reality without remembering the fact that the psyche can also have very real effects which are performed through that something which is called "the subtle body."

Thus shouldst thou stammer, and praise thy virtue.

By that he means you cannot possibly talk clever words about virtue, the uncommon efficacy of the self; you cannot say anything definite about it because it is greater than you. You can only stammer as if in the presence of a greater one. And you are right if you stammer and are embarrassed, not finding suitable terms or analogies. Then you do justice to it.

Once hadst thou passions and calledst them evil. But now hast thou only thy virtues; they grew out of thy passions.

This is rather unexpected; it is as if a new thought were beginning here. The question obviously has occurred to him: But why *virtue*? Virtue is something very positive, but where is the shadow? Where is the negative side of virtue? Where is vice? And he comes to passion, because passion is supposed to be the mother of all vice: evil passions are surely vices. So he cannot consider the idea of virtue without considering at the same time its negation. You see, he makes something very great of his conception of virtue, and I think we are perfectly right in assuming that he really means the self. Now the self surely is the greatest borderline concept we possibly could invent. It is a great symbol, and it includes also the darkness. We would be quite wrong in assuming that the self is what we would call "wholly positive." It has its own negation, casting a shadow because it is also material, not only what we

call "spiritual." We usually associate beauty and all sorts of divine things with the spirit, and are inclined to assume that all the darkness, the heaviness, and everything bad is associated with the body. Also by historical tradition one is inclined to make all of the spirit and very little of the body. Nietzsche feels that here, and therefore he suddenly remembers, "Once hadst thou passions and calledst them evil. But now hast thou only thy virtues; they grew out of passions." He is anticipating modern psychology when he sees virtue in connection with passions; he understands that the self consists of pairs of opposites and that it is in a way a reconciliation of opposites. But he does not say that here, so one must leave it out of consideration.

Thou implantedst thy highest aim into the heart of those passions: then became they thy virtues and joys.

And though thou wert of the race of the hot-tempered, or of the voluptuous, or of the fanatical, or the vindictive;

All thy passions in the end became virtues, and all thy devils angels.

Once hadst thou wild dogs in thy cellar: but they changed at last into birds and charming songstresses.

Out of thy poisons brewedst thou balsam for thyself; thy cow, affliction, milkedst thou—now drinketh thou the sweet milk of her udder.

And nothing evil groweth in thee any longer, unless it be the evil that groweth out of the conflict of thy virtues.

In speaking here of passions, of the origin of virtues, he does not treat this problem in the way psychology would treat it, of course. We would be conscious of the fact that our virtues possess a shadow and that the shadow is just as real as the virtues. At least I hope you have given up such illusions as the notion, for instance, that you are completely converted, that you are now an absolutely new man, and that all the former sins have vanished. I am sorry: that is an infantile illusion. We cannot get rid of ourselves; we carry our body, and our shadow and everything else is as it always has been. We can only hope to become balanced between light and shadow—that is practically all we can hope for, no more. It is a catastrophic illusion to think that one can jump out of one's skin and be an angel from henceforth. But Nietzsche deals here with a psychology that creates good out of evil, and the connection is good. It is surely true that there is even a *causal* connection between evil passions and corresponding virtues. But it is not exactly as he puts it, that we make a virtue out of our devil. Of course, in a way

one can create the appearance of having created a virtue out of a devil—humility out of vanity, for instance, and generosity out of miserliness; but if one has really created generosity out of miserliness, then it will be a miserly generosity. One's cleanliness will be an impurity at the same time, and one's frankness will be a lie in a miraculous way, because one forgets that the shadow is still there. One can create ten thousand angels but one's ten thousand evil passions are right behind those angels: it is a mere façade. A façade is very real. It is the front side of the house and the house would collapse if it had not a façade, but there is something behind it. Otherwise a façade makes no sense.

In this way we can understand it then—that one can even create the illusion to oneself that “Henceforth naught of evil groweth in myself except that one evil which comes from the conflict of virtues.” You see virtues, like all things which are named and specified, easily get into a quarrel; a virtue which is named has the disagreeable quality of being very imperious. Justice, being named, wants to be nothing but justice, and of course it gets into conflict right away with compassion; one cannot be just and compassionate at the same time because justice must be hard and cruel, otherwise it is not justice. *Fiat justitia pereat mundus*.⁵ And true and essential compassion, compassion as it should be, from the standpoint of man cannot be just. And so on. So a man who really tries to be virtuous, having named his virtues that is, is always heading for tremendous moral difficulties, the so-called conflict of conscience, where the two goods clash. Then he does not know whether he should be more compassionate or more just or more respectable or more moral,—or should he be more human? The more he has all these marvelous virtues and the more he believes in them, the more he gets into a hell of a conflict between them; he will create one collision after the other between his own virtues. So he says,

My brother, if thou be fortunate, then wilt thou have one virtue and no more: thus goest thou easier over the bridge.

If you have only one virtue—provided you don't name it—you escape the conflict because that one virtue gives quality to your personality, and that will make itself felt in all quarters of your life, not only in the one which it would strike if you gave a name to it. For instance, if you say your virtue is justice, then within the realm of justice you are just,

⁵ “Let justice be done though the world fall.”

but outside of it you can be anything else; where justice as you understand it does not enter the question, there your named virtue simply would not play a role. But if you don't name it, then that valuable substance which produces justice can produce something else just as well—generosity or compassion, for instance. If you call it “justice” then it must produce nothing but justice, because you have caught it in the cage of your concept. You see, a concept is what you have grasped in that particular form; you have stolen that value and put it into a cage and then it can only produce what you say it should produce. It is no longer a general value of personality.

Illustrious is it to have many virtues, but a hard lot; and many a one hath gone into the wilderness and killed himself, because he was weary of being the battle and battlefield of virtues.

Here he refers to one who has sustained too many moral conflicts, not between good and evil but between two goods, which is worse. A battle between good and evil is easily won. You can slay the devil by the aid of all sorts of helpful ideas and institutions, public support. Everybody will shake your hand and congratulate you on having slain the dragon. But to slay another virtue is harder: there you gain no recognition. The just will say you are just, but others will say you have not been compassionate; and others will say, yes, you have been frank and honest yet you were not generous or compassionate. For if you are honest and believe in honesty you will speak the truth, and you will make a hell of a mistake: you will be cruel, tactless, unjust and you can have every vice under the sun. Just because you believe in that one virtue, you will have offended against all others.

My brother, are war and battle evil? Necessary, however, is the evil; necessary are the envy and the distrust and the backbiting among the virtues.

You see, he puts it very plainly here: each ideal claims the whole man, for provided one names the virtue, each virtue claims its own essence. If one says it is justice then it must be the justest justice, otherwise justice is not satisfied and will keep on grumbling; if you allow your compassion to make you deviate from the path of justice, then justice will begin to complain. And if your justice violates your feeling of compassion, then it will be compassion that is wailing and lamenting. Again somebody is not content, and finally you are in the situation of that famous old parable of the man, his son, and the ass.

Lo! how each of thy virtues is covetous of the highest place; it wanteth thy whole spirit to be its herald, it wanteth thy whole power, in wrath, hatred, and love.

Jealous is every virtue of the others, and a dreadful thing is jealousy. Even virtues may succumb by jealousy.

He is quite right, jealousy is the real character of virtues, of all ideas.

He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisoned sting against himself.

People in conflict between good and evil as a rule don't undergo such a terrible battle as those in whom virtues are clashing, where two perfectly good things fight against each other. That is the worst. That is civil war where brothers are slaying each other. It is a sort of poisonous war because you cannot deny that this idea is good and that idea is good and that they are irreconcilable. Suicide may result from such a conflict more than from a case of clear good and evil; one would hardly commit suicide on account of the fact that one does not like to steal, but one might if one is in conflict between morality and compassion, say.

Mrs. Adler: That would only mean *named* virtues?

Prof. Jung: It is always under the supposition here that virtues are specified by names. He says, "My brother, if thou be fortunate then wilt thou have one virtue and no more." That means an indistinct virtue, not a named one.

Mrs. Adler: If those virtues were not named, then the conflict would not be possible?

Prof. Jung: Well, of course if they are not formulated, such conflicts cannot take place; then it is the one value that rules the whole thing and you have not assumed the power by giving it a name. You see, we usurp something by giving it a name. We say it is this and nothing else, and think we have the purest substance of the thing when we name it. It is like qualifying a thing, as when one says that this is such and such a man. How can we say what a man is?—or what man is in general? He is millions of things. By saying he is such and such a man, you have classified him and then he is no longer free. If he allows it, he will be forced into that category. Usually we defend ourselves against being put into cages. But the State puts everybody into a category, and popular movements do it, and the church—those who belong to it are marvelous people and otherwise they belong to the devil. Or one is a German and beloved by God, and the other is a Frenchman and Satan's own son. You see, those are all names, and it is the same when you name or spec-

ify certain qualities. I don't say that this is all wrong of course, or that we have to give names is simply a tragedy. But don't forget that behind all names is the nameless and unutterable; beyond all our virtues there is one real virtue that has no name.

For virtues are gifts. I may have the faculty of being kind as some one else has the faculty of playing the piano, and as others have the moral art: they just have the gift of being nice or being good. Those are all gifts, and the poisonous thing is making a morality of it and imagining it to be a merit. If you are musical it is no merit; if you are a red parrot it is no merit. It is just so. So you see, if you don't give names, then it remains more or less a natural fact. It is not differentiated and it will work as something in nature will work. For instance, a dog is jealous, voracious; he hates his fellow dog and he tries to get his bone. But he has justice and even a sort of compassion in the measure in which a dog should have such virtues. If you have a big dog and a small one and put the bone between them, then the bone is considered to be in the middle when it is nearer to the small dog than to the big one: the distance between the big dog and the bone can be greater than the distance between the small dog and the bone. I have made that experiment with my own dogs. If it is right in the middle, they hesitate as to which should take it; but if I put it a bit to one side the small dog takes it. If I throw a ball, they both jump at the same time, but they always consider that the one who is first must get the ball, and the other desists; and if the ball is rolling towards one of them, then the dog on the other side desists. It is really natural politeness. So primitives have exquisite manners. They have immense virtues and immense vices, but they work more or less smoothly together, so that a fairly round individual appears. Of course, it is wholly unconscious because it is not named. If they said, "Now I am compassionate, now I am just," they would have an inflation and of course they would then be one-sided; they would be at once in conflict with their surroundings and with themselves if they were capable of having a moral conflict at all.

Miss Kaufmann: I know that Nietzsche is right here, but I must say that to find a name for an experience is also a great experience. What he means here perhaps only applies to people who have too much consciousness, and consciousness is a kind of imperative power. But with the right kind of consciousness, to name it can be so beautiful; it has happened to me so many times that I got my balance just because I found a name which was just the right thing.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there is a great merit in names. It is tremendously important to give a name to a thing—it may really save you from de-

mons and disintegration and chaos. To be able to name things is man's greatest prerogative. But you can see what they made of it—having nothing but names. And with a man like Nietzsche it is, of course, a different question. We give too many names; we name things far too much, thereby killing possibilities which would otherwise function naturally. We must be careful only to give names where we really know. For instance, if you call a certain tendency or psychological movement in a man "sexuality," then it is just sexuality and you have spoiled the whole thing: it becomes absolutely unmanageable and you can do nothing at all with it. You make the same mistake if you call it "spiritual." If you give it a certain name you qualify it, put it into prison, into a drawer, or a cage, and you can no longer handle it because that name is all wrong. But if you give the right name to a thing, ah, that is something else; there you have acquired a power over nature. Science chiefly consists in an attempt of man to give the right names to things, and science is a great achievement of man.

Mr. Baumann: The Greek philosophical school made a great fuss about what they called the virtues, and it has a great influence upon the whole of science. Was it partly because they had to put something up against Greek mythology?

Prof. Jung: That early philosophy was the great attempt of the human mind to free itself from the mythological level; as scholasticism was the heroic attempt of man to free his intellect from the evidences of facts, of immediate impressions, affects, and so on. Therefore, that utterly detached manner in which they tried to think.

Dr. Escher: Can one call this process re-abstraction?

Prof. Jung: Yes, one could designate it like that. Giving a name to a thing creates a sort of abstraction, you remove a thing from life by having abstracted it; then in order to bring it back into life you have to undo the attempt, give up the name, and that would be re-abstraction. Nietzsche is really trying that here. He tries to dissolve the abstraction of differentiated concepts into nameless experiences. He does so because he has been tremendously impressed by the utterly irrational experience of Zarathustra; he is filled with that experience and he believes in it, so he wants to convey it to everybody. Therefore, this particular admonition: don't name your virtue, in order that the virtue may remain an unutterable value which will lead you in the right way. Don't use too much man's prerogative of giving names, for thus you are not creating life substance but killing it. Now, the idea of this last sentence, "He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like the scorpion, the poisoned sting against himself," is that the

one who is in a raging battle of ideas or moral duties will eventually kill himself. He will go under in this fight.

Ah! my brother, hast thou never seen a virtue backbite and stab itself?

This means again that those virtues which are named have a tendency to kill themselves. If you overdo justice it is no longer justice; it is as if you jumped off the roof of your house: you fall dead. You can kill each virtue by following up only its own tendency. Compassion that goes beyond common sense one could say was no longer compassion; it simply becomes a vice and so it kills itself. Now he says

Man is something that hath to be surpassed: and therefore shalt thou love thy virtues,—for thou wilt succumb by them.

This is very interesting. If you try to follow up your virtues, you cannot avoid naming them, and then you will get into that battle which will eventually destroy you. And that is exactly what he wants: man ought to be surmounted. This man must be killed in favor of the Superman; otherwise he cannot produce the Superman. This, curiously enough, is a Christian idea, and I brought a picture which illustrates it. It is a codex of the thirteenth century from the Bibliothèque de Besançon, *Jésus-Christ crucifié par les vertus dont il avait été le modèle*. He is being crucified by all the named virtues; one is hammering the nails into his feet and his hands, another one is stabbing his side, and so on.⁶ His virtues have really brought that painful death upon him—obviously a very Christian idea. That is medieval philosophy, you see. To that extent could they draw the conclusion that it was really the virtues, not the devils, which brought Christ to his cross. Now what does this symbolize?

Mrs. Fierz: Is it not the idea of the *enantiodynamia*?—if you go to the very end of the thing then it must change.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it is an *enantiodynamia*, but more important here is the thought that it was not the evil people—those evil Jews or Romans or whoever they were—who crucified Christ. It was his virtues, his greatness, that really led him to the cross; consciousness of those qualities, the named virtues, killed him, tore him to bits. And the cross is, of course, the well-known individuation symbol, which means that individuation is the necessary outcome of moral development. If you are

⁶ "Jesus crucified for the virtues for which he had been the model." The library of Besançon is in France, near the Swiss border.

consistent in the moral development you get into the moral conflict and into the role of Christ, namely, into the process of individuation. That is not a weakness, it is strength—as it was not a weakness that Christ was crucified. It was strength because it was voluntary; he made up his mind to the crucifixion. And that is Nietzsche's idea: you should live your virtues because they lead to your destruction, and only through your destruction can you create the Superman, which is of course the highest man, the self. The act of destruction is the nailing to the cross in the Christian mystery. The cross is the symbol of individuation.

LECTURE VIII

13 March 1935

Prof. Jung:

Both Mrs. Baumann and Mrs. Stutz have asked about the concept of the subtle body which I mentioned last time. That is a very big problem in itself, and I think it would be a good thing if a comprehensive report were made next term about the primitive idea of the body of breath. Very little is known about this strange concept of the subtle body. Mead has written a book about it.¹ You see, when we speak of the unconscious we mean the psychological unconscious, which is a possible concept; we are then dealing with certain factors in the unconscious which we really can understand and discriminate. But the part of the unconscious which is designated as the subtle body becomes more and more identical with the functioning of the body, and therefore it grows darker and darker and ends in the utter darkness of matter; that aspect of the unconscious is exceedingly incomprehensible. I only mentioned it because in dealing with Nietzsche's concept of the self, one has to include a body, so one must include not only the shadow—the psychological unconscious—but also the physiological unconscious, the so-called somatic unconscious which is the subtle body. You see, somewhere our unconscious becomes material, because the body is the living unit, and our conscious and our unconscious are embedded in it: they contact the body. Somewhere there is a place where the two ends meet and become interlocked. And that is the place where one cannot say whether it is matter, or what one calls "psyche." Now everything that can be represented to the conscious is psychological, but if a thing cannot be made conscious, or can only be expressed by vague analogies or hints, it is so dark that one doesn't know whether it has to do with the top or the bottom of the system, whether it leads into the body or into the air.

According to the old Gnostic system, the *pneuma* is above, that part


¹ G.R.S. Mead, *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition* (London, 1919).

of the unconscious which is divine; then below would come the body which was called *hyle*, or *sarx*, as Paul calls the flesh in the New Testament, and between the two there is the human or the psychological sphere. The Latin words for *pneuma* are *spiritus* and in another connection *animus*, not to be mistaken for the specific *animus* concept in our psychology. Then with the *psyche* would be the *anima*, with the connotation of the breath of life, the living flame, the living warmth of the body. This *anima* has a spiritual side, called in China the *shen*, and their concept of *kuei* would be the somatic or corporeal part. This region contains the psychology of the subtle body because it reaches into the *sarx*. Now, when you look at man you see the body, the *sarx*, and only by inference do you come to the psychological side; you get reflected rays of light from a body of flesh, and you hear a voice, vibrations of the air, and they give you the necessary hints to conclude as to the *psyche*. If you are inside yourself, in your own body, then you are in the *psyche*, which is the center. It would be about like this. The mountain would be the conscious and the unconscious, and the spiritual would be on one side and the somatic on the other. The greatest intensity of life is in the center and the darkness is on either side, on the spiritual side as well as on the side of matter.

animus, pneuma, spiritus

spiritual unconscious, *shen*
anima, *psyche*
 somatic unconscious, subtle body, *kuei*

body, *sarx*, *hyle*



You may have read that famous Gnostic work, *Pistis Sophia*.² *Pistis* means fidelity, confidence, trust, loyalty, wrongly translated by “belief” or “creed,” and *Sophia* is the woman wisdom of God. She is God’s wife in a way, and therefore has also been understood as the so-called *theotokos*, the mother of God—that is the term used in the Greek Orthodox church for Mother Mary—and certain Gnostics held that *Sophia* was the mother of the spiritual Jesus. The man Jesus has of course been born of an earthly woman, but the spiritual Jesus that descended into him when he was baptized by John was born out of *Sophia*. They

² This third-century work centers on the legend of “the twin Jesus.” Mary is represented as telling Jesus that when he was a child, a spirit descended, identical in appearance to the child he sought as brother, and in an embrace the two became one. See *Apocrypha* XXIII, and *Pistis Sophia*, tr. G.R.S. Mead (London, 1896), pp. 188-919.

were convinced that the man Jesus who was hanging on the cross was only the material body, that during his struggle in the garden, hours before his crucifixion, the God had departed from him. So the God was never crucified. The body was hanging on the cross and not the God-man, the proof being that Christ himself said, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" That is the belief of the *Doketic* form of Christianity, a very important branch which for a while threatened the development of the orthodox Christian dogma.³ I mention this because all these ideas of the subtle body play a great role in the New Testament. The body, or *sarx*, to St. Paul is the gross, biological, physiological body, the corruptible body; but he speaks also of the incorruptible body which we put on with Christ, because Christ is in a way the soul or the *pneuma*, the incorruptible body that is beyond space and time.⁴

You see, the subtle body—assuming that there is such a thing—necessarily must be beyond space and time. Every real body fills space because it consists of matter, while the subtle body is said not to consist of matter, or it is matter which is so exceedingly subtle that it cannot be perceived. So it must be a body which does not fill space, a matter which is beyond space, and therefore it would be in no time. You know, we can only have a notion of time by the measure of distance; for instance, to move from this end of the room to the other needs a certain length of time, but if there is no extension, no change, there is no time; even if that moment stands still for ten thousand eternities, there is no time because nothing happens. This idea of the subtle body is very important, and it is marvelous to encounter it in a text which naively comes from the wholeness of man. You will see from the next chapter that *Zarathustra* is one of the books that is written with blood, and anything written with blood contains the notion of that subtle body, the equivalent of the somatic unconscious. I usually do not deal with that concept simply because it is too difficult; I content myself with things of which I can really know something. It is beyond our grasp *per definitionem*; the subtle body is a transcendental concept which cannot be expressed in terms of our language or our philosophical views, because they are all inside the categories of time and space.⁵

So we can only talk primitive language as soon as we come to the question of the subtle body, and that is everything else but scientific. It

³ *Doketic*, see above, 16 May 1934, n. 20.

⁴ I Corinthians 15:53-54.

⁵ Jung often contrasted the empirical or experimental approach with the transcendental, meaning by the latter "approximately the same as Kant meant when he called the thing-in-itself, a merely negative, border-line concept" (CW 13, par. 82).

means speaking in images. Of course, we can talk such a language but whether it is comprehensible is an entirely different question. And you know I believe in science, I believe in that which man can do. I also remember what Mephistopheles says to the student who went away with the devil's good advice. The devil smiles behind his back and says:

Scorn reason and science if you can,
The highest powers yet bestowed on man!⁶

Science is the highest power of man, for we can do just what we can do, and when we try to deal with things which are beyond our comprehension, we are overstepping our competence. You see, there are plenty of secrets—only a few fools, morbid intellects, think we have solved all the riddles; anybody with even the smallest amount of imagination knows that the world is a great enigma, and psychology is one of the foremost enigmas. And you can touch one with your hands in this question of the subtle body. Now, Mrs. Baumann first asks, “Are there not two uses of the expression ‘subtle body’? At times, it seems to be used as a synonym for the diamond body. Isn’t the other, more primitive meaning of ‘subtle body’ a kind of ghost-like body, like a framework, halfway between spirit and matter, which everyone possesses and in which the various centers are located? Is the diamond body something which *may* develop in this subtle body?”

Such questions will inevitably arise as soon as you begin to talk of the subtle body: Is the subtle body identical with what Chinese Yoga calls the diamond body, or it is rather the *kuei* of Chinese philosophy, the somatic unconscious? Well, the diamond body is the equivalent of the concept of the self. Therefore it is expressed by the stone of the highest value, and it is also called the golden germ, the golden child, *Hiranyagarbha* in Sanscrit. According to Chinese Yoga, it comes from the lead of the water region, which is not of a precious nature. It is the heavy cold metal of a low nature which is supposed to be deep down in the body, the *muladhara*, or in *svadhisthana*, the water center; out of this common or vulgar body the alchemistic procedure produces gold or the diamond body, the everlasting body. In the language of medieval alchemy it would have been the philosopher's stone or the eagle (*aurum nostrum*, “our gold”); for those old alchemists were by no means making ordinary gold. There was no making of bodies. They started from bodies and tried to develop something out of the water region into a

⁶ Spoken by Mephistopheles dressed in Faust's long robe. *Faust*, tr. Alice Raphael (New York, 1932), Act II, Sc. ii.

substance of highest value, something with the qualities of light. Yet it is located in the center—the psyche—between body and spirit—and consists of both. So in that respect one can say the concept of the diamond body is really identical with the idea of the subtle body. Naturally, the subtle body is a primitive formulation and the diamond body is the expression for a finished product of the same nature.

The Chinese Yoga procedure and alchemy are much alike, but alchemy is a most mistaken name; it had better be called the “Yoga process.” It is a process of transmutation which creates out of the subtle body within, something which is equal to the subtle body, yet it is of very great value. The matter out of which it is created can also be of little value, so the alchemists said that it could be found everywhere, quite ordinary, even despicable, a stone that is *ejectus in viam*, thrown out into the street. It is the stone, rejected by the builders, which became the cornerstone. They even find it in the *Sterquilinium*, the dung heap, as you can read in their literature. Therefore when Meyrink read those old alchemistic treatises about sorcerers making gold and God knows what, he was so impressed that he bought an ancient water-closet, a little outhouse, and dug up the *fond*; it was two or three hundred years old and he went to the very bottom of it in order to find the substance for the stone, because the old texts say you can find it in such disreputable places.⁷ It is funny that many old things, even manuscripts, have been found in that way. I am not a bit sure whether the famous *Oxyrhynchus papyri* were not found in such a place and that they had not been put to a most disreputable use before.

Mr. Baumann: In Schaffhausen they found a wonderful one, containing a whole collection of valuable things.

Prof. Jung: Yes, such places are often really treasure-troves. But it was also said in the old texts that many have dug up such places, worked with fecal matter, yet found nothing. (That would be a good motto for a certain variety of psychoanalysis: I have dug up and worked with fecal matter yet found nothing!) Another thing they said was that people stop their work where they should have begun. The sayings of those old masters are really marvelous; as Nietzsche says in the next chapter, such things should not be read but learned by heart, they are so exceedingly true. You see, that is exactly this idea; the process begins no matter where, deep down or up above, but if above, you

⁷ Gustav Meyrink, author of *Das Grüne Gesicht* (The Green Face) (Leipzig, 1916), once bought a house in Prague famous for its still having an alchemical dung heap wherein the priceless philosopher's stone might lie buried. Meyrink read old alchemy and dug in the dung heap for the stone.

have to work down into the *sarx*, because the body also must be in the great mixture. The body is an important contribution to the diamond body, the final finished product. So, as I said, the diamond body would be merely the finished product of the primitive concept of the subtle body.

Then Mrs. Baumann says: "I don't understand how Christ was crucified by his virtues." That picture of Christ being crucified by his own virtues was an idea which they already understood in the twelfth or thirteenth century, and which you easily could understand in the text of *Zarathustra* which we have just dealt with, so that by naming your virtues you create the collision between virtues. If you follow up the divergent virtues, if you are just and compassionate and several other things besides, inasmuch as you name these qualities you will be torn asunder. For then you don't know whether to follow your justice or your compassion. Only inasmuch as you are unconscious of your value can you remain together. If you become conscious of your virtues you are lost; you will quite certainly get into a hellish conflict. That people don't get into these conflicts more comes from the fact that they are altogether unconscious; they don't notice it, and at a certain place they stop. For instance, a man preaches on Sunday, "Sell all your goods and give your money to the poor," but he doesn't dream of doing it. Or the Communists talk of sharing their goods, but if they have a fat pig in the stable they don't share it. So millions of people don't dream of doing it, and it is very healthy not to because it doesn't work; if you really try it you get into hot water, and nobody is fool enough to want to get into hot water unless he understands that it is necessary—that that is the one way, though it goes into the cooking pot, the *Krater*, and it is pretty hot there.

You see, your named virtues would be your conscious ideal; you want to be just but you want to be compassionate too, and you want to be generous yet you don't want to be a spendthrift. If you try it in reality, you will land in a tremendous moral conflict between duties, and if you follow it up to the end you get into a state of dismemberment. Compassion then runs away with you on the one side, and justice on the other, so you are like a spread eagle, or like an animal that has been nailed onto a board. The peasants are so mad at those black animals—in England they are called stoats—that they nail them on a board, crucify them alive; everybody must know that if those animals don't listen to what they are saying to them, if they do that again, they will be crucified. They hate them so much that they inflict the punishment of the Lord upon them. So you see, the end is that our virtues become utterly

dissatisfied with us and kill us because we cannot fulfil them. If we are dishonest, we may say we have fulfilled them, or that, having declared a principle or an ideal, we are bound to fulfil it. But if we are honest we know we cannot. Therefore, don't say this is your ideal, because you are then giving a promise which you cannot keep. For *if* you give it, if you cannot avoid giving it, you *must* name your virtues; every decent man must name his virtues, and so he is meant for crucifixion, provided he is consistent. If he is very healthy he will stop on the way: he will be half-crucified, perhaps on Sundays. He will give an old coat, say, his Sunday coat, and he will put the thorns around his top hat.

Dr. Strong: Doesn't the fact that Christ was crucified vindicate John the Baptist in his stand against revealing the divine mysteries? In giving it to collectivity, making it a collective concept, Christ gave it a name and therefore it turned upon him. He gave the crowd a chance. That was exactly what John the Baptist foresaw.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in that making conscious, that revelation, he was giving it a name.

Now Mrs. Baumann asks: "Did Christ identify with the virtues and undergo the conflict between them?"

Evidently I must make this clear once more. Nietzsche's idea is that you should not name your virtue; otherwise you will get into a conflict of the virtues and destroy yourself. And at the end of the chapter he says, "And therefore shalt thou love thy virtues—for thou wilt succumb by them." The most foolish thing one can do is to name the virtue, because as long as you don't, you *are* one, acting under the influence of something incomprehensible and indescribable. You have no wrong impressions, don't know yourself, are more or less a primitive; or more like an animal that is always at one with itself and so never hesitates. It goes to its own death because dying belongs to life; and primitives die with no particular fuss. They take it as part of life. This is in a way an ideal condition, so *why* try to give names to things? Just because we must: our growing intellect, consciousness, forces us to do so; if we don't discriminate, we are cursed by the primitive condition. Primitive conditions are all right as long as the conditions *are* primitive, but the unfortunate thing is that man is not only an animal—in a way he is an animal and in a way he is not—because he has the faculty of developing consciousness. His consciousness *wants* to develop; he must give names even to his virtues, and so he is meant for conflict. He cannot escape it, cannot remain at one with himself. He will get into hot water in the end if he develops at all; and if he has once given a name he must continue to give names. Already, the primitive man has begun

to give names, and the more "adult" he becomes, the more he will do so. So it was a particular stunt of old sages to know the names of things: it was understood to be a particular sign of power; to know the names of demons meant power over the demons. But there is a high price on knowing names; you will be tempted, even forced, to give names, but you will pay for it with conflict. Because you have discriminated between things, they begin to compete with each other; and you will be the victim of your own conflict, be crucified, get into the condition of the Christian mystery of self-destruction, self-sacrifice.

In the making of the Superman, Nietzsche is simply continuing in the path of Christianity, developing our hitherto valid form of Christianity into a philosophy that reaches a bit beyond. He tells us to be reasonable, continue the way on which we have begun, name our virtues and be damned for it; if we are damned that is our destruction, yes, but thus we shall give birth to a new man, a man with a new consciousness; a new light will dawn on mankind if we are able to give birth to the Superman. That is his message, and for that it is necessary that he even kill God. He means also that since you cannot avoid giving names, give as many and as accurate names as you know how, because all that works for your own undoing. In the end you are dissolved in conflict, you will be dissociated, disintegrated, extended on the cross, and torn asunder. You see, crucifixion is also a dismemberment, the classical death of the god, like the death of Osiris and Dionysos; through that dismemberment the god distributes himself into all parts of creation. Everywhere is a part of the god. The dismemberment is figuratively shown in Christianity by the dividing of his mantle under the cross. The soldiers cut it asunder; they threw dice and divided it. That is a sort of symbolic performance which foreshadows the distribution of the sacred body in the Host, or the indwelling of the deity in the tabernacle: the God dwells in the Host or on the altar. So Christ is distributed all over the world in the form of the Host. As a sort of Dionysos he enters into everybody and deifies everybody; you eat the *pharmakon athanasias*, the medicine of immortality, and are given an immortal soul. For without the sacraments of the church, unless you participate of the God, in other words, you cannot attain to immortality. That is the dismemberment, and the crucifixion symbolizes the state of supreme torture through conflicts.

When you are eaten up with conflicts, completely disintegrated, you can safely say it is crucifixion because you are spread out in the four directions of your being, to the four points of the horizon. You may have read that article in an American paper about the death of a med-

icine man. A medicine man who has misused his powers, failed or neglected to do the right thing, is put to death by being torn asunder in the four directions of space, and the torn-out parts are left in the distance. You see, a medicine man is made by the drawing together of the four into one, a process of individuation; therefore, when he is killed he will be torn asunder into those four directions of space. This condition of the crucifixion, then, is a symbolic expression for the state of extreme conflict, where one simply has to give up, where one no longer knows, where one almost loses one's mind. Out of that condition grows the thing which is really fought for. For Nietzsche, it would be the birth of the Superman. We would say it was the birth of the self. Only through extreme pain do you experience yourself; you believe then that you are a unit. Before that, you can imagine that you are anybody, the Pope or Mussolini—you are not necessarily yourself. Afterwards, when you have undergone this extraordinary experience of the self, there are no illusions any longer. You know exactly who you are. That is what Nietzsche means.

There is another question about the subtle body by Mrs. Stutz: "Does the 'subtle body,' which is a symbol for the individuating process of human beings, help forward the physiological work of the body itself?" The subtle body is not a symbol for the individuating process, as I have already explained; it is a concept that covers only the somatic unconscious. She goes on: "For instance, are the reactions of the body on itself, as well as coming from it, directed from the 'subtle body'?" One could not say that because the subtle body, being the somatic unconscious, is only one part; the ultimate decisions of body and mind or anything that lives within them, are obviously not only given by the somatic side of our existence; there are determinations coming from the other side just as well, and the ultimate decision is given by the self. The self includes the somatic as well as the spiritual unconscious, being neither the one nor the other, but in between, in the psyche. Then she says, "I experience the inside body as a free power, wherein all possibilities for forming or producing are given from one central point, which leads all events and reactions. So is the putting of the body into life as the consequence to an inside demand, the 'subtle body'?"

Well, from the standpoint of Platonic philosophy, the body is built up on the *eidos*, the eternal image of the human body. The human body would then be explained exactly as the making of a crystal is explained, by a sort of preexisting abstract axial system into which matter is filled. In crystallography, one also assumes a sort of spatial structure, the so-called mother solution, which has reached the highest degree of

saturation where crystallization begins. The ions in solution are already in a certain axial structure, and they draw the molecules of the solution into place. If it is a solution of ordinary salts, the system is cubic and the cubic crystal will result; a sort of *eidōs*, an inevitable form, preexists and the ions are in the decisive points of that structure to draw the molecules of the solution into place. One can assume that the human body is also built in that way; this is the theory proposed by Geley in his attempt at physiology viewed from the standpoint of the subtle body. He was formerly director of the Institut de Métapsychologie in Paris, the predecessor of Dr. Osty.⁸ It is a thoroughly Platonic idea. In that sense, one could say that the subtle body directs and builds up the physical body. Of course, this point of view is in a way very much against our hitherto valid physiological ideas, but I must say, from a scientific standpoint, there is as little proof on the one side as on the other. To explain it through the chemical transformations of bodies, the materialistic assumption, is just as right and just as wrong as explaining from the other side; one needs both points of view. In that example of crystallography you have a practical Platonism. One needs that hypothesis to explain a crystal, but of course one also needs the ions of a solution to give the start.

Mrs. Stutz: I did not think of such a material standpoint.

Prof. Jung: You can explain from within or from without: those are two contradictory points of view. It is the same with the ultimate explanation of nature. For instance, the modern explanation of light is corpuscular, but on the other side is the theory of oscillation. You have the two explanations and you need both because there are certain phenomena which you cannot explain as corpuscular, which must be oscillation, and others where it cannot be oscillation—where it must be corpuscular. You are simply forced to these antinomies of reason if you follow up a problem far enough—to a clear issue. And even there you get into a conflict. You cannot live without getting into trouble, cannot think, cannot feel; you can do nothing without getting into trouble. For trouble is what we are all looking for; we all hate it—we want to be perfectly nice and frank—but we are looking for trouble.

Now we come to the next chapter, which begins with a problem in the title, “The Pale Criminal.” How does Nietzsche arrive at this?

Mrs. Baumann: It refers to Christ.

⁸ Gustav Geley, *From the Unconscious to the Conscious*, tr. Stanley Debrath (London, 1920). Eugene Osty, *Lucidité et Intuition* (Paris, 1913). For more on Geley, see *Dream Sem.*, p. 116n.

Miss Hannah: The whole chapter seems to me to be awfully influenced by his being a parson's son.

Prof. Jung: So is the whole of *Zarathustra*. There is a great deal of Protestant psychology in it, but we are now only concerned with the title.

Mrs. Baynes: I think he draws the title from the thing that we see in the rationalistic mind and what he goes on to describe; that is to say, he has lust which he cannot justify, and so he tries to take the blood from the lust, and what is left is the pale criminal.

Prof. Jung: That is pretty complicated. How does he arrive at the subject matter of crime or the criminal? It must follow from the chapter before and I want to make the transition.

Miss Wolff: Because the virtues are fighting like hell and murdering themselves. The idea of murder and bloodshed is at the end of the last chapter. The virtues kill man, trying to create the Superman out of the ordinary man.

Prof. Jung: That is true. But I might put that same question in a somewhat different way. Usually in a work of this kind, written out of the blood or out of the unconscious, as we say, it is written out of that which has been left over from the preceding chapter, the preceding image. You see, each of these chapters corresponds to an image. The stream of the unconscious is a stream of images. In one chapter comes up one image, and in the next another, and all these images are connected as, for instance, the images of the *I Ching* are connected. There you have the same stream of images, not connected by what we would call causality, but by an irrational connection. What is its chief characteristic?

Miss Wolff: The opposites.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the *enantiodromia*, the opposite comes up. Now in this case, quite superficially looked at, the opposite of the virtues we are speaking of would be vices. In the preceding chapter man is supposed to name his virtues and to live them to the utmost until he himself is killed by them; he lives his virtues until he is thoroughly virtuous, and he ends in terrible trouble because he is virtuous all over. Even his vices have been transformed into virtues, or they have been overlooked, or neglected; out of his many virtues he made a god, and out of his poison he made a medicine or something sweet. So the shadow is transformed into light and he dies really from sheer goodness. And when the vicious evil way of living, the way of the shadow, is entirely neglected, up it comes in the next chapter. Like dreams—what you have forgotten in

the daytime is brought up in the night. And here is the thing that is forgotten, that should be also realized.

Mrs. Baumann: You did not read the end of my question about Christ. Christ said, "Resist not evil." He was conscious of the black side.

Prof. Jung: I did not read it on purpose because it is a different consideration of which we shall speak after this chapter. Of course, Christ says "Resist not evil" because it is too one-sided to be only good. It is very nice to be only good if one can, and it is enough of a task, sure enough.

Mrs. Baynes: You have explained why it should be the criminal but not why it is the *pale* criminal.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one can be a rosy criminal! This is a criminal who does not feel well in his skin.

Mrs. Baynes: But "pale" is very important is it not?

Prof. Jung: This man cannot help being pale; he gets pale at the aspect of himself. But that leads to the next chapters. Let us assume now that we don't quite understand why this criminal is pale and unhealthy-looking. We will begin.

Ye do not mean to slay, ye judges and sacrificers, until the animal hath bowed its head?

The German text is a bit different here. Nietzsche had profound philological knowledge, and by this nodding or bowing is meant the movement which is called in Latin *numen*, meaning a hint; nodding the head would be a hint or a sign. When you have whispered into the ear of the god and remain before his divine image, then you suddenly see that the god, the statue, is nodding. He has heard you and agrees or disagrees: that is the *numen*. One observes such phenomena in studying fantasies; when you concentrate upon, *betrachten*, a fantasy image, after a while it begins to walk perhaps. You have made it pregnant with your life and it moves, just as when you concentrate upon a picture with exclusive interest, it begins to move. *Numen* is one connotation of the divine power, the assent of the god. So this German text means that the judges and sacrificers don't want to sacrifice or to kill before the animal has nodded—given its assent or justified the killing. The translation overlooked that meaning; of course it is a bit involved.

Lo! the pale criminal hath bowed his head: out of his eye speaketh the great contempt.

"Mine ego is something which is to be surpassed: mine ego is to me the great contempt of man"; so speaketh it out of that eye.

How is that passage connected with the chapter before? We can see then how the unconscious introduces the idea of the criminal.

Dr. Schlegel: In both these is something that must be surmounted.

Prof. Jung: Yes. The end of the chapter before is, "and therefore shalt thou love thy virtues, for thou wilt succumb by them." The idea is that you should love your virtues because they will eventually kill you, will mean your own undoing. For instance, a criminal shows by his crime his will to destroy himself. He has committed murder so he will be judged and his head will be cut off, and that is what he wanted. Moreover, when a person murders, he has murdered himself morally, which is of course just as bad as real death. He has had the courage to rebel against human life, and therefore the idea here is that judges and sacrificers should not be afraid of standing up against human life; he almost says they should not wait until the animal has nodded its assent, they should be as courageous as the criminal in killing. As the criminal does not ask whether the victim consents to being put to death, does not say to his victim, "Perhaps you will be kind enough to allow me to kill you," so those judges and sacrificers should not be afraid of killing right on the spot, with no delay, not asking whether it is fitting or just. They should have the same quality of decision and the contempt of life and of man which the criminal has. Of course this does not agree with our ideas of justice in the least, but it agrees very much with our psychological ideas of punishment.

The natural idea of punishment if a man has committed a murder is to hang him, kill him; then we are satisfied. That is the only real theory of punishment, any other is nonsense. You see, when a man commits murder, he has the advantage of us, because we have all wanted to do that. Once at least, in a moment of affect, everybody has wanted to murder his fellow man, but he could not because he was decent. And then comes that hell of a fellow who dares, and why should he do it when *I* couldn't? We are all potential murderers. Of course it does not need to be a cowardly murder, it can be straightforward manslaughter. Our ancestors have universally been murderers—it was even a virtue to commit murder in that way—so it is innate in us: it is in our blood. But we have not been allowed to do so because it is immoral. Therefore we say rightly, if another man has committed murder, we also have a right to do it. But he is one and we are many, so we must do it in collectivity; we call it "law": we elect one member of our society and give him a sword to hack off the criminal's head. Then we are all pleased; now his head has been cut off and we are highly satisfied. So everybody has got at least his sprinkling of blood for his own salvation. It gives

people a fine feeling to have committed a certain amount of crime. That is the psychology of crime, and any other way is just a rationalization of this very primitive fact.

I can substantiate it by a very real example. In the Celebes it is the custom to kill prisoners of war in the ghost house. This is used for all sorts of purposes, it is a condensation of all the buildings round the square in a village; the church, and one or two little inns, with the names of the Evangelist animals if possible, and the mayor's place, which usually is connected with the house for the fire engine, and the morgue where they put all the corpses they find, and also the communal prison. This whole assemblage of establishments in a primitive society is condensed into one building which is not only the ghost house, the place of initiation, but also the guesthouse, the community building, the club house, and the morgue. And there they fasten the prisoner of war to a pillar round the top of which are hung skulls of former victims, a sort of ghost pillar. Then the whole crowd arms itself with knives or spears or arrows, and each sticks his knife into the victim a bit and then licks the blood, so finally the victim dies. Everybody has had a taste of the blood, it is a sort of communion, a very gruesome thing naturally.

The original idea was that putting to death should be a communion of the whole people, that they should all share in it; it was establishing a sort of connection between people through a common emotion. Since they have no such chance now, they must read detective stories, or go to the movies; they must be thrilled by accounts of ugly crimes. Also they must at times be very enthusiastic about a war because they have seen too little killing. The psychology of killing is the psychology of the criminal, so there are even murderers who want to be put to death and are not satisfied if they are not. In certain murderers there is a sacrificial psychology; they thus feel their importance over people. All that is in the death of Christ; he was counted as a criminal and crucified between two thieves and in place of a thief. He was exchanged against Barabbas who was freed as the fertility god of the coming year, according to the old rites. So Christ was very much in the place of the criminal, he was the god of the past year that is crucified for the good of the community.

SPRING TERM

May / June 1935

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LECTURE I

8 May 1935

Prof. Jung:

We had just begun last term, the chapter called “The Pale Criminal”; I think we dealt with only the first two verses. This is not a particularly engaging chapter—even disagreeable. I will read it beginning with the third verse:

When he judged himself—that was his supreme moment; let not the exalted one relapse again into his low estate!

There is no salvation for him who thus suffereth from himself, unless it be speedy death.

Your slaying, ye judges, shall be pity, and not revenge; and in that ye slay, see to it that ye yourselves justify life!

It is not enough that ye should reconcile with him whom ye slay. Let your sorrow be love to the Superman: thus will ye justify your own survival!

“Enemy” shall ye say but not “villain,” “invalid” shall ye say but not “wretch,” “fool” shall ye say but not “sinner.”

And thou, red judge, if thou would say audibly all thou hast done in thought, then would every one cry: “Away with the nastiness and the virulent reptile!”

But one thing is the thought, another thing is the deed, and another thing is the idea of the deed. The wheel of causality doth not roll between them. [That is an awful sentence!]

An idea made this man pale. Adequate was he for his deed when he did it, but the idea of it, he could not endure when it was done.

Evermore did he now see himself as the doer of one deed. Madness, I call this: the exception reversed itself to the rule in him.

The streak of chalk bewitcheth the hen; the stroke he struck bewitched his weak reason. Madness *after* the deed, I call this.

Hearken, ye judges! There is another madness besides, and it is *before* the deed. Ah! ye have not gone deep enough into this soul!

Thus speaketh the red judge: "Why did this criminal commit murder? He meant to rob." I tell you, however, that his soul wanted blood, not booty: he thirsted for the happiness of the knife!

But this weak reason understood not this madness, and it persuaded him, "What matter about blood!" it said; "wishest thou not, at least, to make booty thereby? Or take revenge?"

And he hearkened unto his weak reason: like lead lay its words upon him—thereupon he robbed when he murdered. He did not mean to be ashamed of his madness.

And now once more lieth the lead of his guilt upon him, and once more is his weak reason so benumbed, so paralysed, and so dull.

Could he only shake his head, then would his burden roll off; but who shaketh that head?

What is this man? A mass of diseases that reach out into the world through the spirit; there they want to get their prey.

What is this man? A coil of wild serpents that are seldom at peace among themselves—so they go forth apart and seek prey in the world.

Look at that poor body! What it suffered and craved, the poor soul interpreted to itself—it interpreted it as murderous desire, and eagerness for the happiness of the knife.

Him who now turneth sick, the evil overtaketh which is now the evil: he seeketh to cause pain with that which causeth him pain. But there have been other ages, and another evil and good.

Once was doubt evil, and the will to Self. Then the invalid became a heretic or sorcerer; as heretic or sorcerer he suffered, and sought to cause suffering.

But this will not enter your ears; it hurteth your good people, ye tell me. But what doth it matter to me about your good people!

Many things in your good people cause me disgust, and verily, not their evil. I would that they had a madness by which they succumbed, like this pale criminal!

Verily, I would that their madness were called truth, or fidelity, or justice: but they have their virtue in order to live long, and in wretched self-complacency.

I am a railing alongside the torrent; whoever is able to grasp me may grasp me! Your crutch, however, I am not.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

What is your general impression of this chapter? Do you like it? Does your heart react to it?

Mrs. Sigg: It is very deep and interesting and extremely difficult.

Prof. Jung: You seem to be chiefly attracted by the intellectual intricacies, then. Is there no man here who has an opinion on this chapter—a man who realizes his feelings independently? Or perhaps an independent woman's mind with a heart attached to it?

Mrs. Fierz: I don't know whether I am independent, but I think it shows very much what I often feel about *Zarathustra*. I did not read it ahead, not a line, because I could not; this, especially, is a chapter where I simply stop if you don't do the whole work beforehand to help me to get into it a little.

Prof. Jung: Yes, exactly my feeling. It is exceedingly disgusting to my feeling. Excuse me for talking of my feeling condition, but in this case you simply go astray if you don't realize your feelings. From an intellectual point of view, it is unspeakably intricate; a sort of intellectual devil is all over, which will come still more to the foreground in a chapter a bit further on. Here Nietzsche really becomes an intellectual criminal. That is the disgusting thing—he reaches here one of the pre-stages of his own madness. It is not yet madness, but it becomes as sophisticated, as intricate, as madness when it first begins to insinuate itself. Therefore, my idea is that a natural feeling function, as well as a natural untwisted mind, will be hurt by the special psychology here. It is thoroughly evil from any aspect. You are stopped dead when you begin to read it. Your feeling refuses to touch upon that thing because it is altogether too pathological. No wonder that he speaks of the secret thoughts of the red judges as a poisonous worm, because a poisonous worm is at work here. You see, you have to deal with a man who is doomed to madness, preparing himself for it; *Zarathustra*, under a certain aspect, is the preparation for madness, the way into it. If a man is really going to be mad, in this way he will land there. And if a sound man goes this way, he will learn what madness means, something of the possibilities, because he will go very close to the edge. Here, Nietzsche is flirting with it. He reaches over into the forbidden land, and he is scorched, tainted all over, by touching upon that area. So it is necessary to overcome a certain resistance in dealing with this material.

You see, each chapter of *Zarathustra* is a stage in a process of initiation, for whenever a man takes that way of the immediate experience of his inner condition, he gets more and more under its influence and thus he becomes initiated. That is the initiation process, as it always has been. Of course later, as has happened in all traditional initiation processes, there comes a moment when the original experience is lost and

then one is confronted only with ritual—with certain ideas that have become dogmatic or almost dogmatic. One looks back and thinks of the experiences of the forefathers—the gurus, the teachers—and one naturally tries to pick up what they have left behind them. One thinks if one imitates these relics that one is surely going to make the same way, forgetting altogether that they are now only shackles—what they used to call *scoria*. We imagine, when we follow the words or images, the symbols left by others, that we are making a way. But we are only *imitating* a way, and it is not the thing itself. The thing itself is an immediate primordial experience, and therefore it is always individual. We still have traditions or such initiation processes; they are to be found in no books of course, but one comes across series of individual symbols in the great libraries of Europe. In the higher grades of Freemasonry, the so-called ancient and accepted rite of Scotland which has thirty-three degrees, the initiation process is codified, dogmatized; one is told what to do, what to think and believe, and the whole thing is just flat and empty. It is most interesting, but it is too good to be true—well, it *is* true, but nobody is in it. It is quite hollow. It is only form and as dead as a door-nail. And this organization, which dates back probably to about the seventeenth century, was preceded by another stage of which we still have traces. I myself have a series of manuscripts and books of symbolic representations copied from those in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal in Paris. They came from noble families whose male members were officers in the army and belonged to secret societies where such initiations took place. But these books date from a time when the initiations were not according to the rule. They were individual, therefore they made books, like the symbolic series of visions of the American woman which I produced in a former Seminar.¹ That was such a secret individual initiation process. And those knights, or whatever they were, made very similar books; some of them consisted not even of words but were picture-books only, in which the processes of psychological transformation in an individual nature were depicted. But no book is really understood, no book resembles any other; of course, they have the style of the time, as our symbolic books have the style of our time, but they are individual in themselves. Later on, those things were replaced by codified dogma, and then the spirit was gone. They were no longer alive.

Now, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* is one of the first attempts in modern times to come back to the immediate, individual initiation. But he did

¹ *The Visions Seminars*, 1930-1934 (Zürich, 1976). See above, 2 May 1934, n. 1.

not seek that. It took him, rather, by the neck: he was overcome by the process because the time was ripe and he was just the kind of man who was open to such a thing. It really began at the height of that period of blooming materialism, and he, being an exceedingly sensitive individual, realized the need of the time, feeling that our traditional forms had become more or less empty. He himself moved in those academic circles where spiritual life was utterly gone. He naturally felt the need of something—there was nothing for him to stand on—so he was forced to have individual experience, and this came about in the moment when he said to himself, “God is dead,” as he says in *Zarathustra*. The spirit gripped him in that moment when it was completely denied. For it is just then that the spirit cannot be hidden any longer. If you believe that there is spirit in a certain form, in a building or a saying for instance, then the spirit has an abode. Then it is cut away from yourself because it is embodied in something. But when you believe there is no such thing as spirit anywhere, you have disinfected the heavens and the whole world and found no God in it as that doctor said (whom I have told you about) who suffered from the same disease as Nietzsche. You see, as soon as you make such a declaration, the spirit is liberated from its incarnations and then it is in yourself: then your unconscious begins to stir. That happened to Nietzsche. His initiation process began, and he wrote it down as such a man would do.

When one has a vivid inner experience, one always feels tempted to write it down, give form to it and expression. Therefore, painting and drawing have been discovered as a means for the symbolic purposes; one simply feels the need, and also has a peculiar satisfaction if one succeeds in giving expression to an inner experience. Many people who are not usually poets begin to write verses, and they write in a peculiar hieratic style. They become solemn and poetic and express themselves in a high passionate manner, using all sorts of means to emphasize it because they feel they are experiencing something which needs that expression. So Nietzsche at once drops out of his intellectual, aphoristic way of expression. *Zarathustra* is a most passionate confession from beginning to end, and moreover it is an experience: his life itself flows into these chapters. Therefore, each chapter is a new image in the process of initiation. You know, those ancient initiation processes consisted of symbolic passages. First, one is confronted, say, with a certain threat, or one is put into a dark room perhaps; and then one is exposed to all sorts of dangers, tests of courage are made—one must endure cold and heat and all sorts of things. Those are all symbolic stages, imitating the processes one would presumably go through

in an individual initiation. These were all individual in the beginning, and from the condensation of the original representations, slowly a ritual was made; and then it all became artificial. The most ridiculous forms were invented which nobody could take seriously. For instance, in the Freemason initiation, one is put through tests which look a bit gruesome, but are not real at all. It is like a sort of child's play. Of course, one is serious, or tries to make it serious, but it is not: it doesn't even touch your skin. Wilhelm² told me that when the Japanese bombarded Kian Tchau, a Masonic lodge was hit by a shell and *éventré*, the whole wall of the house came down, the intestines were laid bare, and people went there to see the funny things inside. Belonging to the initiation ceremonies, for example, was a sort of grating with most dangerous-looking iron spikes upon which the initiate had to kneel, and then the marvel happened that when he believed in God those spikes did not hurt him. But upon examination it was found that those spikes where he had to kneel looked exactly like the others but were made of rubber; they were nice and soft, so instead of having his flesh lacerated, the initiate thought, how marvelous that God had helped him! So the initiation may degenerate into mere fraud.

The individual process on the other side is not a fraud, but a terrible thing. Nietzsche is confronted with all the devils, the temptations of his own nature, all the lowest as well as the highest qualities of man, the greatest possibilities of the depths as well as the heights. Now, there is a secret logic, a sort of Homeric chain, going through the whole thing: one chapter leads on to the other.³ The last chapter before this was "Joys and Passions." To follow the way of delights and passions is the way to the Superman; but it leads to the pale criminal, an inelegant, pale criminal who cannot commit his crime without having an idea of it at which he collapses. That is the pale criminal and as such that term has entered the common speech; one reads it in books and papers, meaning a man who is not on the level of his deed. Now you can be sure, if a man as unsound as Nietzsche comes into that layer of his personality which is meant to bring about his madness, that you will come into something which is surely not very engaging; it is something which hurts and cannot be accepted because it is against our sound in-

² Richard Wilhelm, Jung's principal informant on Chinese and (occasionally) Japanese cultures. See above, 31 Oct. 1934, n. 8.

³ The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have been admired by literary critics (and ordinary readers) for twenty-five hundred years for the elegance of the linkage of episodes as their narrative progresses.

instincts. But this is just the chapter where a man of unsound mind, on the other hand, would be touched or tempted.

I remember a fellow student of mine who was an exceedingly gifted man, but the first thing I noticed about him was that, in reading Nietzsche, the chapter over which he fell down was "The Pale Criminal." It was all the time on his mind and he never got away from it, "What a wonderful chapter—that a man should sacrifice his life even for his crime!" He identified with the pale criminal, and the result was that later on he became insane too—not of course because he had read Nietzsche, but because he himself was doomed to become insane. He never succeeded in life because he was altogether too pathological. But as a student, everybody expected him to have a rather remarkable career: he began in a more or less grand style.⁴ Soon he made himself impossible, however, because his delights and passions carried him too far. He lost sight of humanity and developed paranoia, which is the idea of persecution, the idea that everybody hates one, the reality being that one runs away from people. But in the sound part of such a man there is still the yearning for connection with humanity, and those ideas of persecution develop as a compensation for the fact of running away from them. All those people who feel persecuted and unrelated are suffering from a minor form of paranoia: to feel observed, to have the feeling of awkwardness and to be *gêné* in society, but unable to give themselves because they are inhibited by other people. This is the mildest form of it. Such people don't love others. As a matter of fact they hate them and they try to avoid them, and if that thing grows upon them, they will develop ideas of persecution.

Now, the fact that Nietzsche, after the chapter about "Delights and Passions," arrives at the chapter or the stage of "The Pale Criminal" is not abnormal in itself, but perfectly normal; for if one follows the path of passion one will surely come to the place where one's passion becomes abnormal, asocial or criminal, and that is a quality which is in everybody. Therefore, one says, *principiis obsta*,⁵ resist delights and passions, resist in the beginning before it is too late, don't have passions, it is not good taste, it is bad form. The deeper reason is that if one slips too far into such flames, one is sure to land in criminality. But how can you live and have no passion—for then you would escape suffering?

⁴ Speaking of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wrote, "The art of grand rhythm, the grand style of phrasing, as the expression of a tremendous rise and fall of sublime, of superhuman passion, was first discovered by me" (To Carl Fuchs, Winter, 1884-85, Letters/Middleton, p. 233).

⁵ *Obstare*: to stand in the way. Thus, The Principle of Obstruction or Resistance.

(*Passio* also means suffering. The German word is *Leidenschaft*; as a poet says: *Leidenschaft ist das, was Leiden schafft*.)⁶ Nobody can escape suffering, and to try to escape passion is to try to escape suffering. But as you cannot escape suffering you cannot escape passion; you will suffer from passion either directly or indirectly, and it is much better to suffer directly because indirect suffering has no merit. It is exactly as if nothing has happened. So the indirect suffering in a neurosis has no moral merit. Years lost in neurosis are just lost, without gain. But if you suffer directly and you know for what you suffer, that is never lost. Therefore, Christ said that if you know what you are doing you are blessed, but if you don't know you are cursed.⁷ For then it is a neurosis. So, arriving at the Pale Criminal is perfectly normal, but the way in which one deals with the Pale Criminal is of course the test of soundness or unsoundness. Now here, Nietzsche is dealing with it in his own very peculiar way.

I think we will go on through the different items and try to make sense of this chapter:

When he judged himself—that was his supreme moment; let not the exalted one relapse again into his low estate!

You see, in doing his deed, in committing his crime, he made himself a criminal, and that is what he meant to do because he *was* a criminal; he was meant to be a criminal. Thus far that is perfectly sound, provided that he knows what he does. But there is the difficulty. If he is a criminal without knowing it, simply doing his deed like an animal, he has absolutely no chance of redemption; but if he knows what he does, there is a possibility, for he is then simply fulfilling his role. For instance, a good man will do a good deed. He will be forced to be good and feel utterly miserable if he isn't; so there is no merit in it. He is just doing what he is, all quite natural, like an animal. It is very good of the bees to make the honey we eat, one might say, and when they sting us it is very bad, but in either case they have done it unconsciously and there is no merit in it. But if the man *knows* he is doing a good thing just because he cannot do otherwise, then there is merit because he is then conscious of that saying of wisdom: The king shall play the role of the king, the beggar the role of the beggar, and the thief the role of the

⁶ "Passion is what creates suffering."

⁷ One of Jung's favorite sayings from the Apocrypha as an addition to Luke (*Codex Bezae* V.L. 4) was: "On the same day, seeing one working on the Sabbath, he said unto him: 'Man, if indeed thou knowest what thou dost, thou art blessed: but if thou knowest not, thou art cursed, a transgression of law' " (*Apocrypha*, p. 33).

thief, being conscious of the gods. This means being conscious of their role, of Karma, the necessity that the one must play the role of the king because he is born a king, and the other the role of the beggar because he is born a beggar, and if another man is born the villain of the play, he needs must be that villain. Yet if he knows that this is all from the gods, there must be redemption. That is Hindu philosophy, which simply shows that the condition of redemption is in being conscious of what you do. And from that point of view it is just as bad to be good without knowing it as to be bad without knowing it: neither way has merit; the only chance for redemption is in consciousness, for that is the point where one differs from what one does, where one differs from being a mere animal. So it is a sublime moment here. He should not fall below it by judging himself, provided he knows what he is doing.⁸

There is no salvation for him who thus suffereth from himself,
unless it be a speedy death.

That is not the salvation that I would designate as redemption, of course. Nietzsche means here that he is committing his crime in order to reach death; the lust for murder, the greed for the blood, is simply the preparation for death. Therefore, he says, it is the madness before the deed. The murderer wants to see blood, as if he knew that committing murder meant his own death. He is seeking to end his existence because—as the text afterwards says—he is nothing but a mass of diseases, a coil of wild serpents which can only wind up in its own destruction. So the Pale Criminal is in that respect the symbol for the man who must end his existence because he is no good—in order to make room for the Superman. That was the point which caught my fellow student, but at the same time he was identified with the Superman, like Nietzsche. He was always talking about committing suicide. He felt that if it were necessary in order to make room for the Superman, he would do so without hesitation. He played with such ideas; he removed himself. So he committed a moral suicide, becoming so much a Superman that he could no longer deal with ordinary mortals and the result was that fear of persecution. You see, if the criminal knows in committing his crime that he really means his own undoing, that he commits the crime in order to kill himself, then one can only agree; he most cer-

⁸ For the relation between playing one's role, becoming conscious of the Atman, which lies beneath all roles, and in the final stages of life becoming a beggar in order to attend entirely to transcendent reality, see *Zimmer/Philosophies*, pp. 101-4, 153-60.

tainly will commit his crime, nobody can prevent him, and if he knows that he is thereby killing himself it is all right. One judges a crime differently when the murderer immediately afterwards kills himself too: one has the feeling that he has judged himself and sentenced himself to death. If the murdered is also put out of life, it is satisfactory.

But if we begin to think it over and ask what is the use of putting him to death, we can make frightful mistakes, errors of justice. To think of the moral side, that we should improve the criminal, is nonsense. That is all trash, having nothing to do with justice. It is just to put the criminal to death because we are in his crime too; everyone of us contains a criminal who wants to commit crimes though we don't know it. Our criminal is terribly disappointed. In sleepless nights he complains that we don't give him a chance. Then we read in the paper about somebody who has committed murder and we think, "What an insolent devil! He has smashed a man's head. He can do what I wanted to do, having taken the liberty to commit that crime." Our criminal instincts are all roused and we must have our revenge, something must be done against him. And as it is impossible for all the 350,000 inhabitants of the town of Zürich, for instance, to kill one man, we choose a judge, but we are so unreasonable that we don't even have a hangman in Zürich. In England they are reasonable enough to choose a hangman who is entrusted with the public sentiment: he must take care of the criminal instincts of the whole town. When he has put that man to death, we have had our share in the crime. And that is right. Otherwise, we are simply frustrated. Instead of trying to improve that man, hang him. Our criminal instinct is not satisfied by this damned reasonableness, so we get bitter and poisonous and more and more reasonable, but we are really just waiting for the time when we can take a revolver and kill; we are waiting for an age of revolution, for an age of cruelty. So it would be much better if we could begin at the beginning and put the criminal to death by public execution; it doesn't make us any more cruel than we are already.

Look at the things that happen in the world! The amount of quite open cruelty is incredible. One reads about in in the papers. Yet we still go on believing that we are growing better and better every day and in every way until we shall arrive in heaven. But we are in hell, and I tell you, if in our most reasonable town we had some juicy shooting, people would feel grand. I saw a policeman a while ago in the country, a perfectly harmless fellow, who said, "But just wait till the next time I get at a machine-gun!" He promises himself a marvelous feast. And that is so everywhere. Only a few fools believe that we are growing better and

better every day, hoping that we are improved by improving a few criminals. We are not improved by it and we shall not improve the criminals. That is a bad mistake, because the murderer has murdered himself already long before we cut his head off.

Well, the good admonitions and good counsel here are not very important. The only thing which is revelant would be that sentence, "Let your sorrow be love to the Superman: thus will ye justify your own survival." He obviously means that our guiding or leading idea should be the Superman, and the criminal who is a mass of disease, etc., ought to be done away with, to make room for him. The criminal simply has to perish: that man is no good, he is a bad mixture, and the judge will justify his own survival by having the courage to do away with him. But people say that should not be done! How awful! Or, it should be done in a moral way! But how can I say that somebody else ought to be improved? I have absolutely no stand. I know what filth I am. I know my own thoughts. I have absolutely no point of view. How can an ant say of another ant that it should be improved as an ant? They are all ants.

Mr. Baumann: From the biological aspect, every kind of animal, man or ant, has the tendency to make his own race strong and surviving over the others. So I think there is a certain instinct to improve man for man and ant for ant.

Prof. Jung: But no animal has a tendency to improve another animal. That is again a well-meaning *raisonnement* which we make from a biological point of view. A biological justification for punishment is just as wrong as a moral idea about it, for if you follow your biological idea of punishment, you must punish a degenerate thief as much as a murderer because he is a degenerate individual; you would cut off the heads of all sorts of little frauds, pickpockets, etc., and your feeling would not back you up in that at all. You would say they needed a good thrashing, or to be put in a prison for a fortnight, or something else disagreeable, but not to be put to death. But from a biological point of view, you have to put him to death, and with him, imbeciles and lunatics and people with bodily diseases or anybody equally incapacitated.

Mrs. Jung: What you have said seems to me to refer only to a criminal who would be, as an individual, a criminal, but I think most people who commit a crime do it out of a sort of mistake. They do things which are not really individual.

Prof. Jung: Well, Nietzsche is speaking of such people. He doesn't look at the problem from the standpoint of individuation. To him, the criminal is a man who has gone astray, say a fool or a diseased individual who ought to be done away with, so there is no question of con-

sciousness of crime or of the problem of individuation in the criminal. He doesn't even mention it.

Mrs. Jung: But you say he must only be improved when it is proved that he has got to be a criminal. But with many people it is not proved that they have to be criminals; it is quite unconscious what they have to be.

Prof. Jung: Sure enough, if they were not unconscious there would be a redeeming factor; as a matter of fact they are so identical with what they do that they do not know what happens to them.

Mrs. Jung: And therefore they could be improved.

Prof. Jung: That is a question, As soon as one begins to reason about the possible arguments in favor of capital punishment, one simply loses oneself in a maze of considerations and can do nothing. So the simplest thing would be to react according to feeling; then you do something which is perfectly proper and sufficient, except for the intellectual who wants to have proper reasons. You see, what the crime is for the criminal, whether he can be improved or whether, by committing his crime outside himself, killing somebody else, he has done evil to himself, selling his own chance. Those are considerations for the criminal and we are not speaking of *his* psychology, but of the psychology of Nietzsche versus his own instincts. The criminal is only a sort of mirror reflex of the criminal impetus of Nietzsche. I speak of the criminal in this frame and not of the psychology of this individual criminal—merely of the social aspect of this individual. If I have to deal with the criminal individual then I shall consider the case just as any other. For instance, every case I am treating has a criminal in himself. If one goes far enough, everybody has done something or is planning to do something which is not right, which is criminal; and there we have to observe all the rules of the game, exactly as in any other case. But inasmuch as murderers don't come into my analysis I cannot talk about the possible analysis of a murderer. I also cannot say that all murderers should be analysed, as I cannot say that all neurotics should be analysed. For there are certain social considerations over which I am not a lord, and I never make rules that would be good for humanity, particularly if nobody is very likely to carry them out. They kill murderers in France, in Italy, in England, in America, in Germany, and in most Catholic cantons of Switzerland; only a few very enlightened and reasonable communities have gone astray so far as not to kill murderers. I am not speaking of our Christianity—that point of view is not valid at all, only talk; I go by facts, and the fact is that capital punishment is valid in nearly all the most enlightened and civilized countries, and I

am not against it. There is a very good reason why it is so. All other ways of punishment are wrong.

By putting the criminal to death, one shares the crime; otherwise, one doesn't see the criminal in oneself. One must see one's criminal point: if one does not, one has not shared the criminal impetus, the criminal personality in oneself. And then one never becomes integrated. The purpose of individuation is that every part of the individual must be integrated, also the criminal part; otherwise, it is left by itself and works evil. So thus far Nietzsche is giving recognition to the criminal instincts. For instance, the "red judge" is his own moral function naturally, which might call his criminal instinct by all sorts of bad names: he might say this is perhaps a foolish or pathological tendency. It is, but it is not to be judged from a moral point of view because that is not helpful. It does not help to say a thing is bad or good. To say it is bad helps least the thing which is the most important, namely, that one can accept the bad thing. You see, when we accept it there is a chance that something can change, but we never accept it. We can improve only when we accept what is part of ourselves. Then we can change, not before.

Now he comes to the explanation of the *Pale Criminal*; hitherto he speaks simply of the criminal. The paleness comes from the fact that the man was made pale by an idea; he begins to think over what he has done, and he gives it a name. You remember we came across this idea before; it was represented as a particular mistake to give a name to your virtues. Of course, unavoidably you will do so; you don't live your virtues simply as the recognition of an indescribable something about yourself which has value, but say it is this or that, and so you give it a name and make it exclusive and cause trouble—quarrels, conflicts between duties and between virtues. While if you have not given it a name, you will have retained the value. So you cause a conflict by giving names, but one cannot see how to do otherwise.

The criminal has to give it a name, then. He adopts an idea about his deed and says he has done so and so, and then cannot stand it because he sees himself with ten thousand pairs of eyes. For a name is a collective thing, a word in everybody's mouth. He has heard that word from ten thousand other mouths already; when he says to himself that he has committed a murder, he sees it in printed letters in the newspaper, and what he has done is just that awful thing which is called murder. While if he did not give it a name, it would have remained his individual deed, his individual experience, which is not expressed by the collective noun *murder*. Such a criminal usually says: "I just beat him over

the head, or "I put a knife into him," or "I wanted to tell him something and I put a bullet into him, and afterwards they said he was dead." You see, it was an individual series of events which were not named. Even the premeditated murder is very often accounted for in such a way: "I simply had to give that fellow something to make him quiet because I wanted to get at such and such a thing; naturally I had to shove him aside. And then it turned out that he was dead." That is the way such people use a revolver—as a means to change something. It is a sort of aftereffect or a concomitant circumstance that a corpse was left. How awkward! That it is murder only dawns upon them a long time afterwards when they are told. Then they realize it and get pale, but as long as somebody simply has been removed, well, it was awkward that he was found afterwards with a fractured skull, but that does not make one pale: it is simply regrettable. People who commit a fraud invariably explain that they just wanted to do this or that. They are quite astonished when they are told that they have committed a crime, because they only did it for a certain effect and never thought that it had such an ugly name. So the pale criminal is really slain by his own idea of it, though it is not exactly his own, but is now the standpoint of the eleven thousand virgins who are flabbergasted. Nietzsche calls this a sort of madness: the criminal's weak intellect has been overthrown by a mere word. That is the madness after the deed. Now what is this line of chalk which paralyzes the hen in the text?

Mrs. Baynes: There is an old wives' tale that a hen will not cross over a chalk line.

Prof. Jung: That comes from the fact that Athanasius Kircher, a Jesuit living in the beginning of the seventeenth century, made the first hypnotic experiment by hypnotizing hens.⁹ We repeated that experiment once. You take a hen very carefully so that it doesn't get excited, and you put it down slowly and softly, holding her head down for a while to the floor, and then you make a chalk line over the beak and on the floor, so that it looks as if it were a white ribbon over her nose—of course, that is not necessary, but is only to blind other people—and the hen remains there. You can hypnotize monkeys and dogs in the same way: you must impress them for a while with the idea that they cannot move. That hen stretched out with the line over its beak looks very funny, as if it were glued to the floor by the white line—an *experimentum mirabile*!

⁹ This feat is described in W. Loeff's *Deutschlands Seegelung Bildteil von Prov. A. Kircher* (Berlin, 1939).

Now he says that there is another madness, the madness before the deed; that is the question of the cause of the crime. He says that it is a general prejudice that one commits a murder for a certain purpose, in order to rob for instance, but that it is really madness, that the murder has been committed for the sake of the blood. This is of course an unconscious truth. Consciously, each murderer considers his murder as a by-product. Perhaps in very wild crimes of affect people cry for blood and want to kill, yet it is not quite real; they are always astonished that it worked. They wanted to demonstrate murder and then it happened to be murder. The ordinary psychology is that murder is more or less a by-product. But in the unconscious, as Nietzsche understands it, it is really murder, the thirst for blood, and it means the undoing of the criminal himself if he understands himself rightly. He therefore prefers the rational explanation that it was for robbery. Otherwise, he must admit that he is caught and he cannot admit that, because to have done it for the sake of blood is madness; he prefers the sort of superficial motive of robbery and so he lies, on top of all the rest. "Could he only shake his head, then would his burden roll off": if he only would not think such rubbish he would not be burdened.

Then Nietzsche asks what the criminal is, after all. He is a mass of diseases, a coil of serpents. For such an individual is terribly pained and tortured really and therefore he commits a crime; nobody causes pain to another person unless he himself suffers pain. As a rule only such people torture or hurt who are hurt or tortured themselves; they want to relieve themselves from their own suffering by hurting somebody else, in order to feel that the pain is not inside themselves alone. You see, it is as if we were secretly threatened by the invisible presence of the criminal in ourselves, and then we wish that somebody might commit a crime so that we can say, "Ah thank heaven, *there* is the criminal, *there* is the evil." That explains somewhat why we love detective stories and the long reports of crimes in the newspapers; it is of the greatest interest to us to know where the evil is. We exclaim, "What an awful fellow!" We lap it up because we have hunger and thirst for such things; they fascinate us because we have an unsatisfied criminal instinct in ourselves. So the whole respectable community grows more and more uncanny; if nothing happens, everybody looks at everybody else with fear and hate. Are you the one who is going to relieve us? Am I the one to relieve the others? Am I the one who will set the ball rolling? Am I the one to kill? And then suddenly the news comes: somebody has committed murder. "Thank heaven!"

You see, a murderer is a sort of scapegoat for the community; it is as

if each community should have a *bouc émissaire*¹⁰ who was burdened with the sins of the community. Therefore, in the Orient they often had the very wise custom of making a murderer represent the sacrificed god, as they did in old Mexico for instance; then he was cut open afterwards, the living heart was cut out, and he was a god practically: he carried the sins of the community. That is the original psychology of the sacrificial death of Christ, of course. Therefore, Christ was crucified between the thieves. He was the murderer of the season, one could say; he was exchanged against Barabbas who was a real criminal. So he is the *bouc émissaire* and is killed as the criminal of the season, and thereby we are redeemed from our own sin. When the community puts the criminal to death, it is an act of redemption for the community, a sort of psychological alleviation. The criminal has a certain social role—this is not my idea, it was valid long before I lived—and therefore a real criminal has always been given the dignity of a sort of ritual in recognition of his merit; first a long trial with judges in wigs and gowns, and then the procession to the guillotine or the gallows with tambours and soldiers and a great crowd, and then he is executed. It seems, of course, absurd that we should worship in our churches just that kind of public execution, yet each crucifix carried that meaning. But we won't give that dignity to our criminals to whom we ought to be grateful for committing a crime instead of ourselves; they pay with their blood for our sins and we should give them a decent burial with soldiers and music, or at least tambours. Those ancient ways of burying the criminal took naively into account the great social importance of the crime as the atonement for the sins of the people.

Nietzsche also says here that other ages had other ideas of morality, etc., and that therefore one should not judge morally. But that is not very important—that the heretic and the witch were considered to be bad people in the Middle Ages and that nowadays they are just fashionable. Here again, however, we come to a good and sound idea—that the madness which precedes the crime might be named “truth” or “faithfulness” or “justice.” Those are virtues, mind you, so the madness of the belief in virtue is the madness which precedes crime. The idea is that if we believe in such ideals of virtue and if we identify with them—if somebody says he is faithful or just, for instance—that is the forerunner of crime, because to burden the scale of virtues makes the scale of

¹⁰ Emissary goat, scapegoat. Aztec sacrifice was not, strictly speaking, scapegoating but rather the furnishing of victims to the insatiable sun god who required blood to keep moving. See Jacques Soustelle, *The Daily Life of the Aztecs on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest*, tr. Patrick O'Brian (New York, 1932).

vices rise: the scales have to be balanced. The more people think that they are good or identify with good, the more they leave evil alone, and as much as their good increases, unconsciously their evil will increase. So we leave it to somebody else. But we have already committed the crime in leaving our evil to other people, and we are not even grateful that they spare us. Nothing makes us more moral and self-righteous than when anybody is humble enough to be immoral. Then we say, "*I am not like that, such things don't happen in our family.*" They have their virtue in order to live long in wretched self-complacency. That is, they simply misuse their faculty of being good, the grace they have of being good, in order to rescue themselves from life and to have a long life of despicable ease.

Then having said all this, in the end Nietzsche thinks obviously of his own role, and why he says such things, and he goes on, "I am a railing alongside the torrent; whoever is able to grasp me may grasp me! Your crutch, however, I am not." That is, he is a certain guidance along the torrent, but if you cannot walk, if you need a crutch, it would not do. It is a truth which takes the ground away from under your feet; you know where it leads but there is no stand. It is not a certainty. It does not help you to keep upright. It is tempting but undermining. And it *is* undermining: that is the purpose of this chapter.

LECTURE II

15 May 1935

Prof. Jung:

We have a question by Mrs. Baumann, "Is it *au fait* to deal with my question about Christ now? I cannot help feeling there is a catch somewhere about Christ being crucified by his virtues, because he did recognize evil by saying, 'Resist not evil,' and therefore I should think he was conscious of both extremes."

It is right to ask this question here, indeed almost inevitable, because the chapter about the pale criminal is part of that whole problem of virtue and evil; if you consider the good in man, you cannot help considering the evil too. And there is a catch, as you say, in the fact that Christ really never said that he had been crucified by his virtues: that is what medieval fantasy made of it—you remember I showed you a picture where he was being crucified by his virtues. It is a very curious idea, but that miniature in the medieval codex most certainly shows that it existed, and there is a good deal to say about such an idea. (We have *already* said a good deal about it.) So it is not a contradiction in the *logia* of Christ, because he never said that; from his point of view he never would have said it. You are quite right: he said, "Resist not evil." One must always make a difference between the *logion*, the actual word of the Lord himself as given in the tradition, and what people made of it. If one compares the teaching of the church with the original teaching of Christ himself, one sees that there is most certainly a great difference. Therefore, it is so difficult, really quite impossible, to have a Protestant church, for that can only be found upon the Word, the Bible; but the New Testament as well as the Old is so full of contradictions that it has no authority. Such an institution cannot be based upon those contradictory sayings.

So, the Catholic church is quite consistent in the point of view that the Holy Scriptures have no absolute authority because they were compiled a long time after the death of the Master by pupils of his disciples. They say that Christ is really the founder of the church, which is older

than those sacred books. The Evangels of St. John or Matthew or Luke were not even written by the apostles themselves; the Greek text says *katá*, according to Matthew or Luke. Those reports were compiled by one or more people, who were presumably pupils at least of the evangelists, but it is quite questionable whether the Evangel of St. John was connected even so directly with the apostle. It is very possible that the Evangels have been compilations made in places like Asia Minor or Alexandria for the use of the Christian communities there. Moreover, it is a fact that in the first century the sacred books were considered only as good and useful literature for Christians to read, and never as infallible divine inspiration. Of course, the church has the memory of those days so they have put the Bible on the Index, and that is quite right because it is a tempting and contradictory collection of books with very dangerous teachings in them. The Pope reserves the right of the authentic interpretation; in his official position, according to the dogma of infallibility, he is infallible in his interpretation of the dogma. Also, the church, since it holds higher authority than the Scriptures, can make dogma; that gives a basis for an authoritative body. But the sayings of that institution do not necessarily agree with the teachings of Christ himself.

Then here is a question by Mrs. Baynes: "There seems to be a growing conviction in our world that it is heroic to murder for the sake of the cause one is serving, and lily-livered to be held back by the thought of what that means. Has the pathological element in Nietzsche's idea of the pale criminal helped to foster this point of view?"

Well, it is generally said that Nietzsche was at the bottom of the world war and the new revolution in Germany, and so on. Nietzsche himself would be highly astonished to hear such news. He surely never dreamt that he would be called the father of all this modern political evil. That really comes more from the misunderstanding to which Nietzsche is exposed. For he made one considerable mistake which of course would not be generally considered a mistake. But *I* call it a mistake that he ever published *Zarathustra*. That is a book which ought not to be published; it should be reserved for people who have undergone a very careful training in the psychology of the unconscious. Only then, having given evidence of not being overthrown by what the unconscious occasionally says, should people have access to the book. For in *Zarathustra* we have to deal with a partial revelation of the unconscious. It is full of inspiration, of the immediate manifestation of the unconscious, and therefore should be read with due preparation, with due knowledge of the style and the intentions of the unconscious. If a man

reads *Zarathustra* unprepared, with all the naive presuppositions of our actual civilization, he must necessarily draw wrong conclusions as to the meaning of the "Superman," "the Blond Beast," "the Pale Criminal," and so on. And such people will surely draw such conclusions as murder-for-the-sake-of-the-cause. Many suicides have felt themselves justified by *Zarathustra*—as any damned nonsense can be justified by *Zarathustra*. So it is generally assumed that Nietzsche is at the bottom of a whole host of evils on account of his immoral teaching, while as a matter of fact, Nietzsche himself and his teaching are exceedingly moral, but only to people who really understand how to read it.

You see, it all depends upon what level one speaks from—whether one is talking on the level of the ordinary understanding or of an extraordinary understanding. Whatever you say on the normal level is understood by all the people who are on that level, but if you say something which really comes from a level underneath as *if* it belonged to the normal level, then it will be misunderstood. People will not realize that it comes from the layer below, and that in order to really understand it they themselves should be below. Of course that is very difficult, because we never reckon with such levels, but in dealing with a product like *Zarathustra*, we must consider this question.

In that connection there is something which I really must say here. The general idea is that through analysis one becomes conscious of certain contents which have been hidden in the unconscious hitherto for one reason or another. And in making these things conscious, you would represent the conscious on one line, and the personal unconscious on the line below, and then the collective unconscious below that. Now, if you bring some content from the personal unconscious up to the conscious level, say something you have repressed or more or less wilfully forgotten, then it would be just like anything else on the conscious level. For instance, say you are unconscious of the fact that you are very ambitious or that you have considerable will-to-power. You have believed hitherto that you were a sort of pious lamb with no particular ambition; then through certain experiences or through the benevolent teaching of analysis you become aware that you really have a will-to-power, and are not that pious lamb you were supposed to be. Thus you lift that will-to-power up to the conscious level and you handle it as something quite reasonable, for it is easy to believe that we are imperfect: it is not unheard of that we should have a certain ambition or sex fantasies or something dark like that. You see, the admixture of a bit of dark substance to our snow-white conscious innocence is not absurd; you can easily admit that you are of course not perfect, but are

like everybody, a bit black somewhere. You can say that quite reasonably; being in human society, you can say it in the most respectable drawing room and even acquire a certain merit in doing so. They will think, "What an understanding man, how human—of course we are all a little bit black, you know!" So that is all right, above board; nothing bad has happened.

But you have omitted one fact: namely, you cannot lift up something from the unconscious without being just a bit lowered in consciousness; that thing has a certain weight. You see, you are floating like a ship or a bowl on that level above, but if you put a load into the ship, it goes down a little and then it remains at the slightly lower level. Of course reason would say, "Is it not nice and reasonable that he admits that he is not quite a saint?" You appreciate the person for admitting that he is not 100 percent pure gold. But you don't take into account that if the confession is real, that person is no longer floating on the white fleecy clouds of innocence but is a bit pulled down; inasmuch as the repressed content has come up, the person has gone down. Yet, he really believes that he has added to his whiteness by confessing his blackness—as most people believe—and then he naturally thinks, "I am better than ever before. I am quite different. I am such a nice lamb, and we love each other and there is no sin any more." Having confessed his sins, he thinks there is no longer any black in him. As in the Catholic church, you may have done a hell of a meanness, but if you confess it and repent, you get absolution. It is dealt with; it is *non-arrivé*, past: you are cured. You have made a sort of moral Couéism, *ça passe*, *ça passe*, and finally it has *passed*: it never has *happened*.¹

They have a more modern form of confession in the Oxford Movement. To take a nice example: I go to the meeting where I am to be the leader for the day, and I confess that I have watched a girl in the opposite house quite by chance: I could not help seeing her as she undressed. Of course, I really remained glued to the window, even standing on the table in order to see her. Then I confess that I have had an impure fantasy and must share it with the members of the group. Yes of course—very human, very nice for him to say so! And I feel simply grand; it is rather detrimental to my self-respect, but by confessing it I share it with the people, and the mutual love will keep me afloat. I cannot help patting myself on the back for having been so honest and so

¹ Emile Coué (1857-1926), a French psychotherapist whose instruction to patients was to repeat often in a confident tone, "Every day and in every way, I am getting better and better."

generous in sharing the painful details of my little life. And then the meeting can begin. With radiant eyes they go about, absolutely redeemed, and sin has vanished from the world, and I have only made a slight mistake.

But they don't see that I am loading the ship, because if once I stood upon the table to see a girl undressing and had my pleasure there in watching such a performance, I am forever the man who has done it and it is unforgettable, I am not redeemed by confessing it. Yes, I can feel you are all the same damned fools that I am; you think you are all forgiven, but we are all a herd of fools. But I am never forgiven. Forever I am the one who has done it. I am characterized as such, have burdened my ship with that fact. Forever I shall carry that burden, and I must be careful not to climb too many tables at too many windows or my ship might go under in the end. Hell! What have I lived? A series of mean tricks. I am just an ordinary swine—the swine that always repented what he ate, the poor swine that could not even be a proper swine. One needs must come to that conclusion. Of course I have repented. That is all right, but nevertheless I have done those things. And so one might wake up to the understanding of one's life, and that would be fatal, because one will have seen that one's ship has gone under in spite of all confession and repentance. For by making something conscious one lowers the ship and it keeps on sinking down the more one puts into it.

Now, if you pull up something of the kind from the personal unconscious, you can say it is quite human, something that really could have been conscious; you can rationalize it, and it is not very visible considering that you put such a weight into the balance of your ship. But when you fetch something from the collective unconscious, it has a much greater weight, because it has come from much further down, for everything is in the place where it belongs according to its specific weight. What Nietzsche fetched up was the lead of the water region (according to the *Secret of the Golden Flower*),² and lead is the heaviest metal and therefore at the bottom of the collective unconscious. So put this in your boat and you will be pulled down into the collective unconscious. For when two points are in space, it is impossible that only the one attracts the other: both are attracted. If you lift up a stone from the earth and let it fall, in that moment you would say that the stone was falling and would not assume that the earth was rising; but as a matter of fact if that stone were as big as the moon or the earth itself,

² See above, 31 Oct. 1934, n. 8, on Richard Wilhelm.

it would suddenly appear to you that the earth was attracted to the stone as much as the stone was attracted to the earth. So when you fetch up the lead of the water region, you will notice quite suddenly that your boat up in the bright regions of reason will be pulled down; you cannot get it up to the top because it is too heavy.

Therefore, we are quite reluctant to bring these heavy things up to the surface; we are afraid of pulling down our boat. It seems to be dangerous, too great a risk, and we avoid doing it. We have quite a natural instinct against being conscious of such things; even when it is a small cargo which our boat could easily carry; it is already too heavy. To be conscious of the fact that we steal or lie or have sexual fantasies would burden us too much. We had better keep unconscious of those facts; we want to be clear of them and remain floating in the region of the white clouds. Of course, the higher up you are, the more you lose your body, the more you lose yourself, the more unreal you become; and finally you are just a sort of smoke floating in the sky, and that is no human existence. So you are forced to overcome your unconscious, to make these things conscious; but inasmuch as you make them conscious your ship comes down further, and if you become acquainted with the collective unconscious, you are pulled even further under. You may still be laboring under the impression that you can lift something up to consciousness and that the level of your consciousness will not be affected, that on the contrary, it will be increased, improved—but that is an illusion; if you lift up those contents approaching the lead of the water region, your consciousness will go down. That is an inexorable fact which must be taken into consideration.

Of course it is the secret meaning of life, one could say, that the lead of the water region should be lifted up. For you must make gold of it; you must transform matter by penetrating it. If you don't penetrate space or time, you are still half born, still wandering about in the collective unconscious in a prenatal state. And then the real purpose of the unknown creator that is behind your existence has not come off; he wanted you to penetrate space and time in order to transform the lead, but you buried your talent and have not done it, and you fade away before you have accomplished anything. But if you can lift up the lead of the water region, you really fulfil the task; and whether your consciousness is on this level or that, or on a still deeper level, is relatively unimportant in comparison with the fulfilment of the task. Of course, the deeper down the level of consciousness goes, the more you are threatened by the unconscious, by becoming engulfed in the sea, and that should not be, for it means that you have gone under, the lead

of the water region has overcome you and the experiment has not come off. But if you can just keep afloat, you have accomplished the task; then you will land somewhere in between. So the symbol of perfection, or the self in the human being, was to the old masters nothing volatile or light, but a stone or a metal. Therefore they say about the philosopher's stone, which is the symbol of the self, *lapis est media res inter corpora perfecta et imperfecta*: the *lapis philosophorum* is not the perfect body, but is in the middle, between the perfect and the imperfect bodies.³ You would expect it to be among the perfect bodies, but the perfect bodies are up on the conscious level and that is not the real middle position.

Nietzsche is no longer concerned with a personal unconscious; that chapter about the Pale Criminal clearly shows it. He is here concerned with the evil of mankind, with universal humanity as it is represented in himself, and therefore one can say he is concerned with the collective unconscious; the Pale Criminal is a form in the collective unconscious, the criminal is everybody. Now, inasmuch as he is concerned with that, he undergoes naturally the dangers of those who deal with such matters. But he labors under the assumption that he is on top, that he has a reasonable consciousness, that he can make it visible and understandable; and he tries to bring up the lead of the water region. His Pale Criminal is lead, an ignoble substance, and in bringing it up he has the illusion that he keeps the level of consciousness. He does not see that he gets immersed and really sinks insofar as he brings it up. So he talks on this lower level. Of course there is an infinite number of possible levels; he talks now on the level of people who have contacted the collective unconscious, and they speak a different language. If people on the normal conscious level hear it, they draw conclusions which are typical for that level; only the people who hear him on the lower level have the right understanding because they know about that kind of thing. They will draw the conclusions, not of the world above, but of the world of the shadow.

On the conscious level, everybody knows what a criminal is; if you don't know, you take an encyclopedia and look up the chapter about crime, or any handbooks of laws, and they show you. But from the level below, the criminal is something quite different, no longer a statistical or social or juristic phenomenon, nothing reasonable or ra-

³ Jung continually tried to show that the profound alchemists were dealing in their laboratories symbolically. Not so much proto-chemists as proto-psychologists and philosophers, they took transmuted gold or "the philosopher's stone" as goals of human development and transformation. See CW 12, 13, and 14, *passim*.

tional, but a psychological concept. Therefore, it is already a symbolic concept; it is a concept of the twilight, in the region of the *pénombre* where things have two sides, the sun side and the moon side. The leading principle above is the sun, and below it is the moon; and whatever is between is in two lights, the light of the sun and the light of the moon. So when someone speaks of crime or the criminal on the lower level, he is conscious of crime from such an aspect; it is a twilight concept, and only people who have experienced the shadow can really understand what he is talking about. But if he makes the mistake of coming out into the daylight, into the broad street, and talking as if he were on the first level—and then having the whole thing printed so that every jackass can buy and read it—of course people will read him as they read the newspaper or any other obvious thing. And they will be horrified.

Freud made the same mistake in speaking of things on the unconscious level. He should explain; he should say, "Come, let us go down several steps into the twilight world where things have that aspect." Then everybody could admit incest quite easily. But in the everyday world that is a horrible thing, impossible; the police will catch hold of you and you will be put into jail or the lunatic asylum for it. Also, people from the unconscious level make the mistake of assuming a sort of benignant attitude, and talking as if they were really on a level above, when they are not, but below. Of course, the deeper down you go the worse it becomes; to talk on the topmost level of something brought up from the collective unconscious is to make the most horrible mistake.

You see, Nietzsche, in trying to bring something up from this level, could say he had certain tendencies that were discernible: he might steal, he might lie, or even commit a crime. That is more or less understandable on the upper level, as I said. He might say it was his particular psychology, or write a confession like St. Augustine or Rousseau, freely confessing what a sinner he was. Then people would be agreeably shocked: "How marvelous that people can do such things!"—they themselves of course being not concerned at all. That would be possible: you can speak on this level as a personal confession. But Nietzsche is no longer talking from the level of his personal unconscious; he talks of the crime of *man*, and then everybody is in it. But then he can only have bad results from his teaching. People will say, "If one is a criminal in a good cause, why not? One is a hero—Nietzsche did it, so why not? But here it is not even twilight. It is already the great night, and those are the things which can only be taught in secret.

Therefore, the more dangerous teachings, the more questionable or

profound teachings, were always told in the form of *mysteria*. One finds these ideas in St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: "These things must be taught in secret and woe unto those who speak of them in the daytime, thus betraying the mysteries."⁴ Such people are always injured or killed. They injure themselves by bringing such matter up to the light. Not realizing that they are already dragged down by the weight, they expose themselves in a most unfortunate way to people on the normal level, who suddenly discover that they are really from below and look down upon them. So what happens on this level is still more dangerous, still more mistaken; it has not even two sides. Whoever is on the level of the personal unconscious has still a sort of luminosity on top from the sun, but down below it is all moonshine: treacherous, poisonous, evil, not to be trusted. And if you expose this thing on a higher level, you are not only exposed but a victim also.

That is what Nietzsche does, not realizing at all. He is quite naive about it: to produce that chapter about the Pale Criminal is really a tremendous naiveté. And probably you have noticed that it is profoundly disturbing because it is true, but it should not be told in the daylight, but only told in the night under the seal of secrecy. This idea was by no means strange to Nietzsche. In another place he speaks of the secret teaching in the temples, and how the initiants were put through many degrees in their initiation, harder and harder, always more cruel and more difficult, complete abnegation and mortification and God knows what; and then comes the last ceremony where the grand master himself receives the initiant who of course expects something extraordinary. But the grand master says, "Everything is allowed. Before, everything was forbidden but now everything is allowed." And that means complete licentiousness.⁵ This is of course a legend, but it has a kernel of truth: namely, it reverses the values of consciousness, exchanges the values of consciousness for their opposite, absolute shadow. Of course, for that to be said on the surface is criminal, but five hundred or a thousand meters down in the depths, it is a truth. But we cannot imagine what kind of truth it is because we don't know how things look at

⁴ In Ephesians, Paul speaks of how God by revelation "made known unto me the mystery . . . which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men" (3:3-5). However, nothing is said about keeping them secret.

⁵ Thus, although everything is allowed since there is no cosmic forbiddener, there remain, for Nietzsche, good ways and bad ways of being and acting. "What is good: Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness." *The Anti-Christ*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968; orig. 1895), sect. 2.

that depth; it is a truth of the darkness. There are really organized mysteries in which the ultimate teaching is of such a nature; therefore the principle of these mysteries—I am now quoting facts, this is not my imagination—is: *Gloria dei est celare verbum*, meaning, it is the glory of God to conceal the word. That is the motto of the highest degree of Knights Templars, a contradiction of the more Christian ideas in the lower stages. We say the glory of God is to preach the word; our mysteries are called *sacramenta*, which means the mysteries of the divine word, and to preach the word is our duty. Yet in the highest degree of initiation it is the glory of God to hide the word. And why? Because, bring it up and the people will be dumbfounded—and worse, they will be misled.

That comes from the same fact which we are here dealing with, that the author of such a book does not realize where he himself stands. In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche was already somewhere in the collective part of his unconscious. The *Genealogy of Morals* and his Aphorisms, for instance, would come more from the personal level; it is possible still to be intellectual and rational there, as Freud has shown. But when it comes to the profounder points, like incest, Freud just reaches the collective level where things have a different meaning and aspect; yet he talks of them naively and thus makes a fatal mistake: he betrays the secrets to infants, which always has the worst of effects. Therefore, my idea is that *Zarathustra* should not have been published, but should have been worked over and carefully concealed, perhaps put in a form—in spite of all the beauty in it—more or less like his aphoristic writings, because of the evil or morbid influence such a book can have. Just that chapter about the Pale Criminal has a poisonous influence because it makes a really impossible thing quite palatable, and the result is that one is in a mist.

Well, that, to my idea, is a very important point of view whenever you deal with matters of the collective unconscious; touching the personal unconscious already changes you and touching the collective unconscious changes you all the more: you are a different being, and no longer like the people who have not touched it. That does not mean that you are better. On the contrary, you are worse, because from their point of view you are on a lower level; and if you talk from a higher level it is just bluff and you add to your burden by lying and cheating and trying to make a good impression. So one can only recommend the utmost of discretion and tact in the understanding of the level of other people. Of course, in Nietzsche's case you cannot make him responsible: he was utterly overcome by the unconscious and he did not realize

that he was lower down than his time. On the contrary, he assumed that he was higher up, that he was light and easy and marvelous; therefore, he speaks of dancing and flying as a compensation for the fact that he was really weighed down. If you are concerned with lead, you naturally realize what lightness is and are likely to make the mistake he made. In his letters, for instance, he says that thought never is difficult to him; it jumps ready-made out of his head as Pallas once jumped from the head of Zeus. Yet on the next page he complains bitterly about his terrible migraines when working; he doesn't make the connection, as he doesn't understand why he feels particularly light when he is weighed down by lead.⁶

Now we have another question to deal with, by Dr. Schlegel: "You told us in a quite convincing way that there is no redemption in confessing oneself. Would you, in that connection, deal with the problem of the possibility of redemption (*Sühne*) by suffering in the sense of punishment (*Strafe*)?"

The idea is, you never can get away from the fact that you are the one who has done a certain thing; that is an absolutely indestructible fact and no repentance in the world will ever change it. Now, that being true, you never can live another life than that of a man who has done that thing; inasmuch as it is a general fact that a man who had done it will have such and such a life, you have to expect such a life. If you commit a crime, then you are that man who is called a criminal and the criminal's life is such and such: he will be caught, he will be punished, and he will undergo suffering. So you expect suffering, and if it doesn't come, then you yourself have not found the answer which you expected of life. Of course, it sounds absurd when you put it in this way, but reverse the picture: say you do something really good—then you are the good man who has done the good thing and such a man rightly expects gratification or recognition. He supposes that the good will be followed by certain compensations, and if they don't happen, he is disappointed; he feels frustrated. You see, doing a good thing is, dynamically, exactly the same as doing a bad thing, as from the standpoint of the unconscious, love and hatred are identical—*dynamically* identical: the one is positive and the other negative. In nature it is exactly the same whether electricity is positive or negative, and so to the

⁶ "With the exception of the ten days occupied in composing the first part of this book, my brother often referred to this winter as the hardest and sickliest he had ever experienced" Förster-Nietzsche, Introduction, N/Works, p. 16.

unconscious it is the same; nature is concerned with the dynamism of things.

Of course to us, it makes all the difference in the world whether a thing is good or bad; but any effect would be equivalent to the good or the bad you produce, and you expect the sequence. You accept naturally the consequence, the effect that follows a good or bad deed; if that does not follow, you are frustrated. You have not received what life really owes you. So it is unnatural if crime is not followed by suffering and punishment, and it is unnatural if good is not followed by gratification and recognition. We feel under a certain moral obligation to be grateful to somebody who does good, as we are compelled to an adverse reaction against somebody who does wrong. That is simply inescapable. We cannot reverse the picture and punish the one who is doing good. It is impossible—only crazy people could do that. And it is equally impossible to reverse the conclusion in the other case. For the sake of normal psychological life, the good deed ought to be followed by gratitude or something of the sort, by a true recognition or compensation; and the same in the opposite case. Then only do you feel: this is right. Suppose somebody has done something very good, for example, and is then compensated by public recognition; then, though you have not contributed to it yourself, you feel that to be a perfectly satisfactory expression of your own feeling: it is very nice that recognition has been given to that individual. Therefore you have, and you ought to have, the opposite reaction in the case of crime. When you hear that a man who has committed a terrible crime is sentenced to prison for life, or even has to undergo capital punishment, you cannot help feeling that it is right, the true answer.

And since I look at these things, perhaps, from a very irrational standpoint, the balance of the *dynamis* of psychological events, I think the natural order would be disturbed if we ceased to give recognition to good and evil. There must be an equivalent recognition. For instance, that modern standpoint where a man commits a crime and a very enlightened alienist comes along and says he could not help himself, that he is just a degenerate individual and should be put into a sanatorium where he will be well fed and taken care of and even enjoy a certain amount of liberty: that is not quite satisfactory—it is a worse answer as a matter of fact. Because you put yourself on a much higher level and regard him as pathological, a degenerate individual, you can only put him to bed without caring for the fact that he has murdered a little child or tortured some other being to death. That is really not satisfactory. People's natural reaction is: "Those damned alienists! Now

we must feed him in a lunatic asylum where he can stuff his belly and have a good time and smoke cigars at the expense of the state! And they are right, it is true. Perhaps this is a very sinful point of view, I don't know, but I feel that is simply a straightforward statement about human psychology, and how else can we judge of these things than by human psychology?

Dr. Schlegel: Thank you. The standpoint of modern criminology is really quite a rational one. It denies the *Vergeltung*.⁷

Prof. Jung: Of course. The *Vergeltung* is compensation already, a sort of revenge. That is the only true point of view from the standpoint of psychology. I quite agree that my point of view from the standpoint of Christian morality and of reason is very sinful, yet I am convinced that this is the only right and true standpoint. It always has been true and it will be true forever: that we feel under a certain obligation to be grateful to the one who does the good deed, and if that is the case we must always punish the evil.

Mrs. Baumann: Perhaps some of the confusion in the world today comes from the fact that the good deeds seem to turn out to be bad, and perhaps a crime might turn out to be a good thing.

Prof. Jung: That is possible, but it does not hinder our considering it a crime, and then we punish it. Of course I admit that somebody might be doing a great good to humanity which his time understands as a great evil; we have plenty of such cases in medicine. We have observed more than once that the people who introduced new methods have been persecuted as being the worst enemies of mankind. People were put into prison for dissecting corpses, for instance; they really were benefitting mankind, but it was not understood and so their good was considered to be a crime. And it was in a way a crime for that time too because they were criminally naive about it; they should have known to what time they were talking. It is criminal to put a bottle of digitalis into the hands of a little child as a plaything, for instance. It might save your life by helping your heart along, or might mean rescue to a man with heart disease, but if a child drinks that medicine, it dies. You must always take into consideration to whom you are speaking; it is a criminal disregard to talk certain verities to babies. One of the main considerations in analysis is that one tries to understand to whom one is talking, and that is exceedingly difficult; one is always in danger of saying too much or too little. So a thing which in itself was really good, one would say from a later more enlightened point of view was at that time

⁷ *Vergeltung* is commonly translated "retaliation" or "retribution."

bad, because it was brought out into the open in a naive and very disregarding way.

Mrs. Crowley: May I ask a question in regard to the treatment of the criminal? Would you not say that was influenced by a transforming process in a historical sense, just as other collective attitudes are? If we are attempting to outgrow the medieval attitude in our relation to life, why maintain a system of punishment that belongs to the Middle Ages? If, for example, our rational age has begun to produce certain codes or standards of decency, how in the treatment of the criminal can we revert to barbaric practices that belong to the days of dungeons? Does not the law of development or transformation apply here too?

Prof. Jung: Surely there would be a development, but the development into rationalism is to me no development. It would be a development if we could produce criminals with a moral sense; we would then arrest them and bring them before the judge who would say, "Now Mr. So-and-So, I am very sorry, but I must tell you that you have done something which really should not be done; you have hurt the feelings of all the decent citizens and I must politely beg you not to do such a thing again." Now if the criminal is so far developed that he is deeply humiliated by that, so that he really promises never to do such a thing again, that would work. But we must first produce decent criminals. You see, it all depends whether the prisoner is of a coarse structure or not: the punishment must be according to the nature of the criminal. There is a considerable progress in the postponement of punishment; every reasonable being would agree, when somebody has lost his head and committed a crime, that he did it in a sort of panic, and therefore we must be reasonable and postpone punishment. I think that is progress or evolution, but one should make it clear that the punishment is merely postponed, and if the swine commits such a crime again, we will lay him by the heels and he will then undergo the whole severity of the law. That is sound. But to improve the lot of the prisoner is I am afraid very sentimental; even the prisoners do not approve. The real criminal makes fun of this leniency in punishment.

Mrs. Crowley: Many of our modern prisoners have the same conditions as in the Middle Ages.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one cannot hinder that kind of development; surely one will make the prisons hygienic so that the prisoner can really last fifteen years. It would be too bad if he should die in the third year of his punishment. You have no idea what it is to be in prison really, how hellish it is to condemn a man to that for twenty-five years. It is much better to condemn him to death right away. So it is cruelty anyhow on

principle. For instance, the murderer of the Empress Elizabeth had confessed the murder—it was absolutely clear—so they put him into prison alone where he dies after six years.⁸ It was a very cruel punishment—to be entirely alone for six years. Now, perhaps, the hygienic conditions were not of the best so that he was infected by tuberculosis and died soon; if it had been a very good prison he would have lasted thirty years and the punishment would have been drawn out. I should prefer to die.

⁸ Princess Elizabeth of Austria was stabbed to death in Geneva in 1899 by an Italian anarchist named Luccheni.

LECTURE III

22 May 1935

Prof. Jung:

The title of the next chapter is "Reading and Writing." Now how on earth do you think Nietzsche is coming across that gulf from the pale criminal to reading and writing?

Mrs. Baumann: After he had finished writing "The Pale Criminal," he must have looked back on it to try to understand it himself; he must have begun to think about what he has "written with blood."

Prof. Jung: Well, these chapters, as I said, are like a flow of pictures which follow each other; "The Pale Criminal" is one picture in the stream, and out of that logically follows the picture of reading and writing. But what is the connection? Is there nothing in the chapter of the pale criminal which would explain that we were coming to the chapter "Reading and Writing?" What *is* reading and writing?

Mrs. Sigg: Expression, a means of communicating something to other people.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is a function of relationship. And how does that follow after the criminal?

Miss Hannah: Doesn't it connect up with the last verse about being a handrail? There he is beginning to get rather cold feet about what he has said.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. It connects up with the last verse: "I am railing alongside the torrent; whoever is able to grasp me may grasp me! Your crutch, however, I am not." He begins to ask himself what he has said. But what has the fact that reading and writing are functions of expression to do with the criminal?

Mr. Allemann: The Pale Criminal is a protest against *any* connection.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The criminal is quite certainly asocial, disrupts the laws of humanity, and sins against all the rules of the human community; whoever commits a crime is cut off. He has to keep his crime secret, upsets the feeling of his fellow beings, violates their rights: he is the most violent breaker of the bond of the human community. It is

really interesting that he names this chapter not just "The Criminal," or "The Bad Man," but "The *Pale* Criminal." Obviously he realizes what that means.

Mr. Allemann: He realizes the horror of being alone, of being an out-cast.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and also his inability to be a criminal; he realizes the meaning of the criminal who could not stick to it, could not suffer the complete human isolation. I once had a pale criminal in consultation—a murderess. It was such a case in reality. A highly educated women whom I did not know at all came one evening to consult me. She told me that she had committed a murder twenty years before, had killed another woman, and it never had been found out. It was thought to have been a suicide. She came to me because her last connection with life had been destroyed. She had a daughter whom she loved, but for unknown reasons she could no longer stand her mother and had separated from her. And all her friends withdrew; she did not know how that came about, because nobody really knew anything about it. But she herself sought solitude, lived in the country, and could only deal really with animals. She was afraid of horses however, and they reacted to her very nervously; but being very energetic, she forced herself to ride just because she was afraid. She had dogs also and there was one, an Alsatian, that was particularly beloved by her; and when that dog became lame, she was completely finished, demoralized; she did not know what to do. It was then that she came to me and confessed; I was the first being to whom she had spoken of it. Then she disappeared again. You see, she was in a way not a pale criminal; she just suffered and stood it, but she became absolutely isolated, I have hardly ever seen a human being so isolated—more than any hermit. Even if one lived in a deserted country like Alaska or Northern Canada one would not be so alone, and it was most characteristic that she broke down completely when her dog failed her.

Here, then, Nietzsche realizes the pale criminal in himself; that is his picture, his experience. He is the man who really cannot stand that isolation. It is, of course, sufficient to realize anything of a criminal kind to feel at once the extraordinary isolation, but being a Superman he should be able to stand it. His exhortation is: "Realize yourself, even your criminality, and stand for yourself: be a Superman who is beyond all such human feebleness." The reaction comes at once, however; in the end of "The Pale Criminal" he understands that what he said might perhaps have peculiar consequences, and he begins to preach as if to people actually present: "Now don't use what I say as crutches. I

will show you the way but you cannot rely upon me.” So quite naturally he comes to his most characteristic function, reading and writing, taking in by reading communications from other people, and sending messages by writing to them. That is the logical connection between the two chapters. Here we are in the midst of that activity and he says,

Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.

It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.

He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers—and spirit itself will stink.

Or another century of writers!

Every one being allowed to learn to read, ruineth in the long run not only writing but also thinking.

There is a great deal of truth in that.

Once spirit was God, then it became man, and now it even becometh populace.“

How do you explain that?

Mrs. Crowley: In a previous Seminar, you spoke about the difference between the word that is derived from the spirit, and the spirit that is derived from the word, where the spirit becomes merely a concept. I think it was in “Joys and Passions.”

Prof. Jung: Yes, and we encountered a similar thought right in the beginning where we met the saint in the wood; there we spoke of this descent. Now we again meet that thought of Nietzsche’s, “Once spirit was God, then it became man, and now it even becometh populace”—mere mob. This is the way the spirit has taken. And how did this come about?

Prof. Fierz: We see it in Christianity, where it started.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the whole course of development in Christianity, starting really with the beginning of the Evangel of John: “In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God.” So word and spirit are pretty much the same; the word is simply the emanation of the spirit, the visibility or the audibility of the spirit, because the spirit is conveyed by the spoken word. If God emanates spirit, it will be in the form of the word, the creative spirit. For instance, Ptah, the Egyptian creative god, is a creative word; he generates by

speaking—speaks and it *is*.¹ So the *Logos* that was with God was the potential creation, and by speaking he created the *Logos* that became visible in the flesh: God became man in the god-man, Christ. As Nietzsche says here, “Then it became man.” It appeared among us on this earth, shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not understand it. Therefore, it is the duty of the Christian to preach the word, to reveal it to the world in order that the darkness may be enlightened; it must even be forced to understand the word. Now, inasmuch as the word became established on the earth, inasmuch as it has generated believers, institutions—the universal Catholic church—inasmuch as we have missions that carry the Evangelists to remote places, the word is becoming mob. It is becoming beliefs, stone churches, dogmas, laws, all sorts of organizations. And so it becomes more and more flesh, until it is now a merely human church, and therefore has necessarily lost its power. It is like the transformation of the sun’s energy which through radiation reaches the earth in the form of light, and transforms into plants, say, and into beings that live; but they are not light. It is as if the light has been absorbed into them and then it is no longer light.

You see this is an important process, and it has never been the object of scientific or philosophic consideration, because the time was not ripe and the human mind was not ripe. But long before such processes are objects of philosophic or even of scientific consideration, they are in existence in the form of philosophical mythology. For example, this whole thing has been beautifully anticipated by Manichaeism. Mani, the founder, built up a sort of mythological philosophical system based very largely upon Zoroastrianism. The idea there was that originally the word, or the good spirit, the good attitude, symbolized by Vohu Manō, and the bad attitude, symbolized by Angramainyu, were dormant or identical with Ahura Mazda; then when he dismissed his good countenance and his bad countenance out of himself, the world was split, so ever since there has been the fight between the power of light and the power of darkness. That this very old Zoroastrian teaching is the origin of the most basic concepts of Christianity, is a well-recognized fact, and of course it is the very substance of Manichaeism. Mani lived about 220 A.D. and he represents a differentiation of those older Zoroastrian beliefs, mixed with a great deal of Christianity; the “Hymn to Jesus” was by Mani himself, which makes it evident that he recognized Christ fully, and probably other predecessors. Islam has recognized all “the people of the Book”; it was a law to spare the people of

¹ Ptah, see above, 5 Feb. 1935, n. 12.

the Book, otherwise Mohammedanism spared no one. Christians were tolerated to that extent, the Jews also, and Moses and Joshua and other prophets were recognized, as well as *Nebi Issa*, the prophet Jesus. And so Mani, who is of course older than Mohammed by four hundred years, was also recognized. According to his system, the light was almost swallowed by the darkness. Angramainyu caught an immense number of light germs and was always trying to get more, and Ahura Mazda was continually fighting him in order to recover that lost light substance. It is the eternal struggle of human life really: man consists of a certain amount of light substance and a certain amount of devilish darkness, and in each man the same battle is waged between them.²

Mani's practical prescriptions, which go into great detail, are imbued with the same idea. That shows itself in the symbolism of the communion which consisted in the partaking of fruit. A beautiful representation of that is in the Asiatic Museum in Berlin: some miniatures were discovered by Grünwedel and Lecoque of the so-called Turfan expedition at Gandhara, and on one of them the Manichæan communion is depicted.³ There is a big bowl full of fruit, particularly grapes, and on top is a large melon, which was considered to be a sacred fruit because it looked like the sun and was supposed to contain the most light particles, to be made entirely of light. The outside is yellow and the inside a beautiful orange color: the sun itself. So by eating melon one eats light germs and makes one's body light, thereby depriving the devil of them and restoring them to Ahura Mazda. This myth of the absorption of the light into the darkness is a very philosophical idea; it is the light of consciousness of course, which is forever threatened by unconsciousness. It is much older than the time of Zoroaster; it is found among primitives very frequently in the fights with dragons or dark powers that try to steal the soul of man, to suppress his consciousness. That comes from the fact that primitives are far more in danger of being overcome by the unconscious; they are deadly afraid of emotions, and many of their rites and ways of dealing with each other are dictated by that fear of losing their individual consciousness; it is a real

² Mani, founder of Manichæism, the Christian heresy first adhered to and then forcibly rejected by St. Augustine, which derived its basic belief from Zarathustra's teaching. "Hymn to Jesus," a part of the Apocryphal "Acts of John" of the late second century, is an initiation rite with responses intoned by the candidate, assistants, and someone taking the role of Christ.

³ The Gandhara monasteries are located in the extreme northwest region of India. See Albert Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, revised and enlarged by J. Burgess and tr. Agnes C. Gibson (London, 1901).

danger, for then they entirely lose their self-control and things become exceedingly disagreeable: they kill each other. Therefore, such outbursts are particularly repressed; they become objects of taboo, in order to assert the life of the tribe over against the destructive powers of unconsciousness. So the theme of the struggle between the light and the darkness is exceedingly ancient.

Now, consciousness can be understood as the light because it needs a certain spirit to remain conscious. Spirit is a very peculiar concept which has in many cases lost its original character, but the history of the word *spirit*, or the German word *Geist*, tells us what it originally meant. The Greek word *pneuma* and the Latin word *spiritus* mean wind, and the Latin word *animus* is the same as the Greek word *anemos*, and they also mean wind. *Pneuma* is still the term in the Greek Orthodox church for the Holy Ghost, which is the sacred wind; it is a movement, a force. And *Geist* comes from a root which means to well up; it is a sort of enthusiasm, an emotional condition. The English word *aghast* is an emotional word which comes from it, and the word *ghost* is related to it. *Geist* was understood to be like a geyser, a welling up, an inspiration. In the miracle of Pentecost, all those symbolic phenomena are together; the fiery tongues mean the fire of enthusiasm: the apostles were like drunken people, and a powerful wind filled the house.

That was spirit, but to us spirit has become something exceedingly lame and ineffectual, a mere two-dimensional picture—sort of beliefs or ideas that have no body and no force; one must believe them to give them any force. In the philosophy of Klages, one learns that the spirit is now the devil that destroys life, but he at least attributes a destructive power to it. And Scheler, who tried to restore a certain amount of importance to the spirit, made again a very lame thing of it; it is neither very destructive nor very effective.⁴ That powerful wind, which was destructive as well as generative or emotional, has gone. It is a poor thing with us now, no longer what it used to be. This process has come about within two thousand years. It was God in the beginning, and before that time it was latent in what man calls “God,” that incomprehensible power in the depth of his own soul. And man supposes that this is in the depth of the universe in general because the microcosm is in no way different from the macrocosm; so what is in the depth of the soul was in the universe before, in that eternal source of life. Then it be-

⁴ Max Scheler (1874-1928), a German phenomenologist, gave perhaps his clearest interpretation of spirit in his last work, *Man's Place in Nature* tr. Hans Meyerhoff (Boston, 1961), esp. chs. 2 and 3. For Klages, see p. 171 and 171n above.

came visible or audible; it became the *euangelion*, the glad tidings, and people received it. But later it grew into an organization, so the effect was lost in created things. You see, the creative impulse comes to an end with the creation, just because it has *become* a creation; for a while there is no longer an impulse—until one has liberated oneself again from that which one has created. If one sticks to the creation, one will create nothing more. And so the time comes when the world is absolutely empty of spirit, when nobody knows what spirit is, when there are only the effects of the spirit—though those effects make visible efforts to remember the times when they were young, as old people like to speak about their youth just because they have it no longer. This descent which has happened to us within the last two thousand years, then, is the phenomenon to which Nietzsche here refers—of course in a more or less negative way. Now, where is the spirit when it has done its work? An effect has been produced, one sees that, but one finds no spirit in it.

Mrs. Jung: I think we have already spoken of it; it is in the body, in matter.

Prof. Jung: And what kind of matter? It is always that matter which the devil is especially keen on.

Mrs. Jung: The blood.

Prof. Jung: Yes, because blood is the liquid spirit of life, the seat of the soul; one signs a contract with the devil with blood. The devil wants that quite particularly because he knows its worth; anything done with blood or through blood is mighty important. So arriving now on a level where the spirit is in the blood, in which part of the world do you push your head up through the crust?

Prof. Fierz: In Germany.

Prof. Jung: Of course, Heil Hitler! You see, the spirit in the blood is of course the unconscious spirit; wherever the spirit is in the blood the unconscious begins to stir. Then a man, or a nation, will be moved by the unconscious; then they talk of instincts, race, blood, because they feel that the thing which is moving them comes from within, comes somehow from the body. So naturally they think it is the blood, and then they naturally will rationalize it because they suffer from the disease of rationalizing everything. Thus, their philosophy must then be a philosophy of blood. All that talk of blood and iron, that playing with fire, that war fear and war lust—which does exist—all that comes from this philosophy of the blood. You see in how far Nietzsche is a forerunner. But the Germans of his generation and the next generation and all the following generations are not so gifted that they would learn it

from Nietzsche; it just happens to them. And Nietzsche could foretell it because it happened to him; in a certain way he anticipated in his own life and his own body what the future of his people would be.

The true prophet is the man who in his personal life experiences the fate of his people, and who also tries to find the remedy in his personal life for the disease or the misery of his people. You see that in the Old Testament. That was the reason why Hosea, for instance, not minding his personal convictions, obeyed the command of the Lord and married the whore—that was a symbol to his people.⁵ Now, I don't know how far we are allowed to go in accepting Nietzsche's prophecy. Is Nietzsche's life prophetic? We don't know. But I should say that he was a dangerous prophet, he has surely anticipated in words what the unconscious was preparing, and it remains to be seen in how far his life also will be prophetic. Certainly *Zarathustra* is highly prophetic. Not very long ago I saw that others had discovered something along that line too. I find in the prophecies of Maître Michel Nostradamus, in his book called *Les Centuries* published in 1555, that he says:

En Germanie nai tront diverses sectes
S'approchan fort de L'heureux Paganisme:
Le coeur captif et petites receptes,
Feron retour à payer le vrai dine.⁶

There you have it. He did not mention the century in which that new paganism would come about, but he must have had some feeling about the peculiar possibilities of the inhabitants of those northern countries beyond the Rhine. He had the right intuition, anticipating what was to come in Germany. And he only could do that from the depths of the unconscious that knows ahead, that works ahead, just as Nietzsche anticipated.

Mrs. Baynes: What did he prophesy? I did not understand.

Prof. Jung: Oh, that in Germany different sects would come which would approach very strongly the happy paganism, that the heart would be a prisoner, and that they would have to learn to pay for understanding or acknowledging the true divine. The first editions of that book are exceedingly rare; it was first printed in 1555. I have the

⁵ Hosea 1:2-3.

⁶ "In Germany will be born diverse sects / Coming very near happy paganism, / The heart captive and returns small, / They will return to paying the true tithe." See Jung on "The Prophecies of Nostradamus," CW 9 ii, ch. 7. Henry C. Roberts, editor of *The Complete Prophecies of Nostradamus* (New York, 1949), called this "a prophetic description of the rise of the pagan doctrine of National Socialism" (p. 107).

edition of 1610 which is also quite rare. (I will bring it to show you next time.) Also he wrote to the King of France—I think it was Henri II—that in the year 1792 they would have a new time calculation in France; and as a matter of fact in 1793 the Congress voted for that new division of the year into ten months, giving them those natural names, Germinal, Floreal, Fructidor, Brumaire, etc.; they voted on it in 1793 but it was to take effect already in 1792. So old Michel Nostradamus was materially correct.⁷ He was a most peculiar fellow, but there are really astonishing things in those prophecies, and he said they would be good till the year 3796. I take it as simply an anticipation through reading the unconscious. I don't doubt that he is quite right, and if he had made prophecies for 6000 and 10000 A.D. I would equally believe it. Why not? If he can foretell such things, what can he not foretell? Probably we would all be very much better prophets if we were closer to the unconscious—of course always with a knowing mind. You must have open eyes, and remain conscious in order to realize what you see.

Well, we said that when the spirit has become mob, when it has disappeared into its own creation, then it reappears in the blood. That is, there is a sort of latent time in between when there is no spirit whatever, like the second part of the nineteenth century. Then the depths begin to move, and we are probably not very far from the truth when we assume that those most destructive psychological developments which led into the great war were really the first stirrings of the blood and whatever it implies. Now here is a detail which I passed over: Dr. Kirsch has just drawn my attention to the sentence, "It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood" which comes just after, "Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit." Here Nietzsche realizes something very important: namely, when one is moved by the spirit in the blood, one is really moved by one's own blood and whatever that blood means: and then it is no light matter to understand the blood of others. That is, *le coeur est captif*, the blood is in the heart and the heart gets caught by this idea of the blood, the feeling and the fact of the blood. One is so much in oneself that one will find it very difficult to understand other blood, the expression of other individuals. That is exactly like a patient who in the beginning of analysis is caught by his own unconscious facts. He dreams nothing else, talks nothing else—he is all in his own psychology, and then he spreads himself all over the

⁷ Nostradamus wrote to King Henri II in 1557 that he had reckoned the time between the creation of the world and the birth of Jesus as 4,173 years and about (!) eight months. Then he went on to specify the astrological periods.

world and is utterly incapable of seeing anybody else's point of view. It is one of the most urgent tasks of analysis to make those people see that other people have a psychology of their own; it is simply incredible how little they are aware of that. Perfectly reasonable beings start from the premise that other people are not only like themselves, but simply identical, and if they don't behave as they want them to, they must be wrong.

Of course this is not only the predicament of the patient, but is also the predicament of the analyst, which is still more remarkable. But one sees it very clearly. It is the disease of the analyst that he thinks he must be right as soon as the unconscious is touched upon, in whatever form it is; it needs all one's good humor to keep more or less balanced. You see, when one touches the unconscious one is in danger of becoming a prophet. That is simply the result of the fact that whoever touches the unconscious, in whatever form it is presented to him, is instantly caught, and he cannot liberate himself because the spirit is stronger than man: it is an enormous power. When the spirit is in the blood one is caught by the blood. If it is in the water one is caught by the water, and if it is in a stone one is caught by the stone and becomes transformed into that substance with all its implications. If caught by the blood one gets into a sort of intoxication and sees red. If you meditate on this sad truth, you can understand a lot that is actually happening in the world; on the one side it is positive, on the other negative. Whether you are afraid or enthusiastic over the blood, it is all the same. And it is an exceedingly dangerous condition because the blood is the characteristic or the attribute of the chthonic powers that are typically the gods of darkness.

Now, the picture I am painting for you is pretty dark, and it would not be the whole truth if I remained with that exceedingly negative aspect because it also has another side. Therefore, partially, I quoted for you the verse of the old master Michel Nostradamus; you may have noticed that he said Germany was approaching "*l'heureux paganisme*," *das fröhliche Heidentum*. You see, that sounds exactly like Nietzsche, that is his term: the gay science, *die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, is what he calls his philosophy; his *Heidentum* is a very gay and funny and most enjoyable matter.⁸ So that very terrible thing, the blood, seems also to have an exceedingly enjoyable aspect. For instance, as we see in the actual phenomena of our time, when the pagan tendencies issue from the spirit

⁸ Nietzsche's *Gay Science*, "the most personal of all my books," was written in part just before *Zarathustra* but finished some five years later.

of the blood, we see it under an aspect which is not just agreeable, not in good taste, but utterly unwise. Yet if people could content themselves with the *heureux paganisme*, and if they would not make such a damnably serious affair of it, it would be all right; then some of those funny gods with horns and hairy legs might still be dancing somewhere in flowery meadows, and you would perhaps hear occasionally the flute among the reeds. But if you make a system of it—and the Germans have the unfortunate habit of always making a system of things—then it becomes just bad taste and is most regrettable. For the *heureux paganisme* has really nothing to do with that dry rustling of papers and law books and Bibles and missals and God knows what; those things belong to the next level below.

You remember about the different layers of consciousness which we were discussing last time: first the topmost world of consciousness where everything is perfectly organized and explainable, the daylight sphere; then the next level below is the personal unconscious, the things of the twilight; and below that is deep obscurity. Now, what is happening in our days comes from the twilight region of the spirit of the blood. And woe unto those who understand this spirit from the layer above, for that remains Christian. So whatever comes up from the depths must be assimilated. If it is not to destroy whatever is above with all the good that is in it, it must be canalized into some reasonable form.

For instance, when I introduce myself to you as a doctor, even a professor, I am absolutely established up in the daylight; I have public lectures, I call my stuff “analytical psychology,” and one talks reasonably about these matters. I teach doctors, I go to congresses, I am president of such-and-such societies, and all that shows me to be a properly balanced individual, a citizen, and a man of the right order. And that is important because I am thus far an assurance that the powers of the unconscious can be organized. To those who do not know that there is a twilight layer below, of course that seems self-evident, and they would not understand that I spend any time in the twilight region because they don’t know that anything is happening there: they are simply astonished. They are absolutely incapable of understanding what is happening in Germany, for instance; they cannot understand why no conclusion is reached about disarmament; they think a lot about the League of Nations and they never realize that those things won’t work. Then to those people who are aware that something is happening underneath, it is important that I am established in this world, for otherwise I would be a sort of moth or butterfly or anything else that is drift-

ing and utterly unreliable; and that would result in an instantaneous lack of confidence: people only have confidence if I am a being properly established here. Therefore, I make it all-important that people should be established in this reasonable daylight world, for inasmuch as they are not, they are not reliable and they must not wonder if nobody trusts them. They must be trustworthy and they are only trustworthy when they are here. Anything that supports the day is a pillar of the world as it is and therefore should be maintained, and one must try how far it is possible to canalize the flow of blood, that spirit issuing from the depths.

This is an exceedingly dangerous time and we are confronted with a problem which has never been known in the conscious history of man. You cannot compare it with the early times of Christianity, because that movement did not come from the blood, but came from above, a light that shone forth. This is not a light but a darkness; the powers of darkness are coming up. Therefore we must be careful not to swim as if we were fishes, but remember that we are human; and we must not resist by shutting ourselves up and defending ourselves blindly. The symbol of our time and the coming time is Aquarius, the man with the vessel to catch whatever flows, and he must transform it into the fertile water of life. The symbol of the time before was the Fishes, and they are able to swim; those people were liberated from the earth by the power of the spirit because the spirit was then above in the light. Today it is not in the light, but in the blood, so the position is entirely different; we cannot compare it with the conditions two thousand years ago.

You see, to be moved by the blood means that you are really moved by the things in the twilight zone, where things begin to become visible. And if we want to do something about that fact, I surely should not organize it, up in the light of day; inasmuch as it is a phenomenon coming up from the twilight it should be kept at bay. It should not be a big organization; it should be an *heureux paganisme*—enrich human life and not upset it. It is as if you were to turn a river over your perfectly good fields; of course they need water, but if you turn a whole river onto them, you simply destroy them. And if you turn on that river of blood, it will be a most horrible destruction. But if you keep it in its place, and don't raise too much fuss about it, it will be quite nice. Don't be too specific about it, don't tell if that old Pan is again abroad in the woods; otherwise people will say you are crazy. If you get a glimpse of Pan in the woods, then be very glad that you had the grace to see something of him; but always keep in mind that it is not quite nice to know of such a mystery: you cannot talk about it. It is like a good bottle of

wine; well, it is quite possible to mention that you like to drink a glass of good wine, but don't say you were drunk. To be drunk is very nice sometimes, but don't speak of it too loudly or people will say you organize drunkenness, that you are corrupted by the wine merchants, or feed your patients with alcohol.

That is the way people speak in the daylight where everything is light, where everything is canalized or on a straight roadway; while down below in the twilight, it is a nice round little fact, very enjoyable, very useful, sometimes even vital, saving your life perhaps. But it should not be organized in the open, otherwise it becomes a thing of utterly bad taste, and then it is immoral. If you have a moral conflict, it is quite immoral to answer it by getting drunk; I never can say, "This is the kind of conflict which, according to the books, is dissolved by drinking a bottle of strong wine, by getting drunk and vomiting afterwards." One speaks like that up above, but in the next layer below there are no such things as prescriptions. There are only certain experiences, certain facts which simply don't bear much scrutinizing light. And it would be wrong to disturb these germs because here are the attempts of a new form of life, which needs perhaps centuries and centuries before it can become more or less organized. If you take it right up and make a system of it, you have actual Germany, and that is really not a good example. So this fact of the blood is a most upsetting problem, because it brings up an order of things which is really no order, and it cannot be made into a human order.

Of course we are all thinking of the so-called *neuheidnische Bewegung*,⁹ and there you see the mistake; that thing should not be organized. If anybody has a Wotan experience—and I don't doubt that there are such things—he should keep perfectly quiet and think, "Well, this is a pleasant slip into former times." Or if another god plays a trick on somebody else, he should not try to make it into a system according to which children are baptized and people are married, nor should it become the object of a particular credo. It is all individual fantasy; those are germs, or faint possibilities, which might develop into something in the course of many centuries, but for the time being it is an individual slip, perhaps even regrettable. Of course one can acknowledge at the same time that a real and full life, coming really out of the blood where it ought to come from, is always a bit regrettable. For the culmination of life or the real meaning of life is not the greatest sum of happiness; only very naive people can believe such things. If you have

⁹ *Neuheidnische Bewegung*: neo-pagan movement.

the greatest sum of happiness, then you are simply incapable of appreciating it. For instance, primitives believe that having the greatest amount of food is heaven; but even a primitive, if he could only arrest himself for a moment in his state of desire, would realize that was nonsense. It is like the fairy tale where one must eat cake for three weeks in order to get into a paradise called Schlaraffenland.¹⁰ That is a land where stuffed pigeons fly into your mouth, where the fountains run wine, where the trees are laden with sausages, and roasted pigs run around with a knife and fork in their side, all ready for you to take a slice. Of course anybody would get sick in the first hour.

The greatest amount of good, of happiness, is complete nonsense; the really good life is half happiness and half suffering.¹¹ And therefore God made for man the full life which is always a little regrettable. Then it is all right, then only one feels that one is really alive: the beauty is beautiful and the ugliness is really ugly, and everything is in its place. You see, this organization, the new paganism, even if it is due chiefly to political influence, is nevertheless a fact, and it is a destructive fact. Sure enough, it contains many germs but it needs wise people to make use of them, and the bigger an organization the more it is idiotic; you can be absolutely sure that the more adherents there are in this new movement, the more it will become absurd. It would have been much better to leave the sheep to a well-organized church which is at least universal—that is the only redeeming factor in a church. But a national church, one that has a sort of pagan character, forebodes nothing good.

Mrs. Sigg: I should like to know whether it would not be a solution for us if we could understand the meaning of the old Christian teaching that man had to be reborn by the spirit and the water and the blood together.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is of course perfectly sound teaching that you cannot be redeemed without having undergone the transformation in the initiation process. It is therefore absolutely impossible to start a new religion. People must first undergo the rite of transformation before they can take on a new creed. And that is just not so in these new move-

¹⁰ In Grimm, "The Story of Schlaraffenland" tells of a country of idleness and ready-to-hand delights—like those of the Big Rock Candy Mountain.

¹¹ Jung is presumably thinking here—negatively—of the utilitarian slogan, "The greatest happiness for the greatest number." Nietzsche also despised this philosophy, saying, for instance, "Ultimately they all want *English* morality to be proved right, because this serves humanity best, or 'the general utility,' or 'the happiness of the greatest number'? No, the happiness of England" (*BG & E*, no. 228).

ments; it is not even true of their founders. You see, if you are duly initiated, you surely lose all desire to found a religion because you then know what religion really is.

Prof. Fierz: I have just been reading the report of the 1925 Seminar, where the difference between the German and French Christianity was discussed.¹² An American gentleman said then that when Christianity came to France, it was absorbed by the Roman culture, so the early Catholic church in France is actually one straight line coming from Rome, and it has not changed. Whilst in Germany, paganism had to be destroyed and the new religion put on top of it, so it had no foundation and no continuity. Therefore Luther was possible in Germany, but he was not possible in France.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is a historical fact which cannot be denied. The ground was prepared for Christianity in France and Italy by the Roman civilization and therefore it fitted completely and still fits; but in Germany it did not fit because Germany was not prepared. That is of course an additional reason why we have these difficulties now, and why they break out just in Germany. But they are breaking forth really in the whole world in other forms. For instance, that terrible wave of licentiousness in the United States after the war was the same manifestation. Well now,

He that writeth in blood and proverbs doth not want to be read,
but learnt by heart.

Here another quality of the blood spirit comes to the foreground: namely, if you write out of the spirit of the blood, you are not only caught by that, but you are also caught in your own words. Then your words, your thoughts, take on such an importance that you become intolerant, authoritative; you say, people *shall* read you, shall swallow you wholesale, either they are with you or against you. This intolerance is of course again the difficulty of understanding other people's blood.

In the mountains the shortest way is from peak to peak, but for that route thou must have long legs. Proverbs should be peaks, and those spoken to should be big and tall.

This is a sort of megalomania; if one is filled by one's own importance, then naturally it is quite impossible to talk to an ordinary crowd. One's audience must consist of giants at least; one must always be amongst

¹² This was the Seminar in Analytical Psychology, Zurich, 23 March to 6 July 1925.

the gods. And since your surroundings obviously don't consist of gods exclusively and since there are certain human beings among the noble born, then they have to be improved on the spot.

The atmosphere rare and pure, danger near and spirit full of a joyful wickedness: thus are things well matched. [Indeed!]

I want to have goblins about me, for I am courageous. The courage which scareth away ghosts, createth for itself goblins—it wanteth to laugh.

These verses are again in pretty bad taste; it is of course megalomania. Yet he sees that thing more or less correctly. He understands that what comes out of the blood is a very high and a peculiarly aloof spirit, and a very courageous attitude is needed to meet it. Also one cannot help seeing that this spirit is filled with merry malice, that there is a gay quality about it—that *heureux paganisme*, provided that you have the right attitude. It is as if I should say, “Don’t be too serious for heaven’s sake!” If you don’t take it at its face value, it is a very high and a very delicate thing; yet one must preserve a sort of gay countenance with these profound matters. Then you would strike about the right note. For instance, to say “I want to have goblins about me, for I am courageous” is of course wrongly expressed, but it is correct; he does want to have goblins around him because he is not so brave, but is really afraid, and unfortunately he is not courageous enough to admit his fear. It is much more courageous to say you are afraid; to say you are brave means that you are almost a coward because you are afraid of your fear. If you say you want to have goblins round you, you lie, for you are afraid that you have *only* goblins round you. And if you have only goblins you are in extreme solitude; then your solitude becomes alive with goblins and it is exceedingly uncanny. He would be speaking the truth if he said, “I am afraid. I notice there are goblins about me and no human beings. I have scared human beings away and now ghosts are all over my deserted roads.” Then he goes on to say that courage wants laughter. Well, the courage which consists of fear that is not admitted needs laughter in order to become bearable. So he has the right vision, but it becomes peculiarly distorted by the fact that his attitude is not up to the vision. Therefore, he has to twist the vision, and then it is no longer what it was, no longer helpful, but becomes tragic. You see, those goblins are madness already. If your surroundings begin to be alive and to talk to you, it means madness; but if you can smile when you meet a toad or a squirrel or a leaf that says something funny to you,

22 MAY 1935

and if you don't mention it, don't make a system of it, then you have had a mighty good morning in the woods: you are very healthy and have a good appetite and will sleep very well. You were surrounded by goblins and your solitude was quite a beautiful garden. But don't tell it, because then the goblins disappear and instead you have ghosts.

LECTURE IV

29 May 1935

Prof. Jung:

We will continue our text:

I no longer feel in common with you, the very cloud which I see beneath me, the blackness and heaviness at which I laugh—that is your thunder-cloud.

Here he describes something very important; he says that the cloud beneath himself, the blackness and heaviness, explains his peculiar attitude, the fact that he laughs at it. He feels particularly light because he stands above the blackness which would pull down other people, which would be a threatening thunder-cloud to them. They would be afraid of it, and rightly so. But he makes light of it and that is not natural; he surely lifts himself up too far, even identifies with a dancing god, like Shiva the great Creator and Destroyer who is sometimes represented as dancing in the burial ground upon a corpse. So he says:

Ye look aloft when ye long for exaltation; and I look downward because I am exalted.

He makes a sort of compensatory movement, making light of the thing that is heavy; he simply takes the other side and disidentifies with that blackness. But he thus gets rid of his own shadow and becomes a mere idea; he leaves behind the heaviness and fear and darkness which would make him human, and so separates himself from humanity. That of course must lead into an identification with the deity and that is the inflation; he becomes identical with air and with phantoms of the air, those are his goblins. Here he prepared for the inevitable issue, insanity: it is a very decisive moment. You see, the chapter about the Pale Criminal is really continued here. He cannot stand the vision of the criminal, which means that he himself is a pale criminal; therefore, he disidentifies and rises like a balloon, and thus falls a victim to the goblins. Now he continues:

Who among you can at the same time laugh and be exalted? He who climbeth on the highest mountains, laugheth at all tragic plays and tragic realities.

Courageous, unconcerned, scornful, coercive—so wisdom wisheth us; she is a woman, and ever loveth only a warrior.

Sure enough, wisdom is a woman, Sophia, and sure enough, she loves none but the warrior, but the warrior is not understood to be a being of air, a dancer upon the burial ground. He would be amidst all the dangers, really fighting the battle of life, not dancing in the clouds. There is a parallel in Nietzsche's personal life: when he wrote *Zarathustra* he had withdrawn from his job as professor at Basel University because he suffered from all sorts of neurotic troubles, and having no money of his own he was supported by certain wealthy people in Basel. With that money he lived high above the clouds in the Engadine where he wrote the better part of *Zarathustra*. So even in his personal life he was walking on clouds, living upon the benevolence of other people without realizing at all that he had no feet on the earth. One really doesn't know how he would have written *Zarathustra*, or whether he would have written it at all if he had had his feet on the earth. I always regret that Christ only reached the age of thirty-three, because I would like to know what he would have been at fifty or thereabouts, having had a wife and half a dozen children. I wonder what his teaching would have been then. I have an idea that certain things would have been quite different. Since the normal human life lasts more than thirty-three years, and since most people do marry and propagate themselves and are on the battlefield of life or even the burial grounds, they surely must have different views of life from people who never are fully born into the darkness of existence. Nietzsche was really care-free, scornful, and violent—all that is really true of his personal life. You see, he could afford to be like that since he was not completely born, but remained a human promise, an attempt that never came off; so what he teaches is what a soap-bubble might say, or a butterfly—no, not even a butterfly, because a butterfly is very real. A butterfly never dreams of travelling above thunder-clouds, but is always below the clouds in the vicinity of the earth, among flowers and mates and such things.

Ye tell me, "Life is hard to bear." But for what purpose should ye have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening?

Life is hard to bear: but do not affect to be so delicate! We are all of us fine sumpter asses and assesses.

That is just what he is not, but he easily can talk like that; being out of the fray, he is outside and above it.

What have we in common with the rose-bud, which trembleth because a drop of dew hath formed upon it?

Well, he just escaped it.

It is true we love life; not because we are wont to live, but because we are wont to love.

This is a very great sentence. He says we are accustomed to love. But what? Let us assume, to love life, but if one loves life then surely something should come from it. You see, life wants to be real; if you love life you want to live really, not as a mere promise hovering above things. Life inevitably leads down into reality. Life is of the nature of water: it always seeks the deepest place, which is always below in the darkness and heaviness of the earth. So what he says here is really a soap-bubble.

There is always some madness in love. But there is always, also, some method in madness.

That is very true, but it is a dangerous kind of talk under such conditions.

And to me also, who appreciate life, the butterflies, and soap-bubbles, and whatever is like them amongst us, seem most to enjoy happiness.

One mistrusts that happiness, particularly if one knows that all these ecstasies in *Zarathustra* are dearly paid for by awful days of headaches and vomiting, which Nietzsche never connected with the production of his thought.

To see these light, foolish, pretty, lively little sprites flit about—that moveth Zarathustra to tears and songs.

I should only believe in a God that would know how to dance.

We know that God, but he is called the destroyer and his dancing takes place unfortunately in the burial ground.

And when I saw my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound, solemn; he was the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall.

That very normal and very sound and even inevitable trend of life to seek the deepest places was the devil to him. And who is more earnest or solemn or profound than Zarathustra? You see, he cannot get rid of his devil.

Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, let us slay the spirit of gravity!

I learned to walk; since then have I let myself run.

Because the more he learns to walk, the lighter he becomes and the faster he runs—something like an avalanche.

I learned to fly; since then I do not need pushing in order to move from a spot.

Now am I light, now do I fly; now do I see myself under myself.

Now there danceth a God in me.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

Here he really demonstrates the psychological process going on in him, the preparation for insanity. It is a very frequent symptom in the beginning of certain forms of insanity that people have a very peculiar relationship to their own body. They often have the idea, for example, that the body has no weight, that they can not hear their own footfall. They also think they can fly and make attempts at flying, thus accounting for what has been supposed to be suicide in many cases; they climb out of the fourth story and naturally, following the law of gravity, they land on the pavement. And as they cannot explain what they really attempted, it is called a case of suicide from unsound mind. Or they attempt to walk on the water and then they are drowned.

I remember such a case, a fellow student at the University, a particularly intelligent man who passed his medical examination at the same time as I did, and was equally good at it so people thought he would have quite a remarkable career. But I did not hear of him again until, about ten years later, I met him on military duty, and he then gave me an account of his hectic life in the meantime. I had heard that he had gone to Egypt and thought he must have some great scheme on, so I asked him what he had done there. "I got out of the train at Cairo." "And where did you go then?" "I walked down to Alexandria." "What! You walked down to Alexandria! What for?" "To see the country; there are pretty bad dogs there." "Dogs! Did you see nothing else?" "Well, I had a scrape with the police. I had to shoot those dogs." "And you experienced nothing else in Egypt?" "But what could you see there? It is pretty flat." You see, that was his first attempt at flying over

the earth; he had the idea that he was approaching divinity and should now move over the lands, so why not over Egypt? And being in Egypt, why not move over the Delta? With no relation to the soil, with no relation to the country, just in order to move over the lands of the earth. But when he told me he had been in a lunatic asylum later I began to understand.

The next thing after his notable trip to Egypt and his experience with the bad dogs in the villages of the Delta, was that he had grand schemes, sort of Faustian schemes, to produce life for millions. His greatest idea was to dam up the Canton of Wallis near St. Maurice in Switzerland, thus making a big lake inside that Rhone valley; the whole population would be drowned, but it would be done in order to produce energy for all of Europe. And while he was at those plans, he made other discoveries, how to diminish gravity for instance; he had a pile of five-franc coins and in playing with them he found that by heaping them up and by means of a peculiar electrical process, the coins at one end of the pile became lighter. He repeated the process many times and finally was convinced that he could produce a similar phenomenon in himself, could cause his own body to lose weight. To test it, he walked out into the street and over a bridge where his footfall seemed to him to be quite inaudible, so he concluded he must have lost his weight. Then he rightly deduced from this fact that his body must have lost the quality of matter and therefore would not reflect light and would be invisible. He tested that by walking in a loop round people on the street for quite a distance; apparently nobody noticed it—or he did not notice that they noticed it—and he even brushed against somebody who paid no attention to it, so he decided he was immaterial. But as he was still not quite sure, he went to the main station and began to circle round the groups of people there; evidently they didn't see him so he made up his mind that he was really invisible, and was circling each tree in a row of trees in front of the station when, he said, "Such a stupid ass of a policeman suddenly caught hold of me and put me into a lunatic asylum, upsetting my most serious experiment." Then he went on to tell me that he noticed afterwards in the clinic that they had mice particularly trained by the director in order to test whether he would be stupid enough to fall for their tricks. But he finally discovered that there were really no such mice—they were hallucinations—and thus realized that there must be something wrong with him. I said, "And you really could correct all your ideas?" "I corrected all of them." "Even the mice?" "Yes, they were all hallucinations but one, and that one was surely trained by the director." He was then

a doctor who was carrying on his professional work, but he had retained that one thread: he held the whole string of delusions by the tail of that one mouse that surely had been trained by the director. Of course one knows in such a case that the whole matter has been condensed into a sort of corner, so that field is left clear for the time being; but that hole is open and the whole thing can swing out into consciousness again. About a year later he was as a matter of fact inundated by such delusions and was confined for life. You see, that is a very similar case.

Of course, here it is a sort of metaphor—it has not yet affected consciousness to such an extent that Nietzsche in person would feel a loss of gravity—but this peculiar loss of connection plays a great role with Nietzsche. He describes a similar feeling in a very beautiful poem about the mistral, for instance, where he becomes identical with the wind.¹ There are many passages in *Zarathustra* where we encounter the same symptom of insanity, but in that mitigated form of a speech metaphor which all too easily can become truth to him. For the time being, however, it is only a piece of psychological symbolism, but a very significant one, which in insanity describes the lost connection with reality. That marked phenomenon in schizophrenia, the loss of feeling *rappor*t, is the same thing. One notices first a peculiar drop of feeling relation; either it becomes exaggerated or it becomes atrophied, no longer in tune with circumstances. It is as if other people or conditions had lost their specific psychological value so that consciousness becomes disorientated. Such cases no longer know how to deal with objects, human beings or objective situations; the function begins to fail which tells what these things mean or are worth. So the behavior of such people becomes inadequate; one first remarks inadequate feeling and then naturally judgment also goes wrong. It is something like a withdrawal of the psyche from its natural projections and expectations. It can also happen that the psyche withdraws from the natural facts of the body, from the instincts for instance; people don't feel hunger, or pain. They don't feel the weight of the body or perceive its condition; so more and more the psyche becomes isolated in itself and what then becomes of it we don't know. When we say that those people are insane, we must never forget that they are only insane in their *effect*; we don't know what is inside the psyche. There are cases where, by careful observation, we see that something in the psyche is functioning

¹ "To the Mistral: A Dancing Son," in *Songs of Prince Vogelfrei*. A translation is included in an appendix of *Gay Science*.

normally, but in the attempt to convey to somebody else what is happening inside, the whole thing goes wrong.

It is exactly like certain spiritualistic experiments. I don't know whether you have read that quite interesting book, *Science and the Future Life*, by Hyslop, in which he quotes his experiments with Mrs. Piper.² She had a wonderfully developed animus called "the emperor group"—which shows very clearly the quality of her animus! But she understood it as a group of real spirits that were communicating with her. Hyslop made some very interesting discoveries; he describes the difficulties of ghosts who want to communicate with this world, for instance. When a ghost approaches the sphere of man, he contacts the psyche of the particular individual he wishes to talk to, and instantly becomes disorientated. He is influenced by the mental sphere of the individual and forgets everything he was going to say. Therefore, one of the helpful spirits of the emperor group advised an inexperienced spirit who wanted to manifest something, to learn it by heart and then to rush in and say it immediately, as quickly as possible, because otherwise he would lose his mind. As if, when entering a gathering where you wanted to say something definite, you were afraid you would be so influenced by the thoughts of others that you would forget your own, and so learned it by heart, and then rushed in and got off your sentence.

The same thing happens in insanity: people sometimes succeed in saying one or two sentences, or only a few words that are on the right line, and then they lose sight of the rest. Of course that is a common phenomenon even with normal people. How often have I heard a patient say, "I had made up my mind to tell you something last time, but as soon as I entered your office I entirely forgot it." I remember a case where that was quite usual; first she accused me of trying to shut her up though I had not said a word beyond, "How are you?" or "What are you bringing me today?" and then she lost her mind completely and talked of everything under the sun excepting what she meant to say. So I asked her to put it in a book and bring it to me. She promised she would but the next time she ran on completely wild till I said, "Now come, produce your book." And then she had forgotten the book! You see, that is like ghosts and insane people—only with insane people it goes a bit too far. They have the right intentions, something functions properly, but when they want to transmit their thought, in the attempt

² James Hyslop, *Science and A Future Life* (Boston, 1905).

of conveying what they really mean, it gets twisted in a peculiar way, and then they become disorientated and talk nonsense.

I had a case of a woman who for many years was in an asylum completely insane, but occasionally she heard voices that talked absolutely normally. She always got caught in the delusion and the artificial kind of speech they have and could not express *herself*, but one day she suddenly in an angry way shook her head and said somebody had called her to the telephone. I asked her what had been said, and after a long hesitation she came out with it, that somebody, a very foolish person, had made the remark, "You are leading the doctor by the nose through the whole wood." Another time she was complaining that she was not insane and should not be in the lunatic asylum; it was most unjust and the other people were all mad, when the telephone rang and the voice said: "But it is perfectly evident that you belong in the lunatic asylum because you are crazy." Of course that was just nonsense to her, but it showed me that her normality had withdrawn into the realm of voices—that is, her insanity had already inundated the sphere in which there had been a normal ego. There was no vestige of a normal ego any longer except that psyche which had withdrawn still further and was only to be discovered through the telephone.

As long as such normality exists, we know that there is somewhere normal functioning, normal orientation. That explains why, under certain conditions, when such people have a very serious physical illness, for instance, they suddenly become normal. There was a man who had never spoken a reasonable word for many years; we always had to keep him in the ward for the excitable cases, but when he got typhoid fever he became entirely normal, very nice and full of understanding. For six weeks, as long as the fever lasted, he was all right. We had become quite accustomed to it and thought he must be cured, but one morning when I came to his bed again, he greeted me in the same old way, as one of the dog and monkey host—he always greeted the doctors like that—so I knew he was back again at his old game. The moment he recovered from his fever he fell back into insanity. And where had his normality gone? It had drawn back and left the field to the goblins. So we have no justification for assuming that insane people are completely destroyed. The last thing we have been able to discover is that their normal psyche simply withdraws, is not on the job, not in the house—unless perhaps in the cellar or the attic. Or it may be outside somewhere and only able to reach home by telephone; so the normal self can ring up at times, but the goblin that is dwelling in the house gets very angry if the former inhabitant disturbs him.

It has often been said that there were traces of such a withdrawal in Nietzsche's insanity, and I don't wonder. There are still people who are convinced that it was not real insanity, but a state of *ekstasis* of a most mysterious nature, that he simply left the level of the ordinary mind and went into a higher region where there was no return, and that we were fools not to understand what he was doing. The only tangible thing which I ever heard of his condition in that respect, which might point to such a peculiar withdrawal, is that, after he had left the clinics in Basel and Jena and was living with his sister in Weimar, he once suddenly said to her in a very quiet voice, apparently perfectly collected, "Has not everything become quite different and are we not quite happy now?" But the next moment he was gone; it was just as if that withdrawn psyche of his had come back and declared itself, as if it could use the wire for a moment, and then the clouds drew in and he was gone again. This would be nothing extraordinary, however; already in former centuries it was well known by doctors that physical illness apparently cured insanity, and they therefore applied certain means to cause pain or fever, having observed that their patients then became more normal. They used to rub an ointment which caused ulceration of the skin into the heads of insane people, assuming that the evil vapors or humors or whatever was the cause of the insanity could thereby escape, and they would then become normal again. And there was some truth in it.

Now we will go on to the following chapters, "The Tree on the Hill." This is the next picture in the great stream of images from the collective unconscious as they represented themselves in changing form to the conscious perception: each chapter is a new phase of the unconscious development. We saw the connection between "The Pale Criminal" and the chapter on "Reading and Writing," and now we must make the bridge to this picture of "The Tree on the Hill." To know the connection, one must consider the main ideas alluded to in the last sentences of the previous chapter. What idea is paramount there?

Miss Hannah: Having no weight.

Prof. Jung: Yes, flying, moving like a bird, like a wisp of air or a cloud.

Miss Hannah: Then he comes to the tree, a rooted thing which cannot move.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The tree is that living thing which is forced to remain where it grew; it cannot withdraw its roots for they are vital, but can only live when it has its roots in the earth. So the tree is the absolute opposite of a flying, airlike being, far more than an animal because

practically all animals, even a snake, can move. Then the tree symbolizes something quite specific?

Mrs. Crowley: It is a symbol of psychical life.

Prof. Jung: Of course it all depends upon how you define psychical life—no easy matter.

Miss Hannah: You usually use it as the symbol for the impersonal life, the life that one gets through taking up the other side of the psyche.

Prof. Jung: But why should not any animal represent the impersonal life just as well?

Miss Hannah: Because a tree is a rooted thing, whereas an animal can walk off.

Prof. Jung: But you can impersonally walk off as well as remain rooted.


Mrs. Baumann: Plant life develops in a spiral and is before animal life; in the past Seminars it has always been used that way. And in the East it is a symbol for development.

Prof. Jung: Well, sure enough, the tree being a plant represents a very different kind of life from an animal; usually warm-blooded animals have red blood for instance, so the plant must represent a life which is really quite strange to what we would call life. And since such a symbol is used and always has been used by the collective unconscious, we must assume that we have some notion within of a kind of life in ourselves which is not animal life. This is of course a very bold hypothesis, but what do we know, after all? We know very little of life. Our hypothesis is that our unconscious produces evidence of facts; and our hypothesis further says we can make use of the evidence produced by the unconscious in order to conclude hypothetically about certain conditions, say, which are absolutely unknown to us. So if the unconscious speaks of a tree, and surrounds that symbol with all sorts of signs of importance—the magic tree for example, the tree that speaks, or the tree in which the gods live—then we can make the further hypothesis that this symbol refers to a peculiar type of life within our animal life, a sort of life absolutely strange to our own, which can most probably be expressed by plant life.

Now, if you assume that the life of the collective unconscious is life in general, not only the life of the human species but perhaps also of animals, monkeys, horses, elephants, snakes even, then why not go further and include the life of plants? Why not assume that they are at the very foundation of our life, engrammes or archetypes which contain also the potentiality of plant life? For surely our planet is characterized by plant life as well as animal life, and there are even quite a

number of animals that are alternately plants and animals. For instance, take the simple case of the algae, which one finds in fountains or ponds, that green spirogyra which makes clouds in the water. It consists of microscopic threads and it is indubitably plant, but it produces cells, young spores with a tail which moves like the motor organ of the Flagellata, and they have a little red eye but are not rooted at all. They swim about quite happily and behave exactly like animals; you could hardly say they were plants. They are animals, and they travel about in the water and seek a place to settle. After a while a new instinct grows in them and they sit down upon a rock and make roots and are plants. Then there are many animals that resemble plants and are rooted like plants, like the sea anemones. So animal life and plant life in their primitive stages interpenetrate. This shows that they are not absolutely different, despite the fact that the results of their long differentiation are utterly unlike each other; in their most primitive forms they are one. Therefore, it is not inadmissible to assume that if there are archetypes at all, there are also archetypes of plant life. At all events these archetypes always introduce the idea of an entirely different life of which one has had no knowledge, a life which is in principle utterly different from animal life. So after that chapter on flying, that dangerous attempt to leap off into the heaven of insanity, it is no wonder that we have now the *enantiodromia*, a chapter about the tree which is rooted in the earth, the absolute opposite.

That loss of the sense of gravity is, as I said, a most alarming symptom; such a condition is an exaggeration of animal life, as if the animal were leaving the earth, overcoming the body. It is an ecstatic condition utterly unlike the life of the plant, which changes only with the seasons, and is extraordinarily slow and static. The curve of animal life is a more restless sort of growth, but it decreases and becomes sterilized a long time before it reaches the end; it ends like the sun or the day or the seasons. The character of animal life is really a curve, while the plant's growth is quite steady, ever-increasing, going on flowering and producing fruit until death suddenly occurs. In the last chapter we saw that these ups and downs are dangerously increasing. When he goes up, he almost leaps into heaven, so we may expect a counter move of the unconscious; if it is not a completely destructive affair, we may expect almost with certainty a compensatory dream containing the symbols that ought to cure this ecstatic



condition, which, no matter how beautiful it looks, is abnormal. This is not the philistine conception of ecstasy, but is a fact; leaving the body is always a dangerous enterprise, and making it an ideal or calling it by beautiful names means cultivating a dangerous state of unreality. But of course we have many things in our civilization which help such an attitude; it sounds so marvelous, wonderful, grand. And naturally when we evaporate, or distil, or sublimate, we can be sure that everybody is quite satisfied that somebody else evaporates, because then there is more room for themselves. Schopenhauer says man's egotism is so great that he could kill his brother merely in order to smear his boots with his brother's fat,³ which is a very cynical way of putting it, but there is something in it; man is nothing very elegant. Now the first sentence of the new chapter is,

Zarathustra's eye had perceived that a certain youth avoided him.

This is a drop into a story, as if Nietzsche had discovered a story or a drama unacknowledged in himself and dropped into the midst of it; we have not heard of that young man before, nor that there was any such situation. We have been moving in an almost completely abstract sphere of potentialities where nothing was tangible, and now suddenly he seems to be on earth and a certain young man avoids him.

And as he walked alone one evening over the hills surrounding the town called "The Pied Cow," behold, there found he the youth sitting leaning against a tree, and gazing with wearied look into the valley. Zarathustra therefore laid hold of the tree beside which the youth sat, and spake thus: . . .

Who would that remarkable young man be?

Mrs. Sigg: It might be Nietzsche, because he says to Zarathustra in the same chapter that it is he who has destroyed him; or it might represent in some way the ideal of his mother's and sister's animus.

Prof. Jung: Now keep that in mind; that is not so bad!

Miss Hannah: I thought it was his actual body.

Prof. Jung: Well, if you keep to the old tradition of *pneumatikos*, *psychikos*, and *hylikos* (material man),⁴ where would you put the young man?

³ This is not the first time Jung has thus cited Schopenhauer, but the quotation has never been traced.

⁴ The tradition of the tripartite self goes back at least to Homer who spoke of the *Psyche*, *Nous*, and *Thumos*, that is (roughly) spirit, soul, and body, which by the time of

Miss Hannah: With the material man, the body.

Prof. Jung: And where would you put Zarathustra?

Miss Hannah: Up as high as possible.

Prof. Jung: Yes, of course he would be the *pneumatikos*.

Miss Wolff: I think this would be just the normal young man whom Nietzsche never lived.

Prof. Jung: Presumably something of the sort; therefore, we could easily put him down to *hylikos*; he lives in *muladhara*, in this world.

Mrs. Fierz: But could he not as well be *psychikos*, the one who feels individually about it?—because when Zarathustra flies up so high, then his own soul, his own life, becomes very sad.

Prof. Jung: The two of them might feel sad. The *hylikos* will feel sad because he is left behind, being the first to notice that something is amiss; and the *psychikos* will feel sad too because on another plane he feels the failing connection with life and surroundings and other people. So I think we can say it is all the lower parts, for Zarathustra not only leaves the body, but also leaves the human sphere which would be the *psychikós*.

Prof. Fierz: But why should it be a young man?

Mrs. Fierz: He is young because it is the un-lived life.

Prof. Jung: People who have not lived often remain young. It is thought to be a great advantage.

Mrs. Sigg: I think that if Zarathustra represents the father in Nietzsche, the young man represents the son: there are two archetypes in him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but Zarathustra, as archetype, is not felt as being the father of Nietzsche; Nietzsche identifies with him as the old wise man. Of course we could say this young man is the son, and that Zarathustra takes him in a paternal way, but that is something else. Zarathustra would be the archetype of the old wise man, and the young man, one could say, would be the inexperienced youth, the disciple.

Mrs. Sigg: The figure tends to be human.

Prof. Jung: He would be the human thing that has not been lived enough, not developed. We will see now how it works out in the text. Zarathustra says,

“If I wished to shake this tree with my hands, I should not be able to do so.

Plato's *Republic* had become more clearly differentiated into the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational.

But the wind, which we see not, troubleth and bendeth it as it listeth. We are sorest bent and troubled by invisible hands."

What does he mean by that rather cryptic remark?

Prof. Reichstein: I think he describes his own condition.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, that is just his case. The tree, being the tree of life, represents the thing which is rooted in life, which cannot escape from the place where it has been placed; and that life is surely badly twisted and badly treated by the wind, the *pneumatikos* Zarathustra. It is the condition of the *hylikos* tormented by the *pneumatikos*. And where does this sentence come from? It is almost a quotation.

Mrs. Baumann: From the Bible. "The wind bloweth where it listeth."

Miss von König: Formerly it was translated: *Der Geist geistet wo er will*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, because in the Greek text it is *pneuma*, the Holy Ghost, so it can be translated either as wind or spirit; they are essentially the same.

Thereupon the youth arose disconcerted, and said: "I hear Zarathustra and just now was I thinking of him!" Zarathustra answered:

"Why are thou frightened on that account?—But it is the same with man as with tree.

The more he seeketh to rise into the height and light, the more vigorously do his roots struggle earthward, downward, into the dark and deep—into the evil."

This is just what we were speaking of: when the movement goes too high, there will be a compensatory movement downwards into the earth. It is the animal type of life that rises, and the plantlike type of life emphasizes itself as going into the dark, even into evil. That throws a light upon the functional meaning of the chapter about the pale criminal, and also on that interesting allusion to the black cloud in the chapter on reading and writing.

Mrs. Sigg: Nietzsche was in criminal depths in the chapter about the pale criminal, and it is a strange fact that in Nietzsche's real illness he behaved in a way like a tree. In December/January [1888-89] he fell ill. He then first had the feeling of being very light and was sometimes in a state of great *ekstasis*, when he actually danced like a god; and his sister said that for five years Nietzsche always got ill in December/January.

Prof. Jung: One observes that in other cases too. When the energy of the sun is lowest and night seems to prevail is the time of evil ghosts.

The approach of Christmas is particularly haunted and I have seen cases that produced most horrible dreams just then; everything that is characteristic of night, the unconscious, is then nearer to the conscious and threatens to overwhelm it. That probably happened in Nietzsche's case too. But what I meant to point out is that as the tree compensates Zarathustra's *ekstasis*, its roots must go much further down in order to compensate that height. In the chapter about the pale criminal he begins really to rise and to remove himself from crime and evil; because he is the *pale* criminal he cannot stand the sight of evil so he tried to leave that sphere; and in the next chapter about reading and writing he already has that dark sphere below his feet, the black thunder-cloud of which people are afraid. Then he leaps up into the air and overcomes the darkness and the heaviness; that falls away from him, and then comes the problem: if one leaps too high, the counter move will follow. Now, you remember that in the beginning of the book we dealt with a particular fateful moment.

Mrs. Baynes: Do you mean the rope-dancer?

Prof. Jung: Yes: "High throweth thou thy stone but it will fall back upon thee." That is the *ekstasis*, leaping high into the air, and then crashing down. And here the tree appears in order to convey the message to Zarathustra that the higher it grows, the deeper its roots will reach; if he were like a tree, he would not leap into the air because he would think in the same moment of sending his roots deeper down; if he rises to heaven his roots will touch hell. That is exactly what he ought to know and what he does not know. Also the tree carries the message that it is rooted in earth and has to stand every storm, even the storm of the spirit which Zarathustra does not stand—well, one should say "Nietzsche" here, though he is identical with Zarathustra. Nietzsche cannot resist the storm; he is tossed about like a dry leaf, and that is just the danger. But the tree, though badly tormented and mangled, resists it. So the tree says to Zarathustra: "You should resist all the moving powers of the earth and the air in order to maintain your position." But you know when the spirit moves us we think it is particularly fine, highly respectable: everybody wishes to be moved by the spirit. You can read your own story in the Old and the New Testament. And we do not realize that it is a danger at the same time; it is an elemental power, after all. Therefore the spirit is wind and wind is spirit.

Mrs. Sigg: Is the tree not the symbol for the kind of object that takes its nourishment both out of the soil and out of the air?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the tree makes a connection with two worlds; the branches above are the growth in the air through the life-giving breath

of the spirit above, and the roots are nourished with the juice of the earth, sucking up all the nourishing minerals and the water. So the tree is a very beautiful and complete symbol. But we must bear in mind that the tree symbolizes life that is utterly strange to the animal mind; when the symbol of the tree appears, it means that a new form of life appears. It is as if within the animal life of man a new type of life would then begin. One finds that idea expressed in every mystery cult; initiation means introducing a man to another type of life which he has not known before, and it is understood by primitives that man is only a man when he has that knowledge, when he knows the other side too. This is called the life of the spirit but it is not only spirit, but also the earth. It is an entirely new attitude to heaven and earth, the relationship of the tree that lives by air or light as well as through the soil. An animal is a parasite on plants, but the plant feeds upon the original elements; an animal is already a derivative, a sort of louse living on plants, and we human beings, inasmuch as we are animals, are also parasites. So we should know the second life; in the new second life we should return to that state of being which assimilates the original elements and can feed from non-organic matter. That is a very important point of view symbolically.

"Yea, into the evil!" cried the youth. "How is it possible that thou hast discovered my soul?"

Zarathustra smiled and said: "Many a soul one will never discover, unless one first invent it."

What does he mean by that?

Mrs. Sigg: Something extremely important, because really what you call discovering a soul can only be done by inventing; our individuality is something you must really invent. Nietzsche was always identified with other people, with his father for instance, and he did not invent his own individuality.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. You know the word *invent* comes from the Latin word *invenire*; *venire* means to come and *invenire* means to enter. So to invent a new form of life means to come into a new kind of life. And it is as if that new kind of life did not exist in itself, at least not for you; it is utterly strange, a life you don't know and apparently do not contact. It is so far away that you have to find it, *invenire*, to invent it; you have to go into it in order to know it. This idea is also expressed in the initiations by the idea of the quest, a sort of voyage of exploration or invention: you seek in order to find that new thing. It may be the quest of a knight errant who seeks the Holy Sepulchre or

the Holy Grail, or who seeks dangers in order to develop his courage; or it may mean seeking the hidden treasure, or how to make gold. All these different metaphors mean the same thing, namely, the way of invention, the way of finding, and that finding consists in inventing the thing which has apparently not yet been. But the very word, *to invent*, means to go into it; when you invent a thing you literally go into something which already does exist though not yet visible. It is as if you were going into a house which you have not seen before, and so you conclude that you invented it, but it was there long before you were born—you simply happened to find it. The German word for invent is *erfinden*, which means the *thorough* finding; it was there already and it was just for you to find it; you didn't make it, you simply found it. So the invention of the soul means that you find the soul, that you come into it; but it is already there.

That is what Zarathustra alludes to here—that the soul, meaning of course the secret life of man, always has to be invented or it would not exist. And it is a true psychological statement that there are no psychical contents which have not to be invented, as long as they are unconscious. For when you are unconscious of a thing, it really does not exist for you; it is not in your world. If you want to find it you have to invent it, and then it is. But it has already existed; you cannot invent a psychical thing which has not existed before, but only come into it. Take, for instance, the concept of animus and anima; it is always there, everybody can see it. Only those who are possessed by it have never noticed it. They say, "I have invented it," and that is right; I came into it and you have come into it too. For one must first invent it in order to see what a thing is.

LECTURE V

5 June 1935

Prof. Jung:

Mrs. Baumann asks what the difference is between the figure of the old wise man in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, and the old wise man in the woman's fantasies which we dealt with in a former seminar.¹ Of course there is a considerable difference between that figure as it appears in a woman's case and in a man's case. In a man it is as a rule the typical archetype, but Nietzsche's Zarathustra is not the typical old wise man; only in certain places is he typical, which comes from the fact that Nietzsche himself is identical with him, thus blurring the picture. Then the archetype gets mixed up with personal traits which ordinarily it would not contain. The figure of the old wise man is much rarer in a woman and not so typical, because wisdom in her case is usually connected with the archetypal earth mother. In the particular case to which Mrs. Baumann refers, the old wise man was not typical, but was falsified, because we had to deal there with a rather formidable animus that was very much against the woman's instincts and interfered with the feminine side of her character. There was a very marked masculine tendency which reinforced the figure of the animus; this is the reason why the wise old man appeared at all. With a very feminine woman, the archetype of wisdom would always be connected with the mother, and the father image would appear in the animus. Therefore, to take the figure of the wise old man in either of these two cases as typical is a mistake. I think we are quite safe in assuming that the particular element of wisdom in a woman's case is associated with the mother archetype, the so-called earth mother, and in a man's case with the fatherlike figure, the typical wise old man. The usual sequence of these images in a woman, the way in which they appear empirically, is, first, the animus as a personification of the unconscious, and then wisdom in the form of the mother. In a man it is just the reverse: the anima first appears as

¹ *The Visions Seminars*, Winter, 1931 (Zürich, 1976). See especially book 2, pp. 268-73.

a personification of the unconscious and the element of wisdom in the form of the old wise man. So when we speak of the old wise man we usually mean the figure as it appears in a man, but a certain exaggeration of the animus can produce that archetype in a woman, as the mother archetype may appear in a man. For example, one finds the motif of the earth mother in the Nordic myth of Wotan who goes to Erda in order to inquire about the future, to learn the wisdom of the mother.² But the earth mother is a sort of pale archetype in a man which does not function as it functions in a woman. And, though the archetype of the wise old man does exist in a woman, it has little practical importance. We will go on now with the chapter called, "The Tree upon the Hill":

"Yea, into the evil!" cried the youth. "How is it possible that thou hast discovered my soul?"

Zarathustra smiled, and said: "Many a soul one will never discover, unless one first invent it."

"Yea, into the evil!" cried the youth once more.

"Thou saidst the truth, Zarathustra. I trust myself no longer since I sought to rise into the height, and nobody trusteth me any longer; how doth that happen?

I change too quickly: my to-day refuteth my yesterday. I often overleap the steps when I clamber; for so doing, none of the steps pardon me.

When aloft, I find myself always alone. No one speaketh unto me: the frost of solitude maketh me tremble. What do I seek on the height?

My contempt and my longing increase together; the higher I clamber, the more do I despise him who clambereth. What doth he seek on the height?

How ashamed I am of my clambering and stumbling! How I mock at my violent panting! How I hate him who flieth! How tired I am on the height!"

What is the meaning of these paragraphs? What is the youth complaining about?

Mrs. Baynes: I think he complains because he has the sense of not taking the whole of himself along when he tries to climb.

² Underneath the great tree Yggdrasil lay Urdr, a holy well of wisdom where Erde lived and the gods often sought counsel. See Snorri Sturluson (1179-1240), *The Prose Edda*, tr. A. G. Brodeur (New York, 1916), p. 488.

Prof. Jung: But what is it that impresses him obviously?

Mrs. Baynes: That he is completely by himself first of all, and the fact that he is not at one with himself on account of the one-sidedness; he is only on the side of the *Geist*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he went up a bit too far and was dancing on clouds, and here comes the recognition which is symbolized by the youth. And who would the youth be?

Miss Hannah: Nietzsche, I suppose.

Prof. Jung: Well, Nietzsche is every figure, as we know, so it can only be a particular part.

Prof. Reichstein: He is the natural part.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he shows a very natural reaction; he is very much in doubt about Zarathustra's leap. Of course he has participated in it, but when Zarathustra was dancing on the clouds there was no youth. Now he appears under the symbol of the tree, and embodies the doubt really. And the fact that he is a youth would symbolize what?

Prof. Reichstein: He is not yet developed; he is young in contrast to Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: Yes. As the archetype of the wise man Zarathustra is always old, but at times, when he is too mixed up with Nietzsche, he begins to leap like a kitten and then he is absolutely ridiculous. Think of Zarathustra in long robes dancing and such nonsense!—the bad taste is already convincing. If he were young, yes, but one can imagine Zarathustra leaping about as little as one can Zoroaster the founder of a religion: he is obliged by his name to be dignified. So when he begins to dance it is comical; that is a sort of pathological element. You see, if Nietzsche were really insane when he talks in this ridiculous way, no reaction would be visible; it would be repressed. When Zarathustra leaps, he would get stuck in the air from that moment on—remain there and talk probably very high stuff, more and more unnatural, more and more crazy. But since Nietzsche is not yet insane, a natural reaction comes up within him, indicated by the title of this chapter, the tree, which is the symbol of just the opposite, of the thing that is rooted. And if he were insane, the young man would not exist. But Nietzsche cannot deny the existence of a contrasting figure; over against the old wise man there is a young man who is rather grieved with this pathological situation Zarathustra has brought about. It is as if he were taking the situation onto himself.

You see, the one that strove upwards was really Zarathustra. The young man was only tempted by Zarathustra to do something which, to a young man, would not have been so bad; if a young man becomes

enthusiastic and loses the ground under his feet for a while, it is not dangerous: he is supposed to do that. But if Zarathustra leaps into the air, it is nonsense. And as the young man is identical with Zarathustra he feels the same compunction which Zarathustra feels. You see, Zarathustra says, "I change too quickly"—namely, Zarathustra came to that symbol of the tree, to the realization which is just in contrast to what he has been before, while the young man talks as if he were Zarathustra, and takes over the bad conscience which Zarathustra ought to feel for changing. Yesterday he danced on the clouds and today he contradicts himself, "My today refuteth my yesterday." Of course if Zarathustra thinks of himself as a hero, naturally he can do anything he wants, but a human being would be accused of absurd, paradoxical, irresponsible behavior. So the young man is that part of Nietzsche which is normal and which is not on a level with Zarathustra; he is a new edition of the pale criminal. You see, as soon as Zarathustra overreaches himself, up comes the figure of the pale criminal, the one who cannot stand the sight of himself, and is unable to remain at his own level because it is really too high. Now Zarathustra, contemplating the tree by which they stood, said:

"This tree standeth lonely here on the hills; it hath grown up high above man and beast.

And if it wanted to speak, it would have none who could understand it: so high hath it grown.

Now it waiteth and waiteth,—for what doth it wait? It dwelleth too close to the seat of the clouds; it waiteth perhaps for the first lightning?"

What does it mean that Zarathustra emphasizes just this particular quality—that the tree stands isolated upon a hill?

Dr. Schlegel: It is the situation of Zarathustra himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and inasmuch as Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, it is Nietzsche's own situation. You see, this is a very particular conflict; the youth would be the ordinary human being who has common sense and knows quite well that jumping into the air means coming down again, that one will surely have a reaction. But Zarathustra is not an ordinary human being, but something inhuman or superhuman; hence the idea of the Superman. Yet that element which builds up Zarathustra is a living reality in Nietzsche, and it takes him far up into the clouds. Inasmuch as Zarathustra is a real fact in Nietzsche, he is like the tree which stands alone upon the mountain high above ordinary humanity. So here a sort of differentiation takes place; first Zar-

athustra tries to get higher and higher, and that is criticized by this chapter, which points out that this is unnatural behavior. It is approaching insanity.

That leaping into the air contains a kernel of truth, then. It corresponds to the reality in Nietzsche himself; there is an extraordinary genius in Nietzsche which could be compared to a being high above ordinary mankind. But these comical jumps and jerks are due to the fact that the ordinary man wants to jump up too, and then it becomes grotesque. If that ordinary man could only remain quiet and stay below in the valley, not trying to imitate Zarathustra, the whole thing would be acceptable: that would be the normal condition. The tree can stand up there because it is a tree, not human but a symbol of growth, while the human being is down below in the valley. But because Nietzsche identifies with Zarathustra, it cannot be a tree; it must necessarily be a human being who overreaches himself, and in that act it is like Zarathustra dancing, walking on air, which is absurd. That is all a consequence of the fact that Nietzsche identifies with Zarathustra, and also with the young man, and naturally the young man is identical with Zarathustra and takes over all the compunction Zarathustra ought to feel for that absurd behavior before. So a general mixup is created. To restore the natural and human situation, you must make a difference between Nietzsche and Zarathustra, Nietzsche being the human individual and Zarathustra the archetype that is rooted in humanity since eternity—and because he has roots, he is like a tree.

There are peculiar trees in the Bush which grow to a height of sixty or seventy meters and are considered to be sacred; they reach far above ordinary trees and usually they are haunted by ghosts or demons that have voices, and the voices must be obeyed. In India, certain trees are thought to be inhabited by the *trimurti*, the Indian Trinity; and usually they have in the villages an *asvatta* tree, the sacred tree of Buddha, sometimes with a hole in the trunk which is supposed to be inhabited by the deity, or the deity may live in the branches. It is the same idea as the Bush soul, of course with a certain differentiation. The Bush souls of primitives are thought to inhabit certain animals with whom they are then related. If the tiger contains a man's Bush soul then that man is the brother of the tiger—or the python, or the crocodile; and the Bush soul, under a different aspect, lives in certain plants or stones or rivers, and then he is the brother of that river or whatever it is. All that simply means the recognition that a part of the human psyche is essentially not human. It is naturally not what primitives assume it to be, but is a fact which we would call a projection—and

we no longer know that projection, we are unconscious of it. I think I have never met a European who was aware of having a Bush soul, but I am a bit doubtful: there are cases that approach it. Then there is another phenomenon of the Bush soul which is very marked with us. Do you know how that is experienced? You see, when the gods disappear from rivers and trees and mountains and animals, they become most banal.

Mrs. Fierz: Is it *Die Tücke des Objekts*?³

Miss Wolff: Is it when objects become animated, as in occult phenomena, for instance?

Prof. Jung: Yes, there are very obvious cases when pieces of furniture, certain pictures, etc., behave in a very funny way. One sees that in parapsychology, and of course the lowest form is the *Tücke des Objekts*, when objects play tricks upon you. Another example would be our peculiar dependence upon objects: we are quite unhappy if we are without certain objects which are dear to us—people are sometimes utterly lost without them. You know that famous story about Kant: his Bush soul, outside of himself, which always directed him, was the topmost button on the coat of one of his listeners who attended his lectures very regularly year after year. He used to walk up and down continuously gazing upon that topmost button; he developed all his thoughts out of it, and once when it was missing Kant could not deliver his lecture. He was completely put off because the god was absent. A primitive would have realized it, and would have said, “This button is sacred, a fetish, and please take care to always bring it with you to inspire me or I am lost.” Kant of course never would have thought of such a thing, but it is the truth. It can take many other forms. There is a story that Schiller could not write unless he smelt the peculiar odor of rotting apples, so he always had apples in a drawer of his writing table. And peculiar habits can take the place of such a fetish. We belittle these things because they are so utterly banal; we think it is merely curious, but if we look at them from the functional standpoint, we see that they plan an important part in the functioning of the psyche of those people. For instance, if one of Kant’s audience had been absent, or if instead of having fifty he had had only one or two, he would have been able to lecture—and if he had been ill he probably would have been able to lecture—but when that button wasn’t there, he could not. He had another Bush soul in the church tower which he saw from the window of his study; he was always looking at it, and when it was taken

³ See p. 352n above.

down, he was incapacitated for months because he had no *point de repère*. Because the Bush soul phenomenon is a sort of *point de repère*, primitives always have such things—like a shrine or the *churinga* of the Central Australian aborigines for instance—and inasmuch as it does function, they assume rightly that it is filled with life, that it contains soul. It is the same thing when one can develop a problem more easily when talking to somebody; even if one's partner in the discussion does not fully understand the argument, it is enough that one talks to somebody for things to become much clearer. Sometimes grateful people say, "When I talk to you I always get a new thought, presuming that the partner is producing that thought or has a certain effect upon them."

So our point of view concerning the tree is that Nietzsche has a Bush soul which is identical with the archetype of the wise old man, and this chapter should inform him of the fact that the wise old man is not human, but is also of the nature of the tree, and one therefore cannot identify with him. The Hindus, for instance, think that the gods are more or less identical with trees, or that they live in certain animals, showing that they are not human. Therefore, to dream of animals or impressive plants means dreaming of the deity, because these things are not human. So nothing could inform Nietzsche better than this identity with the tree; the right thoughts are there but the conclusions are wrong. It is true of course that the tree is also human inasmuch as it is Zarathustra who is human-like; it is an account of the human likeness that Nietzsche is tempted to identify with it. As men think they can identify with the anima who is not quite human: she is also a kind of Bush soul; a man possessed by the anima is just a piece of something that you can no longer talk to. And when a woman identifies with the animus without thinking, she identifies with the Bush soul, and then she is not quite human and loses human contact. Any decent discussion ceases instantly when the anima or animus enters the game. Now Zarathustra, inasmuch as he is not identical with Nietzsche, realizes here his own nature. This chapter is like a dream in which Nietzsche, the dreamer, is informed that Zarathustra is a tree and if he only could understand that, he would no longer identify and all these absurdities would come to an end—his *conflict* would come to an end. It would be better to assume that he was the young man, but he need not descend as far as that, because he was no longer the young man when he wrote *Zarathustra*. He should be his own age, neither young nor old, neither an embryo nor five thousand years old.

Prof. Reichstein: Would it not be more natural if instead of the young man a woman's figure would come?

Prof. Jung: That would be an identification with the anima.

Prof. Reichstein: Yes, but the young man is a kind of compensation, and the real compensation would be the anima here.

Prof. Jung: No, that would be an entirely different conflict, one between the wise old man and the anima. But you see, that conflict is settled, for when the anima is rescued out of the brothel of the world, she follows the wise old man, as his *sibylla*, his *somnambule*. If the anima is in the brothel the old wise man does not exist; he can only appear when the anima is redeemed from the brothel. Of course she would be the complete opposite of the wise old man when she is in the brothel, but then the opposition is so complete that the other part is invisible.⁴

Prof. Fierz: I should like to point out another thing in connection with the big tree. The Sequoia trees in the Yosemite valley, which are the biggest in the world, are considered especially sacred because they have been struck so many times by lightning. And the guide told us that the Red Indians made their fires near those trees in a storm; they believed Manitu spoke to the trees in the flashes of lightning and they were protected. He said that was a very natural superstition, for the trees are so big that they must be struck often by lightning.

Prof. Jung: Well, in the next paragraph you have it: he says such trees are struck by lightning. What does Zarathustra mean by that?

Prof. Reichstein: I think it is inspiration.

Prof. Jung: On one side, it is inspiration. As the archetype of the old wise man is a further bridge to the depths of the unconscious, he is supposed to know the great secrets and to have divine inspiration which could come to him in the form of lightning. As a rule, lightning is dangerous even to a big tree—it can kill it—but if the tree is old enough and big enough it only injures it slightly. But can the human being that is identical with the archetype of the wise old man stand the lightning from heaven?

Mrs. Fierz: No, he will be killed.

Prof. Jung: Of course. One should not identify with such a peculiar old tree; for in such a position it is easily struck by lightning—almost as if it were meant to be struck. One even plants trees as a protection against lightning because they attract it; tree tops are good conductors,

⁴ Simon Magus, a prominent early Gnostic, is said to have taken from a brothel in Tyre a girl in whom he recognized a reincarnation of Helen of Troy and a manifestation of the Divine Mother of all beings, including angels. See Hans Jonas, *Gnosis und Spätantiker Geist* (Göttingen, 1934), vol. 1, pp. 353, 358.

real foundations of electric currents. The outpour of electricity at the top of a tree during a thunderstorm is amazing, and under certain conditions one sees the fire of St. Elmo, the strange fire which is sometimes seen on top of the masts of ships.⁵ That is merely the current which comes out of the tops of things during an electrically charged condition; of course where the positive current of electricity from the earth streams out, it makes the point of attraction for the lightning coming down from the clouds. The usual danger of this archetype is that the divine inspiration or manifestation, the creative impulse, strikes there first, and therefore wisdom is needed where there are such thunderstorms. People who are not exposed to storms are never in need of wisdom—it is quite superfluous—a mere luxury, but a man like Nietzsche would need it because he is always threatened by storms, having this tremendous opposition in his nature. Whoever possesses such widely separated pairs of opposites will be in danger of the lightning on account of the electrical charges, and it will always hit the topmost point. Then the archetype of the wise old man is animated because wisdom must come to one's aid, otherwise one is insufficiently protected. Now what are the streaks of lightning in our psychological language? Inspiration has been mentioned but inspiration is not as destructive or dynamic as lightning.

Mr. Allemann: An explosion of the collective unconscious.

Prof. Jung: But how does it appear empirically?

Mrs. Fierz: As panic.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a brainstorm, or a sudden most dangerous impulse, an obsession or a possession—or an immediate certainty of what you are going to do. When the collective unconscious comes up and breaks into your life, it is as if it were a thunder-cloud out of which leaps the lightning. That means a tremendous impulse, a dynamic explosion in your system, and if you are lacking in wisdom you meet that tension with a brain box which is much too small, and usually it is isolated against the earth: then you get it! Therefore if you are wise, you will have a wide surface and be well connected with the earth; then you are reasonably protected against the danger of the lightning. Not always though. So, as Mr. Allemann rightly remarked, it is a condition, an assault or an immediate explosion in which one is suddenly overwhelmed by the collective unconscious; to call it inspiration is pretty mild: it doesn't fully describe the danger of such an event.

⁵ An electrical display caused by the proximity of a cloud to pointed objects such as a ship's mast. St. Elmo is a patron saint of sailors.

When Zarathustra had said this, the youth called out with violent gestures: "Yea, Zarathustra, thou speakest the truth. My destruction I longed for, when I desired to be on the height, and thou art the lightning for which I waited! Lo! what have I been since thou hast appeared amongst us? It is mine envy of thee that hath destroyed me!"—Thus spake the youth, and wept bitterly. Zarathustra, however, put his arm about him, and led the youth away with him.

This paragraph corroborates what we have been saying. The young man identified himself with Zarathustra. Zarathustra was the temptation for him, he strove to be like him; and then Zarathustra became his danger: the archetype broke in upon him. You see, the ordinary man Nietzsche went too far. That is again a sort of prophecy that in the near future the collective unconscious will send this lightning to destroy Nietzsche. Therefore Zarathustra is compared to the thunder-cloud.

Mrs. Baumann: He also says, "I am the lightning."

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that means the dangerous invasion. You know, the archetype in itself does not mean invasion and destruction; it is eternally quiet unless it becomes constellated, stirred up by the misbehavior of man. If a man leaves too many things to the unconscious and so gets into a tight corner, the archetype begins to stir as if in compensation. And then if he thinks what a devil of a fellow he is to have such a good idea, well, there he is! He is identifying with the source of his idea and becomes too big. The lightning has struck him and he is done for. You see the youth says, "It is mine envy of thee that hath destroyed me!" That is very clear: he wanted to be like Zarathustra but Zarathustra did not allow him to remain normal; the young man did not realize what a terrible danger he was incurring by identifying with an archetype.

Now here is a question by Mr. Allemann, "The problem of the anima rescued by the old man from the brothel of the world, has brought up in me the question of the meaning of the heavenly Sophia. Is she the identification of both old man and anima in the *hierosgamos*?"

It is true that the conception of Sophia in that Gnostic treatise, the *Pistis Sophia*, is the identity or the absolute union of the wise old man with the anima. If you study the anima problem you will surely see that peculiar development from Hawwah to Sophia, and such a development cannot be without the intervention of the wise old man. But the wise old man doesn't undergo such a development—he is not included in the world one could say, he is static; while the anima is very much

involved in the world. That is the part of man which is partially of this earth—and it can be very *much* of this earth: she may be in the brothel of *muladhara*, *muladhara* at its worst. It is even very important that the anima is projected into the earth, that she descends very low, for otherwise her ascent to the heavenly condition in the form of Sophia has no meaning. There is no point in it. She is the one that is rooted in the earth as well as in the heaven, both root and branch of the tree.⁶ The archetype of the old wise man, if looked at from the side of the anima, is always a secondary figure that only appears as the result, or as the divine intercession or intervention in the life and the development of the anima. In the end, inasmuch as the anima transforms into Sophia, there is no longer the wise old man or the anima because they become one. That is the problem of the hermaphrodite in alchemy, the union of the male and the female.

Mrs. Sigg: It seems so strange that Zarathustra does exactly the same thing that the anima does as Salome; it is horrible that the old wise man should be like a female dancer.⁷

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is one of those perversions—that is perfectly true; and it all comes from the fact that we have no anima in *Zarathustra*. Only very near the end anima figures appear in the erotic poem “Unter Töchtern der Wüste.”⁸ We have here the most perverse phenomenon, the wise old man appearing as identical with Nietzsche himself without the anima. So it is quite unavoidable that Zarathustra sometimes shows symptoms of being the dancer, the anima. It takes the whole development of *Zarathustra* to call Nietzsche’s attention to the fact that there is an anima. Of course that has very much to do with his personal life, and it is of course also characteristic of the fact that the anima problem only reaches about as far as the Rhine. East of the Rhine the problem either of the wise old man or the Puer Aeternus comes up. The whole mental revolution in Germany is chiefly an activ-

⁶ *Pistis Sophia* (trust, wisdom) is an important Gnostic text from the fourth century, written in Coptic, an Egyptian vernacular (see p. 442n above). Jung was very much taken with the Gnostic/alchemical representations—for instance by the hierosgamos or sacred marriage of opposites. Hawwah was an earth figure, the progenitor of Eve and thus sometimes in *muladhara*, the lowest chakra. And Sophia, from *The Song of Songs* onward, was the feminine personification of Wisdom. See CW 10, par. 361, for Jung’s fuller discussion of the “four stages of the Eros cult.”

⁷ Though not mentioned by name in the Gospels, Salome was supposed to be the one whose dance so pleased Herod that he offered her whatever she wished. She asked for the head of John the Baptist. See Matthew 14:1-12.

⁸ “Unter Töchtern der Wüste,” Part IV, ch. 74. Common translates the title “Among Daughters of the Desert.”

ity of the Puer Aeternus, but there the wise old man is absent. Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* was an attempt to foresee and to compensate for the danger that his country would fall a victim to the Puer Aeternus, the boy.⁹ That same problem is in Goetz's *Das Reich ohne Raum*, the kingdom within—of course it has nothing to do with the Christian kingdom of heaven—where there is a revolution of boys.¹⁰ Nietzsche had so much foresight that he tried to compensate the coming events by a book of wisdom, but of course it was in vain. You see, the only possibility by which a *Puer* revolution can be avoided is the anima; without the anima it becomes unavoidable.

And when they had walked a while together, Zarathustra began to speak thus:

"It rendeth my heart. Better than thy words express it, thine eyes tell me all thy danger."

Here Zarathustra very clearly realizes the situation. He admits that he is having the same conflict as the young man; Zarathustra's heart is torn too: he knows what it means to the young man to be pulled up to the heights and not to be at one with himself. For Zarathustra is also not at one with himself inasmuch as he is Nietzsche. The Alpha and Omega of all the trouble with Nietzsche is of course that he is all the time identical with his figures, never separated from them. He has no psychological critique whatever and so he cannot give them their true value; he cannot conceive of a psychological existence that is not himself, not his consciousness. But that is all a consequence of his time. If he had been more modern, if he had had psychological critique, he would have said, "This spirit of Zarathustra is a tree spirit, but a spirit that takes me up to heaven and then lets me fall again is surely not myself: it is an elemental power to which I have fallen a victim."

Mrs. Adler: How does that agree with the idea of Nietzsche's function?

Prof. Jung: Zarathustra is the greatness in Nietzsche, the demon, and Nietzsche has the mission to write *Zarathustra* to compensate for the coming events in those people. But the way in which he tries to

⁹ Jung's large and nationally diverse clientele convinced him that there are cultural influences on the form a neurosis takes: thus, France seemed to produce more men who identify with man's feminine side, while Germany ran more to those who remain boys.

¹⁰ Bruno Goetz's *Das Reich Ohne Raum* (1919) was interpreted in Jung's 1936 lecture on Wotan as an adumbration of Nazi Germany (CW 10, par. 384). Jung wrote a friend once about having a letter from Goetz, whom he refused to see: "The Herrenvolk has become obsolete; Herr Goetz still doesn't know that" (*Letters*, vol. I, p. 445).

compensate is utterly inefficient on account of the fact that he identifies with Zarathustra. The prophet that identifies with Jahve makes a mistake; he can say he speaks the word which is given him by the Lord, but he must make a difference between himself and the Lord. When Nietzsche says, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," he means, "Thus Spake Nietzsche."

Mrs. Sigg: In the biography of Nietzsche, I noticed that the minister at his father's funeral compared his father to a tree that had lost its leaves—the family had lost everything. It seems that Nietzsche from the very beginning got into an identification with his father; when he was a boy of four or five he was called the little minister because he was always preaching. He was very serious and behaved like an old man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that must be expected because he was affected by that archetype from the very beginning, and circumstances helped it to a great extent. The extreme dependence upon authority was a typical German difficulty, however. It has taken an entirely different form now and is said to no longer exist, but it is still there in a different form. That is of course at the bottom of the whole trouble there—it is still the psychology of a young boy who has a father; for a time he pleases the father far too much, and then he displeases him entirely. It is the same mistake: the problem is still the father, and the mother does not exist yet; therefore, there is no anima in the whole game, exactly as in Nietzsche's case. There are surely two things in the world, the Yang and the Yin, the man and the woman, and if the woman is disregarded, it is a mistake. It is said, for instance, that the reason the Mithraic cult did not survive was that women were excluded; the women cultivated the Magna Mater and the men went to the Mithraic grottoes, and that accounts for the downfall. Whereas Christianity won out because man and woman were together in spite of the fact that Christianity is chiefly a masculine religion, a father religion, in which the feminine element, in the beginning at least, was little considered. Later on in the development of the Catholic church, it became much more prominent, but Protestantism has again done away with it. Protestantism generated a secret philosophy, however, where the feminine element was cultivated again, but with a sort of hostility; the main body of tradition in Freemasonry is based on the mother cult and it is therefore hostile to the church.

Dr. Schlegel: Is not the conception in the church itself, the church as the mother?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is abstract. The church has nothing to say, it

is ruled by the Pope—the Pope and the College of Cardinals constitute the church.

Dr. Schlegel: That is true, but in the unconscious the church is the mother.

Prof. Jung: Well, it was the later psychological thought, the later Catholics, that brought in the feminine element, even using the symbols of the secret philosophy. The Litany of Loreto contains all the symbols of the secret philosophy, the *hortus conclusus*, and the *rosa mystica*, and the *vas insigne devotionis*, for example.¹¹

Dr. Schlegel: Has not the church been represented as the bride of Jesus?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, therefore they made use of “The Song of Songs,” which was originally an ordinary love song; there are a number of songs in worldly literature of the same style. But it was interpreted as a mystical relationship between man and God, or chiefly between man and Sophia. First it was in the secret traditions, and then in the Christian church it was used as a symbol of the relationship between Jesus and the church. You see, the symbols have been used, but all under the heading of the masculine deity; Mary never entered the Trinity, the feminine element was excluded. And even the Holy Ghost, in spite of the fact that it is symbolized by a dove, is made a neuter, a breath that creates father and son, but not the mother: that was refuted by the church. That one exception, the *Theotokos*, the idea that the mother of God was identical with Sophia, is heretical. Of course it makes a tremendous difference whether the female principle rules or not. The female principle is always contained—even in a male religion it comes in by a side way—but it makes a tremendous difference whether it is actually the ruling principle. If it is the ruling principle, or if there is at least the condominium of both principles,¹² it produces a religious form that is entirely different from the religion we know. If you study the religious psychology of Paul, you find the female principle still in operation, as in the idea, for instance, that those redeemed by love are beyond the Law.¹³ That was Christ’s idea too, and that is typically fem-

¹¹ “The enclosed garden,” “the mystical rose,” and “the noble vessel of devotion” are attributes of the Virgin in this litany translated from the *Rituale Romanum*. Jung often discusses mariolatry and the subsequent proclamation by Pope Pius XII of the bodily ascension of Mary into heaven, which Jung regarded as a belated recognition of the feminine aspect of the godhead.

¹² The meaning of *condominium* as the joint control by two states is almost forgotten today.

¹³ “He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law” (Romans 13:8).

inine. The masculine point of view is the Law, but the point of view of love is of course feminine. The one is Logos and the other Eros. Well now, Zarathustra here shows clearly that he understands the peril in which the youth finds himself—the youth of course being the part of Nietzsche which simply cannot join in and which will be destroyed if he identifies with Zarathustra. He says,

“As yet thou art not free; thou still seekest freedom. Too unslept hath thy seeking made thee, and too wakeful.

On the open height wouldst thou be; for the stars thirsteth thy soul. But thy bad impulses also thirst for freedom.”

Here, one could say, the whole tragedy of *Zarathustra* begins. That young man is striving to identify with Zarathustra, to be a dweller on the heights and to be free from the fetters of the earth, but if he escapes the law of the earth he becomes an inhuman spirit: he will be struck by lightning and destroyed. Now why does he want that freedom? And freedom from what? Well, very obviously, as Zarathustra says, there are evil instincts below, the wild dogs:

“Thy wild dogs want liberty; they bark for joy in their cellar when thy spirit endeavoureth to open all prison doors.”

If you have the choice between the beautiful heights and the kennel full of wild dogs, then surely one can understand why a man wants to escape the kennel and make for the heights. It is as if there were an evil smell down below and naturally he seeks the pure light, so it is quite understandable that he would try to be above himself. But then he will identify with Zarathustra—he will be struck by lightning—so if he wants to live at all he must not seek such freedom. For if he contains wild dogs, evil instincts in his system, he is partially a wild dog and he should not try to escape from his own dog-likeness, he should remain there in his kennel. If he escapes the body, he will decay; he simply escapes life if he escapes the kennel. Now, it is most important that Zarathustra so gladly assumes that the thing down below in the valley must be a kennel full of wild dogs, for that is by no means certain. It might be horses and asses and cows, quite lovely things, perhaps some pigs too, and the whole makes a perfectly workable farm, exceedingly useful and also quite nice. Why just wild dogs? Why such a hysterical statement? What kind of psychology does such an assumption imply?

Miss Wolff: Christian.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is late Christian psychology, or ordinary Protestant psychology—there is his father. To him the body is of course evil; one

does not even look at it, but simply assumes it is wild dogs. But even if that were true, these dogs are a part of nature like wolves. Of course they are not just agreeable—there are nice animals and animals that are not so nice—but in themselves they are all right; wolves occasionally eat human beings if they are very hungry, but we also eat animals, and by the million, so we have absolutely no ground for blaming those animals for eating a man occasionally. So there is no reason why we should revile our instincts. They are just the ordinary appetites, just as bad and just as nice as the instincts of all nature. It is that particular moralistic Protestantism which reviles instincts and makes them unacceptable; they get evil because we put the devil into them. We say they are devils and cannot be touched, and naturally they will be bad because we send them to hell. Nature is neither good nor bad, and if we judge nature by our foolish categories, it is as if we put it into a dirty drawer which would make even pure nature dirty. Then Zarathustra goes on,

Still art thou a prisoner—it seemeth to me—who deviseth liberty for himself: . . .

That means he is the wild dog imprisoned in the kennel, and how marvelous that he wants to walk on clouds, to no longer be that awful thing there! Now, what an attitude to life! That is ordinary Protestant morality, poison, and a complete contradiction to what Zarathustra preaches in other places.

Ah! sharp becometh the soul of such prisoners, but also deceitful and wicked.

To purify himself, is still necessary for the freedom of the spirit.

Not enough that you get a free spirit, you have to purify yourself from the dog in you.

Much of the prison and the mould still remaineth in him; pure hath his eye still to become.

The eye means his vision, the way in which he conceives of things and envisages problems. Well, that doesn't need to be clean from the admixture of earth, but very much from the admixture of Protestantism.

Yea, I know thy danger. But by my love and hope I conjure thee: cast not thy love and hope away!

Noble thou feelest thyself still, and noble others also feel thee

still, though they bear thee a grudge and cast evil looks. Know this, that to everybody a noble one standeth in the way.

Also to the good, a noble one standeth in the way: and even when they call him a good man, they want thereby to put him aside.

Here again Zarathustra cherishes the aspiration of the young man to become a spirit himself; he lets him feel that his existence in the body and in natural conditions is just a pity, and if he is a noble man he surely will not give up his hope and his love: in other words he will escape his natural existence. Then he says, "Know this, that to everybody a noble one standeth in the way." Sure enough, the one who tries to escape the ordinary human conditions and become an eternal spirit is a stumbling block. It is quite right that he should be considered so; he is really a nuisance and that is not right. Otherwise, the reasonable conclusion would be that the only thing to be done for the world would be for everybody to commit suicide—then all problems would be settled. But that is the cure of headache by cutting off the head. We cannot do away with the living man by making him spirit—he must live here—and we must really assume that inasmuch as there is life it makes sense, and that life is not properly lived when we deny half of life. He calls the belief in a certain tradition and the life of the body in natural conditions, the standpoint of the good people, and he assumes that those people are against the heroes who want to jump out of the body. Yes, happily enough they are against it, otherwise everybody would become lunatics and escape human existence.

The new, would the noble man create, and a new virtue. The old, wanteth the good man, and that the old should be conserved.

Much better that the old things should be preserved than create new things that have no feet and are somewhere in the air, mere castles in Spain. That is just the trouble in creating new things, the necessity that they really live and stand upon the earth within the reach of man. What is the use of creating fantasies which are mere mirror effects in the air?

But it is not the danger of the noble man to turn a good man, but lest he should become a blusterer, a scoffer, or a destroyer.

Sure enough, the danger that he would become an ordinary good man is the thing which is least considered, but that would be the greatest danger to this kind of hero. That he should become insolent, a scoffer

and a destroyer would be a lesser danger, for then he could be easily gotten rid of.

Ah! I have known noble ones who lost their highest hope. And then they disparaged all high hopes.

Then lived they shamelessly in temporary pleasures, and beyond the day had hardly an aim.

That is just because they had that attitude, either on top of everything, above the clouds, or in the slime, but nothing in between—as if there were no green earth where things were perfectly nice and sound and balanced.

“Spirit is also voluptuousness,” said they.

This is the standpoint that spirit or mind is either a god, marvelously pure, the stratosphere fifty or sixty degrees centigrade below zero, or it is a hothouse of vices. We have seen all that, first a tremendous exaggeration of the spirit, then nothing but animal voluptuousness.

Then broke the wings of the spirit; . . .

Well, they would break its wings by overreaching themselves.

And now it creepeth about and defileth where it gnaweth.

Once they thought of becoming heroes; . . .

They would have done much better not to think of that.

But sensualists are they now. A trouble and a terror is the hero to them.

Then they are just the contrary of heroes, they become vicious hogs. But then they are simply heroes of the slime.

But by my love and hope I conjure thee: cast not away the hero in thy soul! Maintain holy thy highest hope!

Thus spake Zarathustra.

That sounds of course awfully well, provided you really can fulfil it. But if it costs your body how can you pull it off? You cannot fulfil it if you have destroyed your body. That is the problem with which he ends here, and you see from the title of the next chapter, “The Preachers of Death,” what he has to realize.

LECTURE VI

12 June 1935

Prof. Jung:

What is the connection between this new chapter, "The Preachers of Death," and the preceding one?

Mrs. Baumann: I think the last one also preaches death; there is only the choice between the heights and the kennel of dogs, and if one gives that up, one has no more life in the body.

Prof. Jung: Have you a particular passage in mind to substantiate your idea?

Mrs. Baumann: At the end of the chapter he says. "But it is not the danger of the noble man to turn a good man, but lest he should become a clusterer, a scoffer, or a destroyer." And the last thing of all is, "Cast not away the hero in thy soul! Maintain holy thy highest hope!"

Prof. Reichstein: I should say the young man was meant to be the life, and now comes the contrast: he cannot live his life.

Prof. Jung: You think the connection is really an *enantiodromia*? Yes, the *enantiodromia* begins where the young man is struck by lightning. Throughout that preceding chapter Zarathustra preaches the heroic attitude, but he realizes that there is a young man who strives to follow him, and later, on the hills, the young man says: "My destruction I longed for when I desired to be on the height, and thou art the lightning for which I waited." Zarathustra is the thundercloud from which the lightning issues, which means that he is not human, but a spirit, a demon full of dangerous energy; that is, of course, the quality of a being so pregnant with thought. Consequently, when the young man, who is not up to such intensity of tension, comes up to Zarathustra, up to the level of the demon, he is as if struck by lightning. This would be insanity; it is the sudden explosion in the head which many cases of schizophrenia describe. They experience such things in the beginning, saying that something snapped in their head, for instance, or there was an explosion like a pistol shot—and from that moment on they are different. There is a special term for it in French, *le trouble cénesthésie*. Cé-

nesthésie comes from the Greek *koinos*, meaning general sensation.¹ And these peculiar troubles are particularly in the head. They are sort of preliminary symptoms; the continuity of the mind breaks up into parts like a surface of ice or a mirror. One finds a characteristic symptom in the pictures such people draw, the so-called breaking lines. For instance, they make the picture of a tree, and then some part of the tree is broken off and they substitute a different design, something which does not fit in; it is like a break which goes right through the picture, as if a piece had broken off and another piece, an entirely different construction, joined on there. Such people have at least one breaking line, or even several, in their mental condition. It doesn't mean that they are necessarily insane, for such things also happen with people who only have a neurosis, where they are perfectly capable of improvement.

I remember the case of a woman who was not insane at all although she had an insane sister. She had a neurosis, and drew a picture which contained a number of breaking lines; it gave me quite a shock when I sat it. But she explained to me that it had been made in a moment of terrible emotion and that the chaotic impression it produced was due to that, though she could not describe what the emotion had been. You see, that shows that it was the right diagnosis; a breaking line means that there is a split, and people with bad splits cannot explain it or they come to an utterly irrational conclusion. It is just as if they could not jump across that split; they can explain thus far and then are stopped by an unknown emotion. But this woman was able to explain the breaking lines as emotion. Then I told her she had better try to bring out that emotion, to make another picture that would express it. Now in the first picture she had drawn a human figure, herself, but completely dissolved or exploded by breaking lines, an eye here, a hand there and a foot somewhere else, like a corpse that had been exploded into many parts by a shell or a high explosive—such deep emotions have that shock effect as if a projectile had entered the body and exploded it completely. While in the next picture she represented herself as whole but confronted with a terrible snake, and that snake was the cause of her emotion: it was the Kundalini snake. For when the snake raises its head, the hissing of the snake, as they describe it in the Tantric Yoga, has the effect of a tremendous shock. That is not always true, but in people with a delicate constitution, as she had, it produces a shattering effect. But the fact that afterwards she could produce a picture

¹ In English, *coenesthesia*, meaning a state of undifferentiated awareness of the body.

which was completely composed, where the figures were whole and logical, showed that she could bridge the gap, could strengthen the breaking lines. These are of course not always indicated in the same way; there may be a more or less symmetrically composed picture, and then in a corner there is an intrusion which contains something else. Or perhaps a part of a human figure (or an animal or whatever it is) is dissolved into strange things. So it is not always like split glass, but also can be like a growth, a tumor for instance. When you look at such a growth in the microscope in reality, you see the regular tissue of the body and then suddenly that dissolves into a strange chaotic accumulation of cells which don't show a trace of the former healthy tissue. So you can describe it in different ways. Now you see, that is the lightning which destroys the young man, who is of course, in comparison to the extreme old age of the archetype, always a young man—the wise old man is at the least two million years old.

Mrs. Baumann: In the end of that last chapter I understood that there was a demonstration of Christianity which he did not realize at all, and I was just wondering whether that would not be the disturbing element, whether that might be what I meant when I called it death.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, that whole preceding chapter, "The Tree upon the Hill," is of course due to the overvaluation of the spirit, as indeed the whole drama of *Zarathustra* is based on that prejudice. In the age in which he lived he could not help identifying with his figures. First of all, he was suffering from the materialistic and rationalistic attitude of his time, which naturally assumed that one's thoughts were oneself, with no objectivity—as people still identify with their thoughts and think they can manage them as they want, because they feel them as utterly subjective. And then there was the Christian conviction. That was just the paradox of the nineteenth century. On the one side they had a perfectly rational mechanistic attitude, and on the other side they were capable of being good Christians where the spirit was everything. During the week a professor confessed a mechanistic theory of psychology, and on Sunday he went to church and believed God-knows-what. They had two drawers: in the one a materialistic philosophy and in the other the Christian belief; so even if they did not openly believe in the spirit or the Christian dogma, at least in their practical life they followed Christian morality. That can happen to the most enlightened minds. For instance, people adopt an Eastern creed like Taoism or any other Eastern system, and then, quite inconsistently with their conviction, they live an ordinary life fitted to the church. But the two things don't work together. Brahmanism is not meant for good

Christians, nor is the Christian life meant for Brahmanism. They simply don't fit, like oil and water. That can cause a tremendous conflict, and it is extraordinary how such a thing can remain quite unconscious.

You see, Nietzsche certainly does not believe in God any longer: he thinks he has done with that—God is dead—and then here is another overestimation of the spirit just as good as any Christian one. Without questioning, he identifies with Zarathustra; he personifies him, calls him a different name. Nietzsche knows he is not Zarathustra, yet he nevertheless identifies, instead of treating Zarathustra as a demon or at least a disembodied spirit. If he would only assume that Zarathustra was really the spirit of the old Zarathustra of Persian times, he could realize that *he* was speaking and not himself, and then he would never climb a hill to meet Zarathustra—in order to be struck by lightning. But he was a child of his time; he did not know psychology. If he had known what we know nowadays probably his case would have been better, I don't know. We always must recognize, however, that we would not know what we know today if Nietzsche had not lived. Nietzsche has taught us a lot. When I read *Zarathustra* for the first time as a student of twenty-three, of course I did not understand it all, but I got a tremendous impression. I could not say it was this or that, though the poetical beauty of some of the chapters impressed me, but particularly the strange *thought* got hold of me. He helped me in many respects, as many other people have been helped by him. Therefore, we cannot say he should have done differently; we only must remember, if we take it to ourselves, that in reading *Zarathustra*, we must apply certain criticism, for it is very clear where Nietzsche went the wrong way. Otherwise one is simply infected by that identification, because we all suffer from the prejudice of the spirit; of course, it is wonderful to identify with that thing which becomes spiritual, but when we study Nietzsche critically, we see the dangers.

Now, because his teaching is imbued by the identification with the spirit Zarathustra, he really teaches something which would mean a mass slaughter. For by far the greatest majority of people could not stand such an identification, as he himself could not stand it and as nobody can stand it; it can be stood for a certain time but then it is just too much and one collapses: one goes crazy. That realization is not coming to the foreground, however. You get a certain idea, as Mrs. Baumann has rightly pointed out, in the last sentence, where he conjures his audience, "But by my love and hope I conjure thee: cast not away the hero in thy soul." There must be a mighty good reason for casting away the hero; otherwise he would not admonish them not to do so. Sure

enough, the hero should not be cast away. It *is* poison when you identify but it is not if you don't. But Nietzsche had not that point of view; he simply could not think it. His idea obviously was, either you are a philistine or a little bourgeois; you are fat and eat and drink and sleep and so on, or you must be a hero, and he grows afraid, obviously, that man will lose the hero ideal, being threatened by so many dangers. Therefore, in spite of all that could be said as counter-argument, he says, don't give up that hope, don't give up that hero ideal. He is in a way, by his identification with Zarathustra, a preacher of death. That insight slowly dawned upon him unconsciously in the preceding chapter and now he must say something about those people who are preaching death. But since it has been an unconscious thought he naturally projects it upon others; he does not know that he is one of the foremost.

It is the rule that unconscious thought is projected, so you always discover it round you. For instance, people who have erotic fantasies of which they are not aware, must surely become aware of what they must find in themselves through their projections—like those people who join the society for the suppression of pornographic pictures. There was an Englishman who was a member of such a society. He collected all the pornographic photographs he could lay hold of—of course only in order to destroy them. He had five thousand, and then he announced in a meeting of the society that before they were destroyed, he wished very much that the society would take the trouble to inform themselves of the evil of the world by looking at them. And they all stuck their heads together to look at those five thousand pictures, so they had a good meal before the final catastrophe when the pictures were burned. Naturally, nobody in his sound senses would believe that they did not enjoy it. Then afterwards they had the voluptuousness of believing they had done a good thing for the world. As if they had not helped the pornographic business by buying all that stuff—many factories and printing-presses benefitted by that large deal. Well now, this chapter begins.

There are preachers of death: and the earth is full of those to whom desistance from life must be preached.

Who are those people to whom renunciation ought to be preached?

Prof. Reichstein: I think the connection is here with those wild dogs in the cellar. He wants to kill them, and if he is beginning to preach of death, that will be the natural part which must be killed. Therefore,

those men "to whom desistance from life must be preached" are the simple men.

Prof. Jung: Well he obviously means that those people who are not able to live up to the heroic idea had better disappear; of course, those are the ordinary people who have no dogs in the cellar. But *who* has dogs in the cellar? No normal person. First of all, it is against simple decency to lock up dogs in the cellar: you wouldn't do that; you have dogs in your rooms, in your garden. They are nice companions for man, very friendly things; it would be abnormal to lock them in the cellar. So the ordinary normal human being has his dogs on the surface; he lives with them and to a certain extent the master is equal to the dog and the dog to the master. You often notice that peculiar likeness between a dog and his master: they take on the same expression, and you can liken dogs to certain human types. There is an inner relationship between man and dog; therefore an old hunter says it is good for the dogs to sleep with the hunters. The horse is also a friend of man. And Philostratus, in his book about Apollonius of Tyana,² says that elephants like man very much; he heard them whispering among themselves in the night, and they were very sad because they were afraid they had not pleased man during the day. They were ambitious to be appreciated by him. This is a very precious piece of animal psychology, inasmuch as our own psychology is similar; many people worry for hours in the night lest they have not lived up to the expectations of others, have not done the right thing by them, have not shown love enough. So you see, the ordinary normal individual lives together with his animals and therefore he cannot and will not overreach himself. Now, those are the people that Nietzsche says are all too many; they are superfluous when it comes to the heroic ideal.

Full is the earth of the superfluous; marred is life by the many-too-many. May they be decoyed out of this life by the "life eternal"!

That is of course a hit at Christianity which preaches the importance of eternal life and the relative unimportance of the temporal life; he says it is quite well for them to die out, to pass away into eternal life because they make nothing of this life.

² *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, tr. F. C. Conybeare (London and New York, 1912). Philostratus (a Lemnian, born ca. 170), faithfully recorded the sayings of Apollonius, who was born 3 B.C. and lived a hundred years. Traveller, miracle worker, Pythagorean, ascetic, he did not know of Jesus but was a kind of rival.

"The yellow ones": so are called the preachers of death, or the "black ones." But I will show them unto you in other colours besides.

What are these yellow ones?

Mr. Allemann: They would be Buddhists.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the black robed ones are usually Christian, Protestant as well as Catholic, because black is the official color, though it originated really in the East where they wore black cloaks. The early Christian monks wore black cloaks, as they still do in the Greek orthodox church; *die Trauernden*, the mourning ones, was the official title for monks in the second, third, and fourth centuries. So black, which signifies mourning, death, abnegation, became characteristic of the priests. In official functions they used other colors, white expressing innocence, purity, red expressing love; and yellow comes in too, but I think that was a later invention. Blue is not a church color.

Mr. Allemann: Violet?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but violet, purple, and crimson appeared much later; the original colors were white, black, yellow, and red. And curiously enough, these were the mystical colors of the four elements in alchemistic philosophy; they must have to do with some original conception. They would be the colors of the four functions; what we call now psychological functions were originally elements or temperaments. Our four functions are four characteristics of consciousness,³ but when there was no psychology, when one only knew the differences between human beings, one spoke of temperaments, meaning emotional differences, the melancholic, or sanguine, or choleric, or phlegmatic temperaments. The phlegmatic person is the one with slow cold humors; the melancholic has a very black bile and is very depressive; the choleric is an irritable or irascible personality, easily inflammable or impulsive; and the sanguine is the optimistic, gay, easygoing person. These were explained by a particular condition of the so-called "humor," a fluid, the humidity or the juices of the body. This idea of the four temperaments is of antique origin, the first attempt to classify

³ "For complete orientation all four functions would contribute equally: thinking should facilitate cognition and judgment, feeling should tell us how and to what extent a thing is important or unimportant for us, sensation should convey concrete reality to us through seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., and intuition should enable us to divine the hidden possibilities in the background, since these too belong to the complete picture of a given situation (CW 6, par. 900). But he added: "As a rule only one of the four basic functions is fully conscious and differentiated enough to be freely manipulatable by the will, the others remaining partially or wholly unconscious" (par. 905).

people on the horizontal, one could say, but there was no particular value attached to it. Another attempt at the classification of human beings in antiquity was the vertical system: the three stages, *hylikos*, *psychikos* and *pneumatikos*—the material man, the psychical man and the spiritual man. The temperaments were linked up with the four elements—fire, earth, water, and air—and they also were often characterized by four colors. In the Eastern Lamaistic mandalas, one again finds four colors—white, red, green and yellow; but in the west green is not a church color because it is the color of vegetation, which has nothing to do with the church and the spirit. It is peculiar that blue was not used but it just wasn't.

Mrs. Baynes: The Virgin's robe is nearly always blue.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in art, but that has nothing to do with the official colors of the ritual; they call them church colors, *Kirchenfarben*, and they coincide with these very ancient alchemistic colors. There is a passage in one of the Latin pseudo-Hermetic writings where they speak of the vulture as the *spiritus volatilis* rising from the black mother: *Vultur in cacumine montis magna voce clamet; ego sum ater et albus, rubens et citrinus*, meaning: "The vulture upon the top of the mountain cries with loud voice, 'I am white and black and red and citron.'" That is, he is the one that unites the four qualities, being above the temperaments, in the language of those days. With us it would mean the one that is neither thinking, feeling, sensation, nor intuition, but above the four functions. The meaning in alchemistic philosophy also was that the four must come together into one, and they tried to express it in the material chemical process by uniting the four elements—fire, earth, water, and air—or more psychically, uniting the four temperaments into one. The one, that central thing, was called by many names, the *lapis philosophorum*, *aurum nostrum*, our gold, (which was not the ordinary gold) and many other metaphors. It was very clearly not a chemical body, and one cannot say it was spiritual, because it was as much matter as spirit. It was symbolic, and held a central position; as for instance, the Lamaistic mandala is by no means in heaven, but is always embedded half in the earth and half in the upper world.

The yellow robed ones are surely the Buddhists because the official color is that orange yellow of their robes. It was originally a disreputable color worn by the low castes as a sign of humility and abnegation. The Jews were always characterized by yellow in the Middle Ages; they were made to wear either yellow hats or a yellow ribbon, and in Basel, as late as 1865, Jews had to produce a yellow identification card at the

gates of the city if they wanted to enter. Then the quarantine flag is yellow, meaning contagion, look out! Now we will continue,

There are the terrible ones who carry about in themselves the beast of prey, and have no choice except lusts or self-laceration. And even their lusts are self-laceration.

To whom does he refer here? You know, Nietzsche had great historical knowledge.

Mrs. Baynes: Does he not mean those Christians who first sowed tons of wild oats and then went into the desert and mortified the flesh?

Prof. Jung: Exactly. He could easily mean a man like Raimundus Lullus or Ignatius of Loyola or St. Augustine or Tertullian, who first led very wild lives and then suddenly turned against themselves, turned to self-laceration;⁴ it was the same wildness of instincts, only it was turned to a spiritual purpose.

They have not yet become men, those terrible ones; may they preach desistance from life, and pass away themselves!

It is a very curious thing, but men like Ignatius of Loyola were really heroes; Loyola died among the Moors as a missionary, died the death of a martyr, and martyrs were heroes—only for the purpose of the spirit, were they heroes. And here Nietzsche sees very clearly to what heroism leads; he himself says to make a god of thy seven devils. He also gets sweetness out of his cruelty, transforms wildness into another purpose. But he only sees that in other people, and he thinks it is there something quite different. But whether it is a Nietzsche or an Ignatius of Loyola or any other who turns round and sacrifices himself or lacerates himself for his purpose, he has a heroic attitude. Nobody becomes a hero without turning against himself to a certain extent, for everybody has that rabbit heart within, which defends itself to the last against the hero attitude; if one has only an inkling of heroism one feels very much how one has to turn against oneself. But otherwise one gets nowhere. That particular reproach, that they have not even become men, shows that he sees the inhumanity very clearly, but identifying with Zarathustra is just as inhuman.

⁴ Self-lacerators: Raimundus Lullus or Raymond Lully (1235-1315), Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430), Tertullian (160?-230). Jung's lectures at the Federal Polytechnic Institute on Loyola were in part published in translation in *Spring* 1977 and 1978.

There are the spiritually consumptive ones: hardly are they born when they begin to die, and long for doctrines of lassitude and renunciation.

They would fain be dead, and we should approve of their wish! Let us beware of awakening those dead ones, and of damaging those living coffins!

They meet an invalid, or an old man, or a corpse—and immediately they say: “Life is refuted!”

But they only are refuted, and their eyes, which seeth only one aspect of existence.

Shrouded in thick melancholy, and eager for the little casualties that bring death: thus do they wait, and clench their teeth.

Or else, they grasp at sweetmeats, and mock at their childishness thereby: they cling to their straw of life, and mock at their still clinging to it.

Their wisdom speaketh thus: “A fool, he who remaineth alive; but so far are we fools! And that is the foolishlest thing in life!”

To what does grasping sweetmeats refer? That must be a different case. Surely he does not refer to any religious system.

Mrs. Baumann: Eat drink and be merry, for tomorrow you die.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Epicurean point of view, the ironical worldly standpoint, which is by far the most frequent form of philosophy. Their idea is that it is foolish to live at all, but alas, one lives and makes the best of it. It means nothing but it is a sort of friendly habit to exist. This is an absolutely practical philosophy which has many followers.

“Life is only suffering”: so say others, and lie not. Then see to it that ye cease! See to it that the life ceaseth which is only suffering!

And let this be the teaching of your virtue: “Thou shalt slay thyself! Thou shalt steal away from thyself.”

To whom is he referring here?

Mrs. Crowley: To Schopenhauer.

Prof. Jung: Of course. Nietzsche was a great admirer of Schopenhauer, but later on he became his opponent. Schopenhauer’s point of view became anathema to him because it was very Buddhistic; he was overcome by a great compassion for humanity and the undeniable suffering of life, and therefore said that one should simply cease to will life in order to put an end to that whole phantasmagoria of existence.⁵

⁵ Nietzsche gradually turned against Schopenhauer’s Eastern disparagement of the

"Lust is sin,"—so say some who preach death—"let us go apart and beget no children!"

"Giving birth is troublesome,"—say others—"why still give birth? One beareth only the unfortunate!" And they also are preachers of death.

What famous man would he be indicating here?

Mrs. Baynes: It might be Tolstoi, that was his doctrine.

Dr. Elliot: Not in Nietzsche's day; Tolstoi did not have a philosophy as a young man.⁶

Mrs. Sigg: Malthus?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the birth control man, he wrote before the middle of the nineteenth century, I think between 1840 and 1850, and started a huge noise all over Europe. Of course Nietzsche was much impressed by Malthus because everybody was impressed then.⁷

"Pity is necessary,"—so saith a third party. "Take what I have! Take what I am! So much less doth life bind me!"

Were they consistently pitiful, then would they make their neighbours sick of life. To be wicked—that would be their true goodness.

But they want to be rid of life; what care they if they bind others still faster with their chains and gifts!

Now to whom does this refer? "Take whatever I have. Take whatever I am."

Mrs. Crowley: It could refer to monks.

Prof. Jung: Oh no, they never say to take whatever they possess; they never were quick at giving.

Mrs. Crowley: I thought they gave everything to the monastery.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but they had very good cellars.

Miss Hannah: It sounds Christian. Christ himself preached it.

Prof. Jung: He is not modern enough, and Nietzsche has already

will as the source of all misery, in the growing conviction that the will to power is the best, the essential, thing about man.

⁶ After establishing his reputation with the great novels *War and Peace* (1859) and *Anna Karenina* (1877) Tolstoi's own blend of Freemasonry and Christianity became with the years more hortatory.

⁷ Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) argued that since population increases in a geometrical ratio while the food supply grows at no more than an arithmetical ratio, population must be checked by war, famine, plague—or by such preventative measures as abortion, infanticide, or birth control. His influential *Essay on the Principle of Population* appeared in 1798.

dealt the Christians one mighty blow. After Malthus we must expect somebody a bit more modern.

Mr. Allemann: Marx.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the communistic theory and such ideas, which originated in the second part of the century.

And ye also, to whom life is rough labour and disquiet, are ye not very tired of life? Are ye not very ripe for the sermon of death?

All ye to whom rough labour is dear, and the rapid, new, and strange—ye put up with yourselves badly; your diligence is flight, and the will to self-forgetfulness.

If ye believed more in life, then would ye devote yourselves less to the momentary. But for waiting, ye have not enough of capacity in you—nor even for idling!

What would this be?

Mrs. Baynes: It is the tired business man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he refers to the main characteristic of the second part of the nineteenth century, industry, business life, and the tired business man.

Everywhere resoundeth the voice of those who preach death; and the earth is full of those to whom death hath to be preached.

Or “life eternal”; it is all the same to me—if only they pass away quickly!

He wipes out practically the whole generation of men; only a few remain and they will be killed by lightning. This is pretty radical: he just takes the sponge and wipes out whatever has been written on the black-board of history, a thorough remedy. This is important. It conveys the idea that everything that exists must be done away with because it is not worth continuing. What does that imply?

Mrs. Sigg: Making a new beginning.

Prof. Jung: Yes, uprooting the whole of actual mankind, producing a complete revolution, in order to prepare the ground for a new world.

Mrs. Adler: It seems to me to be very funny and compensatory, because Nietzsche had in reality absolutely no interest in life; he pictures such things, but people who are very near to life are more careful and conservative.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but Nietzsche is not speaking. Nietzsche is a young man who has been struck by lightning; Zarathustra, the spirit, is speaking. And the spirit is like a mighty elementary phenomenon which

comes when it wants to come and destroys what pleases it to destroy. You see, the spirit did not ask whether we were ready to have a new century or a new world, but simply comes when it is ready and destroys whatever resists. So Nietzsche is not moved by human considerations at all; he is simply following the intimations of Zarathustra's spirit.

We come now to the next chapter, "War and Warriors." What is the logical sequence between this title and the preceding one, "The Preachers of Death"?

Mrs. Baumann: Would it be war to destroy the world?

Prof. Jung: Yes, war ever has been the means of destruction, and that is what he is preaching, obviously. The question is, of course, what form the destruction would take, and the unconscious already prepares the answer. It would mean war or at least a warlike attitude which is ready to strike and to destroy, an absolutely reckless readiness, even. Now, here I must speak again about the peculiar prophetic quality of these two chapters. You see, one could say it was not logical; it simply flows out of him, and has obviously the quality thought and imagery. Yet it is just as much fact, because the spirit of Zarathustra is, one could say, the mirror of the flow of events which are potential facts, though they do not yet exist. Our unconscious has two aspects: the one is the past or the remains of the past, and the other is the future, or marks of the future. The unconscious can flow out in a sort of backward flow, to things that reach into the past far beyond an individual existence; as you know, one can go back in time for thousands of years—or one can go forward. Zarathustra is directed to the things which are to come; the past only comes in inasmuch as it is the building material of a new future. He mirrors the images of the potentialities of the collective unconscious—what is likely to be—so when he speaks of death and the preachers of death, it is not mere words; one could designate that as a potential fact, that which the unconscious holds in store for times to come. Whenever somebody speaks directly out of the unconscious, one must always keep in mind that those are mirrored facts and truly prophetic: a true prophet mirrors the flow of potential facts.

So these chapters are pregnant with the future. They illustrate what is going on in our days, for instance; we have had a good deal of wiping out and it seems we are not yet through with it. He says, "marred is life by the many-too-many," and, you know, people talk a great deal nowadays of the overpopulation—and certainly Central Europe is overpopulated. We are deeply impressed in Switzerland with the fact that we cannot possibly nourish our population of five millions; we can only produce food enough for two millions, and what about the other three

million if we should have to shut our frontiers, for instance, if we could not buy? It is pretty obvious that they would go by the board. Italy has a teeming population and they are preaching death, sending division after division to Abyssinia to nourish the mosquitos there; that is a serious attempt at bloodletting. So, for the wiping-out idea, war is a matter of discussion in our unconscious as one of the most suitable means of destruction. Our unconscious is full of destructive schemes—that is just the fact; of course, not so much the personal unconscious, but if we go a bit deeper into the truly collective layers, we find such a tendency. Therefore, there is a general veil of fear over Europe of a threatening and very obscure future; one suspects fate of playing a huge trick. Every country is arming to the teeth in order to be ready for peace; because of that fear even most peaceful people are thinking of weapons and fortresses. We see that most clearly expressed in France; the French mentality is filled with fear. On the day when Hitler declared general military service, the Frenchmen did not even go to their beloved cafés. They deserted their habitual places on the boulevards, because they thought in the next moment bombs would be coming down upon Paris. That is characteristic; the atmosphere is electric with fear and with possibilities of war. These two chapters really show the unconscious preparation of the future.

Mrs. Baumann: I want to ask whether you see in the dreams or fantasies of your patients, pictures of general conditions, and if you do see them, how do you distinguish between the personal and the political?

Prof. Jung: As a rule you don't see these things, because most of my patients are not concerned with the welfare of the world. They are much more concerned with their personal welfare, so they produce pictures which have a far more personal significance. Prophetic dreams are rare; prophecies that are merely for the next day are quite frequent, but they are unimportant or only of a subjective importance. The true prophecy demands *size* always and not everybody can boast of having that quality. You see, Nietzsche was such a fellow.

Mrs. Jung: It seems to me that it is not only destruction that one sees here; it could also represent an attitude to life, linking up again with the hero spirit that he has praised before. So I think it is also a positive thing, a positive attitude to life, not necessarily destructive.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true. But it is really destructive *here*, and then during the course of the chapter the *enantiodromia* takes place which prepares the next chapter, "The New Idol," where he comes to the idea of the remedy. For the unconscious never sticks to utter destruction. The unconscious is the spirit of life, the stream of events that

go on and on. The unconscious does not know death or complete destruction, but only knows change and usually change according to the law of *enantiodromia*. So it is always a relative destruction, but I think a relatively far-reaching destruction is meant here. If it is only as far-reaching as the world war it is already of a good size!—and the unconscious is envisaging catastrophies which even exceed the world war.

Mrs. Sigg: I think this sentence, “Ye shall be those whose eyes ever seek for an enemy—for *your* enemy,” could be taken as a prophecy of modern psychology.

Prof. Jung: Yes but wait until we come to it!

Mrs. Adler: In your lecture at the University about the anima, you spoke about a man who heard voices; in that case I suppose the prophecy was spoken; it came through voices.⁸

Prof. Jung: In that case, the voice was chiefly concerned with personal things. There were some general hints, yet with a very personal application not concerned with world events. It was always the personal attitude to a possible change in the surroundings. But the object was not changed in the surroundings, only the change of the personal attitude; and there was little of prophetic material even there.

Mrs. Adler: But don’t you find in many cases of hysteria, for instance, very great suffering in the collective unconscious?

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, that is true, but you find that everywhere; the general situation mirrors itself in every case of neurosis. As everybody has a collective aspect, everybody is suffering in his financial dealings, for instance, from the actual world crisis. That goes very deep in many cases. Everybody is mentally affected by actual events and by the general situation. Perhaps one could say that nowadays one quarter of the Swiss population is affected by mental illness. Insanity is spreading; there are very abnormal mental conditions prevailing in Europe, and everybody is more or less affected by it. But it is characteristic for the ordinary neurotic that to him in the first place it is personal suffering. You see, as soon as somebody is threatened with a loss, even if the loss is worldwide and everybody is concerned with it, that person is concerned personally in it, and handles it as if it were his own case and not a general one. For instance, it is always an enormous revelation to certain patients when they come out of their analysis to hear me talk about other cases. Then they discover that other people have similar symptoms when they had thought that they were the only ones on God’s

⁸ No separate lecture on the anima has been discovered from this period, so it is probable that the reference is to some portion of the Children’s Dream Seminar at the ETH.

earth who had had such experiences. It is amazing to what extent people, particularly through suffering, are concentrated upon themselves; they become autoerotic to the *n*th degree and forget all the rest of humanity who might be suffering from exactly the same evils as their own. But it is true as Goethe says in *Faust*:

On Sundays and holidays what I adore
Is a talk about war, with all of its scare,
Whilst far off in Turkey the foreign folk there
Continue to fight just as much as before.
One stands at the window, sipping one's glass,
Watching the flagged vessels glide down the river;
When night comes, then one is contented to pass
Homewards, blessing peace and our era forever.⁹

But if that same fellow should be hit by a bullet, then the whole world would disappear. This is just human and quite universal. Now we will go on with our text:

By our best enemies we do not want to be spared, nor by those either whom we love from the very heart. So let me tell you the truth!

My brethren in war! I love you from the very heart. I am, and was ever, your counterpart. And I am also your best enemy. So let me tell you the truth!

I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. Ye are not great enough not to know of hatred and envy. Then be great enough not to be ashamed of them!

What does he reveal here? Always in the beginning of such a chapter a thought which has been unconscious before comes to the daylight. You see, when you hear somebody talk of a general wiping out, you may safely take him aside and ask why he wants to wipe out those people, what his personal motive is. You remember Nietzsche was a retired professor who lived by the benevolence and goodheartedness of very nice citizens of Basel. I knew an old lady myself who spent several thousands francs a year to support Professor Nietzsche. And when he lived in the Engadine he emphasized very much how beautiful it was to be six thousand feet above the normal. So what does he reveal here? It is very mean to point to it.

Mr. Allemann: His own hate and meanness against other people.

⁹ Jung is here citing the Alice Raphael translation with slight variations (Act I, Sc. ii).

Prof. Jung: Well, his own hatred and envy of those people who lived in the *fact*, who could cope with this world. You see, there is no man, even if he is an exceedingly gifted genius, who is entirely free from that very normal envy of the ordinary well-being. And Nietzsche never felt well; he was entirely isolated. Nobody understood him; all his so-called friends stared at him with deep apprehension because they wondered what was coming next. They were afraid of him and felt already the insanity in the things he wrote. So he was really in a position that could not be called agreeable. Nothing is more natural than that he should hate and envy those people who could cope with ordinary life. One sees that every day in neurotic people who are forced through their condition to live a type of life which is not, and cannot be, the ordinary type. How they envy those who can live the ordinary life within conventions, within the ordinary expectations! For instance, the people who can enjoy the ordinary pleasures and amusements of others, who find it a particular pleasure to sit together with all their relatives every Sunday. Or to be in a society where the only link is that they were all born in the same year; or who walk behind a flag with a band, perfectly happy and most serious, enjoying their pleasure. People who are isolated by a particular fate always feel envy and hatred of those who can live the life they find. So it would be more natural if, instead of saying, "I know the hatred and envy of your hearts," he should say, "I know the hatred and envy of *my* heart." But since it is Zarathustra who speaks—he has not a human heart—therefore, it is projected; to Zarathustra it is they who feel envy. As spirit he does not feel hate nor envy, but just wisdom. Nietzsche on the other hand would feel that he belongs to these people. "Ye are not great enough not to know of hatred and envy," means that he is not demon enough not to feel hatred and envy.

And if ye cannot be saints of knowledge, then, I pray you, be at least its warriors. They are the companions and forerunners of such saintship.

Here, you see what he understands by warriors; they are not beyond hatred and envy, and don't need to be great, but they can be at least warriors of knowledge, even if they are not the saints. Now, of what knowledge should they be the warriors?

Miss Wolff: Of truth perhaps, because he says, "Let me tell you the truth."

Prof. Jung: But what is that truth?

Mrs. Crowley: Does it not mean the prophetic knowledge, those facts that Zarathustra is feeling, sensing in the future?

Prof. Jung: Yes, he means the knowledge he preaches, the knowledge of the Superman. You see, in spite of the fact that they are not saints, not perfect, they are subject to the very human and very personal motives of hatred and envy, they can be warriors. One can win a battle even with bad soldiers.

I see many soldiers; could I but see many warriors! "Uniform" one calleth what they wear; may it not be uniform what they there-with hide!

What does this mean?

Mrs. Baumann: Would that they were individuals instead of a collective group.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in speaking of warriors, he instantly thinks of soldiers naturally; yet soldiers are in uniform, which means absolutely collective with no personalities whatever. They are not responsible man for man, but are only responsible as a body. It is always the danger of such organizations that the individual becomes broken in to such an extent that personality is lost. Of course one called that in German already before the war, *Kadaver-gehorsam*, which means the blind obedience of corpses; they don't exist in reality. They are only obedient images. So here he hints at the idea of individuation; they should not be uniformed. They should be themselves.

Ye shall be those whose eyes ever seek for an enemy—for *your* enemy. And with some of you there is hatred at first sight.

What does he mean by that? Now, Mrs. Sigg.

Mrs. Sigg: I should think the important thing in the chapter before is that Nietzsche himself does not see his own individual enemy because he has projected it—does not see his own hostility against life.

Prof. Jung: Well, the idea is that our worst enemy is always our own enemy, the enemy we harbor within our own system; and we should find that enemy and give him a chance to fight us. He is very much in favor of equal enemies, not one to be despised but really hated. So "*your* enemy" means that you should seek the conflict within yourself; the war here takes on an entirely new aspect. One was inclined to think of this war as a general universal phenomenon, but ere he makes a peculiar break and suddenly the whole thing which seemed to be outside, a political war, becomes a war within the individual. It is not *the* enemy you shall seek, but *your* enemy, and that of course gives an entirely

different aspect to the whole question of war and warriors. One could almost say that this is the place, as Mrs. Sigg has pointed out quite correctly, where modern psychology begins. It begins with a sort of self-criticism—with the question “What is against me?” If I cannot do what I like then something must be against me, and it must be something strong, at least as strong as myself and perhaps stronger because it really can hinder me from doing what I want to do. And that enemy is nowhere outside.

Of course all neuroses begin with the illusion that it is outside. Somebody outside works tricks against them, people above or below them have sort of electric rays that make them jump; they think that the Jesuits are against them, or the international institution of waiters or porters, as a former patient of mine thought. Every neurotic has a *bête noire* somewhere, the mother or the father, or this person or that person who has bad intentions. Or if a certain things had not happened, if the circumstances were different, all would be well. But put them in different surroundings and they discover that the same old thing begins again, because they carry the enemy within; they can go where they please but the enemy is always in themselves. Of course it takes a couple of months or even a year in new surroundings to find this out, because they have the feeling that in new conditions everything will be different—all the old worries will be left behind. But then things go wrong and they discover where the devils are, and then they cannot understand how people learned about their secrets and think they must have been in connection with their former acquaintances.

For instance, the patient I mentioned was a lawyer, a highly intelligent man, and he was persecuted by the waiters in cafés; they always stuck their heads together and laughed and he knew they had certain thoughts about him. *He* had certain thoughts of course—that he was homosexual. So he went to the station and bought a ticket to a small place called Brugg near Zürich, and then he walked over the mountain through the woods to another station on the same line where he took a ticket to Basel. Then by crooked ways he ran through the town of Basel to the German station where he took a ticket to Freiburg; there he hid himself and ten hours later he took a train to Hamburg, and then he knew that he had *dépisté*¹⁰ his enemies and everything was all right—he had escaped them. But in just half a year he noticed that a waiter winked to another one when he entered a café. Of course he began to think furiously in what way they could have detected his where-

¹⁰ *Dépisté*: put off the track.

abouts. He speculated how they could possibly have found out, and finally he came to the conclusion that there must be an international journal for waiters through which they exchanged news, that they had a secret paper issued in which was a sort of *signalement* of the people they wanted to persecute. But he never could discover such a paper. That happens to neurotics; usually after a sort of incubation time all the troubles begin in a new place. That is the reason why so many people move continuously. I met a lady who had travelled three times round the world in order to escape circumstances, but she always came to a world where there were still circumstances.

LECTURE VII

19 June 1935

Prof. Jung:

We will continue our text.

Your enemy shall ye seek; your war shall ye wage, and for the sake of your thoughts!

Here Zarathustra touches upon an idea which seems to become true in modern psychology, as we said last week.

And if your thoughts succumb, your uprightness shall still shout triumph thereby!

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the long.

You I advise not to work, but to fight. You I advise not to peace, but to victory. Let your work be a fight, let your peace be a victory!

One can only be silent and sit peacefully when one hath arrow and bow; otherwise one prateth and quarrelleth. Let your peace be a victory!

Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause.

War and courage have done more great things than charity. Not your sympathy, but your bravery hath hitherto saved the victims.

Much of this sounds rather familiar—you can read similar things in newspapers and in certain modern literature. Now inasmuch as such teaching is understood as the education of a nation, it is of very doubtful value, but understood as educational teaching for an individual it is an entirely different case; it teaches the importance of conflict. War on the objective plane is of course what war is generally understood to be, but war on a subjective plane means the conflict within the individual. What is good within is not necessarily good without, in spite of the

fact that Heraclitus said that war was the father of all things;¹ it is a very doubtful father—well, fathers are often doubtful. Nietzsche's sermon is ambiguous here; we don't know whether he is preaching a belligerent attitude which shows itself in the politics of states, or whether he preaches the individual conflict. If it is the latter, I must subscribe to it, because nobody gets anywhere who has no conflict: we need the conflict and the willingness to accept it. For conflict is the origin of our psychological energy—there can be no energy without it. We must have conflict, otherwise we don't live.

We might assume here that Nietzsche hides in this paragraph the intuition of individuation. For conflict is absolutely indispensable for individuation. You cannot individuate as long as you are identical with your aims and activities because they are always only one aspect, and if you identify with only one aspect of yourself you are merely an autonomous function, an autonomous aspect of yourself. But if you accept the conflict between two or several aspects of personality, you have a chance to individuate, because you then need a center between the conflicting tendencies; then individuation makes sense. If you are identical with only one aspect of yourself, you are naturally up against the unconscious, and then it looks as if your enemy were outside of yourself; at least you don't understand why you should be opposed from within because you only see that one tendency with which you are identical, and do not see the opposing tendencies.² So you project your aspects into other people who then become your *bête noire*. They seem to be the cause of your defeat or your neurosis; one likes to accuse father and mother or a wrong education or enemies in order to excuse oneself for one's own defeat. You see, if Nietzsche really means the individual here, this is really good advice; but if he is haranguing a politically excited crowd, then it is cheap stuff—no good, bad filling of newspaper columns.

"What is good?" ye ask. To be brave is good. Let the little girls say: "To be good is what is pretty, and at the same time touching."

I think this "what is good, ye ask" is due to a feeling of ambiguity and doubtfulness. He asks himself, "Is this sermon I am preaching really

¹ Heraclitus (fl. c. 500), Jung's favorite pre-Socratic philosopher by virtue of the importance he attached to process and opposition, had as one of his dark, gnomic sayings: "War is both father and king of all; some he has shown forth as gods and others as men, some he has made slaves and others free" (Fragment 25 tr. Philip Wheelwright).

² Jung chose the name *complex* for those parts of the psyche that split off and try to represent themselves as the whole. See "A Review of the Complex Theory," CW 8.

good stuff?" Then of course he is not referring to real little maidens who are pretty and pathetic. The German text is unmistakable: it means that good is something pretty and pathetic. That is also a certain point of view, exceedingly harmless. He means here that it is good to be brave. He is, as I said, in doubt, so he extracts the idea of being brave from his sermon as having to do with war; the warrior is at least brave. Of course you can also apply it to the individual again and then this little passage would mean: it is a good thing to face one's own problem, one's own conflict, and it won't do to have a sort of sweetish point of view concerning morality, a morality that is just pretty and pathetic. Here my word *pathetic* has nothing to do with the German *pathetisch*; it means touching, *rührend*.

They call you heartless: but your heart is true, and I love the bashfulness of your goodwill. Ye are ashamed of your flow, and others are ashamed of their ebb.

Ye are ugly? Well then, my brethren, take the sublime about you, the mantle of the ugly!

Now, this seems to be mighty good advice: cover yourself with the sublime or the austere in order to hide the ugly. If that were possible! In contemporary history you see many such cases, where they have tried to put on the mantle of the sublime over things which are really ugly. And if you think of the subjective application of this sermon, you can see how impossible such advice would be. It would not do to cover up your ugliness by the mantle of the sublime because too many people could see the ass's ears or hooves coming out from under the lion's skin.

And when your soul becometh great, then doth it become haughty, and in your sublimity there is malice [wickedness]. I know you.

This is again a funny thing in Nietzsche. At times he gets quite coquettish—like an old maid, you know—with his own malice. Whenever I read such a passage I think of the bust of Voltaire by Houdon in the foyer of the Comédie Française: that exceedingly malicious and ironical look. It needs a Frenchman—it needs just Monsieur Voltaire—to have that malice, yet Nietzsche is always coquetting with it; but he is much too naive. When you read, for instance, Voltaire's *Romans et Contes Philosophiques*, then you know what malice is; he is marvelous in that respect. Or when you read the numerous anecdotes from his

life—even on his deathbed he had that divine malice which Nietzsche would like to have. You see, in this case he ought to *be* malicious.³

Prof. Reichstein: I was wondering whether it could be taken that the mantle of ugliness itself would be the sublime. It could mean just to cover the ugly, but in the German text it could also mean the contrary, that the mantle itself is the ugly thing, just to keep it round you.

Prof. Jung: Grammatically, yes, you are right, but I am a little doubtful about that meaning.

Prof. Reichstein: If you are ugly, to just say you are ugly and not to cover it would be the best you could do. That would make better sense with all the fighting—not to try to make the ugliness nice but to take it as it is. Then it would be sublime.

Mrs. Crowley: That seems to fit in with the next verse also.

Prof. Jung: But it doesn't quite fit in with the general tenor of *Zarathustra*. You see, he uses that idea later on in his conception of the ugliest man. There he really speaks of ugliness, and as you know he rejects the ugliest man: there is nothing sublime about him. So I rather think—together with the doubt “what is good?”—it would mean, “Now what is ugly? Do you think you are ugly, or do you appear as ugly? Well then, cover yourself up by the sublime in accepting your ugliness.” For instance, the pale criminal is the one who does not accept fully the fact that he is a criminal; if he could only accept it he would not be pale, and then he would be in a way sublime. So if they accept ugliness they might possess austerity. Certain people are so ugly that they really are austere. Have you ever seen the picture of the ugly Tyrolese Duchess? She was the ugliest woman in history—the ugliest that was ever portrayed; I don't doubt there have been other monsters. She was just a monster, highly interesting, and one could say sublime in her ugliness, a real masterpiece of ugliness. So you see I would rather take it in the same way that we understood the pale criminal; as far as I can make out, the austere or the sublime is a cover for the ugliness. I am glad to accept your idea, but that is the way it looks to me. This verse, “And when your soul becometh great,” etc., would mean, then, that the soul does not hide itself any longer and that is sublimity, austerity. You see, becoming proud or *übermütig*⁴ is like an inflation, and an inflated person surely will not hide his light from other people, but will show his

³ This volume of *Philosophical Romance and Tales* contains *Candide* and other satires. On his deathbed when the curate of his parish asked Voltaire to acknowledge the divinity of Jesus, he turned away saying, “Let me die in peace,” and he did.

⁴ Common has “haughty.” Other possibilities are “in high spirits,” “frolicsome,” and even “wanton.”

hand, will manifest himself so that he can be seen; he is so filled with the idea of himself that in his own eyes he is perfect or great, and he thinks other people will see him as he sees himself. Therefore, all his ugliness comes to the foreground, and then it could be called sublime; there is an austerity about it. Yet Nietzsche says the austerity is malicious.

Now, in how far that austerity is malicious is not easily to be seen. You see, Nietzsche has a funny kind of attitude toward the austere or sublime; it is almost as if he were afraid of it. It sounds too good, like the austerity of somebody who has renounced life or overcome himself; that sounds like perfection which has a very bad smell and it had a particularly bad smell in his days. So it is almost necessary for him to put a point on that sublimity which makes it less moral or less beautiful; he cannot acknowledge or recognize it fully without putting a certain sting into it, a certain resentment and that is this maliciousness. Sublimity would be almost too dangerous also, because he has said so many disagreeable things about sublime people that it would mean having to contradict himself. Therefore, he must call it malicious, a *Bosheit*,⁵ a sort of joke, as Voltaire would surely do. You know, when Monsieur Arouet de Voltaire, the father of the French enlightenment, the worst mouth in Europe, came to die, and the Abbé who came to take his confession asked him if he regretted all his sins, he said: "*Mais oui, je regrette tous mes péchés, surtout ceux que je n'ai pas commis.*"⁶ That is malicious, the sublime and the ridiculous in one. That is the pathos of Voltaire, that to the very last, with his last breath, he is malicious. But Nietzsche is not, he is *pathetisch*, an expressive actor of his own tragedy.

Mrs. Sigg: Is it not just the way Zarathustra treated the Jews before? He put on a sublime attitude but he was quite malicious to them.

Prof. Jung: No, he is not malicious, he talks about it, but he is sentimental.

Mrs. Sigg: It is *Bosheit*.

Prof. Jung: No, read Voltaire. There is really a poisonous sting, and Nietzsche has not that refinement, one could say.

Mrs. Baynes: Nietzsche is much too serious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and maliciousness is never serious.

Mrs. Fierz: Has this kind of maliciousness a faint resemblance to his dancer idea?

⁵ For *Bosheit*, Hollingdale* also has "wickedness," and Kaufmann*, "sarcasm." Another possibility is "badness."

⁶ Voltaire said, "But yes, I regret all my sins, especially those which I did not commit."

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The dancing idea is also a making light of things which are really very heavy. He is much impressed by the weight of things, he is awfully serious, and so he makes light of them. But you don't feel the lightness; you are never really taken off your feet as it were, never lifted from the ground. There is too much pathos in it—it is too heavy, too sentimental. While if you read a good joke in Voltaire you laugh, you cannot help yourself; it is light, liberated. Nietzsche was a great admirer of the French, and of just the French aphorists who had developed this art of turning a whole situation by one word, but he never succeeds; he is a master of language sure enough, and he has also made many good jokes, but he is too German, too serious.

Mrs. Sigg: I think there is no word in the German language that has exactly the meaning of maliciousness.

Prof. Jung: Of course not. *Bosheit* weighs about ten tons, it is not light: it has not the sting of a wasp. The French *malicieux* is a Latin word; it is just not German, and it designates something which cannot be translated, as the German word *gemütlich* cannot be translated. The Frenchman's equivalent for *gemütlich* is a café with marble tables on a boulevard, or a *salon* where the *Gemüt* would freeze to death.

Mrs. Crowley: Is it due to a lack of real feeling in the German?

Prof. Jung: No, it is just the peculiar capacity of the German to pack so many things together in his sentiment, a whole museum of realities; *Gemütlichkeit* is anything from bacon and beer up to a guitar—it is inimitable. So his idea that in sublimity there is malice is an attempt to make sublimity something light, somewhat unreal, but he does not succeed. If you want to know how a very serious thing can be made light, read *Candide* by Voltaire, read his talk with Pangloss, the philosopher, who suffers from a very disreputable disease about which he is very optimistic in order to make light of it. See how Voltaire treats that subject and you see what maliciousness is and what making light of a difficult thing can be. You will then understand also that the German language is absolutely incapable of producing such a word. The very words in French are so detached, so abstract, so refined, so definite, that you really can isolate one thing against another. But the German words to designate anything emotional or sentimental are so full of earth that they are just heavy. The lightest things you can find in German are certain light sentiments—a German waltz, for instance, is light—but it is not the lightness of France. It is still a feeling with blood in it and some earth; yes, it is a dance but you see the weight of the sentiment in the dance; it has nothing whatever to do with the French *sentiment*.

Nietzsche says, then, that in sublimity there is malice—he hopes

there is malice—that the sublime is not so terribly sublime. If it really reached the highest stage it would show a hook. It does, mind you; if anyone happens to be sublime then sure enough he is the victim of it. What can he do? He is nothing but sublime. And if anyone is really good, what can he do against that? He is nothing but good and he is a victim of it, for without anything bad he has lost his freedom. Therefore I always fight against it when the theologians say God is good. Meister Eckhart says God is not good because if he were good he could be better. That is true. Moreover I would say he loses his freedom because he is then bound to be good, can do nothing but good, which would be a very grave restriction to his omnipotence and is surely not meant. So sublimity has a drawback somewhere because of its one-sidedness. If you have to do with sublime people you feel the maliciousness; it is a fact that they are victims of sublimity and then they are poisonous bores. But it is a malignity of fate; it is something malign and not exactly malicious, an evil thing because it is so perfect. All the shadow and evil is suppressed and naturally pours forth somewhere else. Nothing is more boring and more destructive for one's morality than a relation to undoubtedly Good People: it is disastrous. Children of very good people must become morally defective in order to compensate for that goodness, and naturally the sublime must be compensated for right away by the unfortunate partners in the game. That is the real malice in perfect sublimity. And the one who can compensate for his own sublimity by a hook or by a flaw, say, is never quite sublime. So you cannot have both. It is a supernatural freedom he aspires to because it is humanly impossible to have both things at the same time.

In wickedness the haughty man and the weakling meet. But they misunderstand one another. I know you.

Ye shall only have enemies to be hated, but not enemies to be despised. Ye must be proud of your enemies; then, the successes of your enemies are also your successes.

Resistance—that is the distinction of the slave. Let your distinction be obedience. Let your commanding itself be obeying.

Again, if this is for the crowd it is hardly worth listening to; if it is meant for the individual, it is something else—then it makes sense. For instance, that you shall not have enemies whom you despise means you shall not despise the enemy in yourself; you may hate him but you must not despise him, for you would then despise yourself. If you hate something in yourself, that is a real conflict. Also you can be proud of your enemy because you can conclude as to your own qualities if you

know your enemy; if you have in yourself a particularly bad enemy you know that you have something particularly good on the other side. Then also, "Resistance—that is the distinction of the slave. Let your distinction be obedience." If you apply that to the individual, of course it makes sense—otherwise it makes none; to let your very command be obedience, would mean, obey yourself.

To the good warrior soundeth "thou shalt" pleasanter than "I will." And all that is dear unto you, ye shall first have it commanded unto you.

That is also a very good idea when applied to the individual. If you say "I will," it is usually an inflation because as a matter of fact you don't will it; but if you feel it as "thou shalt," it is in a way easier to accept—also it is more true because the self is not identical with the ego. The ego says "I will," the self says "thou shalt." So the ego feels as if somebody had said "thou shalt"; and that is true—at all events it is more true than "I will," and more efficient. In that sense everybody should be aware of the warrior in his own self, accept his superior insight as a "thou shalt" and never as "I will." If the latter is true, you are in danger of an inflation because you can only carry that responsibility as far as your ego reaches; you cannot carry it as far as your self reaches, because that is beyond your responsibility. Your responsibility is one aspect, one function of the self, but it has other aspects; irresponsibility is also an aspect of the self. Nietzsche means something like that when he speaks of that which is beyond good and evil. The Superman is beyond good and evil but the Superman is the self.

Let your love to life be love to your highest hope; and let your highest hope be the highest thought of life!

Nietzsche says something here which is really a foundation of a new morality, one could say. Formerly the idea was, that whatever was pleasant to the gods was good. Of course a primitive chief would say that what was good for himself was good, and what was good for the other and bad for himself was necessarily bad; he has no other point of view. Later on, as I said, the idea would be that the word of God tells you what is good, and you are bad if you don't fulfil it; you must not stand against that standpoint. Now, inasmuch as these metaphysical concepts have disappeared, we are surely in need of a new foundation. By what standard can we say that a thing is good? We must have some sort of measurement. Well, life would be such a standard: for instance, whatever is vital is of moral importance.

Of course one would refrain from using the word *good* there because it has acquired a particular quality in the history of morality; you know very well that the vital thing is not just good as we understand that word. But you cannot deny it is vital, and that being the case you can also not deny that it looks to you as if there were something good about it, something worthwhile. Perhaps you would say that to decide a thing in such and such a way would be good and moral, but then you see that it is not vital to decide it in that way; so a more vital solution should be sought, allowing life to be lived. But you cannot call it good, despite the fact that you feel it to be more worthwhile than to seek a moral issue. We call too many things good which have lost their vitality altogether; they are no longer worthwhile, no longer living. And there are other things that never have been called particularly good, but sure enough, they convey more life—are not only vital in themselves but also provide a much better basis for living. They give forms or possibilities which enrich life. We have plenty of moral ideas which impoverish life and we think it is even good to do so, but then we discover that we do it not for any moral reasons but out of sheer cowardice—just cowardice and pretext; we hide our cowardice behind moral laws, and it doesn't help very much to believe in their validity. In modern times, we have therefore become very doubtful about moral standards and the so-called idea that a thing is good or bad. The only question is: "Is it vital? Does it help life?" You see, we have now learned to think of life as a fact, not as a wilful and arbitrary affair of certain individuals. Life in itself is a great fact and we assume that it has its laws quite irrespective of our codes of morality; we feel more and more that our moral code is inadequate to deal with life.

That point of view is not altogether modern; we find it already in the Mandaean Gnosis of John the Baptizer, the initiator of Christ, who was one of the representatives of that secret teaching. In the Book of John one is astonished to find at the end of each chapter that almost epical phrase: "And the Life be praised, victorious was Life." They had the idea that the "understanding of life" was the savior: their savior was that *Mandâ d'hayyê*,⁷ the Gnosis of life. They believed that the understanding of life was the supreme knowledge—that the ultimate decision about human action was given through life itself. So the whole of history, as they saw it, was a question of whether life would be victorious or not, a sort of shout of triumph that life was again victorious.

⁷ *Mandâ*: gnosis, knowledge. On the apocryphal Book of John, see G.R.S. Mead, *The Gnostic John the Baptizer* (London, 1924). See *Dream Sem.*, pp. 240, 520.

Peculiarly enough there is the same epical ending in a book by Zola, and he could not have known of the Book of John, because that has only very lately been translated; it was written in the Southern Babylonian Aramaic, a lost language which even existing adherents of that belief were unable to read; a German scholar has deciphered it again only very recently. Yet in one of Zola's books, I think it is *Fécondité*, one finds exactly the same ending to the chapters, "And victorious was life."⁸ Now, Nietzsche says, "Let your highest hope be the highest thought of life." One could say just as well, "Let life be your highest thought of hope." Then you would put nothing above the fact of life, but Nietzsche puts something over or above life, a hope and a concept of life. But life itself should decide, as it always does in reality. We cannot hide the fact any longer from our philosophical consideration that life ultimately decides and that those are the decisions which are valid and always come true, despite all attempts of man to restrict life, to canalize and to organize it: finally life will break through all barriers.

Your highest concept [thoughts], however, ye shall have it commanded unto you by me—and it is this: man is something that is to be surpassed.

Have you any argument against this sentence?

Mr. Allemann: That man has to be surmounted is destructive to life; man is living, man is the highest idea.

Prof. Jung: Yes, if man doesn't live, what else is there?

Mrs. Sigg: I have no sympathy for that sentence, that he will command.

Mrs. Adler: It is just logic that if *he* commands, it is not *our* highest idea, and that cannot be accepted. The command of the highest idea of another might be too high for us.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it would be a concept in place of life; that is the thing we cannot agree with.

Mrs. Baynes: It does not seem to me destructive to say that man must be surmounted; it does not mean that humanity must be killed, but should keep on growing.

Miss Wolff: I think Nietzsche means that man must be surmounted in order to become the Superman.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it cannot be taken so literally. But the first part of the sentence, "Your highest concept, however, ye shall have it commanded unto you by me . . ." needs a lot of interpretation. This sentence only

⁸ Zola's *Fécondité* was translated by E. A. Vizetelly as *Fruitfulness* (New York, 1923).

becomes acceptable if one assumes that Zarathustra represented the Superman as being the self of everybody. If that were the case, then one could accept whatever is commanded, because as I said, it is true. It corresponds with the actual psychological fact when we accept the command of the self as a "thou shalt," the self being not identical with the ego. So here, if you understand that Zarathustra is the self of everybody, then that self can command us, and whatever it commands is the highest thought. But I don't like that word *concept* there; a concept is already an abstraction from life; if instead the sentence were, "Ye shall accept your *life* as commanded by me," I could accept it—naturally with the supposition that Zarathustra is the self of everybody.

Mrs. Jung: In the German text it is *Gedanke* which is not the same as concept, it is something more living. Would it not be rather translated by "idea"?

Prof. Jung: That is true, *Gedanke* is milder; *concept* is much too sharp, too definite. It is less offensive in the German text; you can leave it as it is. *Gedanke* is wide enough. You see, *conceptus* means something that is completely caught, a concept, a thing you have grasped, while *Gedanke* is not necessarily: you can have *Gedanke*, ideas, which you have not grasped; as a rule our ideas are like free birds in the air which we have not yet caught or grasped.

Mrs. Crowley: It is "thought" in this translation. Would "your highest thought" be the equivalent in English.

Prof. Jung: Yes, "thought" is acceptable.

Mrs. Crowley: May I ask what you mean by Zarathustra being the self of everybody—doesn't that make him collective?

Prof. Jung: Well, inasmuch as Zarathustra is Nietzsche's Superman, or Nietzsche's self, and inasmuch as we accept the idea that man has a self and that "Zarathustra" is an apt expression for the self, we can say that "Zarathustra" might symbolize the self of everybody. For instance, instead of calling Zarathustra the self, call him Nietzsche's genius, or god; then inasfar as we accept the possibility that everybody has a relation to God we can say he is the God of everybody.

Mrs. Crowley: Yes, I can see it that way, but not in the way of command.

Prof. Jung: Well, if there is a god, you will be under a command; otherwise it is not a god. So if you accept the idea of the self you are under the command of the self because your ego is only a part.

Mrs. Crowley: You mean of a self, not the self. How could everybody be under the command of the same self?

Prof. Jung: The point is that we don't know how far that self reaches.

Inasmuch as we agree that Zarathustra is very modern and vital, we can be in doubt whether "Zarathustra" does not express, at least to a certain degree, the self under whose command we are actually living.

The last sentences are mere rhetoric:

So live your life of obedience and of war! What matter about long life! What warrior wisheth to be spared!

I spare you not, I love you from my very heart, my brethren in war!

Now, we come to the chapter called, "The New Idol," and that new idol, as you will have seen in the first verse, is the state. What is the transition? How does the chapter on war and warriors lead over to the new idol, the state? You see, we are just following the steps of history.

Mrs. Baumann: If the chapter we have just finished is dealing with the individual, as it seems to be, then the next thing will probably be a collective consideration.

Prof. Jung: Yes, *if* it is dealing with individuals, but I am afraid that it is not just dealing with individuals. The two aspects are confusing. You see, Nietzsche's intuition is right as applied to the individual, but through the identification of the human individual Nietzsche with the archetype Zarathustra, it becomes generalized and has also a collective aspect. So he anticipates the possibility, which for us is already a historical fact, that what ought to be taking place in the individual is happening collectively in a nation, and not only in one nation but in several. It is as if the process of individuation, which is now constellated, were happening on a lower story, on the lowest story of collectivity, where it is not the business of one individual but the business of a whole group. We already have spoken of that; it is a sort of compromise between the individual and humanity. You see, humanity is universal, not even a matter of a group; but what actually is happening is very clearly a matter of national groups, namely, the idea of *autarkia*, the autonomy and self-sufficiency of nations. That has become the leading idea instead of individuation. It is just as if God himself were split up from a universal existence into a national existence, so there is a god of France, a god of Italy, a god of Germany, a god of England. Nietzsche says God himself has become a Jew, and one could say God himself had become German or Italian; that is expressed by a leader, whether they call him Duce or Führer is all the same.

Miss Wolff: War is always made by a state or a monarch, and the warrior means the army, so in the very idea of war the state is implied.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true: the very idea of warriors, or sol-

diers, presupposes a *general will* above them, a monarch or a general or a state. That would be the cause of the existence of warriors, but the question is, how do we progress from the idea of warriors and war to the state?

Mrs. Fierz: When the kind of individuation which he describes here is taking place in collectivity, the state is a sort of *persona*, the incarnation of this individuation, and the change taking place will be described as happening within that form or that personality, the individuating collectivity.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is all expressed in my interpretation of the chapter about the warriors. I want to know how we can make the transition in Nietzsche's language, and we have always seen that the very end of the preceding chapter is really an answer to the main issue.

Dr. Elliot: One has the sense that in talking about the warriors, one is not clear about the way war is going to happen, whether it would be individual or collective. If collective, the state would have to follow.

Prof. Jung: But why does the state follow? Why nothing else? The state would be the new idol, the thing that is going ahead, but why just the state?

Mrs. Jung: War and warriors mean an outburst of primitive libido which calls for order and law, and that is what the state stands for.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it becomes clear in the end of the chapter that some sort of authority is wanted. And why?

Mrs. Jung: Because the instincts are aroused.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The chapter is about war and warriors, about people participating in war, and war is disorder, a wild upheaval of instincts, and naturally that calls for order. If it is collective, it must be a collective organization; if it is individual, then what is wanted?

Mrs. Crowley: Individuation.

Prof. Jung: Well, individuation as a condition of order, and how does that express itself?

Mrs. Jung: In limitation.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, that would be a result. But how does it express itself?

Dr. Strong: By the symbol.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the symbolic way; the expression through the symbol is the way of individuation. That is indispensable: it always expresses itself in a symbol, and that is again the ambiguity. Therefore Nietzsche does not call the next chapter "About the State," but calls it, "The New Idol." So what he really means is that this whole situation of war and warriors, of instincts, disorder, conflagrations and catastrophes—all

this needs an answer, say a principle of order or control. It would need an idol. And what is an idol? An idol is a symbol which possesses authority, which is mana. In the individual case, if it is a question of individuation, the symbol creates order; but if it is a question of collective events, it must be an organization, and then it is no longer a symbol. Then the symbol becomes an idol. For one only uses the word *idol* to depreciate the symbol; as long as a picture or a monument is a symbol, it works, it lives, but the moment it becomes an idol it is dead. A symbol that is dead is called an idol and the worship of it is idolatry. But one never would call the symbolic use of such a thing idolatry, because it is working through itself, it is living. That is just the difference between a living symbol and a dead idol. In this title you can see that ambiguity going on; it is as if Zarathustra or Nietzsche were feeling the right thing, feeling that it ought to be a symbol and not an idol. So the New Idol would mean the new-old error, always that collective so-called symbol which is nothing but an idol. And now instead of what we had before, we have a state.

Mind you, we experience history in our time—we are actually living history, and that is no small matter; formerly people read history, now they live it. Of course we always had a state in Christianity, the church, but we did not live in the time when the church was *the* idol. The church then had the so-called totalitarian claim, she was the ultimate authority, with no authority beyond. As we know, the Catholic church has greater authority than the Holy Scriptures, because there was a church long before the Evangels were written. St. Paul, for instance, lived in a time when the Evangels were not considered to be books of revelation; even after his time they were only thought to be quite useful books. So the church, because she is older, always declares that she is the only competent interpreter of the Scriptures. The worldly power has always tried to liberate itself from the totalitarian claim of the church, and now the church has lost prestige to such an extent that the claim has had to change its abode. You see, that totality claim always exists. That is the need of the symbol, or the idol: somewhere we must have that supreme authority. For a time, it was invisible and we were seeking it everywhere. Of course we had the illusion that people didn't need a supreme idol, but secretly science began to flirt with the idea that perhaps science or rationalism was the idol. H. G. Wells has just published four articles in the *Manchester Guardian* about his recent trip to the United States, and if you want to read the story of a true adher-

ent to the idol of science and rationalism, read H. G. Wells.⁹ He believes that if we had a science of money and property, and if there were better universities, if certain learned men only would speak, then the world could be improved. That is like thinking that if we would only hear the word of God, everything would be all right, as they formerly thought. Now you see that totality claim, after having had a short flirtation with science, has, not very proudly, appeared on the scene of the world in the totalitarian claim of the state, first in Russia to the horror of the world, then in Italy, then in Germany, and perhaps it will go further.

Mrs. Volkhardt: You hear about the *Totalitätsanspruch*, that “claim of totality,” every day in the street in Germany.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is a fact that this claim was the prerogative of the church in medieval times; then during the time of enlightenment it began to fade away, having made several attempts to identify with science. The enlightenment was based upon the *déesse raison*—a totality claim of reason—and later on it was hoped that science would be the supreme authority.¹⁰ But lo and behold, out comes the state, that monster, and says that *it* is the totality, that it can turn the trick. Now, Nietzsche feels very clearly that rousing conflict—wild instincts, preaching war and courage and enterprise—would naturally lead to an anarchic condition which needs a supreme authority; and at bottom he knows it ought to be a symbol. It must be the *eidos*, the symbol. Yet, inasmuch as the conflagration is collective, it will happen on the level of collectivity, and be the individuation not of an individual but of a group—probably a national group or a tribe—and then that tribe will have supreme authority. Then since there is no such thing as a spiritual organization—since God himself, the invisible king of the church, is dead—the idea of the tribal god will lead into a human organization called the state. With that we return to a sort of tribal organization minus the spiritual element. But they will worship the state as they worshipped God before: if something was the decree of God, it was ultimate, with nothing beyond. Formerly, they said God must help you, but now they speak of the support of the unemployed by the state; the state will look after everything. But what is the state? It is perfectly ridiculous, and that is what Nietzsche felt.

⁹ Wells' interest in America dates at least from 1906 when he published *The Future in America* (New York, 1906). For his fascination with science see *The War of the Worlds* (1898), *The Time Machine* (1895), et al.

¹⁰ See above 6 June 1934, n. 5, on the Goddess of Reason.

Mrs. Sigg: Is it not really a Protestant ideal that only the individual God should have the claim of totality?

Prof. Jung: Well, the totality claim naturally has undergone many changes in the course of time. It was first the church, but in Protestantism naturally that was no longer true. Luther tried to make the church the supreme authority, but it soon became obvious that after once breaking its authority, he could not make it supreme again. Therefore, he liked to maintain the illusion that his Lutheran church was in connection with the Catholic church. The Lutherans believed in the apostolic succession, in transubstantiation, that only the church could administer the *pharmakon athanasias*, the communion; and he did not like it at all when the church repudiated him. He tried to save a sort of authority, but you know how little it helped, once the authority was broken through. So the authority within Protestantism had to be God—and the Bible, which is a very bad substitute for authority, being much too contradictory; as you know it is on the index in the Catholic church, and rightly so.

Mrs. Sigg: But I think Luther tried to educate the Protestants to have their own individual God as the highest authority.

Prof. Jung: Not an individual God, but the universal God. The mistake is just there: it is an individual relation to the god but the god is universal. The invisible authority to which you can always have recourse is the Bible, the word of God, and that is a very doubtful authority, since it is man-made. It was assumed that it was made by God himself, yet God obviously contradicted himself several times and said very funny things, so it did not make a good authority after all. That was soon found out in the scientific criticism of the Scriptures; science was the formidable instrument by which the Bible was undermined—and the Protestant creed at the same time: science killed it completely. So the last remnants of the totality claim disappeared and must reappear elsewhere. Nietzsche foresaw that very clearly—he was not in vain a parson's son. That the new idol would be the state was a tremendous intuition.

Mrs. Crowley: Would he not also have sensed it historically through Karl Marx? It was the breaking up of the old system anyway.

Prof. Jung: Yes. And he felt naturally the tremendous need of authority in Germany; this was a fact, and so it was inevitable. I don't say it is a great prophecy, but it was a very true intuition: he foresaw quite naturally the course events would take. At the time he wrote *Zarathustra*, the socialistic state was already widely discussed, and there the state was the ultimate authority. In the latter part of the nineteenth century

the state became personified, and one more and more lost sight of the fact that it was an abstraction. As for instance, natural science lost the understanding of the fact that energy is a concept. We have only recently discovered that matter is a concept; we always thought it was something substantial but it is only a concept. And so we still believe, and the man in the street believes, that the state is something. But it is nothing, a mere illusion, a convention—as a matter of fact it is thinner than air, everybody speaks of it as if it were the subject, but it is simply the illusory object of everybody.

Mrs. Sigg: It seems to be characteristic of the psychology of philosophers that they are apt to write books about the state, and it seems to be true of Nietzsche, too. So I thought it might be a sort of symbolic action; they were concerned with the outer world when really the inner world was more important, when there was a necessity for inner organization, for individuation.

Prof. Jung: Oh well, you cannot say that. For instance, Plato surely did not write his book about the New Republic through any necessity for individuation. That is out of the question. We can only speak of individuation in a case like Nietzsche whose spiritual father was Schopenhauer. He already speaks of the *principium individuationis* and deals with it largely; his whole philosophy was based upon that.¹¹ And all that preparation was needed. You find no such thing with the old philosophers because they were at peace with god; the world was quiet and there were only a few amendments to the divine order. Now I think we will begin this new chapter:

Somewhere there are still peoples and herds, but not with us,
my brethren: here there are states.

A state? What is that? Well! open now your ears unto me, for
now will I say unto you my word concerning the death of peoples.

A state is called the coldest of all cold monsters.

That is pretty strong language. You know, Nietzsche is a great friend of life. He has a pretty shrewd idea of the reality of life, as being the only real thing; so he is quite suspicious as to concepts. All concepts that have become personified, concretized, are exceedingly poisonous, and one of the most poisonous and dangerous concretizations is surely the state, because it is merely the hypostasis of a convention. And if a

¹¹ Schopenhauer invoked the scholastic "Principle of Individuation" to indicate how the universal will, itself (like the unconscious for Jung) single and undifferentiated through spatial and temporal locations, gets translated into a multiplicity of individuals. See *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. I, book II, sec. 23.

concept or an idea becomes concretized or personified, there is always a fatal analogy to a very famous historical event, which Nietzsche would say to beware of. What would that be?

Mrs. Sigg: The Word that became flesh.

Prof. Jung: Of course, the Word that appeared in the world. You see, if the word of God becomes flesh, you can cope with it—that makes sense since anything that is has been spoken by God. That God has spoken the world is an age-old truth, and we are perfectly familiar with it. This is the way it should be. But when man's words become real, you are doubtful at least; things become rather critical. For instance, would you trust any of the living leaders of the world with speaking creative words? Let us assume that Mr. Roosevelt, for instance, were equipped with the word of power, that what he said must be. Would you submit to it?

Mrs. Baynes: No!

Prof. Jung: Of course you would not, even if you are an American, because we don't trust one single human being with the authority, the competence, to speak *the* word that is worth being concretized. Yet by whom is that word, the state, spoken? Not even by one decent individual: it is spoken by newspapers—and see what Nietzsche says about newspapers a little further down. The state is a terrible concretization, but if such things begin to concretize it is the very devil, as Nietzsche feels. You see, it is absolutely in keeping with his own development: he says "God is dead," that whatever speaks is man. He does not even take into consideration that he is not the Superman; he speaks with the voice of thunder as Zarathustra, assuming that he is Zarathustra. Zarathustra would be the word, yes, *his* words might concretize because he is an angel of God, you could say. But surely the state is not the word of God. It is the invention of the many and therefore dangerous and poisonous; it is a devilish invention replacing the eternal plan of God that should rule the world. It is man instead of the divine competence, the limited mind instead of the infinite mind, things based upon temporal assumptions instead of upon eternal verities. So you can understand why Nietzsche calls the state the coldest of all cold monsters. If he still believed in the devil he would say it was the devil's own invention, like a theologian whom I once treated. He had suffered before the war from a very difficult and serious neurosis, but when I met him after the war and asked how he was faring, he told me that he was quite in order. Then I asked him what on earth he was doing with the church, and that theologian cold-bloodedly replied, "Oh, the church is of course an invention of the devil, but if you live in this world you

19 JUNE 1935

must deal with the devil." The church is an invention of the devil inasmuch as it is man's own work; for man is always a single isolated individual, not the universal man, but only a temporal and very local man, so anything he knows is only locally, temporally true. If he invents anything of a universal character, it is sure to be bad, because it is against this or that eternal verity.

LECTURE VIII

26 June 1935

Prof. Jung:

We began the chapter called "The New Idol" last time. It goes on:

A state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people."

That the state is the people is a very modern consideration. You see, if the state is the people, then the people is the state; you cannot separate the two. But Nietzsche is trying to do so, and people in our days often make that attempt.

It is a lie! Creators were they who created peoples, and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life.

Now that is grand, of course; great creators have created peoples, and imposed on them—or tried to impose on them—one faith and one love. Could you give me an example?

Mr. Allemann: Moses.

Mrs. Baynes: Mohammed.

Prof. Jung: Those are very good examples.

Mrs. Adler: And in China, those old kings.

Prof. Jung: Oh no, they were legendary, and they did not make peoples in China, they followed the principles of Wu Wei.¹

Mr. Allemann: The old theocracies, like Egypt, or the Incas in Peru?

Prof. Jung: But they were impersonal. The Egyptian theocracy was an entirely anonymous body; even the Pharaoh, with his absolute power, or any oriental tyrant, one could say was an anonymous figure, the son of the sun, a divine being, and as such anonymous.

Mr. Allemann: Zoroaster?

¹ *Wu Wei*, the principle of inaction, of letting things happen, is especially prominent in *Chuang Tzu*, now thought to be the earliest datable Taoist work.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is a bit obscure; one could not say he had created a state, though it came to something like that in the course of centuries.

Mrs. Baynes: The popes in the Holy Roman Empire?

Prof. Jung: The Pope also is anonymous; it doesn't matter what kind of gentleman the Pope is. It must be a personal leader.

Mrs. Fierz: Napoleon?

Dr. Strong: Lenin?

Mrs. Sigg: Hitler?

Prof. Jung: Yes, those are creators; they created peoples and imposed on them one faith, but what about the love? One questions whether there is much love in it. Nietzsche apparently feels that his statement is exceedingly one-sided and therefore he continues:

Destroyers are they who lay snares for many, and call it the state: they hang a sword [one could say *one* sword] and a hundred cravings [lusts] over them [lusts meaning desires].

Here we have an entirely different picture, the reverse of the one he showed first. Now, it is a fact that human beings are never perfect; they may have wonderful and idealistic purposes but they cannot create anything without the black substance included. Whoever creates light must create shadow, and whoever creates shadow creates also light; whatever is created must have two faces—for one it is positive, and for another it is negative. For instance, if you happen not to believe in Islam in a Mohammedan country, you have a story to tell—if you are still alive to tell it. And the same in Italy if you happen not to be a Fascist. Inasmuch as you are a Fascist or a National Socialist, naturally you can be enthusiastic; you have one faith and one love, but if you deviate from that principle, you will feel that it is one sword and a hundred desires. Now to what does he allude here by the hundred desires?

Mrs. Fierz: All the things people ask from the state if they become dependent.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in a communist state, all the lowest desires of man, his avariciousness for instance, are of course stimulated, and those are the moving forces. You see that also in actual German history, and in Italy. And you cannot imagine that the Islamic conquerors were moved by entirely idealistic motives in making the world acquainted with the faith of Allah; they were moved by all sorts of quite ordinary lusts. They pilfered and murdered and destroyed and conquered countries, enslaving whole nations. That is the truth you see, so these two separate aspects of the thing created are really one and the same:

anything that is created has a dark and a bright side and one should have no illusions about it. If it is in any way good and ideal, it is good and ideal only for certain people; for others it is hell. You cannot say the state is the people and then twist it round and say the people is the state. You have read in the papers, perhaps, that Goebbels has recently delivered such a speech, saying it wasn't the state they cared for, but the people. But what is the people? The people is the state. The two are intrinsically the same; only when a state includes several different peoples would it be otherwise. In this case, one people makes the state, so one rightly says the people is the state; but in this case the state is also the people, so the first sentence is true—or may be true. Of course it is by no means certain that the fact of the people being the state has an entirely positive aspect; if you reverse it and say the state is the people, then the second part of what Nietzsche says is true, because the state is an absolutely soulless monster. But inasmuch as the state and people are identical, both statements are true, both are valid. Naturally, they are only relatively true; if a thing is both bright and dark, then it is only relatively bright and relatively dark. So I consider this an insufficient attempt to create a favorable case for the people. Nietzsche provides the Fascists, the National Socialists, or the Communists with a strong argument for the excellence of their idea, but he provides also a very strong argument in favor of the opposite point of view, that the people is the state. As a matter of fact, both statements are true, and therefore the result is only a relative truth. Every word Nietzsche says in this chapter, then, can be used in favor of a Fascist, National Socialist, or a Communist state, and it also can be used as the best argument against all those creations.

This sign I give unto you: every people speaketh its language of good and evil; thus its neighbour understandeth not. Its language hath it devised for itself in laws and customs.

This is nationalism, like the claims of the German or Latin nationalists, the customs and rights of the people, the *sacro egoismo* and the difference from all other peoples. They have even divided the metaphysical universe: God is now either German or French or Italian, and there is a new German creed. One could speak of a Yugoslavian or a Serbian or a Turkish creed, but the whole world would laugh if we should speak of a Swiss creed or a special Swiss god.

But the state lieth in all languages of good and evil; and whatever it saith it lieth; and whatever it hath it hath stolen.

That is perfectly true. But inasmuch as the state is the people it is true of the people too.

False is everything in it; with stolen teeth it biteth, the biting one. False are even its bowels.

Confusion of language of good and evil; this sign I give unto you as the sign of the state. Verily, the will to death, indicateth this sign! Verily, it beckoneth unto the preachers of death!

All that is true if you really consider the state as absolute, detached from the people, but since the people is the state, it is necessarily true of the people too, and each people is in fact a confounding of languages of good and evil. Collectivity in itself is an evil, a collectivity without evil is impossible; even the best collectivity one could imagine is vicious—at all events a most horrible bore, and to be boring is equal to evil. It is the least, one could say, of positive vices. Look at the great organizations and their morality! We had three great organizations before the war, that famous trinity—the German army, the Standard Oil Company, and the Catholic church. Each considers itself a perfectly moral institution. For instance, Mr. Rockefeller once told me that the Austrians were very bad people, so I thought he must have some fantasies about Vienna, but no, he said: “You know, Doctor, perhaps, of my idea for a standardized price in favor of the Standard Oil Trust; you see what a great advantage it is to pay the same price for oil all over the world—it is for the good of the people—but the Austrians have made a separate contract with Rumania. Those people are very bad.” You see, when a great many people heap themselves up in a sort of organization, their morality deteriorates; mob psychology then prevails and whatever the mob does not want it destroys. So even if a person is fighting with the noblest of motives against an organization, it does not matter; he is the enemy and must be wiped out. Any great organization is a most destructive monster as soon as one goes against it; no matter what one’s character and motives are, one will be destroyed. We know from history that many of the best characters have been wiped out by such organizations; thousands of decent human beings have been destroyed by that Standard Oil Trust. And we know how many of the finest people have been wiped out by the church. For a great organization has to lower its morality in order to cope with the masses; one cannot cope with the masses without making one’s morality of the lowest order, most ambiguous and hypocritical. There are many examples in the Catholic church; it is an old saying that the church has a good stomach. It can digest anything, every vice under the sun, provided it is not

against the creed. Inasmuch as one belongs to the church, everything can be dealt with, everything can be condoned, excepting the sin against that organization. Of course, that is what I call a very low, primitive morality. Nietzsche here is quite positive that the state is a great evil but cannot help seeing that we cannot do without it; as soon as a people is living as an organized body, it must be something like a state, and then there is the devil. So he goes on:

Many too many are born: for the superfluous ones was the state devised.

Yes, they are born unfortunately, and they are thus superfluous ones and for them we need a state.

See just how it enticeth them to it, the many-too-many! How it swalloweth and cheweth and recheweth them!

That is exactly what would be expected of a decent state, it chews over the many-too-many and gets them into a sort of shape. We must be grateful that there is such a machine to devour those nondescript masses which otherwise would be a pest. Therefore, it is exceedingly important to have something like the Catholic church with a stomach able to digest even the most indigestible people. We can turn and twist it as we like, we always need something like a state with police regulations in order to cope with the masses. The good things are only for the few. Well, the state says:

“On earth there is nothing greater than I: It is I who am the regulating finger of God”—thus roareth the monster. And not only the long-eared and short-sighted fall upon their knees.

They will fall upon their knees because there is a great truth in what he says—not in what the state says, of course. After all, the state is a great organization, it is an element of order; it is a monster, but humanity is monstrous too, a people is a monster. Twenty people together are already monstrous, because their psychology is no longer human, but approaches the animal. It is not your virtue that is heaped up in a crowd, but what is commonly human, and that is the inferior man; your morality is lowered. In a crowd of several hundred people you are able to commit a horrible crime without feeling it; you don't know what you are doing, but are simply carried away by the enthusiasm around you, and your morality is utterly gone. Under the mental contagion of the crowd you are a herd animal. Now, that great monster, the people, can only be kept in order by another monster, just as

a wild elephant cannot be dealt with alone, but only with the aid of other elephants. So against the monster of the people you have the monster of the state, and that is simply a necessary evil; there are no other means. You cannot rule a people by decent means, because that monster fights you with the most indecent ways of a cunning animal; you cannot keep it in order by good intentions and pious words and nice deeds because they won't be appreciated. The people only appreciate it when they beat or when they are beaten. That is a fact, and it is perfectly ridiculous to think of ruling people by kindness and wisdom: that is just air.

Mrs. Volkhardt: There is a rumor that Italy is making this war with Abyssinia in order to deal with the unemployed—as a good means of employing them and getting rid of them.

Prof. Jung: Yes, malaria is an excellent means to get rid of the many-too-many. This is a bit of good statesmanship—if it succeeds!

Miss Hannah: Then why does Mussolini give prizes to big families?

Prof. Jung: Well, there you are! That is this animal inconsistency. If there are many human beings, he has a big army. Italy is then great and powerful and everybody is proud to have such a state; they believe in it, and so they can be kept in order. But if you have too many you must destroy them, must invent a colonial war in a particularly pestilential country where there is a reasonable chance that so many thousands will be wiped out. That is absolutely necessary, because they must go somewhere. It is like the Japanese who are now trying to conquer China, it is not a particularly pernicious country as to malaria, but the climate of Manchuria is a bit rough on the Japanese; I suppose they will run millions of people into that country with the secret hope that the climate will deal with them. Why not? Of course one cannot say they are doing it just in order to wipe them out; if they can live there all the better. One can also say that Mussolini is not trying to kill those people; he must do it in a reasonable measure. He could do it much better by making a war with France, for instance. France is well equipped to destroy, so Mussolini could reckon with a million dead; in these modern times even the civilian population will not be spared. Towns will be bombarded with poison gas and a great many women and children will be wiped out too. That would be business on a grand scale, but it would injure the state, so he can only risk a reasonable loss of blood, a war with a state like Abyssinia. These things are inevitable inasmuch as there is humanity and the state. The state is only man-made; it is the psychology of a people. The state is the order people create for themselves, and if it leads to such issues as war or wholesale

slaughter, well, that is what people look for. Because they cannot help themselves in a reasonable way, it must be done in an unreasonable way.

You see, in our mob psychology—which is now called national psychology—we are still exactly like animals. You remember the story of the lemmings, those rodents that populate the north of Sweden and Norway: they are shy, isolated animals, yet from time to time they increase in numbers to such an extent that they form an organization, a state, and then they wander west through villages and cities, eating everything, and finally they walk out into the sea and are drowned. The same phenomenon occurs with a kind of bird in Canada; it is a perfectly nice, civil creature, seldom in large numbers, but occasionally the numbers increase to such an extent that they also wander west and are drowned in the Pacific. That is human psychology; people migrate west if possible, and if there is no place there they wander east, in order to kill off their surplus population. For instance, the Norsemen would surely never have made excursions into Africa if there had not been an increase of population and a desire to do something about it. And once underway, people form a kind of an order, like a parade, and they have leaders to show them the way. So it began. In primitive tribes they have no military leaders except in time of war; then they create a special sort of leader with absolute power to whom everybody submits, and they form a sort of state, so an order is created which leads to a certain amount of destruction. Of course, with their primitive weapons they never could create such wholesale slaughter as we can; when it began to rain they simply gave up the war and went home, like the old Chinese, because the gods were apparently not favorable to a warlike enterprise at that moment. But the white man has built up his consciousness and energy to such an extent that he can produce marvels which the world has never seen before, enormous catastrophes. In Switzerland also, we have no military leader when peace is prevailing; in wartime the Federal Council elects a general, who is the only leader Switzerland ever has, but he is only king during the time of war; when the war is over he goes home and is a citizen again. That is the way it was with primitive tribes, and the modern state has created that need again.

Mrs. Baumann: How was it that China could govern by *Wu Wei*? Could you call that also a monster?

Prof. Jung: No, because the Chinese were planted firmly in the soil like trees; old China consisted of fields and houses and people living in houses chosen for them by astrologers and soothsayers, and everybody

lived for himself and by himself. That is expressed beautifully in the *House of Exile*;² such people make no war and no state. For instance, if a gentleman in a political council utters an opinion which is not heard or appreciated, then he goes home—that is all it needs. Think of a delegate in the Federal Council or in the *Chambre de Députés* whose advice is not heard! But a Chinaman would not shout and raise hell, he would simply go home. So if the whole *Chambre de Députés* would go to their respective homes, France would thrive; *tous les polissons* would go home—Monsieur Doumergue, or Briand, or Laval, or whoever the gentleman is, makes a very nice figure at home with his little belly and good wine—and France would be at peace. China is not a state, but a people—well, not even a people—living and feeding on pieces of ground, exchanging their goods for other people's goods, and having no leaders because everybody remains at home. Nobody wanders about to steal and rob and kill, so why have soldiers? There are petty thieves of course, so there are high walls round the courtyards with a small door through which they communicate with the world. That is Chinese life, and the Emperor is a great gentleman who also lives in such a place; his walls are much thicker and higher than those of the little man, but there he lives with his wives and courtesans and all his *apparat*, and he is just a gentleman who does not bother. He is nice and polite to people—they pay visits to him and he also calls on them occasionally—and the affairs of the state consist of certain wise edicts, like building canals so that particular regions may be watered better. Then there is also a body of soldiers, say ten thousand men, who are sent into parts of that immense country when certain gentlemen become unruly. But one would hardly need soldiers. Sometimes parts of the country are not in order. Heaven and earth have separated for a while. The ordinances of heaven have not been properly heard and those people are in error; and so they are politely told, perhaps with the aid of a bit of poison, that what they are doing is not nice—it offends the rules of heaven—and then the whole thing is arranged again.

We would say this was most horrible disorder, because they don't discuss matters. There is no parliament, no police; we understand order as a sort of belligerent or warlike action, because we start from the idea that we are wild animals that must be shot down or we would never obey. The Chinese start from the idea that to be human is to be civilized.

² Nora Waln, *House of Exile* (Boston, 1933). Wu Wei again.

Mrs. Fierz: In the *House of Exile*, when that girl asks what war is going on, the Chinaman answers, "It is not a war, it is an epoch."

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is very good. You see, a modern American girl comes to visit Chinese friends with whom her family has had business connections for a hundred years or more. They meet her at Peking and she accompanies them to their homestead somewhere in the interior, travelling through a devastated part of the country where a revolution is going on, shooting and corpses, etc. Of course, the American girl is frightened but the Chinaman calmly explains that this is an epoch, meaning that such a disturbed period would last seventy or ninety years perhaps and then pass by. People live quietly in their houses, a lot of evil happens, there are bad people, but it is of small importance. That is human. We would react by making a hell of a fuss; we would say this was the first and only war, and it was for the highest good, and never again. But to the Chinaman this is simply an epoch where things are not in harmony and so there is friction, and naturally where there are soldiers, rifles will go off. But I am afraid this very old human way of looking at things is fast disappearing in China; they are getting thoroughly infected by the western poison. I only hope we shall be infected by the Chinese: it would be much better.

You see, Nietzsche is terribly excited here; a Chinaman would not understand his language. But with newspapers counting up every day how many accidents have occurred and how many crimes have been committed, we are naturally impressed with their overwhelming number and can't help thinking in terms of statistics, as if we were the brain of a whole nation of seventy million individuals. Of course we get excited. For instance, if one sees one man that is drunk one thinks, "Oh well, that is just a drunken man, he is probably a bad number." But when we read that every day there are a thousand accidents on account of drunkenness, that any number of children are destroyed by bad parents, bad inheritance, mental diseases, and God-knows-what, we naturally feel that to be horrible. The increase and widening out of consciousness through newspapers informs us of horrors of which we never dreamt before and which really should not exist for us because they happen in the distance; for the thing that is, is here. You see, it is a human point of view, that whatever is in the distance of time and space is not for us because we are not there and don't know of it—yes, occasionally some evil happens of course. Such people have a much better idea of life; they are more positive because they are not so frightened. They see only a relative amount of evil. Of course the one who is actually under the wheel is thoroughly under the wheel because he is

the *only* one under the wheel, but even that has its merits in a way. He has a much fuller experience of life.

If you move for a while among primitives or less civilized peoples, you see how they experience every moment as something total, full—as something which has a complete and absolutely indisputable meaning. For instance, a youngish native comes swaggering along decked in marvelous colors and plumes and a sword and God-knows-what, and he *is* the cock, he *is* the bull, the hero—he is a hell of a fellow and has no feelings of inferiority. He is vainglorious and ambitious and a damned fool all over, but he is complete; he is happy for that period of life between twenty and thirty. Then along comes an old man between fifty and sixty—primitives grow old earlier than we do—and he is nothing but old. He is the old man that always has been, has never been young; he personifies old age. In every word he says, in every gesture he makes, he is the old man that always has existed and always will exist. So all those people live as if there were no future and no past, they live now; they have no newspapers, no telephones, they don't know what is happening at a distance of seven kilometers even. There might be a war but they wouldn't know it; perhaps two weeks later they hear there has been a war between two tribes but they are not touched by it in the least: it is an agreeable legend. Of course, if it happens to them there is nothing but war, a complete mania of war, but it lasts only a short time and then they get sick of it, go home, and the war has come to an end. You see, such people have the full human life, can fully experience it; there is no telephone to disturb them in the realization of their momentary life, no invasion by millions of other lives lived on their own planet.

We don't come into our own because we must share the life of China, Japan, America, and God-knows-what; we are not in the here and now. If only the telephone and the newspapers would stop, and people flying from a distance at four hundred kilometers an hour in order to bring a new life, a new existence, into a place where they have no right to be, then we would not share that life thousands of kilometers away; it is artificial and it doesn't exist. We are now radio crazy, we begin to hear voices; we hear the voices of all nations and, God! they are just as human as we are. One was just now in Ethiopia and now one is in Manchuria and now in India, one simply switches off into somewhere else and then one is somebody else, and one cannot help acknowledging that it is real. We even hear the voices of the jungle, hear the lions roaring. I always thought my mother's reaction to the telephone was quite right. She was born in a time when there were no telephones, and I was

already a young student when I became acquainted with it. She never would go to the sorcerer's box, as she called it, but once we persuaded her to come when her cousin was telephoning, and she put her ear to the receiver looking hard into that hole, and said, "Yes, yes, I hear you but I cannot see you!" Her cousin wanted to tell her something, but my mother wouldn't listen, and finally she smashed the receiver into the box and said she never would telephone again. This is a sound, natural reaction; it is not right that we should hear somebody speaking and not see them: that is organized madness. We call those people crazy who suggest that they hear voices out of objects, but that is what we are doing; it is unnatural. Man is not up to it and so he loses himself sure enough.

Zarathustra continues:

Ah! even in your ears, ye great souls, it whispereth its gloomy lies! Ah! it findeth out the rich hearts which willingly lavish themselves!

Yea, it findeth you out too, ye conquerors of the old God! Weary ye became of the conflict, and now your weariness serveth the new idol!

Heroes and honourable ones, it would fain set up around it, the new idol! Gladly it basketh in the sunshine of good consciences—the cold monster!

Everything will it give *you*, if *ye* worship it, the new idol: thus it purchaseth the lustre of your virtue, and the glance of your proud eyes.

It seeketh to allure by means of you, the many-too-many! Yea, a hellish artifice hath here been devised, a death-horse jingling with the trappings of divine honours!

Well, here Nietzsche mentions an important point which he could not omit seeing: namely, the peculiar, suggestive power which the idea of the state has, even upon people whom one would suppose to be unprejudiced and able to see what a terrible monster it can be. But it is quite understandable that even the best of people are accessible to the idea of a state because, as I said, a state functions as something very real. You see, when the state claims to be like God's finger creating order out of chaos, it is true to a certain extent; it is monstrous, not human, but a people in its wholeness is not human. It is a big animal, and therefore it needs another monster to tame it. And because that is an inexorable fact, even the finest people are accessible to the idea of a state, they

must admit that it functions as something and they must even pay homage to it. For they feel very clearly that if they don't, they are lost; they are surely much weaker and if they are not careful, they risk being trampled to death by that monster. As important people are very often reasonably intelligent too, they cannot fail to see that. They surely will be aware that it is much better to cope with the powers of the world than to neglect them; only very stupid people neglect obvious dangers.

So quite against his liking, Nietzsche has to admit that even the good people, as he sees them, cannot help acknowledging the existence of the state and the necessity of paying homage to it, even if they see that the state buys them for the loss of their virtue as a sort of advertising. The state is like any big organization; when an important person has joined it, they will print it in huge letters as a good advertisement. It always needs advertising because it needs the faith and confidence of the masses; a state or any other organization will point to the fact that there are very big men in it for the sake of its own existence. If it should become clear that only nondescripts, very unimportant people, were members of that organization, it would lose all its prestige and no longer be able to function. So it is absolutely out of the question that a man of a certain importance should be able to keep entirely clear of that monster. If he wants to deal with the world at all, it means dealing with the monster; and since it is so much stronger than he, he must behave in such a way that it does not get excited. He has to feed the monster and to please it, to give it sugar now and then, in order that it may treat the poor worm of an isolated individual more or less decently.

The thing is only wrong when a man loses the idea of himself, when he sells his soul to the organization. But it is then bad for the organization too, for the good influence he could exert becomes a bad influence; he is the shining example of one who has sold his soul, and other people imitate him right away. They will sell their souls all the more readily. To be soulless is of course the great danger of any large organization, and it only has a soul inasmuch as a few individuals within it are brave or courageous enough to retain their own souls; if there is only one human soul in it, it has at least that human soul, which is always better than none at all. And isolated souls outside the organization have no power whatever, because they don't deal with the monster. Even the God of Job, as you remember, had not only one monster but two with which to rule the world, the leviathan and the behemoth; the leviathan fills one third of the ocean and is the ruler of the seas, and the behemoth rules the earth. Now, if God himself cannot do without

two monsters—acolytes—how can man do without them? It is perfectly true that the state baits its hook with names of important figures to catch the many-too-many, and that is right: the state is there for that purpose, as any organization is there for that purpose.

I would even defend the Standard Oil Company; as a matter of fact it is a great convenience since small companies could not afford to establish pump stations in any odd place: they would not have the capital. But a great organization can do so, and one cannot deny that a standard price for oil has a certain value. The Catholic church also has a standard price in a way; it affords an easy access to so many people who are utterly unable to imagine what spirit could be. There are images and attractive ceremonies, and there are most understanding and urbane priests—the Franciscans for instance, who bring things very close to the understanding of the ordinary people. Protestantism suffers from the fact that we have no such organization. The Catholics surely fulfil an extraordinarily important task in that they keep so many of the unruly chaotic masses in check. They isolate them against each other, and they influence the newspapers, comb the material very carefully so as not to let the wrong things get through, and they paint certain things in becoming colors in order to make them acceptable. They create very useful illusions; if such an organization really works, many an evil can be avoided.

I always say we would not have such organizations if there were not a vital need for them; therefore, we should not feel above them, but be grateful that they exist. But one should see their danger, and the danger always comes in where the individual is selling his soul. If you sell your soul you have done the worst service to the state, as the state naturally—inasmuch as it tempts you to sell your soul—is committing a crime. But you cannot say the monster commits a crime. That is no point of view at all because a monster is amoral; it cannot commit crimes, as it cannot do anything good. Good and evil are considerations for the individual but not for a monster. What can a monster do with good and evil? If you judge it by moral considerations, as Nietzsche judges it, then naturally it is a thing which has an exceedingly low morality, as a rhino or a hippo has a very low morality. Humanity is just that, a huge amphibian.

Yea, a dying for many hath here been devised, which glorifieth itself as life; verily, a hearty service unto all preachers of death.

He really makes too bad a case for the state; but, you can say the same of people.

The state, I call it, where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the bad. . . .

But why do they drink the poison? They don't need to.

the state, where all lose themselves, the good and the bad: the state, where the slow suicide of all—is called "life."

Why do they lose themselves? You can be part of a thing without losing yourself in it. Of course, there our education plays a trick on us in inculcating our so-called honesty, that seeming honesty which tries to persuade us that if we eat the bread of somebody we must also sing their song; the idea that if we serve the state, we must also believe in the state. This prejudice comes from religion, from the quite illegitimate claim of the Protestant church of being the whole thing: the so-called totalitarian claim. As you serve the church you must believe in the essential doctrines of the church. If you are part of the church you are wholly in the church. You have to sell your soul to the church, and consider it to be a mighty good work to do so. But you only need to sell your soul externally to Catholicism, and don't need to believe the dogmas, not one of them. I know a man who informed the priest that he could not possibly be converted because he could not believe in the dogma of eternal perdition in hell. And the priest said, "Oh, that should not be a hindrance, I don't believe it either." "But how is that—can you be a priest and not believe in the dogma?" "Well, of course the dogma is true—there is eternal perdition—but when people die they see at once the purpose of God and what a mistake they have made in the world, so they repent instantly and never get into perdition. It is just as if it did not exist." That is the exceedingly smooth way the Catholic church operates.

I once had some interesting talks with a very able Jesuit and I brought the discussion to the belief in the dogma: then I saw that I was discussing that old matter in the way of a true Protestant—we are fools enough to believe that Catholics believe in the dogma. He said, "Of course the church must have a dogma which is the absolute truth, but the dogma lives. It grows in the course of centuries; certain dogmas have not always existed and some have been added. At any time the Pope can declare a new dogma to be authoritative and then that is a new truth. If you don't agree with it, that is your individual freedom; you don't need to agree with it, but only must not say it aloud; you make a fist in your pocket and wait. For instance, we Germans are of course rather strange birds to those Roman Cardinals. They don't un-

derstand our psychology, so it often happens that we have different views—they may become dogma later, but the Pope does not at present see his way to adopt them, so for the time being, such people declare *pater peccavi* and they will receive absolution provided that they don't talk." I also asked him about a recent case where a Catholic professor made some criticism of certain historical facts, nothing bad, but it was against the instruction of the bishop; and he said that of course one had to reprimand such a man because the young students whom he was teaching were not able to judge the thing properly, to see it in the right perspective. Confusion was created which was not good for their spiritual welfare. I said, "Right you are, one has to be careful what one says; to guide great masses one must avoid confusion and contradictions." Therefore, a general rule must be established to cling to, and the leader also must cling to it. Otherwise, one upsets the church; for the life of the church one has to be careful, one has to shut up. The Catholic point of view is that it is far more important to them to be in the church than to *believe* in the church; to believe in it means precious little. They talk of it but it does not mean so much.

This is an antique idea. To be in the sacred place is the essential religious observance. The church is full of mana and if you are in the same room where transubstantiation takes place and follow the Mass more or less, you receive part of the grace; you can discuss business between times while people pray, but if you hear part of the Mass and are impregnated with that particular smell of the eucharist, you have it on you—whether your mind has been there or not. That is the real conception. Of course, we make great mistakes in judging Catholicism; we are no longer aware of that very primitive and antique point of view in Catholicism which is simply necessary to hold the masses. You cannot expect all those primitive people to have a spiritual attitude. They don't know what it is, even, but if they are in the sacred place, they are sanctified somehow; they see it, they hear it, they smell it, they are under the same roof—and that is enough. As, for example, it is quite enough for most people to feel very distinguished by having one or the other distinguished person for a friend. They don't need any particular distinction themselves, but are in contact with that person and so they are right. And in the eyes of the world, they are. The Catholic church deals with the point of view of the world, and therefore it catches the world. While Protestantism doesn't catch the world, of course; it has developed that most laudable point of view of entire conviction and entire self-sacrifice—entire devotion to a certain spiritual principle. But what happens when the spiritual principle dies out and

disappears? Then they seek something which has an equal totality claim and that is the state.

So instead of the church the state has now the totality claim, because people need that feeling of totality. If anybody is not for the state, he is against the state, as if the state were Christ himself; if anybody belongs to the state without believing in it, he himself thinks it is hypocritical. But that is not true, because you cannot trust that monster the state; you can only trust it as far as the intelligence of the monster goes but no further. And as you are not in any human relation with it, you cannot say the monster behaves disreputably or that it is a nuisance and vicious: those are no considerations for a monster. For instance, if a rhino behaves as a real rhino is bound to behave, it is in order, not a bad animal; a domesticated rhino that did not take you upon its horns at sight would be the bad rhino. You see, the Protestant is quite particularly exposed to that danger of thinking his highest duty to be the belief in the organization by which he is employed; he thinks he should believe in the state whose employee he is, for instance, and that is a great mistake. Through a kind of idealism he sells his soul without knowing it, devotes his soul to the state as if it were a god. It is even a dangerous thing to devote one's soul entirely to God, since we are living in the world. Do it and see where you land. You get out of the world and might as well be an eternal ghost—you don't live any longer and are not in time; you cannot devote yourself to the nowhere because you are here. So it is impossible for the human being to devote himself entirely to God. The mystics knew that the remoteness from God was an intrinsic part of the union with God.

Just see these superfluous ones! They steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise. Culture, they call their theft—and everything becometh sickness and trouble unto them!

Just see these superfluous ones! Sick are they always; they vomit their bile and call it a newspaper. They devour one another, and cannot even digest themselves.

Just *not*, that is the trouble.

Just see these superfluous ones! Wealth they acquire, and become poorer thereby. . . . and jump into the open air.

Nietzsche loses all inhibitions here. He only sees the state as a swamp full of vipers and evil. But that is humanity, those are human beings. The state doesn't even stink, because it does not exist. The state is a convention, an abstraction; only very stupid people think that the state

exists. It is a mere imagination, a conventional term for a certain number of individuals; the only reality is in its being a convention, a sort of agreement, of so many people. If anything really stinks, it is humanity. Come into a room where many people have been, and you smell humanity right away, and it is nothing very nice: it smells like an animal. The negroes say that wild animals shun man because his smell is like the smell of lions, and it might be that inasmuch as we eat meat we do smell like animals of prey. We are impressed by the smell of negroes because it seems to be quite different, a bit more pronounced I should say, definitely “inhuman,” but it is not so different from a European smell when there are a number together. You can confirm mob psychology through the psychological smell of a great number of individuals: they smell exactly like their psychology. Smelling is a half psychological function, one could almost say; you can smell things which you really cannot smell: you intuit through smelling. Sometimes you get an impression through smell which surely has not been transferred by an actual odor. It is *as if* you had smelt a peculiar quality.

Do not go out of the way of the bad odour! Withdraw from the idolatry of the superfluous!

Do not go out of the way of the bad odour! Withdraw from the steam of these human sacrifices!

Open still remaineth the earth for great souls. Empty are still many sites for lone ones and twain ones, around which floateth the odour of tranquil seas.

You see, this could be just as well an admonition, not to the state but to the people, collectivity; therefore, he speaks of hermits. For he feels very clearly that if he has such a resistance against the state, he has it against humanity, and he must exclude himself from humanity if he is to land where he wants to land finally. So a great soul does not belong to the crowd, but must necessarily be outside the crowd; he is positive in that respect. And he says the world is still open, with many places where great souls can live in isolation. Now, here is a point which has always been a sort of question mark to me: I never know exactly what Nietzsche means when he says here “one or two.” Who is the other one? It is a funny kind of hermit who lives with somebody else. I suppose he had a peculiar feeling of duality, as if there might be another one. There are plenty of reasons for that. Zarathustra and Nietzsche are two, for instance. I think this is the most probable explanation.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not because he cannot do without somebody who listens—without an ego?

Prof. Jung: Exactly, and the question is how that appears to him. Is it the intercourse between Nietzsche and Zarathustra, or is it an *entente* with somebody else? It might be the anima, but he discovers anima psychology only at the end of Zarathustra and in the years afterwards when he was becoming crazy; up to then it was entirely a question of his relation to Zarathustra. You know, he belongs to the people living east of the Rhine where there is no anima psychology yet; masculine psychology, the *Puer eternus* psychology, prevails there on account of the youth of those tribes. In the older civilization west of the Rhine the anima problem comes up, but east of the Rhine there is generally the problem of the relationship between man and the subordinate principle—an idea or an enthusiasm, for instance, or a big enterprise. It is entirely the psychology of the youth who is entering life where the world consists mainly of men. There are female appendages who serve a certain purpose, for the propagation of the tribe or for romantic feelings, but there is no other use for them. Therefore, you actually see the idea spreading again that a woman belongs in the kitchen and is only useful to produce children—that she has no psychological problem, and no potentiality for soul-development.

Open still remaineth a free life for great souls. Verily, he who possesseth little is so much the less possessed: blessed be moderate poverty.

“Moderate” yes, better than real!

There, where the state ceaseth—there only commenceth the man who is not superfluous: there commenceth the song of the necessary ones, the single and irreplaceable melody.

There, where the state ceaseth—pray look thither, my brethren! Do ye not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the Superman?

Thus spake Zarathustra.

Well, it is perfectly true that the man who is not superfluous, the man who is needed, is the one who has not sold his soul to an organization, who is able to stand by himself and for himself. Such a man is always necessary just because most people don't stand alone; they sell their souls, and then there is no freedom. The only trace of freedom and the only hope is, of course, in the one who is not devoured by the monster, who can deal with it, who can ride the monster. Therefore, the old Chinese represented their heroes or their great sages as riding the monster. When Confucius was asked what he thought of Lao-tse,

whom he did not know personally, he said he didn't know whether he was an expert at weapons, or at driving carts, but however that might be, he knew he was an expert at riding dragons. He knew how to deal with the monster, that is.³ Now, the dragon is of course the symbol for the collective unconscious; the state is simply the outside appearance of the thousand-headed monster. In the Book of Revelations, the monster with the many heads and the many horns means the nations, the Romans for instance. Any organized body of men is a huge snake; one dreams of such things in that form, and one finds it in historical dreams. Hannibal, for instance, as a young man had a prophetic dream of conquering Italy; he saw that a huge dragon was on his trail, following him and devastating the whole country, which meant of course his army that followed him and devastated the country.⁴ It also means the crowd within, the collective unconscious; it is the crowd soul, the collective soul of man. So over against that monster is the man who doesn't sell his soul to it, and he is needed. He should be careful and even should seek a certain amount of solitude in order to maintain his isolation. But he would also be lost if he didn't know how to deal with the crowd. For instance, he might then have to face not only a moderate poverty but extreme poverty.

³ Of these two sixth-century sages, Jung rarely quoted Confucius, the particularly social philosopher, but the more introverted Lao-tse was a great favorite of his.

⁴ In Hannibal's dream he was led by a god-like youth who said he was sent by Jupiter to lead Hannibal into Italy, and cautioned him not to look aside or back, but of course curiosity won. "Then he saw behind him a serpent of monstrous size, that moved along with vast destruction of trees and underbrush, and a storm-cloud coming after, with loud claps of thunder; and on his asking what this prodigious portent was, he was told that it was the devastation of Italy." *Livy*, tr. B. O. Foster, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1929), vol. V, sec. 22.

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LECTURE I

16 October 1935

Prof. Jung:

We are continuing to plow through *Zarathustra*. But before beginning I want to tell those among you who have not been in our former seminars that *Zarathustra* is a very particular case. It is not a case in which we can expect a differentiation of consciousness from the unconscious; on the contrary, we find a considerable identity of conscious and unconscious. Nietzsche's unconscious being activated, he is therefore identical with all its contents, especially in the very first indications of the onslaught of the collective unconscious, which eventually was his undoing. He is identical with the anima and with the archetype of the old wise man and with various other figures, particularly the self, which naturally has then not the quality of a psychic self, but rather the quality of an ancient rather primitive god. That is, of course, at the bottom of his famous Dionysian experience. Now, this very peculiar psychical condition is exceedingly difficult to deal with, because it always must be kept in mind that there is such a complete identity. It is a condition which we hardly ever find in practical analysis. We would find it naturally in creative people in a creative mood, but such cases are very rare because, when in the creative mood, they surely would not care to be analyzed. All our ordinary expectations are baffled by this condition, and that makes it particularly difficult to understand his peculiar psychology. But I must say again that you have brought it on yourselves. I would not have chosen it. Of course, it is very interesting, but you must cock your ears and work in order to understand this very involved tangle. And I would call your attention again to the report on the first seminar about *Zarathustra*, where I tried to clarify this strange psychology in the form of a *sylogismos*, a diagram which shows the identity of all the figures that turn up in *Zarathustra*.¹ Now we will take up the chapter called, "The Flies in the Market-Place."

¹ See above, 27 June 1934, n. 1.

Flee, my friend, into thy solitude! I see thee deafened with the noise of the great men, and stung all over with the stings of the little ones.

Admirably do forest and rock know how to be silent with thee. Resemble again the tree which thou lovest, the broad-branched one—silently and attentively it o'erhangeth the sea.

You remember, the principal contents of the preceding chapter, "The New Idol," are his ideas about the state; it is as if he had foreseen modern developments. He speaks of the state as the great monster that takes on an extraordinary importance: namely, the wave of collectivism which begins to sway the world and to drown the individual. And as he is fighting for his ideal of the Superman, he naturally tries to assert the right of the individual to live. He sees his Superman in absolute contrast to the state. The state is the archenemy of the Superman, and because the state is the enemy, it is the equivalent of that individual who strives to assert himself and become a Superman.

You see, what has happened there is that the idea of the Superman, or the differentiated individual, having not reached the surface of consciousness, remains in the dark, and therefore it is everywhere; it is in everybody, and everybody becomes so individualized and also so inflated in consciousness that they needs must make a state in order to be able to live. For, when everyone has an inflation they are no longer able to understand one another, and the human and social organizations will disintegrate. Then one sees that it is absolutely necessary that even the most paradoxical standpoints shall be united in order to maintain a sort of order; so all the inflated individuals will form a state in which nobody has any meaning. Naturally, such a condition is quite against the differentiation of the individual; differentiation would be even a danger. That kind of state, which is a sort of compromise between inflated individuals, is afraid of an individual who shows his differentiation; it would mean that the compromise did not work because an individual was sticking out in some way, and the whole compromise was made with the purpose that this should not occur. Such a state is of course the guarantee that no individual shall be able to stick out.

That was the situation in Nietzsche's case, and for quite a while after Nietzsche, until things became so impossible that suddenly individuals began to stick out very badly, especially in certain nations. The world is quite doubtful in regard to that however; some think it is all wrong, others that it is just right. But at all events, that has been the develop-

ment in our conscious world. Now Nietzsche, being chiefly confronted with a state which was a guarantee against individuals who might stick out, felt that pressure tremendously, which explains why he condemns the state as being the absolute caricature of the idea of the Superman. You see, it is invariably the case when such an idea is hovering above mankind—or is happening in the fundamental structure of the unconscious mind—that it is then everywhere: everybody is infected by it, and everybody has an inflation over it; everybody is an unconscious Superman. And since the individual is unconscious of it, the state has to voice it. All the inflated individuals are anarchistically set against each other, and therefore the state has to assume authority in order to hold them together. So people are invariably forced into a sort of society which guarantees a certain amount of life to every inflated particle under the condition that nobody sticks out.

Miss Wolff: I would like to read to you what Jakob Burckhardt says about the new state.² In a letter to a German friend, Friedrich von Preen, he gives a prophecy of future conditions. He says:

Oh, how many things dear to educated minds they will have to throw overboard as mental “luxury.” And how strangely difficult to us the new generation will grow up. It may happen that we shall appear to the younger ones as wholly based on luxuries as the French emigrants appeared to those people to whom they fled.

The essential political nature (commonwealth) of people is a wall, in which this or that nail still can be driven, but the nail has no hold any longer. Therefore in the agreeable twentieth century, Authority will again raise its head, and it will be a terrible head. At last the taking of everything as merely provisional, this right to every wilful innovation, this privilege of every cupidity, will come to its end.

Alas, what will happen to so many interests dear to us? To science, for instance, which is so used to take the back seat on the car of “Progress in general”! How little will the new authority care about science.

² Burckhardt wrote further: “It has long been clear to me that the world is moving towards the alternation between complete democracy and absolute lawless despotism. . . . Only people do not like to imagine a world whose rulers utterly ignore law, prosperity, enriching work, and industry, credit, etc. . . .” (Basel, 13 April 1802). *The Letters of Jacob Burckhardt*, ed. Alexander Dru (New York, 1955).

Prof. Jung: That is a very remarkable prophecy. It must have been written before the end of the eighties because Nietzsche “died” then.

Miss Wolff: Then when Nietzsche was sending *Zarathustra* to Gottfried Keller,³ he wrote him a letter (Rome, June 1883) describing his condition while writing the book as follows:

How strange! Out of a very abyss of feelings in which I was thrown by this past winter, the most dangerous of my whole life, all of a sudden I rose and for ten days I was as if under the brightest sky and high over lofty mountains. The fruit of these days is now lying before you.

Prof. Jung: That is a valuable contribution. Well, the feeling of such a condition brings up the realization of what the differentiated individual must feel when forced to live in such a state, and that we now find in the chapter on “The Flies in the Market-Place.” He admonishes his friend to flee to solitude, to nature, to be like a tree, because, he goes on:

Where solitude endeth, there beginneth the market-place; and where the market-place beginneth, there beginneth also the noise of the great actors, and the buzzing of the poison-flies.

In the world even the best things are worthless without those who represent them: those representers, the people call great men.

He says that the best things are of no account in the world characterized by such a state; because no individual is allowed to stick out, the best things can hardly exist. If they do exist, they must be shown, and for that demonstration there are special individuals like actors. So if the role of a king is to be demonstrated, an actor is needed who demonstrates a king—or the hero, or the god—and then people call those showmen or actors the great men.

Little do the people understand what is great—that is to say, the creating agency. But they have a taste for all representers and actors of great things.

³ On Keller, see above, 16 Oct. 1935, n. 3. Nietzsche sometimes wrote to Keller in a way both intimate and complimentary. He wrote to Hippolyte Taine of the one among the “Swiss whom I consider the only living German poet, Gottfried Keller” (4 July 1887; N/ Letters/Fuss).

The great things come into the world through people who are invisible, and then they must be shown by people like playactors, who have just as much relation to the great things as a playactor has to his role. You know that famous passage in Hamlet, "What is Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, that he should weep for her? . . ." ⁴

 Around the devisers of new values revolveth the world:—invisibly it revolveth.

Here he describes the very important fact that when a great thing is created, it is in the world; but since it is unconsciously in the world, since it is not visible, it is only known by the collective unconscious. It is in the collective unconscious of everybody, and therefore everybody will turn to it; they are made to turn to it quite against their conscious will perhaps. And they don't know to what they turn—if they notice at all that they are turned!

 But around the actors revolve the people and the glory; such is the course of things.

They are turned to the real thing, yet what they discover is the playactors who show it, so they see the mere outer appearance of the thing.

 Spirit, hath the actor, but little conscience of the spirit.

He can act it as if it were his own product, as if it were really himself, and that could be called a lack of intellectual conscience.

 He believeth always in that wherewith he maketh believe most strongly—in himself.

If he does not believe in himself, he is a bad actor. He must believe in himself, must believe that he is the very thing he represents—or he does not represent it. While the one who invents it always presents it in a way which is inspired by intellectual conscience; he doesn't say: "This is myself," and so people don't see it. They cannot, it is too subtle. They only see the man who is acting it.

 Tomorrow he hath a new belief, and the day after, one still newer. Sharp perceptions hath he, like the people, and changeable humors.

⁴ Hamlet in his "O, what a rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy, of one of the players (Act I, Sc. ii, lines 543–44).

To upset—that meaneth with him to prove. To drive mad—that meaneth with him to convince. And blood is counted by him as the best of all arguments.

Here we come to modern history.

A truth which only glideth into fine ears, he calleth falsehood and trumpery. Verily, he believeth only in Gods that make a great noise in the world!

Nowadays, you hear many such great noises. A noise is the evidence that it is something; the more one makes a noise about it, the more one convinces people. We have it in our ears in recent events in Switzerland. That should be an argument.

Full of clattering buffoons is the market-place.

The playactors who identify themselves with the best thing.

and the people glory in their great man! These are for them the masters of the hour.

But the hour presseth them; so they press thee. And also from thee they want Yea or Nay.

Those people are also in a hurry, speak of conquest and cannot wait: This is the day of the Lord! Now is the time! Step up to be a witness! Don't wait any longer because we are in a hurry to secure our success!

Alas! thou wouldst set thy chair betwixt For and Against?

On account of those absolute and impatient ones, be not jealous, thou lover of truth! Never yet did truth cling to the arm of an absolute one.

That hardly needs any comment.

On account of those abrupt ones, return into thy security: only in the market-place is one assailed by Yea? or Nay?

Slow is the experience of all deep fountains: long have they to wait until they know what hath fallen into their depths.

Away from the market-place and from fame taketh place all that is great: away from the market-place and from fame have ever dwelt the devisers of new values.

Flee, my friend, into thy solitude: I see thee stung all over by the poisonous flies. Flee thither, where a rough, strong breeze bloweth!

Now what does he mean by poisonous flies? Why just this peculiar figure of speech?

Mrs. Fierz: Could they not be words which are in the air, stinging and poisonous?

Prof. Jung: Well, swarms of flies are poison in the air, so it might mean the thoughts that are flying about, the rumors, the newspapers, or a slogan of the day. And from poisonous flies one gets terrible infections like blood poisoning; they are an awful pest. This symbol of blood poisoning or infection often turns up in dreams where a collective infection is meant, frequently represented as a venereal or tubercular infection, or any other contagious disease. You see, the one on the way of individuation is naturally exposed to collective infection; all the obvious truth he hears out in the marketplace is decidedly poisonous because it is absolutely against his way, his attempt. It tells him how wrong he is and how things ought to be done, which is all against his grain. If he allows himself to be infected by such views, he will soon die as an individual and be part of a flood or a great river; he will rush along and think himself a great fellow, but he is only one fat sheep perhaps in a whole herd, no more. So it is an almost mortal danger to expose oneself to the flies of the marketplace. Of course one could ask, is there no possibility of immunity—a protection against this infection? Should such a differentiated individual not be particularly protected just by his differentiation? And I should say, yes he *ought* to be protected: I don't think differentiation is of any use if one is simply more exposed to such dangers than before. But this danger of infection comes from a certain condition. Do you know what that is?

Mrs. Baumann: By being in *participation*⁵ through his unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and by his *likeness* to the flies in the marketplace. Nietzsche is a fly too, and he forgets all about it when he aims at the Superman. You see, identifying with the Superman means that he is no longer a fly in the marketplace. If he could only realize that he is just one of those ordinary people, he would be aware that it was quite natural that he should participate in that movement, and then it would not be dangerous. He would say, "Naturally, the collective man in myself is feeling for them or against them, but inasmuch as I am not a collective man, I don't mix in with all that." One could say, "Inasmuch as I am a body I am in the same swing; yet inasmuch as I am human I am out of it. I don't identify with it as I don't identify with my body or with

⁵ That is, Lévy-Bruhl's *participation mystique*, the tendency for the individual to become lost in the crowd. See above, 23 May 1934, n. 3.

the lower layers of my psyche." So the danger Nietzsche describes here is only valid inasmuch as he has an inflation; he identifies with the Superman and leaves the ordinary man behind, as we saw long ago. And naturally he has then no longer the protection of the collective being that surely would allow him to be one of the crowd in the marketplace without getting a dangerous infection. Such infections only happen when one is not humble enough, when one immodestly and immoderately identifies with one's ideals or the ideals of the Superman; then naturally one has no basis, but is suspended in the air, only to come down and wake up, perhaps, having fallen into a deep black hole.

Flee into thy solitude! Thou hast lived too closely to the small and pitiable. Flee from their invisible vengeance! Towards thee they have nothing but vengeance.

That would not be the case if he could accept his shadow, the collective man in himself; inasmuch as he cannot, naturally he will have the whole world against him.

Raise no longer an arm against them! Innumerable are they, and it is not thy lot to be a fly-flap.

You see, he should accept the fact that he is one of the flies; he cannot wipe out the ordinary man because he is one of them, and if he tries to do so he simply creates a hysterical dissociation in himself.

Innumerable are the small and pitiable ones: and of many a proud structure, rain-drops and weeds have been the ruin.

If you don't take care of it, sure enough that will come.

Thou art not stone; but already hast thou become hollow by the numerous drops. Thou wilt yet break and burst by the numerous drops.

One can only say, don't be a stone because you are human; if you are a stone as well as a human being, you will hollow yourself out by your own raindrops: your own life will hollow you out. You should not be stone, you should be flexible.

Exhausted I see thee, by poisonous flies; bleeding I see thee, and torn at a hundred spots; and thy pride will not even upbraid.

Blood they would have from thee in all innocence; blood their

bloodless souls crave for—and they sting, therefore, in all innocence.

But thou, profound one, thou sufferest too profoundly even from small wounds; and ere thou hadst recovered, the same poison-worm crawled over thy hand.

What does he mean by this peculiar figure, the poisonous creature, *der Giftwurm*, in the German text?

Mrs. Fierz: Did he not once dream that he had a toad on his hand?

Prof. Jung: Yes. Bernoulli published the correspondence between Nietzsche and his friend Overbeck, a professor of church history in Basel—it was he who fetched Nietzsche back from Turin to Basel when he broke down.⁶ Now in this correspondence, he mentions the fact that Nietzsche always suffered from the peculiar phobia that when he saw a toad, he felt that he ought to swallow it. And once when he was sitting beside a young woman at a dinner, he told her of a dream he had had, in which he saw his hand with all the anatomical detail, quite translucent, absolutely pure and crystal-like, and then suddenly an ugly toad was sitting upon his hand and he had to swallow it. You know, the toad has always been suspected of being poisonous, so it represents a secret poison hidden in the darkness where such creatures live—they are nocturnal animals. And the extraordinary fact is that it is a parallel to what actually happened to Nietzsche, of all people—that exceedingly sensitive nervous man has a syphilitic infection. That is a historical fact—I know the doctor who took care of him. It was when he was twenty-three years old. I am sure this dream refers to that fatal impression; this absolutely pure system infected by the poison of the darkness.

But that kind of thing happens to such people; I don't say it is always venereal disease—any other infection or injury may happen to people who are too intuitive, who live beyond themselves, without paying attention enough to the body, to the reality of life. We of course hate to talk of disgusting or evil or dangerous things; we are like primitives in that respect. It is unfavorable to mention them. Yet we cannot live in a world which is not, but have to live in a world which is. If Nietzsche had paid attention enough to the reality of his extraordinary sensitive nervous system on the one side, and to the fact of the world on the other side, he would have been very careful to avoid situations in which he could have gotten such an infection; he would have known the effect

⁶ See *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft*, ed. Carl Albrecht Bernoulli (Jena, 1908.)

it would have in his life. Such a situation is not unavoidable. But it is to just those people whose reality sense is defective that those things do happen. To anybody else it would not be so terrible, but to a nervous system such as Nietzsche possessed it was a horrible fatality, and I think that this dream expresses it. Sitting beside that young woman the fact came back to him unconsciously and he felt forced to tell her of the dream in order to inform her: Don't touch me! I am unclean—marked by my fate. He had to give her full information. People do that when they talk to you unconsciously; they always provide you with the necessary information about themselves. It often happens that perfect strangers tell you all about themselves, provided you cock your ears and provided it is important to them to do so. So I think the poisonous creature that creeps over his hand is really the quintessence of what the world did to Nietzsche. But it could do such a thing to him only through the fact that he did not pay attention. He was not aware of the world, did not see it as it was, because he did not see himself as he was. In this way it could happen.

Too proud art thou to kill these sweet-tooths. But take care lest it be thy fate to suffer all their poisonous injustice!

They buzz around thee also with their praise: obtrusiveness, is their praise. They want to be close to thy skin and thy blood.

It is perfectly true that as soon as somebody sticks out—when he goes ahead, for instance—many leeches try to get to the foreground by drinking his blood; but they can only do it when such a man is absolutely unaware of his body, of his real existence. If he is aware of it he simply brushes the flies away.

Miss Wolff: The flies could get at Nietzsche, also, because he was too isolated. He frightened his friends away, being very intolerant with them. Yet, even if they did not understand him, they were really very good friends. He was too much alone, and because he did not attend enough to his relationships, that amount of psychic energy which is to be applied to them was being sucked out of him by collectivity. So he could not just brush off the flies.

Prof. Jung: Well, if he had known the collective man in himself he would have been protected, but he was too much alone and so was separated from the open door to himself through which all the leeches could creep in.

They flatter thee, as one flattereth a God or devil; they whimper before thee, as before a God or devil. What doth it come to? Flatterers are they, and whimperers, and nothing more.

That that flattery is another source of the infection is of course perfectly obvious. You see, projections can happen through hostility or a negative attitude as well as through a so-called positive attitude; those are simply two different ways of carrying projections or infections.

Often, also, do they show themselves to thee as amiable ones.
But that hath ever been the prudence of the cowardly. Yea! the cowardly are wise!

They think much about thee with their circumscribed souls—
thou art always suspected by them!

Well, he describes here the condition of a general idea which had not yet reached consciousness, which is in the collective unconscious, causing as I said, an infection of consciousness which can show, for instance, in a peculiar inflation. You know, when a person has an unconscious content—say a certain archetype is constellated—then his conscious, not realizing what the matter is, will be filled with the emanation or radiation of that activated archetype. And then he behaves unconsciously as if he were that archetype, but he expresses the identity in terms of his ego personality, so that everybody who is clear-sighted and not prejudiced will say, “Oh, well, that fellow is just inflated, he is a pompous ass, he is ridiculous.” For he unconsciously plays a role and tries to represent something which he has taken to be his own self—of course, not the self in the philosophic sense—but merely his ego personality exaggerated by the influx and emanations of the unconscious archetype.

You see, the unconscious, activated archetype is like a rising sun, a source of energy or warmth which warms up the ego personality from within, and then the ego personality begins to radiate as if it were God-knows-what. But it radiates its own colors, expresses the archetype in its own personal way, and therefore it appears as if the ego were all-important. Whereas the ego is of no importance at all in reality, but is simply urged from within, pushed forward and made to perform as if it *were* important. The importance is the greatness that is behind. For instance, you find in the Upanishads the cosmogonic myth of Prajapati, the first being who, when he found that he was all alone, that there was nothing which was not himself, began to talk to his own greatness, or the greatness within himself spoke to him.⁷ You see, the original philosophic mind makes that difference—the ego thinks, “I

⁷ Zimmer writes of the Hindu god-creator, Prajapati, “a personification of the all-containing life-matter and life-force. . . . He felt lonely . . . and so he brought forth the universe to surround himself with company” (Zimmer/Philosophies, p. 300).

am all alone," a pretty miserable condition. But there is also a greatness which is peculiarly myself, yet it is not myself; it speaks to me and even tells me that which I did not know. So this is merely a projection of that original mind which knows very clearly that the opinions of consciousness are of little importance, and that it is a greatness behind that consciousness which speaks the truth. But if one is unconscious of it, then naturally one has an inflation and behaves as if one were the greatness.

Now, when you see people who obviously have an inflation, of course you can blame them for having it, for being pompous asses, ridiculous playactors; but you can also understand them as being motivated, as being a symbolic expression of an underlying importance which they do not see. And you make no mistake if you assume that those people have obviously touched upon something of great importance which works upon them and pushes them into an importance which perhaps they themselves have not sought. But it is so sweet that when you get it you won't let go of it—you cannot say no. If somebody says, "Are you not grand, a wonder character?" you say, "No, no!"—but push the crown a little nearer and you will take it.⁸ So these things happen from that infection.

Then in the paragraph. "They think much about thee with their circumscribed souls—thou art always suspected by them!" he speaks of people finding a fellow who represents the thing which causes their inflation. You see, the cause according to Nietzsche is the all-pervading archetypal idea of the Superman, the greatness of man—and his idealism or ambition is to attain to that greatness. And one cannot say this is not legitimate; it is a fact that there are philosophies, religious systems and so on, which hold such a conviction: they even *teach* it. The idea that we should overcome, that we should be good, is all the Superman in different editions. That we should try to attain a state of Nirvana, not desiring this or that, being free of the opposites, being beyond good and evil, is simply the Indian edition of the Superman. To be in Tao is the Chinese form. Those are all very difficult appearances of the same idea. So his aspiration to become his own greatness is legitimate. It is clear that this idea becomes conscious in Nietzsche and therefore, inasmuch as he identifies himself with the Superman's greatness, he *is* that which moved everybody else at that time. For instance, how did Jakob Burckhardt know about the future? Through his own unconscious, by his own psychological condition. How could

⁸ Obviously Jung is thinking here of Marc Antony's funeral oration in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*.

he see the role authority would play? Because those chapters were in Jakob Burckhardt as they were in everybody, so much in everybody that now they come off in reality: we see them performed before our eyes on the stage of the world.

Now, if Nietzsche is conscious of this idea and identical with it, it is quite to be expected that he will become suspect, for when people meet the apparent carrier of the source of their inflation, they naturally will immediately try to suppress that individual who sticks out, just because he threatens that inflation. For then they are no longer the only sun in heaven—there is another sun, and that should not be. That is not legitimate. Naturally, they will say he apes something, aspires to something, and should be suppressed, because he threatens to take the value out of their pocket which is the happy cause of their most cherished inflation. That is of course disagreeable and therefore people suspect the one who is perhaps conscious of that value. Well, that of course must be. You see, *they* are not conscious of it, and to be conscious of the idea which causes the general inflation is already an asset; that is more than to be merely unconsciously filled with it.

So Nietzsche, in having a conscious idea of the cause of his inflation, is in a better condition. He is ahead of his time, and therefore he is naturally the object of envy because they all crave the consciousness of their possession. They are the people who have a hundred dollars in their pocket without knowing it, and Nietzsche is the one who is conscious that he has that hundred dollars: that is just the difference. But no more than the people of his time, did he know that the hundred dollars were merely a loan; the hundred dollars' worth belongs to the greatness. So naturally, those people would suspect him of thieving, of being a cheat and a liar. Then it is also a fact that ordinary people are so deeply convinced of their nonentity, despite their inflation, that they are quite sure that in the street, or even in the town in which they live, there never has been and never will be a great man. They cannot assume that a great man would live in a street with an ordinary name; the great man lives in a faraway country where streets have very peculiar names, where the houses look very peculiar, and where they are all peculiar people. They even assume that great men never sleep and eat; that they have wings or something of the sort and can fly.

Whatever is much thought about is at last thought suspicious.

That is true because their thoughts are made to turn round the thing which causes the inflation; so when they meet the carrier of that source

of inflation, the idea, they naturally begin to think—but *how* they think is the question.

They punish thee for all thy virtues. They pardon thee in their inmost hearts only—for thine errors.

It is of course a great relief to the ordinary man when he sees that the suspected Superman makes mistakes. That alleviates their task and gives them a certain rope by which to hold on to their inflation.

Because thou art gentle and of upright character, thou sayest: "Blameless are they for their small existence." But their circumscribed souls think: "Blamable is all great existence."

This sounds almost grotesque, yet it is a great truth. All greatness that comes into being is guilt, because it destroys the ordinary man. You see, the invisible things cannot come into being without torture and destruction for the collective man, for the unconscious natural existence; you always kill and destroy in order to bring something into existence. Whatever you do, if it is of any importance, also means destruction. It is the tragic guilt of Prometheus who brought the fire to mankind. It was a very great advantage to mankind, yet he stole it from the gods and they were offended. So the idea that man has greatness, that he is in touch with greatness or that he might attain to greatness, is a theft, because it is stolen from the unconscious and brought within the reach of man. And then the ordinary man is in a very dangerous condition; the neighborhood of the archetype causes an inflation, and the man is mad: his whole world is filled with madness. Such an archetypal presence should be withheld as long as possible therefore, for it causes no end of disturbance in the world. Of course, even the creator or inventor of such ideas is moved by the archetypes; the only difference is that his nervous system is so sensitive that he cannot help realizing it. He sees it, he understands it. So he is not at just the same disadvantage as everybody else, but naturally he will be made responsible for all the destructive effects that come out of such an idea.

Even when thou art gentle toward them, they still feel themselves despised by thee; and they repay thy beneficence with secret maleficence.

Thy silent pride is always counter to their taste; they rejoice if once thou be humble enough to be frivolous.

What we recognize in a man, we also irritate in him. Therefore be on your guard against the small ones!

In thy presence they feel themselves small, and their baseness gleameth and gloweth against thee in invisible vengeance.

Sawest thou not how often they became dumb when thou approachedst them, and how their energy left them like the smoke of an extinguishing fire?

Here is the observation that as soon as he approaches the ordinary people, their inflation naturally collapses, because it becomes visible that he carries the value, and the ordinary people thus lose a certain thrill or a motive power they had apparently possessed: they lost the hundred dollars. For instantly the imaginary hundred dollars they carry in their pockets disappear, and then they discover that he has the hundred dollars really in his pocket and can put them on the table. So everybody thinks that by some unknown trick he has robbed them, has taken all that value out of their pockets. Naturally, they hate him and they will take their revenge. Of course they don't realize that even his hundred dollars are not his property, but are a loan; he has just as little as all the rest of them.

Yea, my friend, the bad conscience art thou of thy neighbours; for they are unworthy of thee. Therefore they hate thee, and would fain suck thy blood.

Thy neighbours will always be poisonous flies; what is great in thee—that itself must make them more poisonous, and always more fly-like.

Naturally, but he makes the mistake of thinking that he is great, not seeing that he is one of them. When he shows his hundred dollars, he says, "Now look at what I have, this is my own!"—and that is the lie. There he cheats them. So when Nietzsche comes out and says, "This is my idea, I am identical with that Superman," he deserves his fate: he really identifies with a thing which is not himself. But it is quite natural—anybody would act like that, and everybody expects a fellow who has an idea to instantly identify with it. For instance, no ordinary people would assume that a first-class tenor could be anything but a great man; they even think he must have a wonderful character because his tones are so high. And all the young girls are in love with him, thinking he is up there in his high tones. Then of course, when his voice has gone, if he is fool enough to identify with it, he is utterly gone too. Where are the tenors? You must seek them with lanterns. Like the great cocottes, very beautiful women: when their beauty has gone, where are they? When the face withers, they disappear altogether be-

cause there was nothing behind the face. Where is Cleo de Mérode, or La Belle Otéro?⁹ They have vanished. Perhaps La Belle Otéro is Frau Meier and lives in a back yard somewhere. So all the poison which comes from the flies is caused by that inflation of the apparent owner of the hundred dollars.

Flee, my friend, into thy solitude—and thither, where a rough strong breeze bloweth. It is not thy lot to be a fly-flap.

There is something positive in this advice; there he would have a chance to realize that he is not the greatness. But he never would be able to realize that he is like the ordinary people and he should realize that too. For instance, if he were really a sage, he would say to himself, “Go out into the street, go to the little people, be one of them and see how you like it, how much you enjoy being such a small thing. That is yourself.” And so he would learn that he was not his own greatness. Or he might say, “Go away from the little people and disappear into your mountain vastnesses; try to identify with that greatness, and you will see that you cannot identify with it, and so you will learn that you are not that greatness.” You see, there are two ways of realizing it. But to disappear into solitude in order to be desirous, to be longing for friends and recognition, effect, and so on, does not pay. Then one never realizes that one is not one’s own greatness.

Mrs. Sigg: I don’t know what this means: “What we recognize in a man, we also stir in him.”

Prof. Jung: Well, it is a great truth that when you perceive something in a person, you also bring it out in him. When you see a certain quality in a person, it is a sort of intuition, and that is not an indifferent fact: it works upon him. When somebody has a bad intuition about you, you feel it without knowing it; you feel suppressed because that intuition is a fact which takes its way through the unconscious. We don’t know how an intuition comes, but it always has to do with something in the unconscious; and since the unconscious is in you both, you also get a shot from it. It will most certainly come out in you, and it all depends upon the character of the intuition whether you are favorably or unfavorably impressed. If somebody has an intuition that you have a certain thought, you are most probably made to think that thought. Intuition seems to work through the sympathetic system, and being a half-unconscious function, intuitions also bring out an unconscious effect in

⁹ Cleo de Mérode (1875-1966), French dancer, and La Belle Otéro (1868-1965), a Spaniard, called “the last great courtesan.”

the object of the intuition. In dealing with intuitives, you notice that they can intuit a thing in such a way that it is shot into your back bone, into your spinal cord, and you must admit that you thought it, though afterwards you will realize that the thought was surely not your own.

There are very curious examples. For instance, certain salespeople read from your eyes what you apparently want; you buy the most amazing stuff and cannot understand afterwards why the devil you ever bought it, whoever put it into you! And Eastern sorcerers put things into you so that you naively step into their trap. A sorcerer tried that once with me and I stepped into the trap; he had such amazing intuition that he was able to twist a cell in my brain. The famous rope-trick is done in that way; it is a sort of projection. I heard a story about a sorcerer who worked the rope-trick in a garrison in India while all the officers, the whole mess, were gathered round. And when the thing was already in full swing, another man who had been delayed came to watch the performance. He stepped up to the circle of men who were all gazing into the air at the boy climbing the rope, but he saw nothing there. He only saw the boy standing beside the sorcerer and the rope lying on the ground, and he was just about to shout when the sorcerer caught him, saying, "Look at that man, he has no head!" And he looked and the man had no head, and then he was all in—and there was the rope and the boy climbing up it. The sorcerer saw of course that the man was not in the circle and that he had to put him on the spot, and he got him. Intuition does work like that in certain cases.

You can observe very clearly that certain thoughts come into your head which afterwards you clearly feel have not been your own: you were infected by something. One calls it magic but it is simply an effect through the unconscious, coming from the fact that the three other functions—perception, thinking, and feeling—move as if in consciousness; but intuition makes a way through the deep unconscious where you are one with everybody. So when such a thing happens, everybody is stirred. If I move on my chair you are not disturbed, but if the soil upon which you sit is shaken, you feel an earthquake and are disturbed. Intuition is like a thing which goes through the floor and shakes everybody. This is one of the important sources of mental infections and there is no defence against it; you cannot suppress the effect, it will happen. The only thing you can do is to make up your mind as soon as possible whether this thought or effect or feeling is really your own. But if you leave things, as most people do—just let them go from a sort of moral laziness—you undergo an infection. It gets you by the neck.

The analyst is in a particularly disagreeable *participation*; for the sake of his own mental health he should clean himself every day from the intuitions of his patients in order to avoid mental infection. If you let things go on, their accumulation eventually causes an inflation; you will one day wake up with a big inflation which will soon make you fall into a hole. Analysts have to be very careful. Nietzsche, of course, is not in that position: he is naively identical with his greatness. And people like him swallow doses of poison with pleasure. They are sort of morphine maniacs or alcoholics, but of a mental kind, and they do it in order to maintain their happy condition. An inflation is a wonderful thing: you are lifted up from the earth and fly in heaven, looking down benevolently upon the masses.

LECTURE II

23 October 1935

Prof. Jung:

We come now to the chapter called "Chastity."

I love the forest. It is bad to live in cities: there, there are too many of the lustful.

As the title of this chapter denotes, Nietzsche is now going to talk of sexuality. For those who were not here last term, I must repeat again that the series of chapters consist of a series of images. He starts with a certain picture or a thought—a thought picture—and then towards the end of the chapter he usually arrives at the possibility of a new picture; a new problem opens up which will form the contents of the next chapter. So the whole of *Zarathustra* is a string of pictures, each one a problem, and all hanging together with one logical undercurrent. We were concerned before with the "Flies in the Market-Place." Now, how do you suppose Nietzsche arrives at this chapter about chastity?

Mrs. Crowley: You were speaking about his dream of a toad in the last discussion.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we have decidedly a cue in that worm, which referred to his dream that a toad was sitting on his hand, spoiling his beautiful system. But the toad had to do with his infection, and that alone would not explain why he arrives at this chapter.

Mrs. Baumann: I thought he was running away from people to escape that infection—in order to find chastity through solitude and so avoid the toad.

Mrs. Crowley: I would not have thought it was to escape infection, but rather that the presence of other people made him more conscious of it.

Prof. Jung: One of the personal reasons for his peculiar sensitiveness might well be the feeling that he was somewhat marked by fate by his syphilitic infection; that would probably give him a certain amount of self-consciousness. Or of course it might link him up instead with the

lower strata of mankind; people often don't mind and don't become particularly self-conscious on account of such an infection. In Nietzsche's tremendously sensitive structure, we could expect that it would have that effect, however. But we should know just what problem was raised concerning the "Flies in the Market-Place," which would lead Nietzsche to this new aspect. In how far would the development in the former chapter make it almost necessary that a chapter on chastity should follow? Mrs. Baumann has already referred to something.

Dr. Bertine: The marketplace is the place of the collective, and sexuality is the bond of the collective; he rejects collectivity and therefore he rejects the cohesiveness of it.

Mrs. Fierz: It is running away from the lower man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one can also put it like that. You see, flies would mean an extraordinary collectivity of small beings, and Nietzsche never tires of speaking of ordinary men as being sort of vermin whose only excellence is their remarkable fertility; practically the only quality he gives them is that they are many, a multitude of vermin. So he excludes himself and is a Superman who has overcome that awful crowd-man. This we shall see even more clearly towards the end of *Zarathustra* when he rejects the "ugliest man." The man that makes for growth is the ugliest man, the inferior man, the instinctive collective being, and that is exactly what he loathes the most. You see, to lift himself out of that layer of the ordinary collective man would mean reaching a height which is superhuman, and how can man be above man? Inasmuch as he is a living man he is just man. So what is bound to follow in such a case?

Miss Hannah: An inflation.

Prof. Jung: Well, he has an inflation already—therefore he bounces in the air like a balloon. One needs an inflation to rise, and one can stay in the heavens by the fact of that inflation. But then what is the mental condition of such a person?

Mr. Allemann: He is torn to pieces.

Prof. Jung: He might explode, but that would be schizophrenia.

Prof. Fierz: He becomes neurotic.

Prof. Jung: Nietzsche was neurotic of course, but when you analyse the dreams of such a case, suspended above the earth in the super condition, what will you find?

Mrs. Crowley: The earth problems coming up.

Prof. Jung: You find probably the earth problems, the earth man, heavy like lead, absolutely identical with the lowest things. And since it

is one and the same man, there must exist a bond between the two. And what is that bond? Where is the connection, the umbilical cord between the body, the lower man, and the balloon up there?

Mrs. Fierz: Conflict?

Prof. Jung: But what would the conflict be? In the end of *Zarathustra* you find the interpretation very nicely. Because it is a self-analysis, it comes out.

Miss Taylor: Is it not sexuality itself? That would function as a sort of bond, because it is very deep.

Prof. Jung: Well, the lower man, being deprived of that part which went off in a balloon, is left to his instincts only, and so he can only express a lowdown sexuality. Of course sexuality is not necessarily lowdown, but in this case it is lower because the higher part has gone and knows nothing of what is happening underneath; so a very inferior sexuality goes on as an expression of the lower man. And the man in the clouds has some feeling of it, for that really binds him together with the lower man and he feels the corresponding resistance. But that resistance is to the sexuality of the lower man, only a connection through conflict. If the lower man has a lustful kind of sexuality, the man in the clouds has the corresponding lustful resistance against it.¹ You see, whether you hate a person or thing, or love it, is in natural psychology exactly the same. Of course, to the human being it makes all the difference in the world whether you like a thing or not, but in psychology it is the same; you are bound to a thing just as much by hatred as by love, sometimes even more, because the bad qualities in people are stronger than the good ones. The real strength in a man is by no means his strength—it is his weakness, because weakness is much stronger than the greatest strength.² So Nietzsche loves the high mountains in order to be excluded from the lower man, and so he says it is bad to live in cities where there are too many of the lustful, But his own ordinary man is in the worst parts of the town.

Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer, than into the dreams of a lustful woman?

There you are! He doesn't even live in towns, but in the dreams of a lustful woman. Now who is that famous lustful woman?

Mrs. Fierz: His anima.

¹ Compare Jung's statement that "nothing is more repulsive than a furtively prurient spirituality; it is just as unsavory as gross sensuality" (CW 17, par. 336).

² To support this apparent paradox Jung frequently cites the *I Ching* movement from the aggressive strength of Yang to the passive, waterlike strength of Yin.

Prof. Jung: Of course, because she always tried to persuade him to come down from the balloon and look after the inferior man; in such a case you can expect that kind of lust. Later, we find a hymn to that anima. And when he became insane he wrote a lot of erotic stuff which was so crude that his highly respectable sister knew no better than to burn it up. We know definitely that he was filled with sexual fantasies, and there are some rather crude allusions in letters to his friends. As is always the case when a man has gone up in a balloon, his anima is of course on the side of the shadow, the inferior person in himself: she is even married to that man, identical with his shadow. You see, the idea is that he is very high and in danger of falling down naturally, and then he would land in the dreams of the lustful woman, his anima, who is the wife of that awful creature, the shadow. But he does not know that he has a shadow because he has lost his body; he is a ghost and a ghost casts no shadow. So he naturally thinks that the woman down there, whose touch he feels, is a strange woman who has nothing to do with him; she is perhaps the wife of somebody. Because he does not recognize himself in his shadow she is projected and he has nothing to do with her. Yet he feels her touch. So the thing which always binds the two things together, the one above and the one below, is not exactly sex or the conflict over sex: it is the anima. But the anima means a conflict. Therefore, woman is always represented as a paradoxical being; very often she appears as split in two, an upper and a lower, a fair and a dark anima. And that is so real that men fall in love accordingly; they fall in love with fair animas and with dark animas and they appear as real women on the stage of reality. When Nietzsche notices that these terrible women are connected with men equally bad, he says:

And just look at these men . . .

Keep in mind that this is his shadow, which is like all the rest of those flies in the marketplace!

their eye saith it—they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman.

That is the inferior sexuality of his shadow, but it is only inferior because he went away in a balloon; if he had stayed below, it would not be inferior. For sexuality is always what the person is, not something detached from man, a thing in itself. It is an activity in man and it is always what the man is.

Filth is at the bottom of their souls; and alas! if their filth hath still spirit in it!

Exactly. His mind went away in the balloon, so naturally there is no mind in the filth; it would not be filth if the mind were down there, but would be a decent human body.

Would that ye were perfect—at least as animals! But to animals belongeth innocence.

That is perfectly true. If he were a beast he would be completely unconscious; he would not have a mind and he would not have a chance to go away in a balloon. Of course, if you have a mind you are tempted to identify with it, because consciousness is such an autonomous system that you can almost include yourself in it; with a certain amount of autoeroticism you *can* include yourself, defend yourself against surrounding conditions and lock yourself up in your consciousness, to the extent that you become identical with it and at any time may fly away. You see, this autonomy of consciousness is a great asset; if that were lacking we would not have will. Willpower is the expression of the autonomy of consciousness: you can choose; otherwise, there is no freedom of choice. You can only have free will—independent of environmental conditions of any kind—inasmuch as your consciousness is autonomous. So the possibility that consciousness can detach itself from its basis is not a disadvantage if it does not go too far. It is even a necessary condition for the existence of free will; inasmuch as consciousness is detachable from conditions, we have free will. Now, free will is surely the basis of ethics; an ethical attitude is only possible inasmuch as consciousness is detachable or autonomous. But if you go too far, if you increase the imagination, the autonomy of consciousness, by assuming too much responsibility, you go up like a balloon. You think you can triumph over natural laws which are the real basis of your life if you follow them; you increase your responsibility for things over which man cannot and should not assume responsibility, and off you go above the clouds. And then you are confronted with a situation like Nietzsche's. For whatever curses he shouts down from the stratosphere, they are simply curses about himself. Those filthy beasts down there that sleep with each other are the other side of himself; he has cleared that vermin out of his Superman's consciousness and he imagines that he is well above it. But he is far from it, for nobody can do that. He himself has a doubt here. He says:

Do I counsel you to slay your instincts? I counsel you to innocence in your instincts.

Do I counsel you to chastity? Chastity is a virtue with some, but with many almost a vice.

You see what good advice he can give out of the clouds—from far away.

These are continent, to be sure: but doggish lust looketh enviously out of all that they do.

Even into the heights of their virtue and into their cold spirit doth this creature follow them, with its discord.

He confirms exactly what we were saying.

And how nicely can doggish lust beg for a piece of spirit, when a piece of flesh is denied it!

Ye love tragedies and all that breaketh the heart? But I am distrustful of your doggish lust.

Ye have too cruel eyes, and ye look wantonly towards the sufferers. Hath not your lust just disguised itself and taken the name of fellow-suffering?

In this admonition or exhortation to the poor vermin down below, he unveils his own psychology; it all happens in himself. The cruel eyes are very much his own eyes because he speaks out of the coldness of the mind, spying. And as for that “look wantonly towards the sufferers,” well, who is a great sufferer? Who is pitying himself and taking care of himself, avoiding everything which could cause upset to his poor nervous system?

And also this parable give I unto you. Not a few who meant to cast out their devil, went thereby into the swine themselves.

This is a very general and a very great truth. There are many people who try to give good advice to other people, try to rescue them or to help them, and in the end they are drowned in the mire; that is eventually the place they were really making for under the disguise of pity, compassion, and understanding. And it is Nietzsche's own fate. In the end of *Zarathustra* we come to passages which are very much on the line of the pathological eroticism he showed when his insanity came on.

Mrs. Crowley: You said in a former Seminar that a prophet has to have the collective experience in order to speak from his own experience. So that might be a natural cause.

Prof. Jung: Quite so, but the prophet is a different case. We are speaking now, not of the prophet but of the psychology of the man Nietzsche. You see, I would be a Superman if I dared to speak of the psychology of the prophet. I could not possibly do that. I doubt even whether the prophet has a psychology—only man has a psychology.

Mrs. Crowley: But in this instance, as he assumes the role of the prophet, he has to go through this experience.

Prof. Jung: But that is Nietzsche's psychology *as* a prophet. Insofar as he has a prophet's psychology he is bound to have that experience, sure enough. If you assume yourself to be a prophet, then you are in a balloon; to be a prophet is of course his special balloon. Zarathustra is his balloon.

To whom chastity is difficult, it is to be dissuaded: lest it become the road to hell—to filth and lust of soul.

Do I speak of filthy things? That is not the worst thing for me to do.

Not when the truth is filthy, but when it is shallow, doth the discerning one go unwillingly into its waters.

That is also a great truth.

Verily, there are chaste ones from their very nature; they are gentler of heart, and laugh better and oftener than you.

They laugh also at chastity, and ask: "What is chastity?"

Is chastity not folly? But the folly came unto us, and not we unto it.

We offered that guest harbour and heart: now it dwelleth with us—let it stay as long as it will!"—

It is quite obvious that those wise ones who don't know what chastity is are the brethren of Zarathustra; Zarathustra is one of those. And here one sees where Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra; that is the way in which the Superman—if such a thing did exist—would speak. So you can say that this is the way in which the prophet Zarathustra speaks, and inasmuch as there is such a thing as a prophet, he has of course my permission to speak like that. But inasmuch as the man Nietzsche speaks, what does it convey?

Prof. Reichstein: It is as you said, he makes now a lust of his chastity.

Prof. Jung: Well, he makes a very particular point of it, even to the extent of asking what chastity is. That means that he has no such problem at all; it means a superiority to his earthly being which is wellnigh impossible.

Dr. Bertine: It is a disembodied statement.

Prof. Jung: Completely, and therefore exceedingly improbable. Of course if the prophet speaks like that, it goes: there is no argument against what a prophet says, as you know. But inasmuch as the man speaks, it is simply neurotic. So there is very good reason for not identifying with the prophet.

Well, I am going rather quickly through these chapters because, though they are important inasmuch as the psychology of the man Nietzsche is concerned, they are to my mind not particularly interesting. We come now to "The Friend":

"One, is always too many about me"—thinketh the anchorite.
 "Always once one—that maketh two in the long run!"

I and me are always too earnestly in conversation: how could it be endured, if there were not a friend?

The friend of the anchorite is always the third one: the third one is the cork which preventeth the conversation of the two sinking into the depth.

Ah! there are too many depths for all anchorites. Therefore, do they long so much for a friend, and for his elevation.

Now how does he cross over the gulf from chastity to the friend?

Mrs. Fierz: The chapter on chastity was the anima aspect and now it is the aspect of the shadow; he and his shadow make the conversation.

Prof. Jung: That is what one would hope for.

Mrs. Fierz: But it is very painful.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and therefore that conversation does not happen.

Mrs. Fierz: And therefore he needs another person and that would be the *Puer Aeternus*.

Prof. Jung: Well, yes, in many cases. You see, it is very obvious that he has rejected the relation to his anima because she is impolite enough to link him up with the awful men down below who do such terrible things. And as the rejected relation to the anima is heterosexual, what remains is homosexuality, so he discovers the friend. The real friend he would need would naturally be his own inferior man, and the conversation he should have would be with him; but that is excluded, so he is all the more in need of a human relation, which he hopes to find in the friend. Now when Nietzsche was all alone in the Engadine, he had the experience of suddenly feeling double—it was he himself and Zarathustra—and he felt that it was almost like talking to a friend.³

³ Nietzsche sometimes spoke of himself as a *doppelgänger*: "This double thread of experiences, this means of access to two worlds that seem so far asunder, finds in every de-

And now he says that "I and my self"—Zarathustra being the self as you know from a former chapter—are ever too hot in converse. "I and me are always too earnestly in conversation; how could it be endured, if there were not a friend?" To the hermit, a friend is ever a third because the hermit is double, and that he cannot stand, so he needs a human friend: "The third one is the cork which preventeth the conversation of the two sinking into the depths." That is, the self being greater than his consciousness, he is naturally drawn into the eternal abyss of that which is greater than man; through his own conversation he simply disappears. He falls into a complete identity with the self, his consciousness gets a horrible inflation, and there is no chance whatever of any connection with the earth. That is the psychology of a man who is completely isolated, and who therefore would naturally try to link up with the earth again. But since the contact with the earth is infamous and poisonous, he cannot touch it, and the necessary link would be a man friend who would represent the heights over against the depths. The self would draw him into the abyss of eternity whereas a friend would keep him in the surface reality.

Our faith in others betrayeth wherein we would fain have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a friend is our betrayer.

And often with our love we want merely to overleap envy. And often we attack and make ourselves enemies, to conceal that we are vulnerable.

Here he describes a very peculiar type of relationship to a friend, which is a system of many neuroses. What do you think about it?

Prof. Reichstein: I think that Nietzsche is quite incapable of having a friend at all, and therefore he makes such a figure of it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is obviously trying to create a fantastical friend, the friend he imagines he ought to have. Naturally, if he is in the condition that we have described, he would need the friend that he imagines. But no human being could be his friend under such conditions; that is well-nigh impossible. Nobody can adapt to a double, and Nietzsche has in that case a double aspect: he is himself and he is identical with the self—on the one side the regrettable victim, and on the other side a very peculiar prophet. How could an earthly normal man adapt to such a condition? Let us assume that a real man turns up, what

tail its counterpart in my own nature—I am my own complement: I have a 'second' sight, as well as a first. And perhaps I also have a third sight" (*Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so wise," sec. 3). See also the letter to Peter Gast, 14 August 1881.

would happen to him? Nietzsche had a friend, do you know anything about him?

Prof. Fierz: Peter Gast.

Miss Wolff: Peter Gast was an unimportant person. Nietzsche could not accept a man who was his equal as his friend; he was a human being who just needed to be alone. If he had such a friend, he was a rival at once, it was too much on the basis of competition.

Prof. Jung: The friendship with Peter Gast was rather an unhappy story. Peter Gast felt terribly emptied and found it exceedingly difficult, and everybody else who had to deal directly with Nietzsche found it difficult. You may remember that little anecdote about Nietzsche: Once when he was talking very enthusiastically about Italy in his lecture at Basel, he happened to catch the eye of one of the young men in his audience, and Nietzsche instantly imagined that there was a friend for him. So after the lecture he said to him, "We will go together to Italy!" But the young man had no money and naturally thought of his empty pocket. "But Herr Professor!" he stammered, and then the bottom dropped out of the world and Nietzsche simply made off disgusted. That is Nietzsche. He did not think of the reality, that the poor student had not the necessary money to take a trip to Italy, and of course he never would have thought of paying for him. If the young man has said, "Yes, I am coming with you," of course Nietzsche would have been delighted, without thinking that the fellow had no money to do it; you see, the reality which presented itself at that moment was enough to put him off completely, and the man was simply lost to him. That was his kind of friendship. The friend ought to exist, and then in the right moment he ought to disappear, and then he should be there again—that is exactly what Nietzsche expected of him, and that of course is the inevitable result if one is identical with the self.

"Be at least mine enemy!"—thus speaketh the true reverence, which doth not venture to solicit friendship.

If one would have a friend, then must one also be willing to wage war for him: and in order to wage war, one must be *capable* of being an enemy.

One ought still to honour the enemy in one's friend. Canst thou go nigh unto thy friend, and not go over to him?

In one's friend one shall have one's best enemy. Thou shalt be closest unto him with thy heart when thou withstandest him.

This is surely very wise and in a way very true, but it is again a truth which is too high. It is so exaggerated and so paradoxical that it cannot

be believed in a human atmosphere of human feeling; the ordinary feeling simply does not stand such a strain. This is tremendously exaggerated because of the utterly overwrought feeling.

Thou wouldst wear no raiment before thy friend? Is it in honour of thy friend that thou showest thyself to him as thou art? But he wisheth thee to the devil on that account!

Exceedingly true. Out of sheer politeness one should not show oneself as one is; it is always reckless and shocking. Of course he means here *not* exactly as one is, because there are always two sides; everything has two aspects—one doesn't consist of the worst side only. But if you make it an ideal to show yourself as you are, you show the evil things definitely and not the good things, because you are deeply convinced that showing what you are must mean showing something unfavorable. Whereas to show yourself as you really are would mean to show the two sides, one mitigating the other, the two things in one; then you could safely say friendship was only possible when you show who you are and what you are. You should never use such terms as "going unclad" because that means naked, with the assumption that you are ugly, which is not true. A man is not ugly when unclad, he may be quite beautiful, or at least he is as he is, not too bad, not too good. But if the two aspects are torn asunder, if one part is in heaven and the other in hell, then naturally you needs must show the side that is in hell, which of course will be a bad side. Therefore, Nietzsche says that you should be very careful to conceal yourself from your friend. Then he feels afterwards—this is very important:

He who maketh no secret of himself shocketh: so much reason have ye to fear nakedness! Aye, if ye were Gods, ye could then be ashamed of clothing!

He thinks that if he could show himself as the Superman, it would be of course acceptable, most agreeable, because that is the side of the God; but since we are not Gods, we would show our inferior side, which is too lowdown in his case. So he is naturally quite reasonable not to show it.

Thou canst not adorn thyself fine enough for thy friend; for thou shalt be unto him an arrow and a longing for the Superman.

The German text is particularly characteristic: *Du kannst dich für deinem Freund nicht schön genug putzen*. You see, we never would use that expression *sich putzen* for a man, only a woman *putzt* herself—when she

does her hair, and sticks a flower behind her ear, puts on some jewels, a nice costume, and so on.⁴ So Nietzsche clearly has in mind a womanish sort of man—one could safely say a homosexual who even paints himself, puts rouge on his lips and cheeks in order to appeal sensually to his friend. Here we see very definitely where Nietzsche is identical with the anima; this is the anima talking out of him, not the way in which a man would speak, but definitely feminine. The idea that he should adorn himself for his friend is an idea which never enters the head of a real man. “For thou shalt be unto him an arrow and a longing for the Superman,” means that he will adorn himself in order to appear to his friend as if he were the Superman and to instigate the same desire to be above the clouds in his friend, so that they shall not be bothered by the shadow. That would of course be an utterly unreal relationship, which would not be possible for one minute; in the next minute something would happen and they would come down to earth.

Sawest thou ever thy friend asleep—to know how he looketh?
What is usually the countenance of thy friend? It is thine own
countenance, in a coarse and imperfect mirror.

Therefore one does better not to see him asleep, one would say.

Sawest thou ever thy friend asleep? Wert thou not dismayed at
thy friend looking so? O my friend, man is something that hath to
be surpassed.

In divining and keeping silence shall the friend be a master: not
everything must thou wish to see.

Here are his postulates and expectations. The friend cannot be an ordinary friend, but must be a master in divining, always knowing ahead what Nietzsche is expecting of him. “And in keeping silence.” He mustn’t even talk—of course not in the wrong moment—and he must never say anything which is not pleasant.

Thy dream shall disclose unto thee what thy friend doeth when
awake.

That means that one may dream of him when he is at his best, not otherwise.

Let thy pity be a divining: to know first if thy friend wanteth
pity. Perhaps he loveth in thee the unmoved eye, and the look of
eternity.

⁴ Hollingdale*, like Common, renders *putzen* as “adorn.” Kaufmann* has it “groom yourself.”

This is the eternal man again; only for his sake should there be friendship.

Let thy pity for thy friend be hid under a hard shell; thou shalt bite out a tooth upon it. Thus will it have delicacy and sweetness.

Again terrible exaggeration. If you show the hard shell to your friends all the time, why the devil should they feel friendship for you? They don't come to you in order to lose a tooth.

Art thou pure air and solitude and bread and medicine to thy friend? Many a one cannot loosen his own fetters, but is nevertheless his friend's emancipator.

Art thou a slave? Then thou canst not be a friend. Art thou a tyrant? Then thou canst not have friends.

This is an exaggeration also, the pairs of opposites dissociated; either a slave or a tyrant, and where is the human being in between? It is perfectly obvious that only the human being in between can be a friend, not the one above and not the one below. Now he begins to question himself in a way. Why is there such a separation of pairs of opposites? Why is there such a fuss about the friend, why all these expectations and demands?

Far too long hath there been a slave and a tyrant concealed in woman.

You see, he is going to make a discovery. Not that he would realize it—we must discover the anima for him. The anima is the trouble—the womanish side of him is slave and tyrant. It is the anima that separates the pairs of opposites, because the anima itself is a pair of opposites; it is fair and dark, tyrant and slave; it is She-who-must-be-obeyed and at the same time a prostitute, the victim of everybody.

On that account woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knoweth only love.

Instead of saying that the ordinary man who is not too high and not too low is capable of friendship, he says no, that cannot be, because he is not a Superman. And then he projects the whole thing into the woman, not knowing that he himself is that woman. He begins to discourse about the advantages and disadvantages of women, instead of seeing that there is a woman's side to himself and a hysterical woman at that, with a dissociation between the pairs of opposites. That woman is the reason why he cannot have friendship or give friendship; he is

always in danger, either of being in love with a friend or hating his friend, because he is a woman.

In woman's love there is injustice and blindness to all she doth not love. And even in woman's conscious love, there is still always surprise and lightning and night, along with the light.

Here he describes his anima reactions. He is an intuitive thinking type, so his anima would naturally hold the inferior functions feeling and sensation, and those two functions taken together would mean a valued reality, a reality equipped with feeling. You can have a reality without feeling, which is not differentiated, not chosen or characterized by feeling; but if the two functions are together there is a sort of feeling reality. For instance, that anima side of him would choose a world consisting chiefly of personal relations, and inasmuch as he is introverted his anima would have an extraverted character. So he would move in a world of very personal relations among real people. Now, the real people in Nietzsche are suppressed, depreciated as the flies in the marketplace; therefore his anima would like to be a fly too in order to be able to move among those ordinary vermin. That, of course, he simply cannot see. But when he says, "In woman's love there is injustice to all she doth not love," he gives an exact description of what his feeling-sensation is doing. You see injustice means giving the wrong values, and blindness means not to see things as they are.

As yet woman is not capable of friendship: . . .

He is not capable of friendship; nobody is capable of friendship with him because he is dissociated, but he projects it into the woman.

women are still cats, and birds.

Well, those animals are hostile to each other; the birds are the victims of the cats, so that means a dissociation. The spiritual form of the anima is a bird up above, and the other is a cat living down below on the earth.

Or at best, cows.

That is the only middle ground, as if, when you put a cat and a bird together, it made a cow. Now this is hardly probable. So he depreciates his anima as one would expect him to do, because the anima is the weight of his feeling sensation that pulls him down to the real man whom he despises; therefore, she must needs be depreciated.

As yet woman is not capable of friendship. But tell me, ye men, who of you are capable of friendship?

There you have it, men are not capable of friendship either.

Oh! your poverty, ye men, and your sordidness of soul! As much as ye give to your friend, will I give even to my foe, and will not have become poorer thereby.

If he gives to his friend what he gives to his foe, it is a pretty bad bargain. I would not wish for a friend who gave as much to his foe as he gave to me.

There is comradeship: may there be friendship!
Thus spake Zarathustra.

I must say I should prefer comradeship, because that is just and generous and human above all; I care not at all for a friendship that is such a hysterical and unvalued thing. You see, this chapter allows us a rather interesting view into the soul of the neurotic.

Miss Wolff: Of course he tried to have reasons for his projections onto women. He put too much feeling into his men friends so he wanted a woman friend, but she had to be a disciple. He always wanted to be accepted with his ideas. That is of course why it did not work with women; they didn't want to be mere disciples.

Prof. Fierz: Did he have any experience with women of society, a worldly friendship?

Prof. Jung: I happen to know a woman who tried to get at him, but I always thought she was trying to catch him just as a cat catches a bird; she was after his biography.

Miss Wolff: That was Lou Salomé; she told him she would be a wonderful disciple; he wrote and tried to give her his ideas.⁵

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but she had nothing of the sort in her mind, she was trying to catch a bird.

Mrs. Jung: I think one should consider the time in which Nietzsche wrote, I think it was not merely his own psychology. That was the time when everybody left too much to the persona and did not realize the

⁵ The letters that flew back and forth among Nietzsche, Paul Reé, and Lou Salomé et al., show that indeed he had been longing for a disciple, and for Lou to *be* one, but she quickly tired of that relationship and rejected too his impulsive proposal of marriage. Apart from Lou, there was a strong, yet distanced attachment to Wagner's wife, née Cosima Liszt; otherwise, Nietzsche's attachment to women was largely confined to his love/hate relationship with sister and mother.

shadow side, and Nietzsche was the first to point to this background. In this chapter on friendship, there is a lot of ordinary psychology and I think it was very important that somebody said it. For instance, where he speaks of the woman here, I think it is because she, the anima, represents the relating function, and when he speaks of friendship he must *have* this function, so he has to bring in this anima psychology here.

Prof. Jung: That is surely true. He could not form any kind of relation without considering his anima: that is the *conditio sine qua non*. Therefore, he had to consider this psychology which was unknown in his days, as you rightly say. The psychology of the eighties when he wrote *Zarathustra* consisted of bourgeois ideas, of persona ideas—it was all on the surface—though I should say it was known before that time that man had a shadow. But the nineteenth century began to forget it because the intellect became so all-powerful through the development of science and technique; consciousness attained to such autonomy that it really could walk off the earth and leave the shadow behind—ape a sort of perfect man with perfect ideas—until that whole fantastical show broke down utterly with the world war. But to the people of that time it was a valid psychology.

Mrs. Jung: Then I also wanted to point out that it appears to be somewhat prophetic, as in Germany now friendship between men plays such a role.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it looks exactly as if Nietzsche had anticipated a great deal of the future of his people, and that he faced problems which were the problems of his nation. It is a most remarkable characteristic of modern German psychology that the *Puer Aeternus* motif plays a much greater role than the anima. Very characteristic literary manifestations have appeared representing both kinds of psychology. In the West, Benoit's *L'Atlantide* is the most conspicuous example of anima stories, but there are lots of others, such as Rider Haggard's in the English language. There are certain anima figures in German literature naturally, but none is any way comparable to the English or French examples. But one finds there very conspicuous examples of the *Puer Aeternus* psychology—*Das Reich Ohne Raum*, the kingdom without space, by Goetz, is the most characteristic one I have come across. Then that psychology is marvelously organized in the school of Stefan George, the poet, which is imbued with a kind of homosexuality.⁶ For the *Puer Aeternus* always contains homosexuality, real or imag-

⁶ Pierre Benoit's *L'Atlantide* (1919) and Rider Haggard's *She* (1887) are often cited as

inary: it is the psychology of the enterprising youth. The woman only plays a role as wife and mother and appears to be thoroughly unproblematic. While in the West woman is most problematic, and the friendship between men seems to have attained the unproblematic level—I mean as a social phenomenon, not as a personal problem or phenomenon.

Miss Wolff: I think many women have almost a *Puer Aeternus* psychology; they are men's comrades or friends, but they are not women, but sort of boys.

Prof. Jung: Those are more modern developments.

Miss Wolff: Yes, there is a great difference between the women in the time of Nietzsche and women of today.

Mrs. Sigg: It seems to me that Nietzsche had very good friends, at least until he was thirty-five. He wrote *Zarathustra* in '83, which was before his friendship with Peter Gast, when of course he was in a terrible state of mind. But before that his relation was very good with Overbeck, and with the two friends of his youth, Wilhelm Pinder and Gustave Krug.

Prof. Jung: If you study those friendships carefully you will see that they were very far away; they wrote nice letters to each other. Overbeck always handled Nietzsche with gloves; I knew him. He was a typical, refined historian, a very learned man, and in all his ways exceedingly polite and careful not to touch anything that was hot; he appreciated the great genius in Nietzsche, but the man Nietzsche he handled most carefully. Of course Nietzsche called anybody a great friend of his, and people were very polite naturally, but they could not touch him. For instance, I knew a man whom Nietzsche considered one of his great friends. He was a professor of internal medicine, a highly educated man, very musical, and Nietzsche would often go to his house—one never knew exactly when; he would appear suddenly and sit down at the piano and play for hours on end. He spoke to nobody and nobody could speak a word to him. And then he went away and said what a nice evening it had been. Exactly like those two men from the Canton Grison who had not seen one another for twenty years: they said, "Ciao" and made a movement suggesting that they might go to the inn, so they had their wine together and stayed until twelve o'clock, speaking not a word, till when they left one could not

portrayals of anima figures. For Goetz, see above, 5 June 1935, n. 10. Stefan George (1868-1933) is an important German poet who was made into a cult figure by young Nazis, but who exiled himself to Switzerland in protest of totalitarianism. See Jung's account of Stefan George in his essay on Wotan in CW 10, par. 375n.

help saying, "Wasn't it a nice evening?" So if you surrounded Nietzsche with care and let him enjoy himself, you were a great friend, but woe unto you if you had some impulse of your own. Overbeck was really a loyal friend: he went to Turin when he heard that Nietzsche had gone over the border and fetched him back to Basel; he was the only one who took any care of him. But in his personal relation I am quite certain that he had to be very careful with him. So I think those good friendships are doubtful though there was a great deal of appreciation.

Prof. Fierz: It is said that Nietzsche's psychology is expressive of his time, and I suppose Richard Wagner's was also. He ruined his milliner, did not pay his debts to Meyerbeer, wrote a most impertinent letter when he wanted his five hundred francs. He was the Superman and he was a most disagreeable fellow.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes. For instance, when he invited friends, they had to bring the wine, and woe unto them if they did not. And he adorned himself—had a long correspondence with a milliner in Vienna about pink silk ribbons for his nightgown. You know, when Wagner was composing that aria where young Siegfried is forging his sword with a hammer and anvil, *he* was sitting in his study on silk cushions with millions of ribbons, in a silk dressing gown and a velvet cap. The air was filled with perfumes and he was adorned exactly like a woman, the most grotesque sight you could imagine. That was his reality, he was completely identical with the anima, he was a *transvestit* which means a man who conceals himself in women's clothes, enjoying playing the role of a woman. There is no English term for that I think.⁷

Prof. Fierz: In an article published in Basel about five years ago, it was said that over his bed in Paris Wagner had a silk canopy with roses and a mirror in which he could look at himself. And he never paid for it; Meyerbeer had to pay for it. Then five weeks later Wagner wrote *Das Judentum in der Musik*.⁸

Prof. Jung: Isn't that marvelous? Well, Nietzsche also had a peculiar mannerism: he sort of imagined himself a lord. You see, in those days it was thought that all Englishmen who came to Switzerland were lords, and that they always wore grey top hats and grey gloves and spats and so on. Also they usually wore a veil round the hat to denote

⁷ The Oxford English Dictionary traces *transvest* back to 1552.

⁸ Wagner's *Das Judentum in der Musik*, an 1850 work of some fifty pages but supplemented by as many again in 1869, was a scathing attack not only on Mendelssohn, Schumann, and Meyerbeer, but on Jewish poets and other artists as well. An English translation, *Judaism in Music*, by Edwin Evans, appeared in New York and London in 1910.

that they were travelling and apt to get suddenly into a tropical climate; and they were always queer—nobody could understand them. That is the way Central Europe understood the psychology of the English race; very few people could speak English then. So Nietzsche walked about in Basel with a grey top hat. He did not wear a veil, but otherwise he was a complete English gentleman from the storybook, a perfectly ridiculous sight. That was adorning himself! For nobody in Basel ever dreamt of walking about like that. It was the time when they had very sloppy neckties and collars and horrible trousers like accor-

LECTURE III

30 October 1935

Prof. Jung:

The next chapter is called "The Thousand and One Goals." What do you think about this title?

Mrs. Fierz: If a man has rejected his shadow, or his human being, then instead of one goal, he must have a thousand goals because he does not know where he belongs; it is a sort of *Zersplitterung*.¹

Prof. Jung: Yes, but what does he retain when he has rejected the shadow?

Mrs. Fierz: The wise man.

Mrs. Sigg: His anima.

Prof. Jung: You forget the most important thing. In rejecting his shadow, he rejects merely the inferior man, and a part of the unconscious represented by the archetypes of the wise old man and the anima remain with consciousness. Then what does he retain besides these two archetypes?

Mrs. Baynes: His superior function, his ego.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, his ego, which is identical with the superior function, in this case with intuition and intellect. So in rejecting the shadow he rejects his inferior personality, minus the archetypes of the anima and the old wise man, and he retains his superior function: he is identical with it. Now what about the superior function under these conditions? What is the matter with it?

Mrs. Sigg: It acts like a tyrant sometimes because there is no balance.

Mrs. Fierz: It becomes quite collective.

Mrs. Crowley: There is no check, no balance, no opposite.

Prof. Jung: That is all true, but why—what is the matter with that ego?

Mrs. Sigg: It gets inflated.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is like a balloon because it is filled with the vapors

¹ A splitting or splintering.

and very light gases of those archetypes; the ego is carried off its feet—somewhere suspended in space, and under such conditions it would be, as has been rightly said, collective. And what is the actual psychological reason why a person with such an inflation is always collective?

Mrs. Jung: Because of the identification with the archetypes they are inflated by the collective unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, the collective unconscious represented by those archetypes, the wise old man and the anima. That is the reason why an inflated man is nothing but collective; even the ego is so thinned out, evaporated, that it is nothing but collective. The result is that such people become utterly identical with the collective movements of the time. They are no longer human. Therefore, the idea of the Superman is inhuman, because he is an idea, and an idea of everybody—he even *should* be. There the tyrant comes in saying, “My idea should be the idea of everybody.” Nietzsche is not satisfied with the fact of enjoying the vision of the Superman: he must preach it. Everybody must become a Superman. It is a new value which must be believed and carried out by all; he feels his idea to be all-prevailing and valid for everybody. Now, the dangerous thing is that, to a certain extent, it is perfectly true. So the question is: Is such a thing as the Superman possible and, if so, is this the way by which it can be reached? And the answer would be rather negative; as he conceives of the Superman, it is utterly impossible because it is beyond the human. But do you see any possibility in the idea of the Superman?

Mrs. Crowley: Yes, if it is applied subjectively and symbolically for the self.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and in that case in what kind of relation would the Superman be to the individual ego?

Mrs. Sigg: It could be a father and son relationship.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that is a symbol which can be substantiated by historical and recent material. Or you might also use another symbol.

Miss Hannah: The leadership would have gone over to the self, and then the ego would be in the relation of the earth to the sun.

Prof. Jung: That is another simile, a planet revolving round a central star or sun, which again would be father and son; the sun would be the father and the planet the offspring of the sun. It was in fact the original theory, that the planets were torn away from the sun. Are you aware of any other symbolism?

Miss Wolff: The symbolism of man and God.

Prof. Jung: Yes, again God the father and man the son, or God the sun and man the earth, the planet.

Mrs. Fierz: Could one not include the leader or the *Führer* idea of the present time?

Prof. Jung: Exactly, the idea of the *Duce*, a *Führer*, is the same expressed on the plane of concrete objectivity—a non-psychological level. So we have brought it down to the earth and to the experience of today. You see, the contents of the chapters before have shown us how Nietzsche rejects the inferior man and builds up this particular condition of inflation, thereby naturally becoming more and more collective, more and more identical with the humanity that consists of innumerable units, and inasmuch as every unit of humanity has its goal, there is an extraordinary plurality of goals. Now, there is a peculiar choice of words here, the “thousand and one” goals. Where does he find that?

Mrs. Baynes: In *The Arabian Nights*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is a sort of allegorical or symbolical indication of very many. *Thousand* already expresses the idea of an unimaginable quantity, and on top of the many there is one more. So if such an inflation takes place, one would feel at times that one consisted of a thousand and one individuals with a thousand and one values or goals. Now if that is the case, what would follow? A person in such a situation would realize a very particular need.

Mrs. Crowley: Valuation.

Mrs. Sigg: It would be the actual need of his people in that time.

Prof. Jung: Well, yes, if he is identical with his people, but that is a question. He might be identical with humanity, and that would of course cause the great turmoil inside, what the old Latin languages called the *turba*, which means a great noise and confusion; the church fathers used that word to designate the approach of the devils. In dreams it is represented by a swarm of ants or gnats, innumerable little animals; that is always the beginning of that peculiar phenomenon in psychopathology, schizophrenia. If the dissociation into units keeps on, the mind will be dissolved; so it may happen that an inflation gradually worked over into a dissociation. It is usually the case in a real schizophrenic that an archetypal situation comes up—an archetype of any kind—which inflates the individual's consciousness till it expands over the whole of humanity; and when that suddenly begins to decay into many units, it has become a case of schizophrenia. It is like an explosion. Inflation works like a gas pressure, say, where the pressure is caught in a hollow space, till it suddenly explodes the walls of the space into many fragments.

Now, in schizophrenia you observe that many of those units produce

voices; they all have a little ego, with different personal characteristics: each voice says, "I" and denotes a particular tendency or goal. But because it is only a matter of fragmentary souls, or fragmentary psychical entities, the goal is never arrived at, and also the amount of affectivity or emotion which would allow an intention to be carried through is lacking. So the whole individual consists of many little psyches with purposes of their own. You find a description of that in the book by Schreber, who I believe was the son of the founder of the Schreber Gardens which you may have heard of; they are sort of nurseries for little children. The Schreber of whom I am speaking was a lawyer living in Leipzig who became a schizophrenic, and when he was interned he wrote a book called: *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken*,² in which he described peculiar phenomena. Amongst others he said that at times a multitude of little fellows were all over him—tiny creatures were walking on his eyelids for instance; or they were flying about and setting down upon his skin like mosquitos. And sometimes they disappeared into it shouting, "Damn it, I go in!" They obviously tried to get integrated into him again; you see, those were parts of his split mind which still were capable of integration. For at times when the conditions are good—of course we know very little of these things—it seems that certain parts are united once more, like splinters of ice which freeze together in the night, and then split again when the wind comes.

One can even observe how large areas of a broken-up continuum congeal again and become coherent. Such cases give one the impression of being fairly normal, but here and there you meet a chasm, a split which goes right through. You can see this in the drawings made by those people. They make a perfectly well-composed picture till suddenly an angle is cut off, or an irrational line strikes through where the theme changes, and very strange contents come into the broken-off area. In that picture³ you see a demarcation line where the neighboring ice-field has not joined up with the main body, and there are quite a number of such patches. There are several breaking lines; the splintering is pretty bad. And if you compare the bottom of the picture with what is above, you see that there is really no connection, but rather a

² David Paul Schreber (1842-1911), *Memoirs of a Mental Illness*, ed. and tr. Ian Macalaine and Richard A. Hunter (London, 1955). This provided Freud with one of his most memorable case studies. See p. 364n above. In CW 5, par. 458, Jung writes: "The [Schreber] case was written up at the time by Freud in a very unsatisfactory manner after I had drawn his attention to the book."

³ Jung is here showing a picture drawn by a man considered normal.

jumble of dissociated units carefully stitched together by his mind. He has a mental superstructure which probably allows him to behave in a fairly normal way, yet the real material of his psyche is all splintered, and then stitched together and framed, he makes a heavy framework round the picture with magic conjurations, and he even tries to put a top upon the whole thing as a substitute for an ego, and he gives it four corners to make it static. But it is no longer a natural continuity; it is a mind that is thoroughly splintered and probably there was once—I am not informed of the actual history of this case—a moment of complete turmoil where the *turba* got hold of him. Then, with a remnant of himself he could gather up a certain number of splinters, as if they were pieces of a broken glass which one put together with glue, so that it looks like a glass, yet it is all broken up and full of the traces of the former catastrophe. Usually you can see those breaking lines much better in a picture with flowing curving lines; occasionally a sharp chasm goes through the whole thing.

Mr. Baumann: Pictures by insane people sometimes have the same motif many times repeated, small people or dwarfs, for instance. Is that the same idea?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes. You know those dreams in which many little units appear, little animals all of the same kind, beetles, and such things, are sort of semi-organic dreams. Therefore, you find them chiefly in cases of alcoholics, *delirium tremens*; they have such hallucinations. For instance, they see coins on the floor and try to pick them up; or they see thousands of rats and mice or birds or other animals all over, in the most impossible places. This is also a sort of splitting up. I have mentioned before that particularly funny case of a very educated man who drank too much. After a very strenuous night he fell into a delirium and when he woke up in the morning he saw that pigs were in all the trees on the boulevard in front of his house. He thought that there had been a stock-market nearby, and that the pigs had run away and climbed up the trees, so he laughed and laughed and shouted to the people in the street to look up at them too. Naturally the police caught hold of him for making too much noise.

Mrs. Jung: Cannot this phenomenon of the *turba* denote a very deep layer of the unconscious? It seems to have a psychophysical character. One finds this dream with children.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is the archetype of the many, and this dream is found with very young children. In my seminar at the Hochschule⁴ I

⁴ His concurrent German seminar on children's dreams.

am now dealing with a dream of a little child where there are many such units, little animals, swarms of ants or mosquitos or mice, or simply little objects. I think it is a perception of the original multiplicity of the human mind. You know, our bodies consist of such units, the so-called Mendelian units, units of inheritance. For instance, in a family, perhaps the mother has blue eyes and the father has dark eyes, and they have quite differently shaped noses. Obviously some of the children inherit the blue eyes from the mother and others the dark eyes from the father; some have the mother's nose and others the father's nose; and these peculiarities follow certain laws, the Mendelian laws; the accumulation of certain units causes either physical or mental peculiarities.

These laws also explain why, in one generation, there may be only people of a certain type, and in another a different type occurs, both types being contained in the families of the ancestors. Among the Spanish Hapsburgs of the Middle Ages were quite a number of mental-disease cases; then for two hundred years there were none. And the protruding lower lip of the Hapsburgs which the emperor Maximilian had first, has been inherited in many cases; Alphonse of Spain has it: it is very typical. Our bodies consist of such units, and it is the same with our minds; our conscious mind originated and is based upon the psyche which also consists of many inherited units. They are what the primitives would call ancestral spirits, remnants of ancestral lives, and since we have many ancestors, we have many thousands of units in the basic psyche, and they are liable to dissociate. If we knew more about these things, I am firmly convinced that we would be able to show, in a case of schizophrenia, that the units into which the mind breaks are ancestral units, Mendelian units. For instance, one often observes that if the father and mother are not well matched, the first child is a particularly difficult character; the two rows of ancestors don't join, so they create a difficult disposition in the child. Where the ancestral units don't fit, where they are not well glued together, there is danger of a dissociation. I have seen that frequently.

There is also that danger in the mixture of races, against which our instincts always set up a resistance. Sometimes one thinks it is snobbish prejudice, but it is an instinctive prejudice, and the fact is that if distant races are mixed, the fertility is very low, as one sees with the white and the negro; a negro woman very rarely conceives from a white man. If she does, a mulatto is the result and he is apt to be a bad character. The Malays are a very distinct race, very remote from the white man, and the mixture of Malay and white is as a rule bad. It is the same with an-

imals: mules have peculiar, vicious qualities and are not fertile. They may have intercourse, but often it is mere friendship between the male and the female; and even if they conceive they have abortions. They cannot carry the young, gestation is interrupted. It is the same with butterflies; some very interesting experiments have been made with the species from the northern shore of the Mediterranean and the same species from the southern shore. The southern variety is much bigger than the northern, and together they bring forth beautiful specimens, yet they die out in the third or fourth generation because they can't propagate, they don't really mix. So with a great effort you can bring oil and water together for a while: you make a sort of foam, an emulsion, but then it separates again. That is the cause of many cases of insanity. A great difference of race nearly always causes a certain fragile, sensitive disposition because the units are not well glued together—that is at least a way of expressing these very difficult problems of psychopathology.⁵

Now, as you see, we encounter the same thing in cases of inflation; when the inflation reaches a certain culmination, there is an awareness of the multitude of units, and I should say that we had reached such a culmination here. That has been anticipated by the increasing amount of pathological passages in the text before; those chapters were not very sympathetic, and one can take that as a sign that we are approaching the pathological sphere. Then we shall probably have a reaction which tries to mend the trouble. You see, we now come to this realization of the thousand and one goals, which would be, as I said, the goals of the many in the individual.

Many lands saw Zarathustra, and many peoples: thus he discovered the good and bad of many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than good and bad.

The real Nietzsche did not see many lands and many peoples; he only knew Germany, Switzerland, and a part of Italy. Those are lands in himself demarcated by frontiers, continents demarcated by seas, units inhabited by the smaller units called "peoples." That is the structure of his mind, of his basic psyche. And then he made a discovery: the good and evil of many peoples; he saw that there were certain values, merits

⁵ Jung's genetic theories, presumably acquired during his medical-school days, would now be thought archaic, particularly his analogy between interracial genetic crosses (Malay/White) and interspecific genetic crosses (horse/donkey). Indeed, geneticists now hold that in general the offspring of crosses between different races of the same species are more vigorous, fertile, etc., than their parents.

and demerits, among those different peoples, and that good and evil were the most powerful agencies. Now, how does he arrive at the question of values? Well, as Mrs. Crowley suggested, in order to deal with that dissociation, one should establish a scale of values in order to be capable of preferring and rejecting, of making a choice; one should make a sort of hierarchy in these masses, put on top a king, or a leader, and then the others who depend in various degrees. That would be order. So he arrives at the idea of values, and he finds that there is no greater power than good and evil. Now, that obviously has to be understood in this way: it is not exactly good and evil as we would understand it in ordinary language, moral good and moral evil, but means simply the existence of values: namely, values are categories which tell what should be done, for instance, what should be chosen or rejected. To value a thing means a statement about certain contents of the psyche being particularly energetic, strong, suggestive; other contents being sympathetic and recommendable; others objectionable; and others even having the value of leading ideas, royal ideas, which decide ultimately. You really find everywhere that there are certain temperamental ideas which decide ultimately, and nearly every country has such ultimate ideas.

It is a bit difficult to demonstrate them because they always touch upon national prejudices and susceptibilities; they are often a matter for jokes, so it is better to keep away. I might mention one very simple example, which is not particularly offensive, from a nation that has always made it a particular point to be capable of ridiculing itself, England. There the decisive idea is the idea of the gentleman; a man may be rich, he may be intelligent, he may have extraordinary merits in different ways, so that other nations would call him a great fellow. Not so in England. The one ultimate and decisive value there is, "and he is a gentleman." That settles it. If the last judgment is negative, then the case is settled in a negative way. It does not help him in the least to have any amount of merits; if he is not a gentleman he will go to hell. You can read that phrase in newspapers, and more than once it has happened to me that some one said, "This man is a wonderful scholar, you will enjoy very much talking to him"—and then a slight hesitation. "But?" "Well, he is not a gentleman." So one knows what to do with such a man irrespective of anything else he has done.

Mr. Baumann: Could you give a definition of a gentleman?

Prof. Jung: Oh, we leave that to the English; they are responsible for this idea. Otherwise I would be forced to go into a discussion of the ul-

timate values of other nations and then things would become a bit ticklish.

No people could live without first valuing; if a people will maintain itself, however, it must not value as its neighbour valueth.

What he understands here by *value* is of course such a leading idea. A nation must have a leading idea, as it should have a leading political body or leader or king. There must be a sort of hierarchy. Otherwise, a nation is not an individual, but merely a heap. One often speaks of an ant-heap, but mind you, an ant-heap is a wonderful organization: the termites form a marvelous hierarchy with everything in its place! A people without a leading idea embodied in a leading body never makes a nation; it is simply an accumulation, a herd. Even the animal herd has a leader. There really have been cases in the history of mankind where large societies were a mere accumulation, and that was always a time of anarchy; with no leading principle there is confusion, a time of catastrophe and decay. As soon as people begin to live again there is a leader or a leading idea, a leading slogan; it doesn't matter what it is, it is simply necessary. That is the value which Nietzsche means here, and without such a value people would surely not survive. And it must be different from the values of surrounding nations, or they would not be differentiated. They wouldn't know one from the other and would simply get mixed up. The society without a leading idea is the victim of the surrounding societies that have leading ideas. It is only an accumulation which will be torn asunder because it belongs to nobody—to no principle and to no *princeps*, to no leader.

Much that passed for good with one people was regarded with scorn and contempt by another: thus I found it. Much found I here called bad, which was there decked with purple honours.

This is of course self-evident. It is an illusion to think that values are the same; things that are of highest value to us mean nothing at all in other countries. For instance, in the actual religious life of other countries, you see the most amazing things; what is blasphemous to us may be the ordinary thing in other countries. To us it would be shameful if a man discussed business transactions in church; not so in Catholic countries—in Italy, for instance. Of course the church would condemn it, but that does not matter, because to them the church has no particular meaning apart from its being a magic place. It is enough if you have been there; you don't need to participate in the performance. You need only to be in the neighborhood of the performance of grace

and you get a touch of it—just as, if you fall into the water you get wet,—no matter what is going on besides. I don't mean that in a derogatory way; it is just another level of religious experience. That was the antique idea. There was no particular morality about it; you attended a magic performance and got a shot of it—got the medicine. All those complicated moral structures of doing it in the right way, of being conscientious about it, are Nordic superstructures.

Never did the one neighbour understand the other: ever did his soul marvel at his neighbour's delusion and wickedness.

A table of excellencies hangeth over every people. Lo! it is the table of their triumphs; lo! it is the voice of their Will to Power.

This is Nietzsche's point of view, he makes morality dependent upon the power instinct. He says the morality of nations and of individuals chiefly lacks that aspect of adaptation; to be moral is to be something useful—a way to success. This is of course one side of the problem.

It is laudable, what they think hard; what is indispensable and hard they call good; and what relieveth in the direst distress, the unique and hardest of all—they extol as holy.

Whatever maketh them rule and conquer and shine, to the dismay and envy of their neighbours, they regard as the high and foremost thing, the test and the meaning of all else.

That comes from the fact that the leading idea of a people, the chief value, embodies their chief psychological quality, and therefore it is the way to success. For you can only succeed in your own way, never in any other way; you will succeed in your superior function. So if a nation has a certain leading idea, it is a manifestation of a certain temperament, of a certain superior function, and through that superior function those people make their success. That bears out the following:

Verily, my brother, if thou knewest but a people's need, its land, its sky, and its neighbour, then wouldst thou divine the law of its surmountings, and why it climbeth up that ladder to its hope.

Take, for instance, the idea of the gentleman in relation to the climate and the geographical position of England. You know it is a land surrounded by sea, and it was formerly fairly inaccessible. Now of course with airplanes it is a different proposition, and as a matter of fact the gentleman idea is declining. It was originally a feudal idea when England was an isolated island, and it is declining in the age when airplanes easily fly across the Channel. The gentleman is the isolated island. Un-

til comparatively recently any noise started on the Continent simply did not touch England. The principle was: business as usual—that noise over on the Continent or anywhere in the world does not concern us. “The splendid isolation of England” is a slogan of English policy. But it is no longer true since the great war. So the peculiar geographical position of England accounts for their peculiar ideal, and it is the same with other countries. For instance, take the ideology of Bolshevik Russia or Czarist Russia, and compare it with Russia as a country, and you see immediately the analogy, the absolute likeness. Not to speak of Switzerland!

Mrs. Baynes: We have taken this as though Nietzsche had identified with the thousand goals, but it seems to me that he took great pains to show that he did not identify.

Prof. Jung: But he is forced to do that just because he is identical. You see, whoever has an inflation is identical. Otherwise he would make a clear difference between himself and Zarathustra, between himself and his anima. But because he has that identification, he tries naturally to work out of it. That accounts for his idea of the Superman. This identity is an extraordinarily powerful motive to create something which is unlike anything else, and you will see in this chapter a tremendous effort to create something that will lead him out of this identity. Even the chapter before, “The Flies in the Market-Place,” was an attempt to work out of this condition, to liberate himself. Of course the inflation shows in that he tried to do it in a collective way: namely, as he is trying to wriggle out of his identity condition, so everybody ought to in the same way, quite irrespective of what they want. It is a great question whether people want that ideal of the Superman. It was his particular ideal and as subsequent events have shown, this idea seems to be particularly evident in the collective unconscious; but it is a great question how it will work itself out, whether it will be to the advantage of the world or not. I am quite certain that such a time condition always has two sides; to the one it is favorable, to the other utterly unfavorable. This idea may produce and has already produced most peculiar things—the mass movements of today for instance. Though the idea itself is the opposite of a mass movement, yet when it reaches the surface in an unconscious way, it produces mass movements, which are absolutely against this idea of the distinction of the self.

Mrs. Crowley: You were speaking before of the mixture of races producing something that was rather *quasi* in effect, and I was wondering whether it was too far afield to question this thing in Nietzsche himself. The archetype Zarathustra is of a foreign race, the Iranian Zoroaster,

so do you think that the selection of this archetype could have any influence on his psychology—the fact that this power, this unconscious force in him, does belong to another race?

Prof. Jung: Inasmuch as we speak to Iranians in themselves, Zoroaster is an Iranian and Nietzsche is one too inasmuch as he identifies with him. But there are no strange archetypes. They are generally human, everybody practically contains the basic psyche and therefore the same archetypes as other races.

Mrs. Crowley: In this case the Iranian race has that enormous will to power.

Prof. Jung: Not more than other nations.

Mrs. Crowley: Not more than the Chinese for instance?

Prof. Jung: It simply took another form there. The Chinese were not nomadic. The Iranians were horse people and travelled a good deal, whilst the Chinese were cultivating their fields.

Mrs. Crowley: Would that not make a different attitude?

Prof. Jung: Ah well, they would not have been Taoists if they had not also the power instinct; they had such a wonderful philosophy in order to combat it.

Mrs. Crowley: Yes, but they had such an ideal too; Tao as an ideal accents the self.

Prof. Jung: These things can be explained out of the life of those nations. The Persian naturally developed a different kind of philosophy and religion from the Chinaman. The one was sitting upon his land and the other was travelling about, so they developed different ideas. In Persia the important idea was purity, the opposites were “above and below,” “light and darkness”; while in China there was not the fight between moral principles, and there was no question of purity. It was rather a question of reconciling two opposing principles, a far more static vision. The fact that Nietzsche chose the archetype of Zarathustra has nothing whatever to do with the Persian archetype; one finds precious little of Zoroaster in Zarathustra.

Mrs. Crowley: I thought that the pair of opposites, good and evil, might indicate it here.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is true that in Zoroaster’s teaching, good and evil are most important, and Nietzsche thought he was called upon by fate to mend the trouble Zoroaster had originally made in the world. Nietzsche was still on that euhemeristic point of view that man could invent values, which of course is a tremendous error; it was that old euhemeristic hypothesis that man has invented the gods. So he followed on in the idea that man has invented morality. That was the ma-

terialistic view of his age. And you see, that is Freud's chief prejudice. He thinks man has invented something which can repress an instinct.⁶ Of course nothing can repress an instinct except another instinct; it is a conflict of instincts. The power that can suppress an instinct is surely as strong as a man and a bit stronger. Well now, Nietzsche goes on to specify his idea of the ideal.

"Always shalt thou be the foremost and prominent above others: no one shall thy jealous soul love, except a friend"—that made the soul of a Greek thrill; thereby went he his way to greatness.

This is the way Nietzsche formulates the essence of the Greek ideal. Perhaps it was so.

"To speak truth, and be skilful with bow and arrow"—so seemed it alike pleasing and hard to the people from whom cometh my name—the name that is alike pleasing and hard to me.

Here he alludes to one of his favorite ideas, that the name Nietzsche is Polish; he played with the idea that he was of wonderful Polish descent.⁷ It is a little like Benvenuto Cellini who also assumed that he was not the son of his parents, that there was somebody big and unknown behind the scene.⁸ It is always the prejudice of heroes, that they are the outcome of a little mistake of the gods.

Dr. Bertine: Could he not mean Zarathustra by "his name"?

Prof. Jung: Well yes, the Persians use the bow and arrow, that is perfectly true, but Nietzsche himself is behind it. To my idea, it refers more to Nietzsche than to Zarathustra because of his notion of being of some unknown noble Polish descent. You see, Zarathustra is nowhere in the book characterized as a person, but there are any amount of hints about Nietzsche in the disguise of Zarathustra, as well as his

⁶ Jung has in mind "the super-ego," which Freud regarded, in Jung's words, as "the representative of the parental authority, as the successor of the Oedipus complex, that impels the ego to restrain the id," wherein are located the instincts (CW 18, par. 1152). The super-ego was also regarded as the basis for belief in a divinity.

⁷ As Nietzsche wrote in 1883 to Georg Brandes, "My forebears were Polish aristocrats (Niezsky)" (Letters/Middleton). Biographers agree that this is a fiction, presumably stemming from Nietzsche's wish to dissociate himself from Germany. He often spoke admiringly of the Slavs.

⁸ In his celebrated autobiography (1558-1566), Benvenuto Cellini does not renounce his parents, but he did with scant evidence say, "I believe that our family is descended from a very great man." *Autobiography*, tr. George Hall (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968), p. 17.

own confession that Zarathustra was a split, the other one in himself, his own self.

“To honour father and mother, and from the root of the soul to do their will”—this table of surmounting hung another people over them, and became powerful and permanent thereby.

That would mean the Jews.

“To have fidelity, and for the sake of fidelity to risk honour and blood, even in evil and dangerous courses”— . . .

This would refer to the Germans. “Honor and blood” is the German slogan; you can read it in the newspapers today.

teaching itself so, another people mastered itself, and thus mastering itself, became pregnant and heavy with great hopes.

Verily, men have given unto themselves all their good and bad. Verily, they took it not, they found it not, it came not unto them as a voice from heaven.

Here you have it. You see, he really thinks that people have made it. He does not see that man doesn't invent those values, but they are invented for him. All the values that we have inherited or that have been handed to us by well-meaning teachers, go by the board inasmuch as they don't agree with the instinctive pattern. They simply won't work, but cause awful conflicts and are cast out as soon as possible. For the real foundation of our values is our family temperament, our national clan; ultimately our morality is not an invention, but an instinct. Yet it is the materialistic prejudice that once a man called Moses unfortunately climbed Mount Sinai, and there he felt queer, so he said: “Now you people must get it in the neck; I will show you what you must not do.” And if Moses had not done that there would be no morality in the world at all: the instincts would blossom unashamed. Everywhere, in every country, there was a Moses; every decent nation has a Moses, and even if we cannot establish the historical existence of such a man, at least there are the laws, and very severe laws at that. And where did they come from? They came from another instinct. Freud does not see that however, on account of the materialistic prejudice that there is nothing but human consciousness; that consciousness does the trick. But laws and values and so on are temperamental dispositions which exist before consciousness. We wake up in the morning and say, “Is the sky not beautiful?” That is made for us; we simply find it there as a beautiful thing. Or we say, “Isn't the coffee good?” Well, it is good for

us because it has been made good before we ever tasted it, so it was our disposition to say it was good. Otherwise we would have considered it bad or indifferent. Naturally, our taste and such things can also be greatly influenced by a sort of tradition; certain idiosyncracies, for instance, have to do with certain prejudices by which we have been poisoned. If we are descended from parents who were convinced that an onion was made by the devil, we shall labor for quite a while under the impression that any man who eats onions is a great sinner and, inasmuch as you remain in your mother's womb forever, that only very bad people eat onions—or play cards or something of the sort.

Values did man only assign to things in order to maintain himself—he created only the significance of things, a human significance! Therefore, calleth he himself “man,” that is, the valuator.

The measurer rather. It is probable that the word *man* really has to do with the measuring one; “to measure things” is simply another word for being aware of things and naming them, giving them value, giving them a number and a significance. That is surely true to a certain extent, but for the fundamental values it is also not true, because the meaning of things, the value of things, the numbers of things, have been established before consciousness. They simply forced their way into consciousness, and so they became. The first ideas of man were always sort of revelations. Suddenly, the name of a thing was revealed unto man; one spoke the secret sacred names of deities that revealed the significance of things. The better part of the decent philosophies in the first centuries of our era were revealed. The Gnosis is a revelation for instance, and the *Corpus Hermeticum*⁹ begins with a revelation, and the New Testament (which is also a philosophy) is a revelation; the orthodox still believe it was dictated by God the Father himself, despite the very obvious fact that he made numerous mistakes. And it is a truth. They would not believe such obvious nonsense if it were not true in a way, a temperamental truth. We are still inclined to believe that the real truth can never be known if it is not revealed. If somebody asserts seriously that something has been revealed to him—well then, it is

⁹ Jung may well have taken this etymological derivation from Nietzsche's observation that *man* (*manas*) suggests that man sees “himself as the being who measures, the ‘assaying’ animal.” *The Genealogy of Morals*, tr. Francis Goffman (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 202.

Jung often drew upon the *Corpus Hermeticum*, a medieval collection of alchemical and other Hermetic works. See especially CW 11 and the alchemical volumes, CW 12, 13, and 14.

true. Of course, that concept of revelation has fallen into disrepute in the last century, but temperamentally we are apt to believe anybody who turns up with the claim of being a miracle worker, even if it is the most elementary nonsense. Like Mme. Blavatsky—she was a miracle worker. She was a medium no doubt, but that would not have counted in the least if she had not been a miracle worker at the same time. And the old reformers or prophets in the beginning of our era were always miracle workers and teachers of revelation.¹⁰ The man Jesus was a miracle Rabbi who was travelling about the country, and very probably Simon Magus also, and Apollonius of Tyana, and the Gnostic Fathers—they were all of that band.¹¹ It is really a truth that powerful ideas always have the character of a revelation. So Nietzsche here falls into the materialistic mistake.

Valuing is creating: . . .

Here you have it! Only people with an inflation can assume that they create. You don't create, you are created; in creation you are created. Something makes you do it, something is working through you, you are most tremendously instrumental. Try to stop creation and see what happens. If creation were our own doing, we could say yes or no, but it is a well-known fact that the creator cannot say yes or no; he has to create, and woe unto him if he does not.

hear it, ye creating ones! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued things.

Well, that is true. If you understand the valuation process as an instinct in man, as a preconscious fact in man's unconscious that produces the gold, then that is the treasure. Therefore, it is always symbolically expressed as the treasure guarded by the dragon, or the precious stone, the jewel hidden in the cave at the bottom of the sea or in the lap of the mountain, etc. Those are all symbols of that dark power in our unconscious which produces the value, and producing the value means a valuation. The substance is always the same, but a new value is given to it, and the new value is the treasure. That is the secret of alchemy for instance.

¹⁰ The Russian Elena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891), the founder of Theosophy, and author of *Isis Unveiled* (London, 1877). Though she had a considerable following in Britain, the U.S. and India, she was not one of Jung's favorites. See *Dream Sem.*, pp. 341-42.

¹¹ On all of these see Jonas on the Gnostics, as in 5 June 1935, n. 4.

Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones!

Change of values—that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator.

Here the process of thought turns into an *enantiodromia*. All that he has said has been true with the sole exception that Nietzsche takes it as the action of consciousness, while we know that our conscious valuation means just nothing. Try it on your children or on other people, and you will see it is all bunk: it simply won't work. If you say to a child, "My deepest conviction is that this soup is very good," the child doesn't think it is very good: he won't eat it. When my parents told me that something was very good and wonderful, I thought, "Not a bit of it, it bores me." "Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator" is true. You cannot put something on a table which is already laden; you must first clear those things away in order to put new ones in their place. And to build a house where an old house stands, you must first destroy the old house. We must go a bit deeper and realize that with the instinct of creation is always connected a destructive something; the creation in its own essence is also destructive. You see that quite clearly in the moment when you check the creative impulse; nothing is more poisonous to the nervous system than a disregarded or checked creative impulse. It even destroys people's organic health. It is dangerous because there is that extraordinary destructive quality in the creative thing. Just because it is the deepest instinct, the deeper power in man, a power which is beyond conscious control, and because it is on the other side the function which creates the greatest value, it is most dangerous to interfere with it.

Mrs. Lohmann: I want to ask you if it is a general experience that man feels a terrible anguish as long as he thinks he is the creator of something which has, in fact, come to him. It throws him down also with the responsibility, and it is the greatest relief when he can experience the fact that he is the instrument; it is not himself that is the creator, it is something else.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you experience that great relief when you realize that you are not identical with the creative power. For instance, if Nietzsche could have realized that he was not identical with Zarathustra, I don't know what it might not have done for his brain. To feel that you are the creator is a terrible burden, hellish anguish, provided of course that you are creator enough to feel it consciously. The creator is usually like a child that just plays with the gods and can produce the

most awful monster without seeing it. Many artists can only produce because they don't know what they are producing; the moment they know, the creation is completely stopped. For then they begin to reflect; then they feel responsible and cannot play like the gods, unless they fulfil the psychological demand that they dissociate themselves from the creation, from the archetype, from the creative impulse itself. If they can do that, they can go on creating; then they can allow the god to play. It needs a certain faculty, the art to live amorally; if any kind of morality is caught up with the creative impulse, it simply cannot work and it will destroy you. On the other hand, if you destroy the creative impulse, you will destroy the intrinsic value of the individual at the same time. But you still can live on as a wall decoration.

Creating ones were first of all peoples, and only in late times individuals, verily, the individual himself is still the latest creation.

This is a very important statement. It is perfectly true that in the beginning the people were creators—well, the peoples that consisted of individuals who were unconscious of their existence. Can you tell me a very good example of that kind of psychology, where creation was everything and where only one individual existed?

Mrs. Fierz: Egypt.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is most characteristic of the Egyptian civilization. The people, even the Pharaoh, lived in mud huts, and the gods had the most gorgeous stone buildings which would last through many thousands of years. The real beings lived in mud huts that completely disappeared, while the unreal beings, as we would say, lived in wonderful palaces built for eternity. Babylonia was along that line too, but the Greeks, not to speak of later civilizations, built their worldly houses much more solidly. The creative instinct in Egypt was a matter of the nation; we do not know the name of a single great Egyptian artist. There were great artists but their names are unknown. It is a Greek invention that we know the name of Homer, for instance. Mesopotamia is like Egypt in that respect, the names of their poets and artists are unknown; they had great poetry and great art, but there was no individual expression of it. We see something of that in Japan where they had certain great names but the disciples of those great fellows like Hiroshige or Hokusai renounced their own names and called themselves simply Hiroshige number two, three, four, etc. hiding themselves, becoming anonymous. They carried on the name of the master, while they themselves completely disappeared. That is still a remnant of the ancient consciousness of creative men; they felt so utterly identical

with their people that they didn't even have a name; *it* created and man was merely an exponent of it. To create was a sort of craft; he created not even knowing that he was creating something beautiful. Many an old craftsman who produced a marvelous piece of art was utterly unconscious of the fact. I am rather convinced that the great composer Bach was such a fellow. He did not know what he was really producing. He composed nice chants for the church and other things, but I am very doubtful if he knew that he was the composer Bach. One would assume that he knew it, but it is just as difficult as to know in what time we are living. At this point I must always tell the story of that knight in the thirteenth century who was caught by his enemies and thrown into a dungeon for several years. Finally he got sick of that eternal prison and beating his fists down upon the table he said, "I wonder when these damned Middle Ages will come to an end!"

Mr. Baumann: Bach belonged to a huge family in which were seventy-two composers. Also some musicians were called Bach who did not belong to the family. A Bachian was a musician, a kind of clan.

Prof. Jung: Well, a guild rather. "Verily, the individual himself is still the latest creation." That is perfectly true. You see, the first individual—and he was only the symbol of an individual—was the Egyptian Pharaoh; in order to classify him as an individual he was supposed to be the incarnation of a god, twice-born, one who through divine birth was made god. He was the only outstanding individual whose name was known and he was worshipped as *the* individual, the personification of the whole people. The whole people was the Pharaoh. In other nations, the kings were the first individuals, and they were always characterized as sons of the gods, or of the sun or moon. They were made into individuals by the act of coronation. Coronation is the equipment of a human being with the sun or the cosmic quality. Therefore, the robe of the emperor was embroidered with stars and constellations, and the emperor still wears stars upon his body called "orders." The Babylonian kings were represented very early with stars upon their person. Their mantle was the celestial cosmic space, and the head was the sun. So the individual was the revelation and came down from heaven.

The Gnostic idea of Christ was that he was not born a Christ; he had to be twice-born, baptized in the Jordan, in order to be the real God Christ. According to this tradition, the Holy Ghost generated the body of the man Christ by the miraculous impregnation of the Virgin, but he was still only an ordinary man though his generation was a miracle. So the Holy Ghost has to descend a second time in order to make

Christ into a God, and the God left him in the garden before his execution took place. Therefore Christ said on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" It was only the man who found himself hanging on the cross, and he did not know how he came to be there; he had been led through the garden—that was life—and made to do certain things. He had been entirely instrumental, and the tragedy was that the God had gone out of the man before he was dead. That is the belief of the Doketic form of Christianity which was a very serious competitor of the Christianity that survived.

Now, Christ as a twice-born inherited all the religious tradition of old Egypt. He was the living Osiris, because the Pharaoh was the god only insofar as he was Ra in Osiris. At first he was the only one who had an Osiris and therefore he was an individual and distinct; later on, the nobles, his viziers and so on, had an Osiris too, and finally all the better class people had an Osiris. That was of course a preparation for the Christian idea that everybody has a soul and is therefore worth saving. And when that was generally known, the time had come for Christ who was again a god-man, the only one who contained a divine spirit in which God himself appeared—while other people had a partial soul, a partial Osiris. You see, the idea of Osiris was devalued on account of its general distribution; if everybody has a thing it no longer has any value. They were quite doubtful whether an Osiris that was in everybody would work, and on account of that devaluation there was great danger that the idea of Osiris would be lost altogether. So it was a great relief for the people when that man Christ came with the idea that he was the god-man, for only then had they an idea of the imperishableness of the individual. They needed a prophet who told them that God himself appears in man. God being necessarily imperishable, inasmuch as you believe in that savior, inasmuch as you eat of his body and drink of his blood, you participate in the imperishableness of the God, you are yourself deified. Therefore, the early Christian idea that when you receive baptism and communion, you cannot sin any longer, or if you should, you must be baptized a second time, and if that does not work, you are ready for hell.¹²

¹² It was Tertullian's belief that baptism made sin impossible. See above, 16 May 1934, n. 7.

LECTURE IV

6 November 1935

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Mrs. Baumann: "In connection with Nietzsche's and Wagner's ideas about *adornment*, I would like to ask why it has become an abnormality or perversion for a civilized man to adorn himself? Dressing in bright colors was not always considered effeminate or a mark of homosexuality, and it is not unmanly among the primitives. Primitive men decorate themselves just as much as, and usually more conspicuously than, primitive women. (For example American Indians.) Among animals *all* the bright colors are reserved for the males. (Lions, tigers, etc., as well as birds.) Bright colors and 'decorations' in the army seem to be the only acceptable form civilized man allows himself today."

Even in the army [dressing in bright colors] has become more or less obsolete since the last war because it was no longer practical, and it is for very much the same reason that those complicated and gorgeous colored clothes have been abolished generally. It is true that it is primitive and animal-like when the male adorns himself. It is too obvious, too naive, and inasmuch as man has lost his naivete, inasmuch as he has had to give up primitivity, he has had to give up that primitive style; he simply could not maintain it without giving himself away completely. That beautiful apparel which they wore in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was just too conspicuous; we simply could not wear it any longer because it was not sufficiently concealing; men in particular have to be concealed in order to fit into collectivity. The more populous our towns and cities grow, the more we need inconspicuous clothing; our actual style is chiefly English and French; the great cities Paris and London have set the fashion. More recently New York has had a tremendous influence in deciding the style for the whole of America; for a while it was absolutely *de rigueur* in the United States to wear either a certain kind of straw hat or a certain kind of black hat. London has preserved the tradition of wearing a top hat; for a very long time

that has been considered indispensable. So the cities are responsible for the inconspicuous and uniform dress for men.

You see, men live chiefly in collectivity, but hitherto that has not been true of women. Women have to adapt to their husbands and children and houses, and society and outside responsibilities are more or less play: the only thing that matters is the family, the house, and so on, and not the state or society in general. While *that* is the man's serious life, not his playground, and he would feel it in his pocketbook if he were not adapted in that field. Women can wear all sorts of individual clothes and colors in the social playground; it is even necessary. They must take over a part of the spontaneity and activity which the men have had to renounce. Inasmuch as men have had to repress their natural primitivity, since they can no longer afford it, women have to take up that side. We see in modern times how women have adopted the masculine style to an extraordinary extent, not only in clothes, but also in the very line of the body; they imitate the masculine fitness and strength, share their sports, and are even producing an entirely new type of woman, a sort of woman-friend for a man, something like a boy. And it is highly appreciated by men because they are then relieved from the odious task of playing the role of a sort of primitive, which they are not any longer; they cannot be naïve about it because they would injure themselves far too much in the actual social condition.

Of course women have become more or less falsified by having to ape masculine qualities which they only have in their minor characters—the animus helps them to play that masculine role. But it is not natural. So we have in our days an animus masculinity among women which was unheard of in former centuries, when it was not necessary for them. In primitive society women were inconspicuous and exceedingly uniform; if there was any kind of conspicuous costume, they all wore the same. Like the Red Indians for instance; the men are much adorned and wear gorgeous colors, and the women wear their black shawls and clumsy high boots, which are not particularly showy—really exceedingly unattractive I should say. But for primitive men, women do not need to make up particularly; it is quite enough that the woman is a female; the primitive man is active enough himself. The modern man is eaten up by social conditions where he has to adapt to an extent of which women usually have no idea—unless they are in the same game. I always say it is not a league for the protection of the *jeune fille* that is needed, but one for the protection of the *jeune homme*, and not only the *jeune homme* but also for the *vieillard*. No man in modern society is safe, none, for women have become terrible. Man has been

deprived of his masculinity through the circumstances, through the social conditions. The big cities, the great accumulations emasculate him; men cannot afford to be men in large societies.

In an isolated small community, you can still find individual types among the men; one is the man with a beard, another is the man with the flowing locks, and another the man with a wonderful moustache, etc., and they wear funny things, appear in a funny way. They are originals. These are the sad remnants of the time when every man distinguished himself by a particular kind of feather or by a peculiar knot in his hair perhaps. You see that among the negroes, particularly the negroes of the Sudan, the Shilluks, where every man has his coiffure of individual design. One wears a boat, for example, made of clay and rancid fat and hair; he has only short kinky hair but he adds horse's hair or the hair of the giraffe and makes it into an extraordinary thing. Another has a sort of canoe on his head, and another one, something like a halo. Each is absolutely individual, having his particular art. They go about for years with those things carefully kept; they are always about the same. So each one is distinguished by a particular head-dress, and there is nothing uniform about it. While their women are just inconspicuous; they have no particular refinement because it is enough that they are women. They are supposed to be passive and not to adorn themselves, and go about naked except that they wear a lot of brass rings, but that belongs to their uniform. Those primitive men can afford to be individual because they are not in large masses; only here and there is an isolated group, so they have space enough to build up their own fantasy and imagination. But put a lot of them together in the cities of Southern Africa, and they would soon become uniform or there would be no end of teasing and trouble in rubbing up against their fellow men; they had better be inconspicuous or they would be liable to comments.

That is the reason why individuals in big cities are wiped out, becoming just particles of a herd; a man in a simple uniform dress denotes that he feels himself like any other man, one uniformed atom among millions. And woman can afford to take over that masculine role inasmuch as they are not so ground under. Of course we are speaking of the women who are not in business, the married women who have at least a world of their own. Naturally, if they live in a community where there are thousands of other women, they must be very careful to wear just the right thing in order not to be conspicuous in the wrong way, so even among women there is a limit to the individual variation. There are laws which become more severe, the larger the community in

which they live. They can afford something out of the ordinary in the country, but in a big town they must not be out of tune. Moreover, they are not helped to be individual in that they wear, most probably, things which are handed out to the public in dozens or even in thousands; most women cannot afford to wear clothes made for themselves.

So looking back through the centuries, you find that as man ceased to be colorful, the women took it on themselves, and now it is due to them that we have individual distinction in dress at all. But the more women are in business, the more we shall see that even the small margin that is left of individual variation will decrease. Also our dashing type of life simply does not allow complicated clothes. English women have developed the tailormade costume as a sort of practical national uniform, only dressing up once a day for dinner. It is now restricted to that one hour—then they can look decent—and the rest of the day they look just like nothing, or like anybody. And even in the army the colors are now restricted to a little patch of red or yellow somewhere. Now, at the same time that the enormous increase in population in big towns has brought about this peculiar lack of individual distinction in our dress—having no longer a chance to do it outside, naively unconsciously, with gorgeous robes and so on—we developed the idea of individual distinction within, individuation. We haven't even gowns and hoods here as you have in your English and American universities, and as they have in Germany and Italy. But that will vanish also, because it belongs too much to the Middle Ages; they don't fit in with the modern type. It will all be introverted and disappear into the unconscious. And then it comes back in another way as the idea of inner distinction. All these things hang together.

Now, we will go on to a somewhat more difficult question by Miss Hannah: "In connection with the verse ending 'the individual is himself the latest creation' I should like to ask: (1) Do you think the creative force entirely decides on the form of creation, or has the artist a certain choice in whether that force shall be used subjectively or objectively? (2) Supposing he has that choice and decides to use it subjectively, do you think he would feel any more need to create outside himself?"

I must ask what would be the other choice. If the creator could not create outside of himself, what would he do?

Miss Hannah: I mean, could he use it in the process of individuation? Nietzsche says the last thing which is invented is the individual, and I want to know if the whole process can be turned inside voluntarily—or is that done by the creative force?

Prof. Jung: Well, the creative force entirely decides any form of cre-

ation, as long as there is no consciousness to make the choice. You see, consciousness has a certain amount of disposable libido, so we can put a certain value, arbitrarily, on a thing; we can value it as Nietzsche says. Inasmuch as we have free will, we can declare a thing to be valuable, or we can choose, decide between two possibilities. But inasmuch as we have little consciousness we have little free will. We don't know how much because we cannot measure, but can only say that we have more free will than the primitive inasmuch as we have more consciousness; we have developed the faculty of discrimination. Our consciousness is far more extended. We have wrenched from the unconscious a great amount of libido, so that we really have something like free will up to a certain point. Now, inasmuch as he has free will, the artist can choose a form; he can canalize the creative force to a certain extent, depending upon the degree of its power or intensity. The creative force could be compared to a river. If the river flows smoothly through a plain, with no great push, then naturally you can do something with it, turn it into different canals. But if the river is rushing through a gorge with tremendous power you can do little. In that case, the river will choose its own form quite irrespective of your free will. Of course, with our modern means we can build powerworks even in a very wild river; provided we spend the corresponding amount of time and energy on the work, we can tame that wild torrent, but it demands a corresponding amount of free will. Then there are surely conditions in which we cannot chain the creative impulse, where it is explosive and works like a volcanic eruption; and in that case it will always choose its own course. Only where the river flows gently, where we can easily build canals and dams without being afraid that it will destroy the whole thing, can we give it a form that we have chosen by free will. Inasmuch as we have that choice of the form we can use creative energy here or there; we can build a canal on the left of the river and water the desert there, or we may prefer to water the desert over to the right. So if you can give a form to the creative impulse at all, you can choose it, can decide whether it will be an inside or an outside form—always of course providing that the nature of that creative impulse does lend a hand in the operation. Now, supposing that the river of your creative forces is so gentle that it allows you to lead it, then you can even apply it to an inside form, which is rather an unusual application. But it might also be that the creative impulse chooses the inside form rather than the outside—that is also possible—and then it does not show on the surface at all.

Miss Hannah: That is more or less what Nietzsche says here, doesn't he? Isn't it a question of the *Zeitgeist* turning the libido inwards?

Prof. Jung: Well, that is questionable. When he says that in the beginning the peoples were the creators, he means in primitive times when there was little consciousness, little free will. And that is true, you can see that. They naively decorated their weapons and canoes, working almost unconsciously. For instance, you remember the famous story of a primitive who was carving his canoe very elaborately and when he arrived at the further end of his boat the beginning was already rotten—but he still went on through the years. That is the primitive creator, quite irrespective of very natural facts; when wood is left in the sun and the rain for years, naturally it will rot, but he did not think of that because to have a fit canoe was not his purpose. I am sure he always used a canoe but one that was very little decorated, and then he thought—if he had any idea—he would have a particularly marvelous one, and he began to make a particularly elaborate decoration for it; quietly, as the years passed, he went on and on while the other end was already rotting. That is the true primitive creator. So you can say the “creating ones were first of all peoples,” because the unconscious simply used them as tools. As the creator used his tools, so he was used by the unconscious as a supertool. Late on in their development, people became conscious of the fact of being an “I,” that there was something in them which was different from others; but before that time they were living in a sort of mist.

If you look back into your own childhood, perhaps you may remember the moment when you became “I,” when you knew who you were. I can remember that moment very well. In my eleventh year, I remember thinking, now I am. When I looked back there was mist and I knew I existed in that mist. I knew many things had happened and that I happened among other things, but it just was, and there was no I. Then one day it came to me, now I am, somebody is doing, somebody knows that that thing is done. I am I, the only I. I have heard often enough that people remember the moment in which they became conscious—sometimes later, sometimes earlier—and this is simply the repetition of what has happened in the history of mankind; in a certain age people became conscious of their existence.¹ It is a curious feeling to move among primitives who live as you lived when you were six

¹ Jung recounts in his autobiography various discoveries about how (at age 11) “I came upon myself,” including the fact that he was not one but “two different persons.” See *MDR*, pp. 20, 32-35/33, 44-46.

years old; they are like children, with no continuity whatever. They love a thing very dearly one minute, and they kill it in the next; and then they repent, they are very sorry. There is no consistency, no continuity of the ego; they are always something else, never the same. When they are children, they are nothing but children; when they are adults they are nothing but adults, and when they are old they are nothing but old. Therefore, you see among primitives and barbarous people the most wonderful and impressive performance of manhood and youth and old age; it is marvelous to watch an old man or an old woman, and as the culmination of biological life, a man of thirty, or a woman of twenty or twenty-five is really a sight. They *are* it completely. You see, sometimes our children are already adults, and our adults are children and old people at the same time. We can even see in our faces signs of extreme youth, of manhood, and of extreme age; it is a collection of all periods of life because we have become almost incapable of believing that we are here and now and nothing else. It is quite rare to have such a mood.

If you are entirely here and now, you are complete. But it is exceedingly difficult to be complete, so we are always all over the place, here and there. We have hardly a moment in which we think one thing—we always think at least two things, ten things. Have you any moment in your life, in any kind of relation, in which you can say, “I am complete, I am one in myself?” But the primitive is nothing else; in his sorrow, in his joy, in his pain, he is complete. Have you any moment in your life when you can say that you are nothing but joy? Of course not. We look at it, judge it, have opinions about it; we know it has a beginning, an end, a cause and an effect—and what does Mr. So-and-So say about it? You find nothing of that with the primitive; the real primitive is the moment. He is the here and now, the complete performance. It is a marvelous sight. The sick man or the beggar is fabulously complete; you could paint every one of them. The gesture, the intonation, the whole horizon, the atmosphere, is complete; it is unmistakable what they are. With us it is most mistakable. When a primitive weeps it is perfectly clear, a marvelous demonstration, but if a woman in modern society weeps, how shall we know what it is?

Mr. Allemann: Don't you think with a good toothache you are complete?

Prof. Jung: Have you got one? Sure enough, if we are absolutely demoralized we show it, but it needs extraordinary conditions; it needs a complete realization. Well now, all this has to do with what Nietzsche was speaking of in the paragraph which I read last time, “Creating

ones were first of all peoples, and only in late times individuals; verily the individual himself is still the latest creation." But the individual is a separateness, and the separateness is naturally due to the fact that something is put between oneself and the herd, and that is another point of view. That at once causes a dissociation of course: namely, as an atom of the continuum, as a member of the herd, you are and feel nothing but herd, but inasmuch as you are an "I," a separate unit, you feel different—or you couldn't be a separate unit. So through the very fact that you are conscious of existing, you are already split; there is already a dissociation. Therefore, the becoming of the individual has been understood as a sin: that is the original sin. Sure enough, it was something disagreeable, and the primitive man always understands the thing which is disagreeable as sin. When the missionary asked the negro chief about the difference between good and evil, he said, "It is bad when my enemy takes my women and it is good when I take his." That is the original conception of good and evil, and since man has always felt that separation from collectivity as a loss, he called it sin. But in about the time of Christ, people began to see that it could be valued in a very different way, and that accounts for the interesting split which occurred between theological or philosophical opinions as to the interpretation of the paradise legend: namely, the question whether the god who made man so unconscious was a good or a bad god.

The Gnostics held that this god was a vain, inferior demon, who in his vanity had created man imperfect and unconscious, and that therefore it was a mighty good thing when the foreign god of the spiritual worlds interfered with the doings of that creator, and sent his son into paradise in the form of the serpent to redeem man, to teach him consciousness. So the redemption was simply the continuation of the separation, the distinction; the separation was then understood as a good thing inasmuch as it was a separation from something that was evil; they understood it from the side of individuation. While the standpoint of the Old Testament, as well as the Christian point of view, is from the side of collectivity. The Christians were convinced that the creator was good and that Adam and Eve were simply naughty children who did not obey the law of the Father, but the Gnostics were really on the side of individuation. And Nietzsche, with his idea of the Superman, continued on that line which is always aside from the collective opinion. For collective opinion has always been and always will be in favor of the view that things are really good as they are and that one should stand by them and not make a difference; the aim is to have things uniform with no separation. The Black Shirts in Italy mean: No

distinction; we are particles of the herd, with no existence of our own, because God is good and he knew very well why he said not to eat of the tree. Then all the people who don't belong to that creed are necessarily bad. You see, these political parties simply imitated what the church and other collective bodies of opinion have always done.

Miss Hannah: I still don't quite understand about turning the thing inward and using the whole creative force on the individuating process. If Nietzsche had done that, if he had understood it, would he have gone on writing? Would he have felt any need to preach it, to put it in any form?

Prof. Jung: Well, I say that is possible provided the creative impulse allows it. The question is there. With a certain amount of free will you can do more or less what you please; you can direct the creative impulse. But inasmuch as the amount of free will is quite indefinable—inasmuch as the sum total may be very small or very great—we don't know; we only know it is never sufficient. We know we cannot win out by free will. It reaches a certain point and then it depends upon the grace of heaven, depends upon whether the creative impulse fits in with it or not. If the creative impulse fits in with your purpose to use it inside, you can do it because the creative impulse is with you. In other words, if your unconscious wants you to apply the creative impulse to the inside exclusively, you can do it, but if your unconscious does not want it, nothing in the world will enable you to do so. Of course you can drive yourself crazy, split yourself, and become unreal, but you will pay for it, and you will not reach your goal. You simply cannot accomplish it without the help of the unconscious; if you go against it, you will fail. Now inasmuch as *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is really a creation, it does exist and it has its undeniable significance. This is the way in which it worked and Nietzsche simply had no choice. But also he did not want anything else. He wanted to produce a book, and he did not think of applying that creative impulse to himself. In the eighties nobody could possibly dream of such a thing, because there was nothing inside—intestines and entrails and that was all.

Miss Hannah: But still, as he went mad I think he might have been able to turn it a little more inside.

Prof. Jung: Might! What would have happened if the old Romans had possessed machine guns? What would have come out of the Germanic invasion of Italy if they had had poison gas and such things? Obviously we can look at it from a distance of time and say that *we* might have chosen differently. But don't forget, we are just standing on the shoulders of Nietzsche—standing on the shoulders of a whole

generation of thought which has been enormously influenced by Nietzsche—and therefore we are able to think as we do. In a hundred years, when people have digested what we call modern psychology, they will think quite differently; they will have a different point of view.

Mrs. Baynes: I thought the question was turning round the point as to whether or not a book should be taken as a symptom of an incomplete inner experience.

Prof. Jung: I don't think Miss Hannah meant that. You can deal with *Zarathustra* as a symptom if you like, of course. It is a pretty bold point of view but possible; you can call any creation, even the most finished artistic product, a mere symptom of personal psychology, but the question is, do you arrive at a satisfactory result with such a hypothesis? You see, the more the creation is significant the less you are capable of reducing it to the personal psychology. Freud tried it, for instance—tried to reduce a very perfect work of art to the very imperfect personal psychology of the artist. But nothing comes out of the destruction of a work of art.²

Miss Hannah: But if you did not use it as a symptom which somebody has produced, but as a projection, could not concrete, objective art be the first fumbling of the individual towards individuation—with the hypothesis that if the individual was formed, the need for art would disappear?

Prof. Jung: Well, if you don't call it *art*, but call it *the creative impulse*. Naturally, the creative impulse has always been the maker of the individual. You see, creative impulse does not appear in everybody in the same strength: certain individuals are picked, they have a particular gift. They create something which is striking and they are then the innovators, and stick out like old man Prometheus, that great sinner against the gods. He was an individual and he was punished for it, but he was made to stand out through his creative impulse. Naturally, the creative impulse is forever the maker of personality and uses that individual form, that distinction. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that, in the process of individuation, everybody should become aware of his creative instinct, no matter how small it is.

Miss Wolff: I think Miss Hannah is speaking of a certain phase of the

* "An artist is once more in rudiments an introvert, not far removed from neurosis. . . . Consequently, like any other unsatisfied man, he turns away from reality and transfers all his interest, and his libido too, to the wishful constructions of his life of phantasy, whence the path might lead to neurosis." *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1916-1917), tr. J. Strachey, std. edn., vol. XVI, p. 376.

creative impulse, and it is quite possible that that at a certain time would turn naturally inside, but I don't think it would be so forever. For man never really lives inside for himself alone; he is a collective function. A creative man may need his creative impulse for a time to build up his personality, but after a time he will need it for other people. He will again write books or be an artist, because he would only be half a being if he were living just for himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we must not understand the individual as turned in only upon himself; otherwise individuation would lead to the complete disappearance of the sane individual. He must reappear again. In the case of the really creative artist, he goes on being the creative artist because that is the means by which he links himself up and communicates with the outside world. There is no point in turning in—disappearing—if you are not coming back with a message to the people outside.

Miss Hannah: The first thing that occurred to me was a sentence in one of the letters of van Gogh where he says Christ got beyond the period where he had to carve stone or paint, and worked on humanity direct.³

Prof. Jung: It is an interesting point, but that is the point of view of an artist with reference to Christ. Obviously Christ never thought of painting. I am sure that a man with any other craft might have the same idea; the doctor, for instance, could say that he gave up general practice and became a psychotherapist.

Mrs. Baynes: One could also say he did not descend to painting to express his creative power.

Prof. Jung: Perhaps he had no gift in that respect. For instance, Mani, who was the founder of a religion, was also a fine painter; he is said to have decorated two temples with frescoes. And in modern Persian tradition he is no longer known as the founder of a religion but only as a very great painter and artist. He was a man of considerable creative power which took many forms, and I assume that he could also give many forms to his artistic expression—while in the time of Christ there was a singularly restricted field in which to express creative power. But that is all fate; we cannot speculate upon such things. It is perfectly futile to say that Christ was beyond that stage; you could

³ In a letter to Emile Bernard (June 1888), van Gogh wrote of Christ, "This unbelievable artist, one who is scarcely conceivable to such an obtuse instrument as the neurotic worn-out brain, made neither statues, nor pictures nor books; indeed, he said clearly enough what he was doing—fashioning living men, immortal beings." *The Letters of van Gogh*, tr. Douglas Lord (New York, 1938).

say just as well that Schopenhauer or Kant were beyond the stage when they could express themselves in stone or something like that.

Well, we are still sticking at this very important point that "the individual himself is still the latest creation." Now, Nietzsche's conception of the individual cannot be treated here in a modern way; we must go back to the eighties in order to understand what he means. You see, the individual only began to be talked about in the time when they were talking of species and families and collectivities as special concepts; such a term is a scientific invention meaning the individual unit over against the herd. They did not use such terms at all if they were not envisaging things in a scientific way. So when they were talking of species or classes, the smaller units in them were called individuals. It is that individual, seen as a separate unit, which is, he says, the latest creation. Before that invention the greater units—families, classes, tribes, species, clans—were the really existing things, while the individual was of no import whatever: the individual was the more or less transitory way in which peoples or classes or nations appeared. To a very large extent, that is still our point of view; we still think statistically. The scientific mind in particular thinks in great numbers; in dealing with any social problem, say the problem of public hygiene, they say so many per thousand lead a certain life, or three individuals out of a hundred are suffering from such-and-such a condition, or in the United Kingdom there are so many individuals run over by motor cars per month—and three or four thousand in the United States. It is that concept of the individual which Nietzsche means.

Our more modern idea of the individual is entirely different from that statistical way of envisaging problems. We look at the individual from the inside, and then the individual means the man, the subjective man, the single man being a sort of microcosm and not an atom in a continuum. So our psychological concept of the individual, in comparison with that of the eighties, seems like a most extraordinary exaggeration. When that era was in full bloom, the individual was of course nothing but a sort of contrivance of nature and the main goal of the whole life-process was the life of the species; the individual meant no more than a cell means in a body. Moreover, the individual contained nothing. There was nothing inside but his conscious psyche; everything else was just the body. So that time was utterly unable to see the individual as a microcosm, in contradistinction to a previous time, the early Middle Ages. Then the individual *was* seen as a microcosm, but then they saw the macrocosm—the sky with the stars and the planets and God as the ruling spirit of the universe—and every individual was

the mirror reflex of that wholeness; it was as if the whole cosmos had descended into the individual entity *man* and made him a microcosm.

Now we have again a similar idea, yet it is very different: namely, we discover the microcosm in the individual as the origin of the macrocosm. Our idea is that as you find certain archetypal ideas in man, you also discover them in the universe, but man put them there: they were not there before. For instance, the eternal constellations in the heavens to the medieval man had had a meaningful existence for an eternity. God himself expressed his power and his might in those constellations, and he caused them to be in man too; he created man as the microcosm. We would turn the thing round and say the individual man was the origin of such a universe; we see the universe largely depending upon man. He fills this universe with meaning, but in itself it is without meaning; it is even quite futile to ask whether it is eternal. Moreover, we are convinced that it is not eternal in its present form. There are no eternal constellations, because they all change their position in the course of untold centuries. So what was an eternal and unshakeable truth to the primitive man—namely, the unchangeable nature of the zodiacal signs—is relative to us; we know that in the course of many thousands of years all those stars will change their positions and the universe will have an entirely different shape; and to call them “eternal” or to name them “The Fishes,” “Capricorn,” and so on, is merely a projection. You see, we also find the archetypal images in man, but instead of making them derive from the great cosmos, we make them derive from the constellations in man. Now, I don’t want to discuss the ulterior philosophical question, “Which is older, the ape or the hen?”—but I say that for our time we have a tendency to think in this way. Of course this may be a continuation of materialism, an *enantiodromia*, an overestimate of the individual over against the time when he was utterly depreciated. That is quite possible, but even if we know that, we cannot get away from such a point of view, because this is a necessary concept at present. We have to live it, have to accept it; for the time being, such a standpoint would be the natural thing.

Mr. Allemann: Is not this point of view like an inflation in an individual?

Prof. Jung: It would only be an inflation if we had it in a time when it was not suitable; in 1850 it would be an inflation.

Mr. Allemann: Yes, for the individual, but is it an inflation for the *whole* to have this opinion?

Prof. Jung: Well, a super-critique could call this a probable inflation of the individual. But we are hardly allowed to have such a critique,

because we would thereby deprive ourselves of the specific life of our era; we have to think in a certain way in order to make good what the time before has made wrong. We cannot escape these laws; we would not share the life of the era if we thought differently. If the general intellectual atmosphere becomes entirely convinced and satisfied with the idea that man is the measurer of things, or that in man the universe begins, then you could allow yourself to take another road and ask if this was not inflation. But since only a few people in our day think so much of the individual, your inflation is damned at each step. Everywhere you run up against people who tell you what a damned fool you are to think so much of the human mind or of what is inside man, for what is man after all? Now this individual in Nietzsche's text is the bridge to the Superman; it is the individual which was valid in the time of materialism. And with the Superman, Nietzsche himself is going through that process of transformation of values; in this chapter he says man is the maker of values. Man has made the eternal signs and symbols, or a god-man has made them; they never came from the heavens. So in his own personal life he begins to introject the whole of metaphysics—God is dead. He fills the individual with things which used to be in the universe, and that is of course an inflation, inasmuch as Nietzsche is not sustained by his time. Everybody with a new idea is always threatened with an inflation. If he lifts himself up above his time, of course he really has an inflation, because he can only lift himself above the surface of the earth by means of an airplane or a balloon. He can only do it by a sort of inflation. Therefore, I say a super-critique is necessary. Our prejudice is our idea of the individual and this is an inflation; but mind you, it is only an inflation as long as you are in a balloon. When the earth has come up till it reaches you, when you stand again on the surface of the earth, it will no longer be an inflation. Then you can give it up because the world has come up: there has been an advance of consciousness.

Peoples once hung over them tables of the good. Love which would rule and love which would obey, created for themselves such tables.

This table of good is of course *die Tafel des Wertes*, which means a sort of code or a list of values, and he says that the desire to rule and the desire to obey are responsible for the creation of such moral values. So here is an important part of his moral philosophy—he makes morality or ethics derive from the instinctive will-to-power.

Mr. Allemann: I think it is badly translated. It is here *Liebe*.⁴

Prof. Jung: Yes, but you could say the libido that wants to rule and the libido that wants to obey, so it amounts to the same. It is the desire to rule; in calling it “love,” he is giving it a very good name. If you go on through the text or if you read his *Genealogy of Morals*, it is perfectly plain that he derives morality entirely from the instinct of power, no matter whether the instinct is love or not. In this poetic language he gives it a very nice name because he refers here to the love of life, to the positive attitude toward life; even to rule or to be forced to obey is positive, because the joy of life is love and love is joy, and he holds that joy is much deeper than suffering. That comes later on in the poems; in the next paragraph we have the joy:

Older is the pleasure in the herd than the pleasure in the ego;

...

So this love and joy are pretty much the same: it means the saying yes to life, the positive answer to the question of existence. Now, it is of course a very questionable point of view whether you can make morality derive from the will-to-power, or whether it has not another origin. It is a question also whether morality has an origin at all or whether it is not one of the entirely genuine, basic laws of existence. If you analyse the moral laws, of course you find any amount which clearly derive from the power instinct. For instance, you could interpret the worship of the parents, or obedience to the parents or the authorities, as a power question, but I should call such an interpretation very short-sighted, because it is so clear that it is suitable—that it is teleological—for the sake of continuity. One could not say that old people demand worship or authority for their own egotistical ends, because the other side is so obvious: it is useful that somebody should have authority.

You see that in the life of primitive tribes; the authority of the Elders is so important for the life of the tribe that the British really try their best, by hook or by crook, to enhance it. I followed up quite a number of legal cases when I was in Africa. I was interested in the British policy in that respect, and there were cases where young people had offended against certain tribal laws which were really nonsensical, or perhaps even immoral from a European standpoint; but when the Council of Elders complained to the D.C., he decided in their favor. In some cases the Council of Elders had administered punishments to

⁴ *Liebe*: The translation rightly says “love.” Mr. Allemann apparently thinks Jung is citing “will-to-power” as the translation.

members of the tribe which were hardly warrantable, where the right was not on their side, but the D.C. decided in their favor in order to protect their authority.⁵ That is because the British discovered that the tribes where the authority of the Elders had been undermined soon became unruly; and an anarchistic element developed which affected the other tribes and undermined the general order of the colony. Therefore they tried to reestablish the Council of Elders throughout the country, in order to maintain as much as possible the primitive order of things. They found it impossible to rule those tribes in a European way; they have not the same idea of justice, and they have a very different morality in spite of the fact that they are influenced by the missions. Naturally it is the missions, chiefly, that undermine the authority of the Elders, because, with their tainted morality, they combat their decisions in a very shortsighted way—of course offering them an idealistic point of view which those people never apply because they don't understand it: they only make nonsense of it.

Now in such a case, where somebody has a *ressentiment* as to the authority of the Elders, he might be inclined to explain the law that one should worship and obey the parents as simply the egotistical instinct of the said parents; but otherwise he will understand that it is in the interest of the life of the tribe, and therefore in the interest of the individual, that the young people have respect for the older people. For that maintains the continuity of the cultural life of a tribe. So all those tribes that have lost their belief in the authority have descended to a very low level of anarchistic society, and it is merely the police and the machine gun that keeps them in order. This is actually the case in many parts of Africa, chiefly through the work of the missions, who therefore have now to deal with anarchists. It is the case of Uganda and that is the reason why England is particularly anxious when somebody kicks up too much dust in Africa; there is too much dust lying around loose in Africa anyway and something might catch fire. The Sudan is an Anglo-Egyptian condominium and Uganda is really a colony; and a very short time ago there was no real connection between the two. It would be quite possible to construct a good road there, but they left that country devastated; there is nothing but a terrible barren country inhabited by unruly tribes. They left it so on purpose in order to prevent infection coming down from Egypt by the Nile through the Sudan to Central Africa. They prefer to have the whole traffic go by Mombasa on the East coast where they can catch everything that comes

⁵ D.C.: District Commissioner.

in by keeping a very severe control of immigrants. The whole Buganda population in Africa is very dangerous.⁶ They say they are only waiting for a sufficiently large number to first cut the throats of the Indians, and then the Europeans. They hate the Indians even more than the Europeans, and they don't even mind the guns. That tribe in particular has lost its proper organization completely; but they are very clever people, so clever that the Hindu merchants and usurers have little chance in the Buganda country. In the other parts all the more.

So morality is really rather more a form of instinct, or laws ruling the instincts, which are born with man. It is a sort of cunning device derived from the power instinct or any other instinct; morality is merely the expression or the codification of vital laws which rule the life of a community. For instance, if you are alone you need no morality—there are no situations in which you could possibly use it—but as soon as you live in a community the law begins to operate; and the more populous our cities become the more it will be differentiated, because the conditions where people can hurt each other will become more numerous. Therefore, we have a development of law and a refinement and differentiation of morality which we have never known before; such a refinement of consciousness is simply the consequence of the accumulation of population in the great centers. And, you know, we never have the proper amount: either we have too much or too little, because this is a point where man is not sure of himself. For never before has there been a time in his existence when he accumulated in such numbers, and when there were such facilities for meeting and rubbing up against one another. Formerly, it took two or three days travelling to reach the relative with whom you were quarreling, and by that time you had forgotten all about it and couldn't think why you had come unless it was for some joyful purpose. If every one of us who had quarrelled with another fellow had to walk a week in order to reach him again, it would be the end of the quarrel.

Dr. Bertine: Is there not a contradiction in Nietzsche's idea that valuing is creating, and that valuing is the expression of a will-to-power?

Prof. Jung: I would not say that. He could easily defend this apparent contradiction by saying he had simply created out of the power instinct. But probably, as has always been assumed, each instinct is in a way invented since we have no proper definition of creative power. That is utterly unknown; I would not be able to give you any suitable

⁶ Buganda is a part of Uganda. Jung spent some days in Uganda in 1925 on an expedition with two friends.

definition of "creative power." It is a peculiar quality which shows in the instincts, in this form or that, and it is a borderline concept, almost a metaphysical concept. We only know that it is, but how that is possible we don't know. Just as we cannot explain why it was just man who invented fire, and protection by means of weapons, and so on. Why have animals not invented fire? Or why is it that certain human beings, the central Australian natives, wear no clothes? The temperature does not explain it because the temperature goes as low as zero centigrade in the night, yet they have no clothes; they never invented them. They have every chance to cover themselves with the furs of animals but they don't; rather they lie around the fire like snakes stiff with frost, and just wait in a kind of numbed unconsciousness until the sun is high enough to warm them up and then they live again. They are too primitive to dream of inventing anything. While other tribes long ago, the Aurignaciens⁷ for instance, in prehistoric days, who we assume were actually on the level of the Australian native, did have clothes. They lived in a climate very much colder than Australia, so they probably used fur or skins and lived in caves; they could never have gone entirely without clothes in our countries. You see, science is incapable of explaining this peculiar fact that man does invent. If we could not actually see that, we could say just as well that it was quite impossible that anything was invented; the only thing which proves it is the fact that it is.

and as long as the good conscience is for the herd, the bad conscience only saith: ego.

This is a very important statement, and it is surely true. Joy is in the herd, and that is older than joy in the "I," because joy in the case of the primitive is exclusively collective. This is true even with us. There are people who cannot enjoy themselves when they are alone—they are so hellishly miserable that they avoid it—and when they are together in a herd they are different beings, a fact which you can still observe. It is typically human. You see, when you are in the herd everybody has a good conscience, because whatever you do there you do with others; even if you do the most appalling things it is perfectly O.K., because everybody is doing it. For instance, if tomorrow it were the latest Paris fashion that women should go to a dinner entirely naked, they would do it; of course there would be a slight shock when they first saw it in

⁷ "Aurignacien" designates an upper Paleolithic culture which contains human artifacts in various media.

the papers, but if Mrs. Jones is going quite naked, then I can too. Why not? If in the eighties they could have seen *how* undressed ladies now are in their bathing costumes, or the way they go to dinners with their backs naked to infinity—everything visible practically—they would have died of apoplexy. But it is quite possible; because if it is done in collectivity, you can do just what you please. Inasmuch as collectivity agrees with it, there is no bad conscience, none whatever; you are even unconscious in a great crowd. It is as if you did not exist, you don't mind. So the "I" really only exists when you have a bad conscience—when you have sinned against a good conscience. You share a conscience when you are with everybody; but if you do something by yourself you have a bad conscience because it is not shared with mankind. Even if you do something quite decent, you are ashamed, and you may expect to be ashamed because you are separated: you have committed the original sin. You see, if you can only make up your mind to share whatever you possess, every evil thing you feel, with others—I mean inasmuch as others also condescend to share their dirt with you—you are in an effortless state of justification because everybody is at this level; everybody is doing the same and you are rid of the "I." And inasmuch as you are no longer "I," it doesn't matter whether you are moral or immoral; you simply don't matter any longer and can do the most immoral or absurd things. Therefore, in the Catholic church where you can confess and have absolution, where you have no more qualms, you are no longer an "I."

Then of course the question comes: Which is better—what should be? Well, obviously there are two opinions. The God of the Old Testament says: "Don't be an 'I,' don't eat of that tree, or you will see how unconscious and pitiful you are, how pitiful is the thing I have made." And the other point of view is: "Be as conscious as you can, be responsible to yourself, for you will thereby spare much evil not only to yourself but also to your surroundings." Now, we don't know which is right. The decision is always the particular task of the time—whether we are forced this way or that, to be a collective people or a more individual people. I cannot decide it in many cases. I have said to quite a number of people that they had better go another way. If you are interested in Catholicism, or are a Catholic, remain in the fold of the church. Or join this or that other movement, where you are no longer "I." I am quite convinced that there are numbers of people who are not meant to be "I," who ought to live in the world of old Jehovah where everything is perfect. But there are numbers of people who are not meant to be perfect and who cannot live in the world of old Jehovah.

LECTURE V

13 November 1935

Prof. Jung:

Last time we got as far as the paragraph,

Verily, the crafty ego, the loveless one, that seeketh its advantage in the advantage of many—it is not the origin of the herd, but its ruin.

Here Nietzsche explains that the “I,”¹ as a conscious separate unit that seeks its own profit in the profit of the many, is not the origin of the herd but its destruction. This is perfectly plain: the herd exists only inasmuch as the conscious “I” does not exist. The herd consists of biological units because only the unit, the living being, carries life; life appears, not in a general or an absolute form, but in the form of living biological units. And they only form a herd inasmuch as they are unconscious of their separateness. When the living unit, the individual, becomes conscious of its separateness, the herd is destroyed, ceases to function. So inasmuch as individuals become more and more conscious, the herd recedes more and more, and is replaced by what we call “society”: namely, an organism based upon conventions between conscious individuals. You see, the self-consciousness of the individual does not destroy the connection among human beings, but only destroys the *unconscious* relationship between them. Society is not destroyed by the consciousness of individuals, or individuation, but is only destroyed by unconscious individuals. Yet the herd is destroyed by conscious individuals.

Now, as soon as there is a conscious individual, there is also a system of values, for values mean discrimination. If there is no conscious individual, there is no discrimination, but if there is a conscious individual, there is also a possibility that values and significances are

¹ The point is frequently made now, especially among critics of the English translations of Freud, that the German *ich* is often much better rendered “I” than “ego.”


discerned. To be conscious means that there is discrimination; consciousness cannot be without discrimination, for there must be a consciousness in order to discriminate itself from the other thing. You find in Plato's philosophy a very apt terminology to express two principles: namely, the *Tauton*, which means literally, "the same," that which is identical with itself; and the *Thateron*, which means "the other,"² the thing which is not "I," not my consciousness. My consciousness is the *Tauton*, the thing which is identical with myself, and the object of my consciousness is the other thing. As soon as there is consciousness, there is a *Tauton* and a *Thateron*; if there is no consciousness they don't exist. Now, since there is a sameness, the identity of myself with another thing, I have already created a discrimination: significance and values. The *Tauton* is a significance, because it means the sameness with myself; and *Thateron* is also a significance, that which is different, the other thing. At the same time, it is a feeling discrimination—that is, the thing which is the same is relative to me. It has then the feeling value of being identical with myself while the *Thateron* is the stranger or the strangeness—it is the other thing—and that is a feeling discrimination. So the origin of consciousness means the origin of values and significance, and you find these concepts so well coined in this early philosophy, because Plato was close to the origin of philosophical consciousness.

You see, he was pre-Christian, a man of the fourth century B.C., yet there were other philosophies before, and the pre-Socratic philosophers were less concerned with consciousness than with objects, particularly the nature philosophers like Empedocles; they had a marvelous naïveté in reference to nature or to natural objects, a lot to say about how things came into existence, etc., and it was all a projection of unconscious Socratic and Platonic philosophy. So, from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. the ideas of Plato already existed but in the unconscious of those philosophers; they projected them into nature. Then Plato became more psychological—well, it is difficult to make a difference between Socrates and Plato—it was perhaps Socrates who discovered the first psychological terms. And we find that Plato makes use of the old nature philosophy in the form of a myth. The idea of the Platonic primordial man, which is still going strong, is a symbol for the self, the all-round being. This is a part of the philosophy one hundred and fifty or two hundred years before Plato, when the Platonic ideas

* *Tauton/Thateron*: In his later dialogues, Plato often discusses the same and the other or different. See, e.g., the *Parmenides*, 139sq., and the *Theaetetus*, 186a.

were still dormant in the unconscious, and Plato narrates the story of the all-round being as if it were a myth. This is a very clear example of how such ideas come into psychological existence. There is nothing, then, of that idea of the *Tauton* and the *Thateron* in the older philosophies—they were just not concerned with those ideas; yet they made the same differences among objects. But they did not include themselves. They could not think of the sameness of themselves and their consciousness, of being identical with themselves; they rather put it into the object as two opposing principles. It was seen outside and not inside of man's consciousness. One could almost say that the pre-Socratic philosophy was on the objective plane, and the Platonic philosophy already arrived at the subjective plane.

One sees the same thing in certain Christian symbols, or other symbols of the past, which are now applied in their psychological form, while formerly they were seen as qualities of the objects. The discrimination which Plato was trying to use in those two concepts was seen by earlier philosophers as the dry or cold or humid or warm quality of the object; they discriminated the elements, separated them into those that attracted each other and those that opposed each other. But Plato connected discrimination with consciousness where of course it really originated. When consciousness developed out of the general unconsciousness, a split went through the whole world, the whole world was divided. One could say that the primordial experience of the dawn of consciousness, that division of the world-soul, was still preserved in Plato's myth. You see, he says that in the beginning, when the Demiur-gos had made the world-soul, he separated it crosswise. Plato had the idea that there were three staffs, with the world-soul as a sort of axis. He cut the thing in the middle and bent two staffs back into the form of wheels, and then pushed them into each other obliquely, and when you look at those circles in the prolongation of their plane, you see it like this.



world.³
light and
ological

This is the Platonic *chi*, the fourfold division of the
You can see it in the sky in the division of the zodiacal
the Milky Way. This peculiar symbolism is the myth-
remnant of that primordial experience of becoming
conscious; in the moment when consciousness appeared, there was divi-
sion. Of course the creator is always creating a new understanding, a
new level of consciousness; he expands or extends consciousness, con-
quers a new world perhaps or a new continent, adding it to the existing
image of the world; and so he has created new significances and new

³ Here Jung is thinking of Plato's *Timaeus*.

values. Now, Nietzsche is not concerned here with significances; he is only concerned with the feeling values of good and evil. But in order to make it complete you should add to good and evil, new differences, new significances.

Loving ones, was it always, and creating ones, that created good and bad.

The creative is not necessarily loving; loving is simply the feeling form of creation. Loving brings two heterogeneous objects together that meet in creation. Creation is an outburst of energy and without opposites there is no creation. So one can say, loving is creativeness in feeling.

Fire of love gloweth in the names of all the virtues, and fire of wrath.

This is a poetic statement.

Many lands saw Zarathustra, and many peoples: no greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than the creations of the loving ones—"good" and "bad" are they called.

It is peculiar that he insists upon the feeling. But Zarathustra would. And what is the psychological reason for that? Why does he not insist upon the understanding?

Mrs. Crowley: Because feeling is Nietzsche's weak side.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is chiefly intuitive and intellectual, and therefore feeling is contaminated with the inferior function. Probably, as he is more intuitive than intellectual, the real inferior function is sensation but coupled with feeling. Therefore, Zarathustra insists so exclusively upon the feeling and far less on the significance. The typical feeling values are of course "good" and "evil," not "significance."

Verily, a prodigy monster is this power of praising and blaming.

Now, if praise and blame are feeling values or feeling judgments, carried out through the values of good and evil, then in how far is the power of praise and blame a monster?

Dr. Bertine: If it is in the unconscious or in the hands of the anima, it can be quite animal-like, and that is somewhat the case with Nietzsche.

Prof. Jung: Yes, under the condition that the feeling function or the feeling judgment is inferior, it is in the unconscious or contaminated with the unconscious, and then it takes on the qualities of a monster.

So the term *monster* or *monstrous* is a more or less veiled allusion to a contamination of the collective unconscious. Now what is a monster?

Mrs. Adler: It is not one, but composed of several.

Prof. Jung: Yes. The typical monster is the chimaera which is in front a lion, behind a snake, and in the middle a goat; it is a monster because it is a mixture. In medicine, a monster means a child that is quite abnormal, or a calf with five legs and three heads, for instance. So the unconscious is monstrous because it contains paradoxes which are not yet paradoxes, but if consciousness should step out somewhere and look at the unconscious, it instantly would discover that the thing was a monster. As long as you are inside, you cannot see it.

Miss Wolff: I don't see why one should speak of the unconscious here. These concepts of "good" and "evil" are just collective factors and as Nietzsche is speaking of collectivity, I think he means that just this passing of laws of good and evil is like a monster; I think we don't have to go as far as the anima and the unconscious and all that.

Prof. Jung: We have to because that term *monster* refers to his conception of good and evil, and they are not necessarily monstrous, but in their mythological understanding they are monstrous. For instance, in the Book of Job God is accompanied by two monsters, the leviathan and the behemoth, and those are the pair of opposites. The behemoth is the warm-blooded, land animal, and the leviathan is the great sea monster that fills two thirds of the ocean. It would be the *makara* in the *svadhisthana* chakra,⁴ and the same idea is in the Upanishads, where a Brahman is accompanied by two monsters. You see, that separation or discrimination which consciousness causes is on the one side a most insignificant fact, a tiny change of the world's surface; it does not matter whether somebody once said that one thing was good and another evil—that means nothing at all. But on the other side, the origin or the existence of consciousness has a tremendous metaphysical meaning; looked at from the standpoint of mythology or philosophy or religion, the creation of man—or the creation of consciousness—has meant a most revolutionary fact in the cosmos. It means the dawn of the world, because the world does not exist unless somebody knows that it exists. Of course one can say it makes no difference whatever to the universe that man knows that there is such a thing as a universe—it is exceedingly probable that nobody in the universe is very much bothered by

⁴ The *makara* is a legendary creature, a kind of fish-aligator-dolphin which is represented in the Kundalini system as part of the *svadhisthana chakra*, the water lotus, located at the point of the solar plexus.

that fact. But to us, to the world inside, it is all-important that we know that we are, that the world is. So we could say just as well that it doesn't matter what the world is in itself, but only matters what the world *is* which we perceive. Sure enough, we have no conception of any other world than the one in which we are living; we have no contact with any world which is not conscious to us, and cannot even be sure that there is a universe of which we know nothing. It is perfectly futile to talk of it. But we can safely say that this world is for us *the* world, and in our world it makes a lot of difference whether we know that we exist or whether we don't know. Our philosophy, our science, our religion, is concerned with the qualities of our world and our interaction with it; we never shall get away from that, and we cannot go beyond.

Therefore, this little invention of man, to call one thing good and another evil, is at the same time monstrous. It is an enormous thing, a split which goes right through the world, in that the whole world is separated into good and evil. The idea of this split between the heavenly forces and the dark forces of the underworld goes back into the womb of time. And it is really monstrous because they are powers of the collective unconscious which are always monstrous. Nietzsche rightly calls this power of praise and blame a monster, a prodigy; the praise and blame of man has divided the universe, and therefore it has a monstrous power. You read in the Upanishads that the world came into existence through prayer: somebody prayed and there was the world; you see, they knew that the world came into existence inasmuch as somebody was conscious of its existence. And good and evil appear as soon as somebody calls things "good" and "evil." Tremendous power has been called into existence by pronouncing those words—that is, by the separation of that pair of opposites which had always lived peacefully together in a primordial condition. The old Greek philosophers thought the original chaos was in a peaceful oscillating movement like the sea, a state of breathing gently and nothing happening, until somebody caused a crystallization or a division, and then the pairs of opposites were set against each other; the moment that split in the world was created, pairs of opposites began to fight.⁵ And they are always represented in dreams as well as in mythology by enormous animals or mon-

⁵ In a passage which Jung might have happily cited, Nietzsche wrote "That it is precisely through the principle of opposites and the feelings they occasion that the great man, the bow with great tension, develops" (*WP*, p. 967). They agreed, too, on the great Greek apostle of oppositeness: "I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus" (*Twilight*, "Reason in Philosophy," no. 2).

sters or devils—the devil is also a monster, having a human figure and hooves and horns and a tail.

Even our modern unconscious still represents the pairs of opposites by monsters. I remember a dream of a patient which was particularly impressive. She dreamt she was waking up from an unconscious condition; she could hardly open her eyes, her lids felt like lead. But slowly, with the greatest effort, she opened them a little and she saw that she was standing under something like two columns, with a sort of roof over her. Then as she became more conscious, she found to her terror that she was standing between the legs of an enormous elephant that towered above her, and opposite was another elephant equally big. They were going to fight and she was in between. Those are the two monsters of good and evil. And what has caused the conflict between those two animals? They have been there since eternity, but now man has come in between them—consciousness has come—and the moment my patient saw those two creatures, they had instantly to fight. She jumped from between the two legs and awakened terrified.

Mrs. Schevill: The Sphinx was a monster, with the body of a bull, the wings of an eagle, the claws of a lion, and the head of a man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there were many such beasts, the Babylonian animals, for instance.

Mrs. Baynes: Do you mean that when you seem to see these pairs of opposites in the cosmos, it is a projection solely?

Prof. Jung: It is not a projection; they *are*, but they are not operative inasmuch as you don't know it. It is like the old Egyptian ideas about Ptah, the creative word; what he speaks, *is*. Of course our rational standpoint would say it always had been. Yes, but it did not exist for us because *we* did not exist.

Tell me, ye brethren, who will master it for me? Who will put a fetter upon the thousand necks of this animal?

Meaning, how can we get beyond this terrible split which goes through the whole world?

A thousand goals have there been hitherto, for a thousand peoples have there been. Only the fetter for the thousand necks is still lacking; there is lacking the one goal. As yet humanity hath not a goal.

This is important. You see, the feeling judgment causes values to be, and the ultimate values are good and evil, that pair of opposites which splits the world; so the feeling judgment also causes the existence of a

conflict. Then the question is naturally, how can you get beyond that conflict? How can you unite the pairs of opposites? And the *sous entendu* here is that you can unite them through a goal. If you have an ultimate goal, then on the way to it, a third thing is created between the pairs of opposites which eventually will unite them. Now the goal here is understood to be not one goal but many, thousands of goals, referring to the different ideals of different peoples, chiefly religious or philosophical ideas. One would expect that that cosmic or metaphysical conflict between good and evil would be just one, and that there would be only one answer to it, or only one goal. We cannot imagine that there could be more than one answer to this one conflict; for if many answers are possible, then that conflict of good and evil is not one but many, having many aspects which can be answered by many aspects: so no goal, or no symbol, ever will settle it. It is like a disease with many qualities which are inaccessible to treatment, and then there are a thousand remedies; when you find in your textbook that there are a hundred remedies for a certain disease, you know it is practically incurable; if it is a simple thing, you have a simple answer.

So Nietzsche starts here with the notion that it is surely not a simple thing, it must have many aspects, and therefore a thousand answers have been given to it hitherto, all unsatisfactory. And realizing that the problem of good and evil is one problem, that it is *the* problem, there should be one answer, one goal, which would be the yoke upon the thousand necks. But this one goal is lacking, and inasmuch as this one goal, this one uniting or reconciling symbol is lacking, mankind has no goal. You see, he realizes clearly here that it is one question and there is one answer to it, but mankind has not found it.

But pray tell me, my brethren, if the goal of humanity be still lacking, is there not also still lacking—humanity itself?—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

Well, inasmuch as the goal is the answer to the one great conflict, and this answer is not given, or is not possible, mankind has failed to assert its own active existence in between the two elephants. Inasmuch as my dreamer cannot get out or assert her existence between those trampling feet, she surely will be completely squashed. She should assert her existence in between those two animals, and by that she would give the answer to the conflict, she would be the reconciling symbol. She might hold those two fighting elephants apart, or she might rise above that terrible conflict and assert her humanity above the animal fight. Inasmuch as she is able to give that answer, she does exist, but inas-

much as she is unable to give it, she does not exist. Therefore, Nietzsche questions if there is such a thing as humanity, because it hasn't found an answer to that great conflict.

Well now, we come to the next chapter, "Neighbour-Love," and we have again to try to establish the connection. The former chapter winds up with the question of the one goal. The one answer to the one problem is still lacking, and now he comes to the problem of love for one's neighbor. What is the connection?

Mrs. Whitney: For one thing, we have tried to dodge this problem of the pairs of opposites through the Christian formula.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. We tried to escape this terrible problem by the famous Christian attitude, "Love thy neighbor . . .," and we stop there because the next thing, "as thyself," does not exist. So Christian love has become a subterfuge and the easiest means of getting away from oneself. One sees this at work in our day; it is exceedingly popular, one doesn't need to mention names. The conflict between good and evil is naturally a conflict in yourself; it is as if the great monsters of the world were within you, or as if you yourself were the two-headed monster. What we are afraid of and don't want to see is that there is nothing good in us which is not checked by a corresponding evil, and that our whole life is checked by these two powers. There is no way of asserting that we are only good or that our purposes are nothing but good; we have to acknowledge that there is a shadow which is just as big as the other thing. Knowing that, one naturally cannot cherish illusions any longer as to one's wonderful character. One hears everywhere, "I always wanted to do my best," but it means, "I surely did not do my best." It is a declaration of defeat. When one talks to people about it, they simply turn their faces away and look for the neighbor. It is as if someone made a social *gaffe*, saying something he should not have said, and then somebody else says, "*À propos*, isn't it a fine day?" It is a sort of attempt at changing the subject. Or as in revival meetings, when somebody makes a true but awkward remark, then somebody else opens the windows to let out the evil spirit of truth.

This is really the problem of our actual Christianity, which has forgotten that man is a very rotten proposition. It is a fact today that we have settled down to the idea that man is a fairly decent proposition. But that is not true. The early Christians were in a much better position because they knew that they were rotten; they could see it every day, had cases right under their noses. You remember, for instance, that wonderful example in the *Confessions* of St. Augustine. His friend Alypius had become a good Christian, and when he went to the circus

where the fights of the gladiators were going on, he shut his eyes so as not to be wounded by those infernal scenes. Yet when a man fell and there rose a mighty cry among the thousands of spectators, he could not help looking at it, and instantly he was in it again, shouting and behaving like a wild animal. He lost all his grace.⁶ That was a daily spectacle, so surely the first Christians had no reason whatever to have illusions about themselves. But later on, the conditions became more settled and peaceful and then we could allow ourselves to raise a whole vegetable garden full of illusions about the goodness of man and eternal peace and such bunk. At the slightest provocation, there rose a new group of illusions. As soon as the war was over, everybody said, "Now we are going to have eternal peace, now people will become reasonable." And now look at the damned thing!

That is man, and that is our Christianity. We say we are going out to love our neighbors. But when somebody says to me, "I love you," I say, "*Who* loves me? Who is that somebody who is loving me?" For instance, when a brigand comes along, I know that he loves my pocketbook. It is exactly like the Shilluks when they have killed a hippopotamus. They cut out its intestines and a man creeps into its belly and prays to the spinal cord where its soul is supposed to be: "My dear hippopotamus, don't think we hate you because your flesh is good to us; don't tell the other hippopotami that we have killed you for hatred; we killed you for love because we love your meat. If you tell the others that we hate you, they will go away and we shall have no more meat."⁷ You see, the good Christians entirely forget that the question is: *Who* is doing it, who is taking the responsibility, who is loving? For instance, if a man says to another man whose business doesn't thrive, "*I* will do it, *I* will take the responsibility for your business," the other one says, "You are wonderful, but by the way, who are you?" Then he is informed that this man who is so anxious to take that responsibility has been five years in prison for fraud and twice bankrupt. We hear all over the world: "*We* are taking the responsibility." That is the one shout in Germany. But *who* is taking the responsibility? That is what I want to know.

So the Christians say "We love" or "I love," but who is the one that loves? If it is a hen it is not particularly bad; she will only eat your salads in the garden and won't do great harm. But if it is a tiger, it is something else: then things are getting a bit stiff. You see, the mere fact that

⁶ See book 6, no. 8.

⁷ The Shilluks are a people of the Sudan with whom Lévy-Bruhl was especially concerned. They attach great importance to the power of the evil eye. See *Primitives and the Supernatural*, tr. Lilian A. Clare (New York, 1923), pp. 167, 389.

they are baptized and have confessed their sins means nothing, but simply: "I declare I am a tiger, but that does not mean that I am not going to eat meat any more. I have devoured your goat and I am exceedingly sorry for that, and next week I am going to take another." Because he is a tiger he is *supposed* to devour goats and sheep and so on. The mere confession does not mean that the thing is not going to happen again—it is even necessary; otherwise, how can you confess again? In the Catholic church they make a small affair of a sin; you confess your sin and it is understood that you repent, and then you do it again.

Mrs. Volkhardt: But in the Oxford Movement you must promise not to do it again.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but you know they will. That is an old story; that was already the story in the time of Tertullian who thought that when one was baptized, one would never commit the sin again. But then there were cases where one did. There is a very nice case of a man who was converted from alcoholism by the Oxford Movement, which was a great merit. Then he played an important role; he was one of the center-forwards of the team and he did his confessing in a marvelous way—really a model. So the Movement got interested in him and sent him to Germany to conquer Leipzig. But there he obviously got sick of confessing and turned back to drink, which was to be expected; after a while he would get thirsty. The whole chase was after him and tried to help him, but man is man and remains man. So promising helps very little.

Mrs. Lohmann: I have read that the tiger does not attack man. Naturally he must have his food, but he does not attack unless he is attacked or when the female tiger with her young are killed.

Prof. Jung: Yes, under natural conditions everybody is perfectly aware of the fact that everybody needs his food, and if the natural conditions are not disturbed, it is not so dangerous. But there are people who always want to improve natural conditions, and then they make them worse. Well, that is just so; man is a funny kind of animal. He always tries to have wings which he has not.

Ye crowd around your neighbour, and have fine words for it.

But I say unto you: your neighbour-love is your bad love of yourselves.

Nietzsche has here a very deep insight, he says what you really love in your neighbor is yourself; and he could add that you blame him for what you blame in yourself, but you don't know it.

Ye flee unto your neighbour from yourselves, and would fain make a virtue thereof: . . .

They do make a virtue thereof!

but I fathom your "unselfishness."

The *Thou* is older than the *I*; the *Thou* hath been consecrated, but not yet the *I*: so man presseth nigh unto his neighbour.

Here he brings in the thoughts which we discussed before: namely, that the projection of oneself is older than the self; before man became conscious of himself, he discovered the self outside of himself, and that is still true.

Do I advise you to neighbour-love? Rather do I advise you to neighbour-flight and to furthest love!

Higher than love to your neighbour is love to the furthest and future ones; higher still than love to men, is love to things and phantoms.

He discusses here the means to be applied against this sickly love for the neighbor; he is rather for fleeing from the neighbor and loving that which is furthest. Of course it is interesting to see what he means by that which is furthest. It is not human beings; it is the remote, the future, or "things and phantoms." To what does he refer? This time we must talk a bit above Nietzsche.

Mrs. Crowley: Could he, unconscious in psychological terms, be referring to the self?

Prof. Jung: Well, to the unconscious. To things not in human consciousness, and phantoms, specters, and remote things. Future things are potential only; those are not phantoms. They are more symbols or allusions to things.

The phantom that runneth on before thee, my brother, is fairer than thou; why dost thou not give unto it thy flesh and bones? But thou fearest, and runnest into thy neighbour.

You see, he clearly has a vision, not of a shadow, but rather, a light, a more beautiful man ahead of himself, a more ideal figure to whom one should give one's flesh and bones. That is, of course, the idea of the Superman, the man that is beyond man. Yet one could not call it a phantom. That is a curious expression.

Ye cannot endure it with yourselves, and do not love yourselves sufficiently: so ye seek to mislead your neighbour into love, and would fain gild yourselves with his error.

This is a paraphrase of the idea he has already expressed but a bit amplified: namely, you don't love yourselves because you cannot *stand* yourselves, you flee from yourselves. For to love yourself is difficult; it is in a way *too* natural. You know, in the Bible where it is said, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," it is quite self-evident that you love yourself, but it is not evident that you should love your neighbor, because to a more primitive man love of the neighbor is a perfectly unknown conception; such a sentimentality is unconscious to him. He is generous, he shares his goods with the poor, he is perhaps far more generous than we are, but he is not sentimental about it. He gives without meaning to give. He does not give out of sentiment, but gives because a man who is hungry comes to him and, naturally, that hungry man must eat. He is that other fellow too; he says, "I eat when I am hungry, here is food." He does not give hospitality out of sentimentality, and he does not expect gratitude as we do, and the man who receives the good never thinks of being grateful for it because he also is not sentimental, since being hungry is caused by nature. That is the primitive point of view. For instance, if your apple tree has given you a rich harvest of apples, you don't go to the apple tree and say thank you; you simply take it for granted that it has produced so much fruit. As an apple tree does not give from sentimentality, from its good heart or Christian love, you also are not grateful.

But on a higher level you begin to realize that these things are not self-evident, because through the advance of consciousness they have lost their self-evident nature. You know, the primitive simply cannot resist his generous impulse; he has to give and therefore he has no sentiment connected with it. On a higher level of collective consciousness, one thinks, "Why the devil should I give my food to that beggar?" Then perhaps one overcomes one's selfishness and gives it, and then one tells the beggar that he must be grateful that one has overcome one's selfishness and egotism and been so nice to him. And from that time on, the beggars must be grateful because they have received through kindness of heart and so on. But in the beginning of human consciousness, the love for oneself was perfectly evident because the primitive is naturally interested in himself. And as he gives he also takes, so why not steal something? Outside the tribe it is a virtue to steal. But if he cheats *within* the tribe he sins against the laws of the herd, and as he *is* the herd, nobody would be such a fool as to injure himself; therefore he will not lie or cheat or steal within his tribe, his clan. It is a virtue outside however; he is then clever. He asserts himself, he lives—and that is his duty. So to love oneself is a self-evident fact as long as one is not conscious.

Where one realizes that it makes little difference whether it is your tribe or the next, whether it is your family or another, your clan or the state or humanity, there the Christian point of view has widened out the river of consciousness considerably. It has lifted consciousness to a level where to cheat, to steal, and to lie are sins, even if you apply them to a stranger, because he is a man like yourself. So love of oneself is no longer self-evident; it became obsolete in a way because it was always connected with doing some injury to somebody else. When you love yourself, you have to steal, you have to take for yourself. As Professor Brunner said in his recent article in *The Zürcher Zeitung*, even the word *private* comes from the word *privare*, “to rob”; whatever you have in the way of private goods is all taken away from collectivity: you have really stolen.⁸ So we should collapse from pricks of conscience because we have taken away from the community. But we have to take away from the community; otherwise we lose our individual existence. If there are no private goods we no longer exist. Of course, Professor Brunner means more the ideal goods, your secrets and so on—you should not keep your secrets to yourself, but let other people enjoy them too. So the original meaning of that self-evident fact that you love yourself has become obsolete, and it had to be overcompensated by the idea, “Love thy neighbor.” The fact that you love yourself should be hidden, not mentioned. It should look as if you did not love yourself; otherwise, the community feels threatened in its existence. All the more, when you do love yourself you have stolen, because you have allowed yourself to have something of your own, to have your own ideas about things instead of the ideas of everybody else; and that, from the standpoint of the herd, is exactly the thing which should not be. But in that way we created this fabulous unconsciousness about our shadow. The idea is that you should not know about your shadow because it is upsetting, and then how can you share the community life? You are at a frightful disadvantage naturally because you are practically the only one who is conscious of it. So you will find that you are not able to live like that; you are hesitant, not quite happy—only those people can be quite happy who forget who they are. And your blessing, your love to other people is a doubtful gift; you don’t know what you bring to them with your love, even with your best intentions. For where do you hear the most, “I always tried to do my best?” Exactly with those people who

⁸ Professor August Brunner, Swiss theologian and philosopher, author of *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*, tr. S. A. Raemerz (St. Louis, 1937).

have created the greatest disturbances or catastrophes through their good intentions for others.

Would that ye could not endure it with any kind of near ones, or their neighbours; then would ye have to create your friend and his overflowing heart out of yourselves.

That is really a sentence upon which our modern religious people have not sufficiently meditated. Instead of those perfectly insipid discussions about natural theology and such things, Protestantism would do much better to discuss this chapter of *Zarathustra*. That would be mighty useful.

LECTURE VI

20 November 1935

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Mr. Allemann, "Last seminar you said that the outer world only exists owing to the fact of our being conscious of it." I must interrupt the question here because this is a statement which is often misunderstood. This is a subjective statement, a statement like, "It is light and therefore you see certain objects; then it becomes dark and you no longer see them." And then you say those objects don't exist any longer, or it is *as if* they did not exist. You assume that they still exist naturally, but it is just as if they did not, and if you had not seen them in the daylight you would assume that they were not there. Now in that sense, when your consciousness ceases to exist, your world comes to an end. Naturally we know by experience that the world does not come to an end when one individual comes to an end. But if consciousness comes to an end, then the world comes to an end—that is quite certain. For a world of whose conditions nothing is known is not in conscious existence; if nobody knows of it there is no world. Of course we always like to think of existence as going on even if nobody knows of it, but as a matter of fact it is a phenomenon of consciousness too.

Now Mr. Allemann goes on: "Could we not with the same right say that as our consciousness advances into the realm of collective unconsciousness, other worlds might become as real and as 'outside' as the outer world? I think of the different concepts or degrees of consciousness in Indian philosophy which Professor Hauer mentions in the Jubilee Book, 'Prana—Maya—Purusha' and so forth.¹ If we consider these states of consciousness as worlds different from ours, but as real and even more real to the persons who have access there, we may come

¹ Jubilee Book: the Festschrift for Jung's sixtieth birthday, *Die Kulturelle Bedeutung der Complexen psychologie* (Berlin, 1935). Professor J. W. Hauer contributed an article, "The Indo-Aryan Teaching on the Self in Comparison with Kant's Teaching on the Intelligible Subject."

to a better understanding of the German terms *entrückt* or even *verrückt* if the bridge between the consciousness of this outside world and the other breaks, while the consciousness of the person in question is in the other world.² Could not also Nietzsche's illness have been due to an adventure of this kind?"

Well, it is perfectly certain that if the ego consciousness should be capable of an advance into a sphere hitherto unconscious, it might discover a sort of reality system outside of this reality system. As a matter of fact, the reality of the unconscious, for instance, does not coincide with the reality of this world: it is a different kind of system. So we might assume that other systems could become conscious; this is an idea which has often been discussed. You find it in that book by J. W. Dunne, *The Serial of the Universe*, for instance.³ And it is an old problem in the Buddhist cosmogony where it is assumed that there are millions of world systems; the one cosmos which we know is not supposed to be even the so-called Chiliokosmos (the Buddhist translation of the Greek concept of the thousand worlds); our cosmos is just one, and it takes a thousand others to make a Chiliokosmos, and then there are again hundreds of thousands of Chiliokosmoses. They supposed that the absolute world, the world of the infinite existence, consisted of an infinite number of possible world systems. This concept is quite universal, one could say; the philosophers of all great civilizations have realized this idea, and it is discussed again in our days from the standpoint of natural science. Even a literary man like H. G. Wells considers such possibilities in his fantastical stories. You may remember his story of a man who was driving his car and suddenly felt a jerk so he got out to see if there was something wrong with it, and then it turned out that nothing had happened to the car, but by a peculiar chance they had driven into another dimension; there was a split through the world in that place and they had gone into another world system where everything was quite different, far more advanced. Then Wells naturally makes use of that opportunity to develop one of his Utopian schemes.⁴

It is of course quite nice to speak of such possibilities, but the question is always: Is it of any empirical value? Can we establish the reality

² *Entrückt*: entranced; *Verrückt*: mad.

³ This work of Dunne's appeared in London in 1934. He is better known for *An Experiment With Time* (London, 1929).

⁴ H. G. Wells (1866-1946), in his well-known story "The Time Machine" (1929), tells of an inventor traveling forward to the year A.D. 802,701. In *Men Like Gods* (New York, 1923) a Mr. Barnstable inadvertently drives his car into another dimension, thus finding a time-warped Utopia.

of different systems beyond those we know already? Even the primitive has a definite notion in that respect; his idea of the ghostland, or the islands of the blest, or of the dead, are concepts of a different kind of reality. And they naturally understand, when a man is *entrückt*, in a state of transport or trance, that he is then in a different system. Therefore one finds stories practically everywhere of the *katabasis*, the going down into the underworld, or the wandering through the heavens, through the land of the hereafter, and so on. Those are states of *Entrückung*; people are removed to another country, to another world—it may be under the sea, or in the air, or on the moon—anywhere but here. Now, it is well known that any such attempt to produce a condition in which one realizes a different reality than the ordinary one, is always beset with dangers. Therefore, the process of becoming a medicine man is a dangerous enterprise. He is supposed to experience a different world system than ours; he meets with ghosts, demons, and so on. In reality, those people are often driven more or less mad; a hole is cut in the threshold of consciousness through which the unconscious flows. They are always more exposed to other states of consciousness than ours, whatever they are. We would say the man was mad, that it was a case of schizophrenia, or autosuggestion; we have a hundred words by which to rationalize his condition, but the fact remains that the fellow, if he is a true medicine man, is exposed to experiences of an overwhelming nature which are just as real as any experience in the world system we know.

So, since there are such dangers, it naturally often happens that people are injured when they are on the way to such an experience. They may become crazy or physically ill, or die by a so-called accident; all sorts of peculiar things may happen to them on the road to that adventure. That is what the Knights of the Round Table, and the old Germans in the middle-high German poems, called the *aventure*, a fabulous experience; they were going to fight dragons and liberate virgins guarded by dragons and sorcerers. But those are only projections of certain inner realities; it was really the mystical experience which found its expression in many different forms. The quest may be described by the novelist in a more or less fascinating yarn, or it may be expressed by a very serious poet. Rider Haggard's *She* is a very good example. You can say it is an excellent yarn, of an amazing or fascinating nature, but when you read his poem in the first edition of *She*, you realize that it was an exceedingly serious experience in his own life, by no means a matter he could trifle with. That explains why the enormous number of books which he wrote afterwards all deal with more

or less the same problem; there is hardly one which does not contain an allusion to the great experience. He could never have developed such extraordinary energy in that respect—that motive could not have had such an exaggerated power—if it had not had a tremendous reality for him; if it had only been an ordinary motive or an ordinary fantasy, it would have worn out in no time, and would have made perhaps one book and not a particularly fascinating one. It was just as real as a steam-engine or a viaduct; they also were once fantasies in the head of an engineer and then the motive power was so strong that they became real. The motive power was so strong in Rider Haggard's psychology that he wrote about sixty volumes.

And this kind of experience, this adventure, can be described in terms of approaching or entering into another system. It is described like that in the religious mysteries; it is Hades, the underworld, for instance, or a ghostland, a marvelous city, a marvelous island or something of the sort. It is understood almost as if it were a geographically situated country. It is also understood to be a peculiar state of consciousness, which is of course the equivalent of a country, a country being merely projected consciousness; so one can say this country does not count, but the state of consciousness which perceives such things counts. At all events it is a sort of psychical reality, and the adventure is just as serious as the discovery of a new continent—it is also represented as that—or the discovery of a particular region, as in *She*. It is the mystery adventure and this is positively dangerous. You know, it has been said that Nietzsche's illness was not an ordinary illness; he was simply removed, and only the husk remained which seemed to be disintegrated or crazy. It was thought that he himself in his lifetime was removed to another system of existence, and the fact that his illness was not the ordinary general paralysis of the insane was used as a sort of evidence for this hypothesis. That is true, it was not an ordinary form, but there are cases where even this typical illness takes on particular and abnormal forms, where it is not typical, so that is of course no evidence at all.

Now, we learn from *Zarathustra* that Nietzsche's great preoccupation was that quest, and he found something, no doubt. It is also fair to date his fatal illness from about the time of *Zarathustra*, for we know by experience that the quest can injure the health of the brain as well as the body; because it is a supreme and decisive event in the course of a human life, it can, like any decisive moment, overthrow the system. So we can make the hypothesis that Nietzsche's illness, understood under that particular aspect, was an adventure which miscarried, an adven-

ture in which he was injured. And we might assume that his soul was nevertheless able to cross the dark waters and to arrive in the other country, yet was no longer in a position to send back messages. I have told you about that single instance when something happened to come through. He once said suddenly to his sister, "Are we not perfectly happy now?" Then the next moment the clouds descended again. You see, this incident could be taken in that way. You could also make this hypothesis about insane people in general. Some of you heard the discussion about *The Flying Draper* by Ronald Fraser.⁵ He was the man on the quest and he discovered another world system; in the end he was just the husk, yet it is perfectly clear in the book that he had reached another form of existence. You see, the disappearance of a man may mean his survival in a new condition, and what he leaves behind are just the remains of his former existence. There is the same idea in a new book by Talbot Mundy called *There Was a Door*. You remember his famous book *Om* was most remarkable, very interesting, and the new book expresses the idea or the impression one has when on the quest, that there is no door, no escape. Yet there was an escape. He found it and he disappeared; in that book the man on the quest simply dissolved.⁶

So we are philosophically quite free to assume that even the man Nietzsche reached another form of existence. Yet he disappeared, so there is nothing to be said about it. If you say he was just a poor lunatic, that his brain was rotting away and decayed, you are right, that is perfectly true. And the other thing might also be true, but we have no evidence for it. I am sure that among those sages who have spent their whole lifetime in Yoga practices, there were a number who to our idea would be crazy, yet other people assume with equal right that they are not crazy at all, that it is only an appearance and they are perfectly sane inside. One really has very peculiar experiences with lunatics in that respect. For instance, people who seem to be perfectly crazy become reasonable when they have a fever. Others, with apparently a complete dissociation, have among their voices the voice of the normal mind; that would show that the normal mind had simply disappeared. It was not really gone, but was somewhere among other realities which we cannot account for since we do not know what psychical existence is.

⁵ Sir Ronald Fraser, *The Flying Draper* (London, 1931). Sir Ronald was a prolific novelist and essayist.

⁶ Talbot Mundy wrote novels on Theosophical themes, e.g., *There Was a Door* (London, 1931) and *Om: The Secret of Ahbor Valley* (Indianapolis, 1924).

Then we must also take into account that the psychical existence or the psychical being is very peculiar; it is not a simple thing. You see, matter is also not simple; we assume that it is at least tangible and think it is simple because we can touch it. We cannot touch mind but we assume that it does exist, yet it has exceedingly strange non-spatial qualities: it sees round corners, it knows things ahead. How can you explain these things? We must assume that it is something at variance with our world system as well as with our notion of space and time, and therefore there is a possibility of other systems. Modern physicists are playing with this idea; it is not unheard of: namely, a relativity of space which can change under certain conditions. For instance, we assume that we are here together in the same space, but we may not be at all; under a certain aspect I am here, but under another aspect I am perhaps in the same space with somebody in India or China.

Mr. Allemann: It looks as if in India these things were much better known and consciously realized; as Professor Hauer says, there are five different kinds of worlds, five different kinds of Purushas.

Prof. Jung: In Buddhism one gets the vertigo!

Mrs. Fierz: There is a new novel by Mrs. David-Neal called *Mipam* which is written by her and Lama Yongden. The hero is a so-called *tulku*, an incarnation, though he does not know it, and he learns all his wisdom from a monk in a monastery whom all the other monks think completely mad. But when he talks to him, he always learns the essential thing. It is just as you say, he is just a husk.⁷

Prof. Jung: Such peculiar things do happen. Not long ago someone told me the most amazing story about a man, apparently a drunken lunatic, who talked to him from another dimension, and everything he described came off. So keep an open mind for these things. But as long as we have no actual experience of other systems and if one is not called to the quest, don't make futile experiments, it doesn't pay.

Mrs. Sigg: It is quite a nice example of Nietzsche that when he was supposed to be entirely mad, he wrote advising the rulers of Bavaria and Baden to retire into private life.

Prof. Jung: It is quite possible that he saw things ahead. In the beginning of the war I was always dreaming of having interviews with Kaiser

⁷ Alexandra David-Neal (1868-1969) a Frenchwoman who wrote extensively on Tibetan Buddhism. *Mipam: The Lama of the Five Wisdoms*, written in collaboration with Lama Yongden, her adopted son, was probably known to Jung in its German version (Leipzig, 1928), but was translated into English by Percy Lloyd and Bernard Miel (London, 1938). She traveled to Tibet disguised as a man after meeting the Dalai Lama.

Wilhelm, and I always tried to convince him that he should retire with all his royalties, but he never would listen. We knew each other quite well; when I appeared, he used to wave to me, and I said, "Yes, I am here again and I have to tell you that you should retire!"

Mrs. Whitney: Then it stopped after a while?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it was useless, you see. I did not succeed at all. It stopped in the end of 1916.

Mrs. Sigg: Goethe had a very strange experience; his only son, who died in Italy, was buried near the pyramid of Cestius where more than thirty years before, Goethe had written, "I made a design for my burial place near the pyramid of Cestius."

Prof. Jung: He might have given a hint that his son should be buried there.

Mrs. Sigg: But he was not yet married.

Prof. Jung: That does not matter; he had chosen it for his own burial place, not for his son's, but when his son died it was a nice opportunity—happily enough it is my son and not myself! Now we must continue. This chapter about love for one's neighbor is rather preparatory, but there are so many important hints in it that I don't want to go on without discussing them a little more.

Ye cannot endure it with yourselves, and do not love yourselves sufficiently: so ye seek to mislead your neighbour into love, and would fain gild yourselves with his error.

Here he tries to explain an important motive for the love of one's neighbor. Of course the love for one's neighbor is one of the greatest ideals of Christianity, but it became obvious to Nietzsche and to many other people in the later part of the nineteenth century and even before, that these virtues were by no means what they seemed to be. That famous love for the neighbor was very often an excuse for people who wanted to cover up their own tracks; they talked of the love for the neighbor because they wanted to escape themselves, to dodge their own problems. When their own garden was full of weeds so big that they were hanging over the fence into the neighbor's garden, they wanted to be helpful and tell *him* what to do about it in order to earn the merit of being exceedingly altruistic; they were lazy at home so they tried to improve other people's gardens, to be the schoolmasters of the world. He puts his criticism very drastically, "ye cannot endure . . . yourselves"—that those people cannot stand themselves is the real motive of their interest in their neighbors. As a man once told me, he would become

quite melancholic if he were to be one hour a day by himself; he loved the world and his neighbor from seven in the morning to eleven at night, and he would not believe me when I said he ought to spend at least one hour a day alone. He was such a sad creature that he couldn't stand the sight or the smell *of* himself. You can imagine what such love of the neighbor is worth. It smells evil; such a man only loves the neighbor because he is utterly unable to love anyone in himself. As soon as somebody tells me that he loves me but hates himself, I know all about him; such a love is never convincing. It is all bunk. He only loves me in order to sit on my back and be carried away from himself, nothing but egotism. The interesting fact is that we preach it; we think the great and ideal thing is to love the neighbor and forget about oneself. But the question which Nietzsche raises is "*Who* is loving?" I want to know first if you can stand yourself. If you can stand yourself, then you might be capable of loving somebody else; otherwise, it is a mere excuse, just a lie. And that cannot be repeated often enough.

Would that ye could not endure it with any kind of near ones,
or their neighbours; then would ye have to create your friend and
his overflowing heart out of yourselves.

You see, this late Christian ideal of the love for the neighbor naturally leads into a sort of sentimentality: doing the right and good thing to other people, creating a sort of community where everybody takes care of everybody, and nobody takes care of himself. Nietzsche is against that and he proposes that it would be much better if you would create your friend out of yourself. This has of course a double meaning. He says later in this chapter that the friend must be chosen from far away, from those that are the most remote. Now of course, there is little chance of finding the nearest among the furthest, so, as I say, it is ambiguous; it might mean something like the self, or the self projected into a friend, but the friend must be as far away as one is from the self. So it doesn't matter whether it is a friend that is created out of the self, or whether it is the self. You will see in the next chapter that this friend *is* the self, and that he is man's friend inasmuch as this man is alone; inasmuch as this man projects the self into *many* friends, the self is never a friend, but is the archenemy. Therefore, those people who love the neighbor and hate themselves, hate themselves on account of the self, for the self then appears to them as the archenemy, a devil with horns and claws and a tail. The self is the very devil to such late Christians.

We can forgive the early Christian when he speaks of the love for the neighbor, because he was quite aware that he did not hate himself. He was taught that he loved himself and he knew it very well. He was aware of his primitive egotism and therefore he was aware of the fact that it was a merit to love the neighbor; he made a merit of it in order to compensate his absolutely naive selfishness, the naive love for himself. Then later on, it was discovered what a cunning loophole that love for the neighbor could be; when things are getting hot for yourself, disagreeable, then you simply love the neighbor and forget all about yourself. So when Nietzsche speaks here of the creation of a friend out of yourself, you can take it that he means creating the self, and for that it is necessary that you are able to endure yourself, that you return to yourself, that you dare to become melancholic in standing yourself, and that you don't use your neighbor for your lust. For it is just lust: you don't want to become melancholic and so you satisfy your lust on other people, doing marvelous things to satisfy yourself at the expense of others.

Ye call in a witness when ye want to speak well of yourselves; and when ye have misled him to think well of you, ye also think well of yourselves.

That means you cannot think well of yourself if you have not a witness, if you have no support, if nobody else tells you that you are right. Or you need a support in order to think somebody else is right or good—somebody must first tell you that that fellow is right. Now is that not miserable? You cannot even give recognition to a dog if you are not supported in your judgment. Well, that is herd psychology.

Not only doth he lie, who speaketh contrary to his knowledge, but more so, he who speaketh contrary to his ignorance. And thus speak ye of yourselves in your intercourse, and belie your neighbour with yourselves.

That is perfectly true. This kind of late Christian love deceives other people, and it deceives yourself; it is a pretext and a means of escape.

Thus saith the fool: "Association with men spoileth the character, especially when one hath none."

The one goeth to his neighbour because he seeketh himself, and the other because he would fain lose himself. Your bad love to yourselves maketh solitude a prison to you.

That is the melancholy condition into which you get when you are with yourself. But if you are so bad that it is a punishment to be with yourself, that would be an excellent reason to improve, to develop a better quality which you could enjoy. One should really be able to enjoy one's own company. But the prophet says one's own company is the worst, and that simply confirms the mob psychology of late Christianity: namely, that the individual is bad and that one should do everything in one's power to escape it in order to put all that evil onto other people—*they* have to carry it then.

The furthest ones are they who pay for your love to the near ones, and when there are but five of you together, a sixth must always die.

I love not your festivals either, too many actors found I there, and even the spectators often behaved like actors.

Perfectly true.

Not the neighbours do I teach you, but the friend. Let the friend be the festival of the earth to you, and a foretaste of the Superman.

The Superman is surely the self, so the friend appears and plays a certain role only inasmuch as he is the carrier of the symbol. Naturally, the friend, inasmuch as he is real, would be a pre-stage of the complete realization of the Self.

I teach you the friend and his overflowing heart.

That would be yourself and your own overflowing heart.

But you must know how to be a sponge, if one would be loved by overflowing hearts.

You see, you cannot be overflowing if you are empty and black inside; then the love you give to other people is mere desirousness. You are a beggar, yet you think you bring presents in bringing your love to other people. In such a condition you don't give from your abundance; you give from your need, and your need sucks them dry. I don't want five francs from a beggar when I am in need, but I can accept them from the rich man because it then comes from abundance. So the feeling one gets from an overflowing heart is a real treasure, but if it comes out of misery, out of penury, one gets nothing: one has to pay, one is simply vamped by Christian love.

I teach you the friend in whom the world standeth complete, a capsule of the good,—the creating friend, who hath always a complete world to bestow.

This friend is highly symbolical, it is obviously the self.

And as the world unrolled itself for him, so rolleth it together again for him in rings, as the growth of good through evil, as the growth of purpose out of chance.

This passage also shows very clearly that this is the self, the personal and the superpersonal Atman that contracts and unfolds.

Let the future and the furthest be the motive of thy today; in thy friend shalt thou love the Superman as thy motive.

My brethren, I advise you not to neighbour-love—I advise you to furthest love!—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

Obviously, he recommends love for the furthest in order to protect oneself against that easy dodging of oneself that one has offered to other people in the immediate vicinity. If those you love are far away, you have the greatest chance of being alone with yourself in the meantime; you have an incomparable opportunity to become acquainted with yourself and then you make discoveries. The quest is the quest of the self—that is the precious thing which is difficult to attain; that is the hero's fight and you are alone, and even have no weapons. Anybody who is with you at that moment would be in between; the final fight is with yourself, and everything else is—or may be—a hindrance. It may also be that "furthest" may be a stepping stone, a means that is to a certain extent indispensable—but the ultimate criterion is whether you can stand yourself all alone or not.

Mrs. Whitney: Could we assume that this man Nietzsche speaks of is the shadow, and that if the ego and the shadow would get together, the self would be born out of that relationship?

Prof. Jung: From a psychological point of view it would be the shadow, because that would be the precondition for the union with the self; without the realization of the shadow there is no such union. But on account of the identity of Nietzsche with the archetype Zarathustra, he is not aware of the shadow; that is, he is aware of it, yet not in a positive, conscious sense. In a later part of *Zarathustra* the shadow incarnates in the ugliest man and he rejects him because of his inflation. Anybody who is inflated by an archetype naturally cannot accept the

shadow because it would deflate him; yet that deflation is absolutely necessary for individuation. In the chapter we have just dealt with, you see that he is inclined to identify that man with the Superman: he is the foretaste of the Superman. As the Superman is most definitely not a shadow, he is dreaming of a Superman who is a friend of the self, yet without a shadow. But if he should try to identify or unite with the self, he would come across the shadow and it would interfere. When the shadow does interfere later, he does not recognize it. There is the tragedy. For his shadow is the reality of his ordinary self, which would not allow such a union through identification. The archetypal union is of course a union through identification; he is simply identical with the archetype, and then the self is not exactly his own self, but is the archetype expressed through Zarathustra, an old teacher of wisdom who lived about two thousand seven hundred years ago.

Mrs. Sigg: Why does Nietzsche later say that *des Übermenschen Schönheit* came to him as shadow?

Prof. Jung: We cannot take that so literally; he might use that word without any such psychological connotation as we attribute to it. I cannot remember that particular passage, but it is perfectly certain that what we call "shadow," the inferior man, appears in the form of the ugliest man. We come now to the next chapter, "The Way of the Creating One." What is the logical connection with the chapter before?

Mrs. Crowley: The distant friend, the one we have been discussing as the self, would be the creator.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you see, those nice late Christians assumed that when you don't do it, you must love somebody else and then *he* will do it.

Mrs. Crowley: But from our point of view it is the self. That is why he is speaking of solitariness.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, and that is the reason he projects it into the friend, hoping that if he loves the friend, he will create for him. But in the subsequent chapter you will see that is another tune. On account of identification with the creative self, he feels himself a creator, and you will see how he experiences the fact of being a creator. You see, it is a great advantage to be able to identify with an archetype. Then you have wings, you are walking on clouds, it is marvelous; yet at times you pay very dearly for such stunts, you have to come down. If you are identical with the creator, if you find yourself to be the creator, you are confronted at times with a terrible fall, with an extraordinary darkness. Nobody is the creator except the self. If you assume the divine prerogative of creation, you will suffer the punishment which is meted

out to the creative god: you will be dismembered. That idea was enacted in the mystery of Dionysos, and it has been taken over into Christianity as the creative principle, the seasonal cycle of life, creation in spring and decay in winter. Dionysos undergoes the fate of the creator. He is caught by the Titans, the chaotic powers of nature, and they dismember and devour him; so a part of Dionysos is everywhere in nature, and only his heart, in the nick of time, was rescued from the cooking pot of the Titans. That was swallowed by Zeus who thus gave rebirth to Dionysos. The fate of the creator is dismemberment in matter, and that is also represented in the Christian sacrifice. Christ's body and his blood are distributed to the whole of mankind. As his mantle was divided among the soldiers under the cross, so he is divided among mankind. That is again Dionysos, and the wine we drink as the blood of Christ is Dionysos.

There was such a very close connection with the mystery of Dionysos that the old father of the church, Justin Martyr,⁸ said that about 900 B.C. the devil became aware that God was planning to do something for the world which was in a pretty bad condition, and, being very clever, he had a pretty shrewd idea of what it was going to be. So the devil went to humanity and told them the story of Dionysos in order that, when Christ should appear, people could say, "Oh, that is an old story, that is the story of Dionysos." And it is quite an interesting historical fact that when the Spanish Conquistadores came to Yucatan, they found among the remains of the Aztec civilization many crosses and signs of bloody sacrifices. They were amazed to find the Christian symbol all over the country yet nothing was known of Christ by the Aztecs. So they put the case to their bishops, who held a synod and came to the conclusion after long researches, that it was a very similar case to that mentioned by Justin: namely, that the devil had foreseen that the Spanish would discover America, so he went there several centuries before and told those people to make crosses all over the country, so that, when the Spanish came, they could say to them, "Oh we know all about your god; he is nothing new to us." That is the way people think when a thing is new.⁹ First, they call it nonsense, and then when several hundred people believe it, they say it is true and they knew it long ago.

⁸ St. Justin Martyr (100?-c. 166), born in Flavia Neapolis, was thrown to the beasts for refusing to renounce his faith.

⁹ One Grijalva, appointed by Velasquez as commander of an expedition to the Yucatan, "was astonished . . . at the sight of large stone crosses, evidently objects of worship." This led to the name "New Spain." William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico*, ed. John Foster Kirk (Philadelphia, 1873; orig. 1843), vol. I, p. 225.

That is always so. Those are the people who have no judgment, who must always have a support. Only when somebody else tells them a thing is true do they know it, not before. Now we will begin this chapter:

Wouldst thou go into isolation, my brother? Wouldst thou seek the way unto thyself? Tarry yet a little and hearken unto me.

In the last chapter it became more and more visible that the friend was simply the carrier of the symbol, and in this chapter it is quite obvious that the one who is on the quest is really confronted with the self and with the self alone—not with the friend. And if he is concerned with that question, he is solitary and he must be solitary. He will seek the way alone because he has to; nobody else is on the way to himself, only he alone. Now Zarathustra is going to give good advice.

“He who seeketh may easily get lost himself. All isolation is wrong”: so say the herd. And long didst thou belong to the herd.

He calls his attention to the fact that in seeking the self he will be doing that which everybody says is wrong; everybody will say he is an egotist. For they are reminded very disagreeably that if such a way should be recognized, if a dozen other people should consider him right to seek himself, it would be true, and then they must go and seek the self too. This would be very unpleasant and therefore it must be smashed or flattened out in the beginning, trampled into the ground, so that nobody will support him; their great fear is that somebody else will say the same thing. You can stamp out one little fire, but if there are several it is much more difficult. Moreover, not only “they” in reality but “they” in himself, his collective conscience, will say, “Are you not quite wrong? It is not altruistic, you don’t love your neighbor, you don’t forget yourself, you are all the time with your ego and nothing but your ego—and therefore you are wrong.” This is the standpoint of the collective conscience, the conscience of the herd.

The voice of the herd will still echo in thee. And when thou sayest, “I have no longer a conscience in common with you,” then it will be a plaint and a pain.

Lo, that pain itself did the same conscience produce; and the last gleam of that conscience still gloweth on thine affliction.

What is the affliction? How would you formulate that?

Mrs. Lohmann: To be alone.

Prof. Jung: Well, yes, and the disagreeable consequences thereof.

The pain that is caused through loneliness is the affliction, that you feel so miserable when you are all alone with yourself is the last flicker of the herd conscience.

But thou wouldst go the way of thine affliction, which is the way unto thyself? Then show me thine authority and thy strength to do so!

The term *affliction* means suffering of course, and you can amplify that conception; you can make any kind of affliction enter this frame—for instance, that there are people who are not at all with themselves on account of their herd conscience. They can do nothing for themselves because, with one leg at least, they believe in the late Christian ideal, and with that one leg they walk away into the neighbor's garden; then naturally they become split because the other leg stays at home—they become dissociated. So this affliction can be just as well a state of neurosis. And when the patient decides to take the way to himself, then the doctors and the friends and the newspapers will say he is all wrong—it is quite sickly, morbid. You hear that everywhere. For instance, when a young person comes to a consultation, perhaps the mother or father comes too, and then I regularly hear, "Don't you think that it is dangerous for people to be concerned with themselves?" They are naturally already concerned with themselves, but everybody thinks this is just the sickness, that it is merely egotism; that one can decently be concerned with oneself is absolutely out of the question. To occupy oneself with oneself means that one is wholly indecent and disreputable, quite morbid even. Nobody has any conception that one can do decent reasonable work on oneself; such an idea has become entirely obsolete with us.

For instance, if somebody should ask me what I had done in the last fortnight and I should say I had done work on myself, he would ask, "What do you do—gymnastics?" If I told him what I had done, he would call it plum crazy, absolute bunk—what is the good of it, one cannot sell it, it doesn't apply anywhere. For the thing to which such work applies does not exist; one is nothing. To say I have done work on Mrs. So-and-So is professional: that is all right. Mrs. So-and-So does exist—you can find her in the public telephone book and so you can do work on her—but if I say I am working on myself, I am anonymous, I don't exist. Anybody else can do work on me; for instance, Frau Stutz can, and everybody would believe that she was doing hard work, but if that same lady should say she had done work on herself, nobody would

understand it. If not gymnastics, then what could it be? Yet in former times, people were so utterly convinced of the reality of such work on oneself, that whole cities of people withdrew into the wilderness in order to do just that; and there are great religions which make it quite a particular point, like the Buddhists, to work on oneself. But with us it has been stamped out on account of the cowardice of the so-called Christian love for the neighbor. That is an organized cowardice.

Mr. Baumann: But those people in the Middle Ages thought they dealt with God and not with themselves.

Prof. Jung: That was naturally the doctrine, but I couldn't even say that during the last fortnight I had done work with God, nor could Frau Stutz say that; nobody, not even a parson, would understand it. What is work with God or for God? They would assume that she had been in a charity association where she sold pocket-handkerchiefs for the negroes. Now on account of this collective attitude and the utter ignorance of what the self might be—the self meaning the reality of the psyche—people have a very strong collective conscience which makes them quite ill if they try to follow their own way, to be with themselves and to work on themselves. That may amount to a real affliction, an ailment, a neurosis. But if the case is already a neurosis, then any doctor who really understands about these matters would be forced to say, “If the patient wants to be cured he must follow the way of his neurosis”—just the thing everybody is speaking against. People say; “If you have a neurosis keep away from it, travel to India or anywhere else where there is no neurosis, leave your neurosis in Europe, bury it there.” But I should say, “Follow the way of your neurosis; it is the best thing you ever produced, your real value.”

And that is very much what Nietzsche means here. But he questions whether one has the right to choose that way or not, and that is of course one of the major problems. It is by no means sure that one has either the power or the right to go to one's self, because this is a very great and difficult enterprise. As, for instance, the Catholic church may be in doubt whether somebody has the power, the right, or the faculty to be a priest, to live like a priest or a nun. And the way to one's self, the way to one's own affliction, is the hardest, the most difficult way. We really can question, “Has one really the power, the energy, the patience to do it? And also, has one the right to do it?” For you might do it from a wrong motive; you might be really selfish—for example, if you are going to yourself in order to indulge in yourself and not to work. You see, most people don't understand it as indulgence but they

make an indulgence of it; they indulge themselves, and then they do not work. You can see that in every detail. It is part of the daily work of the analyst to show people in how far they indulge in their fantasy and in how far they work. Inasmuch as they indulge in their fantasy it leads nowhere. It does not develop. They jump away from it again and again in order to find some new aspect in which they can indulge, and there is no synthesis because there is no work done. It makes a great difference whether you read a book in order to work on it or whether you indulge yourself in it; and there is the same difference with fantasies.

Art thou a new strength and a new authority? A first motion? A self-rolling wheel? Canst thou also compel stars to revolve around thee?

This is a pretty big problem. You see, he expects that the one who is able to go to himself will feel himself a new power and a new right, a thing that never has been before, a primal motion. That would be a thing without history; beginning today, it starts out of nothing. It is a wheel rolling all by itself like the sun. And moreover, he asks whether such a one possesses that power which compels even the stars to circle round him—as if he were a sun. The rolling wheel is very clearly the symbol of the self and the stars rolling about the self would be the Milky Way, the center of the heavens. So Nietzsche would ask here, “Art thou the self? If you are, then you can risk it.” He assumes that one can only risk that way if one is the wheel—only one who is the self could risk that way of being alone. What do you think about this? Is this right?

Mrs. Baumann: No, it shows identification.

Prof. Jung: Nobody in his sound senses could say he had that power, that he was a self-rolling wheel, as nobody could say he possessed the power to make the stars circle round himself. That is impossible, superhuman, divine. So when he asks that question he can only be speaking in terms of an identification with the archetype, which is decidedly dangerous. If he identifies with the God he will be dismembered; when the sun begins to circle he will explode into a million parts and fly off the wheel.

Alas! there is so much lusting for loftiness! There are so many convulsions of the ambitions! Show me that thou art not a lusting and an ambitious one!

Alas! there are so many great thoughts that do nothing more than the bellows: they inflate, and make emptier than ever.

He only needs to apply that thought to his identification, and then things would be right. He has absolutely the right intuition.

Free, dost thou call thyself? Thy ruling thought would I hear of, and not that thou hast escaped from a yoke.

Here he makes a difference between indulgence and accomplishment or work. He doesn't want to hear of freeing oneself. It might be a slave that escaped his chains, or an ox that has forsaken his cart. He has liberated himself, and for what? For nothing, for an indulgence.

Art thou one entitled to escape from a yoke? Many a one hath cast away his final worth when he hath cast away his servitude.

This is a very important statement. You see, people think that they can go to the self in order to escape the yoke, and the late Christian love is quite right when it applies to such people. They are merely egotists who go to themselves in order to dodge something, in order to cheat the world or themselves. In seeking themselves as an indulgence, they have liberated themselves from a servitude which was their destiny. So in whatever situation you find yourself, you have to accept it as a symptom of yourself; your situation is yourself, and if you don't take up your situation as the expression of yourself, then you simply leave it for an indulgence, and then naturally you have lost the values you possessed: namely, your servitude, your connection with humanity, your use for mankind, and also your use for yourself. You know, the difficult entanglement in which everybody lives constitutes the roots of their existence. It is the canal with which they fertilize the soil. If you withdraw from that, if you make for indulgence, you make for a perfectly artificial world in a sort of glass house; you don't touch the soil and there is no fertilization, but merely a sort of code for existence—and you are no longer real. If the self has no real feet in this world, it might just as well be a ghost—it has never been born—and in that case the connection with the self would be absolutely futile indulgence.

Free from what? What doth that matter to Zarathustra? Clearly, however, shall thine eye show unto me: free *for what*?

Canst thou give unto thyself thy bad and thy good, and set up thy will as a law over thee? Canst thou be judge for thyself, and avenger of thy law?

Terrible is aloneness with the judge and avenger of one's own law. Thus is a star projected into desert space, and into the icy breath of aloneness.

So those people who think that they can escape the servitude to which they are called through fate and through life by indulging in their own ego, are of course wholly mistaken, and they will soon see that they become so unreal that they cannot influence the world. The world doesn't reach them and they are useless—are simply cast out, thrown out on the shores of life. But if you accept your servitude, if you are really entangled in life, then you can produce something, and then you also have the right to your own way. That way can only be trodden if one is willing to accept the fact that you are your own law. Then collective conscience goes by the board, and all those collective ideas. And then the question is, can you stand it? Can you stand that offence against your collective conscience? If you cannot, you had better stay at home. But if you find you can, then you can go further. You might fall into the illusion that you would then have no judge over yourself, no law over yourself, but you will discover that there is no judge in the world and no law book in the world as severe as the one that is set for yourself: you yourself are the law which is severer than any which man has ever invented. But of course one cannot experience that when one doesn't continue on the path, and it is much better not to continue on that path if one cannot stand all the evil consequences that the offence against the collective conscience brings with it.

To-day sufferest thou still from the multitude, thou individual;
to-day hast thou still thy courage unabated, and thy hopes.

But one day will the solitude weary thee; one day will thy pride
yield, and thy courage quail. Thou wilt one day cry: "I am alone!"

One day wilt thou see no longer thy loftiness, and see too closely
thy lowliness; thy sublimity itself will frighten thee as a phantom.
Thou wilt one day cry: "All is false!"

There are feelings which seek to slay the lonesome one; if they
do not succeed, then must they themselves die! But art thou ca-
pable of it—to be a murderer?

That is the conflict with the collective conscience. If you are able to murder those most understandable, collective feelings, if you can stand the sight of yourself as a murderer and an offender, then you might be strong enough to continue on that path, for then you can

stand even a severer law than the one you have destroyed. And it is a matter of that: the law you are going to encounter is worse than any other law. Those who escape into the collective law are much better off—that is much easier, much simpler. As in the world of thought, to think the ordinary thing, the common thing, is quite easy—you have it in the textbooks—but to think the rare thing is exceedingly difficult. It is the same in life, in the *type* of living, in ethics: it is everywhere the same. A Frenchman once said that those inventors were the most miserable who had invented the new morality. They were all immoral, *c’était toujours des immoralistes*.¹⁰

¹⁰ Doubtless Jung was referring to André Gide’s *The Immoralist* (orig. Paris, 1921). Gide in turn would have known Nietzsche’s claim, “I am the first immoralist” (*Ecce Homo*, ch. 3, “The Untimely Essays”).

LECTURE VII

27 November 1935

Prof. Jung:

Mrs. Sigg asks about the paragraph, "Canst thou give unto thyself thy bad and thy good and set up thy will as a law over thee? Canst thou be judge for thyself, and avenger of thy law?"

Mrs. Sigg: The judge is clear but not the avenger.

Prof. Jung: The judge and the avenger are very much the same, because the judge is there to avenge the wrong; the law is always an avenger.

Mrs. Sigg: Yes, but Nietzsche has these figures in several different places. In "The Pale Criminal" there is the judge and the criminal, and he sometimes even speaks of Zarathustra as the hangman.

Prof. Jung: Well, if there is a judge there is also an avenger—the judge himself is the avenger. Of course if nothing else happened when the judge passed his judgment, you would not call him an avenger; he would simply have spoken a very inefficient word. To say a man is guilty would mean nothing if there were no avenging power connected with the judge; it is an act of the law and there must be the police and the prison and capital punishment. So the terms are almost synonymous; a judge without efficiency can never carry his sentence into effect. No head will be cut off by a mere sentence, it needs the sword or the guillotine, and that is the avenging act.

Mrs. Sigg: I thought there was a slight difference, as they were two inward figures.

Prof. Jung: Naturally there is a difference; there is the law and there is the carrying out of the sentence. The law in itself is nothing but a breath of air; only when it takes form by execution does it become a fact. The idea of what one is going to do and the doing it are two decidedly different things.

Mrs. Sigg: I know what the judge is.

Prof. Jung: Then you know what the avenger is. You see, if somebody knows he has done wrong, he does not remain with that inner

judgment. It will be carried into effect; something is going to happen to him. Only very naive and deeply unconscious people don't know it because they cannot connect facts. For example, you know that you have done something wrong, but you let it pass and think nothing has come of it, and then you think it is funny that you fall downstairs and sprain your ankle, because you don't connect it with the judgment—that you have been *sentenced* to that punishment. It is just as if the criminal about to be hung were to say, "How funny! What are they doing to me?"—seeing no connection between the murder and the trial and the fact that he is being hung. People have a moment in which they see they have done something wrong but they repress it and forget about it. Then something happens and they cannot make the connection because they have forgotten the first part of the sentence; when the last part comes they are astonished. I have often been asked, when people have had an accident of some kind, how it could have happened out of a blue sky, and then one has all the trouble in the world to find out what happened before in order to explain what has happened afterwards; these accidents don't come out of nothingness. It is causality.

Mrs. Sigg: It is self-punishment.

Prof. Jung: You couldn't even call it self-punishment because you have not inflicted that punishment on yourself; you were merely instrumental. That is just the trouble. In *Zarathustra* Nietzsche identifies with the judge; he thinks he is his own judge, thereby unfortunately working in favor of the point of view that anybody who speaks of himself is necessarily an individualist. You see, Nietzsche is supposed to be the arch-individualist and the forefather of all individualists; he is ranked with Marx and such people, which is a tremendous mistake. He is not at all an individualist in that sense, because his conception of the self is a perfectly decent idea which really links him up with the whole of mankind. Therefore, he can be appreciated by practically all peoples. But you still hear wherever you go that he preaches individualism, because people cannot make a difference between the self and the ordinary ego; when you speak of the self, they think that you mean the ego. One should be careful not to identify with the judge; one should not speak of self-punishment because one has not chosen the punishment. When you analyse such a case carefully, say an accident, then you see that many circumstances and even many people have collaborated in order to carry out a sentence which you yourself have not passed; you only had a slight feeling of misgiving that something was not quite as it should be. Then on top of that you forget it. It is disagreeable and you put it aside, and then the whole apparatus of the law

is in action. Just as the criminal who has stolen something, or committed a fraud or a murder, would like to forget it; he covers up his tracks and disappears and lives in the meantime as if nothing had happened. He returns to settled conditions, to good conduct and even to self-respect; in the meantime the police work more or less feverishly to find out who the criminal is, and finally they get on his track and catch him, and you cannot say that that is self-punishment; surely not: it happens to him. Accidents happen in exactly the same way, and it is really marvelous to see how circumstances and people come from a long distance and meet at just that place in order to carry out the sentence. And you can hardly say that you have arranged it.

Now, the judge and the avenger have usually been projected into God, but to Nietzsche God is dead; there is no such being to function for him. Therefore, he assumes that this judge is himself. He knows that there is a self, but on account of his idea of the Superman and his lack of an idea of a being outside of himself, he is forced to assume that is identical with himself. If he could only be clear about his own conception! For you can be your self—I mean *the* self of yourself—just as you can be a part of your country, your nation. A German cannot say that he is the whole German nation, that the whole German nation is nothing but himself, as a Swiss cannot say that he is Mother Helvetia or his own canton, but he is most certainly a part of it. So the self is in exactly the same relation to us as the state or the nation is to the individual; it is simply a greater psychological system to which we belong as a part of the whole. And the whole is the judge and the avenger, not the part; the part is the thing that is judged, and the part is the thing that is instrumental in inflicting punishment. Through us a punishment is inflicted.

For instance, it can happen that you are *used* to punishing somebody else, and it is a great mistake to think that *you* have inflicted that punishment. Woe unto you if you think that, that comes back on you, because you have carried out your merely instrumental role with a *ressentiment*¹ and with the assumption that you have the dignity of the judge. You see, it is a pretext and an impertinence for parsons to think they can tell other people where they are wrong and teach them about their sins. That comes back to them with a vengeance, for we are in no way able to judge about the guilt of other people; we are not the aveng-

¹ Nietzsche started the philosophic fashion of using the French *ressentiment* to name a prevalent modern disorder—not only resentment but an accompanying depletion of spirit.

ers, the law of righteousness, because we are always in the wrong too, and if fate, or the judge, uses us for inflicting pain on other people as a punishment, then we ought to excuse ourselves, should ask pardon and leave. We should always be conscious of the fact that we are merely instrumental. I don't know why Nietzsche was not able to realize this quite simple thought of the self's being the total and himself only a part, an atom in the molecule. This is not my original idea of course. I got that formula from the East. Nietzsche unfortunately had not studied Eastern philosophy; that would have been a tremendous help to him there, one can reasonably say. The East is of invaluable importance. During thousands of years master minds have worked out those ideas and we would be foolish not to adopt them inasmuch as we can thereby clarify our own; they must not be taken *instead* of our own ideas but in order to clarify them. If we lose ourselves in the Eastern ideas, of course we become quite vaporous. Now we will continue:

Hast thou ever known, my brother, the word "disdain" [contempt]? And the anguish of thy justice in being just to those that disdain thee?

Thou forcest many to think differently about thee; that, charge they heavily to thine account. Thou camest nigh unto them, and yet wentest past: for that they never forgive thee.

In these and subsequent paragraphs Nietzsche confesses very important experiences in his own life. He is of course the creative man who had to follow a lonely path, and whoever has to choose such a way will have peculiar experiences which those on the highway with thousands of companions will never have. So when he speaks of contempt or disdain, or of condemning somebody—"the anguish of thy justice"—he is speaking of a specific experience; he says "contempt" in quotation marks, meaning a particular kind of contempt—that contempt which is necessary to distinguish himself from his companions. For if he does not distinguish himself from his companions, how can he choose his own path? He will remain with them; he will be on the same highway. And if he really wants to climb higher he will be several yards above them and must look down upon them. This looking down is what they call "contempt," and to him also it looks like that inasmuch as he is a collective man. You see, the collective man naturally cannot refrain from feeling it as contempt when he looks down upon other people. But that is the thing one must be able to stand inasmuch as one wants to choose one's own way, and inasmuch as one's path leads one higher than the highway. Such a thing is possible when one is creative, and it

is a real anguish to one's justice to find oneself with just that problem of looking down; instead of "contempt" you had better call it "looking down." But then looking down is not contempt, although the collective man in you, as the collective man on the highway, will naturally *call* it "contempt."

You see, people who are a bit more intelligent than the majority always suffer from that prejudice that they are disdainful or looking down upon other people, because the ordinary person naturally feels disregarded if something is said which goes a little beyond his horizon. If *they* were looking down, it would be in order to give themselves a particular flair: it would really *be* contempt. They can only understand it as the pride or ambition or fastidiousness of those who say or do something which is out of the ordinary; not understanding it, they can couch it in no other terms. So ambitious people who seek power and prestige cannot understand that a person can do something decent without having that ambition, and they will try to catch him by offering the same sort of thing. For instance, a fellow comes to me and offers me so much money, because he assumes that this is what I am really after. Then if he finds he cannot buy me with money, he thinks he can influence me with honors—that prestige is my ambition—and he puts something under my nose that would attract through the evil instinct of power. He can only explain my difficulty by his miserable idea of power, because the idea that a person would do something for its own sake is not within his scope. He cannot assume, for instance, that I might investigate something, or build up something, just because it is beautiful in itself, he thinks I only do it to impress and blindfold other people, in order to put them in my pocket.

You cannot help feeling contempt for such a psychology—it is contemptible, damn it, and it is very difficult to do justice to those who apply it. "Thou forcest many to think differently about thee." You cannot imagine a worse plight than having to teach people that one has no such motives; they would rather die than believe that one had a decent motive, or such a quixotic motive as to do something for its own sake. They cannot think in terms of processes which are beautiful in themselves, but are always out for something—as if a flower were only beautiful for the insects; it is a perfectly satisfactory explanation to them that its beauty is only to attract insects to fertilize it. They even think that this is a high virtue of the flower. But the real psychology of the flower, I bet you anything, is to be just itself; the sun shines upon the plant and it beautifully unfolds in the air without thinking of getting fertilized. It doesn't think of bees nor yet of scientists!

Yes, it is really a difficult and dangerous task to teach people something new, not only because they charge it heavily against one, but they assume that anything new must necessarily be bad. They say, "We have such good and beautiful things, why anything new? We have the truth and you are a heretic." For the new truth puts out the old truth. If one produces something new in the field of religion, naturally one is in for trouble because religion has always possessed the whole truth and the eternal truth. Unfortunately, there were quite a number who possessed the eternal truth: there must be many eternal truths. For who is the Christian God for instance?²—Is it the God of the New Testament, the God of love, or is it the God of the Old Testament who insinuated or suggested such horrible things to those old primitive tribes?

Thou goest beyond them: but the higher thou risest, the smaller doth the eye of envy see thee. Most of all, however, is the flying one hated.

That is perfectly true. One can also put it that the sheep that walks just ahead of the herd is the leader, but if that sheep should perchance have wings, or was able to go a bit faster—if it should walk two hundred yards in front of the herd—then it would be a wolf. So don't follow it. It is too far away. That is dangerous.

"How could ye be just unto me!"—must thou say—"I choose your injustice as my allotted portion."

This is inevitable. If you do or say anything new, you will hurt somebody or something. The old truth which is still there will be restricted or upset, and then you are an evil doer, a criminal.

Injustice and filth cast they at the lonesome one: but, my brother, if thou wouldst be a star, thou must shine for them none the less on that account.

Well, usually the filth cannot be cast high enough to reach the stars.

And be thou on thy guard against the good and just! They would fain crucify those who devise their own virtue—they hate the lonesome ones.

They do, that is perfectly true, because he has forever been a nuisance. You see, when conditions become settled and peaceful, then such a fellow comes along with a new idea and upsets the whole thing. For instance, merchants or craftsmen in the old guilds had a sort of monopoly; nobody disturbed them. Then the new principle of free

competition was invented, and they were forced to invent something new or be left behind, so naturally they hated the principle of free competition. But this is and forever has been the principle of the world. Heraclitus said that war was the father of all things, for nothing moves, nothing develops without a struggle; and when a world is full of fighting, it cannot be ruled by love. It is impossible to avoid competition, impossible to have eternal peace, because things then simply come to a standstill, and out of sheer degeneration people will begin a war. So we had better keep on progressing, and then wars will be worth something, while if they come from our degeneration, they mean nothing.

The world cannot be ruled by love: it is an incommensurable principle. If that were possible, it would have been ruled by love long before Christ. For instance, if the teaching of old Pythagoras could have been applied, the world would have been in a marvelously peaceful, wise, and perfect state; we would all be wearing white linen clothes, and we wouldn't eat or drink too much, would be mild in every respect.² But the world would have remained where it was six hundred years B.C. That teaching cannot be applied and never was applied. Even when God's son came to earth, they crucified him. And what has Christianity produced? Constant fighting! It started with bloody fighting at the very beginning. A long string of wars and revolutions—that is the history of Christianity. It is full of devils.

"How could ye be just unto me!"—must thou say—"I choose your injustice as my allotted portion." Here Nietzsche accepts the necessary evil of injustice as his portion, his fate—also the filth that is cast at the solitary one. For it is unavoidable that a man with a new idea should not be at one with the world of the good and the righteous. You see, the good and righteous are the people who possess and take care of the established goods; they maintain the order or the good condition of the established truth which has been built up in the past. And these people are exceedingly useful. If they did not exist, nothing good that came into the world would stay for one second, but would instantly vanish again; it is those people who cling to it and take care of it, who maintain the existence of a good for a time, until somebody comes with a better idea. Then they will be against him because he upsets their truth and value. Naturally, they think his idea is immoral and of no

² Pythagoras of Samos (fl. c. 530 B.C.) seems to have left no writing, but the person somewhat disappears into a group, a school, which not only did mathematics, but also taught and practiced an ascetic way of life based on the moral qualities of numbers, e.g., "four square."

value and they will then, as a last resort, cast all the filth they have gathered up in their own unconscious at the one who has the new idea. The good and the righteous are then the worst; when a new idea comes which invalidates or undermines their old idea, they fall into the wrong which they have accumulated through the centuries. Take the good Christian, who is really a very good and nice man within his settled sphere, and tickle him with a new idea: then see what comes out! Like those good shepherds of herds, the benevolent, fat priests of the Middle Ages for instance, with their wine and fish and meat and their rich fields. It was good to dwell with them then because they were peaceful, but they became terrible when their own order was upset. They burned and tortured people in order to defend their own existence. People get bad when their whole existence is threatened.

Of course the mistake is in the good and righteous. Anybody who is good and righteous should say to himself, "I should be very thankful that for so many centuries God has permitted me to belong to the good and righteous people." This is an enormous advantage over those whom he destined to be bad, or to play the role of creators, which is still worse in a way because they are not really bad, but are merely creative. When people who are really bad are punished, they know for what they are punished, and moreover they know that they are really wrong in comparison with the good people, because they hold to the opposite side and don't represent the value. But the man who is creative represents the greatest value that is known in the world, so he is the better man; therefore, to the good and the righteous he is naturally the worst, much worse than the criminal. That is expressed in the Christian mystery where Christ is chosen instead of the criminal Barabbas. (That name also means "the son of the father.") The criminal was allowed to go free and Christ was chosen for the ordeal because he was the better man. You see, the church is exceedingly lenient with the man who is really bad, but not with the better man. To the church, the better man is the worse.

Be on thy guard, also, against holy simplicity! All is unholy to it that is not simple; fain, likewise, would it play with the fire—of the fagot and stake.

To what does he refer here?

Mrs. Jung: Johann Hus.

Prof. Jung: Yes. In about 1400 the Bohemian Protestant reformer Johann Jakob Hus was burned to death in Constance, the nearest German town, at the instigation of the church. And when he was at the

stake, he saw that a little old woman was also bringing some wood for the fire and he said, "Oh holy simplicity!"—because she thought she was doing a good work. You see, these holy simpletons are the great power behind the good and the righteous, who are really comparatively few; it is a virtue, an accomplishment, but they only become efficient and dangerous when millions of simpletons are marching behind them. But it is very right that these simpletons should believe in people who are good and righteous, for they might otherwise follow criminals as they did in other times. They marched with the same childlike belief behind devils who led them into hell; then when they had been roasted in hell for a time they thought the good was better, so they changed over. The masses are formidable, exceedingly dangerous, because they really bring the fuel for the stake—it doesn't need to be a real stake of course: there are moral stakes too. Now the worst of all:

And be on thy guard, also, against the assaults of thy love! Too readily doth the recluse reach his hand to any one who meeteth him.

The solitary one is naturally always exposed to illusions because to those people living in deserts for whom there are no human beings, all sorts of specters and phantoms come. And many have the illusion that they are quite ordinary people. You see, a man like Nietzsche naturally assumes that he is an ordinary human being and could live the ordinary life; he assumes that he could be a good friend, for instance, forgetting entirely that his creative demon has stolen away his human life, all his human values, and that he offers nothing to the human being. He needs must be alone. All too easily he forgets this truth and imagines that he really could mean something to those who approach him. But as a matter of fact, he is a disappointment; creative people are usually a disappointment on the human side because the god has taken too much from them. They are victims.

To many a one mayest thou not give thy hand, but only thy paw, and I wish thy paw also to have claws.

Just on account of the fact that so many have paws, you see.

But the worst enemy thou canst meet, wilt thou thyself always be, thou waylayest thyself in caverns and forests.

That solitary man who meets his own illusions, specters and phantoms, in the desert, is naturally waylaying himself. From such a statement one might almost assume that Nietzsche could and should deduce that

he himself, the ego, and that fellow who appears to him, are really enemies; they are opposites, yet they are one and the same. Now who is that oneness, the being that is both? You see, that man who is solitary, the ego, is the right hand, and there is also the left hand which is the mirror reflex of the right hand, and the two are fighting. Then where is the whole man, the primordial man? Well, that is really the self, and that is what Nietzsche understands by the Superman.

Thou lonesome one, thou goest the way to thyself! And past thyself and thy seven devils leadeth thy way!

In this sentence he approaches the truth quite closely. He is on the way to *the* self, not to *thyself* or to *himself*, and his way goes past himself and his seven devils. So the lonesome one is also the seven devils—that is his left hand. He is not on the path of the right hand because he *is* the right hand, and on the way to the self he naturally meets the left hand, which means his own opposition. We call that “the shadow,” and of course it would be a powerful shadow since it is expressed by seven devils; we may conclude that the conscious ego is much too overwrought or inflated when it needs such a contrast in compensation. One finds the same psychology with Luther. When he was planning his reformation, the devil appeared to him, and he threw the inkstand at him; that was *his* devil. And the same psychological critique could be applied to Christ; when the devil tempted him it was *his* devil, the power devil. I cannot see why people should be shocked by such a statement. I hope that Christ was a human being, otherwise he is of no use to us. We expect God to do better than we can; to be a model, it must be a *man* that does better, and he is only man when he meets his own devil. Then he is human. If he were the omnipotent God himself, what would be the merit? Then it would be pretty poor, I must say. But if he was a human being who failed, it is quite understandable because human beings make mistakes; he did what he understood as his best, and he really *did* something, he even fought his own devils. For a god, it would be nothing. But *he* was always checked by himself, by his own devil.

A heretic wilt thou be to thyself, and a wizard and a sooth-sayer, and a fool, and a doubter, and a reprobate, and a villain.

Ready must thou be to burn thyself in thine own flame; how couldst thou become new if thou have not first become ashes!

Here he describes what naturally will happen when you really meet your own devil, your own opposite; it will be a fight to death, a conflagration in which nothing remains but a heap of ashes. Of course this

statement is a bit too strong, too mythological. It is like the Phoenix that burns itself, together with its nest, the soul and the body, and arises from the ashes anew. Such a total transformation is hardly possible. That is not the myth of the ordinary man, but of the god in man, the primordial man, who was called the *anthropos* in Neoplatonist philosophy and in those syncretistic religions at the time of Christ.³ It was on account of that idea of the *anthropos* that Christ called himself the *monogenes*, meaning the son of man—that primordial man, not of God. (The *monogenes* means “the only begotten,” and the *autogenes* means “the self-begotten.”) This is the *anthropos* in man, or you can call it the self, and the story of the self is like the Phoenix myth and like this passage here. When man is on the way to himself, he will see his other side, and there will be a tremendous conflict; it will be a conflagration, a flame in which he is burned up.

Nietzsche always foresaw something of that; even in one of his first works the *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, there is a peculiar passage: “A spark from the fire of justice fallen into the soul of a seeker will be sufficient to devour his whole life.”⁴ That is like the Gnostic myth of the soul, the soul being the *spinther* (the Greek word for spark) which falls from the pleroma or the empyrean into matter; that spark is the soul of man and if it is touched, there will be a fire. This idea was in the grain of man, and in the philosophy of the time of Christ. There is an apocryphal word of Christ, a *logion*, which says. “Whoever is near to me is near to the fire and whoever is far away from me is far from the kingdom.” So the kingdom is the kingdom of fire. Christ himself is the flame. That is also expressed in the Pentecostal miracle where the Holy Ghost descends in tongues of fire.⁵ And there is an authentic *logion* of Heraclitus which says: A dry glowing best and wisest soul.⁶ You see, it is inevitable that anybody who seeks the self is forced into that fight with the shadow, with the other side of himself, his own negation; and that will be a catastrophe in which the ordinary man is as if destroyed: he becomes ashes. There is again the connection with alchemy here, of

³ In early Christian Neoplatonic thought and syncretistic religions, *anthropos* signified primordial man, Adam. In alchemical writings, the *anthropos* was represented as whole, completed, and therefore symbolic of the self. See CW 14, pars. 484-97.

⁴ “Schopenhauer as Educator” in *Untimely Meditations*, sec. 3.

⁵ “And when the day of Pentecost had come, they were all together in one place. . . . And there appeared to them tongues as of fire distributing themselves” (Acts 2:1-2).

⁶ Heraclitus (fragment 118; Freeman*). Wheelwright translates fragment 46 “A dry soul is wisest and best,” which is immediately followed by “Souls take pleasure in becoming moist.”

course. This conflagration is necessary; otherwise the self as the living unit cannot appear, otherwise it would be obliterated by the continuous fight of the Yea and the Nay. They must exhaust each other in order that we may be still enough to hear the voice of the self and follow the intimation. This is the ordinary way of the religious experience. First it is a Yea and then it is a violent Nay, and then there is a catastrophe and man ceases to exist; then he becomes willing and submits to God. Then it is the will of God that will decide for him. Without that terrible conflict, there is no reality in such an existence. To go into a revival meeting and get caught is no merit.

Thou lonesome one, thou goest the way of the creating one: a
God wilt thou create for thyself out of thy seven devils.

Here Nietzsche is going to create a god out of his conflict, out of his seven devils. He cannot help seeing what he is doing but he cannot draw the necessary conclusion. It is not he who is creating a god, not the man Nietzsche who declared that God was dead, but the god is creating himself. Like the old Egyptian texts, he is the builder of his own nest, the maker of his own egg;⁷ he forms himself upon his own potter's mold. It is the Phoenix myth, and that is what happens in religious experiences, as Master Eckhart has shown very clearly. The godhead in itself is not blissful, but must be born in the soul of man again and again: only then does it become God. Otherwise, man would be of no importance whatever; he would be the most foolish and imperfect invention God ever made. But just because man is man, a restricted something living in three dimensions, in a very small space in the here and now, God is forced to go through that narrow doorway, the gate of man, in order to become God. That is the teaching of Master Eckhart, and that is also the meaning of the Christian mystery, that God first became man and underwent the most miserable fate in order to become God.⁸

⁷ For a representation of Ptah shaping the world egg, see CW 5, plate XLIV.

⁸ "From the very bottom of my heart I say, Man, how can aught afflict thee or be hard to bear when thou considerest that he who yonder subsisted in the form of God and in the day of his eternity and in the glory of the saints, and who before was born in the splendour and substance of God, did enter the prison, the trap of thy sense-nature which is so unclean that aught, however pure, is besmirched and befouled by coming near it, yet notwithstanding this he abode there for thy sake?" (Frans Pfeiffer, *Meister Eckhart*, tr. C. de B. Evans [London, 1956], p. 145). This symbolized for Jung the act of an individuated person voluntarily sacrificing the larger personality for some aspect thereof. Jung's testimonies to Meister Eckhart are numerous. In one place he credits him with being, in Europe, the first one for whom "the self begins to play a noticeable

And when you look at the God of the Old Testament, you understand that he needed the mystery in order to become human; the terrible *demiurges* of the Old Testament became in the New Testament a loving father. Look at what Jahveh did to old man Job, for instance, a perfectly respectable man who worshipped him. Jahveh was betting with the devil as to whether they could blast him or not; God bet that they could not and the devil that they could. And there was no judge above Jahveh, he was a lawless individual—it was not even fair play. That poor little human, Job, was happy with his women and his children, his slaves and his cattle, and then the omnipotent God of the universe first came down and ruined him and then boasted: Look at my power—here is my Behemoth, here is my Leviathan, my two monsters are my lap-dogs, such a fellow am I! I can ruin you completely!—and now worship me again. We have finished our joke, and I will give you back all the cattle and the women.⁹ That is the Jahveh of the Old Testament and there are far worse stories. Now, such a God needs rebuilding, and that is the reason he was crucified: it was well deserved after all he had done in the Old Testament. So a punishment was inflicted upon him and he was reformed. Well, that is the world drama: the world is God's own drama.

Thou lonesome one, thou goest the way of the loving one; thou lovest thyself, and on that account despisest thou thyself, as only the loving ones despise.

That he speaks of despising in connection with love would mean, "You are not good enough to me, you could do better."

To create, desireth the loving one, because he despiseth! What knoweth he of love who hath not been obliged to despise just what he loved!

With thy love, go into thine isolation, my brother, and with thy creating; and late only will justice limp after thee.

With my tears, go into thine isolation, my brother. I love him who seeketh to create beyond himself, and thus succumbeth.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

This succumbing is again a fore-feeling. Nietzsche had this intuition of his end. He felt obviously while writing *Zarathustra* that it was going to

role" (*Letters*, vol. II, p. 453). Or again: "The act of letting things happen, action through non-action, letting go of oneself, as taught by Meister Eckhart, became for me the key opening the door to the way" (Richard Wilhelm, *Secret of the Golden Flower*, Jung's Psychological Commentary, CW 11).

⁹ See "Answer to Job," CW 11, ch. 6.

finish him, and in fact his disease began soon afterwards. Of course, all sorts of beautiful explanations have been given for that disease as I said last week—that it was not a mental disease, that he was simply removed into a higher state. That may be, we don't know—we cannot see behind the veil of insanity—but to us he perished, and he felt it as a destruction. Whenever you meet such passages in *Zarathustra* you see that he felt it as a sort of catastrophe. Now why is it just *Zarathustra* that brings this intuition particularly near to him—such a work more than any other?

Mr. Allemann: Because it was not done by himself but really by his self, by something above him that he identified with.

Prof. Jung: Yes, *Zarathustra* is really what the self has worked in him, that is true, but why should that be so particularly destructive?

Mr. Allemann: Because he could not understand it. He identified with his work and with the Superman, and he was too small for it. He could not stand it.

Prof. Jung: You would explain it as too great an intensity?

Mr. Allemann: Yes, he got burned.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the book *Zarathustra* is that conflagration. It is there that the opposites come together, there that the conflict really takes place, and out of that huge conflagration comes the intuition of the Superman. The Superman is the flame, and it naturally eats him up: he himself will be the ashes. Out of himself and his shadow the Superman will be formed, but of course not in the way he expected; the Superman is really the *super* man, beyond and above man, and that is the self. Man is something that is to be overcome but when he is really overcome, there is no more man. He is in a way the playground of the gods, the place or the form in which the divine drama, the transformation of the god, is enacted. I have often regretted that Nietzsche was so identified with this process, because he would otherwise have been able to give us a very wonderful picture of that great mystery, the transformation of the god. He would probably have produced something which would have enlightened us about the secret aspirations of the old alchemists in the Middle Ages. Their aspiration also was the transformation of the god brought about through man, man being the retort in which the god is transformed, where he descends into uttermost matter and where the spirit develops out of matter again, carrying with itself all the degrees of existence. First it is nothing but a spirit and afterwards it is spirit, body, and soul—*spiritus, corpus, et anima*. Now we will begin the next chapter on women, old and young. Everybody smiles! How do women come in here? This is a very interesting and intriguing question. Perhaps you know the solution.

Dr. Whitney: I wondered whether this was a woman at all or just his experience of the anima. I think he is really not talking about women in this chapter.

Prof. Jung: Let us hope!

Mrs. Sigg: When St. Anthony went into the desert he had visions of women who tempted him.

Prof. Jung: St. Anthony had quite a time with those phantom women in the desert.

Mrs. Fierz: The end of this last chapter is emotional: "With my tears, go into thine isolation," for instance. An emotional power is now called up, a sort of feeling side, which for him must have a female aspect, as he is just the vehicle.

Prof. Jung: Well, this chapter is rather intuitive. He is describing the way of the one who is creating beyond himself, creating the self or being in the creative process; and he feels that such a thing cannot be without the conflagration of the opposites. Now, the opposite would be here chiefly the side of the human being which is left in the dark whatever that may be—in this case seven devils. But that dark side is usually projected into other people, particularly if it consists of seven devils. If a man, it would be projected into seven women, and if a woman, into seven men. That is at least the naive condition. You see, you cannot really get into a serious conflict with yourself when you are in the Engadine with nothing around but an elderly landlady. Only when the contrast becomes personified do things get hot; a real fire can never burst forth without a personified opposite. The other side must also have body, and because it cannot have your own, it will take somebody else's. If your opposite appears simply as your inner enemy, it is entirely abstract because it has no body: *you* have your body. And then you may think it is merely your imagination; or you may admit that you have very bad qualities, and confess all your sins with much sentiment before God. But if anybody else should tell you that you had such sins you would swear hell and the devil against it—you would not accept it, particularly not if that person had a hand in your system. So a conflict only becomes real when the other side is projected into somebody. Then it fills a body; then your own opposite is projected into a person who is perhaps forced to play a role in opposition to you.

Usually when a man has an anima transference to a woman, the woman has to more or less play the anima role; or when a woman projects the animus onto a man he is forced to play that role whether he wants to or not, and the less he knows the more he will play the fool. You remember the classical example, *The Evil Vineyard* by Marie Hay,

where the heroine marries the wise old man in her husband, and they are both tremendously disappointed in each other. He does not produce the right kind of wise stuff, so she is frigid; and he is always trying to find out what the devil she can be after until he finds the right answer. Then he shuts her up in the Casa di Ferro near Locarno, a good place to have such a girl, and he eventually tries to murder her.¹⁰ She simply pushed her own opposite, the evil male in herself, into her husband, and he, becoming more and more unconscious, was trying to live what she insinuated into him. Very interesting things often happen in marriages in that way.

I remember an interesting case: A very nice, quite respectable, youngish woman came to consult me, not on account of her own condition but on account of the condition of her husband. She told me he was formerly a nice man, but that now he was always running after the servants. He admitted that it was so, didn't know why he did it, and said he would never dream of doing it again—but again he was after them. I asked whether they had children, and she told me they had one little girl two or three years old, and that this disturbance of her husband first began several months after the birth of the child. They had been married already six or seven years and both of them had always wished for a child, and didn't know why they never had one, so he was overjoyed when a nice little girl was born, and she thought it was very curious that just when they were so happy, he should begin to be so peculiar. I said, "But how did it happen that you suddenly had a child?" And then I saw that somebody was walking over the stage behind her closed lids, so I said, "Now come, how was it?" Whereupon the following story came out: Several doctors had told her there was no reason why she should not have a child, and she became quite depressed about it. So she asked a cousin who was studying medicine if he didn't know a means, and he said, "Well, it is probably your husband, but if you want me to make you a child I can do it." So he made her a child, and her husband was very happy and she too. But then the trouble with her husband began. I said, "Did you never think that what your husband has done was perhaps a consequence of what you have done?" You see, he was naturally trying to find out how that child was made and whether he was really the one at fault, so he had to try, to experiment with the nearest women, though they didn't interest him at all. That is the way she brought about his peculiar behavior, but of

¹⁰ Marie Hay, *The Evil Vineyard* (London and New York, 1927). On this work see CW 10, pars. 89ff., and *Dream Sem.*, pp. 165f.

course she was not conscious of it. I don't know how this story continued, but it was perfectly obvious. In this way, such things come to pass. Perfectly harmless, nice people become fiends when they receive such a projection from the unconscious of the partner.

Men sometimes have an absolutely fiendish anima that they cannot help projecting, so it concretizes in the wife or another woman; then the woman, inasmuch as she is unconscious, is forced to play that role of devilish impulse, and it leads into all sorts of tragic difficulties. And vice versa. Now, that is the real conflagration—when the opposite appears in another human being. Otherwise, it is merely academical; we can label it and shelve it and the case is finished. But the case only begins when the story becomes somehow real; then there is a real fire, emotional fire, passion, conflict, despair, everything under the sun: it is the flame of life. Only the flame of life burns, not an academical recognition. So when Nietzsche begins to speak in high tones of the divine thing that is to be created, he forgets entirely that when God is going to renew himself, he needs more than one man; and he will usually carry along a great piece of our earth in that conflagration. Therefore, no sooner do you begin to seek your self than you see your own enemy; you *draw* the enemy near to you. Naturally, to any solitary anchorite, women specters appear: women come up. Now, inasmuch as a woman is quite capable of receiving and performing the anima projection, she is also like the anima; that cannot be denied. There are plenty of women who therefore quite coincide or harmonize with the description man gives of his anima. He never would have such a picture of the woman if no such experiences were to be had. And a woman never would have such an animus if there were no men with whom it was possible to have such an experience. For instance, to give the women an anticipatory consolation before we venture into this chapter, I know an author who discovered his wife reading the book of another man, and he slapped her in the face!

LECTURE VIII

4 December 1935

Prof. Jung:

We had gotten as far as the chapter called “Old and Young Women,” and we decided that it had more to do with the anima; for when the creator is alone, the first thing he meets is of course his unconscious, that is the companion of every solitude. In a man’s case, the unconscious has a feminine quality, personified in the form of what we call the “anima,” and in a woman’s case it takes the masculine form, the “animus.” That is the reason why people don’t like being alone with themselves, it is disagreeable; it is a very clever saying that one’s own society is the worst, for the companion one finds there is naturally all the things one likes to disregard or to keep in the dark. When a man is alone with himself he will be assailed with all sorts of queer feelings and ideas which his anima produces, and the animus does the same thing to a woman. And one is singularly defenceless against such attacks. Now we will see what Zarathustra is confronted with:

“Why stealest thou along so furtively in the twilight, Zarathustra? And what hidest thou so carefully under thy mantle?

Is it a treasure that hath been given thee? Or a child that hath been born thee? Or goest thou thyself on a thief’s errand, thou friend of the evil?”—

Verily, my brother, said Zarathustra, it is a treasure that hath been given me: it is a little truth which I carry.

But it is naughty, like a young child; and if I hold not its mouth, it screameth too loudly.

As I went on my way alone to-day, at the hour when the sun declineth, there met me an old woman, and she spake thus unto my soul:

He is rather *precieux* about the thing he is concerned with here, which is apparently the outcome of a little *rencontre* with an old woman. I personally wish it had been a young one—that would have been much bet-

ter. What does it mean that he meets the old woman when he is alone? What conclusion do you draw?

Mrs. Fierz: That he is too young.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The rule is that a man dreams of an old anima when he is too young in his own consciousness. That may be for the time being or it may be generally so; certain men are too young for their age by lack of experience, or they are just childish, and then the anima is apt to be very old in order to compensate for the conscious individual. As a woman's animus may be just a very childish boy, full of naughty ideas, because the conscious is too old and wise. Of course that is not always true—there are certain exceptions, the obvious one being the figure of the *Puer Aeternus*. Now, this *rencontre* contains a secret. That the meeting with that old woman meant to him something like a little child is a speech metaphor naturally, but it contains more than a mere metaphor; it points to a secret connected with his meeting the anima. What could that child be? It is as if he were a mother himself carrying a child. This is very interesting.

Mrs. Sigg: As Nietzsche himself is nearly always pregnant with thoughts, his anima is with child.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. But why does Zarathustra behave as if he had a child under his mantle? He is not a woman.

Dr. Whitney: He is identical there with the anima.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the point. Nietzsche is identified with Zarathustra and naturally also with his anima, because he can only reach Zarathustra through the medium of his anima, that being by definition of the function which connects the conscious with the unconscious. So he is identical with his anima and with the old man and with every other archetype in sight. And since Zarathustra is hiding that child he carries, what kind of child would it be?

Mrs. Fierz: It would be illegitimate.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and where has she gotten that child? Who is the father of the child of the anima?

Prof. Fierz: I should say his unconscious animus.

Prof. Jung: You could say that, but the unconscious animus in a man is a very particular case, a substitute for something else. What is the animus of the anima? This is a problem the Gnostics deal with; here you find the motive of the unknown father.

Mrs. Baynes: Would it not be the wise old man in this case?

Prof. Jung: Yes, if a man realizes the animus of his anima, then the animus is a substitute for the old wise man. You see, his ego is in relation to the unconscious, and the unconscious is personified by a female

figure, the anima. But in the unconscious is also a masculine figure, the wise old man. And that figure is in connection with the anima as her animus, because she is a woman. So, one could say the wise old man was in exactly the same position as the animus to a woman.

Now, it may be that the conscious man and the anima are identical; if a man is anima possessed, for instance, he is instantly transformed into a woman. And so inasmuch as the woman is possessed by the animus she becomes naturally a male, but when a man is possessed by his anima, that masculine figure which belongs to the anima is transformed into an animus. A man possessed by his emotions is possessed by his anima, and when he thinks through his emotions it is just as if he were a woman; he talks exactly like a woman and will produce the same animus stuff. A woman, however, produces the animus stuff quite directly, so one can say only men have moods. When a woman has a mood it is because she first has an animus idea or an opinion which naturally suggests a certain emotion, while with a man it works in just the reverse way: first he has a mood and then he has an opinion. One can see it in this: If you tell a man he is in a bad mood he says, "No I am not, decidedly not." And when you say to a woman, But you have an opinion, a prejudice, she replies, "No, I have not"—she has no opinions, none whatever. But if you say she is in a mood, she will admit it. As when one says to a man who is talking out of his emotions that he is uttering such and such an opinion, he cannot help seeing it. A woman cannot help seeing an emotion or a mood, because it is quite obvious to her that she has a certain emotion; while to a man it is not obvious because he hates to admit that emotion. This is of course a bit complicated but if you have a clear idea of the relation of the ego to the animus or the anima, you can easily draw the conclusion as to the nature of the masculine or feminine figure in a man or woman. You see here, Zarathustra proves very clearly his identity with the anima—both Zarathustra and Nietzsche are identical with the anima of course—so naturally Zarathustra at times behaves as if he were a woman. You remember not very long ago we had a passage where Zarathustra spoke of decorating or painting oneself for one's friend, as if he were a woman. Now here he obviously hides an illegitimate pregnancy, his anima is pregnant with certain contents and the father is unknown. And the father must be the old man, who is here the animus. What legend does this suggest?

Mrs. Sigg: Mary.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the myth of Mary, the illegitimate mother made pregnant by the animus. And animus is spirit, the Holy Ghost; there-

fore his authority is so overwhelming. Then how, according to the old tradition, did that act take place? How was she impregnated?

Prof. Fierz: The angel came to her.

Prof. Jung: But by what way instead of the *via naturalis*?

Miss Wolff: By the ear.

Prof. Jung: Yes, according to that famous hymn: *Quae per aurem concepisti*, which means, "Thou that hast conceived by the ear." Buddha was also not conceived in the regular way.¹ So Mary conceived through the ear, she heard the Word, the Word came to her. Now, here the anima has heard something. That is the way an animus opinion comes into existence in a woman: father always used to say, or the uncles said, or the parson or the doctor said, and therefore it is the eternal truth. And in a man's case, it is exactly the same: his anima has heard something, she had an audition, she conceived the Word. So, expressed in Christian symbolism, that passage would be the *conceptio immaculata* through the Word, and she is pregnant with a savior. Of course we don't know whether this child is really a savior—it might be something else because the case is not clearly Christian. We are quite in doubt what the father means in this case, and also what the child means.

Mrs. Jung: Zarathustra says here that the old woman spoke to his "Seele." Is *Seele* to be understood as the anima?

Prof. Jung: Well, the word *soul* would have the traditional meaning to Nietzsche, and the idea of the Christian soul has nothing to do with the anima concept. The Christian soul is understood to be the innermost thing, and it is said to be immortal, the part of one that survives, and so on. The soul can be anything which is covered by the unconscious. While the anima is a specific, empirical concept, it is more like the primitive idea of a soul. The primitives believe that there are several souls, sometimes as many as six. That simply means that it is a psychical complex which is detachable or relatively autonomous—an archetypal constituent—and it is more personal than the Christian idea of the soul, which means completeness, totality, the essence of man. But that is not empirical, but metaphysical and dogmatic; while in the anima concept we have very definite empirical qualities which we can substantiate by evidence. For instance, the anima is an ambiguous kind of person, female, with a sort of immortality; she lives much longer than man, or she has a peculiar adventurous fate, not only here on

¹ The Buddha's mother is said to have been impregnated in the side as she dreamed of a sacred white elephant.

earth but in the land of the hereafter, as one can read in Rider Haggard and such stories.

The interesting thing here is that this anima has heard the Word, has obviously been impregnated, and we don't know what that child may be, but apparently it is a lively child and it wants to make itself heard. And a child that has been conceived by the Word will be a *logos*, a word of authority. so Zarathustra, without knowing it, is threatened here with the birth of a child that might cry aloud, and it might say something in a voice which is not his own. You see, that is what Zarathustra risks when he is in solitude without a friend: he will hear voices; while if a friend were there, he would naturally think it was the friend's voice. In this case, he really spoke of being alone, so we must assume that Zarathustra attempted to be alone with himself. Then as he could not put down any voices he might hear to another human being, he would be forced to admit that there was another reality than himself, some other thought than his own. That would of course prove fatal, because it would bring the identity of Nietzsche and Zarathustra to an end; for whether it happened to Nietzsche or to Zarathustra, there would be something outside. Either of them would have to admit that somebody other than himself had spoken. From this we may draw the conclusion that sooner or later something will come out which will cast a very peculiar light upon this identity of Nietzsche and Zarathustra. Now we will see what the old woman has to say:

"Much hath Zarathustra spoken also to us women, but never spake he unto us concerning women."

And I answered her: "Concerning women, one should only talk unto men."

That is, of course, very careful and wise in a way, for when a man speaks of woman to women he usually says something very stupid.

"Talk also unto me of woman," said she; "I am old enough to forget it presently."

Perfectly true. For a man to speak to an older woman is of course much easier, since he can assume that he is meeting a certain amount of experience, and that what he says will not have such consequences as it might with a young woman. So he feels much safer.

And I obliged the old woman and spake thus unto her:

Everything in woman is a riddle, and everything in woman hath one solution—it is called pregnancy.

This is rather a contradiction. If everything in woman is a riddle then surely he cannot say there is only one answer. That exactly characterizes a man's attitude to woman however—of course, inasmuch as he projects his anima: one must add that. But he cannot help it. He always projects his anima when talking to a woman because that is the only way he can reach her; he cannot touch a woman without the anima in between because that is the very system by which he must contact woman. If there is no anima, there is absolutely no contact, no bridge, and inasmuch as his anima is Maya, illusion, the relation between the sexes is illusion. And a woman simply cannot understand a man without the help of the animus, because the man in her enables her to understand the man outside; the less that system plays a role, the less she meets the real man. This only proves how difficult it is to establish a real relation between the sexes. The more you know about it, the more you know it is impossible, or if you have understood it, you are probably at the journey's end. When you have understood that it is all nonsense anyhow, then you have integrated the man and the woman in yourself, and then of course something else begins. So in his very first statement Nietzsche utters the most shocking paradox. It is perfectly true that a man understands nothing of a woman; that every woman is a riddle is the best notion he can start with. But that there is only one answer to what a woman may be means that it is perfectly clear what she is, and this is his other standpoint. That is the way in which he handles the case: it is a man's prejudice, his paradoxical attitude. He understands nothing of woman and so it is perfectly clear what she wants and what she is and what she is for—of course, for child-bearing.

Man is for woman, a means: the purpose is always the child. But what is woman for man?

Two different things wanteth the true man: danger and diversion. Therefore wanteth he woman, as the most dangerous plaything.

This is very clearly the standpoint of a man who is enveloped in his anima; he talks from her point of view only. When he contacts the real woman, immediately his anima is in between; he is behind her smoke screen and sees nothing of the real woman. He hears a voice on the other side of that cloud, but he doesn't understand it—it is all a riddle. Yet it is perfectly plain to him that, whatever it says, it must be just that answer which he has already prepared: "Oh, she just wants a child, that is all." Now, the unfortunate thing is that there are plenty of women

who are absolutely true to that role; their very first idea is to have the child of that man, or nothing at all. So, inasmuch as there are such women, and since the anima is the deposit of the age-old experience of man with woman, one can say there is truth in this statement—one can say that obviously the majority of women have told men they wanted to have a child; therefore, he has naturally come to the idea that he is merely a means to the end, and everything else is non-existent.

Miss Wolff: If you don't take the child literally, is there not more truth in it—if you say that the relation of the woman to the man is far more purposeful than the relation of the man to the woman, and he is in that respect a means to an end to her?

Prof. Jung: Well, naturally I remain within Nietzsche's style here when I speak of a child; it is not necessarily a child, but is the purposiveness of a woman's Eros. And that is what a man does not understand at all. Of course, in speaking of a child, Nietzsche is using a drastic kind of language; if he were speaking more psychologically he would say a woman's Eros is purposeful while a man's Eros is playful. The Eros or the function of relatedness in a man's case is not his serious side. His serious side is the mind—he means business with his mind; and there a woman is playful: she talks in order to have talked. When a man talks, he means business; it is always for some definite purpose. He is laying down the law, or making a contract or a statement, or giving an opinion; only an idle man who is possessed by the anima will talk for the sake of talking. But for the woman that is perfectly legitimate, because it is the additional charm in any kind of relationship that she can say what she has to say; if a man does not give that chance to a woman, naturally she feels curtailed, maimed, and the relationship suffers. While to a man the relationship suffers when he has to do just that kind of talking—usually men dislike that form of playfulness; to talk for the sake of talking is like a misuse of something which ought to be businesslike and rational.

Now, when it comes to the Eros it is just the reverse. There a man wants to play and doesn't want to be responsible. He wants Eros for its own sake, and the purpose of Eros is fulfilled in itself. As women like talking around, as their aim is thus fulfilled, so a man's Eros fulfils itself within its own sphere, and then—well, it is just fulfilled and he can go. When wooing and lovemaking have led up to the culmination, a man walks away because his circle is thus completed: he has had what he wanted. But for a woman it is the beginning, not the end, and that is what a man does not understand. Well, one has to learn that as a

woman talks in order to have talked, so a man loves because he *wants* to love; for him it is finished when for a woman it has just begun. Of course that is a source of endless misunderstanding. You see, to a woman relatedness and Eros, which are identical, have purpose—she means business. It is not empty talk about love: *On ne badine pas avec l'amour*² but she really wants to bring about something. Just as a man's mind is not there for what he calls empty talk—just as he means that something should be produced—so a woman means that something should be produced out of relatedness. It is not done in order to have done with it, but in order to bring something about—it may be to breed a child or anything else, but something must come of it.

Of course, the more purposive a woman's Eros is and the more a man sees it, the more he withdraws, because that is not what he means by Eros, not in the least. He doesn't want to spoil his pleasure. As when a woman understands that what she says has consequences, she withdraws, she grows cold; the more serious things become, the more she is afraid of talking: she has seen that people draw conclusions. Perhaps a man says, "You gave me information and I have done such and such a thing, and it is damned nonsense"—and then there is a catastrophe; from that time on she will hold her tongue. So when a man sees the true Eros of a woman, he says, "No, nothing of that kind!" And then women are astonished because they find him completely locked away. He simply gets frightened because she draws conclusions from what was merely a playful merry-go-round. That is a man's love—his idea of it—to begin with at least. It is very awkward indeed, but it is obviously so. I am not its creator, I never would have invented it, so I assume the creator was probably a woman too. A man alone never would invent such a scheme—that is absolutely out of the question you see—to make something serious which is obviously a play.

Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.

Yes! This is true anima stuff.

Too sweet fruits—these the warrior liketh not. Therefore liketh he woman;—bitter is even the sweetest woman.

Better than man doth woman understand children, but man is more childish than woman.

² "One doesn't trifle with love."

So one could conclude that women should understand a man because, as Nietzsche continues,

In the true man there is a child hidden; it wanteth to play.

But apparently he assumes that this does not appeal very much to a woman; therefore he says:

Up then, ye women, and discover the child in man!

She discovered it long ago unfortunately, as a man discovered long ago what the talk of a woman means; she of course uses all sorts of thoughts but he has to correct even the commas in her letters, or the autograph; he sees only too well where the child lies hidden in a woman—in her mind. And the woman of course sees only too clearly where a man is a boy, sometimes rather inconsiderately; even women of a minor quality can see the boy in a man they admire. When a man believes that he is wholly masculine, a sort of sublime rooster, she can see how ridiculous he is in a way. Zarathustra is quite wrong to admonish women to get up and discover the child in man—she sees it only too well; he rather should admonish them to be a bit more tolerant and more understanding with that child.

A plaything let woman be, pure and fine like the precious stone, illumined with the virtues of a world not yet come.

It would of course be very wonderful if women could transform themselves into that marvelous jewel with which man could play. But that is not so in reality. Nothing comes of it when a woman pulls the wool over a man's eyes and makes him believe that she is a delicate jewel illumined with the virtues of a world that is yet to come; it would take a long time and it is not true. And what would a man do with a woman of a world that is yet to come, a heroine on credit?

Let the beam of a star shine in your love! Let your hope say:
"May I bear the Superman!"

You see, this is all the sentimentality of a man who never has really learned anything about women—that is perfectly obvious. But in that anima stuff there is pregnancy nevertheless, and you can see it here; it is highly sentimental and unbecoming, but if you are not shocked by the sentiment, if you overlook it and go for the ideas or the metaphors in what Nietzsche says here, you will discover the child with which the anima is pregnant.

Mrs. Adler: The jewel is the symbol of the self, and the self was iden-

tified with Zarathustra before, but now it seems that the self is identified with the anima in Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: Zarathustra is identical with the anima, so you can say that Zarathustra under the aspect of the anima is pregnant. But it is the anima that is pregnant, pregnant with the jewel. The jewel being a symbol of the self, the anima is really pregnant with the self, but it is expressed in a rather shocking, sentimental way. Now, the father of that child is the old wise man, and the old wise man is forever the Holy Ghost, as he is forever the initiator, the psychopompos, the great teacher; he is the archetype of all that, so he is the personification of what one would call inspiration. He is the inspiring archetype that holds the secret of the self. In the Christian myth, for instance, it is the Holy Ghost that causes Mary to be pregnant with the Word, the incarnated Logos: Christ who is an anticipation of the self. In the case of Simon Magus and Helena, it takes another form; one might say it was the illegitimate or the immoral form, for Helena has no child. But this is simply the anticipation of the idea that the child is not a real child, but an invisible birth. It is exactly the same, whether it is Simon Magus, or Zarathustra, or any other old wise man that is given rebirth through Helena; she is the mother of the father, as the old man is the father of his mother. Therefore, in Gnosticism the creator was called the father-mother; this is the hermaphroditic creator, the father-mother of the beginning.³ So it is quite interesting to discover how in the worst kind of sentimentality the symbol lies buried.

You see, sentimentality gets on one's nerves and rightly so; one should be shocked by sentimentality because it is so wrong. It is quite correct when women are shocked by the anima sentimentality of men, for it is just the wrong expression. But that is simply unfortunate; it comes from the fact that there are unconscious mental contents for which there are no conscious forms. They can be couched in no other terms than sentiment. A man is possessed by the anima on account of the fact that his mind does not offer an opportunity to his unconscious. He has no vessel, no form, into which to receive its contents. The anima is pregnant and he is merely sentimental about it. He is like old Joseph, who is a somewhat regrettable figure; he looks at Mary and says, "Oh yes, it is very wonderful that you are pregnant by the Holy Ghost; yes, I will be a patron saint to you. I will help you. I will go with

³ The early Gnostics frequently spoke, in opposition to the monadic father-god, of the ultimate dyad, father-mother. See Mead*, pp. 336-38. Jung discusses this on p. 1490, 1490n below.

you to Egypt.” But it is a regrettable situation, very awkward; he gets awfully sentimental about it. And that is exactly a man’s situation whose mind does not provide that form, that hermetic vase, in which to receive the contents of his unconscious. In that way, by understanding it, you might become perhaps quite tolerant and lenient with a man’s sentimentality. But he really deserves a spanking nevertheless, and women with instinct will never hesitate to provide it; they cannot help punishing a man for this kind of unreal sentimentality. One cannot take it literally and it should not be taken literally. For a man ought to take his mind seriously and to provide the necessary vase in which to receive those contents of his unconscious.

It is the same with women; it is of course not expressed there in terms of pregnancy, but in masculine terms. It is the *logos spermaticos* that plays the same role in a woman, the seed word. Her playful mind is not sentimental—well, you know what an animus is, I don’t need to repeat it. It is irritating to a man and he is rightly irritated and is quite right in beating back. Many women need a hiding for their animus. A man’s brutality is always roused by the animus of a woman, but she needs and wants it; her unconscious cannot come to itself if she is not manhandled in a way; that is the reason why the animus drives a man quite mad. But in that wrong form of the animus there is a kernel of truth; there is something for which a woman should find the right form. There is a form, but it is only in her Eros and not in her mind; she cannot make it through her mind, only through her feeling. You see, a woman’s Eros is inspiring to a man provided that it is not animus; if it is animus he beats it back and he is quite right to do so. As a woman is quite right in refusing that slimy, sticky sentimentality a man produces. But that wrongness is pregnant, as the animus is full of seed. Well, Zarathustra continues:

In your love let there be valour! With your love shall ye assail him who inspireth you with fear!

In your love be your honour! Little doth woman understand otherwise about honour. But let this be your honour: always to love more than ye are loved, and never be the second.

You see, he teaches here a sort of Superwoman.

Let man fear woman when she loveth: then maketh she every sacrifice, and everything else she regardeth as worthless.

This doesn’t need any particular comment. There is enough in human experience to substantiate what he says here.

Let man fear woman when she hateth: for man in his innermost soul is merely evil; woman, however, is mean.

Mean is not exactly the right word for *schlecht*—*base* would render it better.

Prof. Fierz: Doesn't he mean *böse*, like a tiger?

Prof. Jung: *Schlecht* has also the connotation of corrupt, not only evil but on top of that, corrupt.⁴

Miss Taylor: Vile?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that would about cover it.

Whom hateth woman most?—Thus spake the iron to the loadstone: "I hate thee most, because thou attractest, but art too weak to draw unto thee."

The happiness of man is, "I will." The happiness of woman is, "He will."

That is of course the way the anima sees it, the anima being that cloud which veils a man's eyes; he only sees woman inasmuch as he is affected by her. He does not see into her. You see, he says here that woman's happiness is "He will"; but a woman's happiness is also "I will"—only she does not say so. It is the way of the purposeful Eros to say "He will" instead of "I will," but that is a suggestion: "Don't you want . . . ?" The purposefulness of a woman's Eros suggests it in such a way that the man is caught by the illusion that he really wants the thing; he doesn't want it probably, but she suggests it exactly like a clever saleswoman who can envelop her client to such an extent that he believes he wants it and buys it. That is what a man doesn't see. He really believes that the woman is happy that he wants it; in his selfishness and blind egotism he is only happy when he can fulfil his own will, and he does not see that she is fulfilling her own will too. If he meets the same woman at another moment, or perhaps another woman in the same circumstances, and her purpose doesn't coincide with his, then he will learn a lesson and he will be deeply disappointed. And again he will say, "Oh, you never can understand women!"

"Lo! now hath the world become perfect!"—Thus thinketh every woman when she obeyeth with all her love.

Obey, must the woman, and find a depth for her surface. Surface, is woman's soul, a mobile, stormy film on shallow water.

⁴ Kaufmann* translates *schlecht* as "bad."

Yes, that is the unfortunate misunderstanding between men and women; a man doesn't understand that a woman's business is love, as his mind is a man's business. And a woman makes the same mistake in thinking that a man's mind is for itself, but to a man his mind is no end in itself: he uses it for certain purposes. So love, as a man understands it, is a sort of carousal in heaven, but that is not so with a woman and she would be a damned fool if she assumed that this was or should be her love. Her love is just as purposive as a man's mind; she is reasonable, she wants to do business with her Eros, and a man naturally hates to see that. Of course, women would be stupid if they let it be visible to a man. If you want to do real business you must not let it be seen or people will become mistrustful; a clever salesman does not show his hand.

Man's soul, however, is deep, its current gusheth in subterranean caverns: . . .

Yes, that is the mistake a man always makes; he sees a woman as his anima, the foam tossed to and fro on shallow water; but he feels no certainty because there is something behind his anima that has depths. When he projects his anima, he naturally only touches an illusory surface of the woman and does not see that a woman's purpose is at least as deep as his own. This form of the anima is again a metaphor which seems to have its history; you know, Venus or Aphrodite is the *aphro-geneia*, the one that is born out of the foam. Well, if he had had one serious love affair he would have discovered something about women, about the subterranean caverns, and he would have marvelled.

woman surmiseth its force, but comprehendeth it not.—

This is just anima talk. The anima always tries to convince a man of his extraordinary depths and what a hell of a fellow he is, in order to envelop or entangle him in as many foolish love affairs as she possibly can—the more the better. You see, since he is such a man of power and God knows what, he naturally assumes that he is a sort of savior to all sorts of women, and the more he gets entangled, the more the anima has free play. So he can never establish a real relation to a woman; he never can make roots in the world. He is simply a fool caught in his own cage and driven around by his anima that has become like those women in circuses who go around with a whip; she keeps him going but in a state of complete unreality. And when the anima has that quality, she forms such a thick cloud round a man's consciousness that he

cannot individuate. He is entangled in his own superstitious ideas about himself and cannot pierce the cloud of illusion, so he doesn't touch reality at all. He remains unborn—doesn't come out into the world, really, to see the light of day. He is always chasing butterflies and doesn't see that he is chasing round in his own cage. It is better that a man doesn't think that a woman has divined his power, because there is nothing to be divined; he is an ordinary human being and it is much better that he considers his power very limited. Surely, women don't understand men in certain respects—as men don't understand women—because they don't take the necessary trouble to do so, and that is of course tragic.

But the difficulty of understanding does not lie where people who have no experience assume. It is rather the difficulty of understanding oneself. If a man could only understand the difference between himself and his anima, he would understand himself; then he would know what a man is and then he would know by instinct what a woman is. If he thinks via the anima about himself he never will discover himself, but stay caught in illusions. And inasmuch as a woman does not know herself—and if she thinks through her animus she certainly does not know herself—she will never know a man, will be forever bewildered. Naturally she will project her opinion upon a man: he ought to be this and that. So the real difficulty is not in the object, where such blindfolded people always suppose the darkness to be. A man thinks the difficulty is that he doesn't understand the woman; no, he doesn't understand himself. Whenever one has to treat such a condition, the whole course of the analysis, as dictated by dreams, always leads the patient to himself; and if they can once understand something of themselves, they will understand other people. One cannot learn it through the object because one invariably sees only one's own face in the object; one stares into the cloud and it becomes a mirror reflex. It is finally one's own face. It is a general truth that one can only understand anything inasmuch as one understands oneself.

Then answered the old woman: "Many fine things hath Zarathustra said, . . ."

She is still a clever old thing, not unlearned; she is playing the game because naturally she is his anima devil.

"especially for those who are young enough for them."

She is playing up: Of course I know I am quite old but older women understand men so much better, they have experience, naturally the

poor man is not understood by such young geese, but older women have a heart for men and understand their needs. She is playing up to him as if she were young. And he licks it up!

“Strange! Zarathustra knoweth little about women, and yet he is right about them.”

Just because he knows so little of them!

“Doth this happen, because with women nothing is impossible?”

“And now accept a little truth by way of thanks! I am old enough for it!

“Swaddle it up and hold its mouth: . . .”

Don’t be indiscreet and tell it to everybody.

“otherwise it will scream too loudly, the little truth.”

“Give me, woman, thy little truth!” said I. And thus spake the old woman:

“Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!”—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

You see, if Zarathustra were really wise he would say, “Isn’t she a clever old thing to play up to me like a true woman? And doesn’t she lie like anything, giving me good advice and making believe that she understands me much better than I do myself? Remember thy whip when you go to *such* women, or, when you go to your anima remember your whip.” That is what a man never knows and it is the first thing he has to learn in analysis: Remember thy whip. But the whip is for his anima and not for women, not even if they deserve it—though if he knows how to use it, it might be very good for a woman, as it is good for a man to be kicked sometimes. He first must learn to whip his anima, however. Of course this is a much quoted passage; men like it. They lick it up like anything. But they make the mistake of trying to escape their anima. As women try to escape the animus by locking it in a certain man and making him the *bête noire*, instead of putting up with their own animus and saying, “Oh, here is the hellish beast, not over there.” And naturally a man, being human, tries to find that woman whom he can accuse of spoiling nature and being the cause of all evil, for then he knows where the devil is. That woman is the devil incarnate has been an organized truth for two thousand years; man invented the wonderful story that the serpent in Paradise was the woman and that she was influenced by the devil, the two being pretty much the same. This idea was valid throughout the whole Middle Ages and we are still

under its spell; a woman represents something so utterly different from man that naturally all her moral principles—everything except coarse facts—are absolutely different. So a man's world instantly becomes relative when he admits that a woman's standpoint is valid too, and he gets into the most frightful turmoil and confusion. The whole evil of the world has been called the work of the woman, meaning the work of the devil. They are equal.

Now since there is such a historical prejudice, one has to protest against this passage in Nietzsche; it is apparently again applied here to women, and it seems as if it had been suggested by that old woman—who is of course also Nietzsche. That is not preposterous, I know women who play the game to such an extent that they would even tell a man that certain women deserved the whip. You see, that whole passage is couched in such terms that one cannot help thinking that this is really what is meant, that Zarathustra or Nietzsche is of the conviction that you can only deal with women when you don't forget your whip. But the truth is that the whole thing is symbolic, which of course Nietzsche himself has not seen. That oldish woman is his anima who is just playing the game like any old woman—old Eve. The eternal Eve is playing her role in himself, and when it comes to her, he should remember the whip; he should discriminate between his ideas and the ideas of that woman demon he harbors.

Miss Wolff: This chapter opens in an unusual way with a question put to Zarathustra, and I think no other chapter does. And afterwards Zarathustra seems to be putting a question, but that cannot be because he is quite alone where he is hiding this secret thing under his coat. So perhaps we have to find out who is really addressing him.

Prof. Jung: Whom do you suppose? Who is the nearest?

Miss Wolff: He says "my brother."

Prof. Jung: Yes, but the supposition from the former chapter is that he is in solitude, that nobody else is there. Yet apparently he is two again.

Miss Wolff: It would be Nietzsche's own voice then.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is asking himself. That is according to the rule. He says: *Da wurde eins zu zwei, und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei.*⁵ When he is alone Zarathustra appears as his second person. So one notices that, with that Zarathustra element in him, Nietzsche is very secretive. He walks about in a funny way and seems to be concealing something. It is just as though he were asking himself why he was stealing along so fur-

⁵ Again, "One becomes two and Zarathustra passes by me."

tively. But unfortunately he never takes it seriously enough; he forgets all his science and his criticism when it comes to his own psychology. It is a funny thing that people who have a most psychological and discriminating attitude in dealing with the psychology of primitives, say, or perhaps the psychology of other people, forget everything when it comes to themselves. They forget every virtue and become as vicious as other people. For instance, those people who have that Christian interest in their neighbor indulge in no end of kindness, in spite of being told that the fellow they are taking care of is perhaps just a cheat, not worth all their consideration; yet when they should apply that kindness to themselves, they have no mercy. Then they are just as hard as steel, cruel—and think that is a virtue. But it is no virtue. It is a vice. They create a desert in themselves. And so Nietzsche, being exceedingly psychological and discriminating in his other writings, when it comes to himself is not critical. He forgets all about it. He should say, “Now who is there alone? Am I alone? Is Zarathustra alone?” Then he would instantly see that he is not alone: there is always that second one, that friend, with him. The creative man wants to be alone, ought to be alone, and when he discovers that he is two he should be serious about it and say, “Now, old man, what are you doing? You are hiding something.” Then he would have objectivity. If once only he could have a decent discussion with Zarathustra and ask him about his secret psychology, he would discover that Zarathustra also is two, that he consists of a man and a woman. And then he would have the whole game, the whole drama. Of course we cannot expect that of a man who lived in a time when such things were out of the question. I only mention it in order to bring the thing up to date.

Miss Wolff: Since Nietzsche could not do that, might not this be like the voice of the dreamer you told us about in Ascona, who had such an objective voice in his dreams?⁶ He might have a sort of innermost psychological consciousness that calls his attention to the fact that he is the friend of the evil doers. That is quite logical because formerly he said he was going to meet his seven devils. Now he is with seven devils and the first appearance of the evil doers is this child he hides, and then the old woman.

Prof. Jung: I quite agree. You know, Nietzsche at his mental best was really a discriminating psychologist and when he is truly at his best he

⁶ In his lecture “Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process,” given at the Eranos Conference of 1935, Jung comments on the voice in dreams that “expresses some truth or condition that is beyond all doubt” (CW 12, par. 115).

represents himself, his own self; in that which he does out of his most individual substance, the self appears. So we could say just as well that this is the impersonal voice of the self, that his intellectual or philosophic or psychological consciousness begins to manifest here. We shall have many situations where it comes in, so that one really marvels that he never could grasp it; for instance, in this jewel, and the star, and later on in the chapter about the adder, it comes so close that one would almost expect him to be able to realize it. Yet he does not; it was not of his time. Of course *we* fall down somewhere else; we make this discrimination now but we omit something else. And we never shall become perfect—happily not!

Mrs. Baynes: He tells this chapter in the past tense, so I thought that the child he carried in his arms was the truth the old woman gave him.

Prof. Jung: Well, it would be hardly worthwhile for Zarathustra to make such a fuss about that, like an old spinster, perfectly ridiculous. One sees that the woman is cheating, and what Zarathustra says here is not particularly wise; moreover it has often been said before; one can read very similar things in Schopenhauer.

Mrs. Baynes: Yes; but inasmuch as he knew so little of woman he probably thought it was the last word of wisdom, so it would be legitimate to take it that he thought it was a great truth.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right; on the surface that is so. But you see, though this whole chapter really contains some very profound things, they are under the disguise of wrong ideas and sentiments. So I would say, yes, in a way what the old woman whispered to him would be the child he is hiding, but there is more in that child. For instance, if he had realized that this woman who speaks to him is really another voice, that she is not only his invention, he would have been able to lay his hand on the treasure hidden behind that phantasmagoria.

Mrs. Jung: You said that the anima was pregnant with the Superman and that the father was the Holy Ghost. I should like to know what is the role of the individual? It seems to me that nothing is born if it is left to archetypes only.

Prof. Jung: Well, the individual of course has the heaviest burden in this case because he is the living carrier of all those figures. You see, the living individual has to carry the anima that is pregnant. He is really the Joseph in the whole show, the means by which the thing becomes real. The individual is the human being in space and time, in the here and now, who has to make that inner drama real. And that is the great trouble. For instance, the man Jesus suffered miserably for the divine

drama that was enacted in him. That is the role of the individual—bad enough!

Prof. Fierz: I should like to point out that the foregoing chapter deals with the brother, and in the preceding one he is speaking to his brethren; he seems to have concentrated more and more on one person, and in the chapter we are discussing, even he disappears and the anima appears. It is as if she were emanating through these chapters; it goes more and more away from collectivity and then she appears.

Prof. Jung: That is necessary; otherwise she could not appear.

Prof. Fierz: It is quite logical.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it is concentrating upon himself. It should come to that head, otherwise nothing would be realized.

Mrs. Crowley: I think in this chapter the secret was the wisdom of the serpent, or the serpent attitude of understanding, and in the next chapter the serpent appears.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that was already in the air.

LECTURE IX

11 December 1935

Prof. Jung:

Mrs. Baumann has brought us a picture of St. John, which is quite remarkable because he is represented with a little angel girl behind his back, who is probably whispering into his ear that famous secret. We come now to the chapter called "The Bite of the Adder." What is the connection—always keeping in mind that we have here a logical series of images?

Mrs. Crowley: It is via the anima problem.

Mrs. Fierz: Eve being connected with the snake.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the anima is represented as woman above and serpent below, as the serpent in Paradise is often represented with a woman's head; the snake element is always connected with the anima problem. And why is that?

Mrs. Crowley: There is the chthonic quality, the association with the earth, and the snake also has the prophetic and divine quality.

Mrs. Fierz: It is the symbol for the emotional system, the lower nervous system.

Prof. Jung: For the lower nervous system, and of course that may become visible through emotion but it is not necessarily emotional. So one could say the snake was chosen for its external appearance and for its characteristic qualities in general. It is a coldblooded animal with a non-human psychology; one can establish a sort of *rappport* with almost any warmblooded animal but with snakes there is no parallel feeling. It is peculiarly strange to human psychology. Its brain is very little developed, chiefly consisting of sense organs and their nervous appendages; the main body of its nervous system is the cerebrospinal prolongation, the lower central motor centers, and then the whole spinal cord. The case is still worse with the saurians, those so-called dragons which can be referred back to the dinosaurs; man was not a witness of the earliest saurians, but he was very probably a contemporary of the dinosaurs, and so had the *engrammata*, the racial memories of dino-

saur or dragons. And they were characterized by an almost non-existent brain since the accumulation of nervous matter in the spinal cord was much greater than the brain; in the lumbar region there was an intumescence, an accumulation of nervous matter, which surpassed the brain considerably in size. That shows very clearly for what the dragon or snake stands.

The word *dragon* comes from the Latin *drako* and the Greek *drakon*, meaning snake; it is the same word. (In German, *Wurm* and snake are the same; and the dragon is the *Lindwurm*, *lind* being originally a Celtic word which meant "soft, flowing like water." The name of our river Limmat comes from *lind*, and the upper part of the river is called the Linth. And there is a Roman inscription found near the lake of Thun in Switzerland which says the inhabitants of the *regio Lindensis*, meaning the Lind region, devote this altar to the gods; the Lind being the water region, they were inhabitants of the lake. The German town Lindau on Lake Constance comes from that same root, *lind*.) The dragon is a water worm, and dragons are always supposed to live near the water or in the rivers, brooks, and so on. Another connection is the fact that a river meanders exactly as a snake moves. Also the Chinese Tao is of the nature of water—it moves like a snake—and the original idea of the Tao was a feminine goddess that was a serpent. So the serpent and the river are essentially the same because they are analogous; for to the primitive mind things that are analogous, or of analogous use to man, are supposed to be substantially the same.

Whenever the snake symbolism appears in dreams, then, it is always representative of the lower motor centers of the brain and of the spinal cord, and our fear of snakes denotes that we are not fully in tune with our instinctive lower centers; they still contain a threat to us. This comes from the fact that our consciousness, having a certain amount of real freedom of will, can deviate from the inexorable laws of nature which govern man, from our own laws which are organically formed in the structure of the lower brain surface. Inasmuch as we have ethical freedom we can deviate but we do it with fear; we have a certain idea that something untoward will happen to us because we are instinctively aware of the power of those lower centers. Since they are connected with the sympathetic nervous system which rules all the important centers of our bodies—digestion, inner secretions, the functioning of the liver and kidneys and so on—a serious deviation means upsetting the functioning of those nervous systems and we eventually risk a grave disturbance in our glandular organs or in our blood circulation. A certain thought can arouse your heart so that it beats faster; it can pro-

duce such an acceleration that there may even be a sort of hypertrophy of the heart. These disturbances can go as far as to cause diabetes, or skin diseases; or it can cause such a lowering of self defence through the blood that one becomes open to all kinds of infection. One of the most psychogenic diseases is angina, a disease of the heart. Of course you can say I am a psychotherapist and therefore think that everything is psychical, but you also hear these facts from specialists on internal diseases; *many* people have the idea that those diseases are of psychical origin. So this lower nervous system is a constant threat, a sword of Damocles, and we are—and we ought to be—instinctively careful, always a bit afraid lest we might deviate too far.

Those people who are completely identical with consciousness are often so unaware of the body that the head walks away with them, so they lose control of the body and anything can happen to it: the whole system becomes upset. The brain should be in harmony with the lower nervous system; our consciousness should be in practically the same tune or rhythm. Otherwise, I am quite convinced that under particularly unfavorable conditions one can be killed. Whenever you have an argument with yourself, whenever you are making a decision, in order to be far-reaching enough you should consider the reaction of the serpent, of the lower brain centers; nothing can be decided definitely, nothing can be definitely argued if that answer is overlooked. One should always wait for the answer. Those people are wise who say: "It seems to me one could decide in such and such a way, but I want to sleep on it." For in sleep, consciousness is extinct and there you have a chance to become acquainted with the reaction of the serpent. Certain negroes, for instance, would say they must discuss a matter first with their serpent; they try to find out whether what they are going to do is really built upon the pattern, the fantasies, of the laws of nature. So it is very characteristic that after the chapter where the anima has a lot to say, we should have a chapter where the snake turns up. And that is why the anima is represented as a woman above and snake below; there is a Latin verse about it, not exactly a snake in this case but another coldblooded animal, a fish: *Desinit in piscem mulier formosa superne*, which means that the woman who is beautiful above ends with a fish's tail. You see, that symbolism comes from the fact that the anima is a semihuman function on one side; through her head she denotes that she has connection with human consciousness, but below she extends into the spinal cord and into the body.

Our unconscious is surely located in the body, and you mustn't think this a contradiction to the statement I usually make, that the collective

unconscious is everywhere; for if you could put yourself into your sympathetic system, you would know what sympathy is—you would understand why the nervous system is called sympathetic. You would then feel that you were in everything; you would not feel yourself as an isolated being, would not experience the world and life as your own private experience—as we most certainly do inasmuch as we are conscious persons. In the sympathetic nervous system you would experience not as a person but as mankind, or even as belonging to the animal kingdom; you would experience nothing in particular, but the whole phenomena of life as if it were one. Of course you can only get hints of such an experience, as, for example, you experience the mood of a crowd or of a place as if you were in everything that constitutes the situation; you feel the mood of everybody and swing into it together with the crowd. That would illustrate it to a small degree. Also on account of the possibility of such extension you must necessarily assume that such awareness would be without time. You would need time in order to transfer your head consciousness to a distance and into everybody, while the kind of perception in the sympathetic system needs no time; it is at the same time everywhere. But you see, this collective unconscious, in spite of its being everywhere, or in spite of its universal awareness, is located in the body; the sympathetic nervous system of the body is the organ by which you have the possibility of such awareness; therefore you can say the collective unconscious is in the lower centers of the brain and the spinal cord and the sympathetic system. Speaking accurately, this is the organ by which you experience the collective unconscious, which means as if there were nothing but you and the world—whether you are the world, or extend over the whole world, or the whole world is in you, is all the same.

And that is the secret of the anima, human on the one side and that most paradoxical and incomprehensible thing on the other. On the one side she is an inferior woman with all the bad qualities of a merely biological woman, an intriguing and plotting devil who always tries to entangle a man and make a perfect fool of him; yet she winds up with that snake's tail, with that peculiar insight and awareness. She is a psychopompos, and leads you into the understanding of the collective unconscious just by the way of the fool. So wherever you touch upon that anima business you will have a paradoxical picture and Nietzsche was careful enough to divide these two aspects into two chapters instead of being suspicious already in the first chapter as to whether this was not one of the famous tricks played by the anima on man. But apparently the idea did not come to him that this was a trick of the little old

woman; he may get it in this chapter however, for here the snake bites. Here we shall have the reaction to the unconscious, to what Zarathustra said in the chapter before.

One day had Zarathustra fallen asleep under a fig-tree, owing to the heat, with his arms over his face.

Why just the fig tree?

Prof. Reichstein: It is a mother symbol, or at least a very old female symbol.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is a nourishing tree like an apple tree, which is often considered to be of a feminine nature; the fig is nourishing food. But that is not the thing which sticks out in the history of the fig tree.

Mrs. Baumann: Christ spoke of the tree which did not bear any figs; the fig tree was made to have figs and it had none.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he was particularly angry with that tree; it got under his skin somewhere and he cursed it in an absolutely un-Christlike fashion.

Mr. Allemann: There is the connection with the serpent in Paradise and the tree of life. And Adam and Eve wore fig leaves.

Prof. Jung: The fig tree and the fig leaf have played their peculiar role since very remote times.

Princess von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen: I have heard that in Arabia the fig meant the womb.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it has an erotic significance. Have you any evidence for that?

Mrs. Crowley: Well, sometimes the Greek statues used fig leaves as sort of garments.

Prof. Jung: The fact that they chose fig leaves to cover certain parts was by no means out of the way; to any somewhat obscene fantasy the fig leaf is quite obviously representative of the male organ. Moreover, fig wood has always been used for the images of Priapus which the peasants put up in the fields for scarecrows, but it was also to fertilize the fields. I don't know whether that was true in Egypt where they still have those Priapi. I saw one near Luxor and you surely have seen them too. They are phallic figures which are supposed to fertilize the fields. And the Romans, instead of putting up stones to mark the boundary lines of fields or estates, put up figures of Priapus which served several purposes at the same time. They marked the boundary lines, served as scarecrows, and as fertilizers of the fields. They were always represented with huge phalli. The fig tree was supposed to be of a phallic nature on account of its leaves, and figs have a certain resemblance to

a womb; also they contain the seed inside, supposed to be the eggs. The pomegranate was also a symbol of the fertile womb.

Now, when the fig tree turns up here and Zarathustra goes to sleep under it, it means that an archetype is mobilized within him which affects him like a narcotic. That is typical; when you get into a situation where an archetype becomes constellated, you will undergo this peculiar hypnotic effect: you fall asleep rather suddenly. It has a peculiar fascination which makes you unconscious. And people who constellate an archetype have such a hypnotic effect. Of course there are people who just bore you, and one couldn't say a particular archetype of boredom was constellated—I don't mean those very normal effects which naturally begin to work after a certain time. If you are at a particularly boring lecture, for instance, after a while you will fall asleep. I mean those rather sudden losses of libido which you definitely feel; the primitive would say you had lost a soul and have therefore gone underground. Now this archetype of the fig tree has been brought out by the talk Zarathustra had before. How can you explain the fact that this particular archetype became thereby constellated?

Mrs. Fierz: He said many things about women but he never touched upon the real magic charm that they have on a man in an erotic way; and the anima also has an erotic quality which was not spoken of.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and he omitted entirely to mention the fact that he himself was under the spell. One is always under the spell of the anima and of the woman, but one dislikes to admit it because one wants to keep up the illusion of freedom and independence. So one pushes the fact of woman as far away as possible. You see, he spoke in a very lofty way in the chapter before—when you go to women don't forget the whip and so on—without paying attention to the possibility that the woman may also not have forgotten the whip. That would be a pretty awkward situation. He behaves as if he were entirely beyond the problem and talks about it from a height of twelve thousand feet, quite disregarding the real facts, and therefore he constellates the archetype. For when one is so high, naturally something will come from below to tell him that there are other facts which should be taken into consideration. So he falls asleep; he is pulled down into the unconscious to the other fact, which is a woman. And it was hot. Now where does the heat come from?

Mrs. Schevill: From his own libido.

Prof. Jung: Yes, naturally; he sinks down into the hot world. And where does that begin?

Mrs. Baumann: In the sympathetic region.

Prof. Jung: Yes, or it would be the *manipura* center; that is the fiery region where things become hot. It means the hot blood, it is the so-called alchemical oven in the abdomen, the kitchen, the laboratory where things are transformed, the stomach. He sinks down into his own underworld and is fascinated by the archetype of sexuality. And he covered his face with his arms. What does that gesture denote?

Dr. Whitney: He is trying to protect his consciousness, is he not?

Prof. Jung: It might be a gesture of protection, or what would it more probably be?

Mr. Allemann: Introversion. He shuts out the outside world.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he sinks down into himself and covers his face in order not to see. In order to sleep you seek naturally a dark place or cover your eyes in order not to be made conscious by the light.

And there came an adder and bit him in the neck, so that Zarathustra screamed with pain.

In his unconscious the serpent comes up and bites him. What does a snake bite mean?

Mrs. Schevill: In America it generally means that the snake is protecting itself; the rattlesnake, for instance, bites to protect itself.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, looked at from the point of view of the animal it is what one calls the *Angstbeissen*;¹ most snakes only bite from fear and for self-protection. The African mamba, the cobra in India, and in the West Indies the fer-de-lance are exceptions: those three snakes attack on sight. They even seek their victim. But the snake bite is a well-known symbol. Do you know a parallel?

Miss Wolff: The Egyptian myth of Ra.

Prof. Jung: Yes, when Ra, the sun god, the king of the two Egypts, was making his way over the heavens, Mother Isis had prepared a worm for him, a sand viper which lives buried in the sand, a particularly ugly beast; only its nose sticks out and it bites whoever walks over it. So the sun god was bitten, and then all the gods came together and begged Mother Isis to remove the poison from his system, which she did, but Ra was definitely weakened. Now this is very much like that very ancient Egyptian myth which has been believed through so many thousands of years because it is a very great truth, one of the great psychological truths expressed in mythology. You see, the sun god is a hero man, the typical man with high ambitious plans, but he is at variance with his anima; she doesn't want such aloofness, but wants to have

¹ "Anxiety-bite."

him close to the earth, she doesn't like his distance from the lower centers. So she prepares a trap into which he invariably falls, thus losing all his divinity, which is of course a rather painful loss to a man; it sometimes means losing all his best qualities. It is a dangerous catastrophe when a man falls into a trap laid by the anima. To be caught by the heel is the usual fate of a man. Crush the head of the serpent and it will bite you in the heel. This is a regular occurrence and it can finish a man's career, his hopes, or even his life. Or it may also be the way to wisdom, if he is intelligent enough to make the right use of it. Well, whether one avoids the trap very sagely or whether one falls into it is pretty much the same thing; in either case he is poisoned, that is the awful thing, and therefore it is expressed in a myth. Now Nietzsche or Zarathustra would be very much in that predicament; he talked in a very high style, walked over the heavens, and then down he comes with a crash.

When he had taken his arm from his face he looked at the serpent; and then did it recognize the eyes of Zarathustra, wriggled awkwardly, and tried to get away. "Not at all," said Zarathustra, "as yet hast thou not received my thanks! Thou has awakened me in time; my journey is yet long." "Thy journey is short," said the adder, sadly; "my poison is fatal." Zarathustra smiled. "When did ever a dragon die of a serpent's poison?"—said he. "But take thy poison back! Thou art not rich enough to present it to me." Then fell the adder again on his neck, and licked his wound.

Isn't that a wonderful miracle!

Mrs. Fierz: But is it not queer that it is the neck that is bitten? It should be the foot.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and why is it the throat?

Mrs. Fierz: The throat is the center of speech.

Mrs. Crowley: The *logos*.

Prof. Jung: Well, he was sky-walking in his speech, so it has to do with words; his feet were not on the ground. The same motif comes again later where the serpent tries to crawl into the shepherd's throat, and he is advised to bite off its head. So we must assume that the throat region is the active organ. In how far is that true?

Mrs. Sigg: When Nietzsche wrote this part of *Zarathustra* he had just had five months of daily discussions with Lou Salomé.

Prof. Jung: Ah, there he met the serpent, that is quite certain. But it happens here to Zarathustra, and why was he bitten just in the throat?

Miss Welsh: Because he was always preaching.

Prof. Jung: Yes, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*; you see, he did not act, he spoke. Zarathustra is very obviously the *logos*, and you cannot reach the *logos* with the feet because it has none; you can only reach it by the throat where the word comes from. Expressed in the Tantric system it would be in the *visuddha* center that he was bitten, not in *muladhara*, because he is located on a much higher plane. So it might lame his speech, as, if bitten in the feet, his legs would be first paralysed. Obviously the purpose of the serpent in the case of Zarathustra himself and of the shepherd, is to get at the speech center, to lame his talk. It is through his talk that he has attracted the serpent, for it is through his talk that he walks over the heavens like a sun god. Now Zarathustra looks at the serpent and the serpent obviously becomes quite uncomfortable. Can you explain this peculiar phenomenon?

Miss Wolff: It almost looks as if the snake, if it had known that it was Zarathustra, would not have bitten him.

Prof. Jung: Probably, if the snake had been informed beforehand. But why should the snake not bite Zarathustra? There is a particular justification for this passage.

Miss Wolff: It may be Zarathustra's own snake; he has a snake and an eagle, so if it had recognized him it would not have done it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but he says, "When did ever a dragon die of a serpent's poison?" He identifies with the serpent—he himself is the serpent—and he assumes that when one serpent bites another it would not be poisonous. As a matter of fact that is not quite true; serpents do die from the poison of their own species even, but that doesn't matter. Because Zarathustra is of the same nature as the snake, its poison here doesn't injure him. And in how far is Zarathustra of the same nature?

Mrs. Crowley: He is the hero, and the hero is supposed to be a snake.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is supposed to have a serpent's soul. The justification for this idea is found chiefly in Greek mythology. Those two old heroes Cecrops and Erechtheus were supposed to be half human and half serpent; they were legendary kings of Athens, and Cecrops was the founder of the Acropolis. Also it was thought in ancient Greece that the souls of heroes actually took the form of serpents that lived in the grave, so they used to sacrifice to the soul-serpent through an opening on top of the tomb. And one finds very often the belief with primitives that the first animal seen near the grave of the diseased contains the soul of the dead man—the first snake or toad or beetle or whatever it is that appears is supposed to be the carrier of his soul. In East Africa they generally assume that souls appear in the form of serpents, and whenever a serpent enters a hut the people clear out, not

from fear, for they could kill it, but out of sheer politeness; they say an ancestral spirit has honored their hut with his visit and so they leave the hut for its use. They even leave food for it, and then when it has gone, they use the hut again for ordinary purposes. So souls are very often identified with snakes.

Now, we have seen that the anima is a serpent and here we see that Zarathustra holds that he is a dragon and therefore invulnerable to the bite of the snake. And the snake itself seems to be quite uncomfortable; it is wriggling under the eye of Zarathustra who, being a hero, has snake's eyes. According to the Northern myth, the hero has the magic eye of the extraordinary individual whose soul is a serpent;² a hero soul does not yield to the ordinary difficulties of the human being. If a fellow is a hero he has a different kind of soul, is impenetrable, inaccessible to human considerations; the ordinary human being is afraid. He doesn't dare to go there, but the hero says, "I am not afraid, I go there," so his soul is cold like the soul of a serpent. He is not human inside but a divine animal. And so Zarathustra explains here that he is not in the least impressed by that snakebite because he belongs to the same species. Now, in how far does he belong to the same species?

Dr. Whitney: Insofar as he is an archetype.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is of the same kind as the anima. The old wise man represents the wisdom of the serpent, as the anima represents its movement and cunning; there is really very little difference between the old wise man and the anima and therefore the two are so often together, as in the myth of Simon Magus and Helena, and in the idea of the Sibylla or the Somnambule and the wise man. They are near relatives. Therefore, Zarathustra is not injured. It would be a different thing if Nietzsche himself had been bitten, but he is so thoroughly transformed into Zarathustra that he thinks he *is* Zarathustra and that therefore the snake cannot reach him. You see, that is the illusory protection which identification with an archetype gives you; you assume that nothing can reach you because you are of the same nature, but in reality you are poisoned and you cannot explain the evil effect. You notice that you suffer from an apparently inexplicable ailment, but you don't trace it back to the snakebite because you are convinced that it hasn't hurt you in the least; another archetype cannot hurt you—it is just a sham fight. But unfortunately, terrible destruction takes place in

² Jacob Grimm reports that divine heroes descended from Wotan inherit the "snake in the eye." *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass (Gloucester, Mass., 1976; orig. 1888), vol. IV, p. 491.

the body and one cannot establish a causality. So whenever a man is identical with an archetypal figure, he naturally thinks that certain things won't bite him; or if they should he assumes it to be the bite of a gnat, not even a decent mosquito. He thinks he is not injured and if things become queer or entirely wrong afterwards, it is for every reason under the sun but it has no connection with anything that happened before. Of course I quite realize that the idea of being identical with an archetype is a somewhat unpopular statement; we usually cannot see when we are in that condition. It is one of the most invisible experiences we can have, and in analysis it often takes a very long time until one can make people see in how far they are living archetypes. That comes from the fact that it is still a sort of ideal to be identical with archetypes: we are taught to be so.

For instance, the whole teaching of the Catholic church, the *imitatio Christi*, which is also valid for many Protestants, is the instruction on how to be identical with the archetype. The Oxford Movement is a training to that end: put all your sins and responsibility on Christ, give your life to him. A man who is supposed to be one of the leaders told me that they confess and throw all their burdens upon Christ and he takes care of them; they haven't to decide, but are quite identical with Christ. "You say you are identical with Christ?" I said. "Yes, or you can say with God, or with the Group." "Oh, the Group is God and you are the Group—you are God? Well, I have treated such people." But he did not grasp it. The only difference between that man and one who says "I am Jesus Christ since a fortnight ago" is that one is collectively acknowledged and the other is not. If a man says he is Jesus Christ you tell him he is a fool and belongs in a clinic. But if a man says he throws his whole load on Christ to take care of, it is considered marvelous; he preaches it and confesses it and nobody has any doubts about its being right. But nothing could be more wrong, for by making himself identical with an archetype he has a hell of an inflation, though he calls it modesty or humility. With all their humbleness, those people are impertinent and inflated. It is exceedingly useful to have such a big bird with whom to identify; he can carry you over a long stretch, over many abysses, but it has to be paid for. To identify with a suffering God is no small business. Something is going to happen to you. You cannot have all the advantages of an inflation and no disadvantages. That the god has all the human disadvantages, and you all the advantages of a god, is not possible, and it will cost very dearly in the end. We can see that, but we are not accustomed to put the evil of the world down to the account of our ideal. For the time, this identification with archetypes is

still an ideal; we are educated to it, are praised for it, so why develop a critique about it? Therefore, it is one of the most difficult things to make people see, even people who know about them; it is so difficult that it can happen to oneself. One has to hold on to oneself every day in order not to be carried away by an archetype because human life is built on that system. Archetypes are full of energy. They are human forms of life, have a tremendous attraction, and they grip one again and again if one doesn't look out. So when one speaks of such an identification, as a matter of fact one usually doesn't know exactly of what one is speaking. Of course it sounds as if one understood, but in reality it is exceedingly difficult to see where one is identical, and even in the safest case one should always be suspicious and careful.

Now, in Nietzsche's case he is not only carelessly identical, but is enthusiastically identical with the archetype of the Logos: he lives his words. Therefore, his words are tremendously exuberant; his blood is in it, all his sexuality is in it, and that is of course a marvelous feeling. Then you are redeemed, apparently; you are flying away with your head and your head is travelling through the universe, but the body is left behind and suffers the torture of the god, because somebody has to pay for such a tremendous advantage. You see, Nietzsche does not realize here that something is happening to him; he only sees that nothing is happening to Zarathustra—naturally the archetype would be perfectly safe. People who are identical with an archetype can apparently stand any amount: they seem invulnerable, beyond human reach. They can do the most extraordinary things. And they don't see that somebody is going to pay for it. It is impossible to get away from the laws under which we are born; somebody has to pay, either the man himself or his surroundings. His life will be curtailed somewhere.

Dr. Escher: There is a book by Gerhard Hauptmann, *The Fool in Christ*, which contains a description of such an identification with an archetype. It also shows how that man behaved in his surroundings and what his effect upon his surroundings was.³

Dr. Adler: When Christ was tempted by the devil to cast himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, would it have meant an identification with the archetype if he had done so?

Prof. Jung: Well, not necessarily. That would be the demand of the depths to come down, which of course would mean disidentification

³ In *The Fool in Christ* (1910) Gerhard Hauptmann described the attempt of a man to maintain a mystical attitude in a materialistic world.

from the archetype. You see, "I and the Father are one"⁴ is the identification with the Father, and if he casts himself down—a thing which we are taught to understand as the greatest evil because it is a temptation of the devil—that could also be understood as casting himself out of the archetype. To us the temptation is diabolical because it contains the great truth. We are taught that Satan tempted the Lord to cast himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, but one could say just as well that the serpent or the devil was that darkness behind man which invites him to jump down from superhuman heights, to come down to the level of the ordinary being living in the here and now, disidentified from eternal images. You see, about 90 percent of all the idealistic people in the world believe that to be identified with the archetype is right; you find yourself in opposition to a whole world when you assert the opposite. Now are there any questions concerning this snakebite?

Mrs. Baumann: I thought the fact that the snake was healing the wound, taking the poison away, made another parallel with Isis.

Prof. Jung: Quite so.

Mrs. Crowley: And I thought it had something to do with the prophetic and oracular powers, because snakes are always supposed to be oracular. Also it might have to do with Nietzsche's sickness.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. All these peculiar events which we are encountering have something to do with his impending fate: the rope-dancer, for instance, and throwing the stone that fell back upon him, and the shepherd and the serpent—symbolizing the initiation that went wrong—and then here the bite of the adder which failed to poison him. But then of course, the effect will be elsewhere and he disconnects his physiological or pathological condition from his mental problem. It is as if the book *Zarathustra* were a world in itself, and the physical reality of Nietzsche were in quite another world; the two worlds don't touch each other, and each has its causality in itself. In such a case of course, people produce theories that they have eaten something wrong, or taken the wrong sleeping draught, or the climate is wrong, instead of making the connection between the mental and the physiological conditions. Nietzsche always treats his neurosis as if his mind had nothing whatever to do with his body.

Prof. Fierz: He says at the end of this passage, "Then fell the adder again on his neck, and licked his wound." I cannot imagine a snake doing that; that is a female, a human being.

⁴ John 10:30.

Prof. Jung: She must have arms to do it! It probably has to do with the very feminine nature of the serpent, because it is always through a woman that the serpent reaches a man, as it was in Paradise.

When Zarathustra once told this to his disciples they asked him: "And what, O Zarathustra, is the moral of thy story?" And Zarathustra answered them thus:

The destroyer of morality, the good and just call me: my story is immoral.

What about this most astounding statement? How on earth does he land in the problem of morality? Of course, he asks what is the moral of the story, but that can hardly be made responsible for the "morality" that comes afterwards; it would be a mere sound association. In the latter part of *Zarathustra*, when he is tired, he begins to produce sound association, but here I would not assume it. What is the connection here?

Mrs. Crowley: With the serpent.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but do you see any other connection? Nietzsche is apparently not aware here of the serpent in Paradise that tempted man to understand more about good and evil. The serpent seems to play an entirely different role; there must be a different connection. I want to find out what is in the mind of Nietzsche himself.

Mrs. Jung: I think Zarathustra is not aware of the moral of the incident with the snake.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true; he is surely not aware what the story really means.

Mrs. Fierz: But it is immoral from his human point of view if he identifies with Zarathustra and cannot face his own reality. So when he says his story is immoral he is simply telling his own truth.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the way we see it, but I want to reconstruct the way in which he sees that. You see, they ask him what is the meaning of this story and he tells them, "The destroyer of morality, the good and the just call me . . ." Now in how far can he see himself as the destroyer of morality in this connection?

Mrs. Fierz: In so far as he is a dragon.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. You see, the dragon is of the serpent nature, and the serpent in Paradise persuaded the first parents to disobey, to do the evil thing. And he, being of the same nature as the serpent, is also such a fellow; he persuades people to do the wrong thing. We shall presently see that. He says:

When, however, ye have an enemy, then return him not good for evil: for that would abash him. But prove that he hath done something good to you.

And rather be angry than abash any one! And when ye are cursed, it pleaseth me not that ye should then desire to bless. Rather curse a little also!

If wrong has been done you, you should answer by wrong.

And should a great injustice befall you, then do quickly five small ones besides. Hideous to behold is he on whom injustice presseth alone.

Out of sheer regard to your fellow being, you should not be marvelously forgiving about it when you have been offended, you should pay with five little wrongs. To pay with a big wrong would put you into the most disadvantageous situation *vis à vis* your enemy, so five little ones would be sufficient. You see, that is what everybody does: one retaliates in kind but not in the same kind. This is the immoral advice, for we are taught that we must return good for evil. But he says nothing of the sort; he says to retaliate in the same kind, but in a mitigated way in order to spare your enemy.

Mrs. Jung: It seems to me that he preaches exactly the contrary to what he has been doing to the snake; he has been very superior to the snake. He did not retaliate with five little wrongs.

Prof. Jung: Well, one could explain that by the fact that he was not particularly injured and so was able to show himself in a very superior position. It is the point of the story that Zarathustra, though wounded—he “screamed with pain”—was not really injured because he also was a serpent; he would not be a semidivine being if he were hurt by that snake.

Mrs. Sigg: It is the reverse of Christ's Sermon on the Mount. In every word, he says the contrary to what Christ said, and in many other places also.

Prof. Jung: There is surely something of the Sermon on the Mount in it; it is unavoidable, for that is *the* Christian teaching: any one who invents a new kind of morality must discuss the situation with the Sermon on the Mount. So he naturally gets into that somewhat biblical style.

Did ye ever know this? Shared injustice is half justice. And he who can bear it, shall take the injustice upon himself!

A small revenge is humaner than no revenge at all. And if the

punishment be not also a right and an honour to the transgressor,
I do not like your punishing.

You see, there is great truth in what he says. It is always much more human to be offended when one is cursed; otherwise, where has the anger gone? Where is it harbored? And if the offence has been repeated several times, the angry reaction must be stored somewhere if it is not let out openly, and then there is a festering wound; even if the conscious is most Christian and behaves perfectly, that anger is stored somewhere. Anything that has happened does exist; it is a fact. It may seem as if one could stand any amount of offence with nothing remaining, but you see, such a person is no longer a human being—he just disappears. As long as a man is really in life, an offence counts; it rankles and it is stored somewhere. I have seen people who have received real ill treatment and they are not improved in their character; usually they are bad. Children who have received bad treatment only get out of it by repeating it. Whatever the father or the mother have done to you will be lived out with the people you live with; if you marry, you will live out that wrong received. And you see practically the same thing in analysis. I usually get it then: a woman who has had a bad father or mother will put it upon my head; even against her will, even if she wants to be good, it does not help at all, because then it is indirect and it comes from all sides. I prefer a frontal attack. I can deal more easily with it. You see, that wrong is in their system and they will get it out. People even seek victims upon whom they can revenge their wrong; perhaps they do not even know of it, but the more they are unconscious of it, the more it is effective. For instance, children who have been left or betrayed by the mother will take their revenge most certainly.

I know a case of a child, the son in a family of religious fanatics who believed that if you didn't eat you would become a spirit. So they starved their two little children. The little girl died and the parents were accused of murder; the son, who was two years old, was saved in the nick of time. Later on, I knew that man and I knew his story, and he was the most terrible rascal. He was chased by a continuous hunger which of course did not show in eating but in aesthetic aspirations. He did the most extraordinary things, was utterly unreliable. Once he should have gone to an important meeting—it was his responsibility to be there—but it was a beautiful day, the train was passing a wood with bright red and yellow autumn coloring, and he thought, "How beautiful!" and at the next station left the train and did not go to the meet-

ing. His whole life was like that. The fellow wrote a book, a guide to perfect pleasure in life or something of the sort. That man was chased by an eternal hunger, and the wrong that had been done to him was revenged upon the people who came into contact with him, and spoiled his whole life. It is really a fact that any wrong one has received cannot be gotten out of the system unless it is paid by wrong.

This passage is also very important as applied to the theory of punishment by law. An offender has a right to be punished, and if we are too human or reasonable about it, we deprive him of the punishment he naturally expects. When I was a boy I always preferred the teachers who got angry and gave me a good hiding rather than those who forgave me. We have the theory that punishment ought to be administered for the moral improvement of the culprit, or that it should be a mere measure of prevention. But such theories are quite inhuman; it is only human when you punish the criminal for the fact that he has given offence. That you are angry with that fellow and beat him up is what human nature understands; that is the real basis for any code of laws. These humanitarian theories are all bunk: punishment is only straight and real when it comes from the feeling of man. It is entirely a feeling retaliation, and that of course is a very dark underground current. When a man does something wrong, you are usually envious because you also want to do something wrong. You are not human if you don't. It would be a pleasure. Here is a hell of a fellow who has killed somebody, and you get him in the neck—he must be killed too—and so you share his crime and are even with him. And you both walk away, one to eternity, and the other to his office—and either way it is the same.

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NIETZSCHE'S *ZARATHUSTRA*

NOTES OF THE SEMINAR


GIVEN IN 1934-1939 BY

C. G. JUNG

EDITED BY JAMES L. JARRETT

IN TWO VOLUMES

2



BOLLINGEN SERIES XCIX

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume 2

WINTER 1936

I.	22 January 1936	767
II.	29 January 1936	786
III.	5 February 1936	804
IV.	12 February 1936	821
V.	19 February 1936	840
VI.	26 February 1936	857
VII.	4 March 1936	873

SPRING 1936

I.	6 May 1936	893
II.	13 May 1936	911
III.	20 May 1936	926
IV.	27 May 1936	946
V.	3 June 1936	965
VI.	10 June 1936	983
VII.	17 June 1936	1000
VIII.	24 June 1936	1019

SPRING 1937

I.	5 May 1937	1037
II.	12 May 1937	1055
III.	19 May 1937	1075
IV.	26 May 1937	1093
V.	2 June 1937	1113
VI.	9 June 1937	1132
VII.	16 June 1937	1149
VIII.	23 June 1937	1170
IX.	30 June 1937	1189

SPRING 1938

I.	4 May 1938	1209
II.	11 May 1938	1230
III.	18 May 1938	1248
IV.	25 May 1938	1264

CONTENTS

V.	8 June 1938	1281
VI.	15 June 1938	1298
VII.	22 June 1938	1317
AUTUMN 1938		
I.	19 October 1938	1339
II.	26 October 1938	1355
III.	2 November 1938	1372
IV.	9 November 1938	1389
V.	16 November 1938	1404
VI.	30 November 1938	1421
VII.	7 December 1938	1437
WINTER 1939		
I.	18 January 1939	1457
II.	25 January 1939	1475
III.	1 February 1939	1493
IV.	8 February 1939	1512
V.	15 February 1939	1528
REFERENCES TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i>		1545
INDEX		1547

WINTER TERM

January / March 1936

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LECTURE I

22 January 1936

Prof. Jung:

We have a question by Mr. Allemann: "In the last seminar you said that according to Analytical Psychology, Jesus was wrong when the tempter put him on the top of the temple not to jump down and so come into contact with the earth. Does this opinion take into account the fact that Jesus quite deliberately and consciously had rejected 'this world' and that he said that 'his kingdom was not of this world'? Would he not have left *his own way* if he had accepted the suggestion of the tempter? And would this not have been wrong also from the point of view of Analytical Psychology?"

Well, it all depends upon what aspect of Jesus we were speaking of. That is the trouble. You see, Jesus is such a symbolical figure that one cannot help mixing it up with one's own psychology. If we take him as a historical figure, sure enough he could not have acted differently; he had to be himself and naturally he rejected the world and the flesh. It would have been utterly wrong to cast himself down from the top of the temple; and it would have been a terrible nonsense because it is quite certain that anybody tempted by the devil to do such a thing would be smashed up: the devil makes promises only in order to destroy one. But if we speak of Jesus as a symbolical figure, a god or a symbol that has actual importance, then of course the situation is quite different, because then the devil belongs to the game and the world cannot be excluded. We have learned that it does not do to exclude the world, and moreover it is impossible; even those people who preach the exclusion of the world, the suppression of the flesh and so on, are unable to do it. It is a lie, an illusion. That kind of solution doesn't work; we no longer believe in it. So the idea or the figure of a savior must now be something or somebody who is acquainted with the life of the earth, and accepts the life of the earth. A young man who hasn't yet lived and experienced the world, who hasn't even married or had a profession, cannot possibly be a model of how to live. If all men

should imitate Christ, walking about and talking wisely and doing nothing at all, sometimes getting an ass somewhere in order to have a ride, it just wouldn't do; such people would nowadays land in the lunatic asylum. It is impossible for such a figure now to be a model or a solution or an answer. We shall soon come to a passage where Nietzsche says that Jesus died too early, when he was still a young man not having had experience of life. So to us he is a symbol. And inasmuch as Jesus is supposed to be the key, the real *clavis hermetica*, by which the gates of the great problems and secrets are unlocked, then the world and the devil cannot be excluded—nothing can be excluded. Then we must ask the *symbol* Jesus: "Now, would it not be better if you cast yourself down, if you would once try the earth and find out what the devil means by playing such a funny role? Is there not something quite reasonable in what he proposes? Should you not be closer to the earth perhaps and less in the air?" Of course, that is no longer the historical Jesus; to talk to Jesus like that means that you are surely no longer a Christian, but a philosopher arguing with Christ; as soon as Christ becomes a real symbol you are a philosopher, for Christianity has then come to an end. In Christianity, Christ is an entity, with substance; he is a historical figure first of all, and then he is a dogmatic figure. He is one third of God and nothing can be said about him.

Mrs. Sigg: I don't know whether we are so sure that what the Evangelists narrate is absolutely true; they might have omitted something in the real life of Christ.

Prof. Jung: Well, how can we judge it? We don't know whether the report is reliable because we cannot check it up. The only source is the Evangelical account and we have no means of comparison, so we cannot say whether it is really historically satisfactory or not.

Mrs. Sigg: We are not so sure whether he did not try the earth in some way; there is room for a little hope.

Prof. Jung: We know of nothing and his teaching doesn't point that way. The only thing we know is his baptism by John—nothing else, except that scene in the temple when he was a boy.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not curious that the founders of the two greatest religions both rejected the world? Buddha did the same thing.

Prof. Jung: Quite. It is an astonishing fact, but Buddha doesn't reject it to the same extent. He recognizes it more in that he acknowledges the necessity of a long development. The Christian attitude is far more resentful; the world is denied as sinful. The Buddhistic attitude is less so; of course, Buddha's *ultimate* attitude is just negative, but he agrees more with the world in accepting it as an illusion.

Miss Wolff: Buddha's life began when Christ's ended; he was about thirty years of age and had been in the world. He had married and had a child even, and his teaching was that a man ought to live first; only in the second half of life was he allowed to "retire."

Mrs. Crowley: Could you not say from the psychological point of view that the idea of the hermit, of isolating yourself or negating the world, was projected in order to find the world within—in other words, to individuate? Would that not be the real inner purpose in having rejected the world?

Prof. Jung: That would be very obvious in Buddhism, but not in Christianity.

Mrs. Crowley: But I mean from the angle of Christ, not as later Christianity taught; in his own attitude he was rejecting the world as it was at that time. He was rejecting the literal reality.

Prof. Jung: If you speak of the historical Jesus, that is true.

Mrs. Crowley: Yes, for we were speaking of the historical Buddha.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, but Buddha's life was far more historical; it was not a drama. Buddha really lived a human life. He did not come to an end at thirty-three, but lived to be an old man. That of course makes a tremendous difference.

Prof. Fierz: In the first part of the Gospel, Jesus waits for the Messiah, not knowing whether he himself is the Messiah. If the disciples ask him, he forbids them to ask the question, and then he sends them out to say the Messiah will come. But he does not come, and it seems as if he then changed his mind and decided not to wait for a king from this world but from another world. There is a certain change in his teaching. When nothing comes he goes back to himself, and the final gospel is perhaps the result of the disappointment, a disillusion; he breaks down and then he dies. I think there is much to be said for that, except in St. John.

Prof. Jung: There are several places in the Gospel where one can see that disappointment but the Synoptic Gospels contain a good deal of historical truth about Jesus while the Gospel of St. John is entirely philosophical. There he is a symbol. Of course we get then an entirely different picture of the Christus, there he is really the God, not human.

Now we will go on to the next chapter, "Child and Marriage." In this last chapter there was the story of the snake that bit Zarathustra, and you remember that this *rencontre* between Zarathustra and the snake had the meaning that Zarathustra, being the Logos more or less, a mind only, had linked up with the serpent; or that the serpent, representing the lower nervous centers, the instinctive world, had linked up

with him. The snake would represent the body, and with that a certain element of instinctiveness comes into the situation. Of course Zarathustra is always identical with Nietzsche; he is never clearly differentiated, and so practically every figure in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is always in a way Nietzsche himself. There is no psychological discrimination; it is not an analytical piece of work. Zarathustra is an unconscious creation of which Nietzsche is as much the victim as he is the author. So when the snake bites Zarathustra, Nietzsche himself is bitten. For Zarathustra, it is not dangerous because he is also the snake, but Nietzsche is human and he is presumably poisoned. And we can be sure that whatever the serpent brings up from the depths of its own dark world would be things of *this* world. No wonder, then, that the next chapter has to do with a problem which must have been very near to Nietzsche, though it is not at all near to Zarathustra. Why should Zarathustra talk of child and marriage? He doesn't marry and he has nothing to do with children. This is Nietzsche's problem and it is a very negative one; there is trouble in Nietzsche's case. That the snake comes up and bites Zarathustra means that Nietzsche himself is reminded of the question of his possible marriage, a possible family, etc. Now this chapter begins:

I have a question for thee alone, my brother: . . .

This is as if the serpent were speaking to Nietzsche.

like a sounding-lead, cast I this question into thy soul, that I may know its depth.

Thou art young, and desirest child and marriage. But I ask thee: Art thou a man *entitled* to desire a child?

He was infected as you know, which was of course a tremendous problem to him. And his relation to women was exceedingly poor. He did not know how to approach them. He was terribly clumsy and foolish when it came to women.

Art thou the victorious one, the self-conqueror, the ruler of thy passions, the master of thy virtues? Thus do I ask thee.

Or doth the animal speak in thy wish, and necessity? Or isolation? Or discord in thee?

This is an examination. The serpent is trying him, trying to make him conscious of possible motives for or against.

I would have thy victory and freedom long for a child. Living monuments shalt thou build to thy victory and emancipation.

Beyond thyself shalt thou build. But first of all must thou be built thyself, rectangular in body and soul.

Not only onward shalt thou propagate thyself, but upward! For that purpose may the garden of marriage help thee!

Here we see Nietzsche's peculiar bachelor psychology, and an attempt to make this very difficult and thorny problem of marriage more acceptable to himself—by contaminating it with philosophy, for instance. That makes it much nicer, you see. He can deal with philosophy, and if marriage could be linked up with it—if marriage could have a philosophical purpose and be a technique or a way of creating a higher body—then he might be able to deal with that also.

A higher body shalt thou create, a first movement, a spontaneously rolling wheel—a creating one shalt thou create.

Then marriage would look promising; otherwise it cannot be touched.

Marriage: so call I the will of the twain to create the one that is more than those who created it.

With such a definition it might be considered.

The reverence for one another, as those exercising such a will, call I marriage.

Let this be the significance and the truth of thy marriage. But that which the many-too-many call marriage, those superfluous ones—ah, what shall I call it?

Ah, the poverty of soul in the twain! Ah, the filth of soul in the twain! Ah, the pitiable self-complacency in the twain!

Marriage they call it all; and they say their marriages are made in heaven.

You see, in order to make something of marriage, they must assume that they are made in heaven, just as he must call it a philosophical business; something must be said in favor of marriage so that it can be tackled. Now, his particular idea is that marriage should provide a higher body, the birth of a first movement. What does he allude to here—that spontaneously rolling wheel?

Mrs. Crowley: I should have thought he meant the self.

Prof. Jung: Yes, what he means by “marriage” would be that two come together and create a superman, perhaps in the form of a child.

But of course in reality that won't do; it would be a very ordinary child to begin with, and the superman business would come very much later, if at all. Even Nietzsche could not imagine that if he had married Lou Salomé they would have created together anything more than an ordinary baby, and perhaps a little more pathological than another.

Mrs. Sigg: The actual fact is that in the moment when Nietzsche wrote this chapter his sister was trying to spoil the image of Lou Salomé. He says: "My sister treats Lou as a poisonous worm." He had made an offer of marriage to Lou but it was a very feeble offer, and after a while he had a suspicion that her health was not satisfactory.

Prof. Jung: I knew her and confirm that she was perfectly healthy and vigorous.

Mrs. Sigg: But she had no children afterwards, and Nietzsche said, "I think Miss Lou cannot live many years."¹

Prof. Jung: He would not have lived, *he* would have given up. Well, obviously Nietzsche connects with marriage a philosophical idea of individuation which of course would not do; with such an idea in his head it could not possibly go. It would be a tremendous mistake because that would not meet with the approval of the ordinary biological man. And he has a doubt whether his idea is quite sound; he then projects the other possibility in all those "many-too-many" who also marry—marry like beasts. Of course he would not do that, yet the suspicion that marriage might be something that ordinary people do too creeps in somewhere; he reviles their marriages and tries to defend himself against such a failure of the ideal. But if he had married it would have been pretty much the same and he would soon have discovered it. He would also have discovered that he had reviled marriage. It is *not* like that.

Well, I do not like it, that heaven of the superfluous! No, I do not like them, those animals tangled in the heavenly toils!

Far from me also be the God who limpeth thither to bless what he hath not matched!

Laugh not at such marriages!

Better not!

¹ In his letters Nietzsche repeatedly reported his sister's intense dislike for Lou Salomé, and even her deadly enmity toward her. See for instance the letter to Franz Overbeck, September 1882. Nietzsche's concern for Lou's fragility, as in the letter here quoted (to Peter Gast, 17 July 1882) was wholly unfounded: she proved to be a healthy, vigorous woman who outlived Nietzsche by some thirty-seven years. N/Letters/Fuss.

What child hath not had reason to weep over its parents?

Worthy did this man seem, and ripe for the meaning of the earth: but when I saw his wife, the earth seemed to me a home for madcaps.

Yea, I would that the earth shook with convulsions when a saint and a goose mate with one another.

That is exactly what they do, and that is right. You see, it is the profound wisdom of nature that whenever there was a saint, there was also a goose ready for him and surely they mated. That is the necessary law of compensation; the high must be brought down and the low must be brought up. So that wonderful saint or whatever he was had an anima that was a goose.

This one went forth in quest of truth as a hero, and at last got for himself a small decked-up lie: his marriage he calleth it.

In the Dionysian dithyrambs at the end of *Zarathustra*, there is a very interesting one about Dudu and Suleika who seemed to be nothing more than small, decked-up lies.²

That one was reserved in intercourse and chose choicely. But one time he spoilt his company for all time: his marriage he calleth it.

Another sought a handmaid with the virtues of an angel. But all at once he became the handmaid of a woman, and now would he need also to become an angel.

Careful have I found all buyers, and all of them have astute eyes. But even the astutest of them buyeth his wife in a sack.

That must be so. That is very wise, because if a woman could see what a man was and if a man could see what a woman was they never would marry, or only under the utmost restrictions. You see, we would hardly touch other human beings if we knew ourselves better, or if we knew them better. One may well be frightened out of one's wits.

Many short follies—that is called love by you. And your marriage putteth an end to many short follies, with one long stupidity.

Or, as in Nietzsche's case, with a complete absence of any kind of relationship.

² "Among Daughters of the Desert," Part IV, ch. 76.

Your love to woman, and woman's love to man—ah, would that it were sympathy for suffering and veiled deities!

That sounds very profound. Many people have speculated about what these suffering and veiled deities might be. What do you think? Who are they?

Mrs. Jung: The selves of the people.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the gods in them, the selves in them, are these suffering and veiled deities. You see, Nietzsche brings these problems together with that very practical problem in life, marriage. Whenever a philosophy is involved, or any other exceedingly impractical mixture takes place, the problem itself becomes practically impossible; you cannot deal with such a big problem by going to the *Standesamt*³ where you sign your names in the book that you are married, with the purpose of redeeming, for instance, suffering and veiled deities. You are Mr. and Mrs. So-and-So, and if you tell people that you are suffering and veiled deities, you will be sent to the lunatic asylum; if you mix up those two things, practical ordinary human life becomes unmanageable. Because so many people mix it up with a philosophical problem, a simple matter like marriage becomes clumsy. They assume that they naturally will marry that man or woman with whom they can climb to heaven, but with that idea they never will marry, or they will make a hellish blunder. And the idea that marriage exists in order to improve one another is worse: it then becomes a sort of classroom in which one is educated forever. Or any other ideal. That is not to be done; marriage is something quite different. It is a very practical and sober proposition which has to be looked at soberly and carefully. And then you must not be afraid of animals, a point which Nietzsche carefully excludes. For marriage in the first place, in spite of what idealistic people say about it, is what animals do too, and it needs much work and much suffering until people discover that there is something else behind it. The more people have high tones about marriage, the less they will be married; they will be careful not to disturb the harmony of their talk.

But generally two animals light on one another.

That is not so bad.

But even your best love is only an enraptured simile and a painful ardour. It is a torch to light you to loftier paths.

Beyond yourselves shall ye love some day! Then *learn* first of all

³ *Standesamt*: registry.

to love. And on that account ye had to drink the bitter cup of your love.

Bitterness is in the cup even of the best love; thus doth it cause longing for the Superman; thus doth it cause thirst in thee, the creating one!

Thirst in the creating one, arrow and longing for the Superman: tell me, my brother, is this thy will to marriage?

Holy call I such a will, and such a marriage.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

The unfortunate thing is that such a marriage doesn't take place; because such big things have been said before, one cannot marry at all. It is the saddest thing to compare Nietzsche's fate with such marvelous teaching: the difference is too great. Now, this chapter about child and marriage has been a very hopeful chapter, a great attempt towards life and the continuation of life. But we come now to a chapter called "Voluntary Death." How do you account for this sudden turn? After a chapter on child and marriage, why should we land in a chapter about voluntary death?

Mrs. Stutz: Sometimes it is easier to die than to live one's life.

Prof. Jung: Under what conditions would you consider death easier than life?

Mrs. Stutz: When you cannot undertake the duties of life.

Miss Hannah: He would rather die than lose his high illusions; if he tried to live, he would have to smash them up.

Prof. Jung: Well, suppose you really meet somebody who makes a grand speech on the most idealistic aspect of marriage and children, and then suddenly begins to talk of suicide—what would you think?

Mrs. Crowley: That he was not convinced.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that he was evidently not quite convinced by his own talk, that there must be a flaw in the crystal. Therefore he confesses as much. He has the most wonderful ideas about marriage and its meaning, its goal, etc., yet he is so certain that this thing cannot come off that he prefers to die. You see, the one thing is exaggerated and the other is exaggerated. He makes of marriage such a rare and wonderful thing that it cannot easily happen, and he decides that if such a wonderful marriage is not possible he must choose death. That is the *enantiodromia* by which he reaches this chapter.

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not possible in the previous chapter on "Child and Marriage" that it was really Zarathustra who was preaching, and that

he would be referring not to a psychical marriage but to the symbolic marriage of alchemy, just using that as a symbol?

Prof. Jung: Exactly. He identifies with Zarathustra's point of view and such a thing is unmanageable.

Mrs. Sigg: In actual reality, of the nine brothers and sisters in Nietzsche's family, five remained unmarried. That means something.

Prof. Jung: Rather!

Mrs. Jung: I think one should also consider a very simple meaning—that he admonishes people to be more conscious and responsible about marriage and that is actually what they are preaching in Germany now: an improvement of Rasse.⁴ People must make a more careful choice, and are not allowed to marry without a certificate. In many other places also I think it is interesting to see that things have come about as Nietzsche said, but naturally in a more objective way, not in the spiritual way that he preaches.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there is still the difference that in Germany it is a hygienic question and with Nietzsche it is more spiritual.

Mrs. Stutz: I think we see this in Goethe himself who married a very simple woman.

Prof. Jung: That was too much contrary; the result was not very encouraging.

Miss Wolff: More like the saint and the goose!

Prof. Jung: Yes. Well, I think we will hurry on with these chapters, which are not particularly interesting.

Many die too late, and some die too early. Yet strange soundeth the precept: "Die at the right time!"

Die at the right time: so teacheth Zarathustra.

To be sure, he who never liveth at the right time, how could he ever die at the right time? Would that he might never be born!—Thus do I advise the superfluous ones.

But even the superfluous ones make much ado about their death, and even the hollowest nut wanteth to be cracked.

Every one regardeth dying as a great matter: but as yet death is not a festival. Not yet have people learned to inaugurate the finest festivals.

The consummating death I show unto you, which becometh a stimulus and promise to the living.

His death, dieth the consummating one triumphantly, surrounded by hoping and promising ones.

⁴ *Rasse*: race.

Thus should one learn to die; and there should be no festival at which such a dying one doth not consecrate the oaths of the living!

Thus to die is best; the next best, however, is to die in battle, and sacrifice a great soul.

But to the fighter equally hateful as to the victor, is your grinning death which stealeth night like a thief—and yet cometh as master.

My death, praise I unto you, the voluntary death, which cometh unto me because *I* want it.

What is your impression of this teaching? What is the remarkable thing?

Miss Wolff: It seems like a wish fulfilment. It is as if he had an intuition that his own death would not be like that, that his death would not come at the moment he would choose.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is like a superstition, or almost a conviction, that he was the one who would die when he wanted, but he was just the one who did not die when he wanted. He was dead before his body.

Mrs. Sigg: For a very long time when he was quite young, Nietzsche believed that he would die of the same disease and at the same age that his father died. He was very ill when he was thirty-six I think, and he was perfectly convinced that he would die, and he was also convinced that he would get this disease of the brain.⁵

Prof. Jung: You see, he is now making the same complication of death as he was making before with life: he links up or contaminates death, a natural occurrence, with a philosophy. The natural flow of events which life is and ought to be includes death; death is also a natural occurrence which comes flowing along. But he makes it a task, almost a decision. He says that he is going to die when he wants just as he is going to marry when he thinks best, not taking it as an event which comes along as the will of God, which is not his own will. One can fit in with the flow of events only when one can accept them, not when one makes them. There again is the identification with the archetype; the archetype prescribes what should be and Nietzsche backs it up. His inflation makes it his own conviction, so his idea is that one marries under such and such conditions and makes such and such a thing of it; and one chooses the right kind of death in the right moment, such a death as one wants and with the meaning one wants. You see, that is all

⁵ In a letter to Carl von Gersdorff, 18 January 1876, Nietzsche recalled his father's dying at thirty-six from inflammation of the brain and said that such an affliction may take *him* off even earlier. He was then thirty-one.

violating the flow of events which he just cannot accept, so that even dying becomes clumsy and complicated. Such people cannot die naturally any longer. It is just as if one had to swallow in a certain kind of solemn way; then of course one cannot swallow at all. The simplest functions become absolutely impossible if one is on stilts: one cannot even die. "And when shall I want it?" But there is no choice. He can ask himself when he wants it as little as when he is going to marry.

Prof. Fierz: He speaks already of his heir but he never has one.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he says,

And when shall I want it?—He that hath a goal and an heir,
wanteth death at the right time for the goal and the heir.

And out of reverence for the goal and the heir, he will hang up
no more withered wreaths in the sanctuary of life.

Verily, not the rope-makers will I resemble: they lengthen out
their cord, and thereby go ever backward.

This is just tragic when one thinks how he died.

Many a one, also, waxeth too old for his truths and triumphs; a
toothless mouth hath no longer the right to every truth.

And whoever wanteth to have fame, must take leave of honor
betimes, and practise the difficult art of—going at the right time.

One must discontinue being feasted upon when one tasteth
best: that is known by those who want to be long loved.

Sour apples are there, no doubt, whose lot is to wait until the last
day of autumn: and at the same time they become ripe, yellow,
and shrivelled.

In some ageth the heart first, and in others the spirit. And some
are hoary in youth, but the late young keep long young.

To many men life is a failure; a poison-worm gnaweth at their
heart. Then let them see to it that their dying is all the more a suc-
cess.

Many never become sweet; they rot even at the summer. It is
cowardice that holdeth them fast to their branches.

Far too many live, and far too long hang they on their branches.
Would that a storm came and shook all this rottenness and worm-
eatenness from the tree!

Would that there came preachers of *speedy* death! Those would
be the appropriate storms and agitators of the trees of life! But I
hear only slow death preached, and patience with all that is
"earthly."

Ah! ye preach patience with what is earthly? This earthly is it that hath too much patience with you, ye blasphemers!

Verily, too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow death honour: and to many hath it proven a calamity that he died too early.

That is the passage I mentioned,

As yet had he known only tears, and the melancholy of the Hebrews, together with the hatred of the good and just—the Hebrew Jesus: then was he seized with the longing for death.

Had he but remained in the wilderness, and far from the good and just! Then, perhaps, would he have learned to live, and love the earth—and laughter also!

Believe it, my brethren! He died too early; he himself would have disavowed his doctrine had he attained to my age! Noble enough was he to disavow!

There is quite a famous book by George Moore, *The Brook Kerith*, in which Christ lived on.⁶ It is an exceedingly poor book—you almost die before you reach something that has real substance—but there is one good substantial idea in it. He says that Christ was taken down from the cross and put into the grave by Joseph of Arimathea, and then the grave was opened by some of the disciples and Christ was discovered to be still alive; so they brought him back to Joseph where he recovered and became a shepherd again, as he had been before—he herded the sheep of Joseph. Then later on a very fanatical and excited man appeared who called himself Paul, a disciple of Jesus who was crucified. They told him they knew all about Jesus—he was saved, he is here, you can see him—and then they produced Jesus with the scars on his hands and feet from the crucifixion. But Paul did not believe it, because his Jesus had said he was the son of God, while this Jesus had understood that that was an error.

So the fact that Nietzsche feels that Christ died too early is a general idea only; we really have the need to ask the question: “What would Jesus have taught if he had been a married man, with eight children for instance? How would he have dealt with certain situations in life which only occur when you are in life, when you share it?” Of course he was in his own life but it was a very partial one—he was not really in

⁶ Jung exaggerates the fame of this novel (1916) by George Moore (1852-1933), and probably was not acquainted with a better and more famous little novel on the same theme, D. H. Lawrence's *The Man Who Died* (London, 1932).

life as we know it. He would perhaps be a good teacher inasmuch as one is meant to live his particular life, the life of a philosophical tramp who really has the idealistic purpose of teaching a new saving truth, who recognizes no other responsibility. You see, he had no profession and no human connections which were valid to him. He separated himself from his family, was the lord of his disciples, who had to follow him while he had to follow no one, being under no obligations. This is an exceedingly simple situation, tragically simple, which is so rare that one cannot assume that the teaching coming from such a life can be possible or applicable to an entirely different type of life. Therefore, we may well ask how it would have been if Christ had had a responsible position. Would he have cast it away? How would he have behaved if he had had to earn money instead of catching a fish with a *statēr* in its mouth, or if he only had to unhook an ass somewhere when he needed to ride? That is too simple. Also we could not live on the alms of other people; that would be against our grain. So in every way we are quite different from a man with such an attitude. We don't believe that the life of the earth will soon be finished, that the kingdom of heaven is to come, and that the legions of angels will fall upon the earth so that its power will be finished. And we have an entirely different idea of life in many other respects. And out of this comes the idea of Nietzsche: How would it have been if Christ had had to be responsible for so many children, or if he had been a responsible employee in the administration of Rome or Palestine, or if he had been born to be a priest who was responsible for the traditional creed—and so on? Nietzsche expresses this kind of feeling and so he expresses the need of finding a better key to unlock the problems which we find unanswerable.

Now, the real essence of this chapter is in the paragraph:

Free for death, and free in death; a holy Nay-sayer, when there is no longer time for Yea: thus understandeth he about death and life.

He means of course a complete freedom even in reference to death. But death surely is an event which is not voluntarily chosen, any more than any great event in life which just comes along and has to be accepted. So what Zarathustra says here sounds like a tremendous exaggeration, unless we consider that it is just Zarathustra who is saying it. An archetype looks at life from the standpoint of Zarathustra—that life surely is an arrangement, that there are right moments in which something is chosen to happen, that even events are for a certain end. “Verily, a goal has Zarathustra.” *He* can speak like that, can have a goal

because it is the meaning of life in itself, but for a human being it is of course an exaggeration, making for an impossible complication. Then there is one other point in this chapter which needs some explanation:

Verily, a goal had Zarathustra; he threw his ball. Now be ye friends the heirs of my goal; to you throw I the golden ball.

Best of all, do I see you, my friends, throw the golden ball! And so tarry I still a little while on the earth—pardon me for it!

Thus spake Zarathustra.

What does he mean by the golden ball?

Mrs. Sigg: You spoke in a former Seminar of a ceremony—I think it was a resurrection ceremony—at which the ball was used in church.

Mrs. Crowley: *Le jeu de pelote*.

Mrs. Sigg: But you gave one example of a certain ceremony in a church.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, the burial of the Hallelujah at Easter. A lump of earth was buried, probably symbolizing the dead sun that is buried and given life again. As Christ dies on Good Friday, he is the sun of the past year, and then his resurrection takes place on Easter Day, marking the coming back of the sun. But you can read about the *jeu de pelota* in an early Seminar report; there I gave a full account of it.⁷ It was a symbolic game with a peculiar meaning and it was played in the church. It was a system of relatedness among the figures of the Chapter, the bishop and the deacons and so on. In the way in which they threw the ball to each other they made a certain pattern; it was generally played standing in a circle and it had to do with the making of a mandala where the center moves from one to the other. The center, that ball which moves from the one to the other, is also a god, the god as a function of relationship; it swiftly moves around within the circle and it is the one thing upon which everybody is concentrated. You see, that golden ball is like the wheel which rolls out of itself, another analogy or parallel in *Zarathustra*, or like the dancing star. It is a symbol of the self. This pelote game also has a peculiar connection with depreciatory rumors about the ritual murder which was supposed to take place in Gnostic circles, as well as among the Christians and the Jews; it was said in antiquity that they played the game of pelote with a child that they threw to one another until it was dead. The child represented the god.

⁷ See *Dream Sem.*, pp. 15-16, 21-22, 32-33, for a fuller account of *jeu de paume* or *pelota basque*, a ritual ball game popular in monasteries until the 13th century, and sometimes indulged thereafter, but with increasing disapproval from the higher clergy.

It was a sacrifice of the god and a human sacrifice in order to renew the life of the god. It was like putting to death the god of the past year, as Christ was put to death instead of Barabbas whom the people wanted to have released as the god of the coming year. Christ was condemned as the criminal representing the god of the past year, according to the old Babylonian custom. And the interesting thing is that Barabbas means "son of the father;" just as Christ was the son of the Father; so it is one and the same—the god in its going down and in its coming up.

Now, this is all expressed by the *jeu de pelote*, and the ball is a symbol of the sun; it is the golden ball, an entirely round thing which expresses the state of perfection, of the highest value, of gold. In the next chapter it already appears in that light. There it is the golden top of a walking stick which Zarathustra receives from his disciples, a sun or a globe with a snake coiled round it. And the sun, the golden germ, the *Hiranyagarbha* as it is called in the Upanishads, is another symbol of the self; it is also called the golden child, the precious, perfect substance that is made by man or born out of man; and it is of course the alchemistic gold and the all-roundness of the Platonic being and the *sphairos*, the most blissful god of Empedocles.⁸ That substance is played upon or handled in a mystic circle, the meaning being that such a circle of people, where there is that mystical relationship, are all held together by the sun germ, that one perfect golden ball—that germ which is moving among them, partially or chiefly moved by the people themselves, but according to a preexistent pattern. This is an exceedingly difficult picture, and of course we could not explain such an image out of *Zarathustra* if we did not have other materials by which to elucidate the peculiar symbolism.

It is the idea that the self is not identical with one particular individual. No individual can boast of having *the* self: there is only the self that can boast of having many individuals. You see, the self is an extraneous unit in one's existence. It is a center of personality, a center of gravity that does not coincide with the ego; it is as if it were something outside. Also, it is not *this* individual, but a connection with individuals. So one could say the self was the one thing, yet it is the many. It has a paradoxical existence which one cannot define and limit by any particular definition. It is a metaphysical concept. But we must create such a concept in order to express the peculiar psychological fact that one can

⁸ Empedocles, a contemporary of Socrates who taught that the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—were pulled apart and united by the force of strife and love. See also 4 May 1938, n. 6, below.

feel as the subject and one can also feel as the object: namely, I can feel I am doing this and that, and I can feel I am made to do it, am the instrument of it. Such-and-such an impetus in me makes my decision. I am feeling a principle which does not coincide with the ego. So, people often say that they can in a measure do what they like, but that the main thing is done by the will of God. God is doing it through them; that is, of course, the religious form of confessing the quality of the self. Therefore, my definition of the self is a non-personal center, the center of the psychical non-ego—of all that in the psyche which is not ego—and presumably it is to be found everywhere in all people. You can call it the center of the collective unconscious. It is as if our unconscious psychology or psyche were centered, just as our conscious psyche is centered in the ego consciousness. The very word *consciousness* is a term expressing association of the contents of a center to the ego, and the same would be the case with the unconscious, yet there it is obviously not *my* ego, because the unconscious *is* unconscious: it is not related to me. I am very much related to the unconscious because the unconscious can influence me all the time, yet I cannot influence the unconscious. It is just as if I were the *object* of a consciousness, as if somebody knew of me though I didn't know of him. That center, that other order of consciousness which to me is unconscious, would be the self, and that doesn't confine itself to myself, to my ego: it can include I don't know how many other people. And this peculiar psychological fact of being the same self with other people is expressed by the image of the pelote, the ball that is played in a certain pattern within a certain circle, symbolizing the relations going hither and thither.

Now, Zarathustra says here that his goal is connected with that ball. His goal is obviously to set that ball in motion, to create that wheel which moves out of itself. And he has thrown the ball among his brethren or disciples, which means that he is bringing up or instigating the self and setting it in motion. You see, there is a clear connection between this idea and the idea of the wheel in motion in Buddhistic literature; the teaching of the law is compared to a moving wheel, yet originally it was probably the same idea. As Zarathustra has thrown a ball, so Buddha brings a wheel among men and sets it in motion, a process which will eventually lead up to the Buddhistic idea of the most perfect condition—the condition of complete detachment, of nirvana.⁹ It is also characteristic of Buddhism that it is considered to be a

⁹ The Buddha's proclaiming the Dharma was often spoken of as setting in motion the wheel of the law.

spiritual merit to depict such a wheel, to make a drawing of it. It has spiritual value in that it helps towards one's own perfection. Of course a mandala is such a wheel, though that is again a somewhat different aspect. There we very clearly see that the mandalas mean the gods. As a mandala is the seat of the god, the center of the mandala is the deity. But a deity is simply a projected vision of the self. So this chapter leads us really to a very profound idea: namely, that to Zarathustra, being the archetype, life is a preestablished arrangement, a yea and a nay—it can be chosen—the beginning and the end and the way. And the chief meaning of that whole thing is like throwing the ball among a certain group of people who obviously are assembled, chosen by fate or by that unconscious consciousness to be together so that they produce this play of the golden ball. This is, I am afraid, quite obscure, but when it comes to matters of the unconscious, things *get* obscure because we are only partially conscious of them. But I am perfectly certain that such symbols refer to extraordinarily important things. You see, such things have been expressed in the Greek *to en to pan*, which means that the all is the one, or the one is the all,¹⁰ represented by the *ouroboros*, the snake that makes the perfect circle by biting its own tail. That is the same idea, binding together the many into the one, and that one into the many.

Mr. Allemann: I think in India there is the same idea in *neti, neti*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, neither this nor that. It is, all around, the same idea. For instance, in Christian symbolic language Christ says, "I am the vine and ye are the grapes." You see, the supreme idea that Zarathustra is teaching is that the Superman is identical with a ball, and the ball is the globe, the all-perfect roundness expressing the primordial man, the man that *was* before he had been dismembered, cut up or separated—before he became two. And it is the idea of the alchemistic hermaphrodite that unites the sexes.¹¹ So the Superman is an exceedingly old, mystical idea which appears again and again in the course of the centuries. Of course Nietzsche was not aware of that, he knew almost

¹⁰ The number *one* was perhaps first raised to *The One* by Heraclitus and continued important at least until Plotinus' famous "flight of the alone to the Alone" (*Enneads*, 6.9.70).

¹¹ An allusion to Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium* about how the sexes were created by the division of the original hermaphroditic, spherical creatures, whose power threatened the gods. The story is a favorite of Jung. See CW 11, par. 47n; 9 i, par. 138n; et al. In the Middle Ages, Sun/Moon and even the philosopher's stone were often represented as hermaphroditic. See CW 13, figs. B1-B4. Nietzsche of course knew well the Greek philosophers' writings, but probably not those of the alchemists.

nothing of the particular literature in antiquity which contains these symbols; it was not yet discovered, many things have been dug up since; he did not know of the medieval parallels, and he never would think that this ball had anything to do with the all-round primordial man of Plato, or with the *sphairos* of Empedocles. Yet these ideas keep on coming back again and again, and in that respect one could ask, "what is Nietzsche after all?" He is simply a repetition of one of the old alchemists. Nietzsche continues the alchemistic philosophy of the Middle Ages.

LECTURE II

29 January 1936

Prof. Jung:

We come now to a new chapter, a very famous one. The title, "The Bestowing Virtue," has become a sort of slogan. But before we dive into it I should like to know how Nietzsche comes from this particular theme of voluntary death to the idea of the bestowing virtue. What is the transition?

Miss Hannah: Is it not through the part at the end about tossing the golden ball?

Prof. Jung: It might be; usually in the end of a chapter one finds the idea which leads over to the next chapter. But what would be the connection exactly?

Mrs. Sigg: He might think that he really has to bestow something better on the world.

Prof. Jung: Than the idea of the voluntary death? Then you think of it as a sort of compensation?

Mrs. Sigg: I think that when he wrote that chapter in 1883, he had really given some good ideas to the world, so he gave up that idea of killing himself which he had had sometimes.

Prof. Jung: Sure enough, the idea of voluntary death is a pretty negative one. It would mean saying to oneself, "Well, if my life is unsuitable, if I have no chance, if I am no contribution to the life of the world, then it is better to make an end of it." Such an idea is of course exceedingly negative; many degenerate individuals have played with that chapter on voluntary death. It has a negative quality and a negative influence, and therefore we find in the end of it the positive idea of the golden ball as a sort of compensation. The golden ball is indeed an exceedingly positive symbol; even if we don't know exactly what it means, we have a certain idea as to what it refers. And it must be positive in itself or he would not use the attribute "golden" because gold, as he explains in the beginning of the next chapter, means value.

Mrs. Sigg: If the idea of death comes up from the unconscious, is it

not generally true that something has to die, not the whole individual, but something that is wrong inside?

Prof. Jung: Quite so, but what has to die in this particular moment of Nietzsche's development is a difficult question.

Prof. Reichstein: In connection with what Mrs. Sigg said, I would say that the chapter before was connected with the heavenly marriage and that idea is always connected with death; something has to die before. And the appearance of the golden ball would also be such a moment; this archetypal idea is always connected with something which has to die before.

Prof. Jung: Why?

Prof. Reichstein: Because it is a very great change in attitude. Perhaps you could say that the change would be that the earthly man has to die.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the "earthly man" being of course the biblical way of putting it; in psychological terms it would be the collective man because the golden ball refers to the self.

Miss Wolff: Last time we spoke of the meaning of the self, and in the end of the chapter on death there is quite a new idea: namely, that Zarathustra is intending to give over his purpose or his teaching to his disciples, so he would not be the only one who carries the idea. And the idea comes in here that one man alone cannot reach the self. In one of the last verses he says, "Now be ye friends the heirs of my goal; to you throw I the golden ball." I think this is a sort of analogy to the idea of the child, because the child, as Nietzsche puts it, is also something beyond, beyond the parents. So the idea is to carry on something.

Prof. Jung: So you would connect that passage of the golden ball with the symbolism we encountered before in "Child and Marriage"?

Miss Wolff: It is the same idea, that one person alone cannot achieve the self. It is phrased very differently, but it comes much nearer the meaning than the chapter on death, though he alludes here to that idea that the self is not one individual alone.

Prof. Jung: Well, when you go back through the chapters you find a sort of preparation, like a preparatory initiation, for this idea. For instance, begin with chapter 15—though it would be possible to begin before—"The Thousand and One Goals"; that is the idea of many goals with no certainty as to which is the right one. Then the sixteenth chapter is on neighbor love which means that something else must come in, a partner, a relationship. The seventeenth chapter is "The Way of the Creating One": something ought to be created. How can you create? Well, "Old and Young Women," chapter 18. Then if you have to do with women, there is chapter 19, "The Bite of the Adder": you will be

bitten by the snake which is the reversed impregnation—poisoning. And what is the result? “Child and Marriage,” chapter 20. That is voluntary death: namely, you go under in that relationship and you reappear as a child, because it is all the interior drama of the unconscious development. And so it comes to the chapter we have just dealt with, to the idea of the golden ball; that is the symbol for the thing he has created.

Mrs. Frost: In the third verse before the end Nietzsche says, “Thus will I die myself, that ye friends may love the earth more for my sake.” If he dies that we may love the earth more, is it not the reaction against Christ who dies that we may go more into the spirit? And the loving of the earth is surely that love of the golden ball which he hands on.

Prof. Jung: Quite. This is a reaction against the Christian spirit, since Christ really did not die for the earth but for the spirit. The golden ball has that meaning; it symbolizes Nietzsche’s most important idea, the relation to the earth. But that is not the whole thing. It is only the anti-Christian and the pro-earth aspect of the symbolism, and this same symbolism has also spiritual meaning. But Nietzsche does something new to it and we shall presently come to that.

Mrs. Sigg: I think Christ was not exactly anti-earth, because if people would really follow his teaching it would be possible for them to live in a deeper way too.

Prof. Jung: Well, what Christ himself meant is pretty obscure, with tremendous contradictions, and it is very difficult to make out. So in speaking of Christianity, we must speak of what has become of that teaching, the late Christian spirit as expressed in the churches or sects, and not be influenced by those very remote traces of the teaching which Christ might have given to the world. If you study carefully the teaching of Christ, you see that it is not a perfectly clear system, but full of allusions and profundities and depths which we don’t quite understand: *Wer Ohren hat zu hören, der höre*, “who has ears to hear, let him hear.” It was a mystery teaching. He says funny things sometimes: think of his cursing the fig tree, and the parable of the unjust steward, for instance. That cannot be understood without a knowledge of the mystery teaching of those days. Parsons carefully avoid those things, and they know very well why.

Mrs. Sigg: I think in many cases parsons know the truth and make falsifications. For instance, we have (Matthew 5:22) the expression “in danger of hellfire,” although the word *Gehenna* that Christ uses there has certainly not that meaning. It is wrong for the parsons to say it is eternal hellfire.

Prof. Jung: Well, it makes little difference whether they explain it here as hellfire or not, because there are plenty of other passages in the Gospels where hell is established as a reality.

Mrs. Stutz: I think Zarathustra deals too much by will. He thinks he can arrange things in his own way; if he gave that up, so that the golden ball could fall in *its* way, then its virtue could give him something that he could not enjoy before.

Prof. Jung: You mean that this idea of the bestowing virtue is in opposition to his very wilful attitude? Sure enough, that is a new and a very important idea. Now we must really get on to the next chapter.

When Zarathustra had taken leave of the town to which his heart was attached, the name of which is "The Pied Cow," there followed him many people who called themselves his disciples, and kept him company.

Here we learn that Zarathustra's heart was attached to the town called "The Pied Cow," an impression which we did not receive when we read the chapter about that town before. And it is not known that many disciples followed him and kept him company when he left that town, so it must be an entirely fantastical experience. Obviously Nietzsche is now attacked by love for people, for the world, for humanity—which is not usual. In many passages before he very openly declared his disinterestedness in humanity. Therefore, we can assume that in the course of the development of these images, he has become more and more isolated and feels his loneliness, so the end is the idea of voluntary death, which is often the case with people who have maneuvered themselves into complete solitude. Then when that moment is past, the other side comes up, the side of life, of humanity. Where have we a similar development—a condition of utter despair and a suicidal mood leading up to a similar transition? There is a famous case in literature.

Prof. Fierz: In Faust.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he also maneuvered himself into complete loneliness, and then comes the moment of suicide, and then suddenly a new mood surges up, the Easter mood, resurrection. One might call it the resurrection of the Christian spirit of life. The evidence that it is really a Christian mood in Faust is that he identifies with another famous personage of religious importance, Luther. And he translates the Evangel of John, which is rather astonishing because Faust had been very critical of Christianity before. But when he gets to the point of suicide, suddenly the Christian aspect comes back to him so strongly that he even identifies with Luther, the last thing one would have expected of

such a man. Now this "bestowing virtue" is of course the blood that is poured out for mankind; in that all-embracing love one gives oneself to everybody: one is a present. It sounds almost like the Oxford Movement. You see, this is by no means an isolated case; one observes in practical life that when people come to a head with their existence, if they don't squeeze off their head they reappear in an old garment which they think is absolutely new. How is that?

Mrs. Sigg: It is the natural law that it must go in that way; it is what we call an *enantiodromia*.

Prof. Jung: It is an *enantiodromia* surely, and how do you explain it? How does such a thing happen? Suppose you have gotten yourself into a state of solitude and despair and are going to commit suicide, and then in the last moment you think better of it and come back to life, reappearing in a thoroughly Christian attitude.

Mr. Allemann: It would be an attitude of utter collectivity after utter isolation.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, that is one aspect of it. First you are absolutely isolated in your extreme individualism, cut off from the herd and on the way to death; you feel as if you were already dead. And then when you come back to life you will naturally begin where you gave it up; instead of going back to your individualism you go back to the earth—that is quite certain. Also from your former disbelief or criticism you come back to positive belief, and there is nothing to believe except what was there before, the general belief that exists everywhere. You might even have what people call an experience of Christ, or of God, *ein Gotteserlebnis*; you might have a vision, and you would then be thoroughly convinced that you had been saved by Christ in that moment. Unfortunately, we are not informed about Paul's mood when he was travelling to Damascus; perhaps he had been nervous and in a sort of despair and that led him to the vision of Christ. Of course it had a different meaning then, but in our days when Christ is an established truth, when it is *de rigueur* to believe in Christ, it is most probable that when you go so far on the one side, you will then go far in believing again what you believed before. This is a law, almost a mechanism, so it is quite understandable that Faust, having left all that his time believed in and hoped for, would return to it after he had given up the apparently inevitable idea of death.

That individualistic kind of development leads into isolation and death because one's life is no longer connected with the life of mankind. Life in one, single, isolated individual cannot be maintained because the roots are cut off; our roots are in mankind and if we give up

that connection we are just like a plant with no roots. Therefore, if one wants to establish one's life one must return to the herd and to the given conditions. And our given condition, as it was with Goethe or Faust and as it was with Nietzsche, is the Christian humanity—that is the thing to which one inevitably returns. So this chapter and the idea of the bestowing virtue in itself, has not only a Christian aspect, but a Christian *value*, there is no doubt about it. You see, when Zarathustra, or Nietzsche, returns to life, he surely will be forced to participate in the life of mankind as it is in that moment, and then he will see the positive values of it. That is the reason why we come here to a rather unexpected Christian idea—unexpected with Nietzsche. Formerly he only mocked about that town and now we learn that he loves it, that his heart is attached to it. We were impressed with his utter loneliness before and did not know that he had so many disciples. That is an entirely new aspect from which we can conclude that he had felt quite positive there and had had a large audience. Now coming back to this situation leads him to a crossroad: “Thus came they to a cross-road.” What about this?

Prof. Fierz: He is like Heracles, come now to a new dilemma.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and what would that be?

Prof. Reichstein: Whether to go with all his disciples, or to go alone.

Prof. Jung: Yes, either he goes with his disciples, which means going with the town of the Pied Cow, with the hitherto valid beliefs, or he goes alone; he has the choice of being absolutely collective or again alone. Now, people after such an experience very often decide not to be alone, but to remain with the herd which they then see in its positive aspect, and they think it is an advantage to have lost the loneliness. But then they have lost their last values, to speak in the words of Nietzsche. For the question is not to be either in the herd or isolated from the herd; it is to be in the herd and alone.

Then Zarathustra told them that he now wanted to go alone; for he was fond of going alone. His disciples, however, presented him at his departure with a staff, on the golden handle of which a serpent twined round the sun. Zarathustra rejoiced on account of the staff, and supported himself thereon; . . .

He is obviously making up his mind to follow his road alone again because that is really his first love; his strongest tendency is to go alone, despite the very positive aspect of collectivity which he describes here. Now his disciples give him a sun symbol, the golden ball which he has thrown to them before. You see, in giving to his disciples something as

precious as the golden ball, he has given them a positive value. What is that present, really?

Mrs. Crowley: It is the reconciling symbol.

Prof. Jung: Well, he has given them an important symbol; whether it is reconciling or not we still have to see. But a symbol is always an idea, so he has given them a really positive value. And this symbol means what?

Mr. Allemann: The self.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the self appears to be a most valuable idea. The golden ball is the sun, also a divine symbol; it is what the sun used to be when it was the central god in old cults, the source of warmth and of life. Therefore, it must be an idea which has equal virtue, equal value, which for us, whether we believe it or not, is actually the sun, the source of warmth and life. So it is really a reconciling symbol, the symbol that solves conflicts, that overcomes the oppositions characterizing our lives—a symbol that creates peace and totality. The self is really expected to be able to do that. Of course in the west we have no philosophy of the self, but in the Upanishads you will find all these attributes; and you will see that the idea of the self is the most essential idea in their philosophy of Atman, for instance. A particularly beautiful example of that philosophy is the dialogue between Yajñavalkya and the king. I cannot quote it literally but you remember, the king asks him a series of questions about the light. For instance, when the people go out to do their work they return in the light of the sun, and then the king asks: But when the light of the sun is extinct, by what light shall they live?, and Yajñavalkya says by the light of the moon. Finally every light, every fire, comes to an end, and there would be utter darkness, but there is still left the light of the self, which is the supreme light.¹ That is the exact parallel of the idea of the golden ball. So in giving such teaching to his disciples, Zarathustra really gives them a golden present. And whatever you give returns to you; what you give, you have gained, but what you have acquired is lost. He gives a present to his disciples, and then it returns to him. This is not said by Nietzsche in so many words. I am not even convinced that he was conscious of it; it simply happens that his disciples are able to give him that present, and they would not have been able if they had not the means. Through the gold he has given to them, they can return in kind, and with an ad-

¹ Yajñavalkya, a great sage of the Upanishads, who told of the several kinds of light: sun, moon, fire—and finally Atman, the self.

dition which comes really from them, the serpent twined round the golden ball.

Mrs. Sigg: Nietzsche never was particularly intelligent when it came to his relation to people—not very practical—and the serpent being a symbol of cunning and wisdom might mean a leading principle to him in his relations to human beings.

Prof. Jung: Well, the serpent and the sun are general symbolism, and we must first know something of that before we can make an application to Nietzsche's case; otherwise, that interpretation looks far too personal and arbitrary.

Mrs. Baynes: Would it not be the Yin and the Yang?

Prof. Jung: Yes, in Chinese language it would be the Yin and the Yang, but there is a much nearer idea.

Mrs. Sigg: The Egyptian symbolism of the sun.

Prof. Jung: That is the closest analogy, the disc of the sun encoiled by the uraeus.²

Prof. Fierz: The Chinese universe with the dragon round it?

Prof. Jung: In China it is really the pearl and the dragon, and the strange thing is that the pearl there is the moon, the Yin, and the dragon is Yang. The symbolism is just reversed, and it is difficult to translate because in China the values are in a subtle way turned round; it is as if the real teacher there had been a woman. Everybody would say Yang was the sun, but the Chinaman says, not at all, it is a dragon. Everywhere else the dragon is a malevolent and dangerous beast, but in China it is a friendly thing; the Chinaman is a friend of the dragon. The only friend of the serpent we know is the woman; no man ever was the friend of the serpent unless he was a sorcerer and taught by a woman.

Mrs. Baynes: But it is true that the Chinese dragon can fly and the serpent cannot.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the dragon is a flying serpent. We have dragons but they are all bad while the Chinese dragon is a sign of happiness, of wealth and of health, of everything good. The sun is the important and positive thing to us, while there it is the dragon, and a moon that is very small, a pearl almost in the mouth of the dragon. As a rule the pearl is a little bit ahead so it looks as if in all eternity the dragon were not quite capable of catching that pearl, he is always after it but never quite

² "The disk of the sun . . . a vast dragon with its tail in its mouth mounted on seven powers and drawn by four others figures as horses" (from "The Books of the Savior" in Mead*, p. 510).

happy in its possession. If you follow up that thought and apply it to Chinese symbolism in general, you will see that it works. China has a peculiar twist; the earth plays another part there—it is unsurpassed. In Egypt the positive celestial body of the sun is the important thing; therefore in the time of Amenhotep IV the symbol was no longer the disc and the serpent, but was the disc of the sun rejoicing in its two horizons—the worship of the positive principle *par excellence*. Whereas the addition of the serpent is the earth lying in the sunshine, warming its cold body in the rays of the sun; that is the idea of the uraeus. Then we have another very direct parallel to the positive symbol of the sun and the encircling serpent.

Mrs. Baynes: The Kundalini Yoga.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the sun being the creative point, the bindu, and the Shakti is coiled round the phallic figure as in the *muladhara* mandala. Then there is the Orphic symbol of the egg round which the serpent is coiled, which is perhaps the nearest parallel to this *Zarathustra* symbolism. Now, what do the disciples convey in giving such a present to Zarathustra—what does it mean?

Miss Wolff: Perhaps a side of the problem which Zarathustra himself has not seen. It might be that snake which he has thrown out of his mouth to other people to handle, so they give it back to him, because without that the circle is not complete.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and besides the chapter about the bite of the adder, there is a chapter later where the snake crept into the shepherd's mouth.

Miss Wolff: I meant that chapter particularly—I anticipated.

Prof. Jung: Well, the serpent is rejected by Zarathustra. He loathes it because it is the earth, the darkness, the Yin, the female principle. Zarathustra is entirely masculine, the masculine archetype of the wise old man *par excellence*; and he is the *pneuma*, the wind-god, and therefore has to reject the serpent. That is the reason why he throws only the golden ball to his disciples; *they* add the serpent. And how does it come about that they are able to do that? You see, it is the *pelote* again.

Prof. Reichstein: They have the connection with the earth because they are also with collectivity.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. You see, when Zarathustra is in the circle of his disciples, he already represents that symbolism; one could say that the sun and the serpent symbolized his relation to his disciples. He is in the center, the *pneuma* surrounded by the circle of mankind, and mankind is the earth; so his disciples are his earth. He is rooted in his disciples. And in throwing the golden ball to them, he gives them himself, his

own principle, and they receive it as the earth receives the seed. They form a circle round him like the earth snake that bites its own tail. It is the female that forms a ring round the male in the Tantric Yoga also; the Shakti in everlasting embrace with the god Shiva is an eternal symbol, and it is one of the most complete symbols of the self. The self conceived of as the superpersonal Atman (or the *Paramatman* or Prajapati or the *Purusha*) is alone, one could say; therefore, he emanates a world which is his mirror, the mirror being of course of a different substance from that which is mirrored. The mirror is the shakti that creates the real illusion, the veil of Maya, round the god; the god sees all his millions of faces mirrored in the magic mirror of Maya.³

That is the situation here, and there really could be no self if it were not in relation; the self and individualism exclude each other. The self *is* relatedness. Only when the self mirrors itself in so many mirrors does it really exist—then it has roots. You can never come to your self by building a meditation hut on top of Mount Everest; you will only be visited by your own ghosts and that is not individuation: you are all alone with yourself and *the* self doesn't exist. The self only exists inasmuch as you appear. Not that you *are*, but that you *do* is the self. The self appears in your deeds, and deeds always mean relationship; a deed is something that you produce which is practically outside of you, between yourself and your surroundings, between subject and object—there the self is visible. So the symbol is the sun encoiled by the serpent. That is what the disciples give back to him. It is the answer of the disciples, and it is a symbol of the union of Zarathustra and his disciples. That is the staff upon which he supports himself.

Then spake he thus to his disciples:

Tell me pray: how came gold to the highest value? Because it is uncommon, and unprofiting, and beaming, and soft in lustre; it always bestoweth itself.

This is a sort of interpretation of the symbolic idea of gold. The real gold is symbolic, therefore it is so highly praised. It has definite values but the main value is that which man gives to it; the use to which it is ordinarily put would never explain the fascination gold has in itself for man. In the hieratic language of the whole world, gold is used to designate something that is valuable. It is used in the same way in art—certain things are painted gold. And in alchemistic philosophy it is

³ Atman knows itself by its creations, or as Jung taught, by one's projections.

known as *aurum nostrum non vulgi*.⁴ So when gold appears in dreams it means value.

Only as image of the highest virtue came gold to the highest value. Goldlike, beameth the glance of the bestower. Gold-lustre maketh peace between moon and sun.

Uncommon is the highest virtue, and unprofiting, beaming is it, and soft of lustre: a bestowing virtue is the highest virtue.

Here we have the reconciling symbol, and a very interesting relation to the alchemistic symbolism: namely, the uncommon gold, the philosophical gold, is the child of the sun and moon, the male and the female. The gold or the philosopher's stone is even called the sun and moon child, or the hermaphroditic sun and moon child, the hermaphrodite symbolizing of course the union of male and female. One finds this idea practically everywhere.⁵ The idea of the self under the aspect of a thing born out of man or out of the world is called in the Upanishads the *Hiranyagarbha*, which means the golden child or the golden germ; that is the philosophical gold which comes from the union of opposites. So if the lonely Zarathustra can be united to a circle of human beings then the golden child, the god, is born, *Hiranyagarbha*; then the golden ball appears with the serpent. The idea of the god being the reconciler and peacemaker is often symbolized also by the hermaphrodite; therefore, so many gods are represented as such. A very near analogy is the old Orphic *Phanēs*, whose very name denotes the rising sun. *Phanēs* means the appearing one, the one that is born at the beginning; it is the god of the beginning, hermaphroditic, with two bodies, and there are four symbolic animals. This is faintly analogous to the *quaternium* in Christian iconography, where the four pillars of the Gospels are represented as four animals and the figure of Christ is in the center; it is also called the *tetramorphos*, but that properly is the sort of monstrous animal with four heads that one sees in old illuminated manuscripts, the head of a lion, an ox, an eagle and an angel—the four Evangelists. And it has one leg of the lion, one of the ox, one of the eagle, and a human leg, and then the savior with a flag or emblem of the church is riding upon that animal. You see, the Orphic *Phanēs* is similar.⁶

Now, Frau Dr. Burgers has just told me that in China the horoscope

⁴ "Our gold is not the vulgar [common] gold."

⁵ See CW 12, *passim*, for further discussion of alchemical symbols for the hermaphroditic union of male and female.

⁶ Phanēs, the shining one, is an Eros, but bisexual. See CW 5, plate XII, for a reproduction of an Orphic relief showing this boy-god being born from the world egg.

is based on twenty-eight *moon* houses, not sun houses. And Professor Reichstein has pointed out to me that the currency of China is not based upon gold but on silver. They are trying some such stunt in America now and we shall see how that will influence the general welfare.

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not true that in the east voluntary death is quite a positive symbol?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and voluntary death was well received in Rome also; it was quite counted on. Now, we have a question by Mrs. Baynes: "When you say that the self cannot be reached in isolation, does that mean that the 'Forest philosophers' of India were deluded when they thought they had found the self?"

Oh well, when I said that you couldn't find the self without relationship, I didn't mean to exclude the other side. The forest philosophers don't go out into the forests in the beginning to try to find the self. They first live a full human life in the world and then comes the wood life. They are rooted in the world. They never shunned the individual social life, but gathered all the experience from their worldly existence, and then carried it into the wood. And that was the case in Buddha's own existence; he was a prince, a man of the world, and he had a wife, he had concubines, he had a child—then he went over to the saintly life. I could say just as well that you could never attain the self without isolation; it is both being alone and in relationship. But naturally we have to emphasize relationship with Zarathustra who was always on the lonely side; that Nietzsche was so isolated was the reason why things went so wrong, so he fell into the possession of *djins*. Of course one can rationalize that as coming from the syphilitic infection which caused the paralytic disease. But under that was a case of schizophrenia; he could have gone wrong in another way from being too much alone, not being capable of establishing roots—any plant dies that has no roots. It is not the roots alone, however, that make the plant; the flower must come too. It is the two things, being alone and connected.

Verily, I divine you well, my disciples: ye strive like me for the bestowing virtue. What should ye have in common with cats and wolves?

It is your thirst to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves: and therefore have ye the thirst to accumulate all riches in your soul.

This is somewhat involved. In throwing the golden ball to his disciples he obviously assumes that they are worthy disciples, that they are capable of taking his gift and putting it to the right use. He trusts that

they are striving like him for the bestowing virtue, the virtue of the gold that is shining, beaming, radiating, giving its beauty and its fascination to everybody. "What should ye have in common with cats and wolves?" You see, those are rapacious animals of prey that devour and destroy. It is not the disciples' thirst to become cats and wolves, but to become sacrifices and gifts. Here comes in the Christian ideal that there is no rapacious instinct to steal, but rather to give and give to the utmost, to give oneself as a sacrifice. As Christ has given himself to mankind so Zarathustra and his disciples strive to become sacrifices to mankind. "And therefore have ye the thirst to accumulate all riches in your soul." That *therefore* doesn't belong there, it is not a logical conclusion, but is rather an immediate association; something should be said in between. For in order to be valuable gifts they must be gold first, and in order to be gold they must eat the gold in the world; they must acquire, appropriate, accumulate riches, and store them in their soul in order to become a rich gift. Many people think it is a gift when they give themselves. By no means! It is a burden. When a poor man gives me his last cent I am terribly burdened. Yes, if a rich man gives me out of his abundance, then I really have received a gift, but a beggar cannot give himself. What is he? Has he value? No, he is an empty sack. That all the empty sacks want to give themselves in order to be filled I can understand, but this is no gift; it is as if a tiger should say, I give myself entirely to you, and then eats you. So in order to be able to give something, one has to be something, one has to possess, one must consist of gold and not of hunger. Unfortunately most of the people who talk of giving themselves are just hungry wolves that want to eat your sheep. You see, that must be said between those two sentences.

Insatiably striveth your soul for treasures and jewels, because your virtue is insatiable in desiring to bestow.

If there is a virtue that is desirous of bestowing, there must be also the means by which one can bestow; one cannot give emptiness. Riches must be accumulated first. One must be keen over treasures, jewels. One should be rapacious in accumulating in order to be able to give. Otherwise one is never quite certain whether one doesn't give hunger.

Ye constrain all things to flow towards you and into you, so that they shall flow back again out of your fountain as the gifts of your love.

You see, this is the formula for what has happened: namely, Zarathustra threw the golden ball. He could give it because he had it, and then the ball came back to him.

Verily, an appropriator of all values must such bestowing love become; but healthy and holy, call I this selfishness.—

Another selfishness is there, an all-too-poor and hungry kind, which would always steal—the selfishness of the sick, the sickly selfishness.

Here is an important moral difference: when we speak of selfishness it sounds like a vice because we usually know only what Nietzsche calls sickly selfishness. We know selfishness as individualism, as a hungry or thirsty kind of craving to impose upon others, to steal from others, to take away their values; one can call it morbid—selfishness in the sense of egotism. But there is another selfishness which is holy, only nobody has any idea of it; this idea has died out for us since the early Middle Ages. We have the idea that when somebody withdraws into himself, when he does not allow other people to eat him, that he is morbid or terribly egotistical. This simply comes from the fact that late Christianity believes in the early teaching of Christ: “Love thy neighbor, “and then what Christ really taught, “as thyself,” is never mentioned. But if you don’t love yourself, how can you love anybody else? You come to him as a begging bowl, and he has to give. While if you love yourself, you are rich, you are warm, you have abundance; then you can say that you love because you are really a gift, you are agreeable. For you must feel well when you go to your friends; you must be able to give something in order to be a loving friend. Otherwise you are a burden. If you are black and hungry and thirsty you are just a damned nuisance, just an empty sack. That is what these Christians are; they are empty and they make demands upon one. They say, “We love you and you *ought to*”—those devils put one under an obligation. But I always point out that Christ said: “Love thy neighbor *as thyself*,” so love yourself first.

And this is so difficult that for a long time you won’t ask anybody to love you, because you know what an awful hell it is. You hate yourself, are despicable to yourself, cannot stand two hours in a room alone. Like the clergyman I told you about. He was occupied from seven in the morning till eleven at night with people, so he was quite empty and therefore suffered from all sorts of disturbances. You see, you must give something to yourself. How can you give to people when you don’t understand yourself? Learn to understand yourself first. I had the greatest trouble in the world to teach that man that he should sometimes be alone with himself. He thought that if he read a book or played the piano with his wife he would be alone, and that if he were actually alone one hour every day he would get crazy and melancholic. If you cannot stand yourself for any length of time, you may be sure

that your room is full of animals—you develop an evil smell. And yet you demand that your neighbor should love you. It is just as if a dinner was served to you which was so bad you couldn't eat it, and then you say to your friend or mother or father, "Eat it, I love you, it is very bad." But no, you tell them it is very good, you cheat people.

You see, whoever is not able to love himself is unworthy of loving other people and people kick him out of the house. And they are quite right. It is very difficult to love oneself, as it is very difficult to really love other people. But inasmuch as you can love yourself you can love other people; the proof is *whether* you can love yourself, *whether* you can stand yourself. That is exceedingly difficult; there is no meal worse than one's own flesh. Try to eat it in a ritual way, try to celebrate communion with yourself, eat your own flesh and drink your own blood—see how the thing tastes. You will marvel. Then you see what you are to your friends and relations; just as bad as you seem to yourself are you to them. Of course they are all blindfolded, late Christians, so they may not see the poison they eat in loving you; but if you know this, you can understand how important it is to be alone sometimes. It is the only way in which you can establish decent relations to other people. Otherwise, it is always a question, not of give and take, but of stealing.

With the eye of the thief it looketh upon all that is lustrous; with the craving of hunger it measureth him who hath abundance; and ever doth it prowle round the tables of bestowers.

That is the society of the empty sacks.

Sickness speaketh in such craving, and invisible degeneration; of a sickly body, speaketh the larcenous craving of this selfishness.

What about this "sickly body"? Would it not be much nicer to say "of a sickly soul"? You know, to the late Christian you can convey the idea that one ought to be interested in oneself in the way, say, of a schoolmaster, or a doctor. They understand that one needs some education of the soul, some loving care of one's own spiritual welfare, provided that the body is excluded. The thing people are most afraid of is not so much the soul, which to them is practically non-existent, but the body. That is what they don't want to see, the animal or the evil spirit that is waiting to say something to them when they are alone. That is exceedingly disagreeable. So even if they agree that one could be a bit more careful with oneself, it is only with the guarantee that the body is excluded and has nothing to do with it. The body is the darkness, and very dangerous things could be called up. It is better to play the piano

in order not to hear what the body says. So Zarathustra is quite right: it is not only a sickly soul, but is really a sickly body.

Tell me, my brother, what do we think bad, and worst of all? Is it not degeneration?—And we always suspect degeneration when the bestowing soul is lacking.

You know, degeneration was much talked about in Nietzsche's time. There was a famous French book about degeneration (written by a Jew with a German name that I can't remember at the moment), which was a great thing in the eighties, and the word *degeneration* became a slogan.⁷ Now, the meaning of *degeneration* is that the development deviates from the original pattern. A degenerate tiger would be a tiger that developed into a vegetarian, or a degenerate monkey would be one that specialized in sausages—such peculiarities. Singing birds sometimes show signs of degeneration; robins or even blackbirds in the neighborhood of railway lines begin to lose their own melody and imitate the whistle of the engine, or perhaps they learn human melodies; in the war, birds that lived near the trenches were observed whose song began to imitate the whistling of the bullets. *Genus* means the kind to which one belongs, and if you deviate from the pattern which constitutes that *genus* you suffer from degeneration.

Nietzsche uses this word, of course, in a very much wider sense. He means a deviation from the pattern which is in man, and that is the self; that is the individual condition or pattern or form which can be fulfilled according to its meaning. Or you can deviate from it. If you fulfil the pattern that is peculiar to yourself, you have loved yourself, you have accumulated and have abundance; you bestow virtue then because you have luster. You radiate; from your abundance something overflows. But if you hate and despise yourself—if you have not accepted your pattern—then there are hungry animals (prowling cats and other beasts and vermin) in your constitution which get at your neighbors like flies in order to satisfy the appetites which you have failed to satisfy. Therefore, Nietzsche says to those people who have not fulfilled their individual pattern that the bestowing soul is lacking. There is no radiation, no real warmth; there is hunger and secret stealing.

⁷ Jung must have had in mind Max Simon Nordau's *Entartung*, which was so popular that it was almost immediately translated into *Degeneration* (London, 1920). In this book, Nordau (whose name was originally Max Simon Sudfeldt) characterized Nietzsche as an imaginative sadist.

Upward goeth our course from genera on to supergenera. But a horror to us is the degenerating sense, which saith: "All for myself."

You see, that degenerate sense which says "all for myself" is unfulfilled destiny. That is somebody who did not live himself, did not give himself what he needed, did not toil for the fulfilment of the pattern which had been given him when he was born. Because that thing is one's *genus*, it ought to be fulfilled, and inasmuch as it is not, there is that hunger which says "all for myself." This is not love of oneself, but simply a hunger which demands for oneself, and one does not provide for the demand; one steals it, takes it from others, expects it as a sort of present from others, thinks it is their duty to give it. Our late Christian teaching has been like that. Love thy neighbor as Christ loves you, and if you are burdened by sins and all sorts of mental or moral troubles, eat his body and you will be cured: eat Christ in the form of the communion and you will be purified, fed, and fulfilled. People are educated in that way. If you have trouble, cast it on Christ as if he were the animal that carries your burdens, a scapegoat for your sins; and if you feel hungry, eat him. He will feed you. You see, you are thus taught an eternal babyhood where food is always ready; it comes from the mother church that has of course an everlasting supply of the sacred foodstuff in the substantial host and the wine. If you follow such a teaching exclusively, you get used to having most important things ready-made for you; you only have to go to church and there you get it. If something should be too difficult for you to carry, if you have done something of which you cannot stand the thought, you simply put it on the back of Christ and he will carry it away. He will remove it.

The Catholic practice of confession and repentance and absolution is just that: you repent and then you tell about it and are given absolution. You are washed of your sin, and then you can do it again—you are a clean slate so you can write on it once more. That is the reason the Reformation did away with confession, in one way fortunately, in another unfortunately, because people cannot get rid of their sins. And that is the reason *entre autres* for the success of the Oxford Movement, where you can hand over your sin to other people and they run away with it. But that is bad. The Protestant must be alone with his sin. He may confess it but he knows that doesn't give him absolution; even if he confesses ten thousand times, he can only familiarize himself with the fact that he should never lose sight of what he has done. That is good for him. He should arrive at a level where he can say, "Yes, I have

29 JANUARY 1936

done that thing, and I must curse myself for it." But I cannot be nice to a man who has given offence to me if I am not nice with myself. I must agree with my brother for my worst brother is myself. So I have to be patient, and I have to be very Christian *inside*. If I fulfil my pattern, then I can even accept my sinfulness and can say, "It is too bad, but it is so—I have to agree with it." And then I am fulfilled, then the gold begins to glow. You see, people who can agree with themselves are like gold. They taste very good. All the flies are after them.

LECTURE III

5 February 1936

Prof. Jung:

We were speaking last time of the idea of degeneration. Now he continues:

Upward soareth our sense: thus is it a simile of our body, a simile of an elevation. Such similes of elevations are the names of the virtues.

Thus goeth the body through history, a becomer and fighter. And the spirit—what is it to the body? Its fights' and victories' herald, its companion and echo.

Similes, are all names of good and evil; they do not speak out, they only hint. A fool who seeketh knowledge from them!

Give heed, my brethren, to every hour when your spirit would speak in similes: there is the origin of your virtue.

Elevated is then your body, and raised up; with its delight, enraptureth it the spirit; so that it becometh creator, and valuer, and lover, and everything's benefactor.

When your heart overfloweth broad and full like the river, a blessing and a danger to the lowlanders: there is the origin of your virtue.

When ye are exalted above praise and blame, and your will would command all things, as a loving one's will: there is the origin of your virtue.

When ye despise pleasant things, and the effeminate couch, and cannot couch far enough from the effeminate: there is the origin of your virtue.

When ye are willers of one will, and when that change of every need is needful to you: there is the origin of your virtue.

Verily, a new good and evil is it! Verily, a new deep murmuring and the voice of a new fountain!

Power is it, this new virtue; a ruling thought is it, and around it a subtle soul: a golden sun, with the serpent of knowledge around it.

The last part of this chapter is decidedly difficult but we get a hint in that sentence, "Verily, a new good and evil is it! Verily, a new deep murmuring, and the voice of a new fountain." To what would this refer?

Prof. Reichstein: To an impersonal center, not person. He says it is different from the one who says "all for myself."

Prof. Jung: You mean that "all for myself" would be the egotistical tendency and this would be an altruistic version?

Prof. Reichstein: He speaks of a new fountain.

Prof. Jung: But that might simply point to something like a new fountain which hitherto has not played, to a new origin.

Mr. Allemann: It is new energy, new libido welling up from the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: That would be the exact formulation. We could also say the new form of energy was welling up from a different region than before. And under what conditions can such a thing happen?

Mrs. Crowley: When there is a reconciliation of the two opposite sides.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a new energy could not spring up if there had not been a conflict before, so there must have been an opposition somewhere, and then suddenly the pairs of opposites were reconciled, and the energy which was invested in that tension is now released. And what was that opposition?

Prof. Reichstein: The golden ball with the snake round it, meaning the self and collectivity?

Prof. Jung: That would symbolize it. But throughout this chapter we have allusions to a particular dilemma.

Mrs. Frost: Is it the opposition between the *Seele* which wants *ich will*, and the one that says: "Do thus!"?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but it is said here in so many words.

Miss Hannah: The body and the spirit.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. He says, "And the spirit—what is it to the body?" So we have the point of view of the spirit, and the physical or corporal point of view. Now, spirit and body have long been in opposition, as you know, but apparently Nietzsche has here found a reconciliation of the two. Where is that indicated in the text of this chapter?

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not in this idea of the simile?

Prof. Jung: Yes. You see “similes are all names of good and evil; they do not speak out, they only hint. A fool who seeketh knowledge from them.” So these similes really give nothing, give no knowledge in themselves, but there is another answer here in the words of Zarathustra.

Miss Hannah: Is it not, “Give heed, my brethren, to every hour when your spirit would speak in similes?”

Prof. Jung: Exactly. That is, the simile in itself is not a source of knowledge or understanding. The words mean nothing, they are mere words. The important thing is the hour in which the spirit speaks in similes. In other words, when the spirit speaks in similes then a new source of energy has opened up, and then, as the fruit or result of a certain psychological condition, the similes have meaning. It is not the similes themselves, then, that have meaning but that they do occur; that one speaks in parables is important, because that is a symptom of something that has happened. Now, under what particular conditions would you speak in similes?

Mrs. Crowley: In a creative condition. It seems to me that the simile is the thing that grows out of revelation, and the fact is the thing that is absolutely abstract, more a concept. So that creative process which goes on in similes is a kind of revealing form; it doesn't state, but allows one to perceive.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one speaks in similes or analogies, for instance, when unable to express a thing in clear, abstract language. This is one condition, but it is not exactly the condition which Nietzsche envisages.

Mr. Allemann: Would it be a state of *ekstasis*, exaltation?

Prof. Jung: Yes, in an ecstatic condition—as Mrs. Crowley has said, in the state of revelation—namely, when something is revealed to him which was not known or understood before. Then, unable to express that thing totally by the words that are given to him, he will add a long series of analogies. One very excellent example is the Sermon on the Mount, all those similes for the kingdom of heaven. You see, the idea of the kingdom of heaven was a great revelation, a reconciling symbol, the union of opposites. And when Christ tries to convey that revelation to his fellow beings, he uses that series of famous analogies of the kingdom of heaven, in order to characterize the essence of that peculiar idea which cannot be expressed by one word. For what is the kingdom of heaven? Of what does the kingdom of heaven consist? It is difficult to say; and still today, if you ask different people about this notion, they are not at one, not even the theologians. One will say it is to be found amongst human beings, and another, more true to the tradi-

tion, will say that it is within yourself, in your heart for instance. But if a man has no ears of the heart or of the mind, he does not get it, and then you must use a number of other analogies in order to convey the idea. So Nietzsche takes similes, inasmuch as they are mere names of good and evil, for words only, but words that are symptomatic of a certain ecstatic condition: namely, a condition in which the ordinary human being is suddenly seized by unconscious contents and made to speak out. He will produce similes as mere symptoms of an unconscious content, and then they have their value. So he continues logically, "Elevated is then your body, and raised up; with its delight enraptureth it the spirit; so that it becometh creator, and valuer, and lover, and everything's benefactor." This means that out of the unconscious, which is located in the body, flows the revelation and causes similes; one becomes creative, creates similes, and thereby conveys that state of grace, that stream of enlightenment or whatever it is, to one's fellow beings. One becomes everybody's benefactor because one is then the source of a new life, of a new energy. Now, it is interesting that Nietzsche says "elevated is then your body"; everybody else would say it was the spirit. Why is that?

Prof. Reichstein: Because he identifies with Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: But then he would say "elevated is then the spirit," for Zarathustra is the spirit *par excellence*; he is not human.

Mrs. Crowley: Is it because the body is elevated when it has received this revelation or this word?

Prof. Jung: Why then in other cases do people always say "the spirit"?

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not just making that distinction? When it is unconscious it is the spirit, but when it is made conscious, that unconscious is then incorporated in the body.

Prof. Jung: That is all quite true, but usually people don't speak of the elevation of the body.

Mr. Allemann: In an ecstasy it looks as if the body were elevated; the saints were apparently lifted up.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is a peculiar phenomenon which is reported by St. Francis for instance; in certain moments when they were praying before the altar they were lifted up and held suspended in mid-air in a sort of external manifestation of the *ekstasis*. But in the Christian understanding, they were lifted up in the spirit. That the physical body seems to have been elevated, in a way confirms what Nietzsche says, but none of the saints said that. They said that the spirit had been elevated.

Mrs. Jung: Is it not that the body *needs* elevation?

Prof. Jung: Yes, this is a peculiarity in Nietzsche's case which has to

do with his type. He is chiefly an intuitive type with a complete neglect of the body; therefore his body always suffered from physical ailments. Half of the psychogenetic diseases occur where it is a matter of too much intuition, because intuition has this peculiar quality of taking people out of their ordinary reality. Intuitives are always ahead of themselves, never quite in the here-and-now, because they are nosing out possibilities which are to come off in the future. The body is the here-and-now *par excellence*, a prison in which we are here and now; but intuition is that faculty which removes one from the here-and-now in space and time. So as a compensation, the body is always reacting against morbidly intuitive people, who suffer from all sorts of ailments, particularly from disturbances in the abdomen or the stomach, ulcers in the stomach or the perineum for instance; it is as if the sympathetic nervous system, particularly the vegetative nervous system and the digestive tract, were producing spasms. Many such cases can be demonstrated which have the intention of calling the individual's attention to the reality of the body. It is almost dangerous to have so much intuition; such people forget entirely that they are in the here-and-now, and not in another country in the wonderful future.

That is exactly Nietzsche's case, so he is always at variance with his body; we dealt with that in connection with the rope-dancer and on several other occasions. Therefore when he tries to describe a real *ekstasis*, he naturally lays particular weight upon the body, because he realizes here that it is not the spirit in his case that gives the revelation. To an intuitive-intellectual the source of revelation is the body: the unconscious is then burdened with the body because the mind and the intuition don't take care of it. As Nietzsche is quite identified with Zarathustra, who is a pneumatic being, a breath, naturally he is always in the air above his body, and there he has nothing to eat but breath or air. So anything substantial that comes to him must come from the body, because the unconscious is identical with the body. Of course that is not so with a sensation type whose mind and consciousness are very much in the here-and-now; in such a case you would hear that the revelation comes from above, from the spirit. Now, inasmuch as the whole age is too much hypnotized or fascinated by the body, you naturally will be taught that the spirit always comes from above, out of the air. It is a light that comes from heaven, or it is a wind, and revelation takes place out of the breath.

Miss Wolff: I think the translation is not very good here; *auferstanden* means literally resurrected, and that may be a subtle reference to Christ, because Christ was raised up on the cross and then he was res-

urrected. So perhaps one could say it might be not only a problem of Nietzsche's time, but a problem of the whole Christian attitude, which is an intuitive attitude.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is just what I said, that it was a Christian teaching practically; that the revelation comes from the spirit and not from the body is a teaching that dates from antiquity, so it is coincidental with the spirit of Christian teaching. Therefore, Nietzsche is apt to express all his personal psychology by something which is general, collective, and traditional. Now the interesting thing is that when a revelation takes place in the kingdom of the spirit then the spirit is resurrected or healed, because it is then functioning; and when it happens from the side of the body, then that is resurrected and brought back to life. And then of course for Nietzsche as the intuitive, or for the good Christian which he represents, the functioning of the body is a true revelation. That the body is the here and the now if properly understood, is to the intuitive a true revelation; and inasmuch as the spirit of Christian teaching is thinking and intuition and identical with the air, it is a true revelation that there is a here and a now, and that it contains spirit, contains life, that it is something that really functions. To the intuitive the here and the now is nothing but the desolation of a prison, and that is of course exactly the old Christian teaching—that our body is the prison of the soul, that the here and the now is a valley of misery and humiliation, and that we are here in a prison where we only suffer, where we are not free, and only come into our existence in a future life.

Mrs. Frost: Doesn't Nietzsche in all these verses suggest a new synthesis? So far, there has only been the spirit, and here he means the body should join with the spirit in that new synthesis.

Prof. Jung: Absolutely, that is the great revelation, the union of the pairs of opposites, spirit and body. He brings about this union by a depreciation of the spirit in the nominalistic way. The Christian would say the spirit is the Logos, the word, and that it is full of life and revelation. But Nietzsche discovers and tells us that the spirit is Logos, but also that it means *nothing but* the word, and in so far the spirit is air. Of course, one could maintain that this is a very one-sided definition of the concept of the spirit, and that is exactly what *I* would say; the traditional meaning of *spiritos*, Logos, is surely a very one-sided idea. The original meaning of the word *Geist* in German points to something other than the Latin word *spiritus*, which is definitely a breath of air, as the Greek word *pneuma* is just the wind, and has taken on the spiritual meaning only under the influence of Christianity; in the Greek con-

temporary texts the word *pneuma* does not mean spirit, but means wind or air. So the Latin and Greek conception, or the word *spirit*, which we use, means definitely air, while *Geist* does not. The word *Geist*, as I have explained several times, has to do with something dynamic; it is a welling up, a new manifestation, like the foam that comes out of a champagne bottle. It is the volatile substance contained in the wine for instance, *Weingeist*; and *spiritus vini* is alcohol, the spirit coming back from the air. *Geist* had not the meaning of air originally, being a word that expresses a dynamic procedure, an outburst of something. In the New Testament, the descent of the Holy Ghost in the form of tongues of fire or a powerful wind, is the *dynamus* of the spirit; where it appears in a wind or in a storm you have the dynamic quality, but it has lost that quality, as the German word *Geist* has lost that meaning to a great extent. It perhaps still exists in the concept of *Geistreich*, which means that one is full of pep, that one produces, that one is brilliant; then one says *Er hat Geist* or is *Geistreich*, but that is faint. So you see, the original dynamic conception of *Geist* has really disappeared.

Mrs. Jung: I think the word *Gischt* has this dynamic quality.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the foam produced by a waterfall or the waves of the sea is called *Gischt*, and that is the same word.

Mrs. Baumann: Does the English word *geyser* not come from it?

Prof. Jung: A geyser is the welling up of hot water; that word is probably of the same origin, but I am not quite certain. It is Nordic, it comes from a Scandinavian root.¹

Mrs. Sigg: I think just that heroic deed of Nietzsche, that he did write the first part of *Zarathustra*, was a *Rehabilitierung* of this *Geist*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the whole of *Zarathustra*, its tremendous outburst, its élan and enthusiasm, is *Geist*, but in its most original form. He was overrun by it, the victim of this dynamic outburst. Like the disciples at Pentecost: when they came out into the streets, people thought they were drunk, but they were overcome by the *dynamis* of the spirit.² Our idea of the spirit has become quite lamed; in late Christianity it is lame and abstract. Now you see, he feels in this phenomenon that the body and what one called "spirit" have come together in a revelation that really to him comes from the body. So it is a sort of redemption of the body, something which has been lacking in Christianity, where the body, the here-and-now, has always been depreciated. One could say that in the moment when Nietzsche writes these words with his intui-

¹ *Geysir* (Icelandic): gusher, from old Norse *geysa*, "to rush forth."

² Ephesians 5:18.

tion and his whole world of thoughts, he feels that he is rushing into the here-and-now, and that is a revelation. Then the two things have come together and he feels that as portentous. For instance, he says, "Verily, a new good and evil is it! Verily, a new deep murmuring, and the voice of a new fountain!" *Ein neues tiefes Rauschen* is translated by "deep murmuring" but that is not very descriptive of the actual sound produced by an underground river rushing through rocks so that you hear a thunder-like noise in the depths. That sentence points to something which is still below the present moment; it is the future, and Nietzsche feels that he has heard something of the future. So what he feels as a new spring coming up from the ground is a sort of symptom, an anticipation of something very big that is to come.

Mrs. Frost: *Rumbling* would be the proper word, that is something which comes from below.

Prof. Jung: Would you speak of the rumbling of a river?

Mrs. Baumann: Roaring?

Prof. Jung: When there are stones in it, deep down in a big gorge, you hear a thunderous roar, like the roaring waters of Niagara.

Well now, the part we have been dealing with started from the idea of degeneration, and you remember I explained that as a sort of deviation from the *genus*, the particular kind to which the individual belongs. Now, when one has deviated from the law of the *genus*, it is as if one had left the center of the stream of life where the current is the swiftest, gradually drifted against the shore, struck ground, and come to a standstill. Now outside of life, one can look and see how the river passes, but one no longer moves or lives, because the actual process of living is an ever-renewed change, a change from day to day, hour to hour. For a time you can look at it from afar, but more and more life escapes you, and you feel it more and more as a loss; and the end will be that you feel that life is really leaving you, that you are dying. Degeneration leads therefore in a certain measure to death. But as soon as the lack of life is felt, the unconscious, being the balance or compensation, seeks to reestablish the former condition, so an unconscious seeking begins for the main current. Then the moment one comes into the current, one is also in the middle of the stream, in the middle position where right and left join, because in that act of kinetic energy is the act which unites the pairs of opposites; in the current the opposites come together. One is then moving, and this is a moment such as Nietzsche describes here. He feels that the spring has come, that the river is flowing; he is lifted from his feet and carried downstream. He

feels therefore renewed; his spirit has been divorced from the body and now he has found it again. He is moving with the river of life.

That is an intensive, dynamic phenomenon, and in Nietzsche's case of course an individual occurrence, but as I said, it is also a collective phenomenon. In its origin, only one individual has clearly perceived it, but at the same time that that individual perceives that he is lifted up, he also hears the underground rumble and roar of a much more powerful stream which is greater than his individual spring. It is that stream from which his individual spring has come. This is a collective phenomenon which is still in the unconscious, not visible on the surface, but we shall see in the subsequent chapters that he feels it very much as the thing that will be in the future; in the future many will strike the current again and then it will be perhaps a very powerful river which will irresistibly move on and wash away whatever is in its path. I point this out particularly because it refers to what is happening in our days: we are witnessing under many different aspects the beginning of a new time and a new spirit, which older people have great difficulty in understanding. We are split up, uncertain about the meaning of our modern times, we observe many most peculiar phenomena around us and we don't know how to value them. For instance, that fact of going off the gold standard is one of the most remarkable of all times. That nations can break their word, we knew before, but that they should do it so easily is remarkable, when it is quite self-evident that both England and America pride themselves on being very moral and Christian. It is just as if I were owing a man a hundred francs and said, "Here, I pay you fifty, that is what I owe you." Then the man says, "No, you owe me a hundred." But I say it doesn't matter, take it or leave it; I have the power to cheat people and I make use of that power. And without blushing! Nobody feels anything particularly wrong about it—it is all for the betterment of one's own nation. What did the church say about it? Nothing. Nobody blushed about it.

Mrs. Frost: But you said that God should be bad too!

Miss Hughes: Have you not the parable of the unjust steward?

Prof. Jung: Exactly, exactly, and that I call the new spirit. But I say that if the churches believe in their own values, they should have said a word about it. But they did not, nobody dared to open their mouth, and this is an astonishing thing, though those same nations have a great deal to say about the morality of the proceeding when the Germans do such a thing, and we all opened our mouths when the Russians killed a million bourgeois. But the difference is slight, a bit more or less. Now this is decidedly something quite new. And I want to men-

tion the interesting fact that Germany has at least the great merit of having formulated this new spirit. They say it is old Wotan, say they have become pagans. And when they broke into Belgium they said yes, we have violated the Treaty; yes, it *is* mean. That is what Bethmann-Hollweg always said; "We *have* broken our word," he confessed.³ And then we said how cynical he was, and that the Germans were only pagans anyway. But they simply admit what the others think and do. So learn from that. Do it but never say it; then you are wise. Stay with the Archbishop of Canterbury and then it is an economic measure; cut the throat of somebody and then call it an economic measure. Believe in your church and then it is all right. You see, the Germans are moved by that new and strange spirit which is not good, and they are on top of all fools because they say so. But to us it is interesting that I must say that I am very grateful to the Germans for their paganistic movement, at the head of which is my friend Professor Hauer who taught us the Tantric Yoga, and who has now become a savior of the fools. And some of them are really so nice and honest; that they call it Wotan means of course that they are in a sort of dream state where they cannot help telling the truth. For it is Wotan⁴ that is the interesting thing. A Swiss, Martin Ninck, has recently written a very interesting book called *Wotan und Germanischer Schicksalsglaube*⁵ in which he collected all the material about Wotan as evidence that he is the personification of the moving spirit behind Hitler. Wotan is the noise in the wood, the rushing waters, the one who causes natural catastrophes, and wars among human beings. He is the great sorcerer. Quite rightly, the Romans identified him with Mercury—of course not as the god of merchants, but of sorcerers, of the people who go in the dark, who are surreptitious in a way, who are moved by dark purposes; and he is also the psychopompos, the leader of souls, the one that carries the souls into the ghostland, the god of revelation. Therefore one can say he is very similar to the Thracian Dionysos, the god of orgiastic enthusiasm. Now old Wotan is in the center of Europe; you can see all the psychological symptoms which he personifies, including his romantic character of

³ Theodore von Bethmann Holweg (1856-1921) became Reichs Chancellor in 1900 and, in spite of many diplomatic blunders, lasted in office until 1917. Most famous for his dismissal of the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality as a "scrap of paper," he told the Reichstag in 1914 that Germany had been unjust to Belgium.

⁴ J. W. Hauer gave the lectures on Kundalini Yoga in the Autumn of 1932, to which Jung added a psychological commentary. See 6 June 1934, n. 11, above. By now Hauer had identified with the Nazis.

⁵ I.e., *Wotan and the German Belief in Destiny*. His work was published in 1935.

the sorcerer, the god of mysteries—all that is living again. As far as the German mentality reaches in Europe—and it reaches, as you know, from the Urals to Spain—we see religion upset; in the most Catholic of all countries, Spain, the church is completely overthrown. And that is old Wotan, you could not name it better, the wind came and blew the thing into bits. Fascism in Italy is old Wotan again; it is all Germanic blood down there, with no trace of the Romans; they are Langobards, and they all have that Germanic spirit. Of course Switzerland is still a little exception, you know! Oh, we have joined in but we were not so foolish as to say so.

Prof. Fierz: I should like to point out that one of the first acts of King Edward VIII was to receive Litvinov, who was one of the murderers of his cousin. If the poor Tzar could turn in his grave he would do so, but there was no fear of it because he was burned and buried in a well. He could not turn, so King Edward need have no fear.⁶

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is an economic measure like those the Italians follow out in Abyssinia. Well now, after this revelation

Here paused Zarathustra awhile, [I can understand!] and looked lovingly on his disciples. Then he continued to speak thus—and his voice had changed: [It would have changed!]

Remain true to the earth, my brethren, with the power of your virtue! Let your bestowing love and your knowledge be devoted to the meaning of the earth! Thus do I pray and conjure you.

Let it not fly away from the earthly and beat against eternal walls with its wings! Ah, there hath always been so much flown-away virtue!

Lead, like me, the flown-away virtue back to the earth—yea, back to body and life: that it may give to the earth its meaning, a human meaning!

A hundred times hitherto hath spirit as well as virtue flown away and blundered. Alas! in our body dwelleth still all this delusion and blundering: body and will hath it there become.

A hundred times hitherto hath spirit as well as virtue attempted

⁶ Although his father, King George V, would never have done so, Edward VIII, shortly after taking the throne, received the Soviet ambassador, Maxim Litvinov (1875-1951), and had a long conversation with him, during which Litvinov explained why he considered it to have been necessary to kill Czar Nicholas II, his wife Alexandra (granddaughter of Queen Victoria), and their children. (It is, however, by no means clear that he himself had anything to do with this execution.) Litvinov told a reporter afterwards that Edward “impressed one as a mediocre Englishman who glances at one newspaper a day” (from *Time*, 10 Feb. 1936).

and erred. Yea, an attempt hath man been. Alas, much ignorance and error hath become embodied in us!

Not only the rationality of millenniums—also their madness, breaketh out in us. Dangerous is it to be an heir.

Still fight we step by step with the giant Chance, and over all mankind hath hitherto ruled nonsense, the lack-of-sense.

Let your spirit and your virtue be devoted to the sense of the earth, my brethren: let the value of everything be determined anew by you! Therefore shall ye be fighters! Therefore shall ye be creators!

This part of the chapter shows very clearly the meaning of the revelation: namely, the earth, the body, should become of spiritual value—of that value which formerly has been the exclusive prerogative of the spirit. Now, if the earth and the body assume the dignity of spiritual importance, then their peculiar essence has to be considered in the same way as the demands and the postulates of the spirit were formerly considered, and then naturally much that has been in the air with the spirit will return to the earth; many things which were kept in suspense, which were on the wings of the spirit, will now precipitate themselves in matter. You see, that people can keep themselves in suspense is the reason why they prefer to live in the spirit: they can live a provisional life with reference to the earth or the body; that may come about in the future but for the time being they are quite happy postponing it. It is like building one's house on a huge bird that never settles; if one never becomes, one can be anywhere. One is not in the here-and-now when living in the spirit, so one can postpone one's problems. But the moment that the here-and-now begins to suffer, when the individual body suffers, or political and economic circumstances become bad, then one is forced to land, and no sooner does the spirit touch the earth than one is caught. It is like that idea of the Gnosis, the *nous*, that beholds his own face in the ocean; he sees the beauty of the earth and that lovely woman's face and he is caught, entangled in the great problem of the world. Had he remained the *nous* or *pneuma*, he would have kept on the wing, would have been like the image of God that was floating over the waters and never touching them; but he did touch them and that was the beginning of human life, the beginning of the world with all its suffering and its beauty, its heavens and hells.⁷ Of course what the Gnosis represented in this cosmo-

⁷ In the *Corpus Hermeticum*, *Nous* or reason, bearing the name of Poimandres, "seeing reflected in the water this form resembling himself, which was appearing in nature, he

gonic myth as heaven and hell is what really happens again and again in human life. It is an archetypal picture.

And what happens here is really the same: The spirit beheld its image in matter, touched upon matter, and was caught; and it was a passionate embrace, apparently a moment of ecstasy, and the consequence will be that it is once more entangled in the earth. That expresses itself also in the circumstances of our time; if you compare our actual prevailing conditions with those that prevailed before the war, you see the difference. You can no longer travel from one country to another without a passport, and you have not the money you had before; you have to take into account that there is a difference in currency, new laws, and God knows what—so you are simply fettered. Our possibilities have been cut down tremendously; our free movement in quite ordinary ways has been enormously curtailed. All that is merely an expression or a symptom of what has happened: that one is in a way in the prison of the earth. Man has come down to the earth once more. Everybody talks of reducing and becoming simple, living a more natural and simpler life, and that means getting closer to the earth. Formerly one could afford to fly about, but now we have to remain right on the earth and one is very painfully reminded of the reality of the here-and-now. This is simply an external manifestation of the fact that the *nous* has once more come down from the heavens, has embraced the earth, and been caught in the earth. Naturally, that embrace seems at first to be all beauty and marvel, but if you think of the consequences, it is no longer so nice. And we will see in the end of *Zarathustra*—if we ever get there—what happens when he comes to the question of paying the account.

It seems ideal and beautiful: the body is being deified, we live again in the here-and-now, the earth and its vicinity, and we are friends of the next things. But wait until the next things come a little bit nearer and see whether you can remain friends with them. It is very doubtful. Hitherto, nothing but chance ruled the world, but since man has returned to his natural home on the earth his mind rules the world, and see how that works! More than ever, we are victims of mere chance; our politics since the war have been nothing but one big blunder. Man has proved absolutely inadequate to deal with the situation. Everybody was surprised by the development of things. Nobody clearly foresaw what would happen. They forgot all about the past and what very able

loved it and desired to dwell there!" Jean Dorresse, *The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics*, tr. Phillip Mariet (New York, 1960), p. 215.

people in the past knew would happen. So they created a situation where really nothing but chance can lead us out. Now Nietzsche thinks that man's mind, having come home to the earth, will deal with this giant chance and the nonsense that has ruled mankind hitherto, but the nonsense is greater than ever, the lack of sense. For this union of the spirit and the body, or the spirit and the earth, forms something which to man will lack sense forever because he is utterly inadequate. He never will understand what it is. If he did, he would know what life is and that is a mystery. And we don't know what the purpose of life is, don't even know whether it *has* purpose: we are quite safe in believing that this life is mere meaningless chaos because that is what we see. There may be sense here and there, and we can only hope that there is sense in general, but we don't know at all.

The only thing which seems absolutely sure is that the main feature is chance, though certain things are apparently law-abiding. We talk more of laws than abide by them, and when the law does not work—it never works exactly—we say, “Oh, that is mere chance.” We belittle chance and don't admit that chance is the master. And when we want to make a natural law, we build laboratories and make very complicated experiments in order to exclude the chance that disturbs us. So when we observe life in the open, for a short stretch of the way it works *more or less*. You see, it is better that we see things as they appear to be. That is our only reality and it is better than to get angry over the non-observance of laws, for they don't work very clearly; the main thing is chaos and chance—that is a pretty fair picture of the world. We talk so much of law and reason because we wish to have something of it; it is so difficult to be reasonable, so difficult to observe the law. Therefore we talk of it. We usually talk of things as they ought to be and hate people who talk of things as they are; “you *ought to*,” “you *should*,” gives us peace of mind. If somebody tells us how we ought to do or say a thing, then reason is still ruling the world. Of course it doesn't work; things take their own way and we are singularly impotent to change them. Nietzsche says, “Let the value of everything be determined anew by you.” But who is determining things? Are people reconciled even on the subject of the gold standard for instance? So Nietzsche says, “Therefore shall ye be fighters.” You see, that leads directly into war and destruction. “And therefore shall ye be creators.” Yes, when you are capable of creating something.

Mr. Allemann: Does not *Schaffende* mean the doer, the active one, rather than the creator?

Prof. Jung: Well, *der Schaffende* is in Nietzsche's language the creator,

and nothing can be created without destruction. There is an old Latin sentence that expresses it very nicely: *Creatio unius est corruptio alterius*, "The creation of the one is the corruption of the other."

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not also expressed in the myth of the Phoenix?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Phoenix burns itself up—that is destruction—and then it comes back recreated.

Intelligently doth the body purify itself; attempting with intelligence it exalteth itself; to the discerners all impulses sanctify themselves; to the exalted the soul becometh joyful.

Well, let it be known generally to the discerners that all impulses sanctify themselves and you have the condition of Europe as it is today. "To the exalted the soul becometh joyful." You see when pairs of opposites come together, when you have struck the main current again, there is a spring of enthusiasm and life within you, which compensates to a great extent for the external difficulties you create for yourself. Generally, we have to look at fate in that way—that to a much greater extent than we assume, we are creating our fate. Even things which seem to come causally from another source than ourselves are of such an habitual kind that we must assume that they have to do with the deepest roots of our own being. So we can safely say, whatever one's experience in life, "That is *my* experience of life, simply my image; it is mirroring what I am." You see, when something evil happens to us, we can still assume that it comes from our own source, because it symbolizes exactly what we are. Therefore to certain people, always the same things happen; they are part of their scenery. They are like a theater with its different stage-sets, and one of them is just a series of things that habitually happen to them. If you look at things in this way, then you also have a chance to find perhaps a way by which you can avoid such an habitual fate. If it were only happening from without, with no connection with your character, then you would have absolutely no chance of changing anything; you could only run away and even that would not help you, because running round the next corner you would plunge into a situation which was habitually your own again, only worse. But if you accept this fact that fate is really created by your own self, then you are in the current; and then even if the external situation is bad, at least you have the spring flowing within. Then you can say, "To the exalted the soul becometh joyful," for if you are in the river of life you are joyful, and are lifted up by the river.

Now, the question is of course: Is it good to be in the current of life, or is it bad? I mean morally. And that is difficult to say. As a rule, it is

good for others when I am not in the river of life because then I do nothing. I simply look on, and that might be better for others. But if I am outside, if I only look on, it is not so good for myself. Perhaps sometimes it is also good for certain reasons to be safe on the bank and not to touch the current; and usually those people who are onlookers, who have left the main current, are less offensive because they are inactive. You see, this is so in Buddhism. They try to leave the current of life because it is all illusion, and so they become inoffensive, and the evil they work is merely evil by deprivation—that they don't build hospitals, don't observe public hygiene, etc. They are chiefly concerned with their spiritual welfare. So whatever evil they work is simply the evil of deprivation, the absence of good; and that may be better than doing good like the active Europeans, for an active person is more likely to do damage, even if it is meant to be good. The worst people always have good intentions. They are just awful because the devil is behind their talk, all the time whispering, "Now do the good thing." And because they believe in it, they force other people to do the same and that is of course tyrannical, with a lot of power instinct in it. So one could hold that for other people the good thing would be for me to withdraw from life. But for myself it is not good. In order to prosper it is perhaps better to be in life, though the others will suffer because as soon as I step I crush the beetle upon the road; if I eat a certain loaf of bread nobody else can eat that loaf; if I take a seat nobody else can sit there. I am a nuisance right and left, and if I had great compassion I would withdraw from the current of life.

Now of course, one could ask, "But should one never withdraw?" Of course when the river begins to ebb low, it naturally ceases to flow, and then you cannot tell whether you are in the main current or in a by-water, in a swamp or a lagoon—or whether you are in the sea. Then you can and you naturally will withdraw, for if you depend on the movement of the river, what would be the use of trying to navigate a boat in a river that doesn't flow any longer? Then you might as well be on the shore. You see, when you begin to be static, when the world looks as it always has looked for all eternity, as soon as you see that in your own heart, then you can be on the mountain: you don't need the current. But this is only good teaching to older people. For the young people it is wrong; then the main current is everywhere and in everything, and then they should be everywhere and in everything. So if a Buddhist should withdraw into solitude as a very young man and live a passive life, unless he is called by God to be a particular saint, he surely would be making a mistake. But if he slowly goes out of life as

Buddha himself did, I should say that was natural and reasonable and good. Buddha really was good for other people, because he was no longer active. Inasmuch as you are active you are not so good for other people, and you will get your hands dirty; you cannot remain good. If you think you can be good and active, it is a great illusion: it is simply impossible.

Mrs. Frost: How about St. Francis of Assisi who was both good and active?

Prof. Jung: Well, he had had a pretty stiff dose of life before, I have heard. And his activity later is very doubtful. It was the activity of privation, a monk making friends with wolves and other animals is not living in the current of mankind. That doesn't pay, but is a kind of spiritual activity which I would call negative in the European sense of the word.

Mr. Allemann: What about preaching to the leaders of old Europe to be a bit less active?

Prof. Jung: That is pretty dangerous. We are already restricted in our activity by circumstances and we always shall be; and if one teaches anything to Europeans, they most probably will make the wrong use of it.

Mr. Allemann: I mean to people in the second part of life.

Prof. Jung: There it is something else. It is absolute necessity. You are forced by the psychological constitution of people when they are young to teach them a bit of life. And you must teach older people of the living inactivity, which is not mere lameness, but is the absence of movement. The inactivity which is characteristic in the second part of life is only inactivity in reference to people and circumstances. You see, when somebody sits on a mountain and reflects upon what is happening about him, he is very active—only other people don't see that.

LECTURE IV

12 February 1936

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah: "Last seminar you said, in connection with the verse on the giant Chance, that most things depend on Chance and that we can do very little about it. In connection with the next but one verse, you said that we create our fate ourselves to a far greater extent than we realize and that once we know this we can begin to alter it. Is this a paradox?" Yes, it is a paradox. "Or does one change into the other according to our state of consciousness? Or is it rather that what we call chance is really the doing of the self and that as we become more conscious we see that its pattern is our own, however little we may like it from an ego point of view?"

I am glad that Miss Hannah has brought up this point. You see, in saying "we," one speaks of a very complex fact, for there is always the conscious "we" and the total "we"; one should add that to explain the paradox. When one observes how people live, one sees how their totality lives, which is entirely different from the way the conscious lives. In many cases one cannot even make out whether people are conscious of what they do and live and say; one has to enquire and carefully investigate certain facts in order to find out. It is amazing how little people know of what they do; one would assume that they were quite conscious of it but as a matter of fact they are not. It is as if it were happening to somebody else. So one never can tell whether one's partner has done a thing consciously or not; one always has to enquire. Of course in ordinary speech one doesn't take these subtle differences into account. And that is again a paradox because they are shockingly evident; yet from another standpoint they are exceedingly subtle because one doesn't see the differences. So in saying "we" one means at one time the totality of what happens, while in another context one means more particularly the conscious ego. Now, it is a fact that the conscious ego can do very little. It is as if one were surrounded by all sorts of inevitable conditions so that one hardly knows how to move;

but if one speaks of that small circle in which the ego *can* move, it seems as if one could do quite a lot. Inasmuch, then, as one's fate is contained in the small circle of the ego, one can change it—one has free will within that little circle of one's personal reach. But outside of that—and our totality is mostly outside of it—not much can be done.

Then it is quite certain that if one increases the reach of one's consciousness, one will naturally have a much greater area in which to apply freedom of will, so to that extent one can also influence one's condition. But compared with the whole, it is very little. Therefore, even if one reaches a considerable extension of consciousness, one has to accept the lack of freedom, accept the fact that things are going against the grain, against the ego. And one reaches that frontier, I might say, in the moment when one discovers the inferior function, or the contrasting type. For instance, when an introvert discovers the possibility of his extraversion, his consciousness is extended to such an extent that he oversteps the limit of his freedom; for when he touches upon his inferior function his freedom is gone. The instinctive reaction is, therefore, to withdraw as soon as possible, to avoid the people who touch upon his inferiority, to avoid everything that could remind him of it, for nobody wants to be reminded of his defeat. One naturally reviles people and circumstances that remind one of one's inferiority, and that is in a way a sound instinct because one feels unable to cope with it. But if the process of the development of consciousness continues, one understands more and more that it doesn't help to avoid oneself; one is forced through oneself to accept even one's contrast and the lack of freedom. Anybody with a decent extension of consciousness will be forced to admit that in a certain way one is also not free, that one has to accept many things in oneself as facts which cannot be altered—at least not at the moment.

Then, if your extension of consciousness has forced you to accept your own contrast, you have thereby naturally overstepped the limit of a natural ego. That is exactly what Zarathustra is trying to teach here and still more in the subsequent chapters: namely, that we have not yet discovered man in his totality, despite the fact that we can see it externally. We see what other people live but *they* are unable to see that; and inasmuch as *we* only live it without seeing it, we don't know what we live. So within its own reach the ego can do a great deal, but beyond that very little, for then it steps over into the unconscious life where it can do nothing. Only when that area of unconsciousness can be covered by consciousness, when a part of formerly unconscious life is

drawn into the sphere of consciousness, is it at all subject to your choice. If that is not the case, well, then it will be chosen for you: something will decide for you, and then you are of course not free. Now, though all that part of your life which is lived in an unconscious way is unfree, it is nevertheless your own because you are in it; you may not have chosen it yet there you are in a hole. And if you are a bit more conscious you see that you have maneuvered yourself into the boiling water; you have carefully picked your way until you found the hot water in which you are sitting. If you are not conscious of your own way, you say that somebody has surely played a trick on you and put a pot of boiling water just where you wanted to sit down. But with a bit more consciousness you see that *you* have done it, and with still more consciousness you will see that you could not *avoid* doing it: you had to do it for a certain purpose.

So you slowly come to the conclusion that many things which you formerly said were wrong and which some devil had arranged for you, were really just what you had sought and prepared and put there for your own use, for a purpose, and that your former idea that some enemy had worked the trick was a superstition. The more you have such experiences, the more you will be inclined to understand that this is the truth in all those cases which you don't understand. Things still happen to you; you have a certain fate which is not welcome, which disturbs you—or situations arise where you assume that somebody has worked against you. But now you are more able to say, "In so many cases I have seen that *I* was my so-called enemy, that *I* was the wise fellow who prepared such a fix for myself, that probably in this case I have worked the same trick—I really don't understand it yet." There really still seems to be something against you, but you are so impressed by your former experiences that you apply a new hypothesis. And so you slowly arrive at the idea that probably nothing in a human life is just against it; the whole thing has probably been a carefully worked out plan and there is no such thing as the giant chance. The giant is the self; the self has prepared it for a certain end. Then you may still say "we" have done so and so, but it is no longer exact; it is not an accurate use of speech, since it is the self.

Mrs. Crowley: In connection with that, you spoke of accepting life as if it were not only accepting the chaos but living it, as if there were nothing but chaos. That was so perplexing to me, because there is also the same idea in it that if you don't see that thread of the self in it, it would lead to frustration and ruthlessness.

Prof. Jung: Well, if you see nothing *but* chaos, it amounts to an unconscious condition, because that amount of life which you control by the ego surely is not chaos, but is already a little cosmos. Yet outside of that is something that seems to be chaos or chance, and anything else that is said about it is simply an assumption; you are allowed to say it is *not* chaos only when you have experienced the cosmos in it, the secret order. It is really true that unless you have experienced the order of things, they are a disorder; it is a wrong assumption to call it an order. Of course we are full of such assumptions, are taught to make them, to have optimistic conceptions and so on, and this is wrong. The world is an order only when somebody experiences that order, not before; it is a chaos if nobody experiences it as a cosmos. That has much to do with the Chinese idea of Tao. I always think of the story of the rainmaker of Kiau Tschou. If that fellow had not gone into Tao it would not have rained, yet there is no causality; the two things simply belong together, the order is only established when order is established. He had to experience the order in that chaos, in that disharmony of heaven and earth; and if he had not experienced the harmony, it would not have been.¹ Well, this is high Eastern philosophy; I am unable to explain to you this great paradox. Now we will continue:

Physician, heal thyself: then wilt thou also heal thy patient. Let it be his best cure to see with his eyes him who maketh himself whole.

Nietzsche is realizing certain truths here which are highly important from a psychological point of view. "Physician, heal thyself" is particularly good teaching for our late Christianity. You see, he assumes that the real cure is made where it is most needed and most immediate. That is like the rainmaker of Kiau Tschou again. He does not curse the earth or pray to heaven to behave and produce rain. He says to himself that he was right when he left his village and when he got here he was wrong. This place is out of order so he is the one that is wrong; that wrong is nearest to him, and if he wants to do anything for the chaotic condition, it must be done in him—he is the immediate object of himself. So he asks for that little house and there he locks himself in and

¹ The story was told Jung by his friend Richard Wilhelm, who once lived in a region of China suffering from drought. The rain-maker, having been summoned, sequestered himself in a quiet house for three days and on the fourth there was a great snow. Asked to explain his powers, he denied being one who could make snow. Rather, since the country was in disorder, "I had to wait three days until I was back in Tao and then naturally the rain came." See CW 5, par. 604n.

works on himself; he remains shut in until he reconciles heaven and earth in himself, until he is in the right order, and then he has cured the situation: Tao is established. That is exactly the same idea. So the best cure for anybody is when the one who thinks about curing has cured himself; inasmuch as he cures himself it is a cure. If he is in Tao, he has established Tao, and whoever beholds him beholds Tao and enters Tao. This is a very Eastern idea. The Western idea—particularly late Christianity—is of course to cure your neighbor, to help him, with no consideration of the question, “*Who* is the helper?” Perhaps he is not a help, or perhaps he gives something which he takes back with the other hand. There are plenty of people nowadays who join the life of the community, assume responsibility, and all that stuff, but I say, “Who is assuming responsibility?” If my business is in a bad condition and a fellow comes along and says he will assume the responsibility and run the whole thing, I naturally ask him who he is—and then I find he has been bankrupt. Naturally I don’t want one who is himself a beggar and has given evidence of his own incompetence. Those people who are very helpful need help. If they are physicians they should treat their own neurosis, otherwise they are just vampires and want to help other people for their own needs.

A thousand paths are there which have never yet been trodden;
a thousand salubrities and hidden islands of life. Unexhausted
and undiscovered is still man and man’s world.

This is also an important item. But is that not a peculiar sequence? He was just speaking of the physician who should first heal himself and then suddenly “a thousand paths are there which have never yet been trodden.” What is the connection?

Mr. Allemann: Perhaps he says, “Physician, heal thyself” because he sees that he himself has not trodden this path of which he speaks.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. And then the voice says, “*I* am ill, I should heal myself.” But how can he heal himself if he does not know himself? So naturally he comes to the statement that any amount of things are still unknown: man is not yet discovered, but is still the great enigma. It should be: *I* am the great enigma, I have not found out anything about myself. That would lead him into a careful study of himself, for otherwise he would not be able to heal himself. You see, he does not apply that truth to himself, but teaches other people what he really should teach himself; he tries to be helpful, but in the wrong way. Of course it is good teaching for other people too; perhaps somebody else will draw conclusions from it.

Awake and hearken, ye lonesome ones.

It is Zarathustra who is lonesome, but being helpful and a good Christian, he talks to other people.

From the future come winds with stealthy pinions, and to fine ears good tidings are proclaimed.

Ye lonesome ones of today, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people arise:—and out of it the Superman.

This is really a sort of prophecy. It is as if he were hearing something of the future—the winds of the future with stealthy pinions and a new gospel with good tidings. That is the *euangelion*,² he scents faintly a new revelation, a new important truth which of course is connected with the undiscovered man. And what would that be?

Mrs. Sigg: The compensatory function of the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the unconscious is not discovered—all the things that are unconscious to man. So the prophecy would be that good tidings are to be expected from that side because of the compensatory function of the unconscious. That would explain the idea of the thousand salubrities: namely, the helpful qualities of the unconscious which would produce a new health. And he announces these tidings particularly to the lonesome ones; for those who feel particularly separate and suffer from their separateness the good tidings in the air would be that they are lonesome and seceding today because they have more intuition or a certain premonition of what is to be expected in the future. And now comes the funny idea that they one day will be a people. What could one reasonably mean by that?

Mrs. Baynes: Could he mean the unification of the psyche into a whole man?

Prof. Jung: Well, psychologically that is surely true, for that has to do with the structure of the Superman. You see, the Superman really is “a people,” not one man; that can be understood very literally. For if these lonely or seceding ones integrate their unconscious, they are of course different from other people insofar as their consciousness is more extended, and then it is as if they were uniting the statistics of a whole people in one psychology. Then they would recognize that they were not only this but also that, not only old but also young, not only good but also bad—there would be nothing, practically, which they were not. That is a condition which is usually only prevailing in a whole

² *Euangelion*: good tidings, evangel, gospels.

nation or in the population of a town at least, where one is the parson, another the doctor, another a workman, and so on; each has his specific role and is nothing else. The roles are well distributed on the surface. But when people integrate their unconscious, they see they are all those too. So it is as if one man were becoming a whole town; he would then find his former ego consciousness included in the consciousness of a whole population. Now, that is also a simile for the self; the self is often explained as being like a city containing thousands of people because the self only becomes visible in the experience of a greater consciousness. If one extends one's consciousness so that one sees that one is many things besides one's ego, one approaches a certain realization of the self. But it is also true in another way: namely, if an attempt at an extension of consciousness appears somewhere and is not realized, then it causes a sort of mental infection which draws people together in a sect, say, or it causes a mental epidemic such as one sees actually happening in Germany. That is the Superman on the level of non-realization; the whole people is like one man, and one man is shown as an emblem or symbol of the whole nation. That is the substitute for the integration of the consciousness of one individual. You see, Germany *should* be one individual but with an integrated consciousness; instead of that there is just no integration of the unconscious, but the whole people is integrated into one sacred figure—which nobody fully believes *could* be sacred. That is the unfortunate thing.

Mrs. Baumann: The actual phrase used here seems to really refer to Germany; it says a chosen people shall arise, and they call themselves a chosen people.

Prof. Jung: The German text is *soll ein auserwähltes Volk erwachsen*; you are quite right.

Mrs. Baynes: But surely you cannot accuse Nietzsche of that sort of chauvinism.

Prof. Jung: Oh heavens no—nobody was more critical than he; he is talking out of his unconscious. When you read his aphorisms, you understand that he never would have said such damned nonsense, but when the unconscious speaks it is a different matter—then it is in his blood. An integrated consciousness *is* of course the chosen one: "many are called but few are chosen." The integrated consciousness knows its meaning and therefore it is chosen, conscious of the choice that has been made before its birth. You see, the self is timeless, and that assembly of facts which characterizes the self has been chosen before time. Therefore, one cannot help having the feeling of being chosen, and that this whole thing is chosen, premeditated. There is no getting away

from it: one is embedded in a course of events that is meaningful. Now, if that is not realized consciously, it simply spreads out unconsciously, and instead of the chosen self, realized by consciousness as the choice that has taken place before time, the whole people is chosen; and then you have that funny fact of a people imagining that it has a mission or something like that—that they are God's own people, chosen by God himself. That idea can be forgiven on a primitive level, but on a higher level it is absolutely out of the question; it is a psychological feeling that belongs in the individuation process, which has spread unconsciously by mental contagion because it has not been realized by the one individual.

Nietzsche's idea is perfectly clear to him. Those good tidings would be the idea of the Superman: namely, the idea that all those lonely people like himself will form a community, and out of them will come the future birth, the Superman. Nietzsche had the idea that civilization was declining and that something like a monastery might be created for people like himself. Keyserling has also preached that notion in *La Révolution Mondiale*—without mentioning his predecessor—that he himself might found such a monastery, a most amazing idea.³ It is really very usual, however, when people are touching upon something vital, that they organize a society, assuming that they are the kernel perhaps of a great organization which will cover the whole world, and so the world will be renewed. That is the same mistake: it is a rationalization of a psychological fact which according to the principle of "Physician, heal thyself" should be dealt with in an entirely different way. For lacking wholeness of the individual a big organization is substituted. One thinks one is much bigger for belonging to a *Verein*, with ten thousand members, for instance. Of course the bigger an organization, the lower its morality and the more its psychology approaches mob psychology, but they don't see that; and that they would be working quite against the purpose of such an organization. So the idea Nietzsche plays with on the surface is of course the ordinary idea that all the lonely people of the world who smell a rat should be organized into one body.

Many such schemes were tried after the war. A woman named Dorothy Hunt⁴ travelled all over Europe to collect the great names of Europe—not even the people—to organize them into a big hydrocephalus.

³ See p. 18n above.

⁴ Dorothy Alice Bonavia Hunt (who also used the pseudonym Doric Collyer) was a minor English novelist. She brought out two books in 1937 (London), *Reflection* and *Unfettered*.

lus, and when she came to Bernard Shaw, he wrote in pencil at the bottom of her letter, "Don't try, Dorothy! Nothing doing." This is this kind of psychology. And then all these fine and lonely people—who cannot understand each other, but hate each other like poison, otherwise they never would be lonely—are all pressed together into one matchbox. By great good chance they might create a superman. But he would probably be a superman who would jump out of that box as soon as possible. Everyone would like to be a superman or imagines that he is one, but those people never go together. It is evidence of the amazing unconsciousness of good Christians to think that all good people should go together. They don't. They are competitors who hate each other. It is then not a case of being good, but of being better, and that is the worst.

Verily, a place of healing shall the earth become.

Oh God! Wouldn't that be awful?—the whole world a hospital filled with nurses and doctors—everybody healing everybody else.

And already is a new odour diffused around it, a salvation-bringing odour—and a new hope!

There is something decidedly late Christian about this, yet behind it there is a great truth. It would be really marvelous if the earth should become a place of healing, but it would be where people heal themselves, where everybody is concerned with their own health cure. That would be almost a paradise.

Mrs. Sigg: I don't think the translation is exactly healing, *Genesung*.

Prof. Fierz: Oh yes, it is even worse.

Prof. Jung: It doesn't make much difference, *Wahrlich, eine Stätte der Genesung soll noch die Erde werden*⁵—that might be a sanatorium you know!

Mrs. Baynes: Healing can also have the passive meaning in English. I understand Mrs. Sigg to mean that it is here used in the passive sense.

Prof. Jung: It is ambiguous, and on account of that it is as if the historical condition had misunderstood and had chosen just the wrong conclusion; one cannot even say *quite* wrong, but wrong from a psychological point of view.

Well now, I quite understand that my comments on the end of this second chapter have caused some discussion, so I want to make one

⁵ Kaufmann* translates the sentence: "Verily, the earth shall yet become a site of recovery."

point clear, or rather two points: namely, that this whole chapter has a double bottom. Below the surface there is the teaching by Zarathustra. Now, Zarathustra is the archetype of the wise old man, the *nous* or the *pneuma*, as it always has been. And his message is right. But it is transmitted through a human brain. The man Nietzsche receives the message and lends it his own language, and then of course it becomes something else. Nietzsche is the man in time and space, the man who belongs to and is limited by certain conditions—time conditions, social conditions—and naturally these restricting conditions will modify the message. We can read the original message in his words. It is *contained* in the words, but Nietzsche's own time conditions and mental conditions come in too, so that the message comes out already in a modified way. It becomes still more so when it reaches the ears of the audience, because the audience modifies it again. One must always ask, to what time this truth has been taught—and then expect a peculiar modification.

For instance, compare the original meaning of Christ's teaching with what has become of it in the subsequent centuries. When Christianity was taught to a highly educated audience, it was made into a philosophy. If you have a certain idea how men like St. Augustine or Tertullian preached, or how a learned man like Origen understood Christianity, you realize that that makes all the difference in the world. One instance which I have often quoted is that St. Augustine compares the Virgin Mary to the earth: she is the earth fecundated by the spring rains, and from the earth, Christ, our truth, is born: he is the wheat.⁶ That is the type of language which subsequent centuries would not have understood. It would have led back into a chthonic cult, but those men were talking to educated people who could take these things on the wing; an idea was not leaden, it lived. The antique Roman Christians didn't need dogma; their subtle minds could deal with analogies and symbolism. They understood things. Yet the same gospels taught to the barbarians became something quite different; the barbarian mind demands things cut and dried. Originally there was no question about the communion for instance, a sort of memorial rite. The idea of real flesh and blood only became dogma in about the ninth century when Paschasius Radbertus invented transubstantiation: that was a concession to the barbarous mind. He was the abbot of a monastery in

⁶ See St. Augustine, p. 51n above. His mentor, St. Ambrose: "In the womb of the Virgin, grace increased like a heap of wheat and the lily" (*De Institutio Virginis*, cap. 14, cited in CW 6, par. 394.

Corbie, Picardie, one of the Frankish invaders. (The whole north of France was at that time Germanic.) A monk in the same monastery however, Radramndus, still held that it was a memorial meal. And Scotus Erigena, the abbot of Malmsbury, who died in 889, fought for this idea.⁷

So Zarathustra speaks to Nietzsche, but Nietzsche speaks out of his time. He is an advanced man of his time, yet he receives the message already with a certain modification. To reach the ears of an audience, he must speak the language of his surroundings, of his condition; and what people do to it afterwards, well, that remains to be seen. But already the fact that he is teaching somebody, even in the imagination, makes a great deal of difference. When I formulate a thought to myself alone, for instance, I can formulate it in a way that nobody would understand, in a mental shorthand, in a symbolic sort of way; and if I put that on paper and get it printed it will be incomprehensible. If I make up my mind to explain it, I must translate it into the language of my surroundings. I must imagine what people know and don't know, I have to come down to the ordinary conditions of communication, and that of course changes the original idea.

The underlying idea here is, of course, "Heal thyself!"—and then you are in Tao. Then Tao *is* and people are with you in Tao. But how do you get there? You have to explain yourself, have to become conscious of your unconscious, have to integrate your unconscious: you have still to discover yourself. So wake up, for there is a wonderful message in that, the *euangelion*, good tidings; and a lonely man like yourself will perhaps find companions. But these companions are all in yourself, and the more you find outside the less you are sure of your own truth. Find them first in yourself, integrate the people in yourself. There are figures, existences, in your unconscious that will come to you, that will integrate in you, so that you may perhaps come into a condition in which you don't know yourself. You will say, I am this, I am that, I am practically everywhere, I am exactly like a whole people—and when that doubt arises you are whole. But don't make the mistake of thinking you are whole when you are part of an organization, a *Verein der Gleichgesinnten*⁸ or something of the sort.

This is the message but in the actual text he says, "Ye lonesome ones of today, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people arise:—and out of it the

⁷ John Scotus Erigena, born in Ireland, flourished in the mid-9th century.

⁸ *Verein der Gleichgesinnten*: Society of the Like-Minded.

Superman." Now, when Nietzsche is talking to Zarathustra, he perhaps understands the message, but the moment he begins to teach it to others it is already modified. In contradistinction to everything Nietzsche said before as an aphorist, it sounds exactly like the idea of a chosen people, or perhaps a *Kultur* monastery. You see, these lonely ones would not stand each other for two days: it is quite out of the question; far from being a salvation, it would be quite hellish. So the original message slowly, without any wrong intention, changes its meaning, becomes distorted, and finally you have the Catholic church.

And where is Christ's original teaching? Some say they go back to the true word of Christ himself, but then they falsify the Gospel very quietly. I discovered a really remarkable instance about two years ago which I have already mentioned. In the new revised text of the Greek and Latin New Testament, which is supposed to be without flaw, I found in the Lord's Prayer that God should not give us our ordinary daily bread, but the bread that is *supersubstantialis*, *das überwesentliche Brot*, the bread that is not of ordinary substance. I thought that surely this is amazing, knowing that the church had always asserted that it was the ordinary bread. But I happened to possess the first Greek edition of the New Testament by Erasmus of Rotterdam, the so-called *Textus rescriptus*, and there it was. And the other day Professor Karl Barth at his lecture in the university mentioned the fact that Erasmus held that *supersubstantialis* really was intended, that this was absolutely undeniable, and that it made much better sense than the word *bread*. He mentioned also that Calvin was against that; he even said that it was heresy and blasphemy to hold that it was not the ordinary bread.⁹ Now why should it be so terrible? Moreover, it is a fact that the text of Matthew contains that word *epiousios*. (It is interesting that this Greek word *epiousios* only exists elsewhere in two doubtful places; but that doesn't matter; in this place it is an invention of the writer.) And St. Hieronymus, who made the *Vulgata*, the Latin translation of the New Testament,¹⁰ took the trouble to find out the word for *epiousios* in the Aramaic text, where it means "the future thing." You see, *e**pi* means upon

⁹ On supersubstantial (not just daily) bread, see 17 Oct. 1934, n. 1, above; on Barth, see 5 Dec. 1934, n. 9, above. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) was the Dutch humanist whose book *The Praise of Folly* was the most popular work of the age. John Calvin (1509-1564), French Reformation leader, settled in Geneva.

¹⁰ A Latin translation of the New Testament had been made in the time of the Apostles, but by the fourth century many variants had crept in, so there was a need for a new, commonly accepted translation, which was supplied by St. Hieronymus or St. Jerome (c. 340-420).

or after, and *ousios* means the being or the actual existence, so *epiousios* could mean the existence after. Just as the word *metaphysical* as used in Aristotle means that after the physical beings come the metaphysical beings, *meta* of course meaning "after."¹¹ St. Hieronymus assumed that that which follows after *ousios*, the natural existence, is the supersubstantial existence, and therefore he translated it as *supersubstantialis*. So the demand in the prayer would mean: give us that bread of the future kingdom *now*, today and every day—give us our daily supersubstantial bread, the spiritual food.

Now, the church is dead set against that. I read as a special commentary in a recognized work that it was quite evident from the surrounding text in Matthew that it must be the ordinary bread. I could not remember that there was anything to prove that and found that the text of St. Matthew says very emphatically that only the heathens worry about food—what they shall eat and drink and what they shall wear—and that Christians should not do that. So I asked myself, why that resistance? Why the devil should the church be unable to admit that a good Christian should pray to God to give him his daily spiritual food, which is far more important than the ordinary food—though I admit that the ordinary food is very important?

Mrs. Sigg: The church wants to provide the spiritual bread herself.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, that is it.

Miss Wolff: Christ says in another passage, "I am the bread of life." So *he* is that supersubstantial bread, but one is only allowed to get it by way of the church.

Miss Hughes: That "man cannot live by bread alone" is another saying of Christ's, is it not? And that would confirm this, I should think.¹²

Prof. Jung: Absolutely. But the church, which is a human organization, claims, against the truth of the Gospel, that they alone can administer the food. They interfere between man and God, tell you obvious nonsense, and even cheat in order to blindfold you. You see, that is the difference between the needs and the morality of a great organization, and the other way, the integration of a human individual who is simply

¹¹ The usual story is that the editor of his treatises put Aristotle's long work on "First Philosophy" right after the work called "Physics"—hence, metaphysics doubly. Both Jung and Nietzsche professed disdain for metaphysics, Jung often calling it disguised psychology and Nietzsche "the science . . . which deals with the fundamental errors of mankind—but as if they were fundamental truths" (*Human All Too Human*, tr. Marion Faber with Stephen Schumann [Lincoln, Neb., 1984], p. 150).

¹² "I am the bread of life" (John 6:35). "Man cannot live by bread alone" (Matthew 4:4).

confronted with God, with no church and no organization in between. Of course, one can say there is the invisible church, the community of the saints, but that is only a saintly and invisible communion. Obviously as soon as they have a secretary and pay their annual tribute to the *Ver-ein* it is no longer an invisible communion, but is an organized body which has to be registered. Then it is a world organization, and that is the tragedy of the church. Now, it is also obvious that when such an important thing as the integration of consciousness is not realized, not understood, yet is instigated by the message of the spirit, that thing simply spreads below the threshold of consciousness and causes a great mental disturbance which of course has certain social consequences. And then people will try to organize something because they cannot understand it otherwise. They think *good* and *sacred* and *true* are words which apply only to something in a church, so it must be an organization; and the church, the only truth, is the visibility of sacredness, so it must be visible. The symbolic bread and wine must be flesh and blood and the communion of the saints must be a visible organization, and whatever else there is is no good. Therefore, it is unavoidable that such a new movement in the unconscious is always in danger of being swallowed by the collective spirit in man, swallowed again by the collective unconscious. And that is what we see now everywhere—including the Oxford Movement. Now we go on to the next part of this chapter,

When Zarathustra had spoken these words, he paused, like one who had not said his last word; and long did he balance the staff doubtfully in his hand. At last he spake thus—and his voice had changed:

I now go alone, my disciples! Ye also now go away, and alone!
So will I have it.

What has happened here?

Mrs. Crowley: It sounds as if he had realized something of this, as if he realized that it was an inner reality, that he had to integrate within.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. Now, this is really in contradiction with the teaching before, so here we see the two layers. You see, the message goes on and Zarathustra seems to correct himself, as if he realized that something wrong had been said on the surface, as if the message had gotten wrong. So he says, No, not an organization, neither a monastery nor a church nor a state, no visible body; going alone is what I mean.

Mrs. Jung: He said before, “Ye lonesome ones of today, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people.” So that would be a condition for becoming this chosen people, which is only in the future.

Prof. Jung: Yes, those who are lonely today will also become a chosen people: they form a community.

Mrs. Jung: So if he is seceding, it might be in order to prepare for this future community.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, but there is a peculiar emphasis on it which I think can only be explained by interpretation of a possible misunderstanding before, so he insists that not only is he going alone but that they also must go alone. "So will I have it." He would not speak like that if there had not been a certain tendency to substitute by an organization what they should do themselves. Of course, that is quite understandable, it is only too human; nobody chooses the integration of consciousness when he can get along much more cheaply: one is much too weak to stand alone. One makes organizations in order to have the grand feeling of being great by simply paying a certain tax or something like that.

Verily, I advise you: depart from me, and guard yourselves against Zarathustra! And better still: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he hath deceived you.

You see, he makes it very strong in order that any idea of organization should be excluded. They must not trust him; they should even have a supreme doubt as to the veracity of the message. That can only be explained by the ambiguity of the message before, but now the real message breaks through and emphasizes its demand.

The man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies, but also to hate his friends.

This is indeed very strong, but it expresses what kind of condition?

Mrs. Crowley: A paradoxical condition—that he could realize the two things. And I thought it might here have something to do with Nietzsche's own personal complex about friends, because he did not really understand friends in the right spirit.

Prof. Jung: Well, of course his difficulty in establishing relations is always everywhere.

Miss Taylor: Does he not advise them to be detached from him?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the idea. You see, it is the consciousness of the other thing that I am too, my own contrast. One person in me knows I love my friends, and the other person knows that he doesn't love my friends. The love is not absolute, but is only relative; it is only inasmuch as there is hatred. Now, that is a paradoxical consciousness which proves that consciousness has extended beyond the ego limitations and

is now itself ambiguous. Therefore, the person which underlies that consciousness is ambiguous; no longer one, he is two, he is many, he is everywhere.

Mrs. Baumann: But could it not also be taken here that Zarathustra is warning him of his identification and pushing him away?

Prof. Jung: Well, the trouble is, Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, and doesn't make a difference. Zarathustra isn't talking to Nietzsche, but is talking to the imaginary disciples. You might take Nietzsche to be a disciple, but he is not. He is Zarathustra himself.

Prof. Reichstein: Is it not the idea of getting *Erkenntnis*, understanding, recognition, in contrast to the *Gläubigen*, the believers, which comes afterwards? Therefore, you must first detach yourself quite distinctly by hatred to get knowledge, a breaking up of the tradition.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is of course psychologically quite easy to understand why Zarathustra gives that particular teaching. If you are convinced that you do nothing but love, then you hold only one side and somebody else is doing the hating; then you are not an integrated consciousness. You must know that you are both, that you are the yea and the nay; if you are only conscious of the yea, then somebody else is doing the contrary, and it is merely projected. For the integration of consciousness it is necessary that one realizes positive and negative feeling. The extension of consciousness means of course an increase of knowledge, of understanding; otherwise it would be the original unconscious condition. For instance, if one sees a picture but has no relation to it, one could say one was not conscious of it. It would be only a perception.

One requiteth a teacher badly if one remain merely a scholar.

And why will ye not pluck at my wreath?

That of course means that they should accept his teaching to the extent of making it true: namely, that they take him at his word, that they realize themselves literally, and see what kind of feeling they have or what their real attitude is.

Ye venerate me; but what if your veneration should some day collapse? Take heed lest a statue crush you!

You see, veneration also is a clear-cut and one-sided condition only when there is a certain negation of it; if that is not conscious, then it is somewhere else, somebody else has to do it. So they should be conscious that somewhere that veneration is compensated for or contra-

dicted, and if they don't realize that, they are apt to make a statue, an idol, which falls upon them in the moment when their veneration peters out.

Ye say, ye believe in Zarathustra? But of what account is Zarathustra! Ye are my believers: but of what account are all believers?

Ye had not yet sought yourselves: then did ye find me.

You see, as long as I am unconscious of the fact that a criminal or a fool is myself too, I find you the criminal and the fool. My consciousness is only really integrated when I know the same in myself—when I can say, yes, I find you an animal, and this is myself. Then I have really extended consciousness. One finds many parallels to this particular idea in Eastern texts.

So do all believers; therefore all belief is of so little account.

This is again to be sent to the address of late Christianity where people always talk about believing. Either you know a thing and so you don't need to believe it, or you don't know it and then why should you believe it? People say that you ought to believe in God, or that such and such a thing has been sent by God. But you don't—you believe that Mr. Smith sent it. And you don't think the brick which fell off the roof because there was a strong wind was sent by God, so you cannot believe it. The church teaches that you should make a special effort to believe that God has his hands in your life somewhere; but you haven't noticed it so why the devil should you believe it? You should resolutely say, "Only if I see it do I believe it: I have quite a good explanation why the thing went wrong: it can also be explained by the stupidity of man and myself." So it is much better to assume that you haven't the faintest idea of what God is doing and don't even know that he *is*, unless you have an experience where you cannot help seeing the hand of God in it. But the church doesn't risk waiting for that. That can always be anticipated. It is wise to say that everything is done by God in order to cover up the fact that nobody knows whether he does anything. Most parsons don't really believe that, of course not; but they say they do because it is the only possibility for them. They can only live in their superstructure of believing something. But the ordinary man can afford to be objective about it and say that as far as he can see, God is inefficient. And so he lives on that hypothesis until he meets God, and then he doesn't need to believe it. For instance, if I meet a rhino and he tosses me into the air, I don't need to believe it—I know it is a fact. So

we can do without believing; that is the most reasonable thing. Otherwise you make God responsible for all sorts of nonsense and simply blindfold yourself. If you reckon up what pious people say God has done in the course of a year, it is appalling: he has caused automobile accidents, killed people, destroyed crops, damaged cattle and human beings and made himself an awful nuisance. And then one should be grateful! So you see, when Zarathustra makes little of believers, it is a gesture to late Christianity.

Now do I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when ye have all denied me, will I return unto you.

Verily, with other eyes, my brethren, shall I then seek my lost ones; with another love shall I then love you.

And once again shall ye have become friends unto me, and children of one hope: then will I be with you for the third time, to celebrate the great noontide with you.

This is of course Christian symbolism; it is the *parousia*,¹³ the return of Christ and the new reconciliation, the communion with the Lamb; it is the apocalyptic vision where everything is fulfilled, when Christ will set up a kingdom of heaven on earth and there will be eternal communion with him. But this is also dangerously sentimental, dangerously near to the perfectly good Christian ideas. Inasmuch as the Christian ideas are really mythological they are absolutely true, but they are no longer quite mythological. They are already disintegrated to a certain extent and so they have lost the right taste and are no longer good. We are tired of that phraseology; we have heard it every Sunday in church. So the words have changed but the meaning is the same; the great noontide is the midday meal, and if one takes the words and supposes that this Christian analogy of the communion is only apparent, one gets the real message. Then one comes to "the great noontide when man is in the middle of his course between animal and Superman"—then he celebrates that communion with Zarathustra—with the self. This is psychological, for in the middle of their way, Dante's adventure happens to certain people, if not consciously, then at least unconsciously. Then they feel the touch of the self.

And it is the great noontide, when man is in the middle of his course between animal and Superman, and celebrating his advance to the evening as his highest hope: for it is the advance to a new morning.

¹³ *Parousia*: the Divine Presence.

The animal is the unconscious existence, the merely biological, personal ego existence, and the evening is the problem of individuation, the becoming of the self or the Superman; and this is not the going down to the evening, but is the advance to a new morning, which means the idea of rebirth in the self or to the self.

At such time will the down-goer bless himself, that he should be an over-goer; and the sun of his knowledge will be at noontide.

That is of course the same idea.

"Dead are all the Gods: now do we desire the Superman to live."—Let this be our final will at the great noontide!

So, in the first part of life when there is nothing but animal purpose, unconsciousness, and ego existence, the gods are projected: they are outside because they are not integrated. Then comes the noontide where the gods will be integrated in man; he will recognize them as projections. But then he has lost the gods and there is the danger of inflation, of identification with the image of the divine, and then he has to realize the Superman. The Superman would be the superconsciousness and this is now the problem. What is this superconsciousness that has integrated even those psychological facts which formerly were projected as gods? What happens then to consciousness and what will that Superman be? That is the drama which will be enacted in the next part of *Zarathustra*.

LECTURE V

19 February 1936

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah: "I was very much interested in what you said last time about the present state of things (Germany, etc.) being caused by 'the idea of the self spreading by mental contagion.' I would like very much to understand better how this works. Is it because the idea is so much easier to grasp intellectually than to apply to the physical being, and once touched, even intellectually, the whole process must take place elsewhere? Could one almost say that a whole people, even a whole world, are caught in the parts, left in the unconscious, of the vast idea which Nietzsche fettered to the earth on its intellectual side?"

I am afraid I wouldn't be able to explain the strange fact of this mental contagion in such terms. You know, Nietzsche's idea of the self, as presented in the figure of the Superman, has in itself a peculiar effect: namely, he identifies with Zarathustra, and Zarathustra is that Superman as he appeared to him, so Nietzsche is also identical with the Superman. Now, that is already a cause for contagion, for if you identify with an idea then that thing has happened to you and you are caught by it. For instance, if a person when angry *says* he is in a very bad mood today, you are perfectly satisfied—you understand that people can be in a bad mood and are not infected by it. But if he doesn't say so, if he is really in a bad mood and caught by it, then he makes you angry. It is infectious and you are caught too. If he declares his condition you know he is human, not merely a beast, because he is able to inform you that he is human, so you can deal with that fellow: you can still talk to him. But if he doesn't acknowledge it, he is a beast and will bite, and then you are highly irritated and keep away. And so whenever you are caught by the unconscious, be it in the form of a mood or an idea, you are influenced. Therefore if Nietzsche had said, "Ladies and Gentlemen, here is the idea of the self, but I am not that self," you might see that it was a very interesting idea, but very few people would

listen—otherwise they could have listened to it long ago—because it is not infectious. But if somebody says, “I *am* the self, I am the Superman,” you get excited; either you think he is a damned fool to say such a thing, just crazy, and get excited, because you have to do with a lunatic. Or you say, “Isn’t it grand? That is the self, he *is* the fellow.” So those people always have either a positive or a negative following, but people who are balanced in their minds have no following because balance causes no mental contagion; it may cause conviction but never persuasion.

Now, as Zarathustra is the Superman, the inference is that Nietzsche is the Superman, because on account of the identification, it is difficult to make a difference between them. For instance, when he says, “I love you, you are my brethren,” you wonder who is speaking. Zarathustra is not the writer—he has no pen—but is a ghost. He lived about two thousand, seven hundred years ago, but it might be his spirit that appears and speaks through Nietzsche. Then you know that Nietzsche became insane, and many passages in this book are a bit morbid, so you get very much the impression of the identity; and as soon as there is morbidity you are afraid. One often hears, “Don’t read *Zarathustra* because those who have read it have grown morbid or gone mad; that stuff has a bad influence.” Others say the book is a revelation and Nietzsche the great prophet of the age—they are caught that way. You see, there is practically no social fool under the sun who cannot have a following; when he steps out into the street and says he is the great man of the time with a new message for the world, a certain number may think he is just crazy, but some will be convinced that he really is the fellow. He only has to shout and make a noise in order to have an audience. People who suffer from such an identification usually shout, which clearly shows that they are not above their own material, but are really caught by it. And they want to be caught because they want to catch others; because they are caught, they want to catch, just as drug fiends always want to catch other people because they are caught themselves. So they cultivate a certain style which shows that they are caught; they know unconsciously that when they are caught they catch. The primitive medicine man, for instance, must prove to his audience that he is caught because that carries, that infects the whole tribe. And whoever is out to infect or to catch will shout and behave like a lunatic. He will demonstrate his unfree condition because he thereby catches—such people have a great following. In Nietzsche the idea of the self appears in a very tangible form, and he is visibly caught by it; and that will spread, have influence, convey contagion, either in a positive or a

negative sense. He will arouse no end of resistances naturally, but his enemies who resist him are really his followers, because they cannot turn their eyes away from the phenomenon he offers to the world. Others are positively persuaded by him and will themselves seek the Superman, or at least transform themselves into forefathers of the Superman, humbly enough, in the hope that in three or four generations one of their sons or daughters will produce a Superman.

That is the way I explain this mental contagion through an idea which is not completely detached from the man in whom it originated. Of course I don't mean that Zarathustra is really the starting point for the idea of the self, because for many thousands of years this idea seems to have been lurking behind the screen of historical events. In the East it appeared much earlier than here, but we see it at work in Master Eckhardt, it approached closer in later philosophy, and in Nietzsche it broke through in a sort of *ekstasis*. Now, it is tangible, near. And because it is not completely detached from man, it has these peculiar effects. It is still in the unconscious, so the unconscious is activated; people nowadays are gripped by an unrest which they do not understand, so they spread their excitement. That is happening actually in Germany, and has happened in Russia: everybody is infecting everybody else with unrest, with a peculiarly vibrating unconscious—and there must be a reason for all that. It is as if something had gotten into man's unconscious and were stirring there, causing infectious excitement. Even the most ridiculous notions have their following; all sorts of mental epidemics—bigger or smaller—are swaying our civilized world. And it is perfectly natural; we have often spoken before of the causality or the aetiology of this phenomenon. It corresponds to the decay of Christianity, the form in which one lived securely; and the more those metaphysical convictions fade or vanish, the more the energy invested in those forms drops below the threshold of consciousness. There are comparatively few people nowadays who think in metaphysical terms; that is of the past: all that libido has disappeared into the unconscious. That utter *belief* in Christ and God and heaven, the libido which built the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, has gone into other forms. We have now big hotels, skyscrapers, enormous armies, and such things. The idea of God which was the supreme reality of the Middle Ages has been replaced by Einstein's theory of relativity and there are only about a dozen people in the world who understand that. (I don't know whether it functions in them as God: I never heard of that.) And all the other people are empty.

No wonder, then, that all that libido in the unconscious begins to stir

and causes a phenomenon like Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. This book begins, practically, with the statement that God is dead, but you can see throughout the book that Nietzsche never gets rid of him; for God is the unknown partner, the real partner of man. Unnamed and not visible, he is still there. That is the cause of this great excitement, the enormous dithyrambic enthusiasm which bursts out of Nietzsche; that is the fact which forever has been called God. In any former times they would have said a god possessed him and was speaking out of him. In Nietzsche the god for the time being is Zarathustra. You can name God what you like but he always appears in the fire. In the Old Testament he appears in the flaming bush, which is simply the dithyrambic enthusiasm of God breaking out anew in ecstasy; he was then called "Jahveh" and here it is "Zarathustra" but it is the same thing. And there is one of the causes of this infection. Now of course, many people believe that the only good is to be gripped and excited and infectious, and that everybody ought to be caught in the infection; and since that is so, I cannot say it is wrong. I don't know whether it is wrong or right—it is just a fact. But I don't share their conviction. I think it is indecent—perhaps I am quite wrong in my conviction. (I also cannot say whether that is right or wrong.) But it doesn't matter to me: I have it and this is a fact too.

Mrs. Sigg: You spoke about shouting, and Nietzsche had this symptom in his illness; when his mother wrote to the doctor she said that her son had a habit of shouting and it frightened her. She said he didn't seem to suffer. He smiled rather.

Prof. Jung: Perhaps it had a pleasant effect upon him. Well now, we will go on to the second part of *Zarathustra*. We should celebrate this moment—that we have gotten as far as this! You remember at the end of Part I, as in the beginning, Nietzsche declares that God is dead. "Dead are all the Gods: now do we desire the Superman to live." Here we have the psychology clearly; the gods are dead and now let us call for the Superman, the man who is more than the ordinary man as we know him. You see, that is not very far from the Christian idea of the Son of Man. Christ is man, so he is Superman, the God-man; the idea has not evolved very far. Then Nietzsche advises his disciples not to run after him or identify with him, or follow him and so avoid themselves. They rather should become his enemies in order to find themselves; he says it is better that he shut up and give them a chance. Also there is a certain secret tendency behind it: namely, would it not be time to manifest, to find the Superman? And the best means to find or create the Superman is always to put yourself to a test, to go into your

own solitude, to strengthen yourself, in order to find out whether you are by chance the Superman. That is what people do who want to become holy or saints. These are the tendencies which lead to the second part; we shall now see what befell Zarathustra when he went into his solitude. This chapter is called "The Child with the Mirror."

After this Zarathustra returned again into the mountains to the solitude of his cave, and withdrew himself from men, waiting like a sower who hath scattered his seed. His soul, however, became impatient and full of longing for those whom he loved: because he had still much to give them. For this is hardest of all: to close the open hand out of love, and keep modest as a giver.

From this passage we can see one of his particular difficulties: he needed an audience very badly. For, to have an audience is agreeable—it always proves something to you—while if you are all alone you lose your self-esteem. It is as if you became smaller and smaller and finally are a mere speck in an awfully extended cosmos, and then you either develop megalomania or become a nothingness. Therefore it is advisable to have a certain audience, if merely for the sake of demonstrating that you know who you are, that you become something definite, that you are just as ordinary as other people, and that you are living in your body. You lose all these considerations when you are alone with yourself. Now, he particularly suffers from the fact that he cannot give, and he feels very much that he should deliver his message.

Thus passed with the lonesome one months and years; his wisdom meanwhile increased, and caused him pain by its abundance.

One morning, however, he awoke ere the rosy dawn, and having meditated long on his couch, at last spake thus to his heart:

Why did I startle in my dream, so that I awoke? Did not a child come to me, carrying a mirror?

"O Zarathustra"—said the child unto me—"look at thyself in the mirror!"

But when I looked into the mirror, I shrieked, and my heart throbbed: for not myself did I see therein, but a devil's grimace and derision.

Verily, all too well do I understand the dream's portent and monition: my *doctrine* is in danger; tares want to be called wheat!

Mine enemies have grown powerful and have disfigured the likeness of my doctrine, so that my dearest ones have to blush for the gifts that I gave them.

What about this piece of dream interpretation?

Mrs. Sigg: It is most awful extraversion, that he thinks only of his doctrine.

Prof. Jung: Oh not necessarily, that is generally human; it is what everybody does if he has a doctrine at all. You see, nobody in his sound senses would take such a dream to himself, unless he knew about analytical psychology. Of course, then he would feel under a certain obligation to think, "Damn it, what does it mean that this mirror puts such a face on me?" But an ordinary unsophisticated human being not affected by psychology would leap to the conclusion that somebody else must have painted him black. For the bad things are always somewhere else: I am very good, I have not a devil's face. But the dream means exactly that. He has a devil's face because he mirrors himself in the mind of a child. Since children and fools tell the truth, he must look like that. This is the simple and straightforward meaning of the dream. I am quite convinced that he really had this dream just then; it would be most likely to happen to him when he was withdrawing. And there was a real interruption between these two parts of Zarathustra, in which he withdrew from that rushing river of creation where one is filled with the noise and the turmoil of the waves. Then one comes to oneself, everything is quiet, and then it is most likely that one sees one's own face. This is exceedingly apt symbolism; the mirror is the intellect or the mind, and the child carrying the mirror means of course the child's mind, the simple mind, so one cannot avoid the conclusion that the child has told the truth through its magic mirror. Now, what does it mean when he sees his face like that of the devil?

Prof. Reichstein: Is it not here again an answer to the statement that all the gods are dead? And then of course the first thing that appears would be the devil.

Prof. Jung: Inasmuch as Zarathustra is God the reverse side of him is then necessarily a devil. We must also ask *who* is speaking of the gods? If it were an Eastern man, of course we could not assume that there must necessarily be a devil because the Eastern Gods are neither good nor bad, but both good *and* bad; they appear in two ways, the benevolent and the wrathful aspects. That is particularly clear in the Tibetan gods of the Mahayana; but all the Hindu gods have their different aspects and there is no fuss about it. It is quite evident that the good and benevolent goddess Kali is the most bloodthirsty monster on the other side and that the life-giver, the fertilizing God Shiva, is also the God of utter destruction. That makes no difference to the paradoxical mind of the East. But to the Western mind with its peculiar categorical char-

acter, it makes all the difference in the world; to say God is the devil or the devil is God is considered blasphemous or sacrilegious. Yet if there is such a universal being as the deity, it needs must be more complete than man; and since man is a peculiar union of good and bad qualities, then all the more so the universal being. A very famous German Protestant¹ says in one of his books that God can only be good, thereby putting a frightful restriction on God; it is as if in the organization of the welfare of humanity, he were depriving God of half his power. How can he rule the world if he is only good? And it is quite wrong to say that all the evil is just for the good; one can say just as well that all good is for the evil. Therefore, it is more to the point to say things are both good and evil; and you can be doubtful whether they are as favorable as all that, because everything tends more to evil than to good.

Nietzsche would not talk of the devil so openly, however, because that is not popular. But if God is only good, who is producing all the evil in the world? So the omnipotence of God is obviously divided—he has to halve it with the devil. It would be much more to the point to assume that the all-powerful deity was superior to good and evil—“beyond good and evil” as Nietzsche claims for the Superman. Such an all-powerful being could even handle the evil; to handle the good is no art but to handle evil is difficult. Plato expresses this in his parable of the man in a chariot driving two horses; one is good-tempered and white, the other black and evil-tempered, and the charioteer has all the trouble in the world to manage it.² That is the good man who does not know how to handle evil; good people are singularly incapable of handling evil. So if God is only good, he is of course ignorant in reference to evil. There he could not put up any show.

Prof. Fierz: You said that something must have happened between Part I and Part II, and in the history of his life I find that the day on which the first part of *Zarathustra* was finished, Wagner died, and Nietzsche found that significant. I think the mirror showed him also his bad side because one knows how enthusiastic he had been about Wagner, and this trouble might have to do with the fact of his death on that day. I remember that once when he was playing Wagner he wept a whole day. So there was a split in his mind, and there might be some connection with the terrible loss of Wagner who of course was a great man, with all his faults.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there is no doubt that this friendship was a most im-

¹ This theologian is Gogarten. See above, 5 Dec. 1934, n. 4.

² See the *Phaedrus*, 246-55. The horses and charioteer represent aspects of the psyche.

portant factor in his life, because Wagner represented very clearly his feeling side; and the fact that Wagner died just at the moment when he finished *Zarathustra* could easily be considered as a fateful event. For with *Zarathustra* Nietzsche really put the seal on his life; *Zarathustra* was his fatality—then he came definitely to the other side. Therefore, it is so important that this chapter begins with the very helpful hint from the unconscious that he might have a careful look at his other side where he really looks like a devil. But then he makes the awful mistake of thinking that somebody has attacked his doctrine, instead of being naive and assuming that he ought to see the devil in himself. You see, that would of course have put an entirely different light upon many things he had experienced, including his relation to Wagner. If he had been one of the ordinary good Christian hermits, he would probably have thought that the devil had put an awful face upon him in order to tempt him, and he might have drawn the same conclusion that it was a *diabolica fraus*, a devil's cheat; and he would have tried to chase away that devil, projecting his dark side then, not into an anonymous crowd of enemies but into a definitely existing devil. While an Eastern philosopher would probably have smiled at it and drawn the conclusion that he had been very good and that this was his other aspect, he would have said: "I am neither this nor that—this is all illusion." Now, the psychological conclusion is of course not exactly like the Eastern. It would be too cheap for us to say, "I have been very good and I am of course also very bad: I am the fellow who is indifferent to such situations." That would not go because good and evil are real powers, and if you forget for a moment that they are real, you are in the devil's kitchen: you simply lose the identity with yourself.

I don't know in how far the Eastern philosopher is allowed to lose his identity with the human being. I think it is allowed because they never really lose sight of the human being. Laotze might say that he could be superior to a human being, that that was right and this was left, that was light and this was dark—and that he was neither of these. When he in his great wisdom withdrew from his business—he was the librarian of one of the kings of China—and settled down on the Western slope of the mountain, he took a dancing girl with him. So much was he in his reality, he never got away from the fact of his ordinary, very humble humanity. We would think, "How disreputable!" But that piece of humanity was so natural that he did not bother; the human side was so much taken care of that he could disidentify himself from the human being. Only inasmuch as we live the human being, can we disidentify; inasmuch as we cannot accept good and evil, or have illusions about

good and evil, we cannot detach. Therefore the true superiority is to be in the conflict and acknowledge the good and evil. That is far superior to the attitude in which one imagines oneself to be above it by merely saying so. There are such people. They say this is all illusion, neither this nor that, and lift themselves up until they feel "six thousand feet above good and evil" like the Superman; yet they suffer several hells. I am quite certain that old Laotze did not suffer; perhaps the girl was ugly with him at times and then he suffered a reasonable amount, but he took that as all in the day's work, you know. You can read such remarks in the Tao-Te-King. So according to my idea, Zarathustra would have been wise if he had looked at that devil's face and drawn another conclusion, instead of the funny conclusion that somebody had blackened his wonderful white doctrine. That is now the reason for his making a new decision.

Lost are my friends; the hour hath come for me to seek my lost ones!—

So the logic is: Oh, I see I have a very black face, those very bad people have blackened it, they are against my doctrine, therefore I must run away to my friends, to my audience, in order to escape the ugly aspect of my other side. Very human!

With these words Zarathustra started up, not however like a person in anguish seeking relief, but rather like a seer and a singer whom the spirit inspireth. With amazement did his eagle and serpent gaze upon him. . . .

I am certain they were amazed. You see, they are the instincts: the eagle is the spiritual instinct and the serpent the chthonic instinct; and they would certainly be flabbergasted when they saw that conclusion because they are all for the friendly neighborhood of the black and white face. They hate such conclusions as Zarathustra has drawn here.

for a coming bliss overspread his countenance like a rosy dawn.

Where does this bliss come from so suddenly after that rather depressing vision?

Mrs. Adler: Because he believes that he can escape it.

Prof. Jung: Well, he was very satisfied with the idea that he could get away from it. But anybody who can find out who his devil is, is very grateful. That is one reason why we enjoy detective stories or reading long reports of a crime. It is also the reason the old Greeks enjoyed the drama. *He* is the criminal, I have not done it; and see what the conse-

quences are: *he* got it in the neck! And then they go home and eat a good dinner. Somebody else has done it; happily enough we are quite human and civil people to whom such things never happen. Then for a week they are quite all right and the next Sunday they go again to the theater and again are purified. That is the releasing cathartic effect of the theater. Now how do you suppose Zarathustra comes to the idea that it is just his doctrine which has been attacked or reviled? He might have thought that somebody had said something evil about himself.

Mrs. Jung: Was he not identified with his doctrine?

Miss Wolff: He *is* the doctrine and doesn't exist outside his doctrine. He has no personal existence.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is one of the important reasons: he is his doctrine. Zarathustra is the Logos, and the message is the Logos, and the Logos is personified. He is the spirit. So when he thinks that his doctrine is blackened somehow, he could say just as well that *he* is attacked. But here is again a sort of trap. This is again a case where Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, and therefore there is that difference between Zarathustra-Nietzsche and the doctrine. If he would leave the whole thing in Zarathustra, Zarathustra would be the Logos, the doctrine, and then to the man, Nietzsche, it could be indifferent whether anybody reviled the spirit or not, because the spirit is strong enough to take care of itself. He could say, "If those people cannot accept this message, if they revile the spirit, they won't have the delights of the spirit; they deny themselves all that beauty, all that enlightenment, and if they prefer to move in darkness and torture themselves, leave them to their devices." You see, your truth must be so good that you can enjoy it and pity those who are fools enough not to see it. For instance, if you know what a blessing it is that you have plenty of water to wash every day, and how well you feel when you have had your bath, and that there are people who think one should not wash, that it is dangerous to take baths, you think this is perfectly all right. If they feel well that way, let them cherish their filth and their fleas: you have nothing against it, though you feel better with your own way of living. It is exactly the same with the spirit.

You see, the idea that it is a punishable offence to revile the spirit has been invented by those who believed in but did not enjoy the spirit. Perhaps they were believers of a certain truth but really doubted it. Either you know a thing and then you don't need to believe it, or you don't know it and one can doubt it then just as well. So when somebody doubts the truth which you believe, he is an offender because he has given you a bad example; you are offended because instantly the

doubt can spring up in yourself too. There is danger that you may doubt that which you believe; therefore, kill those people who doubt and thus you remove doubt. That is the psychology of the church: heretics must be wiped out. They have the wrong idea and cause the church to doubt its own stuff. And that is still the psychology of those pious people who think it is terrible if one says there is no God or something of the sort, one should not say such things. One *ought* to believe, ought to *try* to believe. This is, according to my humble idea, all wrong because it leads to very bad consequences. If I force myself to believe something or want to believe something, I become exceedingly intolerant; I don't like anybody who reviles my beloved ideas because I make such an effort to believe them. Whereas if you know a thing, you can enjoy it. If you know that twice two are four, you enjoy the fact because it is true. And if somebody else says he is not sure—perhaps it is five or six, you say, "Have a good time with it." It doesn't offend you because you think you are looking at a poor fool denying something which is obvious. My Somali boys still believe that the earth is a flat disc with the sun circling over it and an angel carrying it below the disc over to the other side. Well, leave those people to their nice ideas; I am not offended that they don't believe that the earth is a globe, because I *know* the earth is a globe. So if you know of God, you are not offended if people say there is no such thing; you simply laugh; while if you only *believe* him, you are offended and must avenge yourself upon the disbelievers, because you might disbelieve just as well.

So inasmuch as Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, he is identical with the message, yet he feels very different; he is a man, a human being, and then there is the message. But inasmuch as he is Zarathustra he *is* identical with that message and anybody who reviles the message reviles himself, Zarathustra-Nietzsche. If Nietzsche could see that Zarathustra was identical with the message, and that he, Nietzsche, was not identical with Zarathustra, he could let it go and he would not be offended, but if he merely believes it, he naturally must be offended. This funny idea that he dreams he has a black devil's face because somebody has reviled his theory, is a very human conclusion, but it can only happen when somebody is identical with the message which is entrusted to him.

Mrs. Sigg: There seems to be a connection with the chapter before, because Zarathustra's chief teaching was that the physician had to heal himself, that he should see himself with his own eyes and make himself whole. So I think neither Zarathustra nor Nietzsche had made themselves whole.

Prof. Jung: Well, the purpose of that ritual kind of solitude was to make himself strong, whole, but the first elucidating thing that happens is used as a pretext to run away, to go down and preach the Evangel.³

Mrs. Jung: I wonder whether Zarathustra should not really go into the world. He says himself that he is longing for men, and also it is very comfortable to sit on a mountain and just leave his doctrine to itself. So it might be a very good instinct, some sort of realization, which calls him back to his work.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is perfectly true; a message makes no point if it remains hidden: it ought to be told. But it must be delivered as such; the message and the man should not be identical. For if he identifies with it, it will spread—he will cause a mental epidemic, and that is the very devil. Then it will be collective, all on a low level, and such things happen as the mob rising in Alexandria. They begin to burn heretics and all that; it is simply a destruction of perfectly decent values. You see, message or no message, when Zarathustra or Nietzsche—we should always say Zarathustra-Nietzsche—has such a dream, then according to common sense he should really consider it, should ask himself, “How, how is it that I appear before the people like Moses, with a face radiant like the sun, when behind that mask I have a devil’s face?” That is not so simple. That should be considered first, and naturally if Zarathustra-Nietzsche could realize that his face is also black, it would help him to disidentify. He could then make a difference between himself and Zarathustra. Of course it would injure his effect, but the effect would be poisonous anyhow, because he would not create conviction, but only persuasion and mental contagion; and then he would not have real disciples. He would have sucklings, *bambinos*, because all people are inclined to be sucklings.

Miss Wolff: There is a doubt in the previous chapter where he says his friends should be ashamed of him and that perhaps he has betrayed them, but he doesn’t mean this seriously. He says, “Only when ye have all denied me, will I return unto you. Verily, with other eyes, my brethren, shall I then seek my lost ones; with another love shall I then love you.” He gives them the benefit of the doubt but he doesn’t really want them to do it. Because it belongs to his archetype, he says here that he is denied. He lives that archetype, but when it comes to himself, of course he cannot see it.

Prof. Jung: Well, the desperate thing is that the figure of Zarathustra

³ Here Jung’s repetition of a story is omitted.

is just as it should be until it comes to the moment when Nietzsche identifies with it, and then it is distorted. You see, the name Zarathustra denotes a savior; Zarathustra was a savior, the great teacher, just as good as Christ or Mani or Mohammed or any of the great prophets. But if a human being identifies with that figure, there is an admixture of human psychology, and it is due to this mixture with human imperfection that the face of Zarathustra appears like the face of a devil in the mirror. For the spirit in itself has not the face of a devil. The spirit itself has no shadow, because it is a principle. You cannot say Yang is black in itself, it is just not black; the black spot simply means the possibility of transforming into Yin; but as long as there is Yang, it is Yang, it is positive. But if a human being identifies with the Yang (or with the Yin), it brings in a creation which is both Yang and Yin and then the Yang is no longer pure. It has then a human psychology. The spirit has no human psychology—it is not human; therefore he calls the spirit divine, as Yang is divine. The Chinese don't even personify it. We have that peculiar tendency of personifying everything since the days of ancient Greece. This light which is now shining out of him like the rising sun is a sort of *ekstasis*. This *is* the spirit. He is now like Moses who came down from the mountain with his face so luminous and shining that they could not stand the light of it: he had to cover it because his face was like Jahve.

What hath happened unto me, mine animals?—said Zarathustra. Am I not transformed? Hath not bliss come unto me like a whirlwind?

Foolish is my happiness, and foolish things will it speak: it is still too young—so have patience with it.

He is here like the new born sun, the Horus child that is young in the morning.⁴ And there is already a hint at the great wind which will play a role later; you see, the sun is at the same time wind and sun. Do you know a mythological connection between the wind and sun?

Mr. Allemann: Would it be in the Mithraic liturgy where the winds come from the sun?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and there is also an old connection in the fact that the morning wind comes when the sun rises; this experience has prob-

⁴ On the four sons of Horus, see CW 12, par. 314, fig. 192. For the mandala and the four Evangelists, see CW 12, par. 101, fig. 62. As with sun gods generally, Horus of the East is represented first as youthful and then "as an aged man tottering down the west" (James Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt* [New York and London, 1912], p. 10).

ably connected the sun with the wind, the sun as the spiritual father and the wind as the emanation of the father. So the idea is that the wind, the *pneuma*, descends from the sun. God was often compared to the sun, of course. Also there was the Neoplatonist idea that the animus or the spirit of man descends from the sun and thus comes into existence; and when a man dies this animus is gathered up by the moon, a female principle, and transmitted to the sun. In Manichaeon mythology—or one could call it their dogma—it was expressed in this way: The spirits of the dead are received by the moon which thereby increases until it is quite full and then it begins to approach the sun. It comes nearer and nearer and finally pours all the souls back into the sun. When the moon is quite close to the sun it is completely empty, and then it appears again on the other side slowly increasing, sucking up souls from the earth in order to bring them back to the sun; and from the sun they migrate over into the pillar of life or of souls, which apparently carries them back to the origin of life, to the divine father. This idea of the pillar of life occurs in *She*, though I don't know how it got there. Then in medieval representations of the Immaculate Conception, the spirit descends as wind: the *pneuma* comes down from the Father into the womb of Mary; and the curious fact is that the Greek word *pneuma* has taken on its specific meaning only since Christianity. Before that time and contemporary with it, *pneuma* referred wholly to the wind. So in that passage in the Bible: "The wind (or the spirit) bloweth where it listeth"—the Greek text says the wind blows. Yet it also means the spirit; it is ambiguous, sometimes it is called one and sometimes the other.⁵ Another example which I have published is the lunatic who thought that the movement of the phallus of the sun was the origin of the movement of the wind.⁶ Now in this case the rising sun is also identical with the wind that comes from the sun, which is perfectly understandable inasmuch as Zarathustra is the spirit; that is the way in which the spirit should behave. Also it is the spirit-child, the Horus-child of the early morning; Horus is not only the rising sun, but also the rising sun as the illumination of the mystery. Therefore, of course, having more the form of the so-called Harpocrates, who until rather late was a mystery god. He appears in alchemistic literature transformed into Harforetus.⁷

⁵ John 3:8. *Pneuma*: wind, and more particularly, breath—hence spirit.

⁶ See above, 14 Nov. 1934, n. 2, on the phallus of the sun.

⁷ *Harpocrates* was the Graecised form of *Horus* the Mystery God of the Egyptians. See Mead*, p. 233. Later, the Latin *Harforetus* was used.

Wounded am I by my happiness: all sufferers shall be physicians unto me!

What is this?

Mrs. Adler: He is wounded by his dream, not by his happiness.

Prof. Jung: No, we must take it as it is here; you see, it is quite right when he says, "Foolish is my happiness." It is foolish, because the immediate manifestation of the spirit when it is still a sort of wind causes phenomena like the miracle of Pentecost, when people thought the disciples were full of sweet wine, drunk and babbling nonsense. That is the ecstatic *glossolalia*, the speaking in tongues. And this "Wounded am I by my happiness" must be taken in the same way, it really means wounded here. Now where would that wound come from? There is a definite example. When is the message told—when is the deliverer of the message fulfilled?

Prof. Fierz: When Christ died.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is the wound in the side of Christ. You see, Christ's mission was fulfilled when he died for it on the cross; his death was really the seal upon the message. If Christ by some good luck had escaped that fate of crucifixion, of course it would not have been a complete mystery—he need not exactly die perhaps but he must be wounded. Where have we this motive in another case where something important was done for mankind?

Prof. Fierz: Prometheus.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he brought the fire from the gods. They chained him to the rock in the Caucasus where the eagle ate out his liver. Now another example.

Mrs. Baynes: Amfortas.

Prof. Jung: Well, the Amfortas story is complicated—a lot of things come in which we cannot unravel here; but the wound of Christ really influenced that story.⁸

Mrs. Jung: Wotan.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, Wotan for nine nights was hanging on the tree, moved by the wind and "wounded by a spear, dedicated to Odin, I myself to myself." And what happened after he descended from the tree—after the suspension?

⁸ Amfortas, head of the knights of the Grail (the vessel Jesus employed at the Last Supper), suffered a grave wound when captured by a sorcerer. He was healed when Parsifal, Lohengrin's father, touched the wound with his spear. See *The Poetic Edda*, tr. Henry Adams Bellows (New York, 1923). In March of 1936, Jung published an article on Wotan in which he related the Germanic neo-paganism to Wotan (or Othin, Odin), and to Nietzsche. CW 10, pars. 371-99.

Mrs. Jung: He invented the runes.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that is the magic writing which meant to those barbarous people the dawn of civilization; he brought the light of civilization to the earth: that was the message of the spirit. So the wound has a very profound meaning. One sees it best in the Prometheus myth perhaps. It is a sort of disruption of the order of the world, as if wisdom or knowledge had been originally a part of the great divine world, in an organic connection with all things existing, as if everything worked then according to rules which never were spoken. And then a revelation takes place: a certain wisdom or knowledge comes to consciousness and then it is no longer in the organic structure of the world. It is just as if there were a hole somewhere, as if something had been taken out of the eternal structure and pulled into space, into visibility, concretization; or it is as if the heavens were splitting and an important piece torn out of its connections. You see, as long as you function unconsciously, things apparently go smoothly and everything is in its place until you make a discovery—when you pull something out of the unconscious you cause a wound. Becoming conscious is of course a sacrilege against nature; it is as if you had robbed the unconscious of something. So when the spirit comes forth bringing something out of the eternal structure of the world, then the spirit itself, being that piece of the world which now enters visibility, is wounded. The spirit is the wound and the message. It is the one that reveals and the one that is revealed, the stealer and the stolen property; and it is at the same time the God that has—one could almost say—sinned against himself, wounded himself in order to bring the light. That God deprived himself of his divinity by sending his Son to the earth to redeem us is the same idea; he caused pain to himself, underwent the symbolic torture in order to give light to man. That all expresses the inevitability of the process and its autonomy when something is revealed or becomes conscious to us. It is not exactly our merit, but is our suffering rather; we suffer it, it simply happens. And it is the tragedy of a God, who is not human; therefore it is expressed in such mythological forms. On the one side it is the glad tidings, the *euangelion* that is brought to man, and that is what Nietzsche calls “my happiness.” But just that is on the other side the wound, or it causes the wound, so he says, “Wounded am I by my happiness: all sufferers shall be physicians unto me.” This means that all who suffer by the revelation will be a consolation to his suffering, just as if the suffering Christian martyrs were physicians to God, as if it were a consolation to the sacrificed God that they took over his suffering. They healed him by accepting his suffering, thus the great merit in their death or torture or martyrdom.

Mrs. Baumann: I don't quite understand the connection, because he is not conscious of this dream before.

Prof. Jung: Oh heavens, you must not mix it up with Nietzsche. The dream belongs to Nietzsche very clearly inasmuch as he is identifying with Zarathustra; but this bit here is Zarathustra and not Nietzsche because it is a divine mystery expressed as it always has been expressed in old religions. Therefore, we mentioned Wotan and Prometheus and Christ. It is the mystery—or call it the psychology of the creative act—and that has nothing to do with Nietzsche.

Mrs. Baumann: Yes, but the two animals were amazed. Are they Zarathustra's or Nietzsche's instincts?

Prof. Jung: They are not Zarathustra's instincts; it is again human that these principles connect in man, not in the spirit. The spirit is the eagle, the Yang principle, and the serpent is the Yin principle; and the animals are amazed at what Zarathustra-Nietzsche is doing. I quite understand that one gets mixed up, but in order to analyse Zarathustra you must understand how to ride your horses, and not only horses but dragons. You must always keep in mind that the two are constantly interchanging, playing into each other: namely, the psychology of the suffering ordinary man Nietzsche, and the psychology of the spirit. Of course we in our immense foolishness always imagine that the spirit has a personal psychology. It is just as if one were assuming that there was no other chemistry but that of the cooking pot, that chemistry is what one cooks in the kitchen, to eat. There is the psychology of the spirit, and a psychology of the instincts, and there is also a personal psychology. The problem here is that Nietzsche is not an ideally analysed person—and not even an ordinarily analysed person is free from that peculiar crisscross of personal tendencies. If Nietzsche were analysed—as a man like Nietzsche could be⁹—he would show two sides: here the suffering neurotic Nietzsche, and there the psychology of the spirit, his particular mythological drama. But as it is, the divine drama and man's ordinary suffering are completely mixed and they distort each other, so naturally we are confused when we look at that tangle and try to decipher the contradictions. In order to have a clear picture, you must hold the thesis and antithesis ever before your eyes, the two things that constantly work into each other or influence each other and then try to separate them. But it is really very difficult.

⁹ Jung here visualizes Nietzsche as an analysand. He once wrote that he himself had been well prepared for psychiatry by the author of *Zarathustra*. See CW 7, par. 199.

LECTURE VI

26 February 1936

Prof. Jung:

There was some confusion last time, due to that most bewildering fact of Nietzsche's identity with Zarathustra; it was just another difficult moment in the neck-breaking enterprise we have embarked upon in attempting to analyse *Zarathustra*. You see, one really cannot deal with such a fact; one has to dissolve it in order to cope with it. One has exactly the same difficulty when a real individual is identical with an archetypal figure. For a woman to deal with a man who is identical with his anima is well-nigh impossible. And for a man it is most confusing to talk to an animus-possessed woman; he thinks that she must be a woman because she looks like one anatomically, but when she opens her mouth he discovers that it is a man who is talking and feeling, and then he is all upside down. Of course, this is only one possibility: a man may be identical with the wise old man for instance, or a woman may be identical with the earth mother—and that is perfectly awful because one doesn't know whether one should fall down on one's knees or take the next taxi to a lunatic asylum. So in dealing with a man who is identical with Zarathustra, one doesn't know to what one is talking, and whatever one says is wrong, naturally, because one rests entirely upon the understanding that one can dissolve this union, that Nietzsche is one thing and Zarathustra another and that the two coincide. Sometimes Nietzsche is talking, sometimes Zarathustra, and when the text says "I," God knows which "I" it is. I must tell you again that excellent story of Schopenhauer. He was once taking a walk in the public gardens in Frankfurt, very busy with his problem, so he paid no attention to his path and stepped into a flower bed. There he stayed, thinking hard, till the gardener came along and said: "What are you doing there in the flower bed? Who are you?" And Schopenhauer said: "Exactly, that is what I don't know!" It is very difficult at times to make out who one is.

So, in talking about Zarathustra-Nietzsche, we have all the time that

interplay of man and God, or man and spirit in the real meaning of the word; sometimes I am referring to the spirit and sometimes to the man. And whatever is true for the spirit is not true for the man and vice versa. No wonder, then, that one gets mixed up. Therefore, the only thing to do in a moment of distress when you are completely at sea, is to assume that you have not understood, rather than that the world is all wrong; probably you have lost the thread and whatever I say would be utterly wrong from the other point of view. And I am in the same predicament, of course, in that nothing I say can apply to both. So you had better assume my hypothesis that Nietzsche and Zarathustra are really two different things; then there is a chance of dealing with them. Otherwise one is in the same unfortunate position that one is in with an anima-possessed man; one gets a peculiar feeling with such double people that whatever one says is always beside the mark.

We got as far last time as this outburst of Zarathustra, and looked at from the standpoint of the man Nietzsche, of course the conclusion that he ought to go back to mankind is all wrong. But this is exactly what on the other side the spirit has to do. To merely believe in the spirit doesn't help, because you are then assuming something that is not; the spirit must be convincing. God has to manifest himself if we are to know him. Otherwise, what is the use of believing in him? The spirit is only convincing when it *is*; when it is, it works. Then it blows as the wind blows; therefore it is named breath, *spiritus*, *animus*, or *pneuma*, wind. But if you don't feel the wind, you are perfectly justified in stating that you don't feel it. If there is no movement of the air, it is much better to say that this is a dark time in which the spirit doesn't move, so one has to be satisfied in *believing* in the spirit; but you cannot go on forever just believing that which you never perceive. When you come to a country without wind, where it is apparently non-existent, it is much safer to assume that there is no wind because that is the average truth. Only when the wind begins to blow and the waters to rush forth, is it convincing. The spirit is essentially movement. As soon as the spirit is at a standstill you fall back on belief, and that is a sad substitute for the spirit.

My impatient love overfloweth in streams,—down towards sunrise and sunset. Out of silent mountains and storms of affliction, rusheth my soul into the valleys.

This verse is an exact description of the movement of the spirit, and this is Zarathustra's proper style, but for Nietzsche it is an inflation; when he consists of air, or water, he is no longer human. It is altogether

too wonderful: to explode with all that love is impossible. If a man comes to you saying that his love overfloweth in streams down towards the sunrise and sunset, that out of silent mountains and storms of affliction he is streaming up against you with a thousand tons of water, what can you do with him? How can you adapt to that? Such impossible stuff means that there is something impossible in the man: he is really two; if it is your personal conviction that the fellow himself is talking like that, your natural reaction will be to telephone the psychiatric clinic.

Too long have I longed and looked into the distance. Too long hath solitude possessed me: thus have I unlearned to keep silence.

Well, if this is Zarathustra speaking, it is perfectly all right; that is the suffering, the affliction of the spirit. No wind was blowing for centuries perhaps and the adventurous spirit of movement had to remain silent, unable to blow and whistle.

Utterance have I become altogether, and the brawling of a brook from high rocks: downward into the valleys will I hurl my speech.

This is exactly what the wind does, falling down from the high mountains into the valleys.

And let the stream of my love sweep into unfrequented channels! How should a stream not finally find its way to the sea?

You see, this image of a stream that finally finds its way to the sea would be the life of the spirit, it is the natural potential. If it moves at all, the spirit always moves on to the distant sea, to completion—the complete standstill; every movement is seeking the eternal tranquility of the sea.

Forsooth, there is a lake in me, sequestered and self-sufficing; but the stream of my love beareth this along with it, down—to the sea!

New paths do I tread, a new speech cometh unto me; tired have I become—like all creators—of the old tongues. No longer will my spirit walk on worn-out soles.

Too slowly runneth all speaking for me:—into thy chariot, O storm, do I leap! And even thee will I whip with my spite!

That is again very high-sounding. You have probably noticed that in the last verse, slowly the man comes in, with the identification of man and spirit, and that causes this statement that he wants to become the

whip of the storm, as if the storm, or the spirit, were his riding horse. He cannot identify the storm; therefore—as always happens—since one cannot be below God one must be above God. This is quoted from a speech made by our Swiss poet Gottfried Keller at a dinner to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of a friend of his youth. He said, “My dear friends, our friend who is celebrating his anniversary belongs to those theologians who are, happily enough, not above but below God.” You see, that was a great truth; since you cannot be on a level with God, you are therefore either below or above him. If you are below God he is the great stream, but if you are above him he is your riding horse and then you are a mighty fellow. As soon as you identify with God you needs must transcend him because God is a stream; and you are not the air or the rushing waters, but are just a definite form called human, so you can only personify god in yourself. Then you are on top, in the saddle, and can even use the whip; you can command God and give him the spurs so that he moves a bit quicker. A pretty dangerous enterprise. You see, this is the way to the catastrophic consequences of inflation.

Like a cry and an huzza will I traverse wide seas, till I find the
Happy Isles where my friends sojourn;—

And mine enemies amongst them! How I now love every one
unto whom I may but speak! Even mine enemies pertain to my
bliss.

Here we come to something rather cryptic—that he wants to traverse wide seas. *Wie ein Schrei und ein Jauchzen will ich über weite Meere hinfahren.* This is like the shrieking wind, the mistral for instance, and this is the symbol which Nietzsche is forever using; in other parts of *Zarathustra* he identifies with the wind that blows over lands and seas, of course always with the goal of the spirit, those blessed islands of eternal peace where his friends and also his enemies sojourn. Now what about these Happy Isles? They are another aspect of the sea of course.

Prof. Fierz: Would they be *die glückliche Inseln*, or *l’Île de Cythère*?

Miss Hannah: Tennyson’s Lotus Eaters?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and other South Sea Islands, like Ganguin’s Tahiti, but there is a much better example, a famous case.

Mrs. Baumann: Atlantis.

Prof. Jung: Of course, the big island that sank into the ocean with a whole civilization that people are still talking about.

Miss Wolff: But Atlantis was not an island—it was supposed to be a continent.

Prof. Jung: Oh, it doesn't matter—one can call Australia an island or a continent. Of course it matters a lot whether you call Mars "Mars"; it is marvelous that people have discovered what the names of the stars are!

Mrs. Baumann: Could one not also mention Happy Neurosis Island?

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but that is not a generally known island. It is a very ancient idea that there are happy islands out in the West, outside the gate of the ocean or the pillars of Hercules. In Egypt we have the Isles of the Great Green, the ocean, which was also the underworld, the land of the dead. And the Western land in the Gilgamesh epic is the place of the dead where people dwell in eternal bliss forever. So the Happy Isles would be the land of the dead, and the movement of the spirit is making for that underground existence, like the way of the sun Osiris that goes under the sea and comes upon the Isles of the Great Green; therefore Osiris as the judge of the underworld was always painted a blueish green, the color of the sea.

Mrs. Jung: Could he not mean here merely the world and human beings? He has been in solitude and now he is longing for human beings, so the world might seem to him like a paradise.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, if you speak in terms of Nietzsche, but we are now on the side of the spirit, and inasmuch as it is Zarathustra, he speaks his truth; the wind blows out over the sea until it reaches the Happy Isles, for as the movement of all rivers is from above to below, so the movement of the spirit seeks finally the great tranquillity, the Great Green of the underworld. Now, when we come to the man Nietzsche we find him naturally in this idea of "where my friends sojourn." Everybody will one day go down to the Isles of the Great Green whether happy or not; and here he says definitely his friends as well as his enemies will be there. Here the man Nietzsche would identify with the spirit and traverse the seas to reach those Happy Isles where he would find friends, for heaven's sake—human beings, even enemies, somebody to talk to! Nietzsche was so forlorn; all his life he was isolated, so he was only too eager to find an audience to talk to. And his books were read by relatively few people, who were shocked by their peculiar character; as you see, they are by no means easy reading. When a man writes such stuff he naturally feels that he will not be understood, for he has the feeling within of what it is that he produces, and it takes him into a rarified atmosphere which is more than six thousand feet above good and evil. You know, Nietzsche always took as symbolic the fact that the Engadine was at an altitude of six thousand feet. So of course, he would feel tremendously isolated when he

thought of his old friends in Basel, Professors Overbeck and Jakob Burkhardt and so on. I wish I could show you old man Jakob Burkhardt as I saw him practically every day, walking near the Cathedral coming from the University library. And Zarathustra!—you could not imagine anything more different than those two, Zarathustra full of modern history, and this gentleman who could have lived just as well in 1670. You see, that loneliness belongs to Nietzsche, not to the spirit; the spirit is not sentimental. Though, mind you, if you believe in the spirit it can be *anything*, because you can project anything into it; then the spirit *can* be sentimental—with blue eyes and flowing locks and a beard. But the spirit is really a tremendous adventure—cruel, inexorable, inhuman. Just now one hears many complaints of this peculiarly inhuman quality of the spirit of adventure and experience; the thing that is riding through the forests in Germany is by no means human or very compassionate. It is a great wind, passionate, and all things will tremble.

Mrs. Baumann: There is one sentence where that is shown very clearly: “With these words Zarathustra started up, not however like a person gasping for air.” Why should he suddenly say “gasping for air”?

Prof. Jung: In my translation it is “like a person in anguish seeking relief.”¹

Mrs. Baumann: It is Nietzsche that is gasping.

Prof. Jung: Well no, he is not gasping, that is just the trouble; he *should* stifle in trying to identify with the spirit, but he doesn’t. He dissolves into it right away.

Mrs. Baumann: But he wouldn’t mention it at all if he didn’t have something the matter.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true; it is an indirect admission that one *should* have felt like that. For instance, “lost are my friends” is a terrible statement really, and then there was that vision of the devil’s face in the mirror which might have caused anxiety to any normal person, and to him it did not. There he was completely identified with Zarathustra. You see, it doesn’t matter to the spirit what its face may be; it *can* have a terrible face. When the Gospel says God is spirit, it means that he can be very terrible; the spirit is an elementary movement, a tremendous outburst in man, and it can be infernal and cruel. I don’t imagine, for instance, that those prophets of the Old Testament who were filled with the spirit of God were particularly lovely people—there is evi-

¹ Hollingdale*: “With these words Zarathustra sprang up—not, however, as if gasping for air, but rather like a sea monster whom the spirit has moved.”

dence for the contrary—yet one cannot deny that they were filled with the spirit. So it is perfectly true, as you say, that Nietzsche the human being should have been filled with anxiety. He should have been stifled, suppressed, because the spirit was getting the better of him. But he identified with the spirit instead of realizing what the very weak human suffering creature feels when the spirit is taking possession of that frail thing which can so easily break. When people are attacked by the spirit, they may break just as well; there are many cases of schizophrenia where, after what is called a religious experience, they just explode; they cannot stand it, it is a very dangerous thing. But the point is that he does not realize it. Therefore, I said it was quite understandable that the eagle and the serpent should look at him in amazement; they are his instincts and they surely are startled. They would have interfered if they had not been dumb animals. They would have said, "Now look out!"

Prof. Reichstein: Can you call that an anima reaction when he says that he feels like a whip to the storm?

Prof. Jung: Well, not directly because there is no evidence for the feminine nature of that particular image. I should say it simply shows that he is identical with the storm and since he cannot be *à niveau*,² or the same as the storm, he will transcend it, and then he is on top of the storm and can use the whip on it.

Prof. Reichstein: But it comes out of emotion.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true; if he is overcome he is in the feminine role. You remember we have encountered before certain places in the text where Nietzsche uses words as if he were a woman, *sich putzen* for instance: a man wants to make himself beautiful for his friend exactly as if he were a woman. There it was quite obvious that he was transformed into his anima by identification, by being overcome by his unconscious. And here we must theoretically at least conclude that he is in the role of femininity. I remember the case of a lunatic, a house-painter who had a religious experience. The voice of God told him that he no longer had a man's name; from now on his name was Mary—he was really the mother of God. Then he, like a true prophet, said, "But how, oh God, is it possible that I should be Mary, since I am made like a man?" And God said, "Oh never mind, that can be mended." So in order to look like a woman, that man tried to amputate his external genitals, and was then brought to the lunatic asylum. That is a case of complete transformation by identification with

² *A niveau*: level with.

the spirit. But you see when he heard the voice of God he would not have accepted it if he had not already been in a feminine condition. If he had been a man, he would have said, "I, Mary! My name is so-and-so—what damned nonsense are you talking?" That would have been the reaction of a man, but no, he instantly felt flattered, very great, that God was talking to him, and at once exploded. A religious experience has that insinuating character: it is a sort of temptation like the temptation of Christ in the desert, when God appeared to him in the disguise of the devil and insinuated certain things. Christ was man enough to say it was the devil in order to hold his own; otherwise he would have been transformed into Mary or another lady and would have followed the devil, the spirit. He probably would have fallen down from the roof of the temple. This is all very paradoxical, yet things do happen in that way. It is not very clear here that a feminine element comes in unless it is in this word *Bosheit* which is translated by "spite." That is one of Nietzsche's habitual terms, and it is a rather disagreeable word; it always arouses my anima because there is some feminine element in it. Think of a man riding a horse who uses the whip with spite. That is unthinkable, and it is unthinkable of a real woman, a human being; only an anima could do that.

Miss Wolff: I think Prof. Reichstein was thinking of that chapter where it says when you go to women don't forget the whip.

Prof. Reichstein: No, I thought this was from his point of view a trial; he tried to get connection with people and as he could not get it directly, his anima now tries to get it through his teaching.

Prof. Jung: You mean he wants to force himself upon people?

Prof. Reichstein: Yes.

Prof. Jung: Well, it would come to that, and therefore the anima would be the whip that forces him to ride the spirit. Yes, you could explain it like that theoretically. That is perfectly correct. He naturally would have to identify through his anima; it could not be done otherwise. Well now,

And when I want to mount my wildest horse, then doth my spear always help me up best; it is my foot's ever ready servant:—

The spear which I hurl at mine enemies! How grateful am I to mine enemies that I may at last hurl it!

What about this symbolism? Isn't it a funny idea that he now questions how to get upon that horse? Apparently he was already on it and now here is the spear that is to help him up; there must be some difficulty in getting into the saddle.

Prof. Fierz: Nietzsche was certainly no rider.

Mrs. Sigg: Yes, he was in the artillery—he liked to ride; he hurt himself once riding a very wild horse.

Prof. Jung: But in the war he was not with the active troops.

Mrs. Sigg: He was a Swiss and was not allowed to be a soldier in the war.

Miss Hughes: Is it not possible that the spear is his leading function?

Prof. Jung: That is true, and it is most interesting that he needs his superior function to climb onto that horse. The spear is like a sword, a dagger, or some such instrument, and it is a symbol for the intellect on account of its piercing, discriminating, dissecting character. So this passage means that he gets onto the horse by the aid of his intellect. How is that possible? Is that the regular way?

Miss Hannah: Well, he just leaves his body entirely behind; he identifies with his intellect and then he can ride with the wind.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is a bit too symbolical. You see, it is obviously by the assumption of the intellect that one identifies: that is simply Nietzsche's experience. And now that peculiar adventurous movement of the spirit, the intellect, will question this function about it. It will pass a judgment on what is happening to Nietzsche. The intellect will say: "That is *your* mind, you are now in such a movement"—and then there you are in the saddle. Just as to some one having a religious experience, feeling the presence of God, the intellect might say, "Well, that is yourself. You did not know that you were so big a fellow. This feeling of amplitude is what you did not realize"—and there is the wrong conclusion: already you are on top of God. Of course another intellect might say, "Now don't identify; this is a gift—the grace of God that you are able to do a thing in such a way." There the intellect would help to disidentify, but it may also say just the opposite: "*You* have done it, *you* are the fellow." Now, the more you identify with a function, the less you suffer from your own critique, and the more of course you suffer from the critique of others. If you are identified with a function you are helped by the function to a further identification. A successful tenor, for instance, will be the biggest man in the world because his voice reaches the highest, so he is on the top of the world. He has that typical megalomania from which most tenors suffer, his surroundings naturally helping him in that belief. But the superior function will always do that, not only the intellect; it will put your achievement or whatever happens to you, down to that leading function, the best side with which one is identical—providing that one has no knowledge of the existence of other functions.

Now there is still a passage in the text to which I would like to call your attention; namely, "Forsooth, there is a lake in me, sequestered and self-sufficing; but the stream of my love beareth this along with it, down—to the sea!" Here something is formulated which bears out practically what I said about the actual situation. What is the lake?

Mr. Allemann: The self.

Prof. Jung: Well, we can only say that there is water, a lake, which wouldn't necessarily flow down, but this stream of love carries it down; so the lake is carried away by the stream as if it were part of it. And you see, this is just the situation—this is again the man Nietzsche. There is something in him like a lake, and this is carried away by the stream of the spirit. Now, why he should be compared to that lake is of course a special question. Mr. Allemann said the lake was the self, and the self is often compared to a lake of peace, or to the ocean. There are certain smaller lakes in Germany, in the Eiffel, called the Eyes of the Sea, and the island is another symbol of the self; you see, the individual self would be an isle or a separate unit of the great collective unconscious. But do you think the stream of love should carry the lake away? Is that as it should be?

Mrs. Crowley: No.

Prof. Jung: No, it is remarkable rather, for what is the use of a lake if it is carried right away? There is no point in a lake if it simply dissolves in the fury of the stream. So when a man is dissolved in that great stream of the spirit, he is no longer himself: he is identical with the spirit and his individual existence is wiped out. Now we are still concerned with that symbol of the spear.

Mrs. Crowley: Would it not have something to do with what you referred to last week in connection with the wound? Because he is wounded, might it not also have some such connotation?

Prof. Jung: Well, a wound presupposes something that wounds, and he says he is wounded by his happiness. The happiness is the consequence of his identification with the spirit, more properly the identification with the spirit by way of the intellect, so by that *détour* it is of course the spear by which he is wounded. That leads us to the Amfortas problem, and also to the idea of the suffering god. Christ suffered on the cross; he was the human being that was wounded by the overwhelming fact of the spirit, which carried him away and killed his humanity. Of course we worship that fact, but not all of us worship it. There is—at least we must suppose so—somewhere a compensating truth for the one-sided worship of the spirit, and that is also indicated here. We admire or worship the phenomenon of the spirit because we

are taught to do so; we assume that it is something marvelous, grand. And if we can trust the words of Nietzsche we are also led to assume that it is a very wonderful experience to be identical with the spirit, in spite of all sorts of indications that it is not such a particularly happy event—that he is wounded by his own happiness, for instance, and that he hurls his spear against his enemies, and is grateful that he has enemies, someone upon whom he can inflict the wound again. You see, that shows a thing from which one always suffers—one is always led to inflict the wound upon others. So people who are caught or overcome by the power of the spirit seem to have the tendency to do the same to others; as they have been overcome and wounded so they will overcome and wound, because they are not themselves, because they are filled with the spirit. They are inhuman or supermen, whatever you like to call it; at all events they are no longer in a human frame and behave as if they were the spirit itself. This is obviously a process which has a very marvelous side. It is most insinuating and really very wonderful to be like a wild river rushing into the wide plains inundating everything and enjoying the play. But on the other side there is any amount of destruction linked up with it, so one can assume that this phenomenon of the spirit is a one-sided thing, and that the unconscious mind has foreseen some compensating truth which shows in the symbolism of the Grail and in similar symbolism of the unconscious. Perhaps we shall find some hints in *Zarathustra*, but I have no great hope of it.

Too great hath been the tension of my cloud: 'twixt laughter of lightnings will I cast hail-showers into the depths.

Violently will my breast then heave; violently will it blow its storm over the mountains: thus cometh its assuagement.

Verily, like a storm cometh my happiness, and my freedom! But mine enemies shall think *the evil one* roareth over their heads.

Here a certain parallel becomes unavoidable. What is that evil one roaring over their heads?

Mrs. Sigg: Wotan.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is Wotan's host roaring through the forest and here we have the symbolism: Wotan's spear and the evil one at the same time, for Wotan the wild hunter becomes later on the devil. Already in the formula of conversion, in the adjuration of the pagan gods, the Germans in the time of Charlemagne were obliged to declare that they would give up Wotan as a devil. Wotan and Erda and the

others are really like devils, and so the later medieval idea that Wotan was identical with the devil came into existence.

Miss Wolff: Does it not also explain his dream of the devil's face in a more synthetic way?

Prof. Jung: That is true. The dream of the devil's face when Zarathustra showed his other side becomes more understandable now—he is the devil himself.

Yea, ye also, my friends, will be alarmed by my wild wisdom;
and perhaps ye will flee therefrom, along with mine enemies.

This is another manifestation of that peculiar Wotan effect which is so incredible. Yet it is a fact that old Wotan has to a certain extent come to life again; one hears of it either directly or indirectly, and if anybody had predicted such a fact twenty years ago, it would have been thought utterly impossible. It has become a fact to the extent that the attitude of the ruling party in Germany is really against the church; they are trying to subjugate the church and to translate, as it were, the terminology of the church into a sort of pagan belief. That idea of Pagan Christianity or the German faith is of course nothing else than the nationalization of God; they then have a specific national God, Wotan for the German as Jahveh was for the Jew. That is quite inevitable. And it is understandable that in the face of such events even friends might be alarmed. One *is* alarmed! I have quite a number of German friends and I must say I am alarmed by the fact that they are so gripped.

Mrs. Sigg: I think if we asked the Germans about Wotan they would sometimes answer that the *Asen* were also there, and that makes it milder.

Prof. Jung: Well, it means nothing else. It means that the myth is *en marche*, old Wotan is going strong again; you might even include Alberich and those other demons.³ That thing lives.

Mrs. Sigg: I think if one reads *The Anti-Christ* of Nietzsche⁴ and realizes that all the youth of Germany used to read his books during the war—Nietzsche's books were sent to them in the trenches—one is not astonished.

Prof. Jung: Not astonished, but it is nevertheless most remarkable psychologically. And you cannot put it down to Nietzsche only. It has always been admitted that Wagner did a lot along that line too: he

³ Alberich was the elf-king whose cloak of invisibility was worn in battle by Siegfried. The Asa gods were ruled over by Wotan.

⁴ *The Anti-Christ* was written in the last year of Nietzsche's sanity, but not published until 1895.

made use of that mythology—and his music is most insinuating. It caused a sort of journalistic Germanic movement. They played with old names long before the war: there were jokes in *Simplissimus*⁵ about the very ordinary civilians who came together and drank out of horns with antlers on their heads—such things.

Ah, that I knew how to lure you back with shepherds' flutes! Ah, that my lioness wisdom would learn to roar softly! And much have we already learned with one another!

My wild wisdom became pregnant on the lonesome mountains; on the rough stones did she bear the youngest of her young,

Now runneth she foolishly in the arid wilderness, and seeketh and seeketh the soft sward—mine old, wild wisdom!

On the soft sward of your hearts, my friends!—on your love, would she fain couch her dearest one!—

Thus spake Zarathustra.

Here we learn more about his wisdom, and that is of course the other side of the figure of Wotan, who is a romantic god as well. He is the god of oracles, of secret knowledge, of sorcery, and he is also the equivalent of Hermes *psychopompos*. And you remember he has, like Osiris, only one eye; the other eye is sacrificed to the underworld. Therefore, he is an exceedingly apt symbol for our modern world in which the unconscious really comes to the foreground like a river, and forces us to turn one eye inward upon it, in order that we may be adapted to that side also; we feel now that the greatest enemy is threatening us, not from without but from within. So on account of all his qualities, Wotan expresses the spirit of the time to an extent which is uncanny, and that wisdom or knowledge is really wild—it is nature's wisdom. Wotan is not the God of civilized beings but a condition of nature. He brings the experience of nature and its abyss, and this is of course as Zarathustra says, a wisdom rather like that of a lioness, a wild animal. Therefore, anybody who teaches this wisdom would do well to have a flute, like Orpheus, to tame the wild beasts, in order that his friends may not be too much alarmed. The roar of a lioness cannot be soft and friendly, but is most menacing, and this wild wisdom, this wild mind of nature, causes misunderstandings and panic. Human beings will be terrified—the lioness will create an arid wilderness around herself. So she probably seeks in vain that soft sward to couch herself and her young upon. This is very much like the man Nietzsche who hopes that he can place

⁵ *Simplissimus* was a popular satirical, weekly magazine, published in Munich.

his child upon the love of his friends, but nobody is particularly ready to accept the young of a wild animal of prey. Well, that is just the conflict in Nietzsche's case, but with the exception of Wagner, he was the first one to realize the events of the future and to give voice to the unconscious that was about to manifest; and he realized more or less that it would be a message that was not welcome.

Mrs. Baynes: Goetz takes Wotan as a symbol of the new integration of the psyche.⁶ But, if I understand you, you would consider that not correct psychologically because he is too much on the natural side?

Prof. Jung: He is just not an integration, but a disintegration. You see, the storm does not cause integration, but destroys whatever allows itself to be destroyed. It is simply the movement after a long tension or standstill, like waters that break loose after long accumulation. This will happen in different periods of history when things have reached a certain one-sidedness. Then suddenly the whole thing will crash down, in a sort of revolutionary outburst of energy that has been too tightened up, put under too much pressure; the steam begins to sizzle out somewhere or the whole boiler explodes, and that is Wotan.

Mrs. Baynes: But inasmuch as he carried for the Germans the symbol of the *Wal-Vater*,⁷ is he not also that side, that form?

Prof. Jung: No, that wandering is without visible goal because it is the wandering of nature, of natural movement.

Mrs. Sigg: But is not Wotan also the inventor of the rune, a new way of expressing himself? And we heard in one poem by Goetz that the other side of Wotan was more the wise man.

Prof. Jung: There is that other side, but first the destruction is most visible; and since Wotan is a historical figure we cannot hope that it is a progression. I am convinced that behind it something else follows, but it won't be Wotan. It cannot be.

Miss Hughes: Doesn't he mention in the second stage of his *Metamorphoses*: "To create itself freedom for new creating"? That is again the lion which he mentions previous to that, so it would be the destructive element in order that new values might come in the wake of it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but first it must be the lion which was forever the destroying animal.

⁶ Goetz's *Das Reich ohne Raum* (Potsdam, 1919), a novel. Jung reports having been early struck with this book in which Goetz "saw the secret of coming events in Germany, in the form of a very strange vision" CW 10, par. 384. But see above, 5 June 1935, n. 10.

⁷ That is, "father of the slain." He was known by a great many epithets from "All-father" to "Long Beard."

Mrs. Jung: Would you call this wild wisdom of the lioness anima wisdom?

Prof. Jung: Or like the wisdom of the tiger; you remember the tiger is the symbol of the anima in Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*.⁸ So the lioness would be the symbol of the anima because it is nature.

Mrs. Sigg: Prometheus is accompanied by a lion and a little dog, and here Zarathustra is accompanied by a lioness and her young ones. I should like to know what the difference is.

Prof. Jung: In *Prometheus* the lion is the will to power, and the dog is the sentimentality, the weakness, the craving for love and tenderness. But one must not be too literal about these things; the real parallel is the tigress. Spitteler compares the first apparition of the anima to a tigress walking under the trees with the leaves casting shadows on her fur. That is a very suggestive passage. Now sure enough, the wisdom of the anima is wild because the anima is nature. That is the one thing in man which he cannot rule, the thing by which he is connected with nature; and if he apparently succeeds in cutting that communication, he is done for. And the animus in a woman is nature. I mean if it is in the right place: if the animus is in a woman's conscious, then of course it means opinionating, convictions, the driest, most soulless stuff you can imagine. If a man has his anima in the conscious, he has the feelings of a mother, something perfectly ridiculous, he will *schwärmen*⁹ for babies and such things. There is a wonderful English book by MacDonald—I think it is called *Lilith*¹⁰—which you ought to read as a most gorgeous example of a man whose anima is in the conscious. The book begins with the problem of Lilith, the anima problem—Lilith of course was a demon, the first wife of Adam—and it finally ends in an orgy of babies. It is beyond words, but marvelous as a pathological manifestation: he finds an anima that produces millions of babies, eats babies and drinks them. It is something awful!

Mrs. Sigg: Wotan is not only in Germany!

Prof. Jung: No, Wotan is an international phenomenon, and he is by no means Christian, but is all over the world.

Mrs. Jung: I think it is interesting to see that, concerning the man

⁸ Jung often cited Carl Spitteler, the only Swiss Nobel laureate for literature, but in CW 6, he dwelt at length on *Prometheus and Epimetheus: A Prose Epic* (orig. 1880-81, tr. J. F. Muirhead [London, 1931]). Spitteler denied any symbolic quality to his work, claiming that it was just straightforward fiction.

⁹ *Schwärmen*: literally "to swarm over" like bees; to gush over or rave about.

¹⁰ George MacDonald's *Lilith, a Visionary Novel* originally appeared in 1859 and was reissued in New York, 1954.

Nietzsche, his function of relationship is evidently all in his teaching, but it has a negative character that came out in sarcasm or spite.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one could say it *all* turns into the negative. That is not his intention. He would like to have positive relationship but he cannot; his anima twists the whole thing into just the opposite of relatedness, into destructiveness, and that won't do. He gets into a warlike attitude and becomes the enemy of mankind—hurling his spear at them. It is desperately like actual politics. Germany is again in much the same position she was in before the war, outside and inside. Hitler has written that most extraordinary book, *Mein Kampf*, for instance. Why not *My Love* or *My Peace*? Through the mouth of her leader Germany has maneuvered herself into such an unfortunate condition that everybody must believe that she wants war and that they are justified in making an iron ring round her. And Germany is again justified in defending herself against that ring, so finally she will be forced into an act of despair and say, "Oh, if we are the arch-enemy of mankind, then have it so."

Mrs. Sigg: I think it would have been pretty difficult for Hitler in prison, and after the Versailles treaty, to write a book called *My Love*. I think that would be asking too much.

Prof. Jung: Well, one might look at it from a different point of view, not always from the point of view of war. We have been talking for two thousand years about love and now, damn it, why war?

Mrs. Sigg: But he does not mean war when he says *Kampf*.

Prof. Jung: I agree that it is not meant like that but it *sounds* like that. Look at the battalions of Brown Shirts; naturally people say that means war. Then the Germans say, "By no means, this is *Arbeitsdienst*,¹¹ they are not carrying guns, but spades." So it is just the difference in the point of view. The book is called *Mein Kampf*, and there are many things said in it which are very difficult to swallow—all the diplomacy of the *neue Reich* for instance; the book has done a lot of harm. It would have been very much better if he had written a book called *My Peace*. If he had been an Englishman he would have written *My Love*—having not meant it at all!

¹¹ *Arbeitsdienst*: work service.

LECTURE VII

4 March 1936

Prof. Jung:

Before we leave this chapter about the child and the mirror, I would like to ask how you have understood the expression "my wild wisdom"? He says: "My wild wisdom became pregnant on the lonesome mountains." That is a very peculiar idea, and I wonder what you think about it.

Mrs. Crowley: I thought it was the wisdom of the collective unconscious, in the figure of the old wise man.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, but this allusion to his wild wisdom would point to something of the old wise man that has come into the man Nietzsche himself, and then how does it look?

Mr. Allemann: It is the snake wisdom, nature's wisdom.

Miss Hughes: It is untamed wisdom.

Prof. Jung: But how does nature's wisdom look? There must be different kinds of wisdom apparently, wild and tame or domesticated wisdom.

Mrs. Sigg: An irrational wisdom.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, wisdom is understood to be irrational to a certain extent because merely rational wisdom is not very wise; science would be rational wisdom, but then one would use the word *knowledge*. (In German, to be wise and to know come from the same root, *wissen*.) But it is also not irrational; one cannot say nature is just wild, otherwise there would be no *ratio* in it, and there is.

Miss Hughes: Is it not a kind of wisdom that would carry one away in spite of oneself?

Prof. Jung: That is the way it would influence us. It is a sort of autonomous wisdom which dominates us but leaves us at times to our own devices; it is not always there, but is like a wild animal which at times one has only glimpses of, while at another time it will approach one. It is not an organized knowledge.

Miss Hughes: Would it be his specific feminine Eros wisdom against his typically masculine wisdom of the wise old man?

Prof. Jung: Inasmuch as he is a man, it would be the wisdom of nature, like Erda's wisdom in the Germanic myth, the wisdom of the underworld that has to do with the moon, rather.

Dr. Adler: If it is like a wild beast it would be instinctual wisdom.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but those are all formal definitions; I would like to know a bit more about the substance of this wisdom.

Mr. Baumann: It is not built up by reflection. It is a kind of *a priori* wisdom which is inherent in man like the instincts.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but I wouldn't say it was just inherent in man because it is wild; you wouldn't say of a bird that it was inherent in man. It is contained in nature—an animal or a bird or a lion or whatever it is.

Miss Hannah: It would show itself as the natural mind.

Prof. Jung: We have to reserve that term for the women; it is too characteristic, you know!

Mrs. Sigg: It might be some elementary intuition.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it can show itself in such a form.

Mrs. Crowley: It appears in a sort of Dionysian form.

Prof. Jung: It does, no doubt. When the panthers of Dionysos jump upon you, you might say a wise word—there is much wisdom in wine.

Miss Hughes: A man cannot go by the guidance of a lioness as his anima.

Prof. Jung: Heavens, he can go by the guidance of a louse even. Do you know the story of the sailor and the louse of Trafalgar? There was a lull in the battle when he felt something upon his head and a louse fell on the ground; he saw it crawling and bent down to crush it, and in that moment he just missed a cannon ball that whistled over his head. Then the sailor said thank you to the louse, and put it back on his head, adding, "But be careful, for the next time I might not recognize you again." So no animal is so small and no wisdom is so small that it might not be helpful at times. But I should like to know something about the substance. Can you name a wisdom that is within human reach—not so terribly wild, to be bought perhaps?

Mr. Baumann: Wouldn't it be the wisdom that lies in wine?

Prof. Jung: But in buying wine, you have not necessarily bought wisdom—you may have bought a monkey.

Mrs. Sigg: You might find that wisdom in a book—in the Bible for instance.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is chiefly religious; there might also be a worldly wisdom.

Mrs. Baynes: The *I Ching*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the *I Ching*, or the *Tao-Te-King*, or the Upanishads, or the great philosophers: all of these contain acceptable and buyable wisdom. But that is not wild wisdom.

Mr. Allemann: It is wisdom that is not man-made.

Prof. Jung: Yes. The *Tao-Te-King*, for instance, has been formulated by Laotze; and the *I Ching* consists of formulas of King Wen and the Duke of Chou. And the Book of Wisdom in the Old Testament is ascribed to Solomon. There are also books by Master Eckhart. But wild wisdom cannot be ascribed to any one. It is not made by man, not even formulated by man. So how does it show?

Mrs. Jung: I think you might call the whole cosmos an expression of it; you might find it in nature. It is not necessarily bound to one form, but can be found everywhere.

Prof. Jung: It can be found everywhere, yes, but in what form?

Mrs. Jung: I think one finds it in the form of a feeling.

Prof. Jung: In a psychological form then. And what would that be?

Mrs. Crowley: It might be in a state of *ekstasis* since we are speaking of this particular way in *Zarathustra*. And I should also say in dreams if you can find it.

Mrs. Stutz: Or in meditation.

Prof. Jung: Oh, you can meditate, or dream, or get drunk; you can be in the mountains, or the Sahara, or the woods—and find no wisdom whatever.

Mrs. Adler: One finds it in old prophets.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and what is the characteristic of the prophet?

Miss Hannah: Intuition.

Mrs. Stutz: They hear God's voice.

Prof. Jung: And what do you call it when you hear the voice of God?

Miss Bianchi: Inspiration.

Miss Hughes: The Angel of the Lord.

Mrs. Dürler: Instinct.

Prof. Jung: It can be instinct, that is perfectly true. But I want to know the term by which you designate the form in which this wisdom comes to us.

Mrs. Fröbe-Kapteyn: Experience.

Miss Wolff: The objective unconscious.

Mr. Baumann: Is it not insight?

Prof. Jung: It can be, but that is an activity on our own part; if a wild animal crosses your path you don't say you have an insight or intuit this animal.

Mrs. Stutz: It might be a great experience in consequence of being alone with nature.

Prof. Jung: It is an experience but this doesn't designate the particular character in which it appears.

Mrs. Sigg: Revelation.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. You see the term *revelation* conveys exactly how this wild wisdom appears; it reveals itself to you. You cannot say you intuit it; you *experience* revelation. This word conveys the idea that there is a factor or an activity, one could call it a living thing at the other end of the wire that reveals its presence to you. A revelation always means a revealing will, a will to manifest which is not identical with your own will and which is not your activity. You may be overcome by it; it falls upon you. The prophetic experiences described in the Bible are very good examples of the way it happens and the character of the voice that speaks in the thunder, in the fire, everywhere—it can come out of stones. No matter where you are, the revelation can come to you when *it* chooses. The important point is that you cannot choose the partner in the game; you are not the active part, but are just the receiver, the object of the revelation. Now what does the wild wisdom teach? What is the content or the substance of revelation?

Mrs. Baynes: It often comes in the form of a command to go forth and teach. Moses was commanded to give the ten commandments, for instance.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and you find it in the prophecies of Isaiah or any other prophet. Then when you try to formulate that, to what results do you come? What, for instance, is the main point in the revelation as we know it from the Old or the New Testament?

Mrs. Baynes: It is bringing god to man.

Mr. Allemann: It gives guidance.

Prof. Jung: That is an effect upon us; it largely depends upon us. But what does it reveal?

Mr. Baumann: The will of God.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a revelation is a self-manifestation at the other end of the wire. There is a living something with a will or intention that is outside, something that conveys its own self, its own command to you: it manifests itself. That is what *revelation* means, and that is wild wisdom. Now where would Nietzsche have gotten that experience?

Mrs. Baynes: From the experience he had in the mountains.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, from the revelation he had from Zarathustra himself. Zarathustra is that wild wisdom; he embodies it, personifies it. You remember Nietzsche says: *Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra*

ging an mir vorbei. Whatever Nietzsche reveals here is the revelation he has received from Zarathustra. Of course, here we get into trouble right away on account of that fact that Nietzsche is all the time identical with Zarathustra so that we never know which one is speaking; only from certain peculiarities of the text, certain thoughts and intentions and so on, can we conclude. It is as if one had to read the original text of a master, upon which in subsequent centuries several other people had tried their hand, mixing in their own intentions, so that one is saddled with the task of disentangling the presumably original text from the later additions and corrections and interpolations. So here we have to try to pull out of that entanglement what is Nietzsche's own and what has really come through revelation. Unfortunately, Nietzsche lived in a time when he could not objectify psychological events, so he thought that he himself was at the other end of the wire, that he heard his own voice. Wild wisdom, then, is really the revelation of the autonomous psychical factor at the other end of the wire, the demon or whatever you like to call it. And from the kind of revelation one can conclude as to the nature of that being at the other end. Of course we need the whole of *Zarathustra* in order to get the sum total of the message, and then from the particular kind of message we can understand what that revealing factor is, or what its qualities are.

Mrs. Sigg: I think the lioness might be at the other end of the telephone as well.

Prof. Jung: Yes, anything is possible. It might be a serpent or a bird, whatever you like; we cannot say. There is an eagle and a serpent and a lion and a camel and a child, and even the hell-hound later on.

Mr. Baumann: Didn't theology try to lift up this wild wisdom into revelation? But how does one experience such things now? We have no prophets, we don't believe in that.

Prof. Jung: But there is any amount of revelation going on all the time; plenty of people have revelations.

Mrs. Baynes: Guidance every morning!

Prof. Jung: You must not assume that revelation is always something of supreme value. The revelations of lunatics are often quite funny. So it is exceedingly difficult to make out what the wild wisdom really means. The guidance is very funny at times; I could tell you the most amazing examples which I have heard from my patients, just wild, but if you can work it out, you discover that there is great wisdom in it. I even admit that there is great wisdom in the guidance of the Oxford Movement.

Mrs. Jung: What exactly is the difference between intuition and revelation?

Prof. Jung: Well, an ordinary intuition is really one's own activity. I can set out to have an intuition and it doesn't come to me as a revelation; I can stare at a thing until something comes into my mind. I can even provoke it. An intuitive type sets out to intuit—it is very much his own activity—whereas a revelation has of course a great similarity but it appears much more as a fact outside oneself. It is true that the intuitive derives the authority for his intuition from the same source, so at times it seems to have the same autonomous character, and the more it has that character, the more it has authority of course. It is amazing how sure he is of his intuition, so certain that he can convince people of the merest possibility, a potential which might come off, or it might not. It is utterly improbable that more than 50 percent of intuitions are true because we are surrounded by a large percentage of false possibilities. You see, a potentiality can remain forever a potentiality, and it may also be a false possibility; something may *seem* to be possible yet it is not at all, although one has an intuition that it *is* already. The more intuition has an autonomous quality, the more it takes on the character of a revelation; therefore the most intuitive people behave as if they were all the time inspired. They are perfectly certain, and in consequence they fall from one hole into the other and never get anywhere. You see, what happens to them is that they assume that authority to be their own; if they did not they would be critical—then they would discuss matters with God. The prophets discussed matters first; they were disobedient because they felt there were other elements involved in it and perhaps God didn't really know whether the thing was right or not. But the moment the intuitive has an intuition, he runs away with it and therefore he falls into a hole.

Mrs. Sigg: Could one say a revelation comes from the self?

Prof. Jung: Well, whatever the phrase is, we don't know the source. We must be very careful. Yes, we could make such a theory—of the so-called self from which a revelation comes—but this is metaphysical speculation.

Mrs. Crowley: I would have thought it could start with intuition.

Prof. Jung: Of course it can have such a form, but you cannot provoke it.

Mrs. Crowley: Then I had the wrong idea of intuition. I thought that was just what could *not* be done with intuition; I thought it was autonomous.

Prof. Jung: That is just the trouble: that is what the intuitive thinks.

The more one is intuitive, the more it just comes to one, but it is one's own activity. There is a tremendous danger in intuition; the more it is differentiated, the greater the danger that it takes on that character of revelation. It is the same with the intellect; if one has a finely differentiated intellect one feels that it is almost infallible. So a philosopher once told me that thinking could never be wrong because it was right in itself.

Mrs. Crowley: I mean exactly the opposite; an intuition is so uncertain that it is no proof if it comes to you, but if it is revelation you would be absolutely convinced.

Prof. Jung: It is true that revelation has authority but the historical fact is, that even if the revelation comes to you with great authority, you may not believe it.

Mrs. Crowley: Well, you would feel more convinced, I should think, if you could possibly realize that it was revelation.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true: people are more convinced by a revelation than by an intuition; but it is also true that if they have a real revelation they may not believe it, while they might believe an intuition.

Mrs. Dürler: Where can you draw the line?

Prof. Jung: Yes, where can you draw the line between the very sharp intellect and error? That is just the difficulty.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not the claim of the church to be able to draw the line?

Prof. Jung: Exactly, and that is why we have such safe-guards as scientific text books or dogma. For instance, St. Ambrose said a very great word: *Omne verum a quocumque dicitur, a Spiritu Sancto est*. Everything that is true, said by whomsoever, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Now this is very wonderful, but what is truth? Who tells you what the truth is? The church steps in and says a thing is not true and therefore it is not of the Holy Ghost.

Dr. Escher: The Apostle Peter was surely shocked at first when the command came to eat unclean meat.¹

Prof. Jung: Yes, that was a revelation too; it is a very good example. You see, when the time had come for Christianity to be spread to the Gentiles, he had a vision that God let down a linen cloth in which were the impure animals which the orthodox Jews were forbidden to eat.

¹ See Acts of the Apostles, 10:11-17, for Peter's vision wherein he claimed that he never ate common or unclean beasts and was rebuked by a voice saying, "What God hath created that call not thou common."

And the voice said that what God declared to be pure could not be impure. So he had to eat it, which means that he had to assimilate the Gentiles. But he surely did not like it; he had to have the shock of such a vision in order to be shaken into accepting it. Now if St. Peter had had an intuition that such animals were not particularly impure and that it was the will of God that one should eat impure animals anyway, he would have said *he* had this intuition. *He* would have made the declaration and would have made it his own affair. It would have been an ego business, and when that is the case one is very much inclined to believe it. While if it is against you, and you have to become yourself in order to bow down to this fact, it is entirely different; then it is revelation and the true revelation is very often not believed at first. People fight against it; often they defend themselves for years against it, which of course is all against themselves, for they will be overcome in the end. But they are always inclined to believe an intuition and make an ego business of it, and then the secret power tendency creeps in and falsifies the whole thing. One would have the greatest difficulty, however, in drawing the line between what one calls an intuition and a revelation—it is very often wellnigh impossible; I don't know of one single safeguard in the world that would guarantee a clear and reliable discrimination. If God should choose to make some new revelation you can be sure that the Catholic church would step in and say it was not true, that it was an invention of the devil. It is the same in the Protestant church. God is fettered, completely lamed; he even risks being declared the devil if he says anything unconventional. So it is a most unenviable situation.

Mrs. Sigg: Did you not once quote somebody as saying that the Protestants had made a definition of God as the *ganz andere*?

Prof. Jung: Yes, Barth used that term.² The *ganz andere*, the totally other one, simply means the man or the voice at the other end of the wire, which is not only the opposite, because the opposite can be deduced—I know that the opposite of white must be black for instance—but the totally different. And what can that be? It can be anything.

Miss Wolff: A very good example where the church interfered is Joan of Arc; she got her revelation through the *ganz andere*, so she was pronounced a heretic for having had a conversation with the saints without the interference of the church.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and in her canonization process, they said that she had had an intuition.

² See above, 5 Dec. 1934, n. 9, and 2 Feb. 1936, n. 9.

Mr. Baumann: Could one not say of a certain quality of revelation that it says just another thing than one is accustomed to think?

Prof. Jung: Well, that is no more characteristic of the revelation than of intuition.

Mr. Baumann: Yes, but I was thinking of the character of the shock it gives one.

Prof. Jung: Ah well, one receives the shock from the fact that it is against one, the object thrown against one. (*Objicere* means to throw against one.) It comes with the authority of a reality, and that is characteristic for revelation. Think, for instance, of that peculiar symbolism in the Revelations of St. John where he is forced to swallow a book, causing an upset in the stomach, or that he has to swallow a live coal.³ Or think of poor old Hosea who was a very decent chap, and the command came that he was to marry a whore.⁴ He was shocked out of his wits, I presume.

Mrs. Crowley: Those all seem like evidences of a sudden conviction that worked immediately, but from what you said before a revelation has to be proved a long, long time.

Prof. Jung: But those are not sudden convictions. Hosea was not suddenly convinced, surely. And when Paul on his way to Damascus had the vision of Christ, he had to be overthrown, blinded, in order to make him believe, just because he was not convinced. Naturally out of such an experience comes a tremendous conviction, but first there is a terrible resistance against it; one cannot accept it because it is so strange.⁵ I believe that the early experiences of Jeanne d'Arc were truly revelations because one cannot assume that a peasant girl in the 15th century had any kind of political aspirations; it must have been something like revelation, and though of course we don't know how it worked in her, if you were called to do something similar you would have certain qualms about it I am sure. So we can assume she had too; it must have been a pretty rough business. Now, we come to the next chapter called, "In the Happy Isles," and as usual we should make the

³ "And I went unto the angel, and said unto him, 'Give me the little book.' And he said unto me, 'Take it, and eat it up; and it shall make thy belly bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth sweet as honey' " (Revelation 10:9). This echoes Ezekiel 2:8-10 and 3:1-3, but in neither place is a live coal mentioned.

⁴ Hosea 1:2-3.

⁵ "And as (Paul) journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven: And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?' " (Acts of the Apostles, 9:3-4).

connection with the chapter before, "The Child with the Mirror." How does he arrive at the new picture?

Miss Wolff: There is one connection in the text. It is not a real explanation, but in the last chapter he says, "Like a cry and a huzza will I traverse wide seas, till I find the Happy Isles where my friends sojourn."

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is of course the formal connection, but we must try to find out if there is any internal connection, and for that it is necessary to get at the concentrated meaning of the chapter we have just dealt with. For instance, there is that passage "Too slowly runneth all speaking from me:—into thy chariot, O storm, do I leap! And even thee will I whip with my spite!" He was travelling with the storm, being the storm itself, and then he comes to the Happy Islands. Now what is the gist of that whole chapter? What does "The Child with the Mirror" show?

Mrs. Jung: The child suggests that his teaching is in danger and that he has to go to his friends to try to make it right again.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the idea in the text, but we decided that his being afraid that his doctrine was in danger, showed that he had seen his shadow aspect without realizing that that devilish image was his own face. Otherwise, he would not have arrived at the idea that his doctrine had been distorted behind his back so that he must run to his friends to protect it. Now, as far as we can see, this is a very wrong idea, inasmuch as it is the conclusion of the man. But now let us assume that this scene with the child and the mirror has not been presented to us through the man Nietzsche but is an impersonal revelation of the spirit Zarathustra. Then what about it as the conclusion of the spirit?

Mrs. Adler: Then the god also would be one-sided inasmuch as he denies his shadow.

Prof. Jung: If a god or a demon—of course in the antique sense of the word, a divine being⁶—had created a certain favorable aspect of himself in the world, and then should suddenly see his face in a most unfavorable light, would it seem right for him to run at once to do something for the general opinion people hold about him? If he were wise, if he were really benevolent, he would have to say, "Beware! My face is also like a devil's face." But these man-made gods are very reluctant to admit such aspects of their respective personalities; of course we cannot burden them with such a responsibility. The fact that there is such a story of a child holding the mirror up to his face, and that we

⁶ *Daimonion*—as in Socrates' inner voice.

know it was a devil's grimace in it, shows that the deity really doesn't care. The deity reveals itself in its own way naively; it has this face and another face, creates this view and another view. It is only we human beings who are afraid of that other aspect and run to others to strengthen our good opinion.

There is that beautiful example of our Swiss saint, Nicolaus von der Flüe—though he is not yet a saint because the money is lacking to get him canonized.⁷ They have tried for a long time, but he is still only *Beatus*. He had a terrible vision of a face full of wrath, and he was so shocked that his own face took on the imprint of it, so that people could not stand the sight of him. They ran away. That was the devil's grimace, and he tried afterwards with the greatest concentration to interpret it in the terms of the Trinity. He struggled to express his vision in a dogmatic form, even painted it on the wall of his cell. It is in the form of a mandala but with the threefold division according to the orthodox rules for the Trinity, and in the center is the face of God or Christ, a very lovely face. One sees nothing of the horror of the face in his vision, that has been completely wiped out by the influence of the church and of course also by his own mind; he was too much influenced by the church and could not stand the revelation of God in his terrible aspect. There is a copy of this painting in the church of his village, Sachseln, where his skeleton is also to be seen, and I am told that there are traces of the original painting in his cell in a little Hermitage in a valley above Sachseln.

This truth, the dual aspect of the god, is not denied in Mahayana Buddhism and Lamaism, where even the most benevolent gods are also gruesome demons. There the dark side of the gods is admitted, while to us God is the absolutely perfect being; we cannot admit that he has a wrathful aspect. The whole thing has to be molded and maneuvered until it looks right. But the fact is that the same thing which now looks quite lovely has been terrible, really shocking. The deity reveals itself as it is, then, and to model it into something else is man's work. So we must conclude that this is Nietzsche's own idea. He draws the conclusion: "Oh heavens, somebody has distorted my beautiful face probably, Zarathustra's reputation has been injured, and therefore my doctrine looks now like the devil—and that cannot be." That is a very human conclusion for anybody who mixes himself up with his revelation as if it were his own business, who is identical with his doctrine instead of accepting it as the manifestation of a deity that has

⁷ For Nicholas von der Flüe, see above, 7 Nov. 1934, n. 5.

freedom enough to show its wrathful face just as well. You see, when Nietzsche hears that story of the child with the mirror, the sound conclusion would be: "Zarathustra looks now like a devil, so let us be careful. He is not only the living teacher of man, he is also a sort of danger, has a wrathful aspect, and may be a demon of the underworld. The East has experienced this fact so many times that they can admit it, and from it they draw a lot of wisdom. For example, Kuan-Yin is often likened, particularly in China and Japan, to the Mother Mary, the kind loving mother, yet even that beautiful being has a wrathful aspect.⁸ According to Eastern wisdom it would mean that there is no virtue so great that it has not also an unconscious, opposite aspect. Generosity, for instance, creates perfect fiends, vampires, animals of prey that jump upon the gifts generosity bestows. You have not done good to your fellow beings by being just and kindly and generous, or by loving your neighbor. He will take advantage of it; you teach him to steal by offering him easy opportunities, not reckoning with the fact that your fellow being has a negative aspect. And even in your virtues, just there, you show the devil's grimace. So whenever you find a shining virtue you must always be aware of the contrary.

Miss Wolff: Is not one aspect of the chapter that Zarathustra is *re-lieved* by the dream? A whole source of new energy is coming up in him because of it. He is speaking in images of wild nature, compares himself to the weather, and to a lioness attacking his enemies, and all that comes from this aspect he gets of himself in the mirror. Before, he was really a bit too human.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The dream anticipates the experience of Zarathustra like a cold wind; in his wrathful aspect he is like Wotan.

Miss Wolff: And he speaks of a lioness that will sleep on the soft sward of his friends' hearts.

Prof. Jung: Yes, all that comes to the foreground; this is really the wrathful aspect of the demon. But if you draw the wrong conclusion first, you are naturally possessed by the effect of the image. For instance, if an archetypal image comes into your dream and you interpret it wrongly, you will be possessed by the image; then you have to perform it. It simply catches you. While if you interpret it correctly, if you understand what it conveys and can look at it objectively without putting a propitious interpretation upon it, then you have a chance.

⁸ Kuan-Yin, a Buddhist Mother Goddess, is called "the Goddess of Boundless Kindness." In an Eranos Lecture of 1934, "The Madonna as a Religious Symbol," Friedrich Heiler associated Diana, Artemis, Isis, and Shakti with Mary.

Otherwise you are possessed, and that has happened here; Zarathustra-Nietzsche has identified with Wotan and therefore must become the man with the spear and the horse and so on. But now, having become the cold storm that rages over land and sea seeking the Happy Isles, what about the next chapter?

Miss Hughes: Would that be his escape?

Prof. Jung: Well, it would be a sort of escape. We already mentioned that the "Happy Isles" meant the islands of bliss, something like the idea we harbor about the islands of the Pacific, a paradise where one is out of the turmoil and torment of life, where life is apparently easy and where one lives like a god. This is an age-old idea: the happy island is even a symbol of heaven, of the ghostland where spirits live in eternal bliss. So he would really be getting to the Western Land of the Gilgamesh epic, where Uta-Napishtim lives. It is a sort of escape, but why does he make for that country?

Mrs. Sigg: There seems to be a connection here with the old Greek myth of the pregnant goddess who had to look out for a land to bring forth her child.

Prof. Jung: That was Leto.

Miss Wolff: She was persecuted by the dragon.

Prof. Jung: Yes, like the story in Revelations of the pregnant woman who was persecuted by a dragon that spat water at her to drown her and the child. Leto was cursed by Hera who made a contract with the rulers of all lands that nobody should give her hospitality; she was jealous because Leto was pregnant by Zeus. But there was an island floating around under the sea which came up out of the water just then, so it was a land where nobody was bound by that contract. Leto happened to get to this island—it is supposed to have been Delos—and Poseidon made four pillars for it to rest upon, so that it was a safe place to bring forth the child. There is of course a hint of that myth in the pregnancy of the lioness; the Happy Isles would be the protected place where she could bring forth. Now why would the lioness or the wild wisdom need such a place of shelter, where she is safe against persecution?

Mrs. Adler: She will again bring forth the bad aspect of Zarathustra because that has not been accepted. It seems to me that it is the resistance of Nietzsche or Zarathustra against the bad aspect.

Prof. Jung: That is the original reason.

Mr. Baumann: It might refer to the fact that sometimes the male lion or bear eats the young, so the lioness has to be protected from her own male, which in this case I should say was the Logos.

Miss Wolff: She has really already given birth to the young one in the last chapter where he says she has borne her young on rough stones.

Prof. Jung: She has given birth but she is now in a disagreeable situation because she has not found a sheltered place where she can nurse the young.

Miss Hughes: Inasmuch as Nietzsche has denied his other side, he is defenseless. He says here, "on your love, would she fain couch her dearest one," so she is in need of feeling.

Prof. Jung: It has to do with that, sure enough.

Mrs. Jung: As he has put the Superman in the place of God he must be afraid of the wrath of the gods.

Prof. Jung: That is true, and that links up with the story of Leto who incurred the wrath of the gods because she had an affair with Zeus. She should have known that Hera was a very jealous goddess who would see that she was persecuted by all the universe under the rule of the gods. Now, we are here confronted with the psychology of a peculiar myth. You see, Leto found that island, the place of refuge which had been under the sea, and that means that there is a place which the gods of the day really do not touch—they don't even know of its existence because it is covered by the sea. Translated into psychological language, the ruling gods of Olympus would be the gods of the day; those gods are our ideas and Olympus the seat of consciousness. And as a universal ruler the conscious rules over everything and therefore can make a contract with everything, in order not to allow anything irregular like Leto. Leto is an anima myth; she would be the illegitimate anima of Zeus, and Zeus was imprudent enough to have a child by her. This is again the story of Mary and the flight into Egypt, where they had to find shelter against the persecution of the gods of the day—represented through Herod killing the boys. The anima is the representative of the unconscious, and Zeus is the supreme lord of consciousness, so the ruling idea has created a child with the unconscious which should be sheltered and protected. The island floating in the unconscious is dead matter covered by the water, something like a spiritual earth, and that is the *prima materia* of alchemistic philosophy without which nothing can be made. Yet nobody has ever known what this primal matter is. The alchemists did not know, and nobody has found out what was really meant by it, because it is a substance in the unconscious which is needed for the incarnation of the god. And now this island coming up from below is a parallel to the child that comes from above, from heaven, and gets its substance from below. Zeus, the highest idea, descended to the earth, like the Holy Ghost coming down to Mary on

earth but touching that which is below the earth, the water. From the bottom of the sea comes up the island upon which the god is seated; that is the lotus, the earth matter that has first been in the water, and on the third day after his birth Buddha stepped into the lotus and announced the law to the world. So the lotus is the seat of the god, the thing that grows from below, while the ruler, the divine form, descends from heaven. Then this matter which comes from below is based on four pillars, placed there by Poseidon, the god of the sea, who, being a partner in the game, has some point of litigation with Zeus. Zeus rules above with his thunderbolt and Poseidon rules in the sea with his trident, the equivalent of the thunderbolt. And he plays a trick on Hera by helping Leto. Now, these four pillars are the four pillars of the world, the four qualities, the four elements. The Tetraktys, the number four, is the basis of nature—and that refers now to what?

Miss Hannah: To a mandala.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Happy Island is a mandala, the Padma, the material seat of the god, in which the god expresses himself. So the god of the underworld, or the water world, which is the collective unconscious, brings up that Happy Island upon which the god is seated; on that flower he can be nursed. You may remember, perhaps, that the German poet Hölderlin uses exactly the same image of the gods:

Schicksallos, wie der schlafende
Säugling, atmen die Himmlischen;
Keusch bewahrt in bescheidener Knospe,
Blühet ewig ihnen der Geist,
Und die stillen Augen
Blicken in stiller
Ewiger Klarheit.⁹

You see, that is like the flower in the bud protected by the brown leaves, and so the birth of the spirit is sheltered against the cold north wind of the winter. That is a very beautiful parallel with the lotus, for the lotus bud grows under the water and opens when it reaches the surface; then the god is revealed. Another parallel is the idea that flowers are really the mirror images of the sun. They are matter that forms

⁹ Friedrich Hölderlin's (1770-1843) "Hyperion's Song of Fate." The lines cited have been rendered into English prose as: "The heavenly ones breathe fatelessly, like a sleeping infant; / their spirit blooms eternally, chastely preserved in modest bud and their blissful eyes see with tranquil eternal clarity" (*The Penguin Book of German Verse* [Baltimore, 1957]). Hölderlin was a favorite poet of Nietzsche's too: they are linked as geniuses who ended in madness.

into the shape of the sun, receive the sun's image and the sun's rays and represent it. The sun of course is the god that descends into matter, fertilizing and vivifying it. That is the underlying archetypal idea here.

Mr. Baumann: There is a very interesting parallel in Christianity in the pictures of the Annunciation. Always between the angel and Mary there is a flower, usually a lily. I think it is the same archetype. By the impregnation of the Holy Ghost, the flower comes up.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and sometimes it is a bunch of flowers. It is the three roses in alchemy or the *Rosenlilie*, a rose and a lily at the same time. And the *rosa mystica* is of course a mandala; our Western idea of the *rosa mystica* is the absolute parallel to the Eastern Padma lotus. In a medieval poem there is an even closer connection; in one of his hymns to Mary the poet says that Christ has hidden himself in the flower of the sea, not in the *stella maris* but in the *flos maris*, like a water bird. That is of course the spirit, the water bird descending upon the flower that rises above the sea; and that is based upon the four pillars, the quality of four in the earth. Therefore, the earth is represented in old symbolism by a square. In China it is a square. And in the Muladhara chakra, the earth chakra, where the elephant carries the world upon its back, the yellow square is the yellow earth, and the four petals symbolize the Tetraktys, the four qualities. In this chakra according to the Tantric Yoga, the god is dormant and encoiled by the Shakti in the form of the Kundalini serpent; this is the condition of the god in the moment of his birth. Now, this being the underlying mythology, or archetypal imagery, we will see what happens in this chapter. It is obvious that the Happy Isle is needed for the birth of that child. And who is the child? Have you ever heard of a child of Zarathustra?

Mrs. Sigg: He was carrying a child under his mantle.

Prof. Jung: Yes, as if he were a woman. And who is the child of the wise old man? We have a psychological name for it.

Mrs. Baynes: The *Puer Aeternus*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the eternal boy. That is the mythological figure that appears, historically, in the form of the Etruscan Tages, the boylike god.¹⁰ The legend is that a peasant was plowing in the field and suddenly behind him out of the furrow sprang up a youthful god who then taught the people all sorts of arts and crafts. This is a parallel to the Eastern Babylonian idea of Johannes who came daily out of the water in the form of a fish. And it is a funny fact that the idea of the

¹⁰ For Tages, see CW 5, pars. 291-92.

Tages appears in an old report in a book that is now about one hundred and twenty years old by Justinus Kerner, the report itself being much older: namely, that such a thing really happened to a peasant. He was plowing and suddenly out of the furrow came a little man with a pointed cap—the characteristic covering of the cabiri—who gave him a message. He prophesied something which I don't remember, and the peasant naively believed him. You see, that is one of the forms in which the *Puer Aeternus* can appear. Of course that *Puer Aeternus* is a specific fact; he is Christ the wise one. You remember the scene in the temple when he was a little boy; he is the God's son, the rejuvenated god, the rejuvenated father. And what is the peculiarity of Christ in comparison with the God-Father?

Miss Wolff: He is incarnated.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, and the God-Father was not. The son is the equal of the God, coexistent and coeternal, yet he is in human form, mortal as man is mortal. He is the man-begotten God. Dionysos was also worshipped as a boylike youth. And Horus is a very similar figure.

Mr. Baumann: Osiris was also human; before he was killed by Set he was supposed to be a man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there the case is reversed; Osiris was not understood to be a god who became man, but a pious man who became a god. You know, Horus in the form of Harpocrates became a mystery god, and the legend is that as Harpocrates he was lame in the legs, which points to a peculiar disease of the gods. The powerless condition in which that child is born is comparable to the powerless, utterly miserable condition in which Christ was born, quite helpless. Of course that is so with intention. It would not befit the god to be born under favorable social conditions. To become man he must be born in human misery and in the worst of misery, as an illegitimate child. That is logical; otherwise he could never experience the misery of human life.

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May / June 1936

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LECTURE I

6 May 1936

Prof. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: I have heard during the vacation that certain members of the seminar were impressed with the pathological side of Nietzsche shown in *Zarathustra*, and the suggestion was made that I should not go on with this dangerous stuff, that I should rather take something more normal, Goethe's fairy tales, for instance. There is a famous fairy tale by Goethe which is a typical fantasy series as we know them; it is an alchemistic story like those one encounters in old Latin texts, and this was suggested instead of the awful Nietzsche. Now if you come to the conclusion that you would prefer something so-called normal instead of this admittedly pathological Nietzsche, which has of course an unpleasant side, then you must tell me. I don't want to grate on your nerves, but you must remember that the suggestion that we should deal with *Zarathustra* came originally from the members of the seminar. I was rather doubtful, but I myself agreed to risk the analysis of *Zarathustra* chiefly because it is a very modern piece of work which has much to do with what is happening in our time; I thought it might be of great interest to look into the actual working of the unconscious mind, which has anticipated all the great political and historical events of our days. But I have to admit that Nietzsche is very involved and what he produces in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is of a kind which stirs the unconscious of modern man to an uncanny degree, all the more because one doesn't notice the way in which it works; it works secretly and at times even in a poisonous way. So if you feel that we have had enough of the devils of *Zarathustra*, you must say so. Since we are still in a democratic country we can vote. Now who is for Nietzsche? [The great majority voted for Nietzsche.]

Well, I must speak also in favor of Goethe's fairy tale. It is in a way interesting, and I don't doubt that there are things in it which might teach us a great deal. But one point speaks against it. I studied it recently in view of the possibility of dealing with it here and I was amazed

at the amount of alchemistic knowledge it contained; this is not a mere hypothesis because we know that when Goethe was studying in Leipzig he read a great deal about alchemy, and that is something which we do not encounter in Nietzsche. Nietzsche read very little because his eyes were bad, and most of his material was drawn out of his own unconscious and not out of contemporary or historical literature. Whereas Goethe read a great deal and particularly things with which you would be very little acquainted. Until about two years ago I also would not have been able to give a satisfactory interpretation of that fairy tale because I had not then read the Latin alchemistic tracts. Of course I can now say something about it, but I am afraid I should have to give you an almost complete picture of the work done in medieval philosophy, what medieval philosophy tried to accomplish, which I could not possibly expect you to know; you would not be in a position to value those attempts because it needs a very special knowledge. So looked at from this particular angle the task would not be easy. I am afraid I would have to say things which would go right into the air, simply because you would not have the necessary basis or the necessary form in which to receive those allusions. You know, there is a very particular language in alchemy and we would get rather far away from the present time.

You must not forget that Goethe died more than a hundred years ago; he lived in the end of the second half of the 18th century, and despite all his pre-vision he was a man of the Middle Ages who really lived and thought and felt in the mind and the spirit of the Middle Ages; one sees it from this fairy tale very clearly. Of course, Goethe's greatest fairy tale is *Faust*, and *Faust* is also an alchemistic mystery story. I don't know whether there is any commentary in existence which has come anywhere near an understanding of the enormous alchemistic contribution to *Faust*; Goethe had read a great deal. Now Nietzsche has nothing of that medieval spirit; he is very much the man of the 19th century, completely severed from medieval tradition, and so he takes his material directly from the unconscious. Of course he tries to formulate it sometimes, to twist it into the form of the 19th century, and naturally he then exhibits all the disadvantages of the mind of that time, a mind which had been uprooted. If he had had the continuity of culture which Goethe possessed through his connection with alchemistic philosophy, it surely would have helped him tremendously to formulate his ideas. But it sometimes needs a complete destruction and a complete separation from historical continuity in order to be able to envisage something new.

You see, in *Faust* the solution is absolutely medieval: Faust knows

completion only when he arrives in heaven. Whereas Nietzsche never arrives in heaven; he seeks his solution in the here-and-now, and that is the modern point of view. He tries not to be metaphysical, which is very much the spirit of our time; we try not to be metaphysical, at least in the sense of that word as defined by the medieval mind. While Goethe's is still the medieval mind, he tries to find the medicine of immortality. Nietzsche of course cannot get away from certain eternal truths but consciously at least he is not seeking that elixir of life. Therefore, *Zarathustra* is in a way a document of our time, and it surely has much to do with our own psychological condition. I quite understand that it may have very bad effects, I myself often felt when I was plowing through the text that it had disagreeable effects upon me. There are passages which I intensely dislike and they really are irritating. But when you plow through your own psychology you also come across certain irritating places. So when I am irritated in those places in *Zarathustra* I say, well, here is a sore spot or an open wound. I take note of it, and then I know where the trouble is. I would advise you to take it in the same way, and then I think we can get safely through. You see, when we can stand *Zarathustra* we can stand a part of our modern world, particularly our European world; we feel it here very immediately.

We stopped last term at the chapter about the Happy Isles. We are now at a critical point in *Zarathustra*. You remember in the chapter before, "The Child with the Mirror," we encountered old Wotan, and we discovered that Zarathustra was there becoming more or less identical with Wotan; he was filled with that peculiar spirit. We talked at length about the psychology of Wotan then, and I must ask the new members of the seminar to read the last report in order to get the continuity. But I quite realize that it will be a bit difficult and therefore I will try to indicate a little the development of thought we have hitherto traced in *Zarathustra*. You remember in the last chapter, "The Child with the Mirror," we encountered also the lioness that gave birth to a cub. The first appearance of the lion is in chapter 1, "The Three Metamorphoses," and in order to see where we are now, we had best have recourse to that chapter, where Zarathustra says.

Three metamorphoses of the spirit do I designate to you: how the spirit becometh a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.

Then in the chapter about the child with the mirror he says, "Too great hath been the tension of my cloud: 'twixt laughters of lightnings will I

cast hail-showers into the depths." Now that tension in the cloud is the state of pregnancy of the lioness. You see, the thunderstorm is a natural catastrophe; it is an analogy to the lioness that is pregnant with young and about to bring forth. The tension of the cloud, which is a well-known speech metaphor in *Zarathustra*, always denotes a state of pregnancy. And that is the mental pregnancy of the camel that carries the heavy load: the camel transforms into a lion that then brings forth. So we are now at the point where the third metamorphosis begins. The lion brings forth young, but it is not a child. It is a so-called animal pre-stage; that is a symbolic mechanism which we encounter very often in dreams.

For instance, if you dream of a certain animal, whatever it does is an anticipation of what is prepared in your instincts, just as what the animus figure does is always an anticipation; so animals mean unconscious movements or tendencies towards what you are going to do, or what is going to happen to you. You see, in the actual functioning of the psyche, it does not matter whether you do a thing or whether it happens to you; whether it reaches you from without or happens within, fate moves through yourself and outside circumstances equally. It is as if outside circumstances were simply projections of your own psychological structure. Of course subjectively it matters a lot, but psychologically it does not matter whether you are the cause of the misfortune or whether the misfortune comes to you. In either case you are miserable and that is all that counts; you are the victim whether it is a self-inflicted misery or whether the world has inflicted it upon you. If the animal appears in the dream, you cannot say whether it is an objective or a subjective tendency, whether it will come from within or without. It is hovering about you and something is going to happen to you, or you are going to do something. If the latter, you will surely be moved, for it happens to you from within exactly as if it had happened from without. And the reason why we have psychology is to make conscious that instinctive motive or that moving cause in the instincts, because by making it conscious you can keep it at a certain distance, or modify it; you may be able to bend or mitigate it—give it a human form. Or you can avoid perhaps the destructive effects if the thing happens from without; but when things take that course—when they happen from without—you are unable to mitigate them very much: you cannot change circumstances to any great extent. Then you are helpless, the victim. Of course you can also do very little when things happen in a merely instinctive form. If you are unconscious of it, you are swept off your feet as if by a motor car; you cannot stand up

against it. Only by being conscious have you a fair chance to do something for or against it.

Now the transformation of the camel into the lion has happened in the chapters before and we did not notice how it happened. That the camel means a state of pregnancy, that it carries the heavy load, was to be seen in that first chapter:

Many heavy things are there for the spirit, the strong load-bearing spirit in which reverence dwelleth: for the heavy and the heaviest longeth its strength.

"What is heavy?" so asketh the load-bearing spirit; then kneel-eth it down like the camel, and wanteth to be well laden.

That is a pregnant spirit or a mind. The German word *Geist* has that double meaning of spirit and mind, one never can make a difference, so it can be understood here just as well as mind. And that load-bearing mind is a pregnant mind. He has taken up the whole load, is pregnant with the whole problem of his time; and in carrying that problem, under the influence of that pregnancy, the mind changes into the form of the lion. In other words, out of the suppression by the load develops a spirit of freedom and independence and liberty, the spirit of the animal of prey. You can easily understand such a transformation; if you have been oppressed by a certain load for a long time, wild rebellious instincts begin to break out in you because you hate to carry it. So the lion is the law-breaker. Just as to the primitive man the lion is the law-breaker, the great nuisance, dangerous to human beings and to animals, that breaks into the Kraal at night and fetches the bull out of the herd: he is the destructive instinct. And mythologically the lion has that same quality as the symbol of the hottest month of the year. It is the sign of the *domicilium solis*, the symbol for the time immediately after the summer solstice when, in those countries where the zodiac originated, all the vegetation is parched and burnt by the sun; its devouring heat destroys whatever nature has built up before. The lion, then, is a destructive, law-breaking animal that develops out of the spirit that is weighed down by the load of the great problems of the time. Just as Zarathustra declares that God is dead and becomes a god himself, so the lion shakes off his fetters and burdens and begins to break laws. But by destroying the spirit of the camel he becomes the pregnant animal himself. That is not for long, however; the lion seldom symbolizes the carrying animal because it is naturally the law-breaking instinct, but it does here immediately produce young, so we see in a glimpse that we are just crossing from the second metamor-

phosis to the third, from the lion to the child as was foretold in the beginning of *Zarathustra*.

Now, I am not at all convinced that when Nietzsche wrote about the three metamorphoses, he foresaw that later on he would come back to it as it were, or that he intended *Zarathustra* to have such an inner structure; in that case, I think he would have shown more signs of it. It just happens in this way, and this is the way in which the unconscious development always takes place; namely, it has its own structure and its own laws, so the anticipation in the beginning really comes off in the subsequent text. That change in the spirit when the camel has come to an end and the lion begins, is also shown in the apparition of Wotan, who is also a law-breaking spirit—the spirit that appears when the load of the past is shaken off or the spirit that makes one shake off the load of the past. It is an absolutely detached free spirit that appears here and there with no continuity whatever, a wanderer with no obligations, whose sole purpose is to arouse life and trouble and strife and misunderstanding. Wotan is also the great sorcerer, and he is a spirit of enthusiasm, of ecstasy; therefore he has very much in common with Dionysos.

If you have any knowledge of Greek religion, you know that there was the same difficulty when the Greeks were confronted with the task of integrating that Dionysian spirit; first, there was some trouble over the Delphic oracle and they finally settled that claim in such a way that Dionysos became a shareholder in Delphi having equal rights with Apollo. They were fifty-fifty and so it worked; in that way they could arrange themselves with that Dionysian spirit without upsetting Olympus, and Zeus remained on top. But Wotan is a different proposition: he is not alone but all the others are of a somewhat different character—Loki, for instance, and such fellows. Yet Wotan is the supreme god. There is no Zeus above him and therefore he is an uncontrolled factor; he doesn't appear in a nicely governed house like Olympus where Hera was always looking out that Zeus didn't raise Cain too much. So Dionysos could be assimilated while Wotan is an unassimilated element. He is the spirit of the lion, and out of that spirit the child is born—for the time being only a lion cub, something absolutely undefined which needs development and care. So no wonder that we come now to the motive of the Happy Isles. We said at the end of last term that the idea of the Happy Isles is often connected with the idea of birth. You probably know some examples.

Mrs. Crowley: Apollo.

Prof. Jung: Apollo himself was born on an island because his mother

Leto was persecuted by Hera; this was one of those domestic cases of Olympus. She was the sweetheart of old Zeus and Hera was awfully jealous and had made a contract with everybody on earth not to give harbor to her. But finally poor Leto reached that island which had been submerged in the ocean and which happened to come to the surface just then, and there she gave birth to the child. And Poseidon—always a bit on the wrong side you know—was very favorable and made four pillars by which the island was rooted fast to the ground of the ocean, so Leto had a nice bed for her child by the god. Now, the four points created for the birth of the god is very clearly a mandala, and it is absolutely necessary that the god have such a safe place, because his birth is always a bit incommoded by rationalists like old Herod who killed hundreds of boys in order to reach the right one. Then there are other cases: there is a very nice one in the New Testament, a bit more obscure but very typical.

Mrs. Crowley: Do you mean Christ's birth?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that would be just what we were speaking of. They had to make for Egypt—Egypt was their happy island—and that was all on account of Herod who was somewhat upset by the birth of the God. But there is another case in the New Testament, in Revelations.

Mrs. Bennett: Do you mean the star-woman who had to go into the wilderness to give birth?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the star-woman gave birth to a son. And then we go right into Greek mythology; the old python from Delphi was after her—she was like Leto, like the birth of Apollo; a dragon went after her and spat a huge river in order to drown her and the child. That shows at the same time the danger of the divine birth. How would you define that?

Mrs. Baynes: The whole of the past rises against the new, trying to swallow it back again.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, and in what form does the past appear?

Mrs. Baynes: As a monster.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and what does that denote psychologically? How is the past represented in us?

Mrs. Baynes: It is the resistance in the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the collective unconscious is the storehouse of the past, so it has that historical aspect; the collective unconscious is the swallowing dragon. We find that in the first chapter of the three metamorphoses, where Zarathustra says:

“Thou-shalt,” lieth in its path, sparkling with gold—a scale-covered beast; and on every scale glittereth golden, “thou-shalt.”

You see, this is the law of the past, exactly the same weight of tradition which St. Paul refers to when he says the law has been overcome and a higher law has been given unto us.¹

The values of a thousand years glitter on those scales, and thus speaketh the mightiest of all dragons: "All the values of things—glitter on me.

All values have already been created, and all created values—do I represent. Verily, there shall be no 'I will' any more." Thus speaketh the dragon.

The dragon represents the historical mind, or the historical fact of our consciousness, and this is naturally in opposition to all human creations; therefore it needs a lion to destroy it. And why is it just the dragon that is such a very usual symbol for the unconscious?

Miss Hannah: You mean more than the whale?

Prof. Jung: Well, the dragon to the *consensus gentium* is a better example for the unconscious than the whale; the whale is only a local celebrity while the dragon is an absolutely universal representative in time as well as space. It is even represented where there are none: we have seen whales but we have never seen a dragon. The dragon is an age-old archetype handed down I suppose from the age when man and dragons lived at the same time—when man lived with saurians and bad saurians at that.

Mrs. von Roques: Is it because it consists of several different parts, wings and so on?

Prof. Jung: That shows the mythological character of the beast, but why is it just a dragon? It is very important in trying to understand a dream with a dragon or a snake or some other saurian-like animal, that you know what it means. Then you can localize things.

Mrs. Baumann: On account of its sympathetic nervous system?

Prof. Jung: Other animals have that.

Mrs. Crowley: Does he really not represent all the unassimilated forces of the unconscious that are such a power against one?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, but what would it be if it were a worm?

Mrs. Crowley: Then it could be overcome.

Prof. Jung: But it might be like an octopus. No, the dragon, as well as the snake or the salamander, or even the frog, are representations of that part of the psyche which is immediately below our higher animal

¹ St. Paul: "For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death" (Romans 8:2).

psyche. The psyche of monkeys is not in the dragon. The dragon is supposed to be a cold-blooded animal. It has a long tail and scales, and on account of the fact that it has no warm blood, it represents the inhuman, cold-blooded part of our psychology. In many saurians the great intumescence of nervous matter is not even in the brain, which is exceedingly small, but in the lower part of the spinal cord. So the dragon shows that it is a matter of that part of the unconscious which is strongly identical with the body, *including* naturally the sympathetic system. But the sympathetic system has its proper symbols, it is symbolized by invertebrate animals, not only the cold-blooded ones—spiders and other insects, and crabs and the octopus are all symbols for the sympathetic system. These are by no means arbitrary interpretations therefore; they are all based upon experience. You know very well why I say that the dragon or the snake has to do with the spinal system, and why the spider, for instance, has to do with the sympathetic system; you see, the unconscious does not choose those symbols with a complete ignorance of zoology. They are born out of the very substance which you also find in those animals. We contain nature, are part of it; animals are not only in text books, but are living things with which we are in contact. Probably in our remote ancestry we have gone through those stages and therefore the imprints are still to be found in us. As certainly as we have a sympathetic rope-ladder system within ourselves, have we to do with insects and worms or any such invertebrate animals.

So the dragon represents not only a human past—say the laws and convictions of a thousand years ago, those of warm-blooded animals—the dragon goes back much further. And the real power we encounter in those old laws is not *their* power, but the power that has been fettered by them; the laws of five thousand years ago, primitive moral laws or primitive religious convictions, would have absolutely no power and no interest for us if they were standing by themselves, but they are still the fetters round the ankles or the necks of dragons, and *they* give them their weight. These very old destructive instincts in man were caught by the old symbolic forms, and inasmuch as these forms still seem to play a role in us, it is due to the fact that they are still in their place, still fettering those old instincts, but unconsciously. For instance, Christianity, which has become unconscious to so many people, is still doing its duty; we are unconscious of its way of doing it but it is still working, still a power over the old dragon. But naturally the further you get away from the history or the continuity of consciousness, the more you forget the purpose of certain religious convictions and of certain laws.

And the more your interest is withdrawn from such forms, the more they are weakened, till the moment comes when they no longer function, and then the dragon breaks loose.

But there are conditions, as we learn from *Zarathustra*, where that old dragon really has to be disturbed, where we must have a lion to destroy old forms in order to give a new form to old instincts and a new protection against old dangers. And that of course is the case here; the dragon ought to be fought by the lion. You see, all the old values that served the purpose of fettering the dragons became identical with the dragon, because we no longer see what those values meant. For instance, we don't understand why God should be a trinity—that conveys nothing to us—yet it was an exceedingly important concept once. It needs now a long dissertation to explain why it was absolutely important that Arianism, the idea that Jesus was not of the same substance as God, should not win out; he must be God and man at the same time completely, and not only God-like. These questions are strange to us; even theologians now avoid speaking too definitely about them. But they have a very definite psychological meaning, and people once fought and killed each other for this or that most abstruse dogma, for the *homoousia* for instance, which meant that God and man were *equal* in substance, or the *homoiousia* which meant that they were *similar* in substance. It was as if those people knew what they were about; of course they could not know as we can from this distance, but they knew it was all-important and that was enough. I understand these things now in such a way that I think I understand why they had to fight each other, why the question had to be decided in favor of *homoiousia*. It was of absolutely indispensable psychological importance. Of course I cannot explain this to you now; you must be satisfied with the fact that those old forms like the Trinity have had their functional meaning, and that it is a loss to get away from them and forget about them. You don't understand why certain doors are locked because you don't know what is behind them, but destroy those doors and you will discover the dragon behind them; you will even think that the doors are identical with this dragon that is your enemy.

You see, when Nietzsche destroys God, he then becomes identical with the idea that people have no god. But a god is a very definite psychological fact; it is the strongest thing to which man always succumbs, whatever it is. If you deny the existence of such a thing it simply takes you by the neck from behind. If you deny the fact that you are hungry, for instance, and go without eating, hunger will overcome you and you will faint; hunger will prove to be the stronger. Also a psychological

fact will get you from behind, most certainly. But you can only do that most foolish thing—deny a psychological fact—when you have gone too far away from a real knowledge of the human soul. If you knew what reality that fact possesses which has been called God, you would know that you could not possibly get away from it. But you have lost sight of it; you don't know what that thing means and so it gets at you unconsciously, and then without knowing it you are transformed into God almighty, as happened to Nietzsche. It got into him to such an extent that he went crazy and signed his letters "the dismembered Zagreus," or "Christ Dionysos," because he became identical with the God he had eliminated. You see, inasmuch as we have eliminated God to a great extent, it is just as if we were all denying the fact that we were hungry, but then we begin to eat each other; we get so hungry that a catastrophe will follow: appetites will be developed in us which we would not have if these psychological factors were in the right place. But we now think that the progress of thought and the development of the human mind is hampered by the existence of such old prejudices, and we destroy those old forms because we think that we are gods and can do without them, that they were mere hindrances. There, of course, is the great danger of any creation: it destroys something which should not be destroyed, and out of that develop most catastrophic consequences, as in Nietzsche's case. Now, that child or that cub born of the lioness expresses what idea?

Mrs. Baynes: The Superman.

Prof. Jung: Of course, and the idea of the Superman is perfectly nice, a thing one can reasonably discuss, but in Nietzsche's case it is very complicated through his identification with the deity—the Superman takes the place of the deity. So since God is dead, that child who is born would be the birth of the god in animal form, which means the birth of the god in the unconscious; and whatever the leading idea of that human consciousness may be, below which such a birth takes place, it will be inflated by the admixture of the archetype, with the idea of the deity. Since the Superman assumes the place of a god, Nietzsche will himself be in the place of God. Now we will begin the next chapter.

The figs fall from the trees, they are good and sweet; and in falling the red skins of them break. A north wind am I to ripe figs.

His identity with the north wind is of course the identity with Wotan, and that phenomenon is preparatory to bringing out whatever is ready, whatever is already mature. Wotan is a phenomenon like Dionysos who is also a god of vegetation; it means a sort of enthusiastic or

ecstatic condition in which those things which are already in the unconscious reach the daylight.

Thus, like figs, do these doctrines fall for you, my friends: imbibe now their juice and their sweet substance! It is autumn all around, and clear sky, and afternoon.

Lo, what fulness is around us! And out of the midst of superabundance, it is delightful to look out upon distant seas.

Once did people say God, when they looked out upon distant seas; now, however, have I taught you to say, Superman.

Here we have the whole weakness of the argument—that people will go on calling upon God when they look out upon distant seas. They will say, “God, how wonderful!” just as the primitive Polynesians when they hear a gramophone say, “Mulungu,” meaning, “Is it not great!” Whenever we are really astonished or overcome by something, whatever it is, either in a positive or a negative way, we exclaim, “God!” And we swear by God; even people who do not believe in God swear and say “God damn you!” A Frenchman says, “Oh, mon Dieu” on the slightest provocation, and a German says, “Ach Gott, lass mich in Ruhe,” or something of the sort. Any Italian workman cries, “Per Dio” even when he is in a club of atheists or those Bolshevik clubs that try to kill God. It is so much in our language. You will never find a single individual who says, “Oh Superman, what a fool you are!”—nobody will ever swear by the Superman. So God is a natural phenomenon; it is the word that designates the thing that makes me. You see, the word *God* has nothing to do with good; it comes from the root meaning “to beget.” He is the begetter of things, the creator, the maker of things. Anything that makes me, anything that creates my actual mood, or anything that is greater or stronger than myself—that is like my father—that is called “God.” When I am overcome by emotion, it is positively a god, and that is what people have always called “God,” a god of wrath, or a god of joy, or a god of love, for instance. They have understood emotions as personalities in themselves. Instead of getting angry, the demon of anger, an evil spirit, has entered my system, and makes me—creates me—into an angry form, and therefore he is a god. And that will be so forever as long as people are overcome by emotions, as long as they are not free.

Now Zarathustra, who is in a way the anticipation of the Superman, is overcome by all sorts of events: he gets angry, he weeps, he is the prey of his emotions exactly like Nietzsche. Later, there is a very classical passage where you can see what happens when one thinks one is

doing a thing which one is really not doing: when one thinks one is the creator of things, one is the victim of things. So this primitive phenomenon which people call "God" is merely a statement of an overwhelming fact; there are parts of my psychical system which overwhelm me at times. And since times immemorial, man has used such a figure of speech. Of course there are certain idiots who have thought my conception of God was nothing but a human emotion; those are the idiots who think they know what an emotion is. Now, I am not among them. I only know a *phenomenon* called "emotion," but I could not tell you what it is because I don't know what a psyche is—I have no idea what it is. So when I say that phenomenon is called "God" I don't give a definition of God. I give a definition of that word and I leave it to him to manifest as he will; if he chooses to manifest through the worst sin that is his affair. But those idiots who speak of emotion think they know what it is, or when I speak of the psyche they think they know what that is. Ask a physicist what matter is. This is a hair-raising question. So you never can really suppress the psychological fact of God through teaching the Superman, but it is of course a different question when it comes to the interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of the Superman.

The definition we have made out as the probable or true one is that he really means the psychological concept of the self, but he makes the mistake of identifying with that idea; so the Superman becomes a sort of person within one's reach more or less—that can be reached, say, in several generations. You will see in the continuation of the text that though you may not now be able to create a Superman, your great-grandson will perhaps be the Superman. Now, inasmuch as the Superman is another term for the self, it is possible that the idea of a deity can transmigrate into another form, because the fact of God has been called by all names in all times. There are, one could say, millions of names and formulations for the fact of God, so why not the self, quite easily? You know that has already been done in the philosophy of the Upanishads and the Tantric philosophy for instance; they had that formulation long ago. And the Christian conception of the Kingdom of Heaven within yourself contains all the symbolism of the self: the fortified city, the precious pearl, the stone, or the gold—there are plenty of symbols for the self. It is also in Greek philosophy; Empedocles, for example, had the conception that the all-round being, the *sphairos*, was the *eudaimonéstatos theós*, the most blissful God.² Well, I

² In fragment 28, Empedocles of Acragas (fl. c. 450 B.C.) wrote, "But he [God] is equal

think it must be rendered something like that: it must be one that is filled with the most blissful spirit and all-round like the Platonic primordial being, which is also the idea of the self. So there are on all sides possibilities of identifying the idea of the divine factor with the self of man. If you want to go a bit deeper into the definition of the self you must look up the literature; I should advise you, for instance, to read the *Eranos* of 1934 where Prof. Hauer has a very interesting article about the symbols of the self in the Upanishads and the Tantric philosophy.³

Inasmuch, then, as you don't identify the idea of the self with the person, with the subject, the ego man, it can be named a god just as well—that would be quite permissible—and it is quite apt to receive the substance of the divine factor. I think this is the most valuable kernel in Nietzsche's teaching, and it is the message to our time, in that it contains the doctrine of individuation, namely: that it is the duty of our time to help to create the Superman, to prepare the way of the Superman. But the moment you identify with the possible Superman or think that your grandson might be the Superman, you fall into the same trap that Nietzsche fell into—that he identifies with an intuition. That is dangerous. If you can keep clear of that trap, it is really the answer of the whole psychological development throughout the Middle Ages. It is the logical development out of Protestantism, for instance, inasmuch as Protestantism has deprived the church of its authority.

You see, the authority of the church is the authority of the dogma, and the authority of the dogma signifies or expresses the absolute authority of the divine factor, for the divine factor is then deprived of its subjectivity. If you destroy the absolute authority of the church, the dogma, as Protestantism has done, you allow interpretations; and then naturally God becomes very relative to your interpretation. Then you can say God is absolutely outside of yourself and you can pass judgment on him: he has no authority any longer. You know that you hold one point of view and other people hold another; inasmuch as God is no longer guaranteed by the indisputable dogma of the church, he is *à votre disposition*;⁴ then you can model him, say things about him, like the

in all directions to himself and altogether eternal, a rounded sphere enjoying a circular solitude" (Freeman*).

³ The Eranos lectures in 1934 centered around the theme, "Symbolism and Spiritual Guidance in the East and the West." Professor J. W. Hauer of Tübingen University gave a paper entitled "Symbols and Experience of the Self in Indo-Aryan Mysticism."

⁴ "To your own way of thinking."

famous modern Protestant Gogarten who says God can only be good.⁵ He thinks he is saying something awfully nice about God but that is blasphemous. He deprives God of his possibilities. He leaves him no choice. Think of the marvelous things you can do when you are also bad!

When you take the sayings of the Bible as the absolute authority, the word of God, it is just as if you were prohibiting a writer from publishing anything else. For two thousand years God has been under the censorship of the priests. He could not publish a new book, he could do nothing, because he had said in the Bible what he had to say and nothing could ever be changed. That is a catastrophe because it is an encroachment upon divine rights, and moreover it is absolutely unpsychological inasmuch as the divine factor changes. Inasmuch as the divine factor does *not* change, God remains the same and then the holy book is the absolute authority, the truth, because it catches the unconscious facts and expresses them. You need nothing else—then it is absolute. But the moment man changes, or the moment God changes, his truth is no longer his truth—it does not express him—and the authority of the hitherto prevailing notions comes to an end. Then there will be a Protestant revolution, as was actually the case. One can say that towards the end of the 15th century, God changed noticeably, or man changed noticeably. You see the two must always be together; yet they are two, and you cannot say who changes first. If you are a pious individual you will say God has changed, and if you are a worldly individual you will say man has changed and in order to suit man God was forced to say something new. But it doesn't matter which is older, the egg or the hen: the change came about and the old truth was no longer a truth.

So all that truth that made the church, that made the dogma, that made finally the eternally valid quality of the notion of God—all that has collapsed and is to be found nowhere apparently. But nothing can get lost; all that authority is in the unconscious, and of course then you have it in your own body and you become all-important. Then you begin to believe in individualism and such things, and the time of the great individuals begins. That was in about the 16th century, we have certain confessions from those days which are highly interesting, the famous confession of Agrippa von Nettesheim, for instance, which I once quoted in my little biographical article about Paracelsus.⁶ That

⁵ For Gogarten, see above, 5 Dec. 1934, n. 4.

⁶ This article (CW 15, pars. 1-17) began as a 1929 lecture given in the medieval phy-

was such an individualistic confession by a man for whom authority had completely collapsed, so that he himself became the authority: he was then identical with the absolutely divine uncertainty, with the creative uncertainty. If you know a bit about medieval psychology you will be able to substantiate what I say—it was a most interesting time then, a tremendous time. A certain megalomania that you find then in people is the God that came into man, and naturally in the first moment it had a great effect upon him. He became very enthusiastic and the kingdom of heaven descended upon earth; but then instantly came all the consequences of such an inflation. You know, after the Lutheran revolution immediately followed war, the terrible revolt of the peasants; it was an entirely mystical psychological movement but it was utterly destructive and of course it caused Luther to restrict his innovations considerably. Then came Protestantism, and there you see the interesting phenomenon that it has split up into about four hundred denominations, so its authority has gone utterly. In Switzerland, for instance, practically every parson preaches his own gospel and it is not interesting at all. It is very personal, with no synthesis, no continuity; it is all subjectified and there is not a trace of a church left. And that is so practically everywhere, except in countries like England where there is a very strong tradition, but even there Protestantism is split up into all sorts of sects and denominations. Only the Catholic church has kept the absolute form which guarantees the identity of God.

The ultimate outcome of that development will be that everybody will preach his own gospel. If preachers will preach to themselves there will be exceedingly useful monologues because everybody will then tell himself what is the matter with himself. Today they still tell other people what is the matter with them—they go on projecting. Of course there are always fools enough who believe it, and it is probably all right because everybody makes mistakes, so it works quite well. When you develop consistently as a true Protestant, of course you have to preach because God is in you, but do preach to yourself and then you are really on the way to the self. Do what Nietzsche admonishes you to do, be a camel, load yourself and then preach to yourself. I would say, don't even write such a book as *Zarathustra*; that is a concession we must

sician's home at Einsiedeln, Switzerland. See also CW 15, pars. 18-43, and CW 13, pars. 145-238. As characteristic of those times, Jung cites the motto of Agrippa von Nettesheim's book, *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum* (On Uncertain and Vain Science), 1527: Agrippa spares no man, / he contemns, knows, knows not, weakens, laughs, / Waxes wroth, reviles, carps at all things, / being, himself philosopher, demon, hero, god and all things (CW 15, par. 9).

allow to Mr. Nietzsche as a gifted writer, but it would have been ever so much better for him if he had preached it to himself. Of course if that moment should arrive, one would be absolutely alone. In all the millions of years before God created man, he had only his own society; if he talked at all he probably talked to himself. That is expressed in the Upanishads as a particularly lonesome condition in which the creator found himself. Therefore, he had to create an object and he created the world, the reason for the world was: that he might have an audience. So if we should arrive at the condition of being our own audience, preaching to ourselves, we would be in a way small gods isolated in the universe, all-important because we would be our only object, but at the same time quite miserable because we would be so alone.

Many serious Protestants are probably isolated on account of that: the whole responsibility of the world rests upon them and they are alone with it. If they repent, there is nobody to give them absolution; they depend perhaps upon the grace of God, but that conception of a god is very unsafe because they *have* to believe it. When you ask how they arrive at the idea of God, they say one must believe it. But why should I believe such a thing? Well, the word of God says so. But Paul did not believe in that kind of God at all; he persecuted the Christians, until on his way to Damascus he experienced God and then he knew. That was *pistis*, the Greek word which means loyalty and confidence—it has nothing to do with believing. He trusted the fact that he had experienced something, because he had that experience he knew, and then he did not need to believe. So when our parsons say you ought to believe, it is a mere confession of bankruptcy; either you know a thing and then you don't need to believe it, or you don't know it and then why should you believe it? That whole question, therefore, is linked up with the experience of the divine intercession; without that experience there is no need to believe. Belief is good for the herd instinct. Then you can make a community song together; you can sing, "We all believe!"—and that makes what we call a church or a community. And there ceases the problem.

The problem with which Nietzsche is concerned cannot be even touched by people who are singing the community song, because they don't need to bother with it—they remain a remnant of the Catholic church. They did not develop as Protestants, but remained historical derelicts of the original Christian church. But if they develop further as Protestants they will necessarily come to the tremendous problem to which Nietzsche came, namely, to the idea of the Superman, to the idea of the thing in man that takes the place of the God that has been

hitherto valid; they will then be concerned with what that is and what they should be in order to be able to deal with the terrible danger of inflation. When one begins to preach to oneself, then, one is in danger of megalomania, or of being utterly crushed by an overwhelming feeling of inferiority. You find both in modern man; on the one side, feelings of inferiority, and on the other side, a conviction of himself, an impertinent self-assertion or foolish megalomania. And you find those two things also in Zarathustra.

LECTURE II

13 May 1936

Prof. Jung:

Now we will go on with our text:

God is a conjecture: but I do not wish your conjecturing to reach beyond your creating will.

We have often encountered the idea that God is a conjecture. It was a peculiar prejudice of that time, the second part of the 19th century, when people began to flirt with a sort of hypothesis which in antiquity was known as euhemerism. This term comes from the name of the Greek philosopher Euhemerus who had the idea that the gods were once human beings, that Zeus, for instance, had been a king or a powerful man like Heracles, and that afterwards people thought they were gods—legend made gods of them. So all the other gods who populated Olympus were supposed to have been remarkable historical figures that had become legendary, and Osiris also had been just a man. One finds practically the same idea in Carlyle's famous book, *Heroes and Hero Worship*; he sympathizes with such euhemeristic views.¹ It is an attempt at rationalizing the existence of the concept of gods. Now in the later part of the century, they began to think that God or the gods were not even euhemeristic persons, but that the conception really dated from nowhere, that it was a mere invention which always had been made, a sort of hypothesis entirely man-made.

You know, the whole 19th century was a time when people became aware of what man was doing. When some idea passed through a man's head, when he found himself talking or thinking, he became aware that *he* was thinking it, and then he assumed that *he* was the maker of his thinking. And that looking-upon-what-he-was-doing was called "psychology"; psychology was understood to be a science of hu-

¹ Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Scots essayist and historian. His best-known book, published in 1841, presents a theory of the hero with examples drawn from history.

man behavior, a science of consciousness exclusively. When something, an event, took place in man, the assumption was that he was the doer of that event or that process—of course only inasmuch as his so-called psychology was concerned. If he developed a cancer or suffered from typhoid fever, it was not supposed that he had made up his mind to suffer from those diseases, because it was obvious that such things *happened* to him. But when it was a matter of ideas or mental conditions he was made more or less responsible for the fact unless he was just crazy. It was assumed that one did not make a psychosis; a psychosis happened to one, like typhoid fever, from certain causes. But in the beginning of the century, in the time of the first alienists—the alienist is an invention of that century—one still believed that people made even a psychosis, that they brought a psychosis upon themselves by a misdemeanor, by certain bad customs or habits, by bad management or immorality and so on. There is a famous German textbook of those days which is entirely built upon that hypothesis that people are the makers of their insanity,² which is about the same as assuming them to be the makers of their own typhoid fever. But we are not yet so far as to assume that our psychology, our mind, the mental processes with which we identify, happen to us; that still seems to be a most adventurous idea. Yet as soon as the mind is a bit crazy, we are inclined to be human enough to think that it happened. For instance, when you become acquainted with the extraordinary ideas of Nietzsche, you say, “Oh, that is insanity. He was forced to say such things. It is a “symptom.” But to him it was not so; that was what he *wanted*, it was his will to say such things. It would of course have been ever so much better for him if he had been able to see that those things were happening to him; then he could have asked himself what they really meant and who was behind the screen making him say them. Then he would have been able to detach from Zarathustra. But he couldn’t because he assumed that he was the maker of Zarathustra. His unconscious behaved very fairly to him: it made him see that he and Zarathustra were two. His famous words are, *Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra ging an mir vor-*

² Although Richard von Krafft-Ebing might not have agreed to this characterization, his *Text-book of Insanity based on Clinical Observations* (tr. C. G. Chaddock, Philadelphia, 1904; orig. Stuttgart, 1879) was much the most popular work in its field for many years. Elsewhere Jung told of happening upon this work when he was trying to decide upon his own medical specialization and was having a “violent reaction” to it because its author spoke of the “subjective character” of psychiatric textbooks, and of psychoses as diseases of personality. Jung knew on the moment where his destiny lay. See *MDR*; pp. 108-9/111.

bei. He paid no attention, however, because he thought that whatever man is or whatever he has done, *he* has done it, that the ego emanates such things based on its own proper will, that it is the creative will of the ego to bring them about. And naturally, when one makes such an assumption, one has to take all the responsibility for the whole procedure on oneself. Then *I* am the maker of God. I am the maker of Zarathustra. I am quite alone. I am the creator of my own world—nothing is happening to me because whatever is, is myself. Nietzsche is absolutely in the position of the creator of a world. A god could say, “I am the world. In every bit of the world I am—whatever happens is myself. I am doing it. I am every kind of foolishness, every crime, every joy, every beauty. I am everything and there is nothing outside.”

You see, this identification with God is the trap into which the later part of the 19th century eventually fell, because they did not see how much did happen to the mind. And mind you, in spite of the fact that science had already evolved so far that they did not take it as a particular sign of immorality when a man became mentally ill: it was a misfortune. His father had been perhaps a drinker, or suffered from syphilis; and if there had been epileptics in the family, it was quite natural that a case of the same nature should occur, that children should be born with weak brains and might possibly become insane. That was the beginning of a newer and truer conception. One must go only a bit further to get rid of all that 19th-century prejudice, and then we would not consider ourselves exclusively responsible for what we think or do: we would know that things really happen to us. We are not free, not creative centers who probably will create supermen. We are very poor. Our free will is very limited. We are so dependent upon our surroundings, our education, our parents, because we are born with certain archetypes, or with certain disturbances.

And as we cannot make an insane person responsible for his insanity, so we cannot make Nietzsche responsible for the fact that he thought he could make or undo God, or that he could make the Superman or Zarathustra. He could not avoid thinking like that, first of all because of his time—he was under the same prejudice. He could not avoid thinking he produced Zarathustra, though he himself chose that name of the old prophet in order to denote the fact that Zarathustra had existed long before there was a Nietzsche. The archetype of the wise old man has existed since times immemorial; you find it everywhere and it is by no means Nietzsche’s creation. Yet he thought he could create such things. So he participated in the attitude of his time

that had not developed enough along the lines of objective consciousness.

We in the 20th century begin now to extend an objective scientific point of view into the sphere of the so-called normal functioning of the mind; and we begin to understand that our mental processes are occurrences or events to a much higher degree than has ever been thought before. And if you can join in such a conviction you have the possibility—which proves to be an exceedingly useful one—of detaching from such figures. You can assume that they have life of their own and that they make themselves; and that you come in simply in the way of a perceiving eye, or that you suffer from it exactly as you suffer from the effect of a bad inheritance. You see, when there is epilepsy in your family you might inherit epilepsy or at least a trace of it in your character, showing in emotionalism perhaps or in peculiar dreams, and naturally you are inclined to think you have surely made those dreams or emotions and that you are very bad. Then you discover it is all inheritance, so how can you avoid it? You found yourself in a body which has such-and-such disadvantages, as you found yourself with such-and-such a brain which has its bad or good dispositions. You see, if you don't identify with your vices, you have no chance to identify with your virtues; as little as we are our inherited virtues are we our inherited vices. But if we don't identify, we have a chance to discover what this poor ego is and we can learn how to deal with the inherited factors of our mind. Then we have a chance to gain freedom. As long as you assume that you are making the weather, what can you do? You will try in vain to make good weather and you never will succeed, and because you are all the time angry at yourself for making rain, you never will invent an umbrella. You will suffer from those hellish feelings of inferiority instead of inventing a good umbrella. So inasmuch as Nietzsche assumed that God was a conjecture, it is quite logical when he says, "But I do not wish your conjecturing to reach beyond your creating will." In other words, you must not make conjectures which you are unable to fulfil because, he continues,

Could ye *create* a God?—Then, I pray you, be silent about all Gods! But ye could well create the Superman.

Of course you cannot create a God, so why conjecture a God? This is of course based upon the assumption that such things only exist because man creates them. But if you leave open the possibility that God exists without man's invention, this whole argument is naturally futile because man has nothing to do with it; God is or is not: he is beyond

man's reach. Sure enough, the idea of God or God's image is very much influenced by the disposition of man in time and space, by his temperament and so on, but it is a universal fact that everywhere we encounter certain ideas which are equivalents of this basic experience of man: namely, that outside his own will, or beside his own will, there is still another will, whatever that is. For instance, if he tries to be nice, he finds he is cross; if he wants to say something good, he says something bad; if he wants to tell the truth, he lies. He is constantly interfered with by something which is not his own will. In this experience, he is as if possessed by ghosts or evil influences—or by God, the ultimate receptacle, one could say, of all the magic crossing of man's individual purposes. Now, this basic experience is not an invention of man, but simply a fact, a fact that is every day under your nose; and if you want to see how it came about that people called it finally "God," study the life of the primitives.

Or study only the cases right under your eyes. For instance, suppose you have something to do with a very temperamental person who easily becomes emotional and angry, and flies into one of his fits when you say something awkward. Then you say to him, "But now look here, you are beside yourself; be yourself, be reasonable. I cannot understand what devil has gotten into you that makes you talk such foolish stuff." You treat that person as if he had been alienated from himself, as if a strange being had taken possession of him. If you are living under primitive circumstances and using the terminology that is provided by your surroundings, you say, "Oh well, at times a bad spirit goes into that man," and then you must try to eliminate it or wait until it has vanished and the man comes back to normality. A primitive explains an ordinary fit of emotion as a magic fact; if you study the history of religions and carefully analyse what is at the back of all these ideas, you see it is a psychological non-ego that has an influence on man. So if you are quite careful and really scientific you see that God is that which we have always observed; namely, that will which interferes with our own will, a tendency which crosses our own tendency, a thing clearly psychical as our consciousness is psychical. Of the very same nature perhaps, showing traces of intelligence and reason or cunning—all sorts of human qualities—being obviously something like a psychical thing, like man; but not exactly like man because it is so cunning and devilish, or benign and benevolent, as man is not.

So certain peculiar non-human qualities or habits have always been attributed to that other will and it was imagined as not quite human in appearance—a helpful animal for instance, a doctor-animal, or a man

endowed with extraordinary witchcraft, a sort of superman, either half animal below or half animal above. Those were the very first symbols for the deity. And in history, even in the most advanced forms of the Christian religion, you find such ideas; Christ is symbolized as the lamb, and the Paraclete, the Comforter, the dove; God himself came down in the form of the dove in the baptismal mystery of Christ. And the Evangelists are still symbolized as half animals or complete animals. Angels are bird men, or only heads with two wings underneath and the body somehow gone. These are all monstrous ideas of divine beings, exceedingly primitive but quite apt as expressions of the peculiar non-human nature of those psychological events which cross our own ego-will.

Now, if Nietzsche had thought like that he would have asked about this figure which he must call "Zarathustra." He could have given him any other name but he chose "Zarathustra." Of course he had a rational explanation for it, but if he had lived in our time, he most certainly would have asked himself what it meant. He would have said, "Here appears a figure; have I made it? Did I premeditate it? Did I set out with the decision to create a figure called 'Zarathustra'?" Then he would have come to the conclusion that he never had dreamt of doing such a thing—it just happened. And he could not have avoided the discovery that here something had happened: *I* have not created it, it has created itself definitely; it is a magic experience, therefore I give it a name. I give it a form even. Perhaps that figure talks, perhaps it has life of its own, for I have not invented it: it made itself. And then he would have landed with the conviction: if Zarathustra can come to life again, why not God? Is Zarathustra in any way different from a conception of God? Not at all. God has been understood to be a conception of the wise old man, and if any demon or hero can come into life again, why not God? So he would have discovered this tremendous error of his age, the idea that God was invented by man.

God never was invented, it was always an occurrence, a psychological experience—and mind you, it is still the same experience today. But in the 19th century the conditions were particularly unfavorable because they labored under that fact of having assumptions about God.

You see, things cannot be left unregulated. Particularly must they be defined when it comes to making a state or an institution like the church; and since God is an object of worship, something definite must be said about him. So the sayings of Jesus were used, for example that God was good, really the best thing in the world, and that he was a loving father. Now, all these sayings are perfectly true, but there is also the

standpoint of the Old Testament, the fear of God. You cannot have the New Testament without the Old. The New Testament was the Jewish reformation of the Old Testament: it was Jewish Protestantism. The Jews were absolutely under the standpoint of the fear of God and law-abiding behavior, and therefore the reformer had to insist that God was not *only* to be feared. It was obvious from many passages and psalms that God was not only a law-giver and a policeman to punish the trespasser on the spot, but was also a loving father and really meant to be benevolent. He was exceedingly wise and kind and would give them everything they wanted. This Jewish Protestantism was then detached, and it was even a necessity to detach it, for the Gentiles to whom this Evangel was preached had no idea of a wrathful God. Their idea of a God was a beautiful and terrible force of nature with a personal psychology, and no moral purposes connected with it whatever.

You see, Zeus was a completely amoral proposition. He was a free lance even in his days, and there was nothing very respectable about Olympus or other heathen pantheons. There was no law to be observed, and there was no idea of good and bad: naturally the gods were very bad people too. If anyone behaved badly he was supposed to be possessed by Mars or something like that, or perhaps he had an affair with Venus and was caught by the husband. And all this *chronique scandaleuse* of Olympus proved that this was the condition of the world, the nature in which man lived. The Jewish standpoint was morality, obedience, the observance of the law; and the wrathful God was revengeful. Of course the Greek gods were also sometimes revengeful, but it was just bad moods, and there was no idea of a morally perfect God. Zeus was director of Olympus, but he was responsible to the great board of directors of the world, the *moïra*, an invisible influence, the *Société Anonyme* of Olympus,³ so even Zeus could not do what he wanted. He was merely the appointed director and the *moïra* was above him.⁴ So the gods were a restricted lot in a way, sort of superior hypertrophic human beings, representing aptly the human dispositions into which man is born.

The Jewish God was an entirely different thing. There was no judge above him in Israel. He was supreme. One sees that superiority in the Book of Job where he is betting with the devil over a man's soul; just for the sake of the experience he destroyed the herds and women and

³ *Société Anonyme*: a corporation—indeed, a “faceless corporation.”

⁴ *Moïra*: destiny, though in Homeric times *Moïrai* were goddesses who could be blamed for misfortune.

children and slaves of the good man Job. He afflicted him with every pest under the sun in order to give a fair trial to the devil; and then God won out and gave everything back to Job. It was a very ruthless joke such as a feudal lord might play on his subject. But that is a very serious thing: it means that he is fate itself, a completely arbitrary fate that makes laws. Provided one obeys, one has a certain chance, but otherwise no chance whatever: there is only utter destruction. This is a very true picture of the world but in a horrible aspect, which of course has much to do with the history of that particular people who developed such an idea of God. The history of the Jewish tribes is full of blood and destruction. New excavations have shown that even in those times when they seemed to flourish, Egyptian kings were ruling over that country, and you can be sure the Jewish colonies did not feel particularly good under a strange ruler; so they saw God as just that, a tyrant who issued laws, and if they did not obey they were in hell.

Now, under the influence of the times, that Jewish emigration into Egypt, with the possibility of joining in the life of a civilization where there were human laws—there was a large colony in Alexandria for instance—brought about a great change which can be seen in the wisdom of “Proverbs” and “Ecclesiastes” quite particularly. And then in the Jewish Reformation called Christianity. There the benevolent, benign side of God was insisted upon and the old idea of the law was abolished to a great extent. When that religion was taught to the Gentiles they necessarily had to detach the New Testament from the Old. This was done with very great care because the message had to be grafted upon an entirely different proposition or premise: namely, the premise of the dear old *Société Anonyme* of Olympus; all those beautiful and amusing and ridiculous figures had to be answered by a different kind of system. It was then that the syncretistic, Hellenistic Christianity came into existence. You know, what we call the Catholic church in our days is chiefly a codification or a solidification of Hellenistic syncretism, a syncretism of a very high order, where one finds all sorts of primitive, pagan remnants. *Syncretism* means growing together. It is like conglomeration. Conglomerate material consists of many different things which have come together and solidified, and syncretism is very much the same, a mixture of many things made into one. Hellenistic syncretism would be the age beginning about 200/300 years B.C. and lasting until the third or fourth century A.D. All the religions and philosophies of the Near East and the West grew together then and formed an entirely new mental atmosphere.

The different aspects of God then became specified, codified, dog-

matized, because it was absolutely imperative that God should be a fitting being for the center of a Christian cult; he had to be the good father, and then there must also be a lot of talk about the devil. That Christian concept of the devil is not in the Jewish religion; of course there were evil powers but God himself was a yea and a nay. He was also the God of wrath; since their main religious emotion was the fear of God, they didn't need so much the concept of a devil. With Christianity came the split into pairs of opposites, so they had to invent a devil because that aspect, the evil experience of God, did exist and had to be formulated. But by that codification or dogmatization a prejudice was formed: God had to be something definite and he became apparently something quite one-sided, to whom bad jokes, for instance, could not be attributed; yet fate is full of very cruel jokes. They could not possibly assume that God was making a nuisance of the world, or dancing a world, or drunk with the world. All those conceptions had to be excluded, and so God got poorer and poorer and became one definite thing.

Naturally, the reaction had to come once people said such an image was man-made. Mind you, the image is not the thing; the experience of God is always there. It is the most frequent experience of man, but through that whole development in the past centuries it has become the rarest experience. There are people who go through the world and say they never experience God; they don't know what it is. But it is the simplest thing. When you go out of the room and tumble over the threshold, you say damn it, because there has been a bad spirit in the room who put up a leg for you to fall over: that is the original experience of something that happens to you which you did not want. Fate is crossing you every day. We ourselves are always doing just the things we don't want to do. And who is doing it? Well, that is the other being, and if you follow it up—if you carefully examine what that being means that is crossing your line—you will see something. But we never can see far: we explain everything by itself. In this case we fell over the threshold and in that case over a chair, and a threshold is never a chair, and that we fell over both doesn't matter. Or we tell a lie and say it is just this particular lie, and the next day it is another one. That is the way we cut up things. We cut up the experience of God all the time, so naturally we never experience God; we only experience certain little facts which mean nothing. They mean nothing because we put no meaning into them. It is as if you were reading a long string of letters only, and naturally it sounds crazy, but put them together and you read "In the Happy Isles," for instance, and that means something.

But that is the way we read our psychology, or the psychology of the deity: the thing that like lightning comes in between, that crosses our intentions. Read it consistently and you will see marvelous things. That is what we do in analytical psychology—we read not just the letters, but we try to put them together. For example, a few nights ago you dreamt so and so, the next night you dreamt of a railway, the night after of a battalion of infantry, and last night you dreamt that you had given birth to a child. Each night you have had dreams and you say they have nothing to do with each other. Now I advise you to write all those letters together in their natural sequence and then study this sequence; you will see something remarkable: that it is a continuous text. You will discover something about the psychology of that non-ego, discover why people have called it a “God” or a “demon”—whatever you prefer. Because this *is* a continuation, it makes sense; it is not merely a heap of elements which have nothing to do with each other.

Well now, God is a conjecture inasmuch as his image has become a dogmatized codified form, and as I said, this fact is the reason why such an idea had to be finally upset. Life itself could not tolerate any longer such a blasphemous restriction of the powers or the possibilities of the psychical phenomenon that is ultimately called “God.” This psychical development was itself instinctively working up to a moment when the dogmatized image had to be destroyed. And Nietzsche comes out of a time whose feature was the overthrow of that image. But of course, as always happens, one goes too far and then suffers the consequences—in that case, the assumption that God didn’t exist when man said he didn’t exist. Just as there are people now who assume there is no unconscious because they say there is none. This is of course childish, but as there are still many infantile people, such infantile judgments are often repeated and even believed. If you have a certain amount of ordinary intelligence, you know that this is all bunk: you cannot do away with a thing by saying it is not; the phenomenon still exists no matter what you say about it. Now, when the assumption is made that God does not exist because he is said to be merely an invention, which is like assuming that there is no unconscious because you say there is none, then a very peculiar thing occurs: namely, something crosses your will. And what can you say? You cannot pretend that you yourself have crossed your will; you have not. It is crossed by something else. Then how can you explain that fact—I mean, if you think philosophically? Of course if you think practically—which means not thinking at all—you have not to explain it. Then you can let it go and say it is merely accidental; you don’t make it an object of philosophy or

of science. Then of course you haven't the task of explaining anything, but simply refuse to think. That is perfectly feasible of course; millions of people live without thinking. You can live without thinking if you happen to be that kind of person—that is the question. But if you happen to be a person who cannot live without thinking, what can you think about it? For if you say there is nothing that interferes, there is no unconscious—in other words there is no God, no non-ego psyche—then how can you explain things?

Mr. Allemann: You either become responsible for everything, or you have to invent something.

Prof. Jung: Well, people are very clever. To be responsible for everything is awkward. That is pretty big, and there are very humble natures who don't like to be responsible, so what do they assume?

Mrs. Naeff: They make others responsible.

Prof. Jung: Naturally, they simply transfer that responsibility to others; then all the others are responsible and they praise themselves for being humble and always the victims. That is the so-called "feeling of inferiority" explanation, and the other is the "megalomania" explanation. Or the result may be, if a man has really a consistent mind in that respect and is firmly convinced that there is no such thing as an interfering will, that he will ultimately land with a paranoia; he will be quite certain of the fact that he has done such things but that persecutors arrange such traps for him and are secretly working against him. He will say it is the Freemasons or the Jesuits or the Nazis or Communist spies. You see, those are the euhemeristic explanations which ultimately lead into a sort of paranoia.

Now, when Nietzsche explains that God is a conjecture and that one should not make a conjecture which one cannot create, it means that it is an unrealizable hypothesis. He is then saying that God does not exist; since man has never made a God, and only assumes that there is a God, therefore God is not. There is nothing that is against our wishing or willing, there is no interference; if there is interference, it would be due to something wrong in other people and something ought to be done about it. Nietzsche was not a man who would project his psychology upon others; of course there is some evidence in *Zarathustra* of his exteriorizing some of his own psychology, but it is not so important. It is very important to him to be responsible; if things are imperfect they should be made perfect. Therefore, make a Superman; make the man that you really should be, the man who makes true that theory that God is not: namely, that man whose will is never crossed, to whom everything is possible. You see, this is by no means a very original idea:

you hear this kind of talk in a Protestant sermon; it is a most Protestant notion that you should be the one whom you wish to be—or rather, do *not* wish because it is immoral to wish for anything. You might wish for something agreeable and anything agreeable is immoral; you must always wish for something disagreeable. So since the Superman is not agreeable, it is a moral task; you ought to, you should, and damn you if you don't pray for it every Sunday. You see, this idea of the Superman is a derivative of that very Protestant idea.

Protestantism talks a lot, of course, about the grace of God, that you can do nothing without it, yet you are whipped into the belief that you must obey the law God has made. Therefore, every true Protestant has a Jewish anima who preaches the Old Testament, so he is not even a Christian, but a good old Jew. As of course the real Jews have a Christian anima, for you cannot do without the two points of view; you cannot fear God only, but also must love him. So there is no Jew without that Christian complex as there is no good Protestant without a Jewish complex; they are exceedingly like each other, only one is the inside of the glove and the other the outside. The Protestant belief in the grace of God is balanced on the other side by a careful observation of the law. Therefore the real god of Protestant communities is respectability, as you see in America and elsewhere. That means observance of the laws, a lower point of view which has nothing to do with Christian love. It is Christian fear. You see, this attempt of the Protestant to force himself into an ideal form is really disbelief in the grace of God, for if he really believes in that, he will gladly assume that in his time God will do the right thing for him; and if he is not perfect today, well, it is a bit in the interests of God that he does something in that line, that he gives him some of his grace, in order that the sinner of today becomes something better in the future. But the real Protestant practically does not believe that. He believes that he has to make himself into a good being, and that he will do it—that it is his responsibility only.

We have a wonderful poem in this country which characterizes the spirit of the Protestant in a very beautiful way. It shows his two-fold morality. It is a popular version of a certain church hymn; one verse is in high German and in between is a commentary in the Swiss patois which contradicts the meaning of the verse. Unfortunately it is in dialect, but I will try to translate it: "Whoever trusts in God and has nothing himself, whoever puts his hope in God and is doing nothing, such a one God must sustain in a miraculous way. Otherwise things won't work at all." That is exactly the Protestant point of view; everything is made dependent upon one's own morality, one's own responsibility;

there is no absolution and at the same time one believes in the grace of God.

Miss N. Taylor: Do you know that Scotch story about the faith which moves mountains? There was an old lady who prayed for a great mound before her house to be removed, and when she went down next morning and found the mound still there, she said, "I thought as much!"

Prof. Jung: That is very good. So those two things really exclude each other. This tremendous amount of moral responsibility that is heaped upon the Protestant forces him to an exaggerated and extravagant belief or hope in his own ability; he hopes and wishes to be able to create that marvelous being which he is expected to be. The text simply continues this idea.

Not perhaps ye yourselves, my brethren! But into fathers and forefathers of the Superman could ye transform yourselves: and let that be your best creating!

Prepare yourself, you may not attain to the kingdom of heaven, but your sons or grandsons eventually will reach heaven. You see, that is in the best Protestant form: what I did not accomplish, I shall burden my son with; he will do it. For always underneath is that idea: Christ will take care of the business. If there is a conflict in me, I will hand it over to Christ and he will run away with it into the desert and take it away from me. We have large religious movements in our days where that happens. This is born out of the misery and real need of the Protestant conscience which must find a way out, so those people who take it seriously must invent the idea of the scapegoat that is sent out into the desert to deal with their own sins, and they take Christ as the scapegoat. They burden him since he is the crucified, deified scapegoat. These people simply cannot stand the moral stress any longer; they repress their own responsibility and call it Christ's and there they leave it. But then they are no longer human; they have lost their sin, the black stuff, which is spiritually fertile earth.

The idea of a sacrificial scapegoat is all right: the divine representative who takes over the role of the sacrificed; that is an idea which works psychologically as long as one is a member of an institution, or in a community in full participation with all the others. Then it doesn't matter who is carrying the burden, preferably the priest, or an animal sacrifice, or a criminal who represents the God or the king. It doesn't matter who is chosen in that community to carry the sin, because he is the whole community and the whole community is himself. This is a

collective emotion which is exceedingly strange to us; we can hardly imagine it now—it is utterly primitive. Of course when you work yourself up into a dervish-like state, you are in a vibrating emotion, in an ecstatic condition, and everybody else is the same; so it doesn't matter *who* is struck, you or anybody else. Then you can tear your skin, cut your throat, or the priest may come and cut your throat and sacrifice you. It is all one: you yourself do not exist. It needs such an emotion and such a oneness to make the idea of the scapegoat work at all; nowadays it would not work because our consciousness is really too individual. Though we see very peculiar things; think of the 6th of May enthusiasm in Germany!⁵ I cannot appreciate how far that goes, but I assume, when consciousness is not particularly strong and there is much collective fear, that under certain conditions the people are again united in a sort of *ekstasis*. All that shouting and the rhythm, the music and brass bands and the marching together, produce a collective ecstasy which expresses itself in that extraordinary faith in the leader. The leader is then the scapegoat: they make him responsible. He represents every one, so there is a *participation*, which is of course something like a primitive collective religious phenomenon. The whole thing is probably a religious phenomenon; the politics are only talk.

Mrs. Volkhardt: There was a woman in Germany who wanted very much to meet the Führer and one day she had that chance. She said: "*Heil, mein Führer,*" and then he talked to her and was so very nice that she suddenly fainted away. And this same thing has happened to others.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is a peculiar reaction—we must leave it at that. Well now, the idea of the Superman who was to be created by man was very much helped by the ideas of Darwin, which were modern in those days. Of course Darwin doesn't suggest that a Superman could be produced at will; he simply shows the possibility of the transformation of a species, say from ape to man. But then at once the question is raised, if the ape has developed to man, what can man develop into? Man may go on and produce a being superior to the actual man. And then the Protestant ideal leaps in and says: That is what you *ought* to do. You see, if there was a Protestant ape, he might once on a Sunday morning say, "Now I really ought to produce man"—which is exactly what Nietzsche is proposing to do here, of course not in one generation: he

⁵ The 6th of May enthusiasm: whatever that was, it did not get reported in the *London Times*. Perhaps a Nazi demonstration, or some response to Mussolini's campaign against Addis Ababa. Italy would announce the annexation of Ethiopia on 9 May 1936.

gives it at least three generations. If we had put the argument under his nose in this way, he would naturally have seen all that; but this argument, as we explain it, never would have affected Nietzsche because his real motive was religious. That Superman idea is entirely symbolic. Yet if one could have suggested to him that it was a symbolic idea, that he naturally couldn't assume that in a few generations he would produce a man superior to ourselves, he would have denied it, because it was equally dark or impossible for him to accept the existence of a symbolic Superman. For a symbolic Superman is a psychological Superman, simply a superior consciousness. You see, that would not have suited him in the least.

So when we say that by his concept of the Superman Nietzsche meant the self, it is a mere assumption and not even a valid one; he did not mean the self as we understand that concept. He meant what he said, a superior man, even physically different, a beautiful man, a sound man such as one ought to be, and that idea has of course nothing to do with the self. We know quite well that no man can ever become the self; the self is an entirely different order of things. So if we try to render Nietzsche's idea, we should not use that term. Nevertheless, when he speaks of the Superman, it rings like something which does not merely mean the man of tomorrow whose tail is a bit shorter or whose ears are no longer pointed, a man who looks like a Greek god or something of the sort. He also means a man who is greater than man, a super-man. It sounds like something because it is a symbol, and it is a symbol because it is not explained; if you should try to explain it, you would meet all the contradictions which were in Nietzsche's time and which were also in him. You see, the Superman is really a god who has been killed, declared to be dead, and then naturally he appears again in an overwhelming desire for salvation; that means the birth of the Superman. There is the god again. So the word *Superman* sounded like "God" to the good Christians; it was a word pregnant with emotions, desires, hopes, highest meaning. And when we analyse it in a dry and critical way, we surely do not do justice to that conception. But we belong to a time after Nietzsche. We know of symbols and we have an idea of psychology, and to us it cannot mean the same.

LECTURE III

20 May 1936

Prof. Jung:

I hope you realize that "The Happy Isles," is a very intricate chapter, difficult and profound. It contains problems of the greatest importance, and I must confess I feel a bit hesitant in commenting upon it because it leads us into depths which are difficult to deal with. You remember we got as far as that paragraph where he speaks of the possibility of our being at least the great grandfathers of the Superman. He continues,

God is a conjecture: but I should like your conjecturing restricted to the conceivable.

Could ye *conceive* a God?—But let this mean Will to Truth unto you, that everything be transformed into the humanly conceivable, the humanly visible, the humanly sensible! Your own discernment shall ye follow out to the end!

We are already acquainted with the fact that Nietzsche takes God as a human conjecture that is not even very commendable, and he also declares God to be dead. Here we see a deeper reason for this particular attitude. It is less a concession to the spirit of his age than a concession, one could say, to his own honesty; he doesn't care to make a conjecture which goes beyond the reach of man. This attitude was prepared by Kant; as you know, Kant has shown in an irrefutable way that one cannot make metaphysical assumptions.¹ The spirit of the age influenced Nietzsche to a great extent nevertheless in his assumption that God was a human conjecture; one could hold just as well that he was an expe-

¹ Kant showed rather that we cannot have knowledge of the noumenal world, that is, of things before they have been subjected to the categories of human understanding. Although he believed it was necessary to assume freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, he maintained that any "proof" of such metaphysical assertions lands one in an antilogism, wherein an equally good counterproof can be advanced.

rience. Kant left it open: he clearly saw that his intellectual or philosophical criticism was just philosophical criticism and he did not touch upon the field of experience, particularly the experience of things which cannot be submitted to theological criticism. You see, he lived at a time when to assume or even to explain the world through the existence of God was taken for granted. It was *the* truth. It was considered quite reasonable then to think in such a way.

As late as the 18th century practically every scientific book began with the creation of the world by God, the six days' work. It was absolutely certain, with no discussion, that God had created the world and still maintained the functioning of the world. But in the time of Nietzsche that former immediate certainty was lost sight of, so Nietzsche's saying that God is a conjecture is not only a concession to the spirit of his time, but is also the conscientiousness of the critical philosopher which does not allow him to assume more than he can prove, or more than is within the human scope. To assume, like the dogmatic Christian formulation, that God is the infinite or eternal one, or that he has any such quality, is an absolutely man-made assumption, and an honest man will never make any statement which reaches beyond the limits of the human mind. It is as if you promised to pay somebody one million francs after two hundred years; naturally in two hundred years you will no longer exist, and moreover you never will have such a sum at your disposal, so you have overreached yourself. An honest and responsible thinker therefore will restrain himself and refrain from making such assumptions. The fallacy is of course the assumption that God is only a conjecture, for he might be an experience, but the recognition of that possibility had completely disappeared, certainly from the field of Nietzsche's vision. You see, the assumption that the conception of God is really man-made is, as an assumption, perfectly all right—nobody can contradict it, just as a blind belief in the dogma cannot be discussed philosophically. So he asks, "Could ye conceive a God?" No, you cannot; you cannot conceive of something that is outside of human reach. By saying a thing is infinite you have not created infinity, but have created a mere word. Therefore Nietzsche says that it is the will to truth in man which forbids him to invent something which is not humanly conceivable, and that this attitude should be the regulation of one's thought, in order that one may never assume more than one can produce. Then he says.

And what ye have called the world shall but be created by you:

...

Also concerning the nature of the world you must not make any assumptions that overreach human limits; you must have the courage to create a world which is admittedly man-made and anthropomorphous. In other words you must admit the anthropomorphous quality of *all* conceptions. Now, this is an attitude which we meet every day, because we are still inclined to assume that our scientific truth is something more than man-made, that it has a certain objectivity, and is not relative only. But as a matter of fact, whatever we touch or experience is within the scope of our psychology. If I should say such a thing to a professor of philosophy he would kill me on the spot, because that means doing away with his assumption that his thinking is beyond psychology. But the universal image of the world *is* a psychological fact or feature, though it is influenced, I admit, by something beyond our psychology. What that is we don't know. There the physicist has the last word: he will inform us that it consists of atoms and peculiar things within the atoms, but that hypothesis is constantly changing, and there we have clearly come to a certain end. If he goes a bit further he begins to speculate, then he falls into the mind, and presumably he falls right into the collective unconscious, where he discovers the psychologist already at work. The speculative modern physicist will surely come into very close contact with the psychologist, and as a matter of fact he already has.*

So Nietzsche, in his great passion for truth, is really carrying on the best Kantian tradition, but of course he is also a child of his time when the prevalent misconception was that God was a conjecture or a concept and not an experience.

And how would ye endure life without that hope, ye discerning ones? Neither in the inconceivable could ye have been born, nor in the irrational.

But that I may reveal my heart entirely unto you, my friends: if there were God, how could I endure it to be no God! Therefore there are no Gods.

Well, the main idea here is that if there *were* a thing like God, it would be catastrophic for man, because he would be deprived of all his highest aspirations and hopes by being hopelessly anticipated; the perfect being would be there already. There would already be the most com-

* Both Jung and the Swiss physicist and Nobel laureate Wolfgang Pauli contributed essays to *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, tr. R.F.C. Hull and P. Silz (New York, 1955).

plete action or performance, and what is the use of seeking or trying to produce something great if it is already in existence? Why bother about it? Moreover, you might have a chance perhaps of communicating with that supreme being and receiving from him something to which you could not add; so you could only wish that he were not there in order to become supreme yourself. If somebody is already in the place you were hoping to occupy, either you must do away with him, or you desist and resign, having lost all hope of producing anything worth while. And so he says: “*if* there were Gods, how could I endure it to be no God! *Therefore* there are no Gods.” Therefore there *shall* be no Gods, for if he were anticipated he would lose all his hopes. Now, he himself feels that this is not a valid conclusion—that because he could not stand having somebody on top of him, there were therefore no gods. It is indeed *hybris*, it goes too far. But looked at from the standpoint of Nietzsche, as well as from the standpoint of history, where God suffers from the human definition that he is the *summum bonum* for instance, such a definition makes of God a human conjecture which is really quite blasphemous. If you assume that God is the *summum bonum*, then what about the *infimum malum*?³ You cannot say a thing is supremely good only, but must also establish the lowest evil, for what is light without shadow? What is high without low? You deprive the deity of its omnipotence and its universality by depriving it of the dark quality of the world. To ascribe infinite evil to man and all the good to God would make man much too important: he would be as big as God, because light and absence of light are equal, they belong together in order to make the whole. So his conception of God leads him necessarily into such conclusions, but as far as the premise goes his conclusion is right: God as he has been conceived by the preceding centuries is a conjecture, quite clearly. And nobody assumes that God is an immediate experience.

In the Christian church they talk so much of the necessity of believing in God that one really becomes doubtful whether God can *be* an experience. You see, if we have the experience, we don't need to believe. So the Greek word *pistis*, which means confidence, loyalty, is not at all what we understand by believing; it means the loyalty to the fact of the experience. The classical example is Paul who, perhaps at the worst moment in his life, on his way to persecute the Christians in Damascus, was thrown down by that experience of God. Then he knew it, and that

³ Jung, firmly convinced of the dialectic of opposites, argues that the highest good must be offset by the lowest evil.

he had *pistis* means that he stuck to that experience and didn't go away from that fact. All the belief in the world doesn't make it; in believing it might be possible one experiences nothing. Of course one might call it *grace* if one is able to believe that such an experience is possible; if for a whole lifetime one is deprived of the experience of God, one deserves that grace at least. But without an experience of God one has really no right to make the effort to believe—it leads nowhere; one had better just say that one is deprived of it. Now *naturally*, when one draws a conclusion upon such an insufficient premise, one has a somewhat unsafe feeling, and Nietzsche shows that *sentiment d'incertitude* in the next sentence:

Yea, I have drawn the conclusion; . . .

and then comes the very interesting statement:

now, however, doth it draw me.

Now can you explain that? What has happened here?

Prof. Fierz: He is in his own trap.

Prof. Jung: Obviously. He can draw the conclusion that gods cannot exist, but now that conclusion is stronger than he. He is trapped. How is that?

Dr. Escher: It has become autonomous energy.

Prof. Jung: Well, you could say that this conclusion that there were no gods suddenly had assumed an autonomous quality, as if it had been invested with autonomous energy. It is like an obsession; this idea is now stronger than himself, beyond him. He is the victim of it. That always happens when you make a wrong assumption concerning something true and vital: it then assumes an autonomous character. You can see that very beautifully in the case of a compulsion neurosis; those people assume that there is no moral law, that they can behave like real devils in an absolutely irresponsible, ruthless way, and that it doesn't matter. Or sometimes people who might appear to be fairly normal, think they can do something definitely immoral, and inasmuch as it is not known by the public it is of no consequence. In fact, it is a widespread idea that only inasmuch as it bothers other people does it matter, that you can even commit murder if nobody knows. But as a matter of fact it does matter.

I remember the case of a woman who committed a murder about twenty years ago and she was completely destroyed. It was very cleverly done; she was a very intelligent woman, a doctor, who could cover up her tracks marvelously, and she could not understand why she was

destroyed since nobody knew. She quite forgot that *she* knew, and that she was a whole nation or perhaps more. You see, there was no nation on earth that would give her hospitality; her unconscious made a contract with the whole world to give her no shelter. She forgot that her ego is not her totality; it is not the self. It would not matter that her ego knew, but there was somebody else in her, the thing that is much greater than herself that said: you have committed murder; there is no place for you in the whole world because the whole world knows it. For we are the whole world in ourselves; not in the ego, mind you—our ego is in ourselves as if it were in a great continent or the whole universe. Her universe accused her of murder and she was executed; she was in an eternal prison wherever she was, so that every human being was removed from her. She could only deal with animals in the end. She came to me when her dog got lame, then she had to confess it to the world, so she confessed it to me. I did not even ask her name; it was an anonymous business.

Now, that is what happened to Nietzsche; he was dealing with a situation that he didn't understand. He started with the assumption that God was a conjecture which one can handle; he drew that conclusion, and then it handled him. He said there could be no such thing as God, and then the self, the unconscious, said, "Now you are in my hands; because you deny my existence, you are my victim." This is a most decisive moment in the whole drama of *Zarathustra*. He will be drawn by that unknown factor, and you will see in the further chapters—if we ever get to them—testimony which shows very clearly how the thing which was denied was working in him. This place explains Nietzsche's life after writing *Zarathustra*, his tragic fate.

God is a conjecture: but who could drink all the bitterness of this conjecture without dying? Shall his faith be taken from the creating one, and from the eagle his flights into eagle-heights?

How do you understand this verse? What about the bitterness of this conjecture?

Mrs. Crowley: Well, he has already confessed that it would be perfectly hopeless if there were a God, as that would prevent man from being creative.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he could not be creative because everything was already created. If we are permeated with the idea that the most valuable and important things are eternal, why create? It is perfectly foolish. Now, do you assume that there are people who experience the bitterness of that anticipation?

Mr. Allemann: I think every invention has been anticipated by somebody else.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, naturally this priority business plays a tremendous role in life. It is a catastrophe when one is anticipated, but we are talking now of spiritual experience, when God anticipates man. Where do you see that?

Dr. Harding: You might see it in a son's relation to his father; when the father has done everything and experienced everything, the son can find nothing for himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that is within the ordinary facts of life. Nietzsche's situation is a bit more involved. You see, he cannot stand the idea of God, because God would anticipate the creative man Nietzsche to such an extent that he could not make the creative effort. Now my question is, are there situations when one cannot make a creative effort because one is anticipated by God or whatever God may mean?

Miss Hannah: The Roman church does that to all its people; it stops them because it explains everything to them.

Prof. Jung: "To be born Catholic means to be stillborn!" That is not my invention, that is Thomas More's.⁴ But that is also within the human scope because they don't assume that the Catholic church is God.

Mr. Martin: The man that is obsessed by the idea that cause and effect create the whole world, as some physicists are, might be deprived of creative power.

Prof. Jung: Yes, inasmuch as he collides with the spiritual fact, the experience of God, but in most scientists their attitude doesn't become a spiritual problem because they have compartmental psychology; in one drawer is science, and in another the political club to which they belong, and so on: things never touch each other. Well, it is a rather difficult question. You know if you have an intense contact with the collective unconscious, you are so much impressed by the eternal images that you are sucked under and never reappear. That is the safest way to sterilize a man completely; it kills him for the world, he simply disappears. Therefore people who are touched by the collective unconscious under pathological circumstances, lose the creative faculty, as it happened to Nietzsche himself. And it can happen in minor degrees to other people; under the influence of the specific experience of the collective unconscious they are quite lamed; floods of possibilities and images sway over them and they cannot grasp them; they can no

⁴ Thomas More (1478-1535), author of *Utopia* (1516), was martyred by Henry VIII.

longer lift a finger. They become absolutely helpless. They don't know where to tackle it because there is too much. They are in a world which is so full of possibilities that they don't know whether to seize any of them, for even when they try to fish something out of the endless sea, in the next moment it is dissolved again and they have lost their grip completely. This is the great danger of the collective unconscious and it is also in a way the great danger of mysticism.

But we don't know exactly whether it is ultimately a danger; looked at from our human point of view, naturally blindfolded more or less by the prejudices of our age, we would call it paralysis, sterilization. The man disappeared—but who knows? Perhaps it is the right thing; perhaps it is what should have happened. For instance, there were the times when all those thousands disappeared in the Libyan and Syrian deserts; they vanished into monasteries, hermitages, etc., and they and their contemporaries thought that was just right. We call it a danger because we believe that things should be manufactured and made visible, but there are other worlds. When a man vanishes into Yoga in the East, we say he is lost to the world—what is the use of being a fakir? But they think it a great merit *not* to live here, to disappear to a certain extent at least, and to complete the great disappearance is considered the height of perfection in Buddhism. So the appreciation of this factor varies a great deal. You see, that is being anticipated. In the collective unconscious you discover the identity of different times for instance, that things have been practically always the same; you begin to see that though symbols vary a great deal, *plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose*.⁵ The basic thoughts are eternal, they never change. So why should you do anything about it? Why invent? Or why should you translate them into the language of this time? You can disappear into them without ever saying a word about them. But the fact is of course that externally, to your surroundings, to your world, you are lost. When the experience of God comes to you you may be taken away, you may die. The “great bitterness” is that you have to divorce yourself from this so-called beautiful world, this human world, nature, etc., and then the faith is taken from the creating one and the flight from the

⁵ Nietzsche's “eternal return of the same” goes even beyond “The more things change, the more they stay the same.” Nietzsche considered his joyful embrace of the idea that in the infinity of time there must be an exact replication of events to be the strongest possible affirmative attitude toward life, a complete renunciation of Schopenhauer's pessimism. Since on Jung's typology of functions, it is the intuitive above all who dreads repetition, Nietzsche's delight in the necessity of the “eternal return” may be regarded as a sacrifice of his superior function.

eagle. So Nietzsche thinks it is better to assume that God is a thought. He says,

God is a thought—it maketh all the straight crooked, and all that standeth reel. What? Time would be gone, and all the perishable would be but a lie?

Exactly, that is so. The more you are absorbed into the deity the more the ups and downs of this world become unimportant or relative, and if you get entirely into the other side, they don't exist; then this side is all illusion. And that is exactly the purpose of Buddhism as you know, and of the Christian mystics.

To think this is giddiness and vertigo to human limbs, and even vomiting to the stomach; verily, the reeling sickness do I call it, to conjecture such a thing.

So his confession is entirely in favor of this world and nothing else; he hates the idea of spiritualism or any metaphysical aspiration—naturally under the prejudice of his time that there is only a *yea or a nay*, and not a *yea and a nay*.

Evil do I call it and misanthropic: all that teaching about the one, and the plenum [fullness], and the unmoved, and the sufficient, [this should be translated self-sufficient] and the imperishable.

Those are qualities of the deity and he thinks it is evil to even talk about or to teach such things. That is of course very much in contradiction to the Christian teaching as we know it. You see, our late Protestantism has taught among many other things a sort of very active Christianity that is little in tune with the eschatological attitude of early Christianity. Nietzsche being the son of a parson naturally had some idea about that teaching, and under those conditions it is quite understandable that he sympathizes with the standpoint and the reality of the world rather than with that peculiar backworldliness of which he occasionally speaks. He says here,

All the imperishable—that's but a simile, and the poets lie too much.

All perishable things are nothing but similes, Goethe says in the last part of *Faust*; and here Nietzsche says all imperishable things are but a simile—just the other way round. "And the poets lie too much!" You see he takes it that they lie when they hold that the perishable things

are more or less symbolic expressions of a real existence, of a real substance. Now, this is a very great problem really, and a great conflict for people who take their life as a serious proposition. Where is the truth? Is my life really only symbolic? Is it completely anticipated? Should I make particular efforts to build railway bridges, or make engines or cannons, or write books? Or should I worship the unmovable, the eternal, the fullness, the *pleroma*, and become rigid or petrified? Well, Nietzsche decides for this world, and I think with some justification, because we really must remain within the human scope.

For how else could we decide about our life? We have to be human, and we cannot know better than to be human and to fulfil that law which is given unto us; we must assume that the law under which we are born is that of the human being, and what else can we live but human life? We have to live, to fulfil human life, exactly as a flower has to live the flower's life, the life of that species. What would you say about a horse that affected to be a cow? Or a dog that affected to be a canary bird? A dog is a good dog when he is a dog, and man is a good man when he is a man. And it is quite obvious that if we live at all, we must live in this world here and now; our law is that we live here and now and nowhere else, and that we don't cast illegitimate glances on things which are not; otherwise the dog is affecting to be a bird. He would be disobedient. The marvelous thing about the animal is that it is the most pious thing that exists—with the exception of the plant, which is still more pious because it is rooted in the ground and must accept its fate. It cannot jump away. An animal can at least cheat fate by running away. And a man can cheat life like anything by his devilish cunning; by his cunning he has done in the whole of creation practically, the whole of nature; we are most immoral beings in that we always try *not* to fulfil the law into which we are born.

Naturally we are saddled with the very great problem of human consciousness, which could not exist if we did not discriminate between ourselves and nature. To fulfil the law of nature completely we must have ego consciousness, and for that we must be able to do something which amounts to disobedience; we only exist when we can do something that is against the law. Many people have to commit immoral acts in order to feel that they are free. A child that is never disobedient never *becomes*. It is always dependent upon the parents, in absolute participation with the mother or the father, and pulls the wool over their eyes and over its own also. For a child always has the temptation to do just what it should not do—and that must be; otherwise it has no feeling of its own existence. So a certain amount of immorality and dis-

obedience is absolutely necessary for the existence of ego consciousness; the ego is something apart. This is of course contained in the legend of paradise; the first parents had to commit that sin in order to become conscious; otherwise they would have been no different from animals—which means from God. You see, animals and plants are absolutely identical with God. And so man would be if only he were not conscious. But since consciousness is in him as a germ at least, it is his own decision. Culture, for instance, is only an extension of the development of consciousness and that is surely his task. He has to develop consciousness, even if he becomes like that prehistoric giant stag that simply became extinct because his horns grew too marvelously complicated, or like the mammoth whose tusks curled inward till they were of no use any longer. So man may kill himself by an overdeveloped consciousness; it has already become a nuisance.

Therefore we try with all our might to compensate it, to reestablish the connection with God, that he may protect us against our disobedience. Yet it is also a will, a law, that has been given to us, that we should fulfil to the utmost the demands of consciousness. For example, we have the Gnostic interpretation that the serpent in Paradise was the son of the spiritual God who really tried to help man from the state of *anoia*, unconsciousness, and to give him *ennoia*, consciousness. And we find the same idea in the pagan Hermetic philosophy in the *Krater*, the mixing jar, the famous vase of Hermes that was made by God after the creation; after he had created human beings in a state of *anoia*, he made that marvelous vessel, filled it with *nous*, and sent it down to the earth in order that those many human beings who felt the need of increasing consciousness could dip themselves in that mixing jar, and there attain to *ennoia*. That is the origin probably of the Grail, for instance, and it appears also in alchemistic philosophy; this idea was widespread quite outside of biblical tradition. Now this necessity to develop consciousness doesn't allow us to obey the law completely, to fulfil the will of God in nature; disobedience is the only means by which we can separate consciousness from unconscious participation. So every step forward is a Promethean sin without which there is no development; we cannot be creative *and* good, but can only be creative and pay the price for it. We would not be able to be creative, or to fulfil that absolute necessity of becoming conscious if we remained within the law in which we are born: we needs must be disobedient.

You see, people even go so far as to assume that there is no such thing as God or as the law and that we are not at all bad and disobedient; that on the contrary we are marvelous, creative fellows, like little

gods going forth to create, and that it is a ridiculous, humiliating superstition to assume otherwise. There they make the fatal mistake: man *is* disobedient inasmuch as his life cannot be that of a plant or an animal. Inasmuch as he has to become conscious, he has to be disobedient and therefore he is guilty—that is inherited sin. It is a psychological truth because ego separateness is indispensable for the growth of human consciousness, and that cannot be attained without disobedience. This is a sad fact but it is so, and it is much better to assume that guilt and to declare oneself tragically responsible for it. Then we understand when we suffer for the development of consciousness; we know we have to pay a heavy price for it. As long as we keep the feeling of an obligation as if we were guilty, as if we were in debt, our attitude is correct; then we are in the right connection with these peculiar spiritual facts.

Now, it is quite clear that Nietzsche's point of view is a complete and unmitigated belief in nature, in the natural life of man in the here and now. To him every glance backwards is a sin, so he says,

But of time and of becoming shall the best similes speak: a praise shall they be, and a justification of all perishableness!

This explains his position fully, and from a psychological point of view of course one must add that this is a very onesided standpoint. That it shall be most complete, most natural, is surely one aspect of human life, but it is not the whole thing; there is another will behind or beside it and Nietzsche himself is the very best example of it. He thought *he* was drawing the conclusion but it was that other will which was drawing him. That is a consideration which should not be forgotten.

Creating—that is the great salvation from suffering, and life's alleviation. But for the creator to appear, suffering itself is needed, and much transformation.

This is the creating which would be anticipated by a God-creator, and this creation, according to Nietzsche, could not live if God did exist because it would be anticipated. So his tendency is to take away the supposed creative faculty of the creator and attribute it to man, to declare that it is really man's creativeness and not God's. Now, that is justifiable inasmuch as the human ego cannot live without creativeness; it proves its existence by inventing something, by doing something on its own, out of the ordinary—by living dangerously for instance, doing the things of which one is afraid, which only a human being will do. Animals refrain from doing things they are afraid of, while man quite nat-

urally asserts the divine quality of his ego by doing just the things he is afraid of. That is so very much against nature that it is the strongest evidence of the autonomous existence of the ego and of the freedom of the human will. So it is quite understandable when Nietzsche emphasizes the creator in man. He clearly sees, with such an emphasis on the ego and its will power, that consciousness cannot come into existence without suffering, that suffering is of course detachment from nature, from unconsciousness, from the animal and the plant. The utter isolation of man in his conscious world becomes his prison. In our consciousness we are peculiarly separated from nature; it is a prison with glass walls. We see through the glass, see the things outside, yet we have no interchange, no participation with them; we can say, "Yes, this is a snake, this is a bear," but the snake is no longer our sister and the bear is no longer our brother. They ought to be our near relatives; we ought to have a spiritual relation to our relatives on this earth, but consciousness has divorced us completely from them and from many other things, not only from the totemic relation to animals.

Now, that is suffering, sure enough, and it is a transformation; therefore the process of becoming conscious has always been seen and understood as an analogy to empirical transformation processes, like the snake shedding its skin, the tadpole transforming into the frog, the caterpillar transforming from the pupal state into the butterfly. Then there was the transformation that man produced in the form of chemical inventions—for instance, in dyeing things so that they have another appearance, in cooking, in cutting things up and putting them together again. In alchemy, the transformation was shown in the form of chemical procedures. In the hero myth, the hero is swallowed by the dragon or the great whale and then kills the beast from within and comes back to daylight again. The rebirth rituals and all those similes that have been made by man are to express the attainment of a transformation of consciousness, a widening out and emphasizing of the ego in a sort of transfiguration. In the Mithraic or in the Isis mysteries a man who was transformed into Helios and worshipped as such surely did not take it as an increase of his higher self. It happened to his ego; he was now simply conscious of another order of things. In that peculiar transformation which was brought about in the mysteries—as we know from certain confessions—man knew himself to be an imperishable being. He had a new life; he knew himself in a new order of things, but it was a new ego. His ego consciousness was widened out.

Yea, much bitter dying must there be in your life, ye creators!
Thus are ye advocates and justifiers of all perishableness.

You see, this clearly points to the fact that you cannot believe in things that are worldly and perishable if you have not given up that connection or participation out of which you were born. You are born out of the collective unconscious, and your consciousness begins to function in your lifetime. You had been alive already for a few years as a mere existence, as an object, and then in about three or four years, sometimes even later, consciousness began to function, a certain consciousness came into existence. Some people attain to a state of consciousness only at puberty, and there are people who never attain to it, but live an accidental life where the ego appears in many different phases and they never have any control over it. They cannot sum it up. You see that in primitive life; therefore experience means so little to them. They go through things but there is no continuity, no *pistis*, nothing. The continuity of the ego is not yet established; they are only objective psychological phenomena. They live but they don't know that they live: *it* lives. They happen to be conscious of acts, of conditions with something like an ego in it, but that ego matters precious little. It decides nothing, chooses nothing, is simply a witness. But on a higher level of civilization the ego is in it and responsibly in it; it chooses, it decides, it avoids, it seeks, it shows a definite will toward something and sees life as its own doing. This is of course an entirely different proposition from the original form in which we lived.

Anybody now who cannot separate himself completely from that objective type of psychological life where the ego is a mere witness, cannot attain to a complete ego consciousness because he is all the time a victim or an appendix to objective processes that happen. He finds himself in the wake of events, and that always—under more or less civilized conditions at least—leads to a neurosis. When people complain that whenever they try to do this or that, they have an attack of such-and-such a nature, it means that a complex comes in between. And they cannot deal with it, it deals with *them*, just as here Nietzsche says he drew a conclusion and then it drew him. It was an appendix; he was in the wake of it. That is the case in any neurotic condition: part of the psychology is not detached from the original background. When Freud speaks of the early infantile fixation, it is merely the fixation to the psychical background; all his talk about incest is not personal, but is the mythology of all races, the images of the collective unconscious.⁶

⁶ Freud, greatly impressed with Edward Burnett Tylor's claim (in *Primitive Culture*) that incest is a universal taboo, gave in *Totem and Taboo* (1913) his account of the primordial struggle of the father and his sons for possession of the mother. This work was, in a

These things are still there and one is still connected with them. That is the world from which one has to cut oneself loose, and it is a ruthless, almost blasphemous act. Nietzsche himself feels it; in another place he says it is a sort of sacrilegious act to detach oneself from that marvelous paradise.

Christianity rightly understood is exceedingly severe on that point; Christ himself gave ruthless advice. What did he say to the young man when he wanted to bury his father? "Let the dead bury the dead." And what did he say to his own mother when she reminded him that the wine was nearly gone and he must do something about it? "Woman, what have I to do with thee?"⁷ She is completely swept aside. Now think of a Jewish boy sweeping his mother out of the way! That is unheard of. You see, those are symbolic gestures, hints as to Christ's attitude toward the detachment from the past. People were to become like unto children, but they were not to *remain* children as theologians want to make us believe. There is nothing sentimental about it, and that is what Nietzsche means here. You cannot be creative and sentimental about your aunt at the same time.

For the creator himself to be the new-born child, he must also be willing to be the child-bearer, and endure the pangs of the child-bearer.

You see, that creating will in man, which is so much linked up with his ego, is the father and the mother of the ego, for your creative will creates yourself; you create a new consciousness, a new ego is born. It is a new generation of the ego one could say, a pregnancy and a birth, and that act of creation must be repeated. To keep life as ego consciousness you must give birth to yourself repeatedly. The ego, the wider and higher state of consciousness, is first unconscious—that is the pregnancy; and then something happens. You hurt yourself against something or you have a tremendous emotion from within, and at that moment a new light comes to you and your consciousness is widened. It is true that thus far man can be creative; thus far he is a little god. Therefore, Goethe calls him the little god of this world, for he *can* produce a man of wider consciousness, and he can do it to a certain extent at will. You can build up your consciousness, increase it at will, study, read: you are entirely free to have certain experiences. This is the justifica-

sense, Freud's rebuttal of Jung's *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (1912), intentionally hastening and widening the split between the two men which became final in July 1914.

⁷ Matthew 8:22 and John 2:4.

tion of Nietzsche's idea that man could create the Superman, perhaps not in his own existence but in a future existence. Therefore we believe in education, in mental and spiritual development, in everything man can do, for he really can do something. But he will do nothing, nothing at all, if he leaves it to somebody else; if we do anything we have to do it in the here-and-now, and we will not do it in the here-and-now if we are not convinced that this is the important place and the important time and that we have to do it here. One cannot say, "Oh well, God has not granted me certain things so I hope and expect that my children will do them," and then goad them on to a certain goal in order that they may fulfil what God has not allowed me to fulfil. I should say, "I have not done it, and my son and daughter are different people, so why should they fulfil what I have not done?" I must be satisfied with the fact that I have not done it. Of course I can repent or be glad over it, but I should stick to the fact that I have not done it, and not assume that it was God who bestowed his grace upon me to do or not to do it. This is the only argument which saves you from passing on your expectations to your children and naturally spoiling their lives by your own choice. That is a perpetuated selfishness.

Verily, through a hundred souls went I my way, and through a hundred cradles and birth-throes. Many a farewell have I taken; I know the heart-breaking last hours.

Here he is simply describing a series of transformations of consciousness. You see, from the beginning, our individual consciousness only lives by a continuous series of pregnancies and births, a continuous series of transformations; and one can say that the belief in reincarnation of other races is merely a projection of the fact of the transformation of consciousness. You know, inasmuch as our consciousness is not only our own accomplishment, since we are born with the faculty of having a certain intensity or a certain width of consciousness, we owe gratitude to our ancestors. We repeat the life of our ancestors as we grow up; the child begins with an animal-like condition and repeats all the animal stages in the development of consciousness until it reaches what is called the modern level of consciousness. And naturally we can feel all those transformations as former lives just as well, because they were former lives; in former times people have repeated that development untold millions of times and naturally we have the deposit, the *engrammata* of all that. Our mind was not made today. It was not a *tabula rasa* when we were born; we have even in its physical structure a brain in which all the former developments have been de-

scribed or molded. Therefore we have quite legitimately that feeling of having gone through many lives and endured their experiences, even the heart-breaking last hours, innumerable times.

But so willeth it my creating Will, my fate. Or, to tell you it more candidly: just such a fate—willeth my Will.

That is, this creative ego-will is responsible for its fate; we are the makers of fate, the makers of our lives. And we should think like that; if we doubt it, we don't put out our strength, our whole force. It is just the misfortune of so many neurotic people, that they cannot pull themselves together and have such a conviction, because they know of course that every human goal, every ideal, is futile. It is eternal and so it doesn't matter what they do in time about it. What is the use of it? It doesn't even matter whether they have lived or not. But from this standpoint it is all important that we live; since our life is the only one we can experience, it surely must be lived, and our highest will should be to live it to the utmost; otherwise it never has been. Now, whenever Nietzsche makes an extreme statement, as we have seen before when he drew a very bold conclusion, he then realizes the other side; so he now says:

All *feeling* suffereth in me, and is in prison: but my *willing* ever cometh to me as mine emancipator and comforter.

Here we meet a very important conflict. You see, that will to exist, or to develop, that will to the Superman, is a sort of concentration of will-power and energy, almost a spasm. It is everything heaped up—but what about the feeling? Now, what does Nietzsche call feeling? He obviously means a certain human pathos, a human sensitiveness which does not agree with that most heroic ideal of creating a suffering ego—a Superman, in Nietzsche's language. Feeling obviously wants something else. Now of course, you can accuse feeling of being cowardly or conservative or lazy or stupid, but that doesn't do away with its existence. That feeling does exist too, and it might be a very important determinant in your behavior.

Willing emancipateth: that is the true doctrine of will and emancipation—so teacheth you Zarathustra.

Well, he teaches a complete detachment from the past, a complete abolition of any tie that might fetter you. But the feeling represents that tie. The feeling suffers, doesn't want to be detached, only lives when the connection is kept, when you are not so hellishly heroic and super-

manish. So there are such doubts on Nietzsche's mind when he writes that, "Now what about it? I am creating, I am emancipating myself, I am going to create the Superman"—but here is that awkward feeling.

No longer willing, and no longer valuing, and no longer creating! Ah, that the great debility may ever be far from me!

To him it is a debility because it makes him doubt whether that creativeness is right, whether it leads anywhere and whether it can be sustained; therefore he must of course preach an emphatic sermon to himself in order to make himself believe in his own idea.

And also in discerning do I feel only my will's procreation and evolving delight; and if there be innocence in my knowledge, it is because there is will to procreation in it.

Away from God and Gods did this will allure me; what would there be to create if there were—Gods!

This is a repetition of his standpoint, of course.

But to man doth it ever impel me anew, my fervent creative will; thus impelleth it the hammer to the stone.

Ah, ye men, within the stone slumbereth an image for me, the image of my visions! Ah, that it should slumber in the hardest, ugliest stone!

Here we come to one of those deeply symbolic passages in *Zarathustra*. The sudden manifestation of feeling indicates that somewhere there is a doubt in his mind; something is harking back that is not completely detached from the past. Yet it is perfectly obvious to him that man should look forward, should detach from the past with no exception. You see, when you are quite at one with yourself about a certain necessity, you often observe that something in you is hanging back. It doesn't join in, but looks back to just those things which you think you ought to avoid, or which you have overcome. Yet something is looking back as if you still were there. You also have *such* dreams; you have changed the type of your life, you live a new life, and then in dreams the former life appears just as if it had never been changed. Or you have certain resentments or emotions which you cannot harmonize with your actual convictions. Well, they simply come from the former mind, from the former type of living, which in spite of all overcoming and conjecturing still exists. That is on account of the indubitable fact that consciousness is a surface phenomenon; our ego consciousness is absolutely on the surface. No matter how important it is or how im-

portant we make it, it is a surface consciousness, and below, it has this indissoluble historical connection with the past from which we cannot get away. And we are forever in danger of falling into the past and being cut off. If we could cut off our own head, we would be detached from the past because our body is history; we make the great changes of consciousness only in the head. The whole thing below is not changed at all. If we live another type of life, it is only up in the head. Behind our consciousness is the whole collective unconscious which lives down in the body, and that is eternally caught in the past: we cannot change it. You can only detach your head, like John the Baptist; you live in your head perhaps but the other part Salome has cut off. That is of course the anima business.

So while Nietzsche is talking great words, the anima behind his back begins to stir and causes feeling. She says, "Yes, go ahead like that, but wait until I show my hand!" Here it shows a little, and he instantly collapses and asks what the world will be if we cannot produce the Superman. If there should be gods, what would we be?—and so on. Instantly, the doubt comes up and lames him completely, so he must preach to himself with increased fervor the great sermon of the Superman. And now he discovers an entirely new idea. You see, he comes to the idea of the stone in the passage: "But to man doth it ever impel me anew, my fervent creative will; thus impelleth it the hammer to the stone."⁸ That is, when he is going to create, his firmly creative will hurts itself against an obstacle: it is like the hammer beating against the stone. Then the new idea occurs that a wonderful image is sleeping in the stone; within the stone there is something that is alive, but is dormant. Now where have we encountered such a picture?

Mrs. Sigg: Pygmalion?

Prof. Jung: Well, there he gives the soul to the stone; it is not living in the stone.

Mrs. von Roques: It is the first man, who only had to be awakened.

Prof. Reichstein: It is the Gnostic idea where the soul is sleeping in prison.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that has to do with the philosopher's stone.

Prof. Fierz: But why is it the ugliest stone?

Prof. Jung: Oh well, that is in the myth. The philosopher's stone is the thing that has been rejected, the thing you find ejected in the road; you tread it under your feet or you find it on the dung heaps cast away,

⁸ Cf. Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols: or How to Philosophize With a Hammer* (Leipzig, 1889). His title was a play on Wagner's *Twilight of the Gods*.

vilis et vilissimus, cheap and the cheapest. Also it is unsightly, makes no impression, like the description in Isaiah of the Messiah: "He hath no form nor comeliness; and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him."⁹ But this idea of the stone is by no means of Christian origin. It has a very pagan origin; it is really an archetypal idea. And here Nietzsche has an intuition that the material out of which the Superman will be formed is the thing that is ugly, cheap, of no use whatever, just the thing he has thrown away—which of course is the past and all the values of the past. That thing which has been rejected is the raw material; out of the stone rejected by the builders must he work that precious image. In other words, just out of the anima, out of that feeling that seems to be a mere nuisance, a mere hindrance—to his creative will.

⁹ Of the Messiah in Isaiah 53:1-2.

LECTURE IV

27 May 1936

Prof. Jung:

Mrs. Crowley asks the following question: "Last week in connection with the verse beginning 'So willeth my creating will,' you said that the creative ego-will was responsible for its fate, or we should think so. Yet you have again and again emphasized that the ego-will should be realized as the partner in the act of creation, which is a process taking place within the individual. My impression of the chapter was that Zarathustra was identifying with the *activity* of *creating*. And I would like to ask if the attitude toward creation is necessarily different in a man's case from that of a woman."

Well, one could not say that it was necessarily different. *Creative will* is a term used by Nietzsche and he identifies entirely with it. Of course when one experiences it, it seems to be one's own will, yet as a matter of fact one is the exponent of it, its representative or implement. The creative will is utterly impersonal; therefore it so very often works against the vital interests of the individual. It may kill him or at least expose him to all sorts of risks and dangers, and may destroy not only one but several human lives: it is like a demon. And it is the same in a woman's case; the creative urge is a fact beyond sex, so I could not imagine that a woman would have an entirely different attitude to it; one could say it was a natural condition to which human beings must have very much the same attitude, whether a man or a woman. It could be compared to an elementary event like a thunderstorm; if there is any choice left at all, the attitude will be either an umbrella or a rain-coat; if it is a matter of creation, if the creative will is serious one simply has to be careful, and the sex doesn't matter.

Mrs. Crowley: But in "The Happy Isles" he speaks definitely as if he were identifying; he says: "But so willeth it my creating Will, my fate. Or, to tell you it more candidly: just such a fate—willeth my Will." It seems in that chapter as if he were very much identifying with the

power, the activity of creation. And that seems to be an opposition to what you have so often said.

Prof. Jung: But that he identifies so entirely is just the trouble; no one in their sound senses can possibly identify with the creative power because it is something inhuman, it is superhuman or infra-human. You cannot *be* the creative will. It is because Nietzsche identified with Zarathustra that he had an inflation.

Mrs. Crowley: But I thought you said that we must consider that it is *our* creative will.

Prof. Jung: Not *ours*. You see there is the trap. If you acquire the creative will, it means that *you* are acquired. It is like that story in an old-fashioned play which Freud quoted in one of his books: A commander is in charge of a fortress where the garrison consists of old veterans; you hear the fight going on and suddenly one of the men shouts: "Colonel, I have made a prisoner." And the colonel shouts back: "Bring him here." Then the man says: "He won't let me!" So when Nietzsche says: "So willeth it my creating Will, my fate," who can say that he is identical with his fate? One can speak of *amor fati* in the sense of accepting it—since it is so, what can one do? One accepts it and calls it one's fate. But to say one's fate is one's own creation, is *hybris*; that is an inflation because it is not true. You see, in order to be able to choose your own fate, you must be able to understand it, to hold it, but you can't; you don't know what the ultimate constituents of your fate may be. You are not God and you are not a super-consciousness that contains all the necessary elements to explain your fate. With our conscious mind, we only know the smallest part of the elements that make up fate, so we cannot identify with it. If we know enough, if we have enough self-critique, we can only accept it. And that acceptance means in religious language, I submit to the will of God and his incomprehensible decisions. But that is not identifying, that is submitting, and Nietzsche does not submit, he identifies.

Well, we came to the end of that passage: "Ah, ye men, within the stone slumbereth an image for me, the image of my visions! Ah, that it should slumber in the hardest, ugliest stone!" I mentioned the analogy with Alchemy and I only want to add that this metaphor does of course on the surface remind one of Pygmalion, that famous sculptor. As you know, he made a beautiful statue which through the grace of the gods came to life, and since it was a woman, Galatea, he lived with her—she became real.¹ Now, one generally finds this feeling in artists; it looks to

¹ In Ovid's story, Pygmalion, disillusioned with the women of the world, carved his

them as if the material with which they work, contained life. For instance, I read once in a French book or paper, that somebody had sent round a questionnaire to literary people and artists, inquiring about the conditions of their creative work. And one writer said that the aspect of an empty white space of paper has the character of a charm—it exhales a sort of voluptuous attraction. He wanted to do something to it, to fill it with his pen; in that empty stuff, in those sheets, there was a magnetic charm which drew him and pulled him out so that his substance flowed into the paper: then he could write. Of course it is a sort of sex allegory one could say, as in the case of Pygmalion, but that doesn't mean that it comes out of sex. It rather means that the creative instinct is so strong that even sex is pulled into it and made serviceable. And so the sensuous beauty of color attracts the creative fantasy of the painter, or the sensuous quality of the clay or the stone attracts the creative fantasy of the sculptor. One sees that particularly in antique art.

I once saw a striking contrast in the use made of material in Florence. I saw first in the Boboli gardens the two wonderful figures of the barbarians—you remember perhaps those antique stone statues. They are made of stone, *consist* of stone, represent the *spirit* of stone: you feel that stone has had the word! Then I went to the tombs of the Medici and saw what Michelangelo did to stone; there the stone has been brought to a super-life. It makes gestures which stone never would make; it is hysterical and exaggerated. The difference was amazing. Or go further to a man like Houdon and you see that the stone becomes absolutely acrobatic. There is the same difference between the Norman and Gothic styles. In the Gothic frame of mind stone behaves like a plant, not like a normal stone, while the Norman style is completely suggested by the stone. The stone speaks. Also an antique Egyptian temple is a most marvelous example of what stone can say; the Greek temple already plays tricks with stone, but the Egyptian temple is made of stone. It grows out of stone—the temple of Abu Simbel, for example, is amazing in that respect. Then in those cave temples in India one sees again the thing man brings into stone. He takes it into his hands and makes it jump, fills it with an uncanny sort of life which destroys the peculiar spirit of the stone. And in my opinion it is always to the detriment of art when matter has no say in the game of the artist. The quality of the matter is exceedingly important—it is all-important. For instance, I think it makes a tremendous difference whether one

own woman out of ivory, named her Galatea, and fell in love with her. Venus granted his prayer to make her live (*Metamorphoses* X).

paints with chemical colors or with so-called natural colors. All that fuss medieval painters made about the preparation of their backgrounds or the making and mixing of their colors had a great advantage. No modern artist has ever brought out anything like the colors which those old masters produced. If one studies an old picture, one feels directly that the color speaks, the color has its own life, but with a modern artist it is most questionable whether the color has a life of its own. It is all made by man, made in Germany or anywhere else, and one feels it. So the projection into matter is not only a very important but an indispensable quality of art.

Now when Nietzsche speaks of the projection into the stone, that an image is lying dormant in the stone, it is a bit more than a mere mythological metaphor—Pygmalion or some such legend. A whole chapter of psychology one could say, is behind this projection. Therefore I mentioned the alchemistic analogy where matter, the stone, was the thing which contained the mysterious life—the more important as an analogy because the early centuries up to the 18th were filled with that idea. Our ancestors have lived in that alchemistic idea; to the mind of the past, matter was filled with a peculiar spirit. In my lecture in the Psychological Club about the philosophy of the stone, I read one of the earliest texts of Greek alchemy. In the beginning it said, “Go down to the bank of the Nile and there thou shalt find a stone which contains a ghost—there you shall find a stone in which a spirit is lying dormant.”² Now this was the fundamental theme for sixteen or seventeen hundred years of most important thinking. Alchemistic philosophy is quite unknown in our days because we can no longer understand its paradoxical character, and though it was so important in the Middle Ages, yet in a history of medieval philosophy you find practically nothing about it. It should really concern us very much more than it does because one of the most powerful monuments in the literature of the world, not only of Germany, is Goethe’s *Faust*, and Faust is the last great alchemistic allegory. It is filled with most important alchemistic thought and parallels.

So it is no wonder that Nietzsche, who is very much in the situation of a medieval alchemist, pulls up an image which belongs essentially to alchemy. If Nietzsche had lived at a time between the 15th and 18th centuries, I would say that he most certainly would have been an alche-

² In CW 11, par. 151, Jung says that this formula was “attributed by Zosimos to the legendary Ostanos.” Then, in par. 355, he cites Zosimos’ interpretation of “the stone”—that is, the philosopher’s stone—as quicksilver.

mistic philosopher. For to him the official dogma, the official transmutation accomplished in the Mass for instance, the transubstantiation which is of course the alchemistic mystery *par excellence*, did not hold truth, did not hold life. Otherwise he would have been a perfectly contented Catholic; he would not have worried. But that meant nothing to him; he came to the conclusion that the church didn't give him the spiritual life which he really expected or needed, so he would quite naturally seek something that would produce life.

But invariably those old philosophers went down to the bank of the Nile to seek the stone which held the ghost; that is, they sought it in the projection. For when the spirit of life has vanished from a system of thought or from the holy rites—when the church obviously doesn't contain it any more—you must find it elsewhere. Since you don't possess it yet feel the need of its presence, well, you can only find it where it is projected; you find that unconscious component of your nature projected either in another human being or in a thing or in a system. And you find it just there where you feel it. The alchemists felt it in matter, and the whole purpose of their philosophy was to find out the technique, one could say, or those methods by which they could extract the spirit they no longer possessed and which was not granted them by the church. They felt that the church spoke a great deal about spirit and performed rites similar to their own by which the transubstantiation should take place, yet nothing came of it. They did not feel redeemed, and so they went in for their peculiar practices. Now, Nietzsche was naturally in the same condition but since he lived in the 19th century when Hermetic philosophy was a matter of derision, he could not go back to that. He was entirely unacquainted with it, yet his unconscious, containing all the traces of ancestral thought, brought up such material. So when such a symbol occurs in *Zarathustra* we must cock our ears and seek the historical antecedents, because they only can explain why he uses that figure of speech in such an important place. That it is an important place we see from the subsequent text. He continues,

Now rageth my hammer ruthlessly against its prison.

This word *raging* expresses a great deal of emotion; he tries to deal with this imprisoned image by a sort of rage.

From the stone fly the fragments: what's that to me?

You see, it is a highly emotional condition and he tries to get at it by hammer and tongs, *cum ira et vehementia*. This is a quotation from an

alchemistic philosopher of the 6th century A.D., Morienus Romanus, who in giving instruction to his disciple, tells him he never can attain to the great art by wrath and vehemence, but can only get at it *per gratiam Dei*, by the grace of God, because it is a *donum Spiritus Sancti*, the gift of the holy ghost.

I will complete it. . . .

But the Hermetic philosopher says only those elected from eternity are able to produce the miracle of the transubstantiation. The accomplishment of the great work is only possible, *Deo adjuvante*, if God assists. An interesting conversation has been reported between Morienus Romanus and Hali, a prince of Egypt. Hali asked why Morienus did not live in a monastery like the Christian monks at that time. And Morienus said, "It is true that in the monasteries there is more peace, and in solitude there is more pain and labor. But since the avenue to quietude is very narrow, nobody can attain to it without affliction of the soul. What you sow, you harvest; if little, you harvest little. The monks have good monasteries and peace but they arrive nowhere, they remain static. While if they risk loneliness they attain to quietude because the goal is reached only through the affliction of the soul."³

And now we come to the important statement in which Nietzsche explains why he is so emotional and why he wants so much to get at that image:

for a shadow came unto me—the stillest and lightest of all things
once came unto me!

The beauty of the Superman came unto me as a shadow. Ah, my
brethren! Of what account now are—the Gods to me!—

That is what came to him instead of the lost God; God is dead but he reappears in the idea of the Superman, and the Superman is the stillest and lightest of all things. Now, that description coincides in a very remarkable way with sayings of the ancients. I remember now particularly Athanasias, Archbishop of Alexandria, the biographer of St. Antony of Egypt, who wrote in about the third century. He speaks about the manifold tribulations of the mourning ones in the desert, the

³ The name is usually given as Kalid (or Khalid) ibn Yazid (d. c. 704), credited with introducing alchemy to the Islamic world. Morienus Romanus is thought to have been a Greek Christian monk. In CW 12, par. 386, Jung cites a long passage in which Morienus is giving instruction to Kalid, an Omayyad prince. The dialogues of these two are discussed by R. P. Multhauf in his introduction to *Alchemy and the Occult* (New Haven, 1968), vol. 1, p. xi.

Christian anchorites, and describes how they are tempted by the devil and the tricks the devil plays on them. He says the devil even occasionally reads the Bible to them or sings hymns so that they think he is a pious one, but as he comes with a great noise singing psalms or preaching sermons, they should know that this must be the devil. It cannot be the Holy Ghost, for that is a stillness; when everything is quite still then they can be sure it is the Holy Ghost. Nietzsche uses here language which shows something one could call the essential experience, and we can see from it what the Superman really means to him; it is the manifestation of God in man, God born out of man, and that is the mystery of transmutation or of transubstantiation: namely, God born and generated in the flesh.⁴

You see, it was that mystery which made St. Augustine, who was surely a very good Christian, insist upon a thought which is very pagan and quite alchemistic; he says that the Virgin Mary is verily the earth, and that that is a proof that Christ is born from the earth.⁵ St. Augustine even speaks of the earth that is not yet fecundated by the spring rains. But that was a time when the spirit still lived, when it was connected with the nature of things, while in our days spirit and earth have become entirely divided. Even in the Catholic church you would never hear that Mother Mary was the earth and that Christ was born from the earth. People would remain as stupid as before, and it would mean nothing to them if a parson of today should repeat St. Augustine's speech. But it means a whole lot because we have now a psychological equivalent. The old idea of the earth to us means the body; the savior is born from this body. To find out how the savior could be produced from the earth in a miraculous way is the alchemistic quest, for to them the philosopher's stone, the gold, or the child was really the savior. They *called* it the savior.

We have here in Zürich the so-called *Codex Rhenovacensis*, an alchemistic codex which came from the library of a monastery; it was written probably sometime in the 15th century, but it might be older than that. There it is openly said that the stone is the savior, and the whole alchemical procedure is expressed in the analogy of the Song of Songs, which is really a beautiful and most sensuous oriental love song. Arabic and Syrian parallels of exactly the same character have been found;

⁴ Athanasias (292?-373), Greek Archbishop of Alexandria, insisted that the members of the Trinity were all of the one essence (*homoousion*, not just *homoiousion*), which became official doctrine in the Nicene Creed. Compare, "All the Buddhas are one in essence" (Paul Carus, *The Gospel of Buddha* [Chicago and London, 1915], p. 259).

⁵ See above, 12 Feb. 1936, n. 6.

they were sort of wedding songs which were always of a typically sensuous character and if possible, obscene. You know, the Song of Songs is in parts quite obscene, but the obscenity then had not the evil connotation which it has now. The obscenities in antique cults had a sort of fertilizing power; it was sometimes believed that such allusions had a favorable influence on the crops. One finds that in the *Aischrologia* of Eleusis, where the rich ladies of Athens after a very good meal with wine started making obscene jokes, because it was supposed to have a favorable effect on the crops of the next season. Mother Earth likes to hear such jokes, it makes her smile, she brings forth rich crops, helped along by such allusions.⁶ Now have you any question before we leave this chapter?

Mr. Martin: Why does it come as a shadow?

Prof. Jung: Well, we mustn't be deceived by the word; our use of the term *shadow* has a very different meaning, but here it means unsubstantial like a shadow. Of course, Nietzsche's idea of the Superman, which I would express by the term of *the self*, would naturally appear first under the cloak of the shadow, using the word this time as a psychological term. It appears in what has been rejected. The *lapis philosophorum*, the stone of greatest price, is at the same time the cornerstone first rejected by the builders; also the matter out of which the stone is made or in which the precious stone is found is what is trodden underfoot or thrown onto dung heaps, cast out in the road. So psychologically it means that the thing which we think the least of, that part of ourselves which we repress perhaps the most, or which we despise, is just the part which contains the mystery. The test is: when you can accept yourself in your totality, then you have brought together the four elements—all the parts of yourself have come together from the four corners of the earth. There again the unconscious uses symbolism which is found in early Christian literature, in the *Shepherd of Hermas*,⁷ written in the middle of the second century: men come from the four corners of the world each bringing a stone which instantly melts into the building of an enormous tower made without joints. This is the building of the church, but it is at the same time the idea of the self which consists of many inherited units, so that it is even compared with a handful of grain or gravel or pieces of iron or of gold; all that multitude of units is brought together in order to build the self.

⁶ A woman named Baubo ("belly") would perform obscene dances to make Demeter laugh. See C. Kerényi's *Eleusis*, tr. Ralph Manheim (Princeton, B.S. LXV 1967).

⁷ See above, 13 June 1934, n. 21.

Now as long as things are in the state called by the alchemists *materia prima*, primal matter, it is dark and objectionable; nobody is convinced that the self will come from such a thing and therefore they don't find it. Psychologically it means of course that the mystery always begins in our inferior function, that is the place where new life, regeneration, is to be found. For we cannot finish perfect bodies, as the ancients say, we must work on imperfect bodies because only what is imperfect can be brought to perfection; a perfect thing can only be corrupted. This is perfectly obvious, so it cannot be done with the superior differentiated function. A very good, well-trained mind is the sterile field where nothing grows because it is finished. So you must take that which is most repressed by the mind, the feeling. And there you find the original chaos, a disorderly heap of possibilities which are not worked upon yet and which ought to be brought together through a peculiar kind of handling. You know we say psychologically that the inferior function, in this case the feeling, is contaminated with the collective unconscious; therefore it is disseminated all over the field of the collective unconscious and therefore it is mythological. So when you try to bring it up, a lot of archaic fantasies appear, the whole thing is unwieldy and utterly mistakeable; you easily take it for something poisonous or wrong or mad on account of that mixture of unconscious material. You reject it altogether therefore; no decent individual would have anything to do with an inferior function because it is stupid nonsense, immoral—it is everything bad under the sun. Yet it is the only thing that contains life, the only thing that contains also the fun of living. A differentiated function is no longer vital, you know what you can do with it and it bores you, it no longer yields the spark of life.

So a moment comes when people get sick of whatever they do and throw everything out of the window. Of course they are called the damndest fools for they are just the people who have had a great success in the world, and then they disappear, take to the wood life as they do in India, and there they live in an entirely different style. They live in their inferior function because that contains the life. So you see the new experience naturally appears from the side where there was dark chaos before, such a chaos that we prefer to know nothing of it; if we have ever encountered it we have tried not to see it. Now usually, as long as things are in a normal condition, this side remains invisible, and one never should imagine that one is up against such a problem when one is not; this is a thing which cannot be aped—one should not try to imitate or feel into it when one is not there. If one is there, one knows it; one does not need to ask. If not, one had better not dabble in

things which are most dangerous and poisonous. Well, that is the manifestation of the self under the cloak of the shadow. But I think here it is more the idea of an unsubstantial image, as unsubstantial as a shadow, also a foreshadowing, an anticipation. The beauty of the Superman appears to Nietzsche as a sort of anticipation, a shadow that falls upon his consciousness. Now, this is very genuine, one of the most genuine things in *Zarathustra*.

The title of the next chapter in German is *Von den Mitleidigen* which in my English translation is called "The Pitiful." This is a bit mistaken, according to my idea; I would rather say "The Compassionate."⁸ Now as usual we have to ask ourselves by what bridge the transition is made from the former chapter to the new one. I must say to the new members that I have explained *Zarathustra* as a series of images; if you look through the index of course nobody can see at the first glance that all those different titles form a sequence, but it is really an irrational sequence like the sequences people develop when they do the actual work in analysis. One could easily look at *Zarathustra* as a work which had originated in analysis; it is an involuntary analysis, but things have happened very much as they happen in a practical analysis—of course not of the ordinary kind, but in the synthetical stage where the fundamental attempt is to synthesize the transmuted individual. First the patient is taken to pieces, which can be done by the Adlerian or Freudian or any other way of analysis, and that may be perfectly sufficient from a therapeutic point of view. That is, the ordinary symptoms may be brought to disappear, and that can be indifferent to a doctor, naturally, whether a man goes on to a spiritual development or another kind of life. In the one case the doctor breathes on a symptom and it disappears by suggestion or something like that; or it can be done by analysis, and the patient says, "Oh, is that so? Very glad to know it. Thanks, goodbye."

But in the other case, something more is needed, and such cases are usually characterized by an intense transference. They want to break away, to say goodbye and be reasonable, but the unconscious says, "No, you are now going to be unreasonable and fall in love," which is of course all bunk—it is all crazy stuff, and they themselves think so, perhaps. But their unconscious without pity holds them to the transference because something else is demanded or expected of them, some further development. And that development goes beyond that mere taking-apart stage, which is quite rational and explicable, to a synthetic

⁸ Kaufmann* translated this title, "The Pitying."

process which, if observed and carefully taken down, appears as a series of images or pictures—or you can make chapters of it. For dreams are chapters; if you put down your dreams carefully from night to night and understand them, you can see that they are chapters of a long text. It is a process which moves in a circle if you do nothing about it. You can see that with insane people where the conscious is absolutely unable to accept what the unconscious produces, and in that case the unconscious process simply makes a circle, as an animal has its usual way where it always circulates; deer or hares or any other wild animals move like that when they are pasturing. And that is so with us inasmuch as the conscious is divorced from the unconscious. But the moment the conscious peeps into the unconscious and the line of communication is established between the two spheres of life, the unconscious no longer moves in mere circles, but in a spiral. It moves in a circle till the moment when it would join the former tracks again, and then it finds itself a bit above. So it imitates what form of life?

Mrs. Baumann: Plant life.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the origin of the symbol of the tree, or the plant, or the growth of the flower. Now, in Nietzsche's case it is not a going round in a circle, not a blind working of nature. There is an eye that sees it; his consciousness looks into the process and so hinders it from being a mere circle. It is a spiral which is moving up to a certain goal. And that process is dramatic: Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* is a drama really. *Faust* is very much the same in that respect. It is also an unconscious process, a drama which moves up to a definite goal. So *Zarathustra* is the making of something, or the making for something, and each chapter is connected with the preceding one in a more or less invisible way. For instance, it is not at all evident how one arrives from "The Happy Isles" at "The Compassionate"—that is dark. But if you carefully study the end of a chapter and compare it with the subsequent title, you discover how he arrives at the particular theme of the next chapter. But the transition is utterly irrational just as it happens in human life. You see, historical events usually develop as nobody has foreseen; something always comes along which nobody foresaw, because we think in straight lines, by certain rules. Now we are moving in that direction and will arrive in such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time. But that is all wrong, because life moves like a serpent in an irrational way; always when you go to the left, soon you will go to the right, and when you say Yea you will soon say Nay. It is irrational, but it is so nevertheless. So we are now confronted with the problem, why does he call the next chapter "The Compassionate"?

Mrs. Sigg: In the end of the last chapter, he speaks of the beautiful Superman, and then by contrast he sees again how miserable man really is. Nietzsche always finds compassion a very bad quality in human beings; he thinks it is a wrong Christian attitude which doesn't help to create the Superman.

Prof. Jung: So you take it that the vision of the beauty of the Superman really accounts for the vision of the misery of man: since man is really quite miserable, to talk of the beauty of the Superman is too much anticipation, too much optimism. There is truth in what you say but I have not the feeling that it fits completely. For instance, in the first sentence he says, "Walketh he not amongst us as if amongst animals?" Now what is the difference between the human being and the animal?

Mrs. Crowley: I thought, replying to your first question, it was that in the last chapter on the Happy Isles he is emphasizing the fact of being the creator, and in this chapter the animals come. It refers here to the idea of his being among animals: they are the thing created. That is the opposite again, the *enantiodromia*.

Prof. Jung: You mean that he would identify with the animals?

Mrs. Crowley: Or be like the animals in that he is just an ordinary thing that is created.

Prof. Jung: But he is here very much in contrast to animals. We had better read the first part,

My friends, there hath arisen a satire on your friend: "Behold Zarathustra! Walketh he not amongst us as if amongst animals?"

But it is better said in this wise: "The discerning one walketh amongst men as amongst animals."

Man himself is to the discerning one: the animal with red cheeks.

How hath that happened unto him? Is it not because he hath had to be ashamed too oft?

You see, that has to be taken into account.

Dr. Harding: Is it not that the feeling in the former chapter was said to be in prison, and when the feeling comes up as over against his willing, he feels compassionate towards feeling; but on the other hand he wants to go on with his willing. It is the feeling that makes man different from the animal, is it not?

Prof. Jung: Well, if you try to feel into the vision at the end of the preceding chapter, what it might mean to him to have that vision of the Superman, to hold that secret, you see that it gives him a very unique

position. That is a realization which emphasizes his solitude, his loneliness, and naturally he will be led to compare with other people who have not had it. Such a vision always separates people from their fellow beings. I have quoted quite a number of examples. For instance, our Swiss saint Nicholas von der Flüe had such a vision, and people ran away when they saw him. They could not stand the sight of his face—it was too hellish. Now that vision is an experience of the divine presence and naturally he will look around afterwards to see where he is. You see, that mocking remark that is made, that satire, is really a mocking remark he makes to himself. Am I not now a man, a human being that walks among animals? He cannot help comparing himself to his human surroundings and naturally the reaction is compassion—particularly so because we know by inference and through some knowledge of psychology that the Superman locked in the stone is the inferior function. That is feeling and sensation in his case, and that leads him immediately to the reality in which he lives. He is very clearly an intuitive thinker and by means of his differentiated functions he is able to discern.

But the vision is an entirely different process which comes from within or from below, from the regions of the undifferentiated functions. The feeling will naturally produce a feeling condition when it comes to the daylight and sensation will produce a reality, so he will surely be led to his reality. It is as if he had said, “Now we have seen the supernatural beauty of the Superman,” and then the feeling and sensation react and instantly he sees that he is amongst animals. For Zarathustra, mind you, is the living Superman, within him, with all his beauty; and he came to him as a shadow, a sort of anticipation, to show him what human beings are. And you can be sure it is a very negative picture because the inferior function is not positive. An intuitive thinker has negative sensation and negative feeling, and it surely doesn’t sound like a very nice feeling when he begins the chapter about compassion with the statement that he is walking amongst animals. To be addressed as animals, one would say, was a bit rough on his surroundings. And when he says, “The discerning one walketh amongst men *as* amongst animals,” this shows very clearly that the vision has taught him a lesson: he discerns something very clearly. What would that be? What is an act of discernment? What does it increase or augment?

Mrs. Crowley: Consciousness.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the discerning one is the conscious one. His vision of the Superman was so substantial obviously, in that he realized the pos-

sibility of a higher, more extended state of consciousness. It meant an increase of consciousness. Therefore he calls himself the discerning one; namely, the one who is conscious over against the blind and unconscious crowd. Expressed in antique language it would be *ennoia* in contradistinction to *anoia*. The one is the conscious man, redeemed, transmuted; and the other is unredeemed, black, dark, with no immortal soul. The one is *quasi modo genitus*, as if newborn, and the other is in an animal-like condition. The Catholic church makes a very serious difference there. They even have the dogma that children who die before being baptized, no matter how innocent they are—a newborn child cannot be sinful—are nevertheless deprived of the presence and vision of God. And what are they going to do with those unredeemed little souls? They must throw them into the wastepaper basket because they are not even fit for hell; or they may have somewhere a melting pot so they go back into the laboratory where new souls are made. But they are deprived of the vision of God as if they were sinners, only they are not submitted to eternal torture in hell. Now, the vision of the beauty of the Superman has an effect which you can observe very often in people who have had it or assume that they have had it: namely, they are easily inflated or inclined to be inflated, and look down upon the ignorant, animal-like crowd that is blind and unconscious. You see, the beginning of this chapter shows very clearly the attitude or the state of consciousness of such people. The Gnostics in the times of early Christianity had that sort of imagination or inflation about themselves, and you remember that St. Paul makes a remark about them. He uses the very word for inflation in the German text: *Viel Wissen blähet auf*, “Much knowledge is inflation.”

Miss Hannah: It is “puffeth up” in English.

Prof. Jung: “Puffeth up” is quite good. That is substantial and would describe the inflation they must have observed in those days. It must have been a very common phenomenon since Paul refers to it. Then the third paragraph, “Man himself is to the discerning one: the animal with red cheeks,” shows very clearly how far the discerning one is above the ordinary man. “How hath that happened unto him? Is it not because he hath had to be ashamed too oft?” Well, naturally one has to be ashamed of one’s companions when they behave like animals—this is a typical experience. He continues now,

Oh my friends! Thus speaketh the discerning one: shame, shame, shame—that is the history of man!

And on that account doth the noble one enjoin upon himself

not to abash: bashfulness doth he enjoin on himself in presence of all sufferers.

What does that mean?

Mrs. Sigg: I should say that it was just Nietzsche's problem. He was himself ashamed of the animal part of his nature; on account of his early Christian training he could not see any God-likeness in the animal. He could not connect God and animal as you do, for instance. And this is just a hint; the beauty of the Superman comes to him as shadow, which implies that there is a dark animal side to the Superman.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is true. The end of the tragic *peripetie*, the drama of Zarathustra, is really that he cannot accept the shadow, cannot accept the ugliest man, and so loses the connection with the body altogether. And that is surely in his case due to his early Protestant education which did not help him to accept the animal; he was really ashamed of his lower man and could not integrate him. You see, this shame or feeling of awkwardness which he experiences in the presence of sufferers is of course very exaggerated. It is a typical sort of hysterical exaggeration, but it makes it clear that he simply cannot stand seeing that inferior man, cannot stand the sight of his own inferiority. It is a sort of aesthetical offense to see how far man is from a Superman. And of course all that brought back to him how far *he* is inferior, how far *he* is from the Superman; therefore he is so particularly priggish and prudish with the imperfection or the defectiveness of man. There is also something primitive in it—in being shy of suffering or hesitant in dealing with suffering people. You see, primitives always assume that people who suffer from disease, or who are maimed, who suffer from malformation of the body, are very unfavorable. They are unlucky, and therefore one should have nothing to do with them. One should keep away from such people because they bring their unlucky mana into one's house. We still have such ideas. For instance, a general who has lost a battle is no longer considered fit. He has lost his prestige even if he wins the next. He is like a captain who has lost his ship and will never have another: he is unlucky so one can have nothing to do with him. That point of view is in Nietzsche aestheticized and exaggerated.

Verily, I like them not, the merciful ones, whose bliss is in their pity: too destitute are they of bashfulness.

If I must be pitiful, I dislike to be called so; and if I be so, it is preferably at a distance.

Preferably also do I shroud my head, and flee, before being recognized: and thus do I bid you do, my friends!

You see, here he is really getting terribly exaggerated about it and whenever he, or people in general, become so particularly exaggerated about certain statements, there is always more behind than meets the eye. You know, it seems to be a particularly ticklish problem to show the feeling of compassion. And what is the conclusion you would draw from such a priggish attitude?

Miss Hannah: That he is still frightfully caught by the church attitude.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly good as a historical explanation, and it would probably be true in his case because he is a parson's son and had too much of that kind of talk pumped into his veins. But we must also take into account that the man Nietzsche was then pretty far from the Christian church; he had gone a long way, and we must give credit to his accomplishments. So when he still goes on being so priggish, what must we conclude?

Dr. Harding: Has it not to do with his own sickness, and that he was in exile?

Prof. Jung: That is it. It is as if he were foreseeing what was going to happen to him; *he* is the man who had to be taken care of for about twelve years, absolutely *à la merci* of his surroundings. He was so particular about it because he felt that this thing was on him, and he would not see it. He would not have it, but tried to be heroic about it, while already he suffered from terrible migraines. He had to take drugs for sleeplessness, and had very bad days and weeks when he could not work; he wrote the most pitiful letters to his sister and friends about it. So he was very much a man who appealed to compassion, and moreover he lived on compassion. He had no money and earned none, and it was the good will of certain people in Basel that guaranteed a pension for him to live on. I happen to know a rich old lady who contributed to Nietzsche's life when he was writing *Zarathustra*. So that is the reason why he is so particular about compassion. And one might well be like that; one cannot be a great hero and identify with the Superman with that bad conscience in the background. It is then not solid ground, but is a bit slippery.

May my destiny ever lead unafflicted ones like you across my path, and those with whom I *may* have hope and repast and honey in common!

He has that desire to be concerned if possible with unaffected ones because he is afflicted enough himself, so naturally he has then a claim to be fastidious with his friends. You know, when people say, "Oh, I cannot stand those people, they are too neurotic, too psychopathic"—or something of the sort, you know why it grates on their nerves. If you cannot stand certain people you can draw your conclusion and are probably not far from the truth.

Verily, I have done this and that for the afflicted: but something better did I always seem to do when I had learned to enjoy myself better.

Learn it!

Since humanity came into being, man hath enjoyed himself too little: that alone, my brethren, is our original sin!

Exactly, if one only knew how! That is the great problem. How can you enjoy yourself? Do you know? Once a certain alienist sent a questionnaire round among the Swiss alienists asking for a definition of happiness; he was not exactly a happy man and he wanted to know from all those people who were supposed to understand something about psychology what the secret of happiness was, how to make it, so that he could make a sackful of happiness for himself. Now what would you have answered? How can you learn to enjoy yourself?

Miss Hannah: By not trying to be anything but what you just are.

Prof. Jung: That is the very first step but that does not mean that you can really enjoy yourself. I would say: Be enjoyable and then you will enjoy yourself. You cannot enjoy yourself if you are not enjoyable. People think they should enjoy something but the thing itself does not produce pleasure or pain; it is indifferent, it only matters how you take it. For instance, if there is a very excellent wine and you don't like wine, how does it help you? You must be able to enjoy it. The question is, how can you make yourself enjoy?

Mrs. Sigg: In Nietzsche's case it would be very much more possible if he could develop his inferior functions, feeling and sensation.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, in his case it is very clear; without feeling and sensation how can he enjoy his life, his world, or anybody else? You need a pretty decent kind of feeling to be able to enjoy a thing. You see, it must come to you, enjoyment is something that comes really by the grace of God, and if you are not naive, if you are not simple like a primitive in your inferior function, you cannot enjoy, that is perfectly obvious; you must still have that immediate freshness of a child or an an-

imal. So the more you accept your undifferentiated functions, the more you are likely to be able to enjoy something; to enjoy with the freshness of the child is the best joy, and it is something exceedingly simple. If you are sophisticated you cannot really enjoy, it is not naive, but is at the expense of somebody else; you enjoy it, for instance, when somebody falls into a trap you have laid, but somebody pays for your pleasure; that is what I would call a sophisticated pleasure. *Die schönste Freude ist die Schadenfreude* is a German statement—enjoying that somebody else has fallen into a hole which you have prepared. But a real enjoyment is not at the expense of anybody; it lives by itself, and this is only to be had by simplicity and modesty, if you are satisfied with what you have to provide. And you get it naturally from the inferior functions because they contain life, while the upper functions are so extracted and distilled already that they can only imitate a sort of enjoyment inasmuch as it is at the expense of somebody else—somebody else has to step in and pay for it.

And when we learn better to enjoy ourselves, then do we unlearn best to give pain unto others, and to contrive pain.

It is perfectly true that we really do enjoy ourselves too little and therefore take a particular pleasure in torturing other people. For instance, children who are cruel to animals or to their fellows are always children who are tortured at home by the parents; and the parents torture them because they themselves are tortured, either by themselves or the grandparents. If the grandparents are dead the parents continue their bad education and torture themselves: they think it is their duty, to do something disagreeable to themselves is their idea of morality. And inasmuch as they have such barbarous beliefs they pass on to their children that unnatural cruelty, and then the child tortures animals or nurses or fellow beings. People always hand on what they get, so what children do is a sort of indicator of what parents do to the children. Of course it is all done unconsciously. That is typical Protestantism, that is inherited sin; they hand on these things to the following generation and then they of course hand them on too. Nietzsche knew a great deal of that, that is perfectly certain. If people would only enjoy themselves they would not hand on so much cruelty; then they would not enjoy disagreeable things and would avoid doing them. Then they could say that they were very immoral but they would be responsibly immoral; they would have a sort of moral inferiority but they would have a legitimate punishment, and they would not hand on the punishment for what they had omitted to do. But inasmuch as they have a sense of duty

and call it morality, they think they must hand that on, and the following generations are punished in the same way.

Therefore do I wash the hand that hath helped the sufferer;
therefore do I wipe also my soul.

This is perfectly true under the assumption that the suffering is really a self-inflicted misery coming from the same premises under which Nietzsche himself suffered, that peculiar Protestant psychology.

For in seeing the sufferer suffering—thereof was I ashamed on account of his shame; and in helping him, sorely did I wound his pride.

You see, that is only when Nietzsche assumes that the other sufferer is in exactly the same sophisticated condition as himself, but that is not true. There he is complicated by sophistication, is trying to play the role of the hero. If a man is trying to identify with a heroic figure while he is really in misery, naturally he is very sensitive and it is quite delicate to deal with him at all, for his misery contradicts him. It shows that he is inferior, yet by his attitude he wants to make us believe that he is a great hero, that his suffering is completely overcome. Then we must help him to hide his own misery, but it is a lie and then your hands get dirty and you must wash them, and it is quite right that you are ashamed in such a case. But if you are dealing with real suffering, it is a different matter; to feel that you must wash your hands after touching real suffering is only possible when you yourself are in a state of misery which you do not want to acknowledge.

Great obligations do not make grateful, but revengeful; and when a small kindness is not forgotten, it becometh a gnawing worm.

LECTURE V

3 June 1936

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Dr. Harding: "Can you take up in further detail the section in the chapter on the Compassionate Ones where Nietzsche speaks of man as the animal with red cheeks? The interpretation given at the last seminar that he was ashamed on account of the unconsciousness of his fellow man does not seem adequate to me. Is there not an analogy with the story of Eden where we are told that when Adam and Eve had eaten of the tree of knowledge they were ashamed before God of their nakedness, which had never bothered them before? And perhaps—who knows?—they may have been ashamed of their clothes before the other animals? In fact, does not consciousness itself carry its own burden of guilt because the discerning one can no longer act with the complete rightness of unconscious instinct?"

Well, you have answered your question yourself, practically. That shame is of course a very typical reaction; it is a primitive reaction which clearly shows the distance that exists between the ego consciousness and the original unconsciousness of mere instinct. As long as man is in a merely instinctive animal condition, there is absolutely no ground for shame, no possibility of shame even, but with the coming of the ego consciousness, he feels apart from the animal kingdom and the original paradise of unconsciousness, and then naturally he is inclined to have feelings of inferiority. The beginning of consciousness is characterized by feelings of inferiority, and also by megalomania. The old prophets and philosophers say nothing is greater than man, but on the other side nothing is more miserable than man, for the ego consciousness is only a little spark of light in an immense darkness. Yet it is the light, and if you pile up a thousand darknesses you don't get a spark of light, you don't make consciousness. Consciousness is the sun in the great darkness of the world. Man is just a little lantern in the world of darkness, and as soon as you have a certain amount of ego

consciousness, naturally you are isolated and become self-conscious—you can't help it—and naturally you no longer possess the absolute simplicity of nature: you are no longer naive. It is a great art and a great difficulty to become like unto a child again—or better still, like unto an animal; to become like an animal is then the supreme ideal.

When you have built up your consciousness to a decent degree, you become so separated from nature that you feel it to be a disadvantage; you feel that you have fallen from grace. This is of course the expulsion from paradise. Then life becomes ego misery and lawlessness and you must create artificial laws in order to develop a feeling of obedience. Having ego consciousness means that you have a certain amount of disposable willpower, which of course means arbitrary feelings and decisions, disobedience of natural laws and so on; and that gives you a terrible feeling of being lost, cursed, isolated, and wrong altogether. And of course this causes feelings of shame. Compare your state of innocence with the innocence of a little child and you have ground for shame; and compared with an animal you are nowhere. So the dawn of consciousness was naturally a tremendous problem to man; he had to invent a new law-abiding world of obedience, the careful observance of rules; instead of the herd or the natural animal state, he had to invent an artificial state. He has now succeeded in making of the state a tremendous monster, such as nature probably never would have tolerated, but he had to do it in order to compensate that *sentiment d'incomplétude, d'insuffisance*. For we should not live instinctively any longer. We had to invent machines and law books and morals in order to give mankind a feeling of being in order, of being in a decent condition—something similar to paradise where the animals knew how to behave with each other. You see, the great world seems to be a self-regulating orderliness, an organism that moves and lives in a more or less decent way. The catastrophes are not too great or too many. There are not too many diseases—only a decent amount to kill off enough animals. But we know that we can break out at any time and destroy as no volcano and no epidemic ever destroyed, and we chiefly injure our own species; we would not dream of making an international war against flies or microbes or against whales or elephants—it isn't worthwhile—but it is worthwhile when it is against man. That is so much against nature that on the other side, man seeks to protect himself by complicated machines, states, and contracts which he cannot observe. So this first reaction of shame symbolizes the moment when man felt his tragic difference from paradise, his original condition.

Yet that original condition was also not a very happy one. The prim-

itive man did not feel his unconscious condition to be very satisfactory. He tried to get away from it. Of course we have the idea that the original condition was a wonderful paradise, but as a matter of actual fact man has always tried to move away from that unconsciousness. All his many ceremonies were attempts to create a more conscious condition, and any new positive acquisition in the field of consciousness was praised as a great asset, a great accomplishment. Prometheus stealing the fire from the immortal gods has become a savior of mankind, and man's greatest triumph was that God himself incarnated in man in order to illumine the world; that was a tremendous increase of consciousness. But every increase of consciousness means a further separation from the original animal-like condition, and I don't know where it will end: it is really a tragic problem. We have to discover more consciousness, to extend consciousness, and the more it is extended the more we get away from the original condition.

The body is the original animal condition; we are all animals in the body, and so we should have animal psychology in order to be able to live in it. Yes, if we had no body then we could live with contracts and marvelous laws which everybody could observe and a marvelous morality which everybody could easily fulfil. But since we have a body it is indispensable that we exist also as an animal, and each time we invent a new increase of consciousness we have to put a new link in the chain that binds us to the animal, till finally it will become so long that complications will surely ensue. For when the chain between man and animal has grown so long that we lose sight of the animal, anything can happen in between, the chain will snarl up somewhere. That has happened already and therefore we doctors have to find in a conscious individual the place where the chain begins; we have to go back to find out where it has been caught or what has happened to the animal at the other end of the line. Then we have to shorten it perhaps, or disentangle it, in order to improve the relationship between the consciousness that went too far ahead and the animal left behind. This figure of the chain is not my own invention. I found it the other day in a book by an old alchemistic doctor, as the so-called symbol of Avicenna;¹ the alchemists were mostly doctors and they developed their peculiar kind of psychology by means of very apt symbols. This one consists of an eagle flying high in the air, and from his body falls a chain which is attached to a toad creeping along on the earth. The eagle of course represents the air, the spirit, and in alchemy it had a very particular meaning. The

¹ Avicenna (980-1037), Islamic physician and philosopher, interpreter of Aristotle.

eagle would remind any alchemist of the phoenix, the self-renewing god, an Egyptian inheritance.

Now we will go on to the next question. Mr. Martin says: "In last week's Seminar you referred to the difficulty the old hermits experienced in distinguishing between the working of the Devil and of the Holy Ghost. Does not a very similar difficulty arise in analytical psychology? How is it possible in practice to distinguish between 'archetypal invasion' (of which Zarathustra is an example), and the appearance of the 'releasing symbol' which is the essential feature of the transcendent function? How is one to know whether one should use a long spoon in dealing with the visitant, or whether one should trust its leading? Again, is the origin of these two great manifestations of the unconscious the same in both cases? The archetype is a very characteristic form of action or situation, experienced many times before in the history of humanity and prehumanity, which becomes activated. Is the releasing symbol similarly a piece of human experience, floated into consciousness by the regressive libido; or is it more likely (judging by its general nature) to be an answer given by the self to the problem with which the individual is struggling?"

I am very glad that Mr. Martin has taken the trouble to ask this question. It is true that the difficulties the old monks and Christian philosophers experienced, when they tried to distinguish the *influxus diabolicus* from the working of the Holy Ghost, is a very fundamental problem. I gave you an example in the way Athanasias dealt with it, but I admit of course that his criterion—that the Holy Ghost comes in the stillness after great noise and confusion—is rather vague. It was probably of service in those days, but we would not now be able to use such a definition since we have no longer the same experience. Those people lived entirely alone for many years under most primitive conditions, generally in the desert, so they naturally had hallucinations. That happens very easily when one is quite alone. But we live in the crowded cities, and even in the country it is the same, only one is then usually invaded not by archetypes but by human beings, who are usually visible so one is able to deal with them. You see, that is all within the human scope; you can deal with them, can say *they* are guilty or wrong. But archetypes are much worse than human beings; you cannot put the blame on them because they are not visible and they have the most disagreeable quality of appearing in your own guise. They are somewhat of your own substance, so you feel how futile that would be. While if you blame human beings, you feel that you have done something quite useful: you have gotten rid of your own inferiority. Now

they have to be inferior and damn them if they are not. Human beings are of great use as scapegoats. So we have no experiences that would compare in any way with the experiences of those lonely birds in the Libyan desert.

If you have experienced loneliness in nature for any stretch of time, you know how easily one begins to hallucinate—one hears one's name called for instance, or one feels presences or hears footsteps. And those Christian hermits in the year 100/150 would experience just marvels: the air would be full of uncanny noises, not only voices and visions. Athanasias tells of the most amazing things that happened to them. In Flaubert's *La Tentation de St. Antoine*, you get a fairly good picture of the turmoil in a primitive hermit's hut or cave.² Now, over against that *turba*, that confusion and turmoil, the criterion of Athanasias, the stillness of the Holy Ghost, would of course be most convincing. If the air has been filled with ten thousand devils and unclean existences, when all that has vanished and the whole thing collapses, the great stillness that came after, and the purity of the air, would give them the feeling of being redeemed. They would be sure that this was now the Holy Ghost even when they did not hear the Bible read in the next compartment; they were presumably very glad to be rid of the noise of the holy words. So for that time, that is a perfectly satisfactory argument, but we are living under entirely different circumstances and must have of course an entirely different criterion. We must have first of all the archetypal experience and there the trouble begins.

According to my experience, it is usually exceedingly difficult for the ordinary man to grasp at all what that means, because we are living so much in our personal psychology, in personal relations, in personal projections—we are so linked and cemented with human society—that we cannot perceive or conceive of anything impersonal. I experience the most unholy trouble when I try to say a word about the objectivity of our psychology: it is not popular. But now let us assume that people are quite ready to have archetypal experiences, that it really happens to them to perceive something of the objective workings of the unconscious, and let us assume that it *is* so—which is not quite self-evident—then that ancient question is put again: is it the powers of the air, of the water, of the earth, of the fire—in other words, is it an elementary power? Or is it the Holy Ghost? Now, inasmuch as it is evident that an

² Gustave Flaubert (1821-1880) described in his *Temptation of St. Anthony* (1874) how the credulous saint, faced with a world of contrary evidence, insisted, "We must believe in the Scriptures. . . . Leave it to the Church." St. Anthony or Athanasius (et al.) reported on the Christian hermits of the desert in *The Paradise [or Garden] of the Holy Fathers*.

archetype is operating—which in itself means nothing more than that nature is operating—this is neither good nor bad. It can be quite demoniacal and it can be quite good—generous and marvelous. It is morally indifferent. It is like a tree full of fruit: the tree lets the fruit fall and you pick it up and say how good the tree is. But the next year it has no fruit at all; you might die of starvation under that tree: it is just nature. And thus the archetypes are simply the functioning of natural elements of the unconscious, neither good nor bad. Inasmuch as we need nature, we need the life of the archetypes—it is indispensable. But though you need water for your life, you can also be drowned in a surplus of water; you need the sun yet the sun can scorch you to death; you need fire yet you can be destroyed by fire. So the archetypes naturally work both good and evil, and it all depends upon your skill whether you can manage to navigate through the many elementary dangers of nature.

Therefore, you so often have the ship as a symbol: even religions are called ships or vehicles. You remember the Christian allegory where Christ is at the tiller of the church, and in German the word *Schiff* means the nave of the church—the church is a ship. It is the same in the East, the Hinayana and the Mahayana, the little and the great vessel, designate the two forms of Buddhism. A religious system is like a safe form, a body of teaching, of principles, of advice and so on, which is destined to help man to navigate over the troubled waters of the unconscious. It is a human contrivance to protect one against the dangers of real life. There is no real life without archetypal experiences. The ordinary life is two-dimensional—it consists of pieces of paper—but the real life consists of three dimensions, and if it doesn't it is not real life, but is a provisional life. We are always exposed to the operations of nature and therefore we are always in need of a system of thought, or laws, or prescriptions—a sort of wisdom that would help us to navigate on the sea of the unconscious. And it is chiefly the skill of man that creates such a system. Not that *he* can bring it together; to say this is *his* skill is of course an insufficient statement: I am using there the ordinary language. People usually assume that they are the inventors of such things, that Moses is the inventor of the law, for instance—and even Christ is understood to be a sort of moral philosopher who had very good ideas, like Socrates; and the prophets in the Old Testament were really people who were just bothered with the fate of their nation and tried to help people by good advice.

But this is a sort of euhemerism which of course doesn't explain the facts; the real facts are that all these methods that make the ship are

not inventions, but are revelations; it is a revealed truth or a perceived truth which has been thought before man has thought. Before I had that thought it had already been thought, and I merely happened to perceive it once in time; it has been there since eternity, is always there, has always lived, and I just happened in a certain moment to perceive it. Then of course I myself might get an inflation; if one touches upon such a thought, that happens. A fiery chariot comes from heaven and carries you away and you think you have invented an automobile; but wait until it comes to a standstill and you find that *you* have invented no fiery chariot because you are absolutely done for. So these things have been thought by an invisible thinker—we don't know where they come from. But I should call this the "Holy Ghost": that gives the helpful thought, personified in many forms in many times, for instance, as Oannes, the teacher who daily comes out of the sea according to the old Babylonian idea; or the boy Tages who comes out of the furrow the peasant has plowed and teaches the people useful things, how to protect themselves against all sorts of evils;³ or it is the *Puer Aeternus* in Roman antiquity; or any other helpful god who reveals the truth. All these different personifications are always one and the same thing, the revelation of the thought that existed before man had the thought; and inasmuch as this thought is helpful, inasmuch as it reconciles a vital need of man to the absolute conditions of the archetypes, one could usefully say, "This is the Holy Ghost."

The Holy Ghost creates that symbol, that situation, or that idea or impulse, which is a happy solution of the postulates of the archetypes on the one side, and the vital needs of man on the other side. Then blind dark nature is again reconciled with the monocularity of man, his one-sided consciousness, and then the tragic gap between man's graceless consciousness and the dark abundance of the unconscious is for once shut again by the intervention of that thinker of helpful thoughts, a real Paraclete. That would be my definition of the function which has been personified in Christian antiquity as the "Holy Ghost." I would not know any better: it is a function that is just as friendly as it is inimical, to man as well as to archetypes. Sometimes the Holy Ghost is apparently quite against the vital needs of man as he imagines them; at another time it is against obvious nature, or it is for absolutely nothing but the demands of nature which we would call immoral. Yet the Holy Ghost insists upon it, and can bring it about because it is a superior thought. And when man has intelligence enough, good will enough,

³ See CW 5, pars. 291-92.

instinct enough, to be able to perceive the superior power which at bottom is helpful, he has to submit—then he *can* submit. But if it is *nothing but* an archetype, then this is simply an elementary condition to which you can submit if you want to, to which you don't need to submit—provided always that it is not the working of the Holy Ghost. You see, the Holy Ghost “speaks to your condition”; this is a most excellent term of the Society of Friends which I learned from Mr. Martin. When a thing speaks to your condition, it means that it has gone home, it has hit the nail on the head, it clicks, it constellates something in you. The Holy Ghost is exactly that thing which speaks to your condition: you feel it all over and therefore there is no hesitation, no resistance.

If you try to resist, you create an artificial neurosis. That is most helpful, a very useful experience which I recommend. I hope you will have the experience once of being commanded by the Holy Ghost and disobeying the command. Then you see how it starts, and when you find it awkward and decide you better come round and obey the Holy Ghost, you see how it collapses. So the Holy Ghost is like a devil and can fill the air with devils if you don't obey, but the moment you obey, all the spooks collapse. You can have all the experiences of those hermits in the desert. What are a thousand years? Just nothing. You can have those experiences again if you expose yourself to those conditions. Then you can see how a neurosis or a psychosis is made and you can see how one heals it. Of course the indispensable condition is that you have an archetypal experience, and to have that means that you have surrendered to life. If your life has not three dimensions, if you don't live in the body, if you live on the two-dimensional plane in the paper world that is flat and printed, as if you were only living your biography, then you are nowhere. You don't see the archetypal world, but live like a pressed flower in the pages of a book, a mere memory of yourself.

Most people live like that in our time, an entirely artificial two-dimensional existence, and therefore they have no archetypal experience; for instance, a personal psychology, like that of Adler or Freud or any other educational experiment, is all two-dimensional. Of course you can say with great plausibility, “one ought to,” “one should,” and think you have done something, as when you move a letter on a flat page you think you have done something. Yes, you have created a new paragraph but of course nobody takes heed of it; as soon as you are exposed to real life you know that the whole system collapses as a perfectly flimsy house of cards.

So if I seem to avoid speaking of the Holy Ghost, it is not that I dis-

miss that idea entirely, but that we are living in this two-dimensional world where people are not up to archetypal experiences and therefore, instead of that language of the real life, one can only use the language of the two-dimensional paper life. All that is utterly invalid in the real life where one has archetypal experiences; then one talks of the Holy Ghost quite certainly, as one talks of God, for this world has nothing to do with the perfectly artificial world of consciousness which is a sort of laboratory, or a rose-garden, or a chicken farm carefully fenced in. There, nothing happens inside of the enclosure which you have not made to happen; anything that happens unforeseen is a misfortune, and of course under human conditions you can always accuse the neighbor of having done it. But if you live in a world where there is no neighbor but the eternal deity, you cannot blame a neighbor. Then you know that your neighbors are ghosts, archetypes, the elements of life. You cannot complain of neighbors when you are in a boat on the sea—there are no neighbors: you are then in an archetypal condition.

Mr. Allemann: But don't you even then put the blame on the neighbors?

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, that is true; you can say the devil brought you into such a situation if it is evident. But that is only good in a human court; the whole archetypal world rocks with laughter when you accuse the devil. That doesn't help you at all.

Mrs. Jung: Do you mean by "archetypal experience" a *conscious* archetypal experience? For when one has an archetypal experience one doesn't necessarily recognize it as being such.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, that is the artificiality of our conscious world. It is like assuming that this room, in which there are doors and windows leading to the outer world, possesses no such doors and windows; or like turning our backs on them and imagining that this is the whole world. You see, that is the prejudice, the hubris of consciousness—the assumption that we are in a perfectly reasonable world where everything can be regulated by laws. We don't recognize the fact that just outside is a sea that can break in over our continent and drown our whole civilization. As long as we turn our eyes to the center of the room we are blissfully unaware of the fact that there is any archetypal situation whatever: we don't collide with the elemental world outside. As a matter of fact, the whole room is, as it were, suspended in an elementary world, as our consciousness is suspended in a world of monsters, but we simply won't see it; and when these monsters at times peep in or make a noise, we explain it by indigestion or something of the sort.

We rationalize it, or if we cannot rationalize it we say it is a miracle which we don't understand—we refuse to understand. You see, this magic circle or this magic enclosure of consciousness is such a triumph—it has given man such security in a way—that he naturally tries to believe in it and to shield it against doubts. Moreover, we ought to shield it, ought to build that enclosure because the progress of consciousness is instinctual; we have to shield it in order to increase consciousness, and in doing that we increase it knowingly, knowing the danger of isolation. So it is as if we were building the most marvelous walls and dams, and then open the floodgates and let the water in, just that. For the soil of our consciousness dries up and becomes sterile if we don't let in the flood of the archetypes; if we don't expose the soil to the influence of the elements, nothing grows, nothing happens: we simply dry up. We are always a bit between the devil and the deep sea, and therefore we always need the intervention of the Holy Ghost to tell us how to reconcile the most irrational and the most paradoxical. For man is a terror in that respect, the highest principle on the one side and a perfect beast on the other. Now how do you reconcile the two? That is the conflict of Faust and Wagner, and Faust says to Wagner:

Du bist dir nur des einen Triebs bewusst,
O lernen nie den anderen kennen.⁴

Wagner is the typical representative of the two-dimensional world.

Mrs. Baynes: There is a point that I would like to ask, pursuing Mrs. Jung's question. Is it not true that each period of time has to find afresh its relationship to the experience of the archetype? For instance, the hermits could not be said to be conscious of the experience as we define consciousness.

Prof. Jung: No, they could not. They lived in a different time and under entirely different conditions, so their experience is necessarily different from ours. You can see the transition through the ages. It is a most interesting process, which of course I could not elucidate without very careful preparation.

Mrs. Baynes: Don't we have to say, then, that not only must we have a communication from the Holy Ghost, but we must *say* that there is a communication? That is, we must have an attitude between ourselves and the communication before we can say we are at the level of this period of consciousness. For instance, take the Wotan archetype which is apparently going round the world today; many people are experienc-

⁴ "You are conscious of but one drive, / Oh, never seek to know the other."

ing that archetype but we cannot say that they are *consciously* experiencing it because they are in it. But if we are to be on the modern niveau, we have to be able to say, "This is an archetype."

Prof. Jung: Yes, one postulates a certain difference of ego consciousness from the archetypal *Ergriffenheit*.⁵ You see, it is a matter here of a sort of periodicity: namely, it is like the mental or psychological evolution of an individual in our time of conflict and confusion, a time of inundation. Say you have been very one-sided and lived in a two-dimensional world only, behind walls, thinking that you were perfectly safe; then suddenly the sea breaks in: you are inundated by an archetypal world and you are in complete confusion. Then out of that confusion suddenly arises a reconciling symbol—we cannot say "the" in spite of the fact that it is always the same—it is *an* archetypal symbol or a reconciling symbol which unites the vital need of man with the archetypal conditions. So you have made a step forward in consciousness, have reached a higher level; therefore it is of course a transcendent function because you transcended from one level to another. It is as if you had crossed the great flood, the inundation, or the great river, and arrived on the other bank, and so you have transcended the obstacle. Now in that new condition you will fortify yourself again, will build new walls; for a very long time you will live on the experience of this spiritual intervention that has given you the reconciling symbol. You will take it as a final and definite manifestation of the deity perhaps if you are religious and have *pistis*, loyalty to your experience. And that is the way it should be even if you have to stay on that level to the end of your days, as so many people do. This intervention is rare; we have very few such experiences. To have a revelation of a reconciling symbol doesn't happen a dozen times in an individual lifetime.

Well now, if it is a question of the whole of mankind, then once in the course of centuries people fall into great confusion. They are flooded, and a reconciling symbol is revealed which now becomes the truth, the new basis of consciousness; the German term *Weltanschauung* expresses it.⁶ It becomes a new *pistis*, a new faith, and it will be fortified by walls. It will be defended. And it will work as long as the walls stand. Then suddenly the walls break and a flood comes and we have a new condition in which a new symbol should be revealed, or where the revelation of a symbol may be hoped for. Of course we cannot make it be-

⁵ *Ergriffenheit*: emotion.

⁶ See CW 16, pars. 175-91, for Jung's address, "Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life."

cause it is not our thought, but is the thought of the invisible thinker that is waiting its time. When the condition of man is such that we have no more force to resist or oppose with our ideals—the old ideals are the worst enemies of the new—and if our resistance is utterly gone, then the manifestation of the new symbol can take place. And then the evolution goes on as it always has gone on. Is that clear?

Mrs. Baynes: Well, I think it boils down to my wanting to know whether or not the transcending function requires conscious perception in order for it to consummate itself.

Prof. Jung: Of course. You see, as long as you don't know what you are suffering from, you are not having an archetypal experience. If you are on a ship that is sinking and go on playing poker in the smoking room without noticing that your feet are getting wet and that the whole thing is going down, you never experience the catastrophe—you are dead before you notice anything. It is absolutely necessary that you make the experience conscious, that you know you are up against an elementary situation. That is of course the very first condition. Yet to apperceive the situation is not the only task for consciousness. There is still more: you have to hold your own, to fight for your own existence in the flood. If you simply go under, knowing that you are going under, you have not dealt with the situation. You have to swim, to use every means possible to defend your own against the flood—you must wrestle with those archetypes—and only when you are really up against it to the last breath, only then, the revelation may take place. But you cannot foresee how it is possible, so you have to show fight, to hold your own. Usually when archetypes come in, people just collapse—they are utterly afraid, completely gone. Then you can only take the broom and clean up the whole mess, or somebody has to hold them to enable them to stand up against it at all. Well, they did not understand that an archetypal manifestation is of immense elemental power, so the shock is all the greater. If a person who has never had an archetypal dream suddenly has one, how he jumps! It is amazing. Now we have another question to deal with: "Will you explain what you mean when you speak of archaic elements in the self?"

We have already dealt with this question in the Seminar, but of course it is not too much to go over the ground again because it is a very important and disturbing problem. You see, archetypes *mean* archaic elements because they are forms of psychical life which have an eternal existence. They have existed since times immemorial and will continue to exist in an indefinite future. And they always retain the character which we call "archaic" (*arche* means beginning or principle). They

date from the primeval state of things and are those forms of life which operate with the greatest frequency and regularity. From the functional point of view, one could describe them as a system or a functional unit which contains the picture of the conflict, the danger, the risk—and also the solution of it. That is the typical aspect of the archetype, and therefore it is helpful in many ways: namely, as a preexisting solution of certain average conflicts. I mean certain elemental conflicts or differences, like the archetype of the crossing of the ford for example. The archetypal situation is always beset with all sorts of dangers, such as being devoured by the dragon or swallowed by the great fish, and the hero is always doing something in order to get out of the danger, either combatting it or liberating himself when caught. This is the narrow pass, or the two rocks that clash together, or the mouth of the monster, and so on. Now, these archetypes make up the so-called archaic elements of the self.

The self is by definition the totality of all psychical facts and contents. It consists on one side of our ego consciousness that is included in the unconscious like a smaller circle in a greater one. So the self is not only an unconscious fact, but also a conscious fact: the ego is the visibility of the self. Of course, in the ego the self only becomes dimly visible, but you get under favorable conditions a fair idea of it through the ego—not a very true picture, yet it is an attempt. You see, it is as if the self were trying to manifest in space and time, but since it consists of so many elements that have neither space nor time qualities, it cannot bring them altogether into space and time. And those efforts of the self to manifest in the empirical world result in man: he is the result of the attempt. So much of the self remains outside, it doesn't enter this three-dimensional empirical world. The self consists, then, of the most recent acquisitions of the ego consciousness and on the other side, of the archaic material. The self is a fact of nature and always appears as such in immediate experiences, in dreams and visions, and so on; it is the spirit in the stone, the great secret which has to be worked out, to be extracted from nature, because it is buried in nature herself. It is also most dangerous, just as dangerous as an archetypal invasion because it contains *all* the archetypes: one could say an archetypal experience was the experience of the self. It is like a personification of nature and of anything that can be experienced in nature, including what we call God.

Therefore the term *self* is often mixed up with the idea of God. I would not do that. I would say that the term *self* should be reserved for that sphere which is within the reach of human experience, and we

should be very careful not to use the word *God* too often. As we use it, it borders on impertinence; it is unlawful to use such a concept too often. The experience of the self is so marvelous and so complete that one is of course tempted to use the conception of God to express it. I think it is better not to, because the self has the peculiar quality of being specific yet universal. It is a restricted universality or a universal restrictedness, a paradox; so it is a relatively universal being and therefore doesn't deserve to be called "God." You could think of it as an intermediary, or a hierarchy of every-widening-out figures of the self *till* one arrives at the conception of a deity. So we should reserve that term *God* for a remote deity that is supposed to be the absolute unity of all singularities. The self would be the preceding stage, a being that is more than man and that definitely manifests; that is the thinker of our thoughts, the doer of our deeds, the maker of our lives, yet it is still within the reach of human experience. And that thing consists of archaic elements, of all the doubtful things with which we have to struggle. For we *have* to struggle with the self. The self is not *apparently* inimical. It is *really* inimical—and it is also of course the opposite. It is not only our best friend, but also our worst enemy; because it doesn't see, it is as if not conscious of time and space conditions. We must say to the self, "Now don't be blind; for heaven's sake be reasonable. I shall do my best to find a place for you in this world, but you don't know the conditions. You don't know what military service means or tax collectors or reputations. You have no idea of life in time and space. So if you want me to do something for you, if you want me to help you to manifest, you must be reasonable and wait. You should not storm at me. If you kill me, where are your feet?"⁷ That is what *I* (the ego) am.

The self makes terrible demands and really can demand too much. For it is the next manifestation of the unconscious creator that created the world in a marvelous dream. He tried for many millions of years to produce something that had consciousness, something like a human being. He tried frogs first, a thing that has two arms and two legs and no tail, but it was coldblooded so it didn't work. Then he drew the conclusion that it must have warm blood, that apparently only the warmth of blood succeeds in producing intensity of consciousness and a refined brain. First he tried to make the skeleton outside the body and found it was no good, and then he made it inside the body. That is the way the thing worked: he kept on for millions of years trying to produce this effect. But that does not show very much forethought. It is

⁷ See above, 27 June 1934, n. 11, for Silesius and Rilke.

just a blind experimenting: you feel that blind urge which wants to come into existence, and it is beautiful and cunning and evil as nature is. And you are the pioneer of that urge, the seeing and the hearing head and the clever hands with which you should make form, make space and existence for that thing which wants to become. That urge is always behind you, always forcing you on quite blindly, and when it becomes too bad you simply say, "Be reasonable, you overrun me. What is the use of it?" But you can only say *that*. If you lie and try to cheat the blind creator then woe unto you. It is like the play of the water that always finds a hole through which it runs out. So the builder of a dam says, "That is a devil of a river: it always finds the place in the foundations where the stones are a bit weak and undermines it—why not the place where the stones are good?" No, exactly, that is the cunning of nature; wherever the weak spot lies, wherever you try to deceive the creative deity, there you will be undermined. It doesn't help you to cheat, it doesn't help you to say, "No, it is impossible." It is only impossible when the argument is watertight; then if it is really impossible, that argument will be heard.

For Tao is of the nature of the water: it always finds the deepest places and will of course undermine the weak spot; no cheating possible, you undermine yourself by wrong statements. So you must always be very careful to consider your situation before you say, "It is really too much, I cannot do it." Otherwise it simply washes the ground from under your feet and you suddenly slip down. You should have tried first, and if it is really impossible you must say so. Then it will be heard: that is the archetypal moment in which the intervention of the Holy Ghost takes place. Then your building with the powers of nature creates such an affinity between the archetypal world and your miserable attempt at consciousness that you become one again with the archetypal world, and that is the divine moment of the revelation.

So you can say everything of the self; you can say it is a devil, a god, nothing but nature. It is your worst vice, or your strongest conviction, or your greatest virtue. It is just everything—the totality. You can even say it is the Holy Ghost. It is the victory of the divine life in the turmoil of space and time. The success is that it could manifest in space and time, that it could break through into existence and appear to the world; and whenever you suffer or enjoy such a victory you have succeeded in giving wider space to the existence of the self. I know nothing truer than that fact that something wants to live, to exist, to unfold: the tiger wants to be a tiger, the flower wants to be a flower, and the snake, a snake, and man, a man. They all want to exist and to appear.

And we want to increase our consciousness. Whether we know it or not doesn't matter. If we can produce the success of life by the aid of the divine intercession, we have fulfilled the purpose of our existence. Of course we can speculate about it—why it *should* be so—but we shall never know why it is so. Yet I think it is useful to have the right ideas, and I call an idea *right* or *true* when it is helpful: that is the only criterion.

For instance, how can you know whether a certain fruit is good or poisonous? You eat it and then you will see; if it is good and nourishing, if it doesn't poison you, that is what I call *true*. And in the same way, if a truth feeds me when I eat it, I say this is a good truth. If I don't know whether I should assume the human soul to be immortal, I simply take it in: I eat immortality, and see what the influence is on my digestion. If it is a bad influence I spit it out and will never eat it again; if it has the right effect upon my nervous and mental system I assume that is the right way. And so we can assume a lot of things inasmuch as they agree with our functioning. If they agree with life they are just as good as truth. Perhaps you don't know whether the body needs salt, so you abstain from eating it and there are bad consequences—you suffer from the absence of salt; whether you know why doesn't matter: the absence of salt is enough and you will be injured. So when a certain truth is absent, you will suffer and be miserable, and if it can be accepted and agrees with your system, it is good stuff. That is my only criterion; if it agrees, it works. You see, we are allowed to—even have to—speculate about certain things: why there should be such a fuss about the consciousness of man, for instance. Why should there be that urge that man should become conscious? It is a pre-conscious urge; once man was entirely unconscious, and then he was forced into consciousness, a most tragic enterprise. It would be much better if he stopped increasing consciousness because that means more machines, more tragedy, a greater distance from nature; but we go on. We are forced by the thing that thinks before us, that wills before us, so we assume that the deity demands the consciousness of man.

Yet if we look on his works which we can observe through millions of years in the study of paleontology and anthropology, we see that the whole thing has gone on in an irregular way. It never had much system in spite of being exceedingly clever, so we assume that the creation was no systematic attempt, but was just dabbling and experimenting and finally falling right, more or less. That is the conclusion that comes and stuns us. If one knows anything about natural science, one can see what an incomplete attempt the creation turned out to be. It was, for

instance, quite clever that water reached its greatest density at four degrees centigrade above zero; if it had not been so, our rivers and lakes and seas would be filled with ice that never melted, and the climate of the earth would be intolerably cold. And if it were not so, *our* creation at least would not have been possible.

Now under those conditions we are allowed to make the speculation that because the creator is blind he needs a seeing consciousness, and therefore he finally made man who was the great discovery. He could say something. He could become conscious that he lived in a space of three dimensions. The creator has made a time-space cage; he split off the fourth dimension from space and the three remaining formed a marvelous cage in which things could be separated. And when time was added, the different conditions which evolved in space could be extended in the time dimension. There is extension in space and extension in time, so one could see things clearly, one could discriminate—and that is the possibility of consciousness. If there is no difference, no consciousness is possible. Consciousness means discrimination. That people could say, “This is this, and that is that,” has been the greatest discovery. So man became exceedingly important.

But it was not just man. He was the carrier of that most precious consciousness and the urge to become conscious became a passion because it was very much in demand. Then through the revelation of the Christian symbolism, we learned the most important fact that the deity had found a means in the human psyche to be reborn, to be born through man. That is the message, the great symbolic teaching; and that of course increases the conscious psyche of man to an extraordinary degree. It becomes the divine cradle, the womb, the sacred vase in which the deity itself will be locked in, carried and born. This is really an *eu-angelion*. So we have to look at this whole question of consciousness, of the human mind and so on, from an entirely new point of view.

Now that is of course all speculation, but I tell you it is perfectly good for my system and it might be for yours too, inasmuch as you can make such a speculation and inasmuch as you can observe how that thing grows in you. Otherwise it means nothing, and it would be a mere theft if you stole my words and ran away with them. But if you observe something that seems to be the real substance, that grows—when you yourself find it—not only in one place but in many places, then you can eat it and it will feed you. If I just tell you a story about that plant, you have only eaten my words and you remain empty: you know that you have potatoes in America but you have seen none here. But if you find

potatoes somewhere, you know this is the plant that can be eaten and that they are very nourishing. This is my standpoint for speculations. Well, we got a bit away from the original problem of the archaic contents, but we cannot settle such a question without taking into account other aspects of the problem.

Mrs. Sigg: It seems as if all that you have said has brought us just to our chapter, because the absence of this truth which you have now explained about the self was the cause of all Nietzsche's suffering. He could not believe in a God. The God that was taught to Nietzsche had no archaic element in him. There was no chance—he was not allowed—to discuss things with God because that was not the Protestant standpoint. He was in a very difficult position: he felt the urge and could not help himself.

Prof. Jung: He could only rage against himself, which he tried not to do.

Mrs. Sigg: But if he had had this conception of the self?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, I hope that this food would have been good for him, but he obviously did not get at the real potatoes.

LECTURE VI

10 June 1936

Prof. Jung:

We have a very difficult question by Dr. Harding—we are getting deeply into speculative metaphysics, “Last time you spoke of the ego as being the visibility of the self.”

Well—before going further—you remember that this is a psychological statement. The psychological definition of “the self” is “the totality of the psychical processes,” whatever that means; at all events the sum total of the unconscious and the conscious contents and processes would be the psychological definition of “the self.” Now of course, anybody is allowed to treat the idea of the self from the standpoint of what one calls, in modern German philosophy, existential philosophy; that is, you can deal with it as being actually in existence instead of as a mere concept. But in psychology the self is a scientific concept with no assumption as to its metaphysical existence. We don’t deal with it as an existence and we don’t postulate an existence, but merely form a scientific psychological concept which expresses that totality, the nature of which we are ignorant of. We know far too little about it because we have only a certain amount of knowledge of our conscious processes and contents and an exceedingly restricted knowledge of the unconscious processes—otherwise one would not call them unconscious. So the unconscious is essentially unknown, and if a thing consists of a more or less known part and a more or less unknown part, its existence is surely a most obscure one. Scientifically, then, one must be exceedingly careful in making assumptions about the nature of that mostly unknown quantity. Of course you can speculate about it: you can assume, for instance, that the manifestations of that total psyche issue from a definite metaphysical existence. That is a perfectly sound conclusion, but you must admit in that case that you are moving in the speculative sphere of metaphysics, that you are then thinking more or less mythologically. That is also sound; it is legitimate to think mythologically, and if you give the proper chance to the self-manifestation

of that kind of thinking, it is psychological material which can be submitted to historical or philosophical or theological comparison. But it is admittedly not a scientific statement. We must be quite clear about this point before we discuss this very interesting question.

Now I will read the rest of the question. "We think of the self as being a manifestation of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is one and indivisible. Are we to think of the self as likewise *one*—the same in everyone? When, for instance, we dimly see the likeness of the self in certain people do we see the same thing in each, modified only by the ego development; or is it more likely that the self is different in different people? That, as it were, the Holy Spirit has been split up by coming into manifestation in time and space? You spoke of the self as being the nearest to us of the heavenly hierarchy which leads up to God, the Infinite and Infinitely Remote. Should we then think of each 'self' on the ascending planes as being more and more inclusive, more and more general, until, to use the Buddhist phrase, it reaches the selfhood of God, which must include all the 'selves' as manifested in different people?"

This is an entirely speculative question. In reference to the statement that we think of the self as being a manifestation of the Holy Spirit, I must say that I don't dare to think like that; in thinking about the phenomenology of the self, I cannot recognize any trace or any quality in that manifestation which would justify me in assuming that there is anything behind it which I could designate as the Holy Spirit—nothing that is a definite image of our Christian mythology, I mean. Spirit is also a definite psychological phenomenon, or we would not have such a word to designate it. So to arrive at an understanding of what the Holy Spirit psychologically consists of, we have to examine the phenomenology of what our language calls spirit, quite apart from the concept of its holiness. The spirit is a peculiar condition, or a quality, of psychological contents. We have certain contents which derive from the data of our senses, from the material physical world, and over against those we have contents which we qualify as spiritual or belonging to the spirit. Now, they are apparently of an immaterial origin, of an ideational or ideal origin that may derive from archetypes. But the very nature of that spiritual origin is just as obscure to us as the so-called material origin. We do not know what matter is: *matter* is the term for an idea used in physics which formulates the presumable nature of things; and so spirit is a peculiar quality or idea of something which is immaterial and in *its* essence perfectly unknown.

Now, we would use the word *holy* in a case where there is a mana as-

pect, where the situation has a fascinating, numinous or tremendous character. You know, Otto makes those three differentiations, *numinosum*, *tremendum* and *fascinosum*, as the three peculiar qualities of what one would call "holy," "sacred," "taboo," or "mana."¹ The mana concept is very useful because it contains all those aspects. So when the immaterial nature of a psychological content has a mana quality, we would call it "holy," and we would call that kind of form or quality a manifestation of the Holy Spirit. For instance, if an alchemist succeeded in having a wonderful vision in his retort, if a great enlightenment took place and he had the feeling that he was making progress in his work, he would say it was the *donum spiritus sancti*, the gift of the Holy Ghost. Because he was overwhelmed by the impression of an agency, a significance, a meaningfulness in what he was doing, he was forced to assume or recognize in it the work of the Holy Spirit. So the Holy Spirit is a formulation of certain phenomena which have nothing to do with the self directly, though you may naturally connect the two and say that wherever the self manifests, you have the feeling of the holy presence, of the *donum spiritus sancti*.

In the Christian legend, for instance, we have evidence of such enlightenment; and that feeling of being redeemed, of conversion—the vision of Christ, for instance—can be explained as parts, or as manifestations, of the process of individuation, Christ being the symbol of the self. The vision of Christ would be the perception of the self in a projected form naturally, and one could say this was at the same time a manifestation of the Holy Spirit inasmuch as it is an *overwhelming* spiritual experience. The vision and understanding of the old Hermetic philosophers led to the idea of the *circulus quadratus*, the squared circle, and the marvelous Golden Flower of Chinese philosophy, and the philosophical gold, and the cube which is the philosopher's stone—all are similar symbols.² These can be called symbols of individuation or of the self, and the finding of them, or their coming up, their self-revelation, appeared to the Hermetic philosophers as a *donum spiritus*

¹ Rudolf Otto (1868-1937) in *The Idea of the Holy* (1917) coined the term *numinum* (which Jung seized upon) to describe a feeling of awe and wonder beyond the goodness of what is holy. *Tremendum* was his word for the feeling of a gentle tide, a strange excitement, sometimes mounting to frenzy in the presence of mystery. *Fascinosum* named the uniquely attractive, over-abounding attraction of holiness.

² Jung often pointed to the interchangeability of alchemical gold and the philosopher's stone. Richard Wilhelm reproduced a golden mandala (squared circle) in *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (German original, 1929), a book for which Jung wrote a foreword and psychological commentary. CW 13, pars. 1-84.

sancti, the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore they say that nobody can arrive at a solution of their art unless God assists, *Deo adjuvante*, or only *per gratiam Dei*, through the grace of God. In that way you can unite the two things, but you could not say that the self is a manifestation of the Holy Spirit, because, if I understand Dr. Harding rightly, that would mean that the Holy Ghost is prior to the self. From the phenomenology of the symbols of the self we have no justification for that assumption; the only thing we can establish safely is that the empirical perception of the self-revelation has the character of a *mana experience* and therefore this could be called the Holy Spirit: there the two things come together. Moreover one should not omit mentioning that the Christian dogma makes a very clear distinction between the aspect of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The latter is the *divine breath* and not a *person*. It is the life breath that flows from the Father into the Son.

You see, spirit to me is not an experience which I could substantiate in any way; it is a quality, like matter. Matter is a quality of an existence which is absolutely psychical. For our only reality is psyche, there is no other reality; all we say of other realities are attributes of psychological contents. Now, Dr. Harding says the Holy Spirit is one and indivisible; yet it is part of the Trinity and thus only One inasmuch as it is God. The self, on the other hand, is *per definitionem* really one and indivisible; therefore, it is called historically "the Monad" and is therefore like Christ, the *Monogenes* the *Unigenitus*, etc. It is one by definition because we call the totality of the psychological or psychical events "the self" and that must necessarily be one. Also the concept of *energy* is one by definition because you cannot say there are many different energies; there are many different powers but only *one energy*. So the idea of the self includes the idea of oneness because the sum of many things must be one. But it consists of many units: the actual empirical phenomenology of the self consists of a heap of innumerable units, some of which we call hereditary, the Mendelian units.

Now, as the self is *one* in every individual, we are more or less led to the question, whether that self is perhaps also *one in several or many individuals*, in other words that the same self that manifests in one individual could manifest in quite a number of individuals. You see, that question is empirically possible because of the existence of the collective unconscious which is not an individual acquisition. It has an *a priori* existence; we are born *with* the collective unconscious, *in* the collective unconscious. It is prior to any conscious function in man. Moreover it has peculiar qualities which we have often mentioned, the telepathic qualities, which seem to prove its oneness. The more you are in the col-

lective unconscious the more you are undivided from other individuals. The oneness of the collective unconscious is the reason of *participation mystique*; primitives live in a peculiar oneness of psychical functioning. They are like fishes in one and the same pond—as we also are to a remarkable degree. We have of course thousands of facts to prove that sameness, but the telepathic phenomena in particular prove an extraordinary relativity of space and—almost *more* interesting—of time. You see, you can say about the phenomena of space, “Oh well, these things were coexistent. The radio now teaches us that we can hear somebody speaking in Shanghai at this moment with no trouble; and if that is physically possible, it might be psychically possible just as well.” But that you should today hear somebody talking, not in Shanghai but here in Zürich in the year 1980, is unheard of because there is no coexistence. Of course, such things don’t happen and if anybody says they do we would say that he suffered from hallucinations. But there is such a thing as prevision in time. Things can be more or less accurately foreseen; and if that is possible it means a relativity of time, so there would be a relativity of time as well as of space.

These doubts are not exactly my own: modern physicists have their notions in that respect and are just about to discover these peculiar psychological facts, which are so impressive that I always say that our psyche is an existence that is only to a certain extent included in the categories of time and space. It is partly outside, or it could not have perceptions of non-space and non-time. Now, if it is true that our time and space are relative, then the psyche, being capable of manifesting beyond time and space—at least its part in the collective unconscious—is beyond individual isolation; and if that is the case, more than one individual could be contained in that same self. Then it would be like this very simple example which I often use: Suppose our space were two-dimensional, flat like this table. Now if I rest the five fingers of my hand on this flat surface, it appears as only five finger tips. They are quite separate, simply spots on the plane of the two-dimensional space, so you can say they are all isolated and have nothing to do with each other. But erect a vertical upon your two-dimensional space, and up in the third dimension you will discover that those are simply the fingers of a hand which is one, but which manifests as five. You see, it is quite possible that our collective unconscious is just the evidence for the transcendent oneness of the self; since we know that the collective unconscious exists over an extraordinary area, covering practically the whole of humanity, we could call it the self of humanity. It is one and the same thing everywhere and we are included in it. Then we have

dreams, and the material of the unconscious in general, as well as the results of active imagination, give a certain amount of evidence for the fact that the self can contain several individuals; also that there is not only one self empirically but many selves, to an indefinite extent.

For instance, those old hierarchies like the one of Dionysius the Areopagite, father of scholastic philosophy,³ or the ideas of the Gnostics, or of Paul, all point to the same idea: namely, that the world has a peculiar hierarchic structure, that different groups of people are presided over, as it were, by one angel, and that those angels are again in groups and presided over by archangels—and so on, up to the throne of God. You find such representations quite often in the Middle Ages where the heavenly hierarchies were represented even in the form of mandalas. Now, these are simply self-representations of the unconscious structure, and inasmuch as we attribute existence to these things, we are allowed to speculate about them, say in the form of the Christian or the Gnostic ideas. One finds the same thing in India, an absolute *consensus gentium*, only there the thinking goes the other way round: instead of starting from the isolated empirical fact, it always starts from the abstract metaphysical unit. They start from the idea of the one indivisible being that splits up into the millions of forms of Maya, but it is of course the same whether you consider it from this end or that. There are very interesting definitions: The *Hiranyagarbha*, the golden germ or the golden child, is the first germ of the manifesting Brahman, and *Hiranyagarbha* is defined as the accumulated collective soul that includes all individual souls. It is the self of selves of selves of selves. *Hiranyagarbha* is the absolute equivalent of the philosophic egg, or the philosopher's stone, or the *circulus quadratus*, or the Golden Flower. It is not the result of something but the beginning of everything, the one mind that starts all other minds. So, as Dr. Harding says, one can use the Buddhistic phrase: *Hiranyagarbha* is the selfhood of God. The self then becomes simply a designation or the specification for the appearance or existence, because a thing that has no appearance whatever has no existence. Existence can only *be* inasmuch as it is specific. Therefore, inasmuch as Brahman comes into existence out of his latent potentiality, he becomes *Hiranyagarbha*, the golden germ, the stone, or the egg, or the first shoot, or the first lightning.

³ The pseudo-Dionysius, whose Neoplatonic/Christian works probably appeared at the end of the fifth century, was long confused with Dionysius the Areopagite, an Athenian convert of St. Paul. For Jung, the former is important as the most forthright denier of the reality of evil. Obviously neither Dionysius bore any resemblance to the Greek god Nietzsche honored.

Well now, we finally go back to Nietzsche. The last verse we read was, "Great obligations do not make grateful, but revengeful; and when a small kindness is not forgotten, it becometh a gnawing worm." He continues,

"Be shy in accepting! Distinguish by accepting!"—thus do I advise those who have naught to bestow.

I, however, am a bestower: willingly do I bestow as friend to friends. Strangers, however, and the poor, may pluck for themselves the fruit from my tree: thus doth it cause less shame.

Now what does he advocate here? Has anybody a shrewd intuition about it? What should the poor do? You see, if he gives, they must be ashamed, and *he* is also ashamed, as he later on says. And if he doesn't give and they cannot ask, what remains for them?

Mr. Allemann: To take, to steal.

Prof. Jung: Of course.

Beggars, however, one should entirely do away with!

Yes, that is wonderful.

Verily, it annoyeth one to give unto them, and it annoyeth one not to give unto them.

And likewise sinners and bad consciences!

What does he want to do here? What is his great redeeming effort?

Miss Taylor: He wants people to live according to their own law and not to reproach themselves.

Prof. Jung: Ah yes, that is very nicely said, but it might be their own law that they are such beggars, and he says that one should do away with them.

Mrs. Jung: He wants to do away with disagreeable feelings.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he wants to do away with all the evil in the world, with all these very sorry existences, and since they of course would strongly protest against such an attempt to wipe them out of existence with the metaphysical broom, the whole thing boils down to the fact that he wants to get rid of his own disagreeable feelings when he meets the misery of the world. Therefore do away with the imperfection of the world and the problem is settled. That shows his psychology: he has an inferior feeling and naturally that is projected—any inferior function is always projected—and so he is particularly affected by the misery of the world. You think he is suffering from compassion, while as a matter of fact he would much prefer to get rid of everything which

causes that disagreeable compassion. He hates everything that reminds him of the existence of his own inferiority—which is to be expected.

Believe me, my friends: the sting of conscience teacheth one to sting.

If one could wipe out bad conscience, what a blessing! But alas, it is not to be wiped out, and the more it stings, the more *one* stings. Only one that is tortured tortures; anybody in a healthy state of well-being never tortures, except perhaps by his unconsciousness. That is a very important principle of education; for instance, children who are torturers have always to be carefully examined to find out whether they are not tortured by a most wonderful education at home.

The worst things, however, are the petty thoughts. Verily, better to have done evilly than to have thought pettily!

I only want to point out here how, in such passages, Nietzsche deals with the petty things—the small, incomplete, imperfect things. He always has a tendency to wipe them out, and through the whole development of *Zarathustra*, these small things slowly accumulate until in the end they reach a definite form in a special figure. Do you know what that is?

Mrs. Crowley: The ugliest man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and he is then in the end condemned to hell wholesale.

To be sure, ye say: “The delight in petty evils spareth one many a great evil deed.” But here one should not wish to be sparing.

Meaning that if you can satisfy yourself with a greater number of small petty sins, you can slip through the net, can muddle along. But if you commit one substantial sin or crime, it cries aloud; you are detected, revealed, and you can no longer say, “Nothing has happened, I am quite all right, I slipped through, I have not been caught by the police.” So he is all for the honorableness or honesty, of taking the definite stand.

Like a boil is the evil deed: it itcheth and irritateth and breaketh forth—it speaketh honourably.

“Behold, I am disease,” saith the evil deed: that is its honourableness.

But like infection is the petty thought: it creepeth, and hideth, and wanteth to be nowhere—until the whole body is decayed and withered by the petty infection.

You see, that is exactly what happened to him: he is of course in favor of the great things, even the great crimes, and he tries to be as evil as possible by uttering all sorts of blasphemies. But as a human being he was quite harmless, incapable of committing anything very bad; he could only fall into the traps of fate, like his syphilitic infection. He made a mistake in that he heaped up the petty things by repressing them, and did not give them the right place. He did not see that any great evil is an accumulation of thousands of small ones, and that very often a very terrible thing has happened because small things have been heaped up. It would have been very much better if those people had muddled along in the ordinary way instead of piling up those petty evils till they resulted in a great explosion and great damage. Also if one heaps up petty evils by repression, they work indirectly: whatever you repress, whatever you don't recognize in yourself, is nevertheless alive. It is constellated outside of you; it works in your surroundings and influences other people. Of course you are blissfully unconscious of those effects, but the other people get the noseful.

To him however, who is possessed of a devil, I would whisper this word in the ear: "Better for thee to rear up thy devil! Even for thee there is still a path to greatness!"—

Well, that needs no comment.

Ah, my brethren! One knoweth a little too much about every one! And many a one becometh transparent to us, but still we can by no means penetrate him.

It is difficult to live among men because silence is so difficult.

And not to him who is offensive to us are we most unfair, but to him who doth not concern us at all.

If, however, thou hast a suffering friend, then be a resting-place for his suffering; like a hard bed, however, a camp-bed; thus wilt thou serve him best.

And if a friend doeth thee wrong, then say: "I forgive thee what thou hast done unto me; and thou hast done it unto thyself, however—how could I forgive that!"

Thus speaketh all great love: it surpasseth even forgiveness and pity.

This is an important passage. You see, the unforgiveable thing is what thou hast done unto thyself. He formulates it in such a particularly drastic way over against the Christian prejudice of loving your neighbor and damning yourself. Of course, that is not the Christian form, but that is the way it is applied: anybody who loves himself is considered to be something along the line of a criminal, yet of course the original meaning of that saying was that it is self-evident that you love yourself, but not that you love your neighbor. We have twisted this very important truth; we base ourselves entirely upon the idea that we should love our neighbor, that it is unfair to hate him but quite fair to hate oneself. You expose yourself to the worst mistakes and misinterpretation if you say you love yourself; it is even quite unsound to pay any attention to yourself. The "know thyself" of Plato became extremely unpopular in our late Christianity, so "as thyself" has become inaudible and "love thy neighbor" is declared by the loud speakers of all movements.⁴ Of course, over against that mistake in favor of the herd that is kept in monasteries and churches and so on, the individual has disappeared completely. He has become a pathological nuisance, the contents of a neurosis. Nietzsche sees that very clearly and puts a very high premium upon that consideration of oneself which sees that one can commit sins against oneself. This thought of Nietzsche is of course to us a very important psychological consideration, but we have evidence that already in the first or second centuries it was a current idea.

For instance I have already quoted the *logia* of Christ from the Ox-rhynchus papyrus, and then there is the famous second letter of Clemens, where a very similar idea is expressed. Also, the philosopher Karpokrates who lived around 140 A.D. interpreted the Sermon on the Mount on the subjective stage. The original text is: "If thou bringest thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath fought against thee; leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." But Karpokrates read that in the following way: "If thou bringest thy gift to the altar and there rememberest that thou hast aught against thyself, leave then thy gift and go thy way; be reconciled to thyself and then come and offer thy gift." And he says that the brother whom you blame or whom you vilify is yourself.⁵ You see, this was a most impor-

⁴ Or, of course, long before Plato, or Socrates, as the prevailing commandment at Delphi.

⁵ For the *logia* of Christ that says God is present even with a single individual, see p. 217, 217n above. For Karpocrates, see above, 13 June 34, n. 13.

tant teaching but unfortunately it was against the politics of the church. The church would not allow that care for yourself. It interfered with the magic institution of the church and its power of intervention. The church has always defended its magic prerogative of bestowing the grace of the sacraments, the sacred food of immortality, in the rite of the Holy Communion; nobody can reach immortal life or a state of redemption without partaking of the communion, which means of course that the church is indispensable. The individual can get nowhere without the church. So, having instituted the church, God can do practically nothing in an individual, for the church would then be meaningless. The individual is nothing, only a herd particle, and of course that brings about, in the course of centuries, an extraordinary collective psychology. Of course it had to be like that—it was unavoidable—yet we have to recognize the fact that there are people who are more or less individuals, who simply don't allow any church to interfere with their particular feelings or with their particular deities. They consider it an entirely private and exclusively individual affair. And such people of course listen to these voices of the past, like Karpokrates or the sayings of Jesus in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, etc., knowing that they have a lot of evidence in history and numbers of passages in the New Testament in their favor.

Nietzsche also takes a very lenient point of view in reference to the poor. You know, that famous parable about the unjust steward contains this very Nietzschean point of view. This other side of the early teaching is very unpopular within the walls of the church: you hardly ever hear a sermon preached about the unjust steward. It is particularly difficult for our peculiar mentality, but it contains a precious piece of Nietzschean morality. It is in the 16th chapter of Luke. A steward had neglected the estates of his master, and when the master heard that he had been unreliable and had wasted his goods, he called for him and said:

How is it that I hear this of thee? Give an account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest be no longer steward.

Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away from me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.

I am resolved what to do, that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses.

So he called every one of his lord's debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How much owest thou unto my lord?

And he said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill and sit down quickly and write it fifty.

You see, he is cutting down the obligations. Then when the Lord had considered the bill which the steward presented to him, he

commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light.

And I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations.

And now he continues:

He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much: and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much.

If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true riches?⁶

You see, this extraordinary paradox is just running on like water and oil; of course oil and water never mix but here they run on together. Now, what idea did the Lord have in his mind when he commended his unjust steward? We must assume of course that the Lord in this case is God, and the steward is man who is trusted with the goods of the Lord and has done very badly. And we must also assume that the Lord is not a fool, but sees quite clearly how inefficient and unreliable man has been. Yet here the Lord behaves as if he were a blind bat, as if he had been entirely deceived by the unjust steward. That we cannot assume, so what then?

Miss Hannah: He is pleased that he has succeeded in keeping himself together, in getting those other people to support him.

Prof. Jung: Well, if you compare the next part of the text, the way it runs on, you get a very peculiar feeling. For in what has that unjust steward really succeeded? Only in saving his face. You see, it *looked* all right, so that the Lord was only too glad that he could say, "Oh yes, that is all right, you are a very nice fellow; you have saved your face, you have muddled through. It would have been terribly awkward if I had detected you and had to accuse you publicly to show what a bad steward I have." So he has not only saved his own face but also the face of the Lord, and the Lord is quite grateful to him. Now isn't that extraordinary? The Lord is glad that mortal man has just muddled through.

⁶ Luke 16:1-11.

But that is really the best we can do, mind you. This shows that the Lord is merely a loving father who knows that his child cannot be good, so if the child does not collapse when it has committed a sin, if the bad steward is not a pale criminal, if he saves his face afterwards and if he is clever, then the Lord is quite satisfied that the vessel he has made is not entirely broken. Of course, that it is a very bad vessel has to be admitted, but it held together and that is all the Lord can expect. You know, it really was a very poor work on the part of the creator—there is a bit of Gnosticism here—to have made such a poor steward, to have made such an inefficient vessel as man to deal with the powers of darkness and chaos. He does the best he can—he couldn't do any better—so if he only saves his face and his existence and holds the whole thing together, that is enough. And live by all means, hang on, and if you are clever enough to make friends with the representatives of capitalism, never mind—that enables you to live. Now, all this is exceedingly bad. The only other possibility of an explanation would be that we assume that the Lord is an idiot who doesn't see that the steward is a cheat. But this is not only bad, it is also idiotic, which makes it worse; the one thing is bad *and* idiotic, and the other is bad *but* it makes sense.

Mrs. Jung: Is it not possible that it is a mistake because it is in contradiction to all other teachings?

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is quite possible that there is a gap here, but unfortunately the text does run on like that, and my idea is that if it had been understood really, it would have been wiped out as other passages were wiped out. You remember that famous passage in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus: "Whenever there are two they are not without God, and wherever there is one alone I say I am with him," and then in the New Testament this is made of it: "For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." You see, the church had already been formed, so if there were one alone, he would be with the devil, just the opposite of the saying in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus that the Lord is then with him. These texts have probably undergone some changes, all the more because in those first centuries they were considered to be merely good literature and not necessarily holy; only at the end of the second century, or later even, was the character of holy revelation attributed to them, and that was only after they had been purified by very clever clergy. My conclusion is that they must have overlooked this, as they did not understand it. The greater part of the Gnostic texts have been badly mutilated or quite destroyed by the church, but the intelligence of the fragments that are left is astonishing.

It is perhaps to the failure in understanding that we owe certain fragments of the Gnosis which give us a most precious insight—the fragments, for instance, where Christ says, “He who is near me is near the fire, and he who is far from me is far from the kingdom.”⁷ That is extraordinarily revealing. Or when he says to the man who offends against the sabbath: “If thou knowest what thou art doing thou art blessed, if thou knowest not then thou art cursed.”⁸ That is also a bit of the Gnostic morality which has, of course, been cleared out of the canonical text. We only know of these fragments because the Fathers of the church quoted them as being particularly foolish or blasphemous, not understanding what they really meant. It is a wonderful piece of good luck that the Oxyrhynchus papyrus was discovered. It throws an extraordinary light upon the history of the evangelical texts. This passage, “If thou knowest what thou art doing thou art blest,” is surely a piece of that kind of morality. And it is surely a formula which would help philosophers and educated people to live; since they could not be as naive as the masses, they had to have such a formula, otherwise they would not have become Christian. For instance, the saying of Karpokrates that you cannot be redeemed from a sin you have not committed, is absolute truth, but what does that imply? Those are problems you simply do not find in the writings of the Fathers or in the New Testament except by mistake, and this might be such a mistake.

Now Nietzsche, in reaction against the exclusively extraverted valuation of morality, insists upon the subjective importance, or the importance of the self as an objective fact. That is, if you cut out yourself, if you only identify with your love, not minding what you are, then you can be anything and one doesn't know at all what your love is worth. For your love is worth just what *you are*. You see, that is entirely excluded when the first part: “Love your neighbor” is insisted upon, forgetting all about “as thyself”; in that case the self remains in the dark and can be whatever it pleases. You forget entirely that the love used is from that particular self and if that self is obscured you never know what the love is worth. Love is not something in itself, but is the love of a specific individual, so we want to know who the individual is and whether he really consists of 90 percent pure gold or 90 percent pure nonsense.

This passage, “Thus speakest all great love: it surpasseth even forgiveness and pity,” is also an important hint. In our prejudiced age,

⁷ See above, 30 Jan. 1935, n. 3.

⁸ See above, 8 May 1935, n. 7.

our late Christianity, we only must say the word *love*, assuming that it is something very wonderful, and nobody asks *who* loves, who is doing the loving. But that is what we really want to know, because love is nothing in itself. It is always a special human being who loves and the love is worth just as much as that individual. People think that they can apply love with no understanding, think love is only an emotional condition, a sort of feeling. Yes, it is a feeling, but what is the value of the feeling if it is not coupled with a real understanding? For instance in the Middle Ages, they coined the formula *amor et visio Dei*, which means "love and the vision of God," *vision* meaning recognition, understanding, the understanding that Paul also meant, which we only reach through thinking. So when you make of love a mere feeling, the second part of it is lacking, and with such a love you might hurt yourself against a human being who doesn't feel that in the least as love. He simply feels you with your ridiculous love as thoroughly autoerotic, because the understanding is lacking; with love must be coupled understanding and feeling. For the Christian concept of love is a universal concept, like the concept of freedom for instance, which is an idea. Therefore, great love as Nietzsche understands it, contains also true understanding, and true understanding knows that love is not a thing-in-itself. It is not an activity that is hovering in space somewhere which can be fetched down by anybody. Love is my own doing and it has just as much worth as I have and not a penny more.

One should hold fast one's heart; for when one letteth it go, how quickly doth one's head run away!

Exactly, one cannot be in an emotional condition only.

Ah, where in the world have there been greater follies than with the pitiful? And what in the world hath caused more suffering than the follies of the pitiful?

Woe unto all loving ones who have not an elevation which is above pity! [That means insight.]

"Thus spake the devil unto me, once on a time: 'Even God hath his hell: it is his love for man.' "

Yes, that is very good.

And lately, did I hear him say these words: "God is dead: of his pity for man hath God died."

How is this paralleled?

Miss Hannah: By the crucifixion.

Prof. Jung: Yes, God's incarnation in Christ, and that he really died a human death on the cross is the act of supreme pity. Now, the death of Christ is a very important question, it was a problem in the early church. There was a famous controversy between the Ebionites and the Doketes. The Doketes said it was the *man* Jesus who died on the cross, and not the god. Do you know how they arrived at that idea?

Mr. Allemann: They said that he only became the Christus when he was baptized by John and that the spirit of the Christus was taken out of him before his death.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the idea was that Jesus was an ordinary man as long as he was not initiated by John the Baptizer; in the baptism the Christus in the form of the Holy Ghost descended upon him. And the Christus departed from him when he sweated blood in the Garden before his crucifixion. He could not have been crucified if the god had remained in him, and that the god left him in the Garden was the reason for his despair, the evidence being that he called out, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" This is a perfectly good and interesting point of view and played a great role in the early church, but it was declared to be an awful heresy. That hypothesis was made to avoid the shocking idea that God could undergo a miserable human death: they simply could not stand the idea of a god undergoing such a punishment. Now, if we take that as a symptom, it would seem as if something in man in those days resisted that awful idea that the god could be so utterly extinguished. There was a sort of instinct against it. Yet we must consider that on the other side this conflict was overcome by the majority of the people in the assumption that God *had* undergone that death, that he was there to the last moment.

The idea that Christ is *homoousios*, of both human and divine nature, is of course the orthodox point of view, over against the Arian heresy that he is *homoiousios*, only *similar* in substance to the deity and not completely divine. The standpoint that Christ as God really underwent the human death won out, and if you translate that into psychological language it means that the god, the active background of our unconscious, undergoes completely the fate of man and cannot be excluded from it. That emphasizes of course the extraordinary importance of human life; we cannot say this is all illusion, that it is the divine substance in us that passes through millions of incarnations and is always outside of us. No, it undergoes the actual suffering of life, undergoes all our misery. The god enters and is present in all our misery—he is in no way different from it; as we are absolutely imbued with the misery of life and identical with it to a certain extent, so also is the god, and

that means the god can die. So we would arrive at the conclusion that when man died the god also died and was buried. Then something very peculiar must have happened. The gods had always been above and immortal; they never came down to earth. Sometimes they took on an earthly form, had perhaps an illegitimate son on earth, but this time the son was the god himself. Now, that symbolizes a certain mental condition where the unconscious is completely identical with the conscious of man, and then that concept, that image of God, goes underground. That is of course a complete revelation: it is the pouring of the *influxus divinus* into the world. It is the light that shines into the darkness, as John says,⁹ and it is contained in the darkness from now on, buried in the world, buried in the flesh even. This thought is continued in alchemy. That is the interesting thing.

⁹ "And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not" (John 1:5).

LECTURE VII

17 June 1936

Prof. Jung:

We stopped last time at the paragraphs: "Thus spake the devil unto me, once on a time: 'Even God hath his hell: it is his love for man.' And lately did I hear him say these words: 'God is dead: of his pity for man hath God died.' " Now why does he say the devil whispered such things in his ear? Doesn't it look like a funny concession? He also seems to have certain doubtful moments. Looked at from a Christian point of view it makes sense, but looked at from the Zarathustrian point of view it makes no sense—so we must conclude that it is really a concession to his own Christianity. For to say that even God hath his hell means that God is in hell, which is a blasphemous idea; and therefore a Christian would naturally be forced to say the devil had insinuated it. So Nietzsche still cannot help yielding at times to his Christian background. I make use of this as a piece of evidence for my thesis that Nietzsche is the ordinary historical man, the traditional Christian, and his peculiar standpoint in *Zarathustra* is just due to the fact that he is possessed by the archetype of Zarathustra that naturally would speak an entirely different language. At times, the man Nietzsche appears as if coming out of clouds, and at another time he disappears utterly, and then it is not a human being speaking but an eternal image, an archetype called "Zarathustra." That is happening here of course when he says God is dead, which is a blasphemous assertion and an offence to the ears of a Christian, so he needs must say it is the devil speaking. Now we have already spoken of the fact that it was out of his pity for man that God underwent his incarnation and died; the divinity or the deity made an association with matter, and matter, according to Zarathustra's statement, caught him. Now we will go on.

So be ye warned against pity: *from thence* there cometh unto men a heavy cloud! Verily, I understand weather-signs!

Now to what on earth—or in heaven—does he allude here?

Mrs. Sigg: I think if people only have pity and love for their neighbors and not for themselves, there must come a catastrophe because they have neglected themselves too much.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is very much Nietzsche's idea and that is perfectly true. You see, to speak in the style of Zarathustra, that God took pity on man cost him his life; he went out of his own position, he transformed, and was caught. So if man does the same, if he allows himself to indulge in his pity, he will be caught. His interest in himself will be taken away from him. It will be invested in other people, and he himself will be left high and dry, completely deprived of that precious creative substance which he should have given to himself. Many people prefer compassion. It is so much nicer to be compassionate to other people than to themselves, and so much easier because they then keep on top; other people are to be pitied, other people are poor worms that ought to be helped, and they are saviors. That is very nice; it feeds that unquenchable thirst of man to be on top. It is a wonderful narcotic for the human soul. Everybody disapproves of the idea of compassion for oneself; they interpret it as self-indulgence and vice. And it is very disagreeable to be compassionate with that most imperfect man in yourself who is in hell, so you had better turn your attention on your neighbor; there are many weeds in your own garden, so go to your neighbor's and weed out his. Now his compassion, this projected kind of interest, Nietzsche takes to be a very serious danger: "*from thence there yet cometh unto men a heavy cloud!*" What could that cloud be? What is this tremendous innuendo? You see, Zarathustra tries to convince his audience of the fact that God is dead, that the Superman ought to be created, and that in order to create him, you are no longer allowed to waste your compassion on your fellow beings, but must give it to yourselves. And then you run into this thunderstorm.

Miss Hannah: It is one's own inferiority, the whole black substance of which one is made.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is of course understood that if you give compassion to yourself you give it to the inferior being in yourself.

Miss Hannah: All your emotions are caught in that and they will come up as a sort of thunderstorm against you.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that would be a perfectly suitable explanation. If you give your compassion to yourself, if you are interested in the imperfect man in yourself, naturally you bring up a monster—all the darkness that is in man, all that with which man is cursed forever, without the

grace of God or the compassion of Christ and his work of salvation. Naturally, you run into that terrific cataclysm which man has within him, that eternal skeleton in the cupboard, of which he is always afraid. In the end, Nietzsche himself runs up against this thunder-cloud: it is a question whether he shall accept the ugliest man in himself. This is the terrible danger, but why does his unconscious produce the idea of such a danger here? And mind you, it doesn't sound like an individual danger only, but like a collective danger.

Mrs. Crowley: Like a prophecy.

Mrs. Sigg: It is quite natural; formerly people gave all beauty to the gods, and Nietzsche gave all beauty to Zarathustra, so there was little left for himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but assume that it is for the possibility of creating the Superman that you give your compassion to the imperfect man. Now if you bring up the imperfect man, it is a collective danger, and what is that?

Miss Hannah: Is it not the danger of madness?

Prof. Jung: Well, opinions are quite divided about this point, as you know. It might be madness but not necessarily. Otherwise everybody who gives compassion to himself would be in danger of madness.

Miss Hannah: All those crazy emotions come up.

Prof. Jung: And when it is a collective phenomenon, what happens then?

Miss Hannah: Well, Germany.

Prof. Jung: I would not say just Germany. We have some good examples in past centuries.

Mrs. Sigg: One remembers Edgar Jung who wrote *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* (The Dominion of the Inferior Ones).¹ Sometimes inferior elements gain power and influence.

Prof. Jung: Well, it would mean bringing up the inferior strata of a nation, the inferior psychology. Do you know of such cases already in history?

Miss Hannah: The French Revolution.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and there is a parallel there with the actual words of Zarathustra.

Dr. Harding: They said that God was dead and they enthroned a new deity called *la Déesse Raison*.

¹ Edgar Jung (1894-1934), *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* (Berlin, 1930).

Prof. Jung: Yes, *la Déesse Raison* was enthroned in Notre Dame.² Then there is another case, a little further back in history.

Mrs. Jung: The revolution of the slaves in antiquity?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that was not so much linked up with a religious upheaval; of course there were religious ideas in it, but it was economic to a great extent. It was not clear for instance that Spartacus dethroned the gods; he simply wanted to overthrow slavery. But there was a particularly good example.

Mrs. Sigg: The revolution of the peasants.

Prof. Jung: Yes. The Reformation was of course a destruction of the authority of the church, and then instantly followed that upheaval of the peasants, for when such ideas reach the collective inferior man they have the most destructive effect. The actual mob consists of cave men. The idea that every man has the same value might be a great metaphysical truth, yet in this space-and-time world it is the most tremendous illusion; nature is thoroughly aristocratic and it is the wildest mistake to assume that every man is equal. That is simply not true. Anybody in his sound senses must know that the mob is just mob. It is inferior, consisting of inferior types of the human species. If they have immortal souls at all then it is God's business, not ours; we can leave it to him to deal with their immortal souls which are presumably far away, as far away as they are in animals. I am quite inclined to attribute immortal souls to animals; they are just as dignified as the inferior man. That we should deal with the inferior man on our own terms is all wrong. To treat the inferior man as you would treat a superior man is cruel; worse than cruel, it is nonsensical, idiotic.

But that is what we do with all our democratic ideas, and as time goes on we shall see that those democratic institutions don't work since there is a fundamental psychological mistake there. Christianity has done it: we owe it to Christianity that all men are equal and dignified and such nonsense, that God looks at all men in the same way. Well, he seems to bestow his grace on everybody in an absolutely indiscriminate way, but that is not to be taken very seriously, because such an indiscriminate handing out of the goods of heaven and earth does not speak for a particularly foreseeing origin. Also, if that were so, we could say, "Since God knows better, since he planned the whole show, why should we lift a finger? No use." Moreover, it is simply blasphemous to preach of the all-foreseeing and omnipotent deity and it pre-

² "The Goddess of Reason"; see above, 6 June 1934, n. 7.

pare the way for atheism, because no reasonable man can believe that the government of the world is wise. It is not, but chaotic, rather. That is what we see and experience, and man would make no sense whatever if he were ruled by a god who knew all about his predestined fate. What about our ethics or our intelligence?

Now, what Nietzsche foresees here is just this dark thunder-cloud that is coming up over the horizon when one gives compassion to oneself. That is, if you make a general truth of it, if you still have the missionary in you, the Christian preacher who tells everybody what is good for them, you most certainly will arouse a thunder-cloud; you will arouse the inferior man in nations as well as in yourself. And you will not be able to accept him because you have brought him up by missionary attempts, in a collective way that is. You preach it to a whole crowd. You publish a book, and so you preach it to yourself too as one of the crowd; the inferior man comes up in the form of the ugliest man and of course it is not acceptable. But if you don't preach it to the crowd, if you keep it for yourself as an entirely individual and personal affair, well, you bring up the inferior man in yourself but in a manageable form, not as a political or social experiment. You can then remain in the political form or form of society in which you find yourself, and you can excuse yourself as an individual experiment for which you are awfully sorry. You *must* be sorry for yourself; compassion means to be sorry for somebody, but if you bring it up with a brass band as Nietzsche does, you cannot accept that monster; he invited him up with flags and fifes and drums and so he has to show him back into hell.

But attend also to this word: All great love is above all its pity: for it seeketh—to create what is loved!

He says that all that compassion—and this is surely Zarathustra speaking, not the ordinary man Nietzsche—is something you can put aside, because the object of your love, the purpose of your love, is to be created. Now what are we doing really? We say nobody loves us, or I am loved, somebody loves me, but no one speaks of the absolute necessity of creating what one loves—that one has to create the thing that loves and is loved. We have no responsibility in that respect; we take love like the weather or a gold mine or a fruit tree which we don't own but from which we can pick fruit, and nobody thinks of such a thing as creating that which loves us or that we love. But Zarathustra holds that this is the absolute condition under which the Superman can be created; to create the Superman we must create that thing which is the essence of love, which gives love and is loved. We cannot take it for granted that

love is something we just get somewhere. It must be produced. So it is a thing which has to be created because it doesn't yet exist. Now this is a very profound idea and perhaps I am not able to make it any clearer. He continues this same argument in the next verse when he says,

"Myself do I offer unto my love, *and my neighbour as myself*"—

You see, he understands by love a creative impulse which has no pity, which creates its object, creates its purpose, and seeks an end which is perhaps against man or even does away with him, an end which does not consider the personal man. The personal man might be subservient to it or he might be just run over. That is creative love as he understands it, and that is the condition by which the Superman is made. Therefore, he says:

Such is the language of all creators.

All creators, however, are hard.

Well, perhaps you will think over this matter and in the meantime we will go on to the next chapter called "The Priests." And how is it that we come now to priests?

Mr. Allemann: Because he had been preaching himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he has been preaching surely, and that is an approach to the priest, but that is not quite enough.

Mrs. Crowley: In the very beginning of the chapter he was trying to distinguish between the two kinds of consciousness, the separation from the animal man and the extension of consciousness, trying to realize the two and to find some sort of bridge between them. Then all this development of the idea of love comes in, and now these priests. The bridge is the idea of love. Probably he needs an enormous amount of compassion to be able to swallow the priests.

Dr. Harding: The priests are professionally compassionate ones.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is perfectly true.

Mrs. Crowley: But are they not just the ones who project, instead of finding the inferior man in themselves? And he projected that into others.

Prof. Jung: But why does he need to talk about them? He has settled that completely and now he writes a whole chapter about them.

Dr. Harding: He was a parson's son and the priest would be his shadow.

Prof. Jung: Well, he has much to say about them, sure enough.

Mrs. Baumann: It seems to me there is another bridge: after the creator, priests must always follow, in order to dogmatize.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and moreover towards the end of the chapter Zarathustra comes very much to the foreground with his extraordinary idea of creative love, meaning the Superman. And Nietzsche gets an intuition of an imminent danger, of that thunder-cloud: namely, the possibility of the revolution of the inferior man or the impossibility of accepting the ugliest man. That means very serious trouble and it is a very serious hindrance to the creation of the Superman, because the superior thing can be created only if it is built upon the inferior. The inferior must be accepted in order to build the superior; otherwise it is as if you were trying to build a house suspended in the air, or a roof having no foundation. First, you must go into the ground and into the dirt: you must make your hands dirty, or there is no foundation to build upon. You must not be afraid of the dirt; one has to accept the ugliest man if one wants to create. Creation means inferiority which you have to swallow; only through that can you create something new and better. Now, feeling that he has run up against a very serious obstacle, Nietzsche discovers—it becomes inevitable—that there are forms or ways that man has used before in such a situation; the collective unconscious knows that in the course of man's history, written or unwritten, this situation has repeated itself numberless times, and therefore man has elaborated certain forms for dealing with collective danger, one of the most powerful means being the church. And the church lives through the activity of the priests, men who devote themselves to the conservation of order, of tradition, of a certain amount of culture even. They take care of the moral laws, of the metaphysical need of man, in order to keep him well ensconced within a form.

This is a very important item, it is by no means to be carelessly dismissed, because there is nothing to put in its place. What are you going to put in the place of the church? What is *Nietzsche*, for instance, going to put in the place of the church? Is the inferior man of this day, not to speak of even the superior educated man of his own day, capable of understanding his ideas? We have to ride a very fast horse in order to understand what he means; it is tremendously high stuff and needs an extraordinary experience of life, or intuition, in order to understand what he is driving at. It is hellishly difficult. Does he really assume that the ordinary man is capable of understanding such a thing? He might use the word *Superman* but what does that mean to him? There is nothing for the ordinary man in it, for the ordinary man needs something visible, something tangible: words, rites; and then he must see that everybody is in it before it is valid. The inferior man is exceedingly mistrustful. He does not trust the thing that is in small houses, in a few

individuals, but believes in great gatherings, in a great number of statistics. For instance, if somebody tells him that in the United States there are so many millions who believe in such-and-such a thing, he will try to believe it too—then it is right. His argument is that many people are doing the same. And in the church many people are doing the same thing. The church says, “I am many—many people believe in me.” In the Protestant church they do likewise—at least they make a desperate attempt to do so, talking about their fifty million Protestants. You know, in the Stockholm ecumenical conference³ they also tried to say they were many, to make the inferior man believe, in that way, that they were good and beautiful and true: their only argument for their particular truth is that many believe in it or have been there. So Nietzsche runs up against this terrible problem, what to do with the collective inferior man—and here is the church. It is a big problem, as one sees in the way he speaks. There is a sort of hush. Now he says,

And one day Zarathustra made a sign to his disciples and spake these words unto them:

“Here are priests: but although they are mine enemies pass them quietly and with sleeping swords!”

That is perfectly clear. He hushes up the presence of those priests, and he keeps his weapons on him.

“Even among them there are heroes; many of them have suffered too much—so they want to make others suffer.

Bad enemies are they: nothing is more revengeful than their meekness. And readily doth he soil himself who toucheth them.”

You see he is beginning to boil.

“But my blood is related to theirs: [Yes, his father was a clergyman.] and I want withall to see my blood honoured in theirs.”—

And when they had passed, a pain attacked Zarathustra; but not long had he struggled with the pain, when he began to speak thus:

It moveth my heart for those priests. They also go against my taste; but that is the smallest matter unto me, since I am among men.

Among men who are generally of bad taste, that is.

³ The Stockholm ecumenical conference of August 1925, of some 600 representatives of 37 countries, was one of the forerunners of the establishment of the World Council of Churches in 1948.

But I suffer and have suffered with them: prisoners are they unto me, and stigmatized ones. He whom they call Saviour put them in fetters:—

Here you have it. He cannot help recognizing the extraordinary importance of priests and the church. He is not the ordinary iconoclast; he can see that there is something behind it, yet he is too much of a priest to be able to stand another priest. They never can stand one another. They quite agree that it is a mighty good thing to have spiritual purposes, but they must be of their own church; other churches are all wrong, worse than the worst sinner, unforgiveable. They even deny that they exist. For instance, when I suggest to certain theologians that Buddhism is also a perfectly decent religion, they say, "Oh, we are not concerned with Buddhism." They are only concerned with the spiritual attempt of their own church. But that must be so: if a church is not intolerant it doesn't exist. It needs must be intolerant in order to have definite form, for that is what the inferior man demands. It is always a sign of inferiority to demand the absolute truth. The superior man is quite satisfied that the supreme state of life is doubt of truth, where it is always a question whether it *is* a truth. A finished truth is dead. There is no chance of development, so the best thing is half a truth—or just doubt. In that case, you are sure that whatever you know is in a state of transformation, and only a thing that changes is alive. A living truth changes. If it is static, if it doesn't change, it is dead.

But doubt is not good for the churches and it is very bad for the inferior man. The inferior man cannot stand uncertainty concerning his truth, and he is only really happy when many people believe in that same truth. He wants to go to sleep in the church, to have a safe bed in which to sleep unquestioningly; otherwise, he has no peace and then he cannot trust and believe what the priests tell him to believe. That is the psychology of the inferior man. The church is made for the inferior man and inasmuch as we are all inferior we need a church: it is a very good thing. So the wise man will never disturb it. He will say, "Thank God that we have a church, for it would be a terrible hell if all those animals got loose." You see, the church could also be described as a spiritual stable for superior animals with a good shepherd—of course the good shepherd symbolized the Lord. We are all sheep, and there are probably wolves and even bulls, but at all events he knows what is good for them. That he gives them good pastures is what the sheep expect of the shepherd; that is their legitimate expectation. So good shepherds really must know what is good for other people; and

they must be very grateful, for since they are sheep they cannot do any better. Therefore the church considered from all aspects is an absolutely desirable thing, and the more Catholic and authoritative, the better for the inferior man.

But naturally what is good for the inferior man is bad for the superior man. The superior man, the creative man, who does not find his satisfaction in peace and in confidence and belief, cannot be satisfied with the church. The church is hell to him, a prison. Any kind of belief is just hell because he must create, and if he is fettered by convictions, by the eternal truth or something of the sort, he is not only miserable, but he suffocates, he dies. And then of course he thinks the church is wrong, forgetting entirely that the church is perhaps 90 percent right, even in himself. I mean that up to his neck he is Catholic, and moreover pagan, because that far he is historical—only a little bit of his existence reaches beyond. It is on account of that bit of existence beyond that he fights the church: he reviles and blames it, or tries to dissolve it if possible. This conflict is going on in the beginning of the chapter. First Nietzsche has to recognize the importance and the inevitableness of the church, and then he boils over and goes against it because he cannot stand his own inferior man, the presence of the sheep in himself. He cannot stand the smell of the stable. But since he himself smells of the stable, it would be better to recognize it and admit that he is one of the sheep.

Mrs. Jung: I think that whenever he makes such extreme statements as in the last passages, his unconscious reacts. He was himself speaking like a priest.

Prof. Jung: You understand that this part where he is boiling over is the reaction against the priestlike attitude before? Yes, that is true. The end of this chapter, the priestlike attitude, leads us to the chapter about the priests. Now, I called your attention to this very interesting passage where he says, "Myself do I offer unto my love, and my neighbour as myself." You see, this is the sacrifice in the Mass when the priest offers up himself and the community to the love of Christ, but that is in order to produce the miracle of transubstantiation. And originally a human sacrifice was offered to produce the miracle of rebirth, of increase, fecundity, etc. It sounds like an age-old sacrificial formula, "Myself do I offer unto my love." Instead of love, put the equivalent, "God," and you have it: "Myself do I offer unto my God and my neighbor as myself." That is about what the priest says in the Mass.

Then Zarathustra says here, "He whom they call Saviour put them in fetters." The priests as representatives of the church are of course

in the same enclosure, the same prison, as the sheep. The shepherd makes no sense without the sheep: they have to stay together, believe in the same system. They are simply two different aspects of one and the same thing. So a priest who is not fettered makes no sense. As soon as we discover that the priest himself does not believe in the dogmas of his church, he has no value; one becomes doubtful and suspects him of hypocrisy, of being rather a cheat. Therefore, the Catholic church had to be a bit "large" in that respect. They had to give the priests more chance, or they would not have been able to deal with the more educated members of the church. They cannot insist upon certain dogmas being taken too literally, but say, "Of course you must believe in this. It is the dogma of the church, so for the sake of good form you have to admit it, but naturally it is quite understandable that you think otherwise. It is, however, much better for the church that you make no row about it since the church exists for the more or less feeble-minded people or the people who are feeble in their faith; you may protest against certain dogmas, but keep quiet about it since the church is the house built for the poor and it should not be disturbed. You would not upset the minds of your own children by strange ideas or doubts, so be careful what you say."

That is almost literally what a very competent Jesuit told me. This standpoint becomes necessary as soon as the church has to deal with the more sophisticated members of human society. For instance, a papal ambassador, an excellent conversationalist, once had a very lively conversation with a certain lady at a diplomatic dinner, and he made the remark, "As you know from Zola's *Rome* . . ." ⁴ She made a mental note of that and at the next opportunity said to him, "I want to ask Your Eminence whether Zola is not on the Index?" "Ah yes, of course, but not for you or for me." This is a most dangerous standpoint, yet it is quite understandable. *Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi*, "What is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to an ox." That is a fact, and whoever observes such a truth is wise. He allows for the different needs of men and for different mental spheres. And he mitigates the lot of the people who are fettered because they must be. They *need* to be prisoners and are much more unhappy if they have not their regular food. If you send sheep out into the open and don't care for them, they will soon be dispersed and killed—the wolves will eat them. But keep them in the stable and they have peace: somebody is looking after them, and that is

⁴ After Emile Zola and his wife paid a visit to Rome he published his book *Fécondité* (Fertility) (Paris, 1896) to great acclaim.

what the inferior man wants. So the Savior, who is understood to be a liberator, has made a prison, a sort of big hospital for mental diseases, a psychotherapeutic institution in which people are kept and treated and fed. For as long as the truth of the church is valid, it does nourish those people: they are fed. You must not forget that the dogma of the church expresses the truth. It is a symbolic formula that is good for an inferior level of understanding where things can only be understood when they are projected.

And if you read these symbols on a subjective level, and translate them into more psychological language, you see at once that they make sense—that they are even most extraordinarily profound ideas and useful to meditate upon. The mystery of the Trinity for instance is immensely profound, expressing the most basic facts of our unconscious mind; therefore it is quite understandable that it played such a great role.⁵ So we cannot dismiss those church dogmas as perfectly useless or nonsensical. They are carefully elaborated expressions that have certain effects on the unconscious, and inasmuch as the church is capable of formulating such things, it has a catching power. The church walls hold. They are tight. People live in peace inside those walls and are fed by the right kind of dogma, a dogma which really expresses the unconscious facts as they are.

That is the secret of the life of the church, the explanation of the fact that the truly Catholic nations have far fewer problems than we have. If one talks of this stuff in Italy or in Spain, nobody understands a word; when I speak about the collective unconscious in Paris they think I am talking mysticism. Why? Because, they say, it is religion, and not psychology. That religion could be psychology has not dawned upon them. They may be atheists but you know what an atheist is: simply a man who is outside instead of inside the church walls. Instead of saying, yes, I believe that you exist, he stands outside of the house and says, no, I don't believe that you are God. That is the only difference: an atheist is just as Catholic as those within the walls. So they cannot understand of what modern psychology is talking, because this whole world of problems, the symbols we are dealing with, is for them still within the walls of the church, safely walled in. There it is, all codified; every problem has been dealt with by the Fathers of the church and by that whole tradition of learning and wisdom of which the church consists. Now this is a great asset. It makes life decidedly simpler and safer and it saves one from a great deal of worry. Well, of course even a

⁵ Jung here repeats his exposition of *homoousia* and *homoiousia*.

Catholic is worried, as we are worried, but not exactly in the same way; in contradistinction to us they are kept in that living water of the church. They are the little fishes in the piscina, the lambs in the herd. Well, now comes the French Revolution, the enlightenment, with Nietzsche:

In fetters of false values and fatuous words! Oh, that some one would save them from their Saviour!

On an isle they once thought they had landed, when the sea tossed them about; but behold, it was a slumbering monster!

Of course as soon as you are outside of the church walls, a fish on dry land, you say, "How terrible that those poor fishes inside are all drowning in the water—they must be suffocating," and you don't see that you yourselves, thrown out on the dry land, are the ones who are really left to perdition. Nietzsche cannot convince one of the tremendous advantages of being outside the walls of the church if one is threatened by the madhouse; it should be realized that it is a miserable condition not to be in the lap of the herd, not to be in the warm stables, not to be taken care of by a loving mother church or a loving father who guides one like a good shepherd. And those people who are outside—apparently, at least—try to create the same sort of thing in their own family. They make the family their abode and they create no end of trouble. They create a society for instance, or a sect with a noble purpose, making that society responsible for their spiritual welfare. For they still want a church; they have all their tentacles outside of themselves to fasten on somewhere, to adhere to something. If they are not in a church, they cling to the arms of father and mother and brothers and sisters and God knows what—cling to the walls of the family like an octopus and expect spiritual peace. Or they marry and then it must be the husband or the wife who is wrong, or if they are members of a society the society is wrong, not producing that which they expect. They have not yet learned that when they are outside of the church, away from the lap of the loving mother, they are fishes on dry land and that they must provide for themselves, if they don't prefer to die.

That is what comes to the man who is outside the church: he has to learn to feed himself, with no longer a mother to push the spoon into his mouth. There is no human being who can provide what is provided by the church. The church provides for all that naturally; inasmuch as you are a member of the church you get the *panis super substantialis*; in partaking of the communion, you receive the spiritual food and are spiritually transformed. Do you think that any father or mother or

godmother or aunt or any book can produce the miracle of transubstantiation? If you yourself can provide for it, then you are the whole mystery of the church: you *are* the transubstantiation. If you understand that, you can have the spiritual food every day; then you know what it costs and you understand what the church costs and what the church means. Well, that is usually a side of the problem which people don't reckon with: they come out of the church in the same state of infantility with which they went in, sheeplike and collective, simply bound to their surroundings and the people with whom they are in contact, always expecting from other people what they should expect from themselves. They don't see that they should provide for themselves.

Unfortunately enough, it is the common fate; even the atheist who is always shouting up to God, "I don't believe that you exist!"—even such a man is already on the way to lose the church entirely. You see, as long as you can be a member of an atheist club or something of the sort, you are not really outside of the church. It is still in view, within your reach—with one leap you are inside; you only have to confess and repent and you are inside again. But you must not look at the church from the outside if you want to live in it. Being inside the church you must not think of inferior and superior people: such considerations don't happen in the church; there you live in the original paradise-like state where all the people are like loving little sheep. Of course there are bad people outside, but you believe that the people in the church are really good. That is a clear-cut situation: all the people inside are right and the people outside are all wrong. That gives a clarity and a simplicity of life which is remarkable and beautiful. Of course, we are so far outside of such a psychology that we are even convinced that those people who live in the country beyond the frontier are not necessarily all devils. But the primitive man believes that they are all devils on the other side of the river and when he sees one he kills him right away as if he were a poisonous snake.

As long as you can feel like that, you have a firmness and a unity in your own tribe which is marvelous, because nothing welds people so much together as vice, a common wrong-doing. If you can do something collectively to your neighbor you are in a marvelous state. In the church therefore, it is part of their life to fight their enemies. For instance, when the church was threatened with falling to pieces, they put up those stakes in Spain and burned a hundred thousand heretics, and that was good for the church. They had done away with that beast outside, and so they felt well inside. At the time of the Reformation a great

part of the Christian church was blown up and that wound has never been healed; Protestantism is a festering wound in the body of the church, the wound in the body of Christ which has been infected and suppurating ever since. So when you are outside of the church you will naturally reach that stage in which Nietzsche is here; then you see the church as an island of refuge, which turns out to be Sinbad's monster: they made a fire upon its back, it felt the pain of it and plunged into the water, and they were all drowned.⁶

False values and fatuous words: . . .

That is what people think and it is just stupid, nothing else. Anybody who has thought critically and scientifically about the dogma of the church cannot say those are fatuous words, as little as the teaching of Buddha or Mohammed are fatuous words or false values. They are true values—right as long as they work. But they only work under certain conditions. So in the comparative science of religion one must always ask about the country, the conditions, and the kind of people to which it belongs; then you understand why they have that particular teaching, and you can draw conclusions from the teaching as to the nature of the people to whom it is preached. Which religion preaches love? Christian love was preached to those who needed it, who didn't have it; they were cruel power devils and therefore they believed in love. The Persians were always known in antiquity to have been dirty swine, and therefore they have the cleanest, purest religion—they *needed* that kind of religion.

So every dogma, every form of religion, is a tremendous problem; if one is intelligent enough perhaps one can understand, but if not, one simply should admit that one is too stupid to understand such profound things and so had better leave them alone—rather than to malign them. If we declare that such things are false values or fatuous words, we are rejecting the ugliest man in ourselves; the inferior man believes that is the food of eternal life. And if we take his food away and throw him out of the house, we have expelled ourselves from our own home and don't know how it has happened; we uproot ourselves by reviling the truth in which the inferior man believes and in which he is rooted. Mind you, we cannot undo historical traditions: whatever is in history is in history forever, in the safe womb of eternity which no mortal ever can reach. It is there and it always will be there. So you

⁶ Sinbad and his sailor companions landed on a small island which, when they built a fire, discovered itself to be an enormous whale and then plunged into the sea. Some interpreters have likened parts of *The Arabian Nights* to the *Odysey*.

never can do away with the fact that you have been, say, Catholic, or anything else; you have a history that is always with you, so be careful not to deny it. It is then as if you had appendicitis and couldn't be operated on; you have appendicitis all right but you have no appendix, and if the appendix doesn't exist it cannot be cut out. You see, you are at a frightful disadvantage. For instance, if one of your devils is wrong in your unconscious, and you don't believe in your historical psyche, then you have no devils. But then what about it? What is the trouble? They may say your glands have gone wrong and give you injections, and then the devils laugh, because that is just in their scheme. It is in their interest to make us believe that they don't exist, for then they can work in the dark, and all the safer because we have scoffed at them. Now he talks like a man of the 18th century:

these are the worst monsters for mortals—[*Ecrasez l'infâme*, Voltaire said.⁷] long slumbereth and waiteth the fate that is in them.

But at last it cometh and awaketh and devoureth and engulfeth whatever hath built tabernacles upon it.

Oh, just look at those tabernacles which those priests have built themselves! Churches, they call their sweet-smelling caves!

This is now the ordinary misunderstanding when somebody is devoting his life to a cause. Then all the people who don't understand the cause, who have no feeling for a cause or who never heard of causes, think that such a person is simply doing it for his own pleasure, or sacrificing his life for his own ambition. Think of the existence of an ordinary priest! Is he living his miserable life simply in his own interest? That is not possible. Those people are to be taken seriously: they really sacrifice their lives, live lonely lives for the sake of the cause. If that were not so, the church would most certainly not exist; it makes the power of the Catholic church that the priests in general live miserable lives, that they accept such a pitiful lot. If you ever have looked into such a life you will be impressed with its misery, tolerated and carried for the cause. And that works.

Oh, that falsified light, that mustified air! Where the soul—may not fly aloft to its height!

Naturally if anyone is cursed or blessed with the creative instinct, he cannot stay at home, but such a one must know that when he leaves his

⁷ In a letter to Alembert, 28 November 1762, Voltaire wrote, "Whatever you do, crush the infamous thing . . . and love those who love you." Nietzsche's last lines in *Ecce Homo* are: "Ecrasez l'infame. Have I been understood? Dionysos against the Crucified."

paternal home he is the lost son who has to live in the wilderness. And then he must not revile the paternal home or he will be suspected of what?

Miss Wolff: Envy.

Prof. Jung: Naturally. He wants to return home to the fleshpots of Egypt, to the security of the church; there is really a secret desire, a longing, to return to the spiritual community in the church. What else is it when Nietzsche, for instance, thought of a *Kultur* monastery? He thought our civilization was threatened and that we should found monasteries again for those people who try to maintain the level of civilization. Graf Keyserling had the same idea, and I had to ask him whether he really thought that he would stay with other people in a monastery.⁸

But so enjoined their belief: "On your knees, up the stair, ye sinners!"

He thoroughly misunderstands the necessity of discipline in such a body as the church. Of course he belongs to that age; this was written in the eighties of the past century and that was pretty close still to the French Revolution, and for those days it was a vital necessity that such things should be said. One cannot turn back the wheel of history, it simply had to go this way. It had to be that those people who were no longer in the church made a clean cut from the church, that they separated definitely from the possibility of regression. For if you make a regression when you are once outside, it is a really bad regression with all its awful consequences—and then it is wise to say the whole thing was a mistake. If you know that you are going out into the wilderness when you leave the church, it is right and good that you should be a hero, but don't go back on that. If you then say, "But this is a wilderness!"—and go home again, that is of course no merit. It is simply cowardice, and you deserve to be thrown into the cellar of the church, and deserve to be buried. Therefore, people who regress under such conditions are not well off.⁹

Of course it doesn't always happen like that. There are certain Protestants for whom it is much better to go back to Catholicism, because they were not meant to continue their spiritual development. There is a long stretch along which one can wander; you may begin, say, with the very high Anglican conception, and then you can wander forward

⁸ For Keyserling, see above, 2 May 1934, n. 22.

⁹ Jung now repeats his account of how Angelus Silesius regressed.

through the centuries till you come to some modern form of Protestantism, and you die, having gone through all the stages of Protestant history. But if you can continue your voyage, you arrive at the last summit where you are confronted with God alone. Well, then you have, for instance, Karl Barth with whom you can die, or you can easily die in the meantime without having covered the whole *parcours*.¹⁰ But there are people who have more speed, and they rush through the last stage of the drama and get beyond Karl Barth even; then of course they fall completely outside the Christian temple, even outside the precincts, and land in the wilderness. That is the fate which has become a collective problem nowadays. But Nietzsche is still bound to fight the church and its concept of God. Otherwise, he could wish the church many happy returns and be quite glad that the whole concern was flourishing and that he had nothing to do with it—glad that they would take care of that part of the world which he could not take care of.

They called God that which opposed and afflicted them; and verily, there was much hero-spirit in their worship!

And they knew not how to love their God otherwise than by nailing men to the cross!

Again this humanity idea, against cruelty and so on, not knowing that he himself is nailed to the cross. People who have been brought up in the church have not been trained to open their eyes and see; they were only allowed to see it projected. They should have been taught that *they* are nailed upon the cross, and shown *where* they are nailed on the cross. No parson ever has done that—of course not. He would break up the walls of the church, but if you are out of the church, you have a chance to see in how far you are nailed to the cross. But Nietzsche is still too much fascinated: he does not see it, but thinks that is only found inside the church and that outside everything is O.K. But he is not satisfied with all the beauties outside; he has to look back and curse about the things he sees there. The thing he does not see is that he is nailed to the cross.

As corpses they thought to live; in black draped they their corpses; even in their talk do I still feel the evil flavour of charnel-houses.

And he who liveth nigh unto them liveth nigh unto black pools, wherein the toad singeth his song with sweet gravity.

Better songs would they have to sing, for me to believe in their

¹⁰ *Parcours*: route, trip.

Saviour: more like saved ones would his disciples have to appear unto me!

Naked, would I like to see them: for beauty alone should preach penitence. But whom would that disguised affliction convince!

Verily, their Saviours themselves came not from freedom and freedom's seventh heaven! Verily, they themselves never trod the carpets of knowledge!

Of defects did the spirit of those Saviours consist; but into every defect had they put their illusion, their stop-gap, which they called God.

This is also the collective misunderstanding which doesn't give to those values which have lived for so long the credit of having attained a living meaning and fulfilling a positive function. It is the regrettable short-sightedness of enlightenment. They never take the trouble to probe into these things and see whether they really work. It is only the lack of knowledge which accounts for such peculiar illusions in judgment, and we see it projected in this passage: "Verily, they themselves never trod the carpets of knowledge!" They had more knowledge than he of the inside structure and the spiritual meaning of the dogma.

LECTURE VIII

24 June 1936

Prof. Jung:

I have here two questions that are very different in form, yet they have to do practically with one and the same thing. Miss Hannah says, "I should be very grateful if you would say some more about the last three verses of chapter 25, 'The Compassionate.' As Shakespeare asks, 'What is love?' could one say that, partly at any rate, it is the urge towards creating a whole human being, towards individuation? Is not 'my neighbor as myself' rather an optimistic remark, because can we love till we have created 'what is loved' in ourselves?"

You refer to the verses: "But attend also to this word: All great love is above all its pity: for it seeketh—to create what is loved! 'Myself do I offer unto my love, and my neighbour as myself'—such is the language of all creators. All creators, however, are hard." Well, you mean that individuation is the real goal of love and that is not possible without seeking to create that which is loved. It boils down to the fact that you must love yourself in order to create yourself. Is that what you mean?

Miss Hannah: Yes, except that I want to know what love is.

Prof. Jung: Well, what *is* love? It naturally comes to that question, and that cannot be easily answered. What is truth? You know that is the famous question of Pilate. Now "Love thy neighbor as thyself" is really a very profound formula; of course a more extraverted mood insists upon the neighbor, and a more introverted mood insists upon yourself, and both are legitimate. For you never can get to yourself without loving your neighbor—that is indispensable; you never would arrive at yourself if you were isolated on top of Mt. Everest, because you never would have a chance to know yourself. You would have no means of comparison and could only make a difference between yourself and the wind and the clouds, the sun and the stars, the ice and the moon. And if you lose yourself in the crowd, in the whole of humanity, you also never arrive at yourself; just as you can get lost in your isolation, you can also get lost in utter abandonment to the crowd. So whoever

insists upon loving his neighbor cannot do it without loving himself to a certain extent. To fall into the extraverted principle and follow the object and forget about yourself, is just like going into the wilderness and losing humanity. We always make the mistake of becoming victims of the pairs of opposites. Therefore, we are only right in following the prescription, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," when we are also entitled to say, "Love thyself as thy neighbor." If you are bold enough to love your neighbor, then you must be just enough to apply that love to yourself, whatever that love may be.

It is most questionable what love is. There is something which people call "love" but which nobody would feel like love if it were applied to them. Love can be anything between the worst stupidity and a great virtue, and only God can say whether it is perfectly pure gold. Usually it is not; it is a sliding scale of values. Surely no human love is 100 percent pure gold. There is always a possibility of criticizing what people call "love"; an uncertain amount of selfishness is included in it. There is no absolutely unselfish love. Even a mother's devotion and love for her child is selfish, full of black substance, with only a little surplus which you can call ideal love. Take a little away and you have an equal amount of black and white, and if you take a little more white away the black overwhelms the white. Then you realize that the whole thing can be explained as instinctiveness, falsehood, selfishness, egotism, and unconsciousness. As soon as the white is drowned in the black substance, then you call everything black because you see everything from the black side. In the next chapter Nietzsche explains even virtue, which is generally admitted to be something right and good, as selfishness, in a way. For instance, you can take all the moral virtues as cunning; if you are nice to people, if you apparently love them, it is practical wisdom because you then avoid enemies. It is very practical not to outrage people: to create less hostility is preferable. To be honest is preferable to being dishonest because you otherwise land in jail. And so on—everything can be explained in that way. Does that settle your question?

Miss Hannah: Yes, as much as it can be.

Miss Wolff: I think Miss Hannah asked, if I understand rightly, whether one should not individuate first before one can really love, and I should say that one cannot individuate without relating.

Miss Hannah: I meant, is individuation not a pre-stage before we can love? Does not real love to other people as well as to yourself always aim at that wholeness?

Prof. Jung: Well yes, both things aim at wholeness; in the one case

there is more emphasis on oneself, and in the other case on the one you love.

Miss Hannah: Well, one always will project.

Prof. Jung: But it is not a projection when we assume that other people do exist—I think you are then on the way to Mount Everest. Now here is another question which deals with something similar: Dr. Neumann asks whether Zarathustra's negative attitude in reference to the mob is not really the rejection of the inferior function, or "the ugliest man," to use Nietzsche's term. Well, it *was* the mob that created the *Déesse Raison* of the French Revolution in opposition to the church, which means that the mob there emphasized the importance of human consciousness, one of the highest virtues of human consciousness being surely human reason. In that case, then, the mob would have been the creator of a high human ideal in contrast to the church that doesn't insist and cannot insist upon human reason; it insists instead upon the divine mind and the irrational language of the symbol. So one should recognize an extraordinary creativeness, a productivity, in the collective man, and this collective activity would be the manifestation of the blind or unconscious creator. And it would be that divine and blind creator that brings about the question and the answer of a new creation—that emphasis laid upon human reason for instance. The human individual was put into the foreground and also the overwhelming importance of consciousness. Those are two points which surely play a great role in modern psychology, and also in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. So the growth of the individual, the problem of individuation, depends upon the inferior function, and thus upon the mob in the last resort.

Now, it is surely true that our inferior function has all the qualities of mob psychology: it is our own mob, but in that mob is the creative will. The creative will always begins in the depths and never starts at the top. One could say that the seed really grows on the philosophical tree, and then it falls down to the ground into the mob; the mob surely is the fertile earth or the incubator or the dung heap upon which the creation grows. For the seed is not the tree and the seed doesn't *make* the tree unless there is the black earth: the black substance is needed in order to create something in reality. So, as the alchemists said, even the gold must be planted in the earth like the seed of a plant. It is indispensable that consciousness and the unconscious come together, that the superior or differentiated function comes together with the inferior or undifferentiated function, that the individual comes together with the crowd, with collectivity. Without that clash or synthesis,

there is no new creation; nothing gets on its own feet unless it is created in such a way. The seeds can remain for a long time without growing if circumstances are unfavorable; certain ideas can hover over mankind for thousands of years, and they never take root because there is no soil. The soil is needed: one could even say the most important creative impulses come out of the soil. It is as if it were contributing the power of growth; at all events, it provides all the necessary substance for the further development of the seed.

Now, that is very much the same question as: love thy neighbor as thyself, or love thyself as thy neighbor. If you understand your inferior function, you understand the collective lower man, because your inferior function is exceedingly collective. It is unconscious, archaic, with all the vices and all the virtues of the collective man; therefore it is always projected. The mob is merely an accumulation of archaic individuals, yet it is a true analogy to your inferior function. That is the reason why we have such a resistance against the inferior function; we have the feeling of being soiled—even our feeling of cleanliness is against it. We don't want to be mixed up with that kind of psychology. There *is* something dangerous about it: it can overwhelm the conscious existence of the individual. Yet if you don't expose your conscious personality to the danger of being overwhelmed, you never grow. So Nietzsche's aristocratic attitude has a tendency to travel to Mount Everest and to get frozen to death there because he leaves the neighborhood of the fertile black fields where he could grow his wheat. It even looks in many passages of *Zarathustra* exactly as if he were not meant to take root, as if he were really taken away from the earth by a strong wind.

Then Dr. Neumann asks whether the church, by catching the mob through her forms, doesn't suppress the creative will which can manifest in the mob. The creative will is blind, so it can be just as destructive as constructive; in some phases a mob is utterly destructive—as a stampeding herd of cattle is most decidedly destructive—and it must either be killed or put in prison. So for a certain length of time, a church or any other organization is absolutely necessary, because it keeps that unruly mob-creator at bay. For it can create all sorts of nuisances like diseases and microbes and vermin—every nuisance under the sun—and we are only too glad if we can keep away from those humble creatures of our Lord. Then naturally, at other times, the prison or the stable is no longer satisfactory. For instance, if the herd has grown and there are too much head of cattle, then the moral demands must be lowered, because the greater the crowd, the more im-

moral and archaic it is; so the church is then forced to a certain reformation in the negative sense. Not for the better elements but for the worse elements it is forced to proclaim certain moral laws adapted to the low nature of the collective man.

There is a remarkable example of that in the encyclical of the Pope concerning the Christian marriage.¹ It is a terrible piece of morality. It deals with love and marriage from an entirely biological point of view, and concerning the personal and human relation of man and woman there is not a word. It is a document that makes me shudder when I read it. Here is Christian marriage as presented to the lowest strata of the population; if archaic man can maintain such a marriage it means that he can accomplish something, but for a man of better quality, such a marriage would be most regrettable—any sin would be better. It is a marriage of unconscious, half-animal creatures. The man of the crowd is no better than an amoral half-wit; he is a sort of monkey or a bull or something like that, and an institution which deals with such a man must have the right kinds of walls and gates, which are just coarse enough. So the church in her positive function is meant to be on a relatively low level in order to answer the needs of the undeveloped primitive and archaic man whom she contains. That of course is most unfavorable for creative development and then the church is in danger of becoming a heavy weight, which is what Dr. Neumann obviously means. It then suppresses the better elements because the archaic man is most conservative, always looking back to the past, doing everything as his ancestors have done it. He is lazy: nothing new ever will be invented because anything his parents have not done is insane—black magic. Better to do everything in the old-fashioned way and not bother about creating anything new. That suffocates life, so the better elements of the mob will strive for something different and the institution will squash them.

Now, that is obviously not desirable and there comes in the importance of the revolutionist who doesn't bother about the mob, who says the mob is just cattle, and that he, the revolutionist, is human and will create something which will perhaps destroy the useful walls of the stable so that wolves can break into the herd and ravage it. Naturally it is the tragedy of all human accomplishments that a time comes when they are no longer good, no longer sufficient, and when it is more or less true that Voltaire's *écrasez l'infâme* must be applied—a time like the French Revolution when the ultimate power of the church was practi-

¹ This is *Casti Connubii*, an Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius XI, 31 Dec. 1930.

cally destroyed. The Reformation upset the church very badly, for Protestantism has no safe walls; there are a few spiritual walls left of the old fortress but they are not strong enough to be a protection against the creation of new ideas.

Mrs. Jung: In the lecture he gave last year at Ascona, Prof. Buonaiuti said that the exercises of the Jesuits systematically destroyed the imagination.² That would not only concern the mob, as Jesuits have superior minds usually.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is perfectly true. On the few occasions that I have had to treat Catholics who were still *pratiquants* in the church, I found that they all suffered from a most remarkable extinction of fantasy—they had the greatest trouble about it. It was almost impossible to get them to realize a fantasy simply because they had gone through the Jesuit training, the exercises that systematically destroy the imagination. Of course one must say that it is a dangerous thing to nurse the imagination. It is dangerous in a patient, and it is even dangerous to ourselves, because you never know what will come out of it. Eventually you bring up the thing you fear the most, mob psychology, which is indispensable for individuation. When you go through such an experience, you know it is a quest in which you may be killed. Even the alchemists said that some perished in their work and I well believe it: it is dangerous, no joke. The Catholic church killed imagination on purpose, knowing very well what they were doing; they wanted to uproot the danger of spiritual revolution which would upset the safety of the church. And the church is a safeguard; therefore I would never encourage people who find their peace safely ensconced in the church to bring up their fantasies. I would even advise a Protestant to go back into the lap of the Catholic church if he finds his peace there, even if his whole spiritual life should be completely destroyed. For the spiritual life that he could afford would not be good enough, would be too feeble, too dependent; such people would fall helpless victims to their unconscious. People have a certain instinct in that respect—they feel how far they can go before striking a high explosive; they have dreams of high tension wires that should not be touched, or dynamite or strong poison or dangerous animals or a volcano that might explode. Then one has to warn people and take them a safe distance away from the source of danger, from the place where they touch that high ten-

² Ernesto Buonaiuti (1880-1946), a former priest and a frequent contributor at the Eranos seminars, gave a paper in 1935 on "The Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola." Jung addressed this topic in CW 11, pars. 937-40.

sion wire which would overwhelm them. So the quest is quite a dangerous thing and many people are a thousand times better off in an institution. Therefore, one doesn't dare to disturb such an institution even if it suffocates creative imagination, even if it is a challenge to the will of the creator. For it is a blind creator, a creator that can work just as much evil as good, but as long as the walls hold one should not destroy them.

One has, in our time, chance enough to escape from such a spiritual prison, and I think that if there should be a strong enough movement in the mob to upset the church, they would have a tendency to create a new church—and they would have the *ability* to create it also. You see, there is no intelligence that can create a new church except the blind creativeness of the mob; the mob can create a new church as no intelligent fellow ever could. For to create a church you must be blind: you cannot have too much intelligence or consciousness. It is something utterly irrational. The only power on earth that can make a church is the mob. So when the mob succeeds in breaking through the walls, the mob itself will soon after make a church, and a church that is perhaps worse than before—it may be a state, for instance. We have no theocracy but we have the state. You know, to an intelligent individual the state is an abstract idea. He never assumes that it is a living being, but the mob is idiotic enough to believe that it *is* a living being and that it must have supreme power, so they make a church of it. For example, the actual organized state of Russia, even the actual Germany or Italy, is a church really, a religious affair; and the laws within that church are far more fatal than the laws of the Catholic church. The church is much more tolerant: you can sin against the rules and laws of the Catholic church with far less danger for you can repent and then the case is settled *en amitié*. But if you commit the least offense in one of those states, you will wake up in prison for twenty years. Of course, in the beginning of Christianity it was the same: it destroyed no end of values. The ways of the primitive church were much severer and more intolerant than later on. Only when the church was threatened with extinction in the 15th century was it again so intolerant; then heretics were burned and tortured but it was in order to save its own existence, for the mob is a tremendous danger to the church. We will continue:

Verily, their Saviours themselves came not from freedom and freedom's seventh heaven! Verily, they themselves never trod the carpets of knowledge!

This is of course spoken *après le coup*, after those saviors had passed, having shown what they meant; they were the exponents of the creative mob and so they came not from freedom as was seen afterwards, and surely not from freedom's seventh heaven. For any mob movement, any creation by the mob, is undesirable because they can do no more than create a new prison. It may be a new safety but it is also a new prison, and very often of such an intolerant nature that a whole generation, the representatives of a highly developed civilization, is simply wiped out of existence. The intelligence of Rome and Greece, for instance, was swept into oblivion. Very lately, however, I discovered that New Platonist and Pythagorean philosophers still survived in 1050 in Baghdad under the Caliphs. They even experienced a late blossoming then; we owe to them the existence of the so-called *Corpus Hermeticum*.³

Mr. Allemann: Then you would call Christ or Buddha exponents of mob psychology?

Prof. Jung: It would be wrong to say "mob psychology," but they were surely exponents of the creative will that was coming up from the depths. It was not without meaning that Christ was crucified between two thieves, and that his first disciples were fishermen and such people: there were very few educated people among them. He moved in the lowest strata of the population and he answered to the expectation and need of the ordinary man, the recognition of immortality and all that. He came at the end of a very special spiritual development, culminating in the Ptolemaic civilization, when the Osiris became the Osiris of every *better* man: the ordinary man had no Osiris because he had no decent burial. Then with Christ there was an Osiris for everybody and that simply uprooted the whole of antique civilization. Therefore, Nietzsche very correctly said that Christianity was a revolt of the slaves in the moral realm. He hated Christianity, and surely the morale of slaves is not freedom: it means a new prison. Antiquity did not know the spiritual prison of the Middle Ages; such a condition never existed before in the world's history.

We now begin to lament about the complete destruction of political freedom in three countries surrounding Switzerland. And it is most probable that our freedom of political opinion and whatever we appreciate in our liberalism, our democracies, and so on, is on the decline; it is quite possible that even our freedom of research, our freedom of thought, will be greatly curtailed. For instance, Austria was

³ See above, 30 Oct. 1935, n. 9.

such a nice, tolerant country where you could do everything that was "not allowed," and now you have to be very careful with your tongue. When you look back, you can see the negative side of Christian history if you put yourself before Christ. Suppose you imagine, for instance, that you have been a small citizen in one of the big towns of antiquity, or a freed man who has been delivered from his slavery, perhaps one of those very educated people who were given freedom by the law or by a benevolent proprietor—then came the Evangel. But not to the upper classes necessarily. Just as our new message of salvation means nothing good to us, not at all freedom, though it means a lot to certain people. To the half-educated middle-class German, for instance, it is a marvelous thing to be able to walk about with drums and flags on Sundays and wear a uniform—wonderful to have the Rhineland again. But that is mob psychology.

You see, that is what is going to happen when the mob comes to the top, and since their gospel this time is a worldly one, we don't know what the future holds in store for us. As the creator can invent tape-worms he can invent a worldly gospel just as well; he may say that men like Mussolini or Stalin or Hitler are holy people whom we ought to worship. The early Christians denied the Caesar; they didn't want to participate in sacrifices to a Roman Caesar because they only believed in an invisible Lord. That was another kind of prison, but it didn't injure them so much as when they were put in fetters or thrown into the arena, and some imaginative people could see more in it than in a Roman Caesar. But now times are changing; bring an old Roman back to Rome today and he will say this is the very stuff. There he sees the licitors who whip you if you walk on the wrong side, and there is the Caesar, and he finds temples where they worship all kinds of gods—one is Peter and one is Paul and another is Anthony—and they have a pontiff as they did in the time of the old gods. He recognizes the whole show: it is exactly as it was two thousand years ago.

That will come again if we believe in the state. Why not? Of course we don't sacrifice cattle nowadays, but sacrifice in another way; we have to pay, and so heavily that we can no longer even buy books to read something decent. And we have to parade with flags and a brass band in honor of the Caesar. That is what is actually happening, and that might be—I hope not—the new gospel with all the *isms* and flags and brass bands; we have the sacrifice to Caesarism, the absolute authority of the state, and we have a law which is no law because it is liable to change by an uncontrollable authority on top. In the same way they tried to bring about the infallibility of the Pope in the church, but they

have it now in worldly respects too; there is no ultimate law, only an indefinite authority which is of course arbitrary. There is no absolute law in Russia nor in Germany nor in Italy; the law can be altered by personal authority, a Caesar or a leader. That seems to be the new gospel. I don't know how long it will last, but it has all the qualities of a new style, not to say of a new religion. And that is the way the antique man felt Christianity, I am quite certain. He would say, "Is that your new religion?" As I would have said, had I been an educated individual of Alexandria and had seen the Christian mob there when they tore a nice woman named Hypatia limb from limb: "Is *that* what you call Christian love and civilization?" Yes, that is what they called Christian religion and what subsequent centuries have always called Christian civilization. So they will believe in a God-State instead of the God-Anthropos, but a God-State is just as invisible, just as abstract, as the former God. He does seem to be visible in his temples however; all the biggest things now are quite worldly buildings; the passion of the mob is for great masses,—well, as it was before. Now we will continue:

Of defects did the spirit of those Saviours consist; but into every defect had they put their illusion, their stop-gap, which they called God.

This is said about the past but one can also say it about the present time. In the place of an illusion they put the concept *State*; that is their stop-gap.

In their pity was their spirit drowned; and when they swelled and o'erswelled with pity, there always floated to the surface a great folly.

Eagerly and with shouts drove they their flock over their foot-bridge; as if there were but one foot-bridge to the future!

What do we read in the newspapers?

Verily, those shepherds also were still of the flock.

Small spirits and spacious souls had those shepherds: but, my brethren, what small domains have even the most spacious souls hitherto been!

Characters of blood did they write on the way they went, and their folly taught that truth is proved by blood.

What do we hear nowadays?

But blood is the very worst witness to truth; blood tainteth the purest teaching, and turneth it into delusion and hatred of heart.

And when a person goeth through fire for his teaching—what doth that prove!

Oh, that proves a lot to a middle-class intelligence.

It is more, verily, when out of one's own burning cometh one's own teaching!

Sultry heart and cold head; where these meet, there ariseth the blusterer, the "Saviour."

Now what does this last sentence mean?

Mrs. Crowley: It is the coming together of the opposites.

Prof. Jung: Yes, quite certainly, because the mob psychology Nietzsche is envisaging here, he understands chiefly as a sultry heart and no head whatever; and one could say that the result of that development was nothing but head with no heart at all, not even a sultry one. But with the coming up of the inferior function, the heart is filled with that sultry emotion. That is a good term to designate the quality of the inferior function; it is sultry like a coming thunderstorm, and the real head is the cold detached superiority of the developed, differentiated function. "Differentiated" means aristocratic, different, independent, and that is the quality of the aristocratic superior function. "Where these meet, there ariseth the blusterer, the 'Saviour.'" Now what does "the blusterer" mean? A *Brausewind* is proverbial; that would mean a young fellow full of all sorts of fantasies and so on.

Mrs. Baynes: A wind-bag?

Prof. Jung: No, more dynamic. It would be not exactly a storm, but a wind strong enough to be dynamic and jocose at the same time, playing with dry leaves and pieces of paper and carrying off people's hats.

Mrs. Baynes: A whirlwind?

Prof. Jung: Yes, a sudden whirlwind is the best rendering of the Nietzschean term *Brausewind*. Those among you who have read *Das grüne Gesicht* by Meyrinck will remember perhaps that the same phenomenon is found there.⁴ It is something like a whirlwind catching up dust, but it is not dust. *Chidr*, the Green Face, is the whirlwind, and the dust consists of a swarm of ants. That figure is the center of Meyrinck's story, and he shows how *Chidr* works in ordinary human circumstances, how he comes in as a sort of sorcerer. The whole thing is a manifestation of the collective unconscious, the way the collective unconscious breaks into an ordinary human existence, the way it transforms and influences human existence. Then in the end there is a great catastrophe, a storm which devastates the whole town; and at the

⁴ Gustav Meyrinck's novel was published in 1916. See above, 13 March 1935, n. 7.

very end this whirlwind catches up a swarm of ants, the swarm of ants being the mob. Chidr is a whirl of mob psychology that carries people off to a distance like a swarm of ants.

The *Brausewind*, then, is this catastrophic wind that breaks into social existence. Whenever the opposites meet, whenever a cold layer of air touches a warm layer of air there is most probably movement, there will be a cyclone, or a wandering whirlwind; one sees those wandering columns of water on the ocean, and in the desert one sees columns of dust. That is the simile for the peculiar collective movement by which people are seized, *ergriffen*. Here and there spouts of air gather up dust that moves and dies down, and then in another place it starts up again, like the little whirls of water on the sea or on our lakes when the Föhn is coming. And that is so in human society when the Föhnwind begins to blow.⁵ Since it shows in very different places one doesn't connect these phenomena, but it is one and the same wind really. Of course when it is in the desert it gathers up sand, and in the garden it gathers up leaves, and in a library it gathers up papers in heaps, and in crowds it gathers up hats, so each time one thinks it is something different; but it is always the same meteorological phenomenon: when opposites meet there is a whirlwind. That is the manifestation of the spirit in its most original form.

So a savior is one who seizes, the *Ergreifer* who catches people like objects and whirls them into a form which lasts as long as the whirlwind lasts, and then the thing collapses and something new must come. That is the great wind described in the Pentecostal miracle, because there two worlds were clashing together, the world of the slaves and the world of the highly differentiated mind. You see, the teaching Christ received through his teacher, John the Baptist, must have been the ripe fruit of the time; otherwise it could not have been so in tune with the surroundings, with all the great problems of the time. And it is also absolutely out of the question that one man alone could have invented it in his own lifetime without making use of an enormous tradition. Christ draws very freely from the Old Testament and from other sources which are to us more or less unknown, partially because the early church did not care for any ideas previous to Christ. It was in her interest to have a body of writing that fell from heaven, with no heathen material. It should be quite obvious that God himself was the author of that stock of books, so that nobody would be able to do any better. Any such institution must found itself upon an unquestionable

⁵ *Föhnwind*: Swiss-German for Sirocco.

authority. So already in the early church nothing was known about the things that had happened before; they were soon buried in oblivion.

But we have evidence that John must have belonged to a certain religious movement, current in those days, which must have been something like the Essenes, also called the Therapeuts, who were chiefly occupied in healing the sick and interpreting dreams. They were sort of *directeurs de conscience* for rich people at the courts, and we have evidence that they were called in in cases of particularly ticklish dreams. When the Tetrarchos of Palestine had a disagreeable dream that was too hot for the court interpreters, they called in a doctor from abroad, an Essene, to tell the old man about it because they were afraid for their heads. The Essenes had great authority, as if they belonged to a feared body of medicine men. Then we know from Philo Judaeus of Alexandria⁶ that monasteries existed in those days and that there were considerable settlements on the Dead Sea and in Egypt, and they naturally had a body of teaching. There are still disciples of John in the neighborhood of Basra and Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia; they have a collection of sacred books, one of them has been translated recently, the Mandaean Book of John.⁷ The Mandaeans were disciples of John and they were Gnostics. Peculiarly enough, the Gnostic Evangel is also called the Evangel of St. John; this is obscure, but since it was written only at the beginning of the second century, it is possible that the name of John covers the Gnostic side of Christian origins; on the one side, he was decidedly an orthodox Jew and on the other side he must have received the Gnostic teaching. Paul also had been a Gnostic, a disciple of a Jewish Gnostic, the Rabbi Gamaliel the elder;⁸ and we have definite evidence in his writings of a Gnostic education: he uses Gnostic terms, particularly in the Epistle to the Ephesians.

So we are almost forced to assume that Christ received Gnostic teaching and some of his sayings—like the parable of the Unjust Steward which we recently mentioned, and particularly the so-called “Sayings of Jesus” which are not contained in the New Testament—are closely related to Gnosticism. Also those Evangelists which were not accepted by the church, and therefore mostly destroyed, contained Gnostic teaching; we can substantiate this from the knowledge of the fragments which we still possess, the Gospel of the Egyptians, for in-

⁶ For Philo Judaeus, see above, 16 May 1934, n. 6.

⁷ For the Mandaean Book of John, see Mead*.

⁸ Paul wrote, “I am a Jew born in Tarsus of Cilicia . . . educated under Gamaliel” (Acts of the Apostles 22:3). Gamaliel was a doctor of laws, a prominent Pharisee, and in Jewish tradition was counted as one of the first of the seven great rabbis.

stance, and among the Apocrypha of the New Testament, the Acts of St. Thomas, where the Holy Ghost is called *Sophia* and where she is the blessed mother. So already in its origins, Christianity was so closely surrounded by Gnostic and by Alexandrian wisdom that it is more than probable that Christ received a Gnostic initiation and possessed a rather profound understanding of the human soul and the peculiarities of spiritual development. One could say that he himself was the ripe fruit of antiquity; he gathered up in himself the essence of the wisdom of the Near East, contained the juice of Egypt and of Greece, and came together with the mob. And that caused a great whirlwind which moved masses and formed them, which brought about that form which we call Christianity. Now Nietzsche continues,

Greater ones, verily, have there been, and higher-born ones, than those whom the people call Saviours, those rapturous blusterers!

And who are those greater ones who have been more than saviors? To whom does he refer?

Mrs. Fierz: The wise old man. There would be a sort of difference, he makes the opposition between the figure of the wise old man and what one calls a savior.

Prof. Jung: Yes, "Greater ones, verily, have there been."

And by still greater ones than any of the Saviours must ye be saved, my brethren, if ye would find the way to freedom!

Never yet hath there been a Superman.

Now who are these greater ones?

Miss Hannah: The self?

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but the greater selves would mean greater personalities, so who could those greater people be?

Mrs. Fierz: People who have been initiated.

Prof. Jung: But who initiated them? Don't you think of a famous name here?

Mrs. Adler: Doesn't this mean the differentiation between Nietzsche and Zarathustra?

Prof. Jung: Of course it refers to Zarathustra, but Zarathustra himself was the founder of the Persian religion; he was a savior too, and therefore there must be a greater one than Zarathustra.

Mr. Allemann: Hermes.

Prof. Jung: Of course, the thrice-greatest Hermes who was greater

than any prophet, Hermes Trismegistus.⁹ Now, we cannot assume that Nietzsche knew much about that figure, and if he had, he would have made little of it because it did not fit into his system. Yet that man or that personality whom he calls "Zarathustra" is a derivative of old Hermes, the thrice-greatest. What he calls "Zarathustra" is his companion, his Poimandres, the Poimen that teaches him: that is his initiator, his Johannes. You know, Oannes is the Babylonian form of the Greek Johannes, and he is the one who in the form of a fish comes out of the sea daily and teaches people wisdom and civilization and every good thing under the sun. No mob psychology there. Hermes the thrice-greatest is the aristocrat of aristocrats. Now, Nietzsche knows nothing of him; he calls him simply "Zarathustra," but he has the right idea, that Zarathustra, or whatever that Poimandres is called, is a Savior greater than the old Zarathustra. He is greater than great, greater than the greatest saviors, the father of prophets, the father or the grandfather of saviors even in that he never has been visible. Tot is the Egyptian equivalent of Hermes. He is also a mystery god. Hermes was the teacher of all wisdom, but a wisdom which is not for the mob, a wisdom which when it touches the mob causes a conflagration or a whirlwind; it is the thing that has to be kept secret. It is "secret knowledge."

In the dialogue between Christ and John in the Mandaean Book of John, Christ is called "Jeshu ben Mirjam," the deceiver, and John reproaches him for having betrayed the secret wisdom to the people. But Christ defends himself very aptly; he pointed out his good works, that he had made the lame walk and the blind see. And the dialogue never comes to a definite solution, so it is open to doubt whether John was right or Christ. John's argument is that if this beautiful truth is given to the inept, they will only destroy it, will make something bad or ugly of it, so one should conceal it. And Christ shows what he has done with that truth. Even if this dialogue is fictitious it is at least something that might have happened. Perhaps the only bit of evidence in the New Testament is where John sends his disciples to Christ to ask him whether he is really the Son of God; that would be the doubt. He might have said just as well, "Are *you* chosen to hand out these precious secrets to the mob? Will you let that evil herd invade our beautiful garden so that whole areas of our garden are destroyed?" A very great question, it is difficult to decide whether the moment has come when the precious fruit of a past civilization should be handed over to the

⁹ *Thrice Greatest Hermes*, ed. and trans. G.R.S. Mead, 3 vols (London, 1949).

herd. You see, that has once to be: the pearls have to be cast before the swine eventually, since the swine are also human. You may try to save the pearls but once the moment will come and a man will appear who will hand them over to the herd; that great wind will come when it cannot wait any longer.

SPRING TERM

May / June 1937

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LECTURE I

5 May 1937

Prof. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: Our last seminar dealt with the 26th chapter of Zarathustra, the chapter about the priests, but before we go on I want to make a few remarks for the benefit of those who have not been here before. *Zarathustra* is a very ticklish subject, but it was the wish of certain members of our seminar that I should deal with it. I felt rather hesitant because it is a pretty ambitious task. I admit it is highly interesting psychological material, but it is long and for certain reasons it is exceedingly difficult to deal with. Of course the fact that it is difficult is no reason against dealing with it; on the contrary, a difficult case is always very much more interesting than a simple and easy one. *Zarathustra* is Nietzsche's most significant work. He expresses in it something which is really himself and his own peculiar problem. His most productive years were the eighties of the past century and in many ways he is the child of his time, yet he is also the forerunner of times that have come since and of times that are still to come.

One could say that the stratification of our population was historical; there are certain people living who should not live yet. They are anachronistic. They anticipate the future. Then there are some who belong to our age; but many don't belong to our age at all, but should have lived at the time of our parents and grandparents. Then there are still many who belong to the Middle Ages, and others to remote times, even to the cave dwellers; one sees them on the street and in the trains, and one meets occasionally a funny old cave dweller who really ought not to live any longer. It is on account of this fact that certain problems of the time become the conscious problems of many people, while other people living at the same time are not touched by them, at least not directly. So Nietzsche at his time was a man of the future; his peculiar psychology was that of a man who might have lived today, after the great catastrophe of the world war. Therefore it is of quite particular

interest to us to delve into it, since it is in many ways the psychology of our own days.

You know, *Zarathustra* is more than a mere title: the figure of Zarathustra is in a way Nietzsche himself; that is, Nietzsche identifies to a great extent with the figure of Zarathustra, despite the fact that he himself said that “one became two” when Zarathustra first appeared to him, showing that he felt that figure as distinct from himself. Yet having no psychological concepts, it did not become a problem to him; since his general philosophical attitude was exceedingly aesthetical, he took it more or less as a metaphorical figure and identified with it. Now, this is an event of consequence: namely, it makes a great deal of difference with what one identifies, and Nietzsche was not fully aware with what he identified. He did not realize that his declaration, “God is dead,” meant something which he did not quite grasp; to him the existence of God was an opinion or a kind of intellectual conviction, so one only needed to say God was not and then he was not. But in reality God is not an opinion. God is a psychological fact that happens to people.

The idea of God originated with the experience of the *numinosum*. It was a psychical experience, with moments when man felt overcome. Rudolf Otto has designated this moment in his *Psychology of Religion* as the *numinosum*, which is derived from the Latin *numen*, meaning hint, or sign.¹ It comes from the old experience that in antiquity, when a man had to direct a prayer to the statue of the god, he stepped upon a stone that was erected at its side to enable people to shout their prayer into the ear so that the god would hear them; and then he stared at the image until the god nodded his head or opened or shut his eyes or answered in some way. You see, this was an abbreviated method of active imagination, concentrating upon the image until it moved;² in that moment the god gave a hint, his assent or his denial or any other indication, and that is the *numinosum*. Now, this is clearly a psychical fact, and Nietzsche, not knowing of psychology at all—though he was really a great psychologist—behaved with that concept of God as if it were purely an intellectual concept and thought that if he said God was dead, then God didn’t exist. But the psychological fact remains and then the question is in what form that fact will appear again.

In this case, it appeared again in Nietzsche’s own dissociation:

¹ On Otto, see above, 10 June 1936, n. 1.

² Barbara Hannah, a member of the seminar, was to write a book on this subject: *Encounters with the Soul: Active Imagination* (Boston, 1981).

namely, when Zarathustra came up in him he clearly felt that it was not one but two, and he said so, yet since there was nothing inside beyond himself—or if there were, it would be himself—he had of course to say that Zarathustra *was* himself, he was identical. And so he was identical with the fact of the *numinosum*: he had to become a *numinosum*. That means he had an inflation, was filled with air, was *tremendous*!—and we shall soon come to a chapter where he will betray this fact, speaking of the wind with which he is filled. Moreover, when a definite image has been reduced to apparent nothingness, it is just as if the *pneuma*, what we call “spirit,” were also reduced to its primeval form which is just air. You see, when you have the experience of the deity, the *numinosum*, and you have an image of it, you can say this is the experience of the spirit; but when you reduce it and deny its existence, you are simply filled with air. Then it may even lead you into a neurosis where you have all the symptoms of being suffocated; or instead of having spirit, the abdomen may be filled with air literally. Spirit is also the source of inspiration and of enthusiasm, because it is a welling-up; the German word *Geist* is a volcanic eruption, a geyser. That aspect of the spirit is the reason why alcohol, for instance, is called spirit: alcohol is the reduced form of spirit. Therefore many people, lacking spirit, take to drink. They fill themselves with alcohol; I have seen many a case of that sort. It is typical for men, though women do it too.

Now, Nietzsche’s book is a confession of this condition and its peculiar problems. You know that we have, or at least have a sort of reminiscence of, what one might call a medieval or primitive world, in which the *numinosum* is outside of ourselves. I don’t need to go into that. But you are probably not quite aware of that world where the *numinosum* is inside you, of *our* world where the *numinosum* is experienced as a psychological fact. The very word shows that we declare the deity as our experience and nothing but our experience; though we may deny that it is a real experience and think it a psychological occurrence that happens only to certain people. That of course produces a new kind of world, a world without a deity, without a spirit, a world in which we are the only living things, practically. Of course it is then questionable in how far we are really living, because we are so deeply convinced that we move through space just as any other object moves through space, that we see no particular difference; there is only a huge space through which things move, and since we cannot indicate any particular sense, we renounce the idea of formulating any sense in the whole thing. You see, that is a perfectly new, very peculiar world; we have never before experienced how it feels when the *numinosum* is

identical with ourselves, how it is when we are the *numinosa*. That is a new problem, and it puts us right in front of an entirely new task: namely, how one should behave if one is a *numinosum*, how it is when *we* are gods or something near to that—in other words how it would be if we were supermen. For Zarathustra is the Superman already in existence in Nietzsche; he himself feels at times as if he were already the Superman.

This book leads us right into that kind of problem. It tells us at length what the inner events are, how one feels with reference to other people, to values, how everything changes its aspect. For instance, Nietzsche himself speaks of the destruction or the *Umwertung aller Werte*, the transformation of all values; naturally all values become different when you are a god, when you are something you never were before. If you are so big, then all other things become small. It is as if you were the size of a skyscraper, when of course your relation to the remaining world would be exceedingly clumsy; you wouldn't be able to enter your own house even, and so nothing would work. Now, we are here in the midst of a discussion of actual, existing values. For instance, the last chapter we dealt with had to do with the new relation to the fact of the priests, what the priests would mean to somebody who has an inflation or who is a *numinosum* himself, or how priests look in the eyes of the deity. We know quite well how the deity looks in the eyes of the priesthood, but we do not know how the priesthood looks in the eyes of the god. But we can get a pretty shrewd idea from reading that chapter.

And now we come to the chapter called "The Virtuous." Here again the question is, how does the deity look at the virtuous? How do they look in its eyes? Of course, the experiment is not quite pure, as you will realize, because we often fall upon facts which show us very clearly that Nietzsche is behind Zarathustra, that Nietzsche has an inflation and that the deity is therefore in a somewhat awkward position. If the deity finds itself to be identical with Mr. Nietzsche, naturally the space is a bit cramped, so even the judgment of God becomes a bit cramped. In such cases we have to refer to Nietzsche's biography and to the limitations of his time, since he is a child of his time. But in the better parts of his text, it is a good thing to keep in mind that not Nietzsche speaks but the deity, and it is obviously not a dogmatic deity but the deity as a psychological fact.

You see, the deity as a psychological fact is presumably not at all what churches or creeds have made of it. Certain Protestants, a Protestant theologian for instance, will assure one that God is bound to be only

good, and then one must always ask why they say so. It might be because it is true that this psychological factor representing God is really nothing but good, but it also might be because they are afraid that he might *not* be good. They might say it as a sort of apotropaic gesture, in order to protect themselves, or to force or propitiate the deity. As we say to somebody who is threatening to become angry, "Now be patient—you are really quite patient," in order to make him believe that he *is* patient. So it is quite possible that we implore God to be good in order that he shall be good, that we refuse to believe that he can be bad, hoping that he will be convinced and will really be good.

That is by no means blasphemy; I have the authority of the Catholic church behind me. Or one need only go back as far as the German reformer Luther, who recognized that God was not always good; unlike the modern theologians he allowed for a *Deus absconditus*, a concealed or veiled god that is a receptacle for all the evil deeds, all the terrible things which happen in the world. We cannot conceive that a good God would be responsible for all that nonsense. It is absolutely in the hands of the All-powerful to make man a good vessel, but he preferred to make him a very imperfect vessel. He preferred to rouse all sorts of extraordinary sins in the world that were beyond the power of man to cope with and made the work of man entirely nonsensical. So, since we cannot assume that it is all for the good of man, we say it is the work of the devil, but the very existence of the devil is an exception to the omnipotence of God. When I was a boy I asked my father why there was a devil in the world since God was all-powerful, and my father said that God had granted the devil a certain time in which to do his work in order to test people. "But," I said, "if a man makes pots and wants to test whether they are good, he doesn't need a devil, he can do it himself." We still have in the Lord's prayer "lead us not into temptation," and one of my daughters said a good God would know better than to lead people into temptation, and I had nothing to say against that. So you see when the deity speaks in Nietzsche it might say very shocking things. That explains why there are so many shocking things in *Zarathustra*. Well now, the new chapter begins.

With thunder and heavenly fireworks one must speak to indolent and somnolent senses.

If you keep in mind that God is speaking, this is almost like the psychology of old Jahve that spoke with thunder and lightening and created so much disorder in the world.

But beauty's voice speaketh gently: it appealeth only to the most awakened souls.

Gently vibrated and laughed unto me to-day my buckler; it was beauty's holy laughing and thrilling.

At you, ye virtuous ones, laughed my beauty to-day. And thus came its voice unto me: "They want—to be paid besides!"

Zarathustra very clearly hints at the fact that most people prefer to be virtuous because it pays, and so their virtue is not quite creditable—it serves a purpose, one is very often only good in the expectation that everybody will say "Isn't that nice?"—and so we shall be rewarded.

Ye want to be paid besides, ye virtuous ones! Ye want reward for virtue, and heaven for earth, and eternity for your to-day?

And know ye upbraid me for teaching that there is no reward-giver, nor paymaster? And verily, I do not even teach that virtue is its own reward.

Ah! this is my sorrow: into the basis of things have reward and punishment been insinuated—and now even into the basis of your souls, ye virtuous ones!

Well, the idea is that if the deity doesn't exist, there is no pay-master, nobody there to pay us at the end of our lives for all our virtues. If a virtue means a reward at all, it must be its own. This idea of the suitability of virtue, the obvious value, almost the commercial value of virtue, pleases Nietzsche very much, so he indulges in it a little, and that explains the peculiar style of the next sentence:

But like the snout of the boar shall my word grub up the basis of your souls; a ploughshare will I be called by you.

You see, virtue is always a difficult thing because there wouldn't be any virtue if there were not a need, so you can expect to find something below it; virtue is often a cloak that covers up something else. If anybody insists too much upon truth or honesty or frankness, for instance, you may be sure that something is hidden behind it; just because there is a tendency to lie, to conceal, they talk a great deal about frankness: *Qui s'excuse s'accuse*. That is, I am afraid, the characteristics of many virtues, and when you have discovered it, it gives you, of course, a certain unholy pleasure to dig up all the things that are hidden; you have discovered that they are all locked doors and naturally your curiosity is aroused—you want to find out what is behind them. Of course, what you find is not always quite harmless: you may find dirt even. And in

digging up dirt you are quite close to the pig and so the boar comes in, and therefore all sorts of wrong metaphors present themselves to Nietzsche—like needing the snout of the boar in order to dig up evil-smelling secrets. This sort of interest makes Nietzsche almost an analyst. Here, then, is a small restriction of the voice of God, at least I think that the man, the “all too human” of Nietzsche, has played a certain role in this.

All the secrets of your heart shall be brought to light; and when ye lie in the sun, grubbed up and broken, then will also your falsehood be separated from your truth.

For this is your truth: ye are *too pure* for the filth of the words: vengeance, punishment, recompense, retribution.

Ye love your virtue as a mother loveth her child; but when did one hear of a mother wanting to be paid for her love?

Here again the “all too human” plays a trick. I have heard of mothers wanting to be paid for their love only too often. Nietzsche had not because he was a man with very developed intuition and intellect, but his feeling developed slowly. He had not his own feeling really. Such men always have mothers’ feelings, continue their mothers’ feelings; there is plenty of evidence in his biography for this fact. And mothers’ feelings have never been subjected to a close analysis, at all events not when a man has them; he believes in mothers’ feelings, and that his mother-feeling is pure and all-powerful and wonderful—and naturally never expects to be paid for. But inasmuch as there are forms of mother love that quite decidedly wait for payment, it is just as certain that the mother feeling in a man waits for the reward.

It is your dearest Self, your virtue. The ring’s thirst is in you: to reach itself again struggleth every ring, and turneth itself.

I will read you the German text here, this English rendering being not quite sufficient: *Es ist euer Liebstes selbst, eure Tugend. Des Ringes Durst ist in euch: sich selber wieder zu erreichen, dazu ringt und dreht sich jeder Ring.*³ What does that mean? We have encountered this kind of language before.

Mrs. Crowley: Is he not referring to the return?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the ring of the eternal return. That is Nietzsche’s

³ Kaufmann’s rendition reads: “Your virtue is what is dearest to you. The twist of the ring lives in you: every ring strives and turns to reach itself in you again” (Kaufmann*, p. 206).

conception of immortality. You see, to him the number of possibilities in the universe was restricted. You do not find that in this book. Nietzsche's idea of the Eternal Recurrence is in a posthumous publication by Horneffer, consisting of fragments from the manuscripts in the Nietzsche archives.⁴ There Nietzsche dealt with the idea that the number of possibilities in the universe was restricted and therefore it was unavoidable that in the course of infinite spaces of time, the same thing would return, and then everything would be again as it was. That idea filled him with an extraordinary enthusiasm. I cannot quite understand it but that doesn't matter. It belongs with this symbolism of the ring, the ring of rings, the ring of Eternal Recurrence. Now, this ring is the idea of totality and it is the idea of individuation naturally, an individuation symbol. It means the absolute completeness of the self, and you will see that this is confirmed in the text.

In my edition of the English text there is a mistake. In the sentence, "It is your dearest Self, your virtue," *self* should not be written with a capital S—that is wrong. Nietzsche does not mean there *the* Self, he means, "it is even your dearest." That would be the literal translation of *euer Liebstes selbst*, and not "your dearest *Self*."⁵ I have the original German edition where it is a small letter. To say it is the *Selbst* is of course an entirely new interpretation, and probably that apparent mistake came in through the fact that a few paragraphs further down you find the sentence that your virtue is your Self and not an outward thing. But this was suggested presumably by the sentence we are actually dealing with; namely, first he merely wanted to say that your virtue was the dearest thing to you, the thing you cherish or love the most, and then *that* suggested the idea of the Self, which is proved by the way this is printed in the first edition. You see, the fact which he tries to express here, that virtue is the thing you love the most, means that the intensity of your love is the virtue, and there he takes the word *virtue* in its antique sense. In German, it is *Tugend*, which has to do with *Tüchtigkeit*, but that also meant originally something that was efficient, like the Latin word *virtus* which had the meaning of "quality" or "power." For instance, a physical body or a chemical body had *virtus*. Opium has a *virtus dormitiva*, which means it has the quality of a narcotic. *Virtus* is a dynamic quality. So he means the very fact that you love the most, or

⁴ A year after Nietzsche's death, Ernst and August Horneffer and Peter Gast (Nietzsche's most faithful disciple and correspondent) edited vol. XV of the *Werke*, "Studies and Fragments," which they titled *Will to Power* (Leipzig, 1901). See WP.

⁵ In this book, the practice of the editors of the CW has been followed, of using the lower case *s* in *self* for Jung's distinctive concept.

that you love intensely, is the virtue: namely, that is the powerful or the efficient in you.

That he really meant this is borne out by the next sentence: the thirst of the ring is in you. Thirst is the dynamic element and that is the value, or the virtue. With the ring comes in the idea of totality, which is always connected with the idea of duration, of immortality, the eternal return. That is substantiated by the fact that the actual psychological experience of totality, which is a religious experience, always expressed or formulated as the experience of God, has the quality of immortality, the quality of eternal duration. That is confirmed also by the *consensus gentium*; you find the evidence in the literature of the whole world. There is that element of duration, either limited to the duration beyond death, or the immediate feeling of divine eternity. So this sentence would show that Nietzsche amplifies his dynamic concept of virtue and says it is really the most powerful, the most intense, the most efficient thing in you. And this is the thirst of the ring; namely, your highest virtue is your expectation or desire, the thirst for the ring. Or it may also be the thirst of the ring in you, or of that experience in you to become real. This is the virtue, and from this, naturally, to the self is only a step. Therefore he says in the next sentence, "to reach itself again struggleth every ring, and turneth itself." In other words, in the circular movement, in the rotation of the ring, is expressed the dynamic intensity which is the virtue. Now this circular movement of the ring is naturally round the center, so this is the famous *circumambulatio*, namely, the concentration upon the central point is the virtue, and that is Nietzsche's idea. This desire is not temporal, but eternal, of eternal duration. It is immortality. So you have practically in a nutshell here the whole symbology of individuation. Then, still amplifying that idea, he continues,

And like the star that goeth out, so is every work of your virtue: ever is its light on its way and travelling—and when will it cease to be on its way?

This is again a bit difficult. The idea is that virtue is the ring, and that is eternal power, cosmic. It is a sort of galactic system which is also a great circle, or it is the circulation or rotation of a planet round the sun. So he comes to the idea of the star. The ring is the star and therefore every act of virtue is starlike; or it might be like a shooting star, or like a star that will become extinct, because an act of virtue will cease to be. But no, says Nietzsche, because there is a feeling of eternal duration; virtue is such a power that it can never be extinct. Therefore, it is like

a star in that, though it may become extinct, yet on account of the infiniteness of space the light travels on. Whether he is able to see it depends upon the observer; if he is near, it will cease to be, but if he is at an infinite distance from the star it will shine eternally. You know, there are many stars in our universe that are extinct but we still see them. Too short a time has elapsed—the light needs perhaps a million years to come here—so if a star has only been extinct ten thousand years, it might take a million more years before we could become aware that it no longer existed. You see, Nietzsche quite naturally uses here the simile or metaphor of the planets or the galactic circle, which is forever the expression of eternal duration, now as in antiquity. For instance, you may remember in the so-called Mithraic liturgy by Dieterich, the confession of the *mystes*, the initiate, when he became aware of the presence of the planetary gods: “I am a star like yourself, who travels on the same way with you.”⁶ That is, he himself was starlike through the fact that he had the virtue, the eternal power of the ring. Now Nietzsche applies his insight to man, saying,

Thus is the light of your virtue still on its way, even when its work is done. Be it forgotten and dead, still its ray of light liveth and travelleth.

That your virtue is your Self, and not an outward thing, a skin or a cloak; that is the truth from the basis of your souls, ye virtuous ones!—

This is one of the two most important thoughts, or *the* most important thought in the whole chapter. Here he plainly says, your virtue is your Self, with a capital S. In German it is, *Dass eure Tugend euer Selbst sei, und nicht ein Fremdes, eine Haut, eine Bemäntelung*. The German word *fremd* means “alien.” I should insist upon that translation instead of “outward” because in the old formulations of the Middle Ages, in the so-called Hermetic philosophy, where we have the nearest analogies to these ideas, one always finds that term, *nihil alienum*: nothing alien should be in the composition of the most important thing, the philosopher’s stone, which is the symbol of the self. They always insisted that the stone was one thing and nothing alien should be put into it; therefore, one should keep the hermetic vase well shut, hermetically sealed. You see, that term comes from their idea that nothing could come in that was alien to the primal matter out of which the stone was made. So

⁶ *Eine Mithrasliturgie* (Leipzig, 1905; 2nd edn., 1910), by Albrecht Dieterich, was a work very important to Jung.

when Nietzsche says, "and not an alien skin or a cloak," he means pretty much the same: namely, your virtue is only a virtue inasmuch as it is the self, understood here as a dynamic entity, a dynamic existence.

Now, of course, this is difficult to understand if you try to realize what it really conveys, and Nietzsche goes no further into it here. It is his intuitive style to just allude to things; one sees how he arrives at it—his words suggest such ideas to him very often. For instance, "It is even your dearest" and then the accent is merely changed and it means, "It is your dearest *Self*," which suggests this idea—merely alluding to it and then leaving it, to return to it again later on. It is as if he himself had not a full realization of what it really meant, which comes from the fact that he, Nietzsche, is not speaking out of his conscious mind: Zarathustra rules his hand that writes. Zarathustra is like a river that flows through him, and Nietzsche is merely the means by which Zarathustra speaks. Sometimes the means is not good—too narrow, cramped, not quite pure—and then the manifestation of Zarathustra is also cramped or contaminated or even falsified; then sometimes, inasmuch as the instrument works well, it is the absolute truth. But Nietzsche's conscious ego participates in it only intuitively. He just catches that your virtue is your self, and though he can write it, yet he has no time and no complete realization of it, and so he goes on. One often sees in *Zarathustra* that the most important ideas are just alluded to and then left. If he were really a philosopher, which he is not, he would stick at it. He never would get away from this place, but would forever turn round this one sentence: "Your virtue is your Self." What does that mean? It means a world. Who is there who really understands it? And what does it mean practically? It is a statement that would need years, a whole lifetime, to realize fully. But one thing is perfectly clear: it is not an outward thing, or an alien thing, not a thing which is taught or imitated or obeyed or followed or suggested. It is not an attitude you take on like a skin or a cloak, or a way of doing. It is just your self. It means, *be yourself* and you are virtue.

You see, to explain such a thing fully, one needs to know a great deal about the history of human thought. What is that self? Naturally, common sense reality would say: *self*—that is, myself. And what is myself? The ego, I myself. And you are completely mistaken. That is why people call Nietzsche an individualist or an egotist. But it is perfectly clear that he is two, Nietzsche and Zarathustra. Nietzsche is "I," his ego, and the self is presumably Zarathustra; we have often seen in the former chapters that Zarathustra is really in the place of, or represents, the self. Zarathustra, being the archetypal image of the old wise man nat-

urally contains the self, as in all cases where that figure becomes a psychological experience. As the anima in a man's case contains the Self. The anima is something different from the ego. If one identifies with the anima, one is in trouble, neurotic, a sack full of moods, a most unaccountable being, most unreliable—everything wrong under the sun. So if you should say, "I am my Self," you would be neurotic, as Nietzsche was as a matter of fact, because he identified with Zarathustra. He would better say, "I am not the self, I am not Zarathustra." As you should say, "My virtue is not myself"—it is just not ego, but something impersonal. It is the power of the self. Our psychological definition of the self is the totality, the ego with its indefinite fringe of unconscious that makes the totality. We don't know how far the unconsciousness reaches, but at all events the ego, as a center of consciousness, is a smaller circle within a wider circle or indefinite extension. We only know where the center is, but we don't know where the circumference is.

Now peculiarly enough, this is the old formulation, usually attributed to St. Augustine, that God is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. But I found recently in Hermetic literature that this saying is attributed to a Hermetic oracle. I don't, however, know the authority for this tradition; it is stated by an Italian humanist and I have had no chance yet to look up his authority. But usually, when the alchemists quoted from the Christian Fathers, they quoted correctly, and they made use of them very often. So if they had been convinced that St. Augustine was the authority for that metaphor they would surely have said so because they liked to quote the Fathers. In the Middle Ages it was always a recommendation; it meant: we are received, we are well spoken of, we are in good company. Naturally they had always a bit of inferiority feeling with reference to the church, so they even talked a lot of patristic language and used patristic metaphors in order to increase the authority for their statements. So when they definitely state that formulation to be of Hermetic origin and quote a so-called Hermetic oracle which is perfectly unknown to me, there might be something in it. I would not go so far as to say that St. Augustine borrowed it from any known Hermetic tradition—there is no such image to be found there as far as my knowledge goes—but there are numbers of Hermetic quotations from texts of which we have no evidence, because they have been lost. Therefore there is the possibility that that statement is authentic. It is also possible that it was a new invention, for the circle is an archetypal image that can occur anywhere without a direct tradition. For instance, you find it used very beautifully in Emerson's essays, in that chapter called "Circles." Of

course he was aware of St. Augustine—he quoted him—yet the use he made of it is not at all what St. Augustine would have made, which shows that it was a living archetypal fact in Emerson's case.⁷

Well now, it is perfectly certain that what Nietzsche means is that virtue is nothing that can be taught or given or acquired; virtue is what you are, your strength. And your strength is of course a metaphor again, for only conditionally is it your strength: it is the strength to which you belong, in which you are included. You see, this is the embarrassed formula of a mind that has stated that God is dead, because every mind of a former epoch would have said we were included in God, that our virtue was the strength of God and nothing else. But since God is dead and non-existent now, you must invent clumsy formulas, must say this is a strength to which I belong, which manifests psychologically. And then naturally you are in the devil's kitchen because that strength which manifests in you might be a very bad emotion or a very bad desire, so that the whole world would say, "How immoral, how disgusting!" A good Christian might say your belly was apparently your God, because your greatest emotion lay in eating and drinking. Or the most powerful thing in certain people is their fear for their reputation, their respectability; and then their respectability is their greatest strength, their greatest virtue, their God. Or they may have a foolish conviction. Or in a drug fiend, the desire for drugs is the strongest thing in his life; that is his virtue according to the definition, the power within him which cannot be overcome.

You see, all this agrees with our definition of God; as that psychological fact which is not necessarily good, it also can be destructive. But in admitting that, we are in line with all religions of all times, with the sole exception of very late Protestantism. For instance, to illustrate my allusion to the Catholic church, Basilus the Great, one of the old Fathers of the church, and St. Ambrose, St. Augustine's teacher, belonging also to the fourth century, used the rhinoceros as an analogy of God. They said that God was like a rhinoceros because of his great strength. That is the origin of the legend of the unicorn in the lap of the virgin,

⁷ Emerson's essay begins: "The eye is the first circle; the horizon it forms is the second; and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end. It is the highest emblem in the cipher of the world. St. Augustine described the nature of God as a circle whose centre was everywhere and its circumference nowhere." But Emerson makes no citation, and Jung is perhaps right in suspecting that the idea had a source other than Augustine. Surprisingly, Emerson was a particular favorite of Nietzsche. "Jung and Transcendentalism" has been discussed by Edward Edinger in *Spring* (1965), pp. 77ff., and by William McGuire in *Spring* (1971), pp. 136-40.

as a symbol of the Holy Ghost and the immaculate conception.⁸ One finds that symbolism on many ancient tapestries; and the unicorn was also wounded in the side by the spear, so he represented Christ in the form of the Holy Ghost—the Holy Ghost having there the form of the wild untameable Jahveh, the God of the Old Testament. Then in the Catholic Church, since the time of Albert the Great,⁹ they had the teaching that God, before he had a son, was of a very excitable temperament, very wrathful. He caused great disorder in the world until he found his peace in the womb of the Virgin, literally captivated by love. Then he transformed. He became the loving father of a son.

So you see, that kind of teaching in the Catholic church shows that they admit that God was not always good, but was first wild and unruly. We have plenty of evidence for that in the Old Testament. For instance, in that passage where Job, speaking about his afflictions caused through the decree of Jahveh, tells his friends that there is no ruler or lord above him in Israel. Therefore nobody could say whether it was good or bad, nobody could condemn Jahveh for playing evil tricks on a man. Of course, if a powerful lord, who had some miserable serfs that entirely depended upon his grace, should make a bet with the devil as to which of them could best lead the poor fellows astray, we would think it a pretty bad joke. But that is what happened: God gave the devil a chance to tease the old man Job, to frighten him out of everything he had, to kill any number of cattle and human beings, to deprive the poor man of his ordinary life, just in order to test him. God in his omniscience could easily have known beforehand how the experiment would turn out. Well, I am just alluding to some of the amplifications of that statement that your virtue is your self. It is something to think about. Now Nietzsche continues,

But sure enough there are those to whom virtue meaneth writhing under the lash: and ye have hearkened too much unto their crying!

⁸ St. Basil, or Basileus (330?-379), the great Bishop of Caesarea, is one of the many theologians whom Jung berates for denying any evil at all to God (see CW 9 i, pars. 81-85). St. Ambrose (340?-397) was Bishop of Milan. In CW 11, par. 408, Jung also cites Nicolas Caussin, a 17th-century Jesuit, as likening Jahveh to an angry rhinoceros or unicorn until, "overcome" by the love of a pure virgin, he was changed in her lap into a God of Love.

⁹ Albert of Bollstadt lived in the 13th century. He was both an Aristotelian and a remarkably empirical natural scientist. He would surely have been shocked at any such account of Mary.

The following passages we can deal with very quickly. They contain important psychological statements so it is very worthwhile to hear them but they need no particular commentary.

And others are there who call virtue the slothfulness of their vices; and when once their hatred and jealousy relax the limbs, their “justice” becometh lively and rubbeth its sleepy eyes.

And others are there who are drawn downwards: their devils draw them. but the more they sink, the more ardently gloweth their eye, and the longing for their God. [A particularly juicy statement]

Ah! their crying also hath reached your ears, ye virtuous ones: “What I am *not*, that, that is God to me, and virtue!”

And others are there who go along heavily and creakingly, like carts taking stones downhill: they talk much of dignity and virtue—this drag they call virtue!

And others are there who are like eight-day clocks when wound up; they tick, and want people to call ticking—virtue.

Verily, in those have I mine amusement: wherever I find such clocks I shall wind them up with my mockery, and they shall even whirr thereby!

And others are proud of their modicum of righteousness, and for the sake of it do violence to things: so that the world is drowned in their unrighteousness.

Ah! how ineptly cometh the word “virtue” out of their mouth! And when they say: “I am just,” it always soundeth like: “I am just—revenged!”

This is a play on words in German, with a little local peculiarity. It sounds like this: *Ich bin gerecht* (I am righteous). But Nietzsche came from Basel and there it sounds exactly like *geracht*, “revenged.” That is what he heard there, I am sure.

With their virtues they want to scratch out the eyes of their enemies; and they elevate themselves only that they may lower others.

Or by lowering others they elevate themselves!

And again there are those who sit in their swamp, and speak thus from among the bulrushes: “Virtue—that is to sit quietly in the swamp.

We bite no one, and go out of the way of him who would bite; and in all matters we have the opinion that is given us.”

And again there are those who love attitudes, and think that virtue is a sort of attitude.

Their knees continually adore, and their hands are eulogies of virtue, but their heart knoweth naught thereof.

And again there are those who regard it as virtue to say: "Virtue is necessary"; but after all they believe only that policemen are necessary.

And many a one who cannot see men's loftiness, calleth it virtue to see their baseness far too well: thus calleth he his evil eye virtue.—

And some want to be edified and raised up, and call it virtue: and others want to be cast down—and likewise call it virtue.

And thus do almost all think that they participate in virtue; and at least every one claimeth to be an authority on "good" and "evil."

But Zarathustra came not to say unto all those liars and fools: "What do ye know of virtue! What *could* ye know of virtue!"—

But that ye, my friends, might become weary of the old words which ye have learned from the fools and liars:

That ye might become weary of the words "reward," "retribution," "punishment," "righteous vengeance."—

That ye might become weary of saying: "That an action is good is because it is unselfish."

Most mistakable—if you make the mistake of mixing up the self with the ego.

Ah! my friends! That *your* very Self be in your action, as the mother is in the child: let that be *your* formula of virtue!

Now how do you understand this; "As the mother is in the child"? Surely the child is in the mother.

Mrs. Sigg: It might be that Nietzsche thinks that a real human being is in the self, and the self is the mother for the human being.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is right. You see, here we have the idea of the ring, the wider circle that contains the smaller, like a mother, a child. And our action is virtuous inasmuch as the wider circle can be expressed within or by means of the smaller circle: namely, inasmuch as the hypothetical invisible self manifests in our actions. In other words, inasmuch as we can allow the unconscious to flow in us, so that whatever we do always contains a certain amount of the unconscious. When a thing is fully conscious, we can be sure that we have excluded the unconscious, and have excluded the indefinite extension of psychical

matter which is always there. We ought, on the contrary, to include the unconscious, but since we are unconscious of it, how is it possible? Therefore, we can only allow that action which has to be; if we do that, Nietzsche would call it virtuous. Then it has strength. But it must be clear, if the unconscious flows in with our action and with our behavior, that *we assume responsibility*. Otherwise it would not be expressed, but would simply be an event that occurred, and it would occur just as well to fishes or plants. It would have no merit; it only becomes ethical inasmuch as we know. If you know that a certain amount of unconsciousness, which means a certain amount of risk, comes in, and you stand for it, you assume responsibility: insofar is your action virtuous or ethical.

Verily, I have taken from you a hundred formulae and your virtue's favourite playthings; and now ye upbraid me, as children upbraid.

Well, he has taken away all the hundreds and hundreds of prescriptions or criteria by which one can say this is good and that is bad, and this should be and that should not be. Naturally, if you say you are virtuous inasmuch as you have virtue, and you have virtue inasmuch as you allow that strength to which you belong to manifest through you, then it is exceedingly simple, something which you see everywhere. That is the way in which a tree builds itself up, it is the way in which an animal lives and we ourselves *would* live if we only were not conscious. But since we are conscious we think about it, understand that certain things are very difficult or even very dangerous, and then we begin to be careful, to avoid. So our morality is the practical wisdom of life. Try to be impolite, or immoral, and see what will happen; you will wind up in jail perhaps, which is not pleasant. You can injure yourself in many ways. Or you may say that something is not good, but just wise. For instance, if you are nice to your enemies, it is pretty clever because you avoid further scraps; if you are polite you don't offend and that is also a good thing, good in the same sense as the primitive chief understood it when he said to the missionary: "It is good when I take the wives of my neighbor chief, and it is bad when he takes mine." You see, there is no difference; it is entirely a utilitarian point of view.

But to be able to submit to the strength which is in us, that is virtue. You see, it is even more virtuous than when you say you submit to the strength of God. That sounds like something that is in a way very nice. You have a form, can even justify yourself apparently, particularly when that strength of God coincides with what is said in books, or with

what the priests say, or public opinion says. For instance, if you raise a fund for certain charitable purposes and put all your energy into it, if you call it the will of God and say you are obeying his strength, everybody will pat you on the back and call it nice and virtuous. But it might be the other way round. It might be that the old god of Hosea would repeat himself—you know he was terribly indiscreet there, saying Hosea should marry the whore, and he did. If Bishop So-and-So were to marry a Paris cocotte it would be pretty shocking, yet there are no safeguards against such possibilities, absolutely none. You can see that in history. Inasmuch as it is eternal truth it may repeat itself at any time—that is the strength. Hosea could say it was the command of the Lord and there was no gainsaying it. But where are you if you say it is the command of the self? You are an egotist, you are excusing yourself. What is the self? It is yourself and there is no excuse whatever. So you are absolutely in the frying pan. That is what you come to when you say God is dead: you have no excuse any longer. But there we are—we have lost every authority for what we do. Now the chapter ends with this pretty ironic remark:

But the same wave shall bring them new playthings, and spread
before them new speckled shells!

Thus will they be comforted; and like them shall ye also, my
friends, have your comforting—and new speckled shells!

If you think that the god in Zarathustra is speaking like that it is exceedingly doubtful, very ambiguous; if you think Nietzsche has played with it, it is harmless and does not mean too much. But it might be that God himself has such a way of expressing himself, and then it would look almost as if he were playing with man and that is coldblooded. You will hear something about it in the next chapter.

LECTURE II

12 May 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah, "You said last time that when the spirit was denied, it sometimes reappeared as actual air in the abdomen. You have often said that whereas the East begins in *muladhara* and works *up*, the West begins in the head and works *down*. Would the air be in the abdomen because when 'God is dead,' we have to work right down the centers and can only re-find him when we reach *muladhara*, or can this occur at any center?"

This is a pretty complicated question. Miss Hannah tries to express this problem in Nietzsche in the language of the Tantric Yoga but I cannot possibly go into the explanation of the Tantric chakras so I must answer rather fragmentarily. It is perfectly true that all Eastern thought-forms start from the *muladhara* region, which means that they come up from the unconscious: the Eastern mind is always in connection with the natural instinctive facts of life. But in the West we are cut off from the instincts. Our mind works out of the air—starts in the head and looks down upon the natural facts; so, instead of growing up like a plant out of the bosom of the earth, one can say the Western mind begins in the head and works down towards the earth. You can see that in our way of approaching the unconscious. So many people, particularly those who have no idea of the unconscious, speak of the *Unterbewusstsein*, the subconscious, a consciousness below the conscious; we always think of it as being somewhere below the surface. At all events *we* are on top, we are above. For instance, take water as a simile of the unconscious; but we are not in the water, we are on the surface, we look down into the water, with the unconscious always below. While in the East it is understood that the unconscious is above and the conscious of man is below because it comes out of the earth. Therefore, it is characteristic for China that the dragon is in heaven; the dragon there is a favorable and heavenly and brilliant figure, a figure of light. With us it is just the opposite: the dragon is unfavorable, humid, dark.

It lives in caves and is lord of fords and rivers and springs; also it represents the lower centers of the brain and the spinal cord and we assume that we are on top of those so-called lower centers. Not so the East. The East starts from the lower centers; the instinctive truths are absolutely indisputable there. But we even dispute their right to existence; to us mind is something air-like that is always on top and allows us to look down upon the instinctive world.

So one can say that when the essence of spirit, which in Christian language is called "God," is dead, then surely it can only reappear in the lower centers. For instance, church people say that you are lost if you don't believe in God—you are on your way to hell—and to a certain extent that is perfectly true, because the moment the spiritual essence is denied, it simply comes up from below but in the form of a disturbance, as if the stomach were disturbed, for instance, or as if a bad instinct were stirred up. You see, the rising of the lower strata of the population and the destruction of the hierarchies—the destruction of *values*—are symptoms of decentralization; all that is the consequence of the undermining or hollowing out of the spiritual principle, or of identifying it with the mind. Klages makes the same mistake in his philosophy: he identifies intellect with the spirit.¹ But intellect is a human business while the spirit is no human business; it is a principle which we do not make. It makes us, it seizes us. And spirit is by no means an enemy of life; it is a dynamic condition, like anything.

Now, the fact is that when you deny that principle, it simply comes up from the other side, so it may manifest itself in the abdomen. For certain people it is quite enough to discover *manipura*. They are perfectly satisfied with the presence of that divine principle when they meet their emotions, so a part of our analysis simply consists in the making conscious of the emotions, and that may be enough. In other cases, you have to go further down into the collective unconscious, to *svadhisthana*, the water-region. But even that will not be enough in all cases; there are others that have to go right down to *muladhara*, and that gets them into reality; it is no longer mere theory, *theoria*, looking at things, being impressed by things, but becomes doing, actual deeds, actual life. That of course is concrete, completely practical, and that only will be convincing. For instance, Paul had every chance to know what Christianity was, but it was not enough until he was struck to the ground—till he was struck with blindness—that it happened to him in reality.

¹ For Klages, see above, 23 May 1934, n. 5.

I remember a woman whom I advised against an operation because her case was really nothing but hysteria. But her husband was a doctor himself and said that was nonsense, so she had twice a laparotomy and found there was nothing.² Then they thought it must be a sort of tuberculosis and she had to spend about two years in the mountains. Nine years later she came to me again, having had her belly cut open twice and having spent all that money and time. But then her sons were threatened by tuberculosis and she had a dream in which she was made responsible for their illness: the dream said she had caused their death, she had killed her two boys. Then she believed, but it needed that fact, and that is *muladhara*. I once treated a very distinguished lady—she was so distinguished that she could only speak in a very high voice, as people do who want to demonstrate how high they are—and I told her if she went on like that something would happen to her. I saw it coming: she was heading for a rape. I told her plainly but she would not believe me. Then when I had been away about eight days on my vacation it happened, naturally, and happily enough she was rescued in time with two broken ribs and a broken cartilage of the larynx. It needed something like that to make her sit up, otherwise she never would have paid any attention to what one told her. But people who have quick perceptions and can draw conclusions only need to touch the sphere of *manipura* and it is enough. Now we will go on to the next chapter, “The Rabble.”

Life is a well of delight; but where the rabble also drink, there all fountains are poisoned.

We must always keep in mind that when Nietzsche talks about the pitiful, or the priests, or the rabble, he means a thing which is particularly disturbing to himself; namely, a thing that is in himself and therefore particularly irritating. You see, we curse those things the most which are the closest to ourselves; the most irritating qualities are our own. If a thing is absolutely strange to us, if it really doesn't touch us on the raw, we are just astonished, perhaps only mildly astonished, and we do not understand, don't even find the necessary words to revile it. But when it is our own fault we become loquacious and dispose of a flow of attributes and criticism to blame or revile that particular thing. So when Nietzsche talks of the rabble, he means the rabble in himself; that gives him the necessary emotion, and sure enough everybody contains rabble. A certain percentage of humanity *consists* of rabble, and since

² A laparotomy is the surgical removal of a portion of the abdominal wall.

we are all part of that humanity we contain probably the same percentage. Now, we would not mention this fact, would prefer not to know of it, as long as the rabble is not what we call constellated; but the moment we rise a bit too high, the moment we become too distinguished, instantly the rabble becomes important and we begin to revile it. Nietzsche, inflated by his identification with Zarathustra, is of course too high, too distinguished, too wonderful; and then the rabble becomes important and he has to repress it. He finds now very strong words: the simile he uses is the "well of delight" poisoned by the presence of the rabble; that means the rabble in himself poisons *his* well of life, as it naturally would.

If you identify with the distinguished figure, all the minor qualities have no place in that image, but are excluded, and they will heap up and cover the fountain of life, which is of course the unconscious. Out of the unconscious flows the well of life, and what you don't accept in yourself naturally falls back into that well and poisons it; when you don't recognize certain facts, they form a layer in the unconscious through which the water of life must come up, and it will be poisoned by all those things you have left down below. If they are accepted in your conscious life, then they are mixed with other more valuable and cleaner substances, and the odious qualities of the lower functions disappear more or less. They only form little shadows here and there, sort of spice for the good things. But by excluding them, you cause them to heap up and they become entirely evil substances; for a thing to become poisonous, you only need to repress it. If you carefully sterilize everything that you do, you make an extract of the impurity and leave it at the bottom, and once the water of life is poisoned, it doesn't need much to make everything wrong. You see this in the next image he uses.

To everything cleanly am I well disposed; . . .

Here you have it: things must be clean or they are not accepted. He has to clean things in order to be able to accept anything. But nothing is quite clean; in everything there is the admixture of the earth, in everything imperfection. So if you prefer to accept only the perfect things, all imperfections will fall to the bottom; below your choice of most perfect things there will be a heap of imperfection.

but I hate to see the grinning mouths and the thirst of the unclean.

Exactly. Somewhere impurity heaps up and that forms these grinning mouths.

They cast their eye down into the fountain: . . .

If he looks down into the well, of course he sees it; therefore he says, and now glanceth up to me their odious smile out of the fountain.

The holy water have they poisoned with their lustfulness; and when they called their filthy dreams delight, then poisoned they also the words.

Now who has the filthiest dreams?

Mrs. Fierz: The virtuous ones.

Prof. Jung: Naturally. The saints have the filthiest dreams. That is a fact unfortunately. For instance, St. Augustine said he thanked God that he did not make him responsible for his dreams. He does not say what they were and I have always been curious to know—they must have been pretty strong.³ You see, that was a time when there was no analysis, but there are particularly good reports of such dreams—in Flaubert's *La Tentation de St. Antoine*, for instance. This is a very juicy bit of saint psychology, and, mind you, whatever Flaubert wrote was always based upon very careful study. Also we have a contemporary account by the holy Athanasius in which he described such visions.⁴ Of course those people who make such a sport of holiness must heap up impurity somewhere, and at times it just crashes down upon them—they get swamped by it—while if they had accepted it in small parcels, it would not come in big lumps. So what Nietzsche describes here is the perception of the fact that below his consciousness, in the inferior mental functions, is a lot of filth, and he projects it into people who to him are human rabble.

You see, we should be very grateful that there is such a thing as human rabble. They are inferior and I am not inferior; thank heaven that I have found people who are inferior—now I know where the inferiority lies. Therefore people are so tremendously interested in believing bad things. They hardly ever believe good things, that would be awkward. They can hardly stand believing that anybody is better than they, because it means that *they* should be better. But if they know that

³ The many dreams St. Augustine reports in his writing are scarcely "filthy," but he took them seriously, and at least some as premonitory.

⁴ Athanasius' visions were reported in *The Book of Paradise*, ed. E. A. Wallis-Budge. See below, 2 June 1937, n. 2.

other people are worse than they are, they should feel it almost as a duty to be grateful to them. They should say, "Thank heaven you are bad, for now I feel better, since I am not weighed down by the terrific task of *doing* better. You are worse, thank you. Stay where you are and then I know where the evil is, thank God, and I am all right." That explains why wives are often quite satisfied with the low moral state of the husband—that he drinks for instance—for then, quite against their will and with no effort, they are always on the good side and are never as bad as the husband. But if one takes the trouble to cure the husband, it gets uncanny; the wife tries to persuade him to drink again because she will then have a much better conscience. Or in treating a couple, if the man is badly neurotic and one happens to cure him, one can safely predict that the wife will then have a neurosis and a bad one. You see, she has always been on top. Of course she has suffered terribly and one had to pity her, sure enough. Her lot was by no means enviable. But in that case one would think when the husband was cured that happiness could begin. Not at all. Then the wife becomes neurotic. Hitherto, she was in good shape only because he was in bad shape. I don't say that this is always so, but it is very often so.

Indignant becometh the flame when they put their damp hearts to the fire; the spirit itself bubbleth and smoketh when the rabble approach the fire.

Mawkish and over-mellow becometh the fruit in their hands: unsteady, and withered at the top, doth their look make the fruit-tree.

And many a one who hath turned away from life, hath only turned away from the rabble: he hated to share with them fountain, flame and fruit.

That is very much Nietzsche's fate: he was extraordinarily intolerant of the ordinary man. He was easily hurt and could not stand banality at all, with the result that he was always isolated; he was a terribly lonely figure because he could not stand the ordinary man in himself. He tried to get away from his own banality, and anybody who tries to escape his own banality has no access to human life at all, but is completely cut off from his tribe. You see, mankind is a terribly banal fact, and inasmuch as you possess banal qualities you have a connection. In your virtues and attainments there is no connection—there your strength lies, you can stand alone; you need inferiority to have connection. If you deny your inferiority, you deny the bridge to humanity, lose your chance. That was exactly Nietzsche's case.

And many a one who hath gone into the wilderness and suffered thirst with beasts of prey, disliked only to sit at the cistern with filthy camel-driver.

And many a one who hath come along as a destroyer, and as a hailstorm to all cornfields, wanted merely to put his foot into the jaws of the rabble, and thus stop their throat.

This is again Nietzsche; you see, he is always identical with Zarathustra. He often compares himself to a destroyer or to a natural catastrophe like a hailstorm, always most destructive, of course, because he felt his new idea like purifying wind or a great revolution. But he never felt that what he imagined himself to be for the world, he most certainly was to himself because he was part of mankind; and whoever means a hailstorm to cornfields is in the first place a hailstorm to his own cornfields. Now, here he uses a very peculiar metaphor: namely, "to put his foot into the jaws of the rabble." This is an extraordinary figure of speech and those who have been in the former seminars know that whenever Nietzsche uses an image of bad taste, there is something symbolic behind it. The idea is that he puts his foot into the mouth of a monster, presumably choking it. Does that remind you of another figure? It comes later on but we have spoken of it before.

Mrs. Baumann: The snake that went into the shepherd's mouth that he could not swallow?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the snake that crept into his mouth while he was asleep. He should have swallowed it, but Zarathustra advised him to bite off his head and to spit it out. And what does that mean?

Miss Hannah: That he refuses his instinctive life.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the snake is the dragon, the representative of the lower centers of the brain and the spinal cord. It is that coldblooded animal that has no connection, no rapport, with man, symbolizing the part of our psychology which is utterly strange to ourselves, which we never can understand, at which we shudder and are afraid. People often have an instinctive fear of snakes, just as monkeys or horses have. Now, since he refused that thing, symbolizing all the lower parts of his mental functions, *la partie inférieure de ses fonctions*, they personified and came to him in the form of a snake that wanted to enter him.

Peculiarly enough, the snake is at the same time a religious symbol in the mysteries of Sabazios. The initiation consisted in the swallowing of the snake—of course not literally: they perhaps patted it or kissed it. The Christian Ophites celebrated their communion with a real snake on the altar, but in the mysteries of Sabazios they had a golden

serpent that was pushed in under the chin—instead of into the mouth—and passed down under the vestments and taken out below again; it was then assumed that the God had entered the initiate and impregnated him with the divine germ, and they called him *entheos*. The serpent symbolizes the god that enters man in order to fill him with the god, to make him the mother of God, and the pulling out from below means the birth, of course.⁵ That was like the antique rite of adoption. The mother who wished to adopt a son or a daughter had to hide the child under her skirts, even if it was a grown-up. And then he was pulled out from under them, and she had to give her breast to the adopted child to denote that it was her suckling. Then after such ceremonies they were nourished with milk and so on, as in the rebirth mysteries in antiquity.

Now we are here reminded of that symbol. Where it is a matter of the rabble, of that inferior part of his psychology, we surely encounter the same idea but in the reversed form: namely, he—or his foot at least—is in the position of the snake. As the snake entered the throat of the shepherd, so his foot enters the throat of the rabble. He is here very clearly identical with Zarathustra who is divine, a humanized form of God, and he has to behave as if he were the god himself, the snake. Of course it doesn't mean to choke the rabble but to fertilize, to impregnate the rabble, to enter the rabble so that the connection would take place between the inferior and the superior parts of himself. Being the superior part, he has to assume the role of the snake and enter the throat of the rabble, or dive down into the well in order that the powers which are above shall be mixed with the powers below. This is of course in order to vivify the dormant inferior layers, or to make the upper layers, the spiritual powers, real. For the spirit that does not appear in the flesh is a wind that is gone in no time: the wind must enter matter for it to be real. The spirit is nothing if it doesn't descend into matter, as matter is utterly dead if it is not vivified by the spirit. So he uses a very similar symbol here to express what should be. But this symbol is suggested by his resentment; he hates the rabble but in that very hatred the positive symbol appears. He continues,

⁵ In CW 5, par. 530, and 530n, Jung cites Clement of Alexandria as the source of his information about the Sabazios snake mysteries. In CW 12, par. 184, Jung says, "Among the Ophites, Christ was the serpent," and goes on to compare this symbolism to that of Kundalini yoga. The Ophites were an early, possibly pre-Christian, Gnostic sect, who held that man and the universe alike were generated by the conjunction of serpent and egg.

And it is not the mouthful which hath most choked me, to know that life itself requireth enmity and death and torture—crosses:—

But I asked once, and suffocated almost with my question: What? is the rabble also *necessary* for life?

Here we have it!

Are poisoned fountains necessary, and stinking fires, and filthy dreams, and maggots in the bread of life?

He has a rich choice of words to revile the inferior functions!

Not my hatred, but my loathing gnawed hungrily at my life! Ah, oftentimes became I weary of spirit, when I found even the rabble spiritual!

This shows how touchy he is. Being a breath of air, a spirit, naturally he is terribly offended by the coarseness of matter, reality, he cannot stand the sight of spirit that has become flesh. Well, one can sympathize with him I must say!

And on the rulers turned I my back, when I saw what they now call ruling: to traffic and bargain for power—with the rabble!

That he should be expected to deal with his inferior functions is quite out of the question; it cannot be done.

Amongst peoples of a strange language did I dwell, . . .

This refers to the long time he lived in Italy. He ran away from his people and his country in order not to be mixed up with the rabble.

with stopped ears: so that the language of their trafficking might remain strange unto me, and their bargaining for power.

And holding my nose, I went morosely through all yesterdays and to-days: verily, badly smell all yesterdays and to-days of the scribbling rabble!

That is most specific; those are his colleagues.

Like a cripple become deaf, and blind, and dumb—thus I have lived long; that I might not live with the power-rabble, the scribe-rabble, and the pleasure-rabble.

This means that he could not help seeing himself to a certain extent as having a power instinct. Of course the whole of *Zarathustra* is a power drive. That is the power-rabble, and to be a famous writer is the scribe-

rabble, and the pleasure-rabble—well, pleasure to a great extent was impossible to him, particularly all the qualities of love were more or less taboo on account of the syphilitic infection which he contracted when he was twenty-three.

Toilsomely did my spirit mount stairs, and cautiously; alms of delight were its refreshment; on the staff did life creep along with the blind one.

He could not accept his lower man, so he had to climb stairs.

What hath happened unto me? How have I freed myself from loathing?

He has not freed himself from loathing, but obviously here, while he was writing, he has somehow transcended his loathing.

Who hath rejuvenated mine eye? How have I flown to the height where no rabble any longer sit at the wells?

Here he is taken *in flagranti*. We have seen that he has not overcome his loathing; his mouth was full of objections and revilements a second ago, and now we suddenly discover that he is beyond, that he has climbed above it.

Did my loathing itself create for me wings and fountain-divining powers? Verily, to the loftiest height had I to fly, to find again the well of delight!

While he was realizing how low down the rabble was, he began to develop wings and to fly; he identified completely with Zarathustra, Zarathustra being the great bird, the wise man. You know the wise man is always represented with wings—the wise Hermes had wings, for instance, and in India the swan could almost be called the title of the wise man. It was always understood that a man who had attained the highest wisdom could fly, transport himself to any place. That was the criterion of perfect wisdom, the height of yoga practice and all that. So for him to say that he has created wings proves he is now completely identical with the spirit Zarathustra. Then of course he can believe that he has found the well, because the superior human wisdom of an unconscious figure like Zarathustra of course knows the well: that figure is the well itself, as a matter of fact. And then comes the *ekstasis*:

Oh, I have found it, my brethren! Here on the loftiest height bubbleth up for me the well of delight! And there is a life at whose waters none of the rabble drink with me!

You see, Zarathustra, being the concretized form or the personification of the principle of the spirit, has an energy of its own, a life of its own. And the spirit is a fountain because the spirit is essentially life. Therefore if you can identify with a spirit completely and disidentify from your own body, as has been tried in many forms of yoga, you can release the fountain of the spirit. Of course you are then no longer human; you have become dehumanized—are above the earth, are a ghost yourself—and of course you have to pay the cost. It has forever been the aspiration of mankind to fly like a bird, to become a wind, a breath; and it can be done, but it is paid for by the loss of the body, or the loss of humanity, which is the same thing. And now on the height of the *ekstasis*—you see *ekstasis* really means stepping outside of oneself—he suddenly realizes something and he says:

Almost too violently dost thou flow for me, thou fountain of delight! And often emptiest thou the goblet again, in wanting to fill it!

And yet must I learn to approach thee more modestly: far too violently doth my heart still flow towards thee:—

It is far too violent. That is the danger, because the identification with the spirit always causes a condition in which the mental function, which is bound up with the brain-matter, takes on such an intensity that it burns up matter. Man is burned up by such an intensity and then there is a great danger. That is exactly what happened to Nietzsche: he burned himself up in Zarathustra. He was a living flame that burned himself up, the result being the overstraining of the brain and a breakdown of the nervous system.

Now, I have a feeling here that the concept of the spirit may not be understood, and it would be in this connection particularly important that our ideas about it should agree. You see, this concept has been used so often and in such a way that most people think they know what they are talking about when they use the term *spirit*, but as a matter of fact they usually do not. We have a tendency to identify it with intellect, though the word *spirit* doesn't denote intellect at all. Of course in English there is a certain difference, but in German there is no difference at all, because the word *Geist* which Nietzsche uses, is used absolutely indiscriminately for intellect, mind, and spirit. German is a very strange language, it is very primitive in that respect; even its most fundamental concepts are still an ensemble of facts, a peculiarity which you would find in practically no other language except perhaps Chinese, or Russian which I don't know. I don't know Chinese either but I have a certain idea of Chinese characters and of their extraordi-

nary many-sided possibilities of interpretation, and they surely form the nearest analogy to the German language. German is, peculiarly enough, the language most incapable of expressing anything definite. The Germans make frantic efforts to be accurate on account of their feeling of inferiority that their language never expresses a thing definitely. Now this is for a certain kind of philosophy most awkward; for psychology, however, it is priceless, and for *real* philosophy it is also invaluable. You see, I understand by "real philosophy" a kind of thinking which expresses the understanding of life—that is real philosophy to me. But what one ordinarily calls "philosophy" at universities is an intellectual affair—like the theory of cognition, for instance. For that purpose, German has no value whatever: it is far too living. It is the spirit of the language to be connected with things, to be the life of things.

For instance, it is most characteristic that what you call reality, the German calls *Wirklichkeit*; there you see the difference. *Reality* comes from the Latin *res*, a thing, a static something, while the German *Wirklichkeit* implies that this thing *is*, only as long as it works. As Mr. Dooley, that man on the *New York Times*, said, "A truth is a truth as long as it works." So this book is a book as long as it works. That is the German idea; their concept of reality is most relative. It is a thing, *wirklich*, inasmuch as it works, *wirken*. There is a sort of dynamic, transitory moment and that is reality. This shows the spirit of the language most clearly. And so the German concept of *Geist* has all sorts of aspects, and it contains traces of the original history of that concept of course, as the word *spirit* does also. The spirit is *spiritus*, meaning breath; it is the breath that comes out of a man's mouth. It is the soul, his life, because he breathes as long as he lives, and when the last breath has left the body the soul has gone too, the man is dead. But *Geist* is not breath. *Geist* is a geyser, something that wells up like boiling water, like steam hissing up, or like the foam fizzling when you open a champagne bottle; that is *Geist*. So *Geist* is the alcohol in the wine, or the carbonic acid, the flavor, the *parfum* that develops from the wine, what we call the flower of the wine; while spirit is liquid air, breath, a gaseous liquid, aquatic, but more or less static. Therefore when Nietzsche speaks of *Geist*, he really means intensity, a dynamic outburst; and wherever he characterizes the nature of Zarathustra—when he calls him a whirlwind, or a hailstorm, or a thunderstorm, or the lightning—then that is *Geist*, the intensity. The original phenomenon of the spirit is a seizure, one could say; one is seized by violent emotion for instance, and then you say a spirit has entered you, you are possessed. Also, *Geist* has the meaning of the English word *ghost*, and in *ghost* you have the original

sense because *ghost* is related to *aghost*: there is the emotional link. The idea of outburst is always linked up with that word *Geist*, the idea of an extraordinary intensity.

One is also continually baffled by the use of the word *spirit* or *spiritus* in the alchemical concept. For instance, they say, "If thou dost not succeed in making the body a spirit, thou hast not accomplished the work." You see, in that case it would mean originally, inasmuch as the procedure was chemical, "If thou hast not succeeded in making the body, a metal, into an oxide, thou hast not succeeded in accomplishing the work." That is, the oxide is a volatile substance. If mercury is boiled, it always ascends and becomes a condensation again in those parts of the retort that are cooler; and then they say that the mercury in the state of boiling is the body, and the vapor of mercury, which ascends and transcends, is the spirit. When substances are heated, they usually oxidize or change their quality, and that change of quality was understood as what they called "sublimation"; it was like becoming a different being. You see, certain bodies change so much through oxidation that a naive person could not possibly recognize the relationship; therefore those old chemists thought that they produced new bodies, and the new body, caused by heating up the former body, was the spirit, a *spiritus*. But they used this word *spirit* absolutely indiscriminately even in their mystical texts, where they also talked about making the body a *pneuma*. Now *pneuma* is a wind, a volatile compound, a changeable compound, or it is really the spirit—I mean the spirit in its metaphysical or philosophical or religious sense—and you simply are unable to make sure which they meant. Presumably they meant that the spirit—what we now call "spirit" or what the Bible calls "spirit"—is a subtle body. You don't get away from that; it is just a subtle body. So you can make a spirit out of matter, can de-materialize—what they call "subtilize" matter to such an extent that it becomes a spirit, not a disembodied spirit but a spirit that is a subtle body.

Now, since this subtle body was made by heat, they assumed that through the fire they imparted fire-substance to the body so that it became partially like fire, and "fire" was another symbol for the soul. In Heraclitus you find a passage where it says that the noblest soul is the essence of fire—it is of the most intense radiation and splendor and quite dry—and therefore he says it is death to a spirit, or a soul, to become water. He also says that souls of alcoholics turn to water; they become water-logged or humid and they die.⁶ So the idea was that the

⁶ Heraclitus often contrasted noble fire with ignoble wetness; e.g., "It is delight, or

real spirit, the essence of life, of the soul, was fire. And by giving fire to substances they assumed that they became half spiritual, or subtle bodies. The fire means, of course, intensity, so if you submit to intensity, say to an intense emotion, you would change into a subtle body. Therefore, to subtilize or sublimate a man, you must expose him to the fire; first he must be cleansed from impurity by the ablution with water, and then exposed to the fire.

That idea is older than Christianity and you remember that saying in the New Testament: "I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance: but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear: he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire." You find that saying already in alchemistic texts of the first century—the famous text of Komarios for instance⁷—and these are all connected with pre-Christian traditions; and though we have no evidence, the texts being no longer extant, we know the names of people who were great authorities on these matters in the first or second centuries B.C. And, as I said, we have authentic texts from the first century, where we find those ideas. When a man is subjected to a great emotion, it means that he is subjected to the fire, and the contact with the fire can give him the nature of a subtle body; the fire can subtilize him, or it may destroy him. This idea is expressed also in the non-canonical saying of Jesus: "He who is near to me is near to the fire; and he who is far from me is far from the kingdom." For he is the fire, the greatest intensity, and whoever touches upon this intensity is subtilized, made pneumatic, made into a volatile body.

Now, the more Nietzsche becomes intense, the more he is identical with the flame Zarathustra; and the more he exposes himself to that fire, the more he becomes volatile, the more his body is burned up. The alchemists say that all the superfluities must be burned up and therefore the action of the fire must be strong; not so strong at first in order not to burn up too much, but later on in the process the fire must be increased, become more intense, and then all superfluities are burned away. Then one becomes subtilized; then one is a subtle body, a spirit.

Mr. Baumann: It seems to me that the German word *Geist* is best characterized as a thing that moves by itself and can move other things; and

rather death, to become wet." and "Fire . . . will judge and seize upon all things" (Freeman*, fragments 74, 66).

⁷ Matthew 3:11. The fullest description of how, for Komarios, baptism may be in both of the opposites, fire and water, comes in CW 14, pars. 316-17. Komarios, or Comarius, was a first-century alchemist.

the opposite, the *Materie* has the characteristic of something that does not move. You can use *Materie* in German for physical substances or you can use it for intellectual or abstract concepts, which you handle, as for instance the lecturer treats the subject of his lecture. So *Geist* means an active power, or a dynamic power.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Well, I wanted to speak of this in order that you may understand his peculiar metaphoric language, for in the next passage he says,

My heart on which my summer burneth, my short, hot, melancholy, over-happy summer: how my summer heart longeth for thy coolness!

You see, that is an accurate description of the process Nietzsche is undergoing; as he approaches the identification with Zarathustra, the living flame, he begins to blossom. That is the spring, and then comes the summer, the greatest heat, but alas, it is a short, hot summer and the end is calcination or what the alchemists call incineration. Then one becomes ashes, burned up, and that is the end—I mean the end of the ordinary banal man. Nietzsche burns up the lower man, the anatomical or physiological man, and he becomes a spirit. I have often said the he was *plus papal que le Pape*, more Christian than a Christian; one could call him the last real Christian. He is led straight back through the identification with the spirit and he doesn't realize it. And here we have the tragic fore-feeling we occasionally meet in *Zarathustra*: my short, melancholy summer. He knows this is transitory. This intensity is never to be reached again and it is a fatal injury.

Past, the lingering distress of my spring! Past, the wickedness of my snowflakes in June! Summer have I become entirely, and summer noontide!

A summer on the loftiest height, with cold fountains and blissful stillness. . . .

Prof. Jung: To what does his insistence upon the noontide refer?

Mrs. Baumann: The middle of life.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we shall come later on to this noontide idea; it is that point of indifference when things are in the balance between the rising and the falling, the idea of the middle of life. Now how old was he when he wrote this part of *Zarathustra*? It was written in 1881.

Mrs. Sigg: He was born in 1844.

Prof. Jung: So he was then thirty-seven; it was exactly the time. The real process begins before, just when the clock strikes thirty-six one

could say, but of course one notices nothing. At thirty-seven there is a chance to realize it, that is noontide—that short time—and afterwards an early autumn comes.

oh come, my friends, that the stillness may become more blissful.

He longs for the coolness, he is so hot. Now the coolness is the contrary, and this cold which suddenly breaks into the heat occurs everywhere, practically, in *Zarathustra*. Often Nietzsche uses metaphors that are of bad taste even, but this idea that the pairs of opposites would touch each other is always present in his mind, not in the form of conjunction, but in the form of *enantiodromia*, the idea that things would suddenly run over into the contrary. Now the whole of *Zarathustra* was written in three weeks practically, not of course in one stretch but in three parts, each in a week. So you can see the intensity of that process; you can imagine what an extraordinary intensity must have been in that brain to enable him to produce such a thing. That was the summer and the extreme heat and the subtilization. Now Nietzsche continues:

For this is *our* height and our home: too high and steep do we here dwell for all uncleanly ones and their thirst.

He said before, “too violently,” and here it is “too high and steep”—but for the others, the impure ones.

Cast but your pure eyes into the well of my delight, my friends! How could it become turbid thereby! It shall laugh back to you with *its* purity.

You see, this is instead of what he said before—that the rabble had cast an evil eye on the fountain and poisoned it. And from the height he has now reached, he says, cast your pure eyes into that well of life. Life is of course to Nietzsche almost synonymous with delight. Now, if you can see the fountain of life as something absolutely pure, you must be inhumanly pure yourself. To anybody who is not so extraordinarily pure, the fountain of life is never quite pure, but is always a bit turbid. You know, other people have had an entirely different idea, like St. Augustine, who said we were born between feces and urine.⁸ That was the Christian point of view, to denote the extreme inferiority of our nature. We would be completely lost if nothing had been done for us. We are conceived and born in impurity and have to undergo the purifica-

⁸ This is yet another saying often attributed to St. Augustine, but untraced.

tion process by ablution and fire and so on. Therefore we must be sublimated, and here Nietzsche assumes that we have been, have reached the top, and therefore we see everything as absolutely pure. I don't doubt, if you can identify with the spirit, that you can see life as absolutely pure, but for man it is another question. Since man is not spirit, since man is also body, this fountain of life must have pretty much the same nature; and since he doesn't consist of 100 percent pure gold we must admit that the fountain also is not 100 percent pure gold, but produces a lot of inferior substances, which would explain why things are as imperfect as they are. Well now,

On the tree of the future build we our nest; . . .

He again uses an extraordinary metaphor, pretty daring I should say. Why does the tree come in suddenly?

Mrs. Crowley: The tree is also a sort of fountain of life.

Prof. Jung: In that it pushes up, or wells up? Yes, but that is a bit far-fetched.

Miss Hannah: Is the tree not always a symbol of the impersonal life? Doesn't he identify with the impersonal life?

Prof. Jung: Well, the tree is a symbol of spiritual development, and spiritual evolution is different from animal evolution. Animal evolution would be the development of the body, and spirit is always understood to be a sort of secondary growth on the process of the body because it burns up the body, extracts the life, in order to reach its intensity. It is most exhausting because it uses up a man's substance. You see, the tree is a plant, and it symbolizes a strange development entirely different from animal life, like the development which we call spiritual, which is always felt as most peculiar, an almost parasitic kind of development. The spiritual development in Nietzsche's case destroyed his brain. The brain is needed and his brain was burned up, so he is a sort of transformation symbol. As a tree extracts mineral substances from the earth, the spirit transforms the coarse body, or the coarseness of matter, into the subtlety of organic matter. The tree represents, then, a sort of sublimation. It grows from below up into the air above, has its roots in the earth as if it were part of the earth, and extends roots again into the kingdom of air; and so the spirit of development rises out of the material, animal man and grows into a different region above. Therefore the tree has forever been a symbol of spiritual value or philosophical development, like the tree of knowledge in Paradise for instance, or the philosophical tree, the *arbor philosophorum*, the tree with the immortal fruits—a Hermetic symbol—

also the world tree in the Edda. And there you find the connection with the spring: below the tree Yggdrasil is a well.⁹

Remark: In fairy tales there is very often a tree beside the well. If a princess gets lost, she is usually found near the tree or under a tree by a well.

Prof. Jung: That is true. The tree takes its life, one could say, out of the well, a transformation of earth and water; and at more advanced levels of civilization it represents the spiritual development. You see that again in the legend of the tree of knowledge in Genesis, because upon the tree of life was the serpent that persuaded the first parents to become conscious. The serpent thought it might be better for man to know all about it, but Jahveh was not quite of the same idea, so he did not allow them to eat of that fruit. Now Nietzsche says, on the tree of the future—the spiritual anticipation of the future—we build our nests, as if we were birds. As the wise man is always a bird, and Nietzsche has become Zarathustra, he says, “I have wings. I am a bird. I make my nest on that marvelous Yoga tree, the tree of knowledge, the *arbor philosophorum*.” Now, who else had his nest in the branches of a marvelous tree? You know that is also an important religious myth.

Mr. Allemann: The Phoenix. And on Yggdrasil, it is an eagle.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Phoenix, the symbol of renewal and rebirth.

Miss Welsh: And Ra.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there are many such myths. Mithras is often represented with wings, being born out of the top of the tree, which is of course rather the idea of Ra, building his own nest and rising like a falcon in the morning. So that again shows a complete identification with the spirit.

Eagles shall bring us lone ones food in their beaks!

Where does this image come from?

Mrs. Sigg: From Elijah.

Prof. Jung: Yes, from the Old Testament—the Protestant comes out in Nietzsche again. It is a raven that brings the food to Elijah but of course it is much more distinguished to have an eagle—a raven would not quite do. So he is in the place of Elijah the prophet; Zarathustra is a prophet as good as any.

Mrs. Sigg: I think Elijah had also to do with fire and flame—

⁹ Jung wrote extensively about tree symbolism. See especially his essay “The Philosophical Tree” in CW 13, pars. 304-82. For Yggdrasil, see above, 17 Oct. 1934, nn. 6 and 9.

Nietzsche with the fire and the thunderstorm, and Elijah with the chariot of fire.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he also had such insight that he burned up—he went in the fiery chariot to heaven. That is like the death of Heraclitus who burned himself up—he disappeared in fire. You find the same motive in *Faust* three times. The first was the *Knabe Lenker*, the boy charioteer, the second Homunculus; the third was Euphorion, who disappeared in a flash of light, burning up in too great an intensity.¹⁰

Mr. Baumann: In a Seminar several years ago there was a very interesting alchemistic picture which symbolized that process. At the base was man and two lions, and the paws were cut off. Then comes the process of burning up, and above is a tree with many birds.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the tree full of birds is a regular alchemistic symbol, and they are very often eagles. You know the eagle is the bird of light, the cousin of the Phoenix, while the raven is the black bird and symbolizes darkness. So the alchemistic matter of *materia* in the state of darkness, a parallel to the human soul in the state of darkness, is called *caput corvi*, the head of the raven—like the head of Osiris, lost in the dark waters when he was dismembered by Set—and later on it becomes a golden head. Therefore, in a Greek text the alchemists called themselves children of the gold head, *caput aureum*, the *caput corvi* that became gold, shining like the sun.¹¹ Now we will finish this chapter.

Verily, no food of which the impure could be fellow-partakers!

Fire, would they think they devoured, and burn their mouths!

Verily, no abodes do we here keep ready for the impure! An ice-cave to their bodies would our happiness be, and to their spirits!

Of course that ice cave is meant for his own body. Ice always conveys the idea of no innervation, no warmth, no life, the death of the bodily man.

And as strong winds will we live above them, neighbours to the eagles, neighbours to the snow, neighbours to the sun: thus live the strong winds. [Complete identification with the spiritual principle again.]

¹⁰ Elijah, told by the Lord to hide by the brook Cherith, for “I have commanded the raven to provide for you there” (I Kings 17:2-4). For Elijah in “a chariot of fire” see II Kings 2:11. Heraclitus was naturally supposed to die by fire, to which he attributed such importance. In *Faust*, Part Two, the king’s renewal fails three times: the boy charioteer, Homunculus, and Euphorion, all go up in smoke. See CW 12, par. 243.

¹¹ Jung has several accounts of the *caput corvi*, or head of the raven, in CW 14; see, for instance, pars. 724, 772.

And like a wind will I one day blow amongst them, and with my spirit, take the breath from their spirit: thus willeth my future.

Verily, a strong wind is Zarathustra to all low places; and this counsel counseleth he to his enemies, and to whatever spitteth and speweth: “Take care not to spit *against* the wind!”—

Now he is Wotan, the wind god—that is perfectly clear—and now look out, don’t spit against the wind, it is not wise; if the wind blows from a certain direction, don’t resist it, it is dangerous. You see, that is what happens.

LECTURE III

19 May 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here is a picture from the Jain sect in India, representing a perfect saint who turns into a plant. Mr. Baumann brought it to us as an example of spiritual development being represented by the plant, which we were talking about last week. We are now coming to the chapter called "The Tarantulas." The chapter before was entitled "The Rable." Now how do we get from that to the idea of tarantulas?

Miss Hannah: In the last chapter he entirely identified with the wind, the spirit; and the spider is very often the symbol of the mother complex. Having gotten into the masculine entirely, he had to get free.

Prof. Jung: Ah, you think of the wind as being entirely masculine. Have you justification for that?

Miss Hannah: No. Perhaps I got mixed up with the Logos.

Prof. Jung: But there would be an argument in favor of your idea. What did we say about the wind last time?

Mrs. Fierz: That the wind was Wotan.

Prof. Jung: Naturally. Wotan is the wind god *par excellence* and since Nietzsche was expressing himself in a German *milieu*, you can be sure that he got something of Wotan: that is in the German substance as you know. So he naturally takes on a very masculine character, though to the antique understanding the wind was not so certainly masculine. And what evidence have we for this?

Mrs. Baumann: Sophia.

Prof. Jung: Yes, Sophia as wisdom is the personification of the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost has been understood as the mother of God; in the first and second centuries there were numbers of Christians who believed that Mary the mother of God was really a sort of allegory and Sophia was the real mother, the Holy Ghost. For instance, in the Acts of St. Thomas there is a hymn in which is the invocation: "Oh come, Holy Ghost our mother." Then in Hebrew the word for *pneuma* is *ruach*, meaning spirit as well as wind, and it is used as a *femininum* just

as often as a *masculinum*—there is evidence for both in the texts of the Old Testament. Do you know the origin of this peculiar fact that there is uncertainty about the sex of the spirit?

Miss Hannah: That it is hermaphroditic—above sex.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but where does that hermaphroditic element come from?

Prof. Reichstein: Because the masculine part of the spirit would be the conscious part, and the unconscious part is feminine.

Prof. Jung: Ah, if you take it psychologically, that is sure, inasmuch as men have thought it. With women it would naturally be the other way round. Men had these thoughts first, and since they were contents of initiation rites, clan or tribal teaching, of course they took on a masculine form first psychologically. But we have historical evidence for these hermaphroditic ideas: namely, it is a very universal idea that the creator of the world was a hermaphroditic being. Almost every mythology contained this idea of the original being—that it created itself by means of itself, being both father and mother. And you remember in Plato's *Timaeus*, the first human beings were round with four arms and four legs, and they also were hermaphrodites; that is the so-called Platonic man.¹ Therefore, this concept of the wind, or the spirit, is uncertain in its character: it can be either masculine or feminine. And there are other ideas of the same sort, the idea of the soul being partially masculine and partially feminine, for example. So it is chiefly the fact that Nietzsche was a German that made him have such a masculine conception of the wind: the archetype Wotan was in his blood. Now it is true that any kind of spider—the idea of the spider's web and all that—has much to do with something feminine, and why would that now be constellated?

Prof. Reichstein: I think that the opposition between fire and water would mean here again the compensatory principle. In the chapter before, about the rabble, Zarathustra is on the side of the fire—too much so—and the rabble would be on the side of the water. He suppressed that side and therefore it comes up now in a negative form; the tarantulas would be a negative form of this suppressed principle.

Prof. Jung: That is an important idea too; the tarantula is a sort of

¹ A slip. Jung often correctly cites this story, attributed in the *Symposium* to Aristophanes. The round creatures were split into two by gods, again concerned with human usurpation of their power—and now men and women go about looking for their other half. In the *Timaeus* (36 B.C.) we are told of God's making a compound of soul and body, forming two lengths as a letter X and then bending each leg around on itself to form a circle, which, set in motion, became the circle of the same and the circle of the other.

compensation just because we had the identification with the masculine element, the wind, before, which always leads to an inflation of the individual. Then instantly there is a reaction of a compensatory nature, so a female element now comes up represented by the tarantula. Now I will read the first sentence,

Lo, this is the tarantula's den! Would'st thou see the tarantula itself? Here hangeth its web: touch this, so that it may tremble.

You know, the tarantula is found in southeastern Europe; it lives in a hole in a rock or in the ground, and it is pretty poisonous, though its sting actually kills only small animals. The legend is that anybody poisoned by a tarantula goes raving mad and is seized by an uncontrollable desire to dance, but I think that idea simply comes from the fact that the people who had been poisoned were forced to dance, which was quite reasonable, in order to induce a heavy perspiration and give the poison a chance to get out of the body. Now the image here is this animal in the den or the cave, and the web by means of which it catches its prey. That is very important symbolism. What would it represent really?

Mrs. Sigg: The tarantula might also represent the rabble in a deeper layer, in the animal kingdom.

Prof. Jung: That is presumably true, for when Zarathustra uses an image like the rabble, he usually goes on enlarging upon that subject; he goes deeper and deeper into the image, one could say—a sort of amplification. The rabble appears as an underlying stratum of a very negative quality, and since that stratum is nearer to earth, the wind or the spirit, which is above, senses a particular danger lurking there. Of course to one who is in the earth there is no danger, because this is the mother from which he draws his nourishment, but to one who is dwelling in the air the earth is a great danger—it threatens to make him heavy. Inasmuch as he approaches the earth, he is filled with the spirit of heaviness and will sink down to the earth, a sort of descent of the spirit into the earth. Naturally the spirit is afraid to have its nature changed by that contact. Therefore so many people are afraid of the earth, like the intuitive who is always in the air, never touching the ground, unable to take root anywhere.

Of course intuitives *wish* to make roots, but inasmuch as they try they naturally come into contact with the earth and are infected by it, and the earth makes them heavy. It catches them and becomes a cage, a prison for them. You know, whenever an intuitive type has created a situation for himself he instantly gets sick of it and must escape again

because it threatens to become real. To the intuitive, only the things that are not yet are real; the moment they take on form and *become*, he is done for, caught by his own creation. Then he is confronted by the thing that has turned static, that no longer moves, that has ceased to be a possibility; to him it ceases to be reality when it doesn't walk away with him. If he builds a house, as soon as it is finished he must leave it because it is unreal, only a fact. To the sensation type on the contrary a possibility doesn't exist; he lives in a house that is made—that is real—and as long as that house exists there is reality; the moment it ceases to be he has lost his reality and cannot foresee any other possibility; to him it is poisonous to think that anything could change, therefore he will resist any change as long as possible. While the intuitive is of just the other calibre: if anything threatens to become static, it must be instantly destroyed. He prefers to destroy his own nest as soon as it is built in order not to be the victim of it.

Now, you can be sure that nowhere else is Nietzsche so intuitive as in *Zarathustra*, so we are likely to meet here any amount of intuitive psychology. And if he is confronted with the lower strata of the human personality, it would mean to him static reality trying to pull him down, and this secret pull that he feels seems to be the worst danger. Therefore he symbolizes it by the tarantula, of which people have a kind of legendary fear. A tarantula is far less dangerous than a venomous snake for instance, but people make a great story about it, a sort of metaphor. I am quite sure that Nietzsche never saw a tarantula—that is clear from his text. Now the next sentence:

There cometh the tarantula willingly: Welcome, tarantula!
Black on thy back is thy triangle and symbol; and I know also what
is in thy soul.

The tarantula to my knowledge has a yellowish back with black stripes, but no such thing as a triangle.



Prof. Reichstein: The triangle would be a sexual symbol probably because the triangle is always a one-sided symbol, and here it is probably a feminine symbol.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but first we must be clear that the tarantula really has no triangle on its back. There is, however, a spider that has a different design on its back. What spider is that?

Mrs. Sigg: The *Kreuzspinne*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, I don't know the English name. It is a big spider which one very often sees here. It is of a well-known species and it has an unmistakable cross with equal branches on its back. That is the spi-

der with the symbol you see, and Nietzsche simply equips the tarantula with the triangle, presumably because he never has seen one. And even if he had, he never would have seen anything of the sort, because being an intuitive he wouldn't care to see it. It is enough that the spider *might* have something symbolic on its back, whether it is so in reality or not doesn't matter. If it has any pedagogic meaning he would say the spider *had* to have a symbol, and if it has none, well, in future it will have one. Now here he surely attributes to it the symbol of the triangle, the triangle and the symbol being presumably the same—we are not sure, however—he may mean that besides the triangle there is another symbol. The only hint we have is the triangle, but that is important because it was surely known to Nietzsche that there was a spider with a cross on its back. His idea undoubtedly comes from that fact, and therefore he would have been naturally prepared to speak of it—but no, it *must* be a triangle, which of course is not to be seen on the real tarantula nor on the *Kreuzspinne*.²

Now we arrive at the idea Prof. Reichstein has alluded to, that the triangle is a one-sided symbol and always has been used as such.³ For instance, in alchemy they make much use of the triangle in this form:  and that form:  the first meaning the flame or the fire, and the second meaning water. And fire and water are typical representatives of the opposites. You find this symbolism on the frontispiece of the *Songe de Poliphile* in the union of the teardrop and the flame, called in their interpretation the fires of passions and the tears of repentance.⁴ That was an attempt at the union of opposites: namely, a process of life looked at from a static point of view. This is always necessary for the creation of a symbol, because it is only a symbol when it expresses opposites; otherwise it has no meaning. It must be an idea superior to any definite one-sided philosophical or intellectual concept. Now, the triangle in the first place—and when Nietzsche uses it, it cannot very well mean anything else—is the idea of the Christian Trinity which is always represented as a triangle, as you know. And the triangle is a one-sided principle inasmuch as the evil is lacking in that symbol; therefore it doesn't comprehend

² The common garden spider, *Araneus diadematus*, has long been thought significant because of its white cross. The European tarantula does have a small triangle on its back.

³ Strictly speaking, Jung meant a symbol lacking the one side that would represent wholeness.

⁴ For *The Dream of Poliphilo*, see above, 12 Dec. 1934, n. 6. In CW 12, fig. 33 represents Poliphilo surrounded by nymphs, as reprinted from Beroalde de Verville, *Le Songe de Poliphile* (1600).

the real meaning of the world, only one side of the universal substance. Then where is hell, where is the shadow? The world cannot consist of light only, so it is clearly one-sided.

Dr. James: It is only masculine.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it consists of three masculine entities. Now where is the female? Our world consists very tangibly of man and woman, but the divine world apparently is a society of men exclusively. That one-sidedness was felt in the Middle Ages tremendously; it was realized but it was simply impossible to bring about a reformation by which the female element could be introduced into the Trinity. The Catholic church had the power: the pope could introduce the feminine principle, but not into the Trinity, for it would then be a quaternion. You find that conflict between three and four throughout the Middle Ages in all forms and it really goes back to the fact of that quite insurmountable problem of introducing the feminine element into the Trinity. For the female meant darkness and evil—hell and woman were practically the same. You see, that simply comes from the fact that woman *is* associated with darkness, as the female element has always been in China for instance, and old China has of course a very much more balanced view of the world than we have in the West, including the Near East which is as unbalanced as we are.

You know, we are an unbalanced race, so our nervous system is very inferior in a way; we are highly gifted, both wind- and flame-like, but we have little earth. Therefore we are chiefly bandits, warriors, pirates, and madmen. That is the characteristic of the West as may be seen in the expressions of our faces. Study the faces of other races and you will see the difference: we have all the characteristics of more or less mad people. It is perfectly obvious—I have seen it—and that is what those other people think *au fond*. We are deeply sensitive and touchy and susceptible, we cannot stand pain and are highly excitable. We are like sort of geniuses with a great number of insupportable character traits. This is sad but so it is, and it probably accounts for the fact that we have such a one-sided idea of the deity. For an unbalanced condition always harbors a feeling of inferiority; any one-sided person has a feeling of inferiority, a feeling that he has deviated. Naturally he has deviated from nature and that gives a feeling of inferiority. The white man is chiefly characterized by an indefinite megalomania coupled with the feeling of inferiority: that is the thing which pushes us on and on. We must know everything, always in search of our lost divinity, which we can have only as long as we are in tune with nature. So even our most cher-

ished trinity, the essence of the highest imaginable qualities, is coupled with and compensated by the idea of a devil.

There is no such thing as a devil in classical Chinese philosophy; there it is a matter of two opposites which are the agencies of the world, Yang and Yin, and as Yang is bright and dry and fiery, everything on the positive side, so Yin is everything on the other side, and Yin is the female. That is the inevitable association, darkness and femininity. We have no such point of view since we are hopelessly one-sided, so if we think straight and logically, we arrive at the conclusion that woman and hell are identical.⁵ You see, if woman were only the female element, the Catholic church could easily introduce her into the dogmatic heaven, but that woman has a tail which leads straight to hell, so she would carry hell into heaven. You have probably read those visions of the old poet Guillaume de Digulleville where he describes his vision of heaven.⁶ There is God on his throne as the king of heaven, and with him his consort, Mrs. Queen, who is also sitting on a decent throne, but it doesn't consist of pure flaming gold. It is of rock crystal of a brownish color, showing that she carried the mineral up to heaven—of course in a diaphanous form, yet some color, the brown of the earth, was adhering and went up to heaven too. That was the idea of a very sublime earth which Mary brought up to heaven. It is not a dogmatic idea, but it is a very valid assumption in the Catholic church that Mary is the only mortal being who has been united with the body immediately after her death, a thing which happens to other mortals only on the day of judgment. Then we all unite with our bodies—of course the subtle body, not the gross body, but containing a reasonable amount of physical atoms, presumably a bit gaseous but having weight: it is materially substantial. But Mary had that chance of being the only one to be united with her body immediately after her death, and so she carried up the earth principle. On account of that, however, she is not one of the saints and she is not divine. That is just a fact and there is nothing to be done about it, for if they made her a goddess there would be trouble—she would bring in darkness. As it is, she fills the position of mother of mercy and is particularly approachable to very bad sinners,

⁵ The difference, as Jung often shows, is that in Taoism, Yin, though dark, is not any less benign (or powerful) than Yang.

⁶ Guillaume is discussed in CW 11, pars. 116-25, where Jung identifies him as a Norman poet and a monastic priest of the 14th century who described paradise as consisting of forty-nine rotating spheres.

having a special understanding of that rabble, naturally a rabble which is beginning to repent of its quality.

Now we surely make no mistake in assuming that the underlying idea of that triangle is the Christian Trinity, but on the back of the tarantula it clearly represents the evil principle of the earth. Before going into that, however, I should call your attention to the fact that any insect or animal that has no spinal cord, only a sympathetic nervous system, represents the same thing in man: namely, that psychology which is more linked up with the *plexus solaris* or with the sympathetic system than with the spinal cord and the brain. There must be such a bridge, because the function of the intestines, for instance, closely depends upon conscious processes, things that presumably happen in the brain. A very conscious trouble can disturb the function of the intestines, and on the other side the state of the intestines can affect the mind; in studying the anatomy of the nervous system one sees that there are any number of bridges by which these enervations can reach this side or the other. So it is certain that the sympathetic system has a sort of psyche; it can harbor contents that perhaps become in time conscious contents. And as a matter of fact, in all cases, practically, where it is a matter of the repression of certain contents, or the retention of contents in the unconscious, we see disturbances of the intestines, particularly in hysteria. The very name *hysteria* comes from this fact: *hysteros* is the uterus that was supposed to be chiefly the cause of hysteria. Of course that is a wrong causality. It is a mere symptom of the fact that there is a disturbance in the unconscious causing trouble on this side and on the other side, in the body as well as in the mind.

The tarantula, therefore, would represent the sympathetic system, and usually when one approaches one's inferior function, no matter what it is, one reaches there this sphere of the sympathetic system. It is always a sort of descent, because the differentiated function is up in the head, the conscious is linked up with the grey matter, whether it is sensation or anything else, and the inferior function is always more connected with the body. When, therefore, Nietzsche is confronted with the unconscious he is confronted with his inferior function. His main function is surely intuition, which would be up above, connected with the brain, with consciousness, and that is in opposition to the things below, namely, the three other functions, a trinity. He was strictly identical with *one* function. Sure enough, Nietzsche in the time when he wrote *Zarathustra* was absolutely identical with intuition, using only that function, to the very exhaustion of his brain. *Zarathustra* cre-

ated a peculiar disturbance in his brain: it really brought about his final insanity on account of the extraordinary strain to which it was subjected.

Now, this was an ideal situation for the constellation of the lower trinity, the trinity of the functions in the unconscious—in the first place sensation, being *la fonction du réel*, as opposed to the function of intuition, and the auxiliary functions thinking and feeling, which are both to a great extent also unconscious. I called your attention in the last chapter to the fact that Nietzsche as an intuitive simply touches upon a thing and off he goes. He does not dwell upon the subject, though in the long run one can say he really does dwell upon it by amplification. But he doesn't deal with things in a logical way, going into the intellectual process of elucidation; he just catches such an intuition on the wing and leaves it, going round and round and amplifying, so that in the end we get a complete picture but by intuitive means, not by logical means. For instance, he does not arrive at the tarantula by logical means, not at all; otherwise he would have much to say about what he writes here, but we hear not a word. We can only catch at his birds, or flies, or sparks, and from the ensemble of all these isolated bits we get a complete picture.

Mrs. Sigg: Is there not hidden magic in the idea that this tarantula is the vessel of all evil, a kind of devil?

Prof. Jung: Naturally.

Mrs. Sigg: I mean that there is a triangle and a cross because they both have magic influence on the devil. For instance, if you think of the cross on the *Kreuzspinne* . . .

Prof. Jung: But unfortunately we have no such thing as a cross here. I spoke of that; we must keep to the text. We have only that triangle which has never been used as an apotropaic sign. The Christian apotropaic sign is the cross—that is the interesting point—while the triangle is a symbol used in churches but never as an apotropaic charm. It is as if they did not trust that triangle but trusted the four, a finesse which could be substantiated by many psychological arguments. Now, it is pretty certain, when the triangle is made the symbol of the best things, the *summum bonum*, that there is also a triangle on the other side. Of course dogmatically there is no such thing: we have no triangle of the devil. He is coupled with his grandmother, not with the mother; that is of course colloquial, a sort of joke, but it might show an attempt at an infernal sort of dogma.

Prof. Reichstein: The devil has very often a kind of fork with three prongs like the trident of Neptune.

Prof. Jung: I remember it with two prongs but the other is quite possible. As a matter of fact, Neptune in early Christianity was occasionally used as a sort of symbol, meaning the devil. I have a vase, presumably dating from the first century, on which are represented the three forms of the union of man and woman. In the first a man and woman are standing opposite one another, and the man holds a mandrake (the German *Alraun*) which is a love charm, and behind his back is a shadow, to indicate that a demon has of course insinuated that magic: that is the union through a magic charm. Then on the other side is the representation of a pagan marriage, which was regarded as being sinful, and there the man holds a fork with three points, a trident, the Neptune symbol. And in the center is represented the Christian union of man and woman; there a vertical fish is between them and they touch hands through the fish, that is the *matrimonium in Christi*, the marriage in Christ. You know, the Christian marriage is not a union of man and woman exclusively, but is a union with Christ between. Of course our modern marriage is no longer a union in Christ, and that is a mistake. The immediate union of man and woman is too dangerous: there must be a mediation, whatever it is. Therefore the Catholic church maintains very wisely the power of interference; the priest is always between, representing the church, the body of Christ in between a married couple. And since we no longer have any such thing in our very marvelous civilization, we have invented as a remedy these damned analysts who are mixed up with I don't know how many marriages. We poor analysts have all the trouble in the world.

Mr. Baumann: I have just found in this book pictures of the three-pointed trident.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and one of the members of our Seminar has called my attention to the fact that in Dante's *Divine Comedy* the devil is represented with three heads; this is only a memory—unfortunately we have not discovered a copy of the book in the library to prove it—but I think it is true that when the devil at the bottom of hell is sticking in the ice, he has three heads that devour the sinners. In Christian language, that would be the infernal trinity, which is clearly hinted at in this triangle on the back of the tarantula. You see, that triangle joined to the upper triangle of the trinity would make the quadrangulum or the quaternion. These two triangles together form a square which would make the four; and this is that eternal problem, the three and the four. You will find a number of contributions to this problem in my essay in

the last Eranos *Jahrbuch*, *Erlösungsvorstellungen in der Alchemie*; also in my essay in the *Jahrbuch* of 1935, *Traumsymbole des Individuationsprozesses*.⁷ The triangles can also be joined in a different way, namely:



and then you have the so-called David's shield, the Jewish symbol which is often used in Christian churches but as a symbol of Jahveh. This is a different solution of the problems of opposites, into which I don't want to go now. We must say a bit more about this spider symbol; we have looked at its negative aspect but there is another aspect: nothing is ever so negative that it has not also a positive aspect.

Mr. Baumann: I think the earthly quality is a positive aspect, and that it carries the trinity. The trinity cannot exist by itself, it must have a foundation.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the idea of Hermetic philosophy is that the three, the trinity, are represented by three bodies. They call them *sol*, *luna*, and *mercurius*—gold, silver, and mercury—and they are represented as three snakes joined together by their tails, a unit in themselves but with three heads, three persons in one. This is the dogmatic form of the trinity contained in a vessel, in the *vas Hermeticus*, and the vessel was number four. It is a well-known alchemistic symbol and would bear out what Mr. Baumann says, that the fourth may be a basis, or a base, as the earth can be a basis for water, earth, and fire; they rest upon the earth. You see, that is a formula for bringing those four together. But in the Christian psychology the fourth is the devil, and how can you bring the good and evil together? The thing is impossible: that moral valuation creates such a split that you cannot bring those opposites together, but are always forced to be one-sided.

Prof. Reichstein: There is a story that the spider was created by the kiss of the devil; the devil kissed a woman and the spider was created. Then afterwards it became beneficial from the moment it was imprisoned in a wooden box.

Prof. Jung: Yes, I can recommend that story. It was in my mind: you have anticipated me. Jeremias Gotthelf was a Swiss writer of the 19th century who wrote very popular things, and among them was this highly symbolic story, astonishingly enough, which contains an attempt at a solution. He was a parson and naturally he was bothered by that question.⁸ The evil was brought on by the kiss of the devil, so the

⁷ "Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process" was revised and expanded as "Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy" in CW 12.

⁸ Jeremias Gotthelf, the pseudonym of Albert Bitzins, was the author of *The Black Spider*, tr. H. M. Waldon (London, 1954).

black spider was created and increased in numbers till it threatened to destroy everything, and then the evil was conjured away by putting the spider into a box, catching that spider in form, in a sort of *vas Hermeticus* (you know, we still speak of a hermetically sealed vessel), which is a vessel that must not be opened. Whatever is inside should be kept in such a way that it cannot escape. If the vessel is opened, the whole process is destroyed and evil is created. It is like the stories of thunderstorms caught in a box or a jar and the trouble it makes if somebody opens it.

Mr. Baumann: The Greek form was the box of Pandora.

Prof. Jung: Yes, this is a general symbol: you find it also in the writing of Apollonius of Tyana where this magic was attributed to Brahmanic priests.⁹ They were supposed to have a particular jar or amphora containing the bad and the good weather, mighty catastrophes all sealed up in a jar. It is the motive of the magic vessel or the magic room in which something is contained that is quite beneficial, or at least does no harm, as long as it is not opened or touched. The moment the taboo is lifted, immediately there is a great catastrophe. Now, these motives and stories lead us to the positive aspect of the tarantula: we learn that this thing can be beneficial under certain conditions. In Christian language, then, if the devil is properly bottled up or caught or chained, he is useful; he has even a beneficent influence. So if the Catholic church could find a suitable formula in which to catch the devil, it might be a great asset, but hitherto nothing safe enough has been found. Today the situation is that God has allowed the devil to play his pranks on the earth, but after an indefinite lapse of time he will do something about it, which of course amounts to a certain impotence on the part of the good principle.

So the problem is a bit shelved in Christianity. It is not as openly discussed as in Manichaeism, where half the world belonged to the devil, and it was touch and go for the good god whether he escaped final destruction. Therefore mankind had to put their weight to help god to extricate the stuff of light from the power of the devil, Ahriman. Their teaching is that one should be careful every day and in every way to increase the sum of the light atoms, not only by *doing* the right things, but by eating only those fruits which consist of sun—particularly melons because they are like the sun—and by avoiding all dark foods containing too much of the heaviness of matter, causing passions and such

⁹ Apollonius of Tyana was an obscure, solitary, alchemical wanderer. See CW 14, pars. 164-65.

things. Thus, the number of light particles in the body is increased and when one dies, one carries the millions of light atoms up into the big pillar of light which leads up to the heavens and the god of light. They had the interesting idea that the souls that carry those light atoms were gathered up by the moon until it became full. Then that full moon gradually poured all the souls into the sun, approaching nearer and nearer till it was quite empty when it touched the sun, and so had become the new moon again. Then it left the sun and began collecting souls once more. You see, they connected their astronomical observations with the moral problems of the world. In modern Christianity the problem is a bit repressed; we are just slightly hysterical, but, as I say, nothing is so bad that it would not contain something good, and there is a positive aspect to that tarantula. Now what would the very positive aspect be?

Miss Hannah: It is also very often a symbol for the self.

Prof. Jung: Yes. There are dreams, for instance, where the spider appears as a jewel, perhaps a sapphire, a blue resplendent gem in the center of the web which is made of golden threads. And people make pictures like that, not knowing of course what they mean. This is the symbol of the self but in a certain condition: namely, in the condition of complete unconsciousness. One could not have such a dream or make such a picture if one knew anything about its meaning, for then it becomes an object of conscious thinking, and the unconscious doesn't heap up attributes any longer—unless one makes somewhere a big mistake in one's conception of such an image. One might come across such a spider in cases that are not in actual analysis, or at the beginning of it, but never unless the person is completely unconscious of what that symbol could mean. Now, its positive aspect is that there is a central being somewhere that has spread its golden web throughout the world to catch the souls of man. Often, however, it is projected in its negative aspect onto the analyst who is then seen as a spider catching people, getting them under his influence and sucking them dry, but this is merely the negative aspect of a very positive thing. You see people of the so-called tarantula quality who preach equality (we come to this in our text presently—it is of course Nietzsche's way of putting the concept of collectivity). Those people who preach that collectivism of equal units are the ones who are afraid of the action of the spider. They feel that the spider, or the analyst, is preaching of individuation, that a hostile power is seeking them, enveloping them as a spider does. They fear that they may get stuck or caught in something, and they necessarily think that this is absolutely wrong, that they should be free.

But people lose their real freedom when they really succeed in believing in collectivism and equality. Then they are caught in their equality and there is no possibility of any differentiation any longer. It is as if all the water were in one lake where nothing moved, where there was a complete lack of potential. Now, this positive aspect of the spider of course is a symbol, but inasmuch as that symbol is a triangle it doesn't fit of course, because a triangle just means one-sidedness, while individuation means everything else but one-sidedness—it means completeness. Therefore individuation is represented by a circle and a square. You know, that medieval problem of the *quadratura circuli*, the squaring of the circle, is very important—it is really the problem of individuation. There is a famous book by Michael Majer in which he describes the whole alchemical process as the squaring of the circle, meaning the completion.¹⁰ It is an attempt at the solution of the Christian problem; those people were really concerned with that question. But the church cannot cope with it. They have postponed it: for them it is still in the lap of God. Now, we are not concerned just here with the positive aspect of the tarantula, we shall see what Nietzsche has to say about it later. First he only sees the negative aspect.

Revenge is in thy soul: wherever thou bitest, there ariseth black-scab; with revenge, thy poison maketh the soul giddy!

This of course refers to the tarantula dance, the madness caused by the tarantula. You see, that idea suggests something one very often encounters when people approach their inferior function; they have attacks of vertigo or nausea for instance, because the unconscious brings a peculiar sort of motion, as if the earth were moving under their feet, or as if they were on the deck of a ship rolling in a heavy swell. They get a kind of seasickness; they develop such symptoms actually. It simply means that their former basis, or their imagined basis, has gone—certain values which they thought to be basic are no longer there—so they become doubtful and suspended in a sort of indefinite atmosphere with no ground under their feet, always afraid of falling down. And of course the thing that is waiting for them underneath is the jaws of hell, or the depth of the water, or a profound darkness, or a monster—or they may call it madness. And mind you, it *is* madness to fall out of one's conscious world into an unconscious condition. Insanity means just that, being overcome by an invasion of the unconscious.

¹⁰ Michael Maier (or Majer) writes on squaring the circle, which is to say individuation, in *Scutinium chymicum* (Frankfort-on-Main, 1687).

Consciousness is swept over by unconscious contents in which all orientation is lost. The ego then becomes a sort of fish swimming in a sea among other fishes, and of course fishes don't know who they are, don't even know the name of their own species. We know that we belong to the species of *homo sapiens* and the fishes do not, and when we fall into the fish species, we lose our identity and might be anything else.

That is the state of insane people: they don't know whether things are true or not, take an illusion for granted as an overwhelming fact. If they hear voices, they are quite convinced that they hear those voices; and if they go into the street and discover the sun is double, or that people have skulls instead of heads, this is a fact to them. They don't doubt it because it is too overwhelmingly clear. So there is absolutely nothing within their disposition to defend them against such realities. One cannot help being convinced by what one hears and sees. That simply comes from the fact that in a moment when the conscious is invaded by the unconscious, the energetic value of consciousness is depotenti-ated, and then one is no longer up to the contents of one's psyche. We have not learned to behave like fishes, to swim in that flood. If you have learned to swim, then you get through: you can *stand* being suspended in water without getting seasick and losing your head. So people who possess a certain psychological insight have always a better prognosis when they become insane: the more the psychological insight, the better the prognosis. Of course certain people who have a latent psychosis just go insane and there is nothing to be done about it. But if they have acquired a certain amount of psychology, there is a chance that they can swim; they recognize something in that flow and may be able to get out of it again. While people who are rigid, without any psychological insight whatever—who are utterly unable to see themselves under another aspect than the one they are accustomed to—such people simply explode, fly into splinters, and they never return. It is as if the knowledge of psychology were making our brain more elastic, as if our brain box were becoming elastic so that it can contain more contents and vary its forms, while those people with rigid convictions are like a sort of box made of stiff boards which can only contain so much, and if the thing that wants to enter the brain box is too big for it, then the whole thing blows up. In such cases an attack of insanity often begins with a pistol shot in the head, or the feeling that something has broken or snapped. You see, a board has split; they cannot shut the lid because the thing that came in was too big.

Therefore in treating such cases, we always have to look out for en-

larging the vessel, the mental horizon, and making it ready to receive any amount and any size, so that it will not explode with the inpouring contents of the unconscious. To use that simile of the fish, one should equip people to dive; the diver is equipped and doesn't get drowned. This fear of madness is always associated with the inferior function, so when Nietzsche approaches the problem of the earth and of evil, he naturally will realize that fear, all the more so as ultimately he was not inclined to accept the inferior man. The question as to whether he can finally accept the inferior man comes later on—and he cannot, he refuses him, and that of course breaks his head. Our shadow is the last thing that has to be put on top of everything, and that is the thing we cannot swallow; we can swallow anything else, but not our own shadow because it makes us doubt our good qualities. We can assume that the world is bad and that other people are bad and that everything is going to hell as long as we are sure that *we* are on the right side; but if *we* are no longer sure, it is too much. Now Nietzsche continues,

Thus do I speak unto you in parable, ye who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of *equality*! Tarantulas are ye unto me, and secretly revengeful ones!

This is interesting. If anybody should have the impertinence to tell him that he is like other people, that all people are practically the same, it would be fatal. Why is that such a danger?

Mrs. Fierz: It touches upon his Wotan inflation and would make it burst.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, it would break his bubble. Being identical with Zarathustra, who is also Wotan, he is half divine and above humanity. Inasmuch as Zarathustra is a spirit, he deserves to be above humanity, but if Nietzsche identifies with him, it will come to the daylight that he is like everybody else. And that is the shadow. In the shadow we are exactly like everybody; in the night all cats are grey—there is no difference. So if you cannot stand living in the shadow or seeing yourself in the shadow, seeing your equality with everybody, you are forced to live in the light; and the sun fails at times: every night the sun goes under, and then you must have artificial light. Many people develop a symptom out of that: they must have the light on or within reach, in order to be able to make a light when the darkness comes. That means: hold onto consciousness for heaven's sake; don't get away from your distinction, from your knowledge of yourself as a separate being; don't fall into what equality or you are put out. And you *are* put out; you become a fish in the sea, just one in a huge swarm of herrings. But that is

exactly the thing one ought to be able to stand, because it is an eternal truth that all human beings belong to *homo sapiens*, that they all came from a particular kind of quite good monkeys, no one particularly different from the other. So from a certain superior point of view, human beings are practically the same. This is a truth and it should not be a deadly poison; but he even reviles that point of view as a spirit of revenge. How on earth does he get the idea that this is a spirit of revenge?

Miss Hannah: Because he is projecting the whole thing entirely on the inferior man. He sees the whole thing as a jealousy of the inferior man who wants to destroy his own superiority.

Prof. Jung: Well, as soon as you assume that you are the god, you gravely offend the inferior man, and naturally he has a psychology like yourself. If you are offended you feel revengeful, and the inferior man is full of the spirit of revenge. So when that fellow contacts the superior man, he will get at him and say, "Now I've got you, now I will show you who I am." That is human psychology. The inferior man will come back with a vengeance as soon as he has a chance. Nietzsche says, "revenge is in thy soul," and so it is. He will be badly beaten, having been identical with the gods.

But I will soon bring your hiding-places to the light: therefore do I laugh in your face my laughter of the height.

There you have it: he is above, they are below, and he projects the inferior man into a sort of imaginary preacher of equality and begins to give him a lecture.

Therefore do I tear at your web, that your range may lure you out of your den of lies, and that your revenge may leap forth from behind your word "justice."

Because, *for man to be redeemed from revenge*—that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms.

Naturally, if the shadow could be redeemed from its spirit of revenge, there would be a chance of reunion and that would be a rainbow bridge; that is the thing to be hoped for—that he could accept his inferior side. But then of course he must *behave* with his shadow, must not offend his shadow by reviling it, and he must not project it, declaring, "This is not myself, thank God I am not like him." That is the pharisaical point of view. You see, Nietzsche forgets again and again that most important fact, that he gains nothing by reviling others. You must know where *you* are guilty and then you can do something about it;

while if the other one is guilty, what can you do about it? We should realize the possibility of guilt or evil in ourselves. If we can realize that, we have gained a part of our shadow and we have added to our completeness.

But if we are forced to live under circumstances where too many other people do the wrong things, they take too much out of us. They deprive us of the possibility of doing them and of realizing our shadow.

LECTURE IV

26 May 1937

Prof. Jung:

My attention has just been called to a passage in the part we have already dealt with: "Because, for man to be redeemed from revenge—that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms." Mrs. Sigg suggests that this might remind us of that stunt played by Jahveh on the sinful world, when he sent the great flood and drowned all the sinners, and then afterwards made a rainbow to show that he was reconciled, or at peace with himself, and wouldn't do it again. Perhaps you have seen *Green Pastures*—there we saw that Jahveh was really quite sorry and kept on thinking of other means.¹ Well, I am sure that archetypal image of the great flood is behind this particular passage, but I would not attach too much importance to it.

Then there is a question by Mrs. Scott-Maxwell, "At the end of your last lecture you spoke of the marriage in Christ, with the hands through the fish. Then I understood you to say man and woman cannot meet directly without trouble resulting. Will you please tell us why you feel this to be so?"

The chief reason is that, as an analyst, I am usually confronted with this most amazing fact, that when man and woman meet, some trouble results. It is generally true that the relationship between man and woman is not simple. But I quite understand that such a bold statement is irritating since we are all perfectly convinced that this should not be so; as you know, we chiefly think the things we like to think and dislike to think such irritating truths as trouble arising from love or friendship. Naturally we dislike such statements, yet if we look at the world objectively, we must ask ourselves why such an important religion as Christianity invented particular rites or particular ideas round marriage; and not only Christianity: we have plenty of evidence that

¹ Marc Connelly's *Green Pastures*, a popular folk play, a light-hearted Black conception of heaven. See CW 10, pars. 16ff.

this has happened in exactly the same way in other quarters at other times and in other civilizations. Every important phase of human life, or important decisions, are always surrounded by all sorts of magic because they are threatened by certain dangers; there are always risks connected with them. And anything so particularly important as the relationship between man and woman, perhaps the greatest intensity nature has ever invented, is so full of spiritual dangers, perils of the soul, that man always felt the need of particular magic, apotropaic means to make sure that the thing worked—since it is just as possible that it won't work, or will work for a while and then turn into the opposite. So if you study the relation between man and woman with unbiased eyes—trying to refrain from thinking as you like, and forcing yourself to think according to what you really observe—you will see that there is usually a great deal of trouble.

That is the reason why I made this statement and it is also the quite obvious reason why Christianity tried to put something in between, some cotton wool or something of the sort, in order to mitigate the impact of those two forces, mutually attractive yet very opposite in character. It obviously needs some additional ideas, or auxiliary conceptions and figures, in order to make the thing go. If it were quite simple, as we always prefer to think—that it should be the simplest thing in the world to embrace each other—then there would be no trouble. But it is not so simple apparently, only we are too stupid to see why it should be so difficult. If we were just a bit more intelligent we would see that such a situation would naturally be full of spikes; it couldn't be anything else. Of course we are always taught how simple it is, “just simple love, you know”—all the world talks in that foolish style—but when you come to it you are in hot water, and then of course the doctors or the lawyers or the priests can look after the job. It is not simple, but exceedingly complicated and full of risks. Therefore, since time immemorial, man has surrounded it by all sorts of magic in order to prevent the very probable troubles of the soul resulting from such a relationship. If you realize what it means that a woman represents the Yin and the man the Yang, then you know enough; it is a pair of opposites, and whenever you try to unite a pair of opposites in your own character, you realize how difficult it is, almost impossible: you cannot see how they *could* be united. And so when they are there in reality it is like water and fire, like vinegar and oil; you must mix them together to make a decent salad—but it *might* be a salad, you know!

Well now, this chapter about the tarantulas is peculiarly important because it deals with ideas that have a particular bearing on our time.

This is obviously a time of big collective movements, collective ideals, and we hear on all sides and in all sorts of variations the sermon of equality, or the manifestation of a will to equality, that should become henceforth the nature of virtue, as he now says:

“And ‘Will to Equality’—that itself shall henceforth be the name of virtue; and against all that hath power will we raise an outcry!”

Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus in you for “equality”: your most secret tyrant-longings disguise themselves thus in virtue-words!

You see, Nietzsche clearly shows here an understanding of the compensatory or contrasting nature of any such attempt. I mean, the attempt at equality consists of, or is based upon, a secret tyrant-longing: if I cannot be king, then we shall all be kings so that everybody has his share of the kingdom. Of course equality under such conditions looks very wonderful, but since everybody is a king nobody wants to submit. It is a kingdom without subjects where everybody fights everybody. So it soon ends either with a real tyrant or in a perfectly anarchic condition.

Mrs. Fierz: In the Persian religion there is the idea that when the reign of Ahriman comes, all the mountains will be made into one plain and there will be one king.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is a good idea. So it is.

Fretted conceit and suppressed envy—perhaps your fathers’ conceit and envy: in you break they forth as flame and frenzy of vengeance.

What the father hath hid cometh out in the son; and oft have I found the son the father’s revealed secret.

This is a very remarkable psychological insight, such as one often finds in *Zarathustra*. Nietzsche was a great psychologist² and his key was the idea of the hidden contrast, so he even looked at this aspect in the relation of father and son. He obviously has that experience particularly in mind because, being the son of a clergyman, he was himself the father’s unrevealed secret.

Mrs. Sigg: His father really looked very problematic; one is astonished when one sees his photograph.

* Nietzsche of course thought so too, but that it was not what passes in Academe for psychology is indicated by Nietzsche’s saying that the only psychologist from whom he had anything to learn was Dostoevsky. See *Twilight*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” p. 45.

Prof. Jung: I remember, but of course I know nothing of the father's possible psychology. I am myself, however, a parson's son, and I have seen many children of theologians, and I can refer to one important fact. Once I sent round a questionnaire asking whether people would prefer to go to a doctor with their complexes, or to the clergy, and among those who answered, the children of parsons—all, with no exception—said they would never go to a parson, but would prefer to go to a doctor. Now, that means something, and there are sort of proverbs about sons of parsons which bear out what Nietzsche says. Of course there are many exceptions to such a rule, particularly in former times when there were several generations of parsons and they didn't disturb each other at all: the son revealed no secret whatsoever, he just repeated the father.

Miss Hannah: Did the doctors' children all want to go to the parson?

Prof. Jung: No, they did not, not at all, although that was really the case with my father. He was the son of a doctor, a professor of medicine, and my father became a parson, but he was the only one. You see, the doctor's profession is not so provocative as a clergyman's; you can imagine all sorts of things about a doctor, and it is true that many doctors are very peculiar people. If you know the history of the profession you realize that all sorts of people are in it, while for the clergy it is far more critical. Our Swiss poet Gottfried Keller once said that there are those who are below God, and then there are the others who are above him.³ Those are the children of Satan, wolves in sheep's clothing, because they use the relationship to God as a personal title and know everything about God. They compensate by a pious attitude for their moral inferiority. But the others really are saints by vocation. That is also true of doctors; one finds most decent characters and most indecent characters, but when a profession is based upon such particular qualities as the vocation of the priest or the parson must be, then things come to a head and the pairs of opposites are badly split. It is a tremendous thing for a man to assume that he is a priest and carries the mana. That is exceedingly provocative to the unconscious. Such people are liable to be subjected to the worst temptations. Therefore, the worst dreams are those of the saints, as we were saying last week; they are most assailed by the devil because they most provoke the devil. By the conscious assumption or by the fact that they are really decent, saintly people, they are a provocation to all the black powers, and of course they have to pay the price for their saintliness.

³ For Gottfried Keller, see above, 16 Oct. 1935, n. 3.

You know the story of the man who had no wish. There was once a very pious man who did not consider himself to be a saint, but by chance he was a saint though he didn't know it. So his merit was all the greater and of course God could not help noticing him. One time when they were having a particular celebration in heaven and God was considering the people who had merit, giving them orders and decorations, he said to Gabriel, "Well, I suppose we ought to do something for Mr. So-and-So, he is really a saint. Go down and tell him that I want to grant him his most important wish." So Gabriel went down and told the saint who he was and that God would grant him his wish. And that man being a saint had no wish. "But surely you must have a wish, everybody has a wish, God in his omniscience knows that you have a wish," said Gabriel. But the man was conscious of none. So Gabriel went back and told God who said, "That is awkward, he should have a wish. Go back and tell him he must have one." And so Gabriel went back again and said it was the command of God that he should have a wish, *any* bad wish, and the only wish that man could possibly think of was to have just one look into the soul of a real saint. Gabriel asked him if he couldn't think of something else, but no, that was his only interest. Then Gabriel flew back and said to God, "This is a terrible man. He only wants to look into the soul of a real saint; what can we do about it?" "That is impossible," said God, "one cannot grant that." But Gabriel said since he had promised to fulfill his wish he would have to do it, and God said, "Of course I cannot go back on my promise. Let him have his look." So the angel again went down and led the man to a real acknowledged saint, and the man took one look into the soul of that saint and went instantly crazy. Therefore we shall never know how the soul of a saint looks. That is a very psychological story which I use as a sort of medicine for all those who cannot put their minds at peace about their inner contrasts.

Now it is surely a great truth that under certain favorable or unfavorable conditions, the son reveals the father's secret. Of course that is true for both parents—he can reveal the secret of his mother just as well. It is quite astonishing sometimes to find in what a peculiar way the secret comes to the daylight; it really explains much in a human life which cannot be explained otherwise. The secrets of the parents have the most extraordinary influence upon the lives of the children, and nothing in the world will prevent the children from being influenced. We can only try to live our lives as reasonably, as normally, or as humanly as possible, but even then we cannot help having secrets, secrets which we don't know ourselves. Those are the true secrets and they

may be the most influential. So we can prevent that influence only in as much as our life is in our hands; and our life is only to a very small extent in our hands because we are only partly conscious. We can pump out of that sea of the unconscious I don't know how many gallons of water, yet it is never exhausted. We always hand on a secret, and whatever creeps out in our children will be a revelation of that thing of which we were quite ignorant. Of course inasmuch as we know of this mechanism, we are under an obligation to do something about it, but beyond that there is still enough which is secret to build up a life or destroy it. We can only say that the further our consciousness extends, the more our responsibility increases, the more we have to consider.

And since too great an amount of such responsibilities will make our lives a perfect hell, we cannot carry more than a certain amount. We soon reach a point where we have to dismiss our responsibility, where we have to admit with seeing eyes that we cannot be responsible. It would lead too far; we simply could not live any longer. It would be necessary to be conscious of every step we take, to give an account of everything we think, because it all might contain a former secret which would be influential in spoiling the lives of the next generation. A certain side of that secret consists in the inheritance of the body; our bodies are not perfect: every body contains so many inferiorities, so many degenerated functions, and we hand that on if we have children. That is also a responsibility, yet only in very bad cases would it prevent us from producing them. For instance, somebody might have a most unlucky face, or certain signs of degeneration, the gland system might be wrong, yet those people have children though they must take it for granted that they are affected by that fact just as badly as by certain psychological secrets. Of course one should try to be as sound as possible in body as well as mind, but inasmuch as we cannot reach beyond our own limits, one has to take it for granted that we hand on some trouble. People who are too much impressed by that fact become quite pessimistic, which accounts for such ascetic movements as in early Christianity for instance, when it was thought that the best thing would be to bring the world to a standstill, that eternal curse, by not having children at all. And Schopenhauer says our compassion with all living things should prevent us from continuing this terrible illusion of the world: look into the mirror of the intellect and you see your terrible face; deny it, and bring the whole thing to a standstill. Of course that would be going a bit too far for the average man, and the average man carries the life. Now, Nietzsche goes on talking about these people, the preachers of equality.

Inspired ones they resemble: but it is not the heart that inspir-
eth them—but vengeance.

We would say *ressentiment*, that is the word really.⁴

And when they become subtle and cold, it is not spirit, but envy,
that maketh them so.

That is a great truth, you can see it everywhere in all our collective
movements, inside and outside.

Their jealousy leadeth them also into thinker's paths; and this is
the sign of their jealousy—they always go too far: [Far too one-
sided!] so that their fatigue hath at last to go to sleep on the snow.

Now how do you understand this peculiar image, that finally they take
their rest in the snow from all that effort of one-sidedness?

Mrs. Sigg: Nietzsche in the beginning of *Zarathustra* always speaks of
climbing too high and therefore he was himself in the snow.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that metaphor occurs very frequently in *Zarathustra*,
climbing very high, reaching the snows of ice-cold mind or intellect.
And how would that work out practically? What happens to a person
who is fanatically one-sided? Why does he get into the snow? Why not
into hot water?

Prof. Reichstein: He loses connection with the other side. Pure think-
ing is meant here and loss of the feeling function.

Prof. Jung: Yes, with a fanatical one-sidedness you lose your connec-
tion with the human being, with the warm living thing which is always
a mixture of everything. You create a sort of sterile field in which noth-
ing is contained but that one thing you have in mind. All one-sidedness
leads into the desert, or to a desert island, or to something as sterile as
snow, which contains no life, but kills life or keeps it in a static condi-
tion. In Nietzsche's case, it is usually the snow and the cold, because his
one-sidedness would be inclined to create abstract thought or an ab-
stract kingdom of ideas, and that is traditionally cold. The mind or the
intellect, when too one-sided, is too much separated from the opposite
function feeling, and then one winds up in a perfectly cold condition.
Later on, he comes back to the ice and snow. In the end of *Zarathustra*
there are passages where it is obvious that he has reached the glacier
and lost his connection with humanity altogether.

⁴ For *ressentiment*, see above, 27 Nov. 1935, n. 1.

In all their lamentations soundeth vengeance, in all their eulogies is maleficence; and being judge seemeth to them bliss.

What psychological condition is this?

Miss Wolff: A person who is speaking out of resentment.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that shows itself in a certain way; he describes here that condition: "and being judge seemeth to them bliss."

Miss Wolff: Because they can always blame others.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. It is a state of complete projection. They project their own contents into others and judge them there. So this one-sidedness naturally leads into an unconsciousness of one's own condition, which is then of course projected. Anything unconscious that lives with us is invariably projected; you only have to wait until you find your *bête noire* that contains your other side. Probably you have it already, but sometimes you find a still better one, and then that is particularly satisfactory. So if people are inclined to get tremendously excited and judge the things that other people do, it means that they are one-sided, unconscious of themselves in a certain respect. You see, they are really offended by evil-doers as if they themselves were the evil-doers. They feel shocked by the evil deed in such a personal way because it is as if they themselves had committed it. Therefore their resentment. They are touched by it, they have done it, and as they cannot stand themselves doing such tempting things, they blame others for doing them—upbraid them for having committed those sins which are so terribly alluring to themselves. So on the one side that resentment is a sort of jealousy, and on the other side it is the shock that you receive when you see yourself doing something which you don't want to stand for, something you would probably call immoral, a thing you would never do. When you talk about other people doing those things which you naturally never do, then we know enough about you.

But thus do I counsel you, my friends: distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful!

There you get it.

They are people of bad race and lineage; out of their countenances peer the hangman and the sleuth-hound.

Distrust all those who talk much of their justice! Verily, in their souls not only honey is lacking.

And when they call themselves "the good and just," forget not, that for them to be Pharisees, nothing is lacking but—power!

I cannot add to that.

My friends, I will not be mixed up and confounded with others.

That is a bit dangerous!

There are those who preach my doctrine of life, and are at the same time preachers of equality, and tarantulas.

Now who are those who preach “my doctrine of life”—obviously Zarathustra’s doctrine—and at the same time are preachers of equality? That is very cryptic. Has anyone a hunch?

Mrs. Jung: Does it not refer to the ideas of Marx, or communism, which came after Nietzsche?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but they did not come after Nietzsche; he knew of them very well. He refers here to a certain materialistic philosophy of those days. Max Stirner, for instance, is a forerunner of Nietzsche’s and would belong to those preachers of equality—communistic equality, political and social equality.⁵ Also the idea of democracy was very young then—I mean our modern idea of it, not the old. The old democracy was like our Swiss democracy, the oldest democracy in the world, and it was by no means what we would call a democracy now. It was an oligarchy, which is quite *different*. Our modern ideas of democracy belong entirely to the 19th-century children of the French Revolution, and that was really a serious attempt at equality. But you know that many people are by no means convinced that democracy means equality. Therefore we have still better equality movements and that was perfectly conscious to Nietzsche. Connected with those new political ideas was a certain libertinism, the reaction against moral traditions and moral laws. They began to experiment in free love, for instance, and those ideas play a role in *Zarathustra*. That devaluation of established values, the complete reversal of values which Zarathustra often preaches, has been mixed up with this parallel movement, and he wants to make sure here that he is not of the same conviction, that there is only a more or less superficial similarity. They *seem* to preach his doctrine of life according to his ideas, but they are at the same time preachers of equality, and *his* idea is that there is no equality, that man is not equal. He is absolutely individual, though he tries to produce a greater freedom of life, less dependence upon tradition, a liberation from moral and social fetters, destruction of authority hitherto indisputable—exactly as in those other political collective movements they preached of equality.

⁵ It is not certain that Nietzsche had read him, but Stirner (i.e., Johann Schmidt, 1806-1856), author of *The Ego and His Own* (1884), anticipated Nietzsche in attacking religion and defending materialism and egoism.

That they speak in favour of life, though they sit in their den, these poison-spiders, and withdrawn from life—is because they would thereby do injury.

To those would they thereby do injury who have power at present: for with those the preaching of death is still most at home.

Here it is quite clear that he really means those collective movements which were the forerunners of our existing political movements, and he explains that as a reaction against those actually in power who still believed in the preaching of death, meaning the union of kings and governments with the churches and other authorities and historical prejudices.

Were it otherwise, then would the tarantulas teach otherwise: and they themselves were formerly the best-world-maligners and heretic-burners.

That is perfectly true, the burning of heretics was a collective movement. Of course it seems to have been started by the church, but it was really a collective movement which began with a faint attempt at a very dangerous reformation, not only in Germanic countries but in Italy as well. One exponent was St. Francis. He was a heretic, and only by the great diplomatic cunning of Bonifazio VIII could he be smuggled into the church.⁶ There were plenty of others for whom that could not be managed and they had to be burned or excommunicated. There was a wide-spread movement of the spirit—Meister Eckhart is an example, and the Brethren of the Free Spirit, or the liberated spirit, who had absolutely communistic ideas and a wonderful way of dealing with capitalism. They said everything should be spent—offered or sacrificed they called it—so they attacked people, a traveler perhaps, as if they were bandits, and took his money, always using the phrase *transmittere in aeternitatem*. They said, “We must do away with these worldly goods and send them into eternity; they must be spent, wasted, and then money will have no value any longer and we shall all be equal.” That was a collective movement in the Germanic countries in the 13th century, part of the movement which brought about the great *autos-da-fé*, the reaction of the church. This movement meant liberation of unruly

⁶ It is not clear what Jung had in mind by “heretic” or “brought into the church.” Francis (1182?-1226) was a wealthy, somewhat impetuous youth until certain visions of 1205 were responsible for his conversion. Shortly thereafter the rules proposed for his new order were approved by Innocent III, and two years after Francis’ death he was canonized by Gregory IX. Boniface VIII, born eight years after Francis’ death, was assigned by Dante to hell.

spiritual powers, and they were liberated not only in the Brethern of the Free Spirit or, in the Spanish heretics, but even amongst the clergy themselves—Torquemada was the worst of the doubters.⁷ Objections were raised in their own dreams, and in order to quench them they burned the heretics; otherwise *they* would have had the ideas. So they said, “Thank you, God, that you do not make me responsible for my dreams. That other man has confessed such convictions and therefore we are going to burn him.” It was a collective movement and Nietzsche is perfectly right when he says there were tarantulas in other times, but they simply took on another form.

With these preachers of equality will I not be mixed up and confounded. For thus speaketh justice *unto me*: “Men are not equal.”

Again he repeats a dangerous statement. “I thank thee God that I am not like this sinner.” That is the Pharisee and he does not see it, but he sees it afterwards. “For thus speaketh justice *unto me*: ‘Men are not equal.’ ” He should be careful not to use that word *justice*. He says men are not equal.

And neither shall they become so!

There is the mistake. He blames the others that they are pleased to be judges and tell the boys all about it, but that is what *he* is doing. He says “they shall,” when if he was careful and reasonable he would say “*I* shall.”

What would be my love to the Superman, if I spake otherwise?

You see how dangerous it is. The Superman is his main idea, and if he says such things he injures his *own* idea because the Superman doesn’t bother about what he should become; otherwise he would be the ordinary preacher of values and not a Superman.

On a thousand bridges and piers shall they throng to the future, and always shall there be more war and inequality among them: thus doth my great love make me speak!

Inventors of figures and phantoms shall they be in their hostilities; and with those figures and phantoms shall they yet fight with each other the supreme fight.

⁷ Tomas Torquemada (1420?-1498), the Spanish grand inquisitor. The Brethren of the Free Spirit were a group of 11th-century Christian dissidents who preached in favor of following the inner voice of the Holy Spirit in preference to the writings of the Gospels. Jung discussed this movement in CW 9 i, par. 139.

Now what does he mean by that?

Mrs. Fierz: That also sounds like a hint about the future; in the world war, for instance, they were fighting for the wrong reason, with phantoms and ghosts apparently.

Prof. Jung: Well, he doesn't need to say "they should" or "they shall"—they will do it anyhow you know, as they always do. Man cannot help inventing the most amazing reasons for beating his neighbor over the head. People go to extraordinary lengths to invent some "ism" which will allow them to spend the lives of other peoples, or to create a place for themselves. So he doesn't need to preach it. This is the way of the world: figures and phantoms are ever invented and people will forever use them as a pretext to fight each other. Sometimes one can clearly see the idea is merely invented for that purpose, and sometimes people are just caught by it. Usually the great masses are mere victims of such ideas and they fight and kill because man is fundamentally a killer. We should make no mistake about that; it is the most hellish illusion when we think otherwise. Of course it should not be and we can think whatever we like, but if we think according to what actually is, we must say he is and always has been a killer. A murderous streak is in everybody, and we have to reckon with it. Therefore, in thinking of a world, you must think of *such* a world, and not of a world in which these facts are not. If you want to think such illusions, then please try first to think how you can undo that streak, how you can eliminate the man that is, for he has to be eliminated in order to create a world where such things don't exist. The world will always be like that because it is the playground of pairs of opposites. So if things are peaceful for a while, we must just thank God because it won't last long.

Good and evil, and rich and poor, and high and low, and all names of values: weapons shall they be, and sounding signs, that life must again and again surpass itself!

If he only would not say *shall*, or if that *shall* had not the meaning of *should*, if it is a mere *futurum*, then I agree. Those have always been the names of the pretexts and motives, and they will be the same forever, because life means building up and pulling down; it means generation and corruption. The old alchemists said: *corruptio unius est generatio alterius*, "the corruption of the one is the generation of another."

Now we are coming to a place where we reach an apex, where things turn into something else. He says,

Aloft will it build itself with columns and stairs—life itself: to remove distances would it gaze, and out towards blissful beauties—*therefore* doth it require elevation.

And because it requireth elevation, therefore doth it require steps, and variance of steps and climbers! To rise striveth life, and in rising to surpass itself.

Just before, he said that people will always fight, that life is a conflict, a battlefield. That is a very pessimistic statement which would not fit into Nietzsche's point of view, for he is not pessimistic at all: he sees an ultimate goal for which he is striving. So naturally he cannot leave that statement about the ultimate meaning or purpose of the world in such a form. He has to add that life wants to build itself aloft, and he uses a somewhat astonishing metaphor, "with columns and stairs." Life here becomes a sort of edifice, suddenly changing its aspect. It is no longer that up and down movement that it was before, everybody fighting against everybody; it takes on now a static aspect, the aspect of a building, and the movement of life is on the stairs of that building. Also it is no longer striving to get something, to acquire or to conquer something. It is rather to create a high standpoint, to gaze into the distance, as if man himself were becoming a watchman on the height of that tower, man looking out toward blissful beauties and therefore requiring elevation, to get to a higher point of view or, anyway to a point of view. Therefore he says steps are required and variance of steps and climbers, and of course fighting among the climbers, because the meaning of life seems to be to surpass itself. Life that doesn't overcome itself is really meaningless: it is not life; only inasmuch as life surpasses itself does it make sense. That is the way one could formulate this thought, but this is of course an extraordinary statement; it seems to be quite against everything he has said before. Now he says

And just behold, my friends! Here where the tarantula's den is, riseth aloft an ancient temple's ruins [Whoever would have thought that?—just behold it with enlightened eyes!

Just where the cave is, the hole in the ground where the tarantula lives, just there are the ruins of a temple. It is so unexpected that it almost seems like bad taste; one cannot associate the two things at all, but it is one of Nietzsche's intuitions. Happily enough he doesn't run right away from it at once. He amplifies this vision a bit: namely, he discovers now an entirely different aspect of the tarantula. He discovers first of

all that the point of view he proclaimed as belonging to the tarantula, is his own point of view—that one should make use of all moral or ethical values in order to make the fight a better one, to give some pep to the fight. To have a good feeling when you are fighting, you must be able to say you are fighting for a very good or just cause. That puts some juice into it; you must not allow any relativity of standpoint, but must be convinced that what you do is wonderful and ideal and just the right thing. Otherwise it would not pay to fight; everybody must be convinced of the entire goodness of his cause. That is what he is now preaching, and then suddenly the whole vista changes, all that turmoil appears in a static thing, as if time had come to a standstill, as if there were practically no fight, as if people were climbing only to get to the next step in the building, where the only thing they possibly can do is to reach the widest platform of the highest tower in order to have the best view. Now, what has happened here? It is one of those amazing intuitive changes in Nietzsche and the reason why he is so difficult to grasp.

Mrs. Fierz: When he said that life must always enlarge itself, it seems as if the idea of the widening of consciousness were coming in, and then that idea becomes prevailing, so the temple growing out of the tarantula's den seems to be the building of consciousness out of the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: But how would the idea of the widening out of consciousness come in?

Mrs. Fierz: Because that is life.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, but does he say so?

Mrs. Fierz: No, it seems to slip in.

Prof. Jung: Then we must see how it slips in.

Mrs. Crowley: That would be Zarathustra's point of view because he is the self, and the other would represent the point of view of Nietzsche the man.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. It is surely Zarathustra's point of view, but that does not help us to see how this widening of consciousness slips in.

Mrs. Crowley: Because all that wideness is being focused in a center point, and before it was spread all over the world in this idea of equality.

Prof. Jung: That is so, but we want to see how this idea of the widening of consciousness slips in.

Mr. Allemann: When he says life must surpass itself then the new birth takes place.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. To say that life shall surpass itself means that you have a standpoint outside of life, you are no longer in life. As long as you are in life you cannot imagine anything that would surpass it: life is the highest thing. He has been talking of his doctrine of life—he was entirely in the movement of life—and then suddenly it strikes him that there is a point of view outside or above it, a life that can surpass its own life. This is an element which obviously is not life, for to overcome itself it must be capable of a counter movement, and that is here represented in the static building. Those among you who have read *Das Reich ohne Raum* by Bruno Goetz, will remember the same conflict there, the conflict between the *Puer Aeternus* that is nothing but life, life in a blind spreading form, full of conflict, full of worry, full of nonsense; and over against that life is the Christian world.⁸ I recommend that book to you. It was written immediately after the war and is a remarkable anticipation of the political conditions prevailing in Germany. And there you find that same peculiar conflict. First, you have the feelings of the extraordinary uprush of life symbolized by the *Puer Aeternus*: you feel that this is the thing, or you expect that it will now grow into something—and then the thing you discover is the Christian world, which is of course the world of ideas, entirely static, cold, rigid, a world which is simply the opposite. That is invariably so, because life is on the one side the most intense movement, the greatest intensity, and on the other side it is utterly static. Of course that is exceedingly difficult to see, but the more life becomes intense, the more there is of that up and down movement, the more you are in conflict, then the more you are squeezed out of life in a peculiar way; you begin to get outside and to look at it, and you ask yourself in the end, for God's sake what is it all about? Why all that turmoil and nonsense? What is the meaning of the whole thing? And that is the life that surpasses itself.

Mr. Layard: Can you explain what you mean by *Puer Aeternus* in this connection?

Prof. Jung: Well, I was speaking about Bruno Goetz's book, but I can give you an idea of it. You know, there is a peculiar line of demarcation going right through Europe; east of the line the archetype of the *Puer Aeternus* prevails psychologically, and west of that line the psychology of the anima. One sees the characteristic difference in the literature, the novels and *belles lettres*, also in the political aspect. For instance, that whole new movement in Germany is typical of the *Puer Aeternus*. It is a mass movement, an intense movement, and nobody can see exactly

⁸ For Bruno Goetz, see above, 5 June 1935, n. 10.

what it means; there is a very mystical idea behind it, but it is chiefly life and movement and what it is all about, even the people themselves don't know. That psychology is also characterized by a peculiar relationship to woman. The woman is chiefly mother, virgin, or prostitute, but she is not a woman; while in the West the woman does exist. If you compare German literature with French or English literature, you see the difference at once. The *Puer Aeternus* has all the qualities of adolescent psychology, all that hopeful one-sidedness, that hopeful attempt. They are not yet on the other side, but this movement leads very suddenly into the static world; I don't know when that will occur but it will surely come, because after a *Puer Aeternus* phase, the static principle always comes. We can't tell how it will develop because it will be a very great thing and it might take a long time. Now the question is of course how far that *Puer Aeternus* archetype reaches. We could call it the archetype of the son versus the father. The psychology of the *Puer Aeternus* is exclusively masculine, it is a man's world. The woman's world is non-existent because woman as mother, as virgin, or as prostitute is all seen from a man's point of view.⁹ In a woman's world there would be a woman, but in a man's world there is only a function, woman as a function. Does that give you the idea? I cannot go into it further now.

Mr. Baumann: I want to ask a question about the former thing we talked about, the static against the dynamic, the turmoil. Bertrand Russell writes in his book *Mysticism and Logic* that the characteristic of mysticism is the absence of protest against, or the disbelief in, the ultimate division of two hostile camps—for instance, good and evil—but that with the sense of unity is associated a feeling of infinite peace which produces, as feelings do in dreams, the whole body of mystic doctrine.¹⁰ Now I would like to know whether that only came out because they were tortured by the turmoil, or whether this static principle is a kind of peace which is already existent in man before he started to fight—a kind of a *priori* principle—to reach this harmonious flow.

Prof. Jung: Well, the two things are always there, but in certain times of history, for a certain purpose the static principle prevails, and at other times movement prevails. For instance, let us assume you live in a time when the static principle is ruling. There you will find mystics, and the mystics themselves are then the ones who are suppressed by

⁹ Toni Wolff, analyst and member of the seminar, was to develop a typology of women in the familiar form of opposites: Hetaira, Mother; Amazon, Medial Woman. See *Structural Forms of the Feminine Psyche* (Zurich, 1956).

¹⁰ Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London, 1918). Russell was much keener on logic than on anything most people would call mysticism.

the static principle, and they begin to boil, to move—with no clear ideas, but they move, they are alive. It is typical for the mystics that they *live*; their most characteristic quality is the intensity of their lives—life counts with them. They are a reaction against the static principle. But in a time when mysticism is really living, as it is now, movement prevails. We live in such a period and we are looking for a static system in which to find peace. And we are going to create one, for after a time of turmoil we are longing for rest, for sleep, even for a kind of suffocation after that eternal boiling and vibrating. You see, it is always a question of one-sidedness. When the static principle goes too far there will be an uprush of dynamic movement, or if you have the contrary, then that will create its compensation. That is the mechanism in this chapter: it is like a piece of life. Nietzsche himself is in the process of seeing life and suddenly it throws him out. He is suddenly standing looking at a solid static thing and he looks at it from the outside. He creates an entirely different picture, instead of the up-and-down, the to-and-fro, instead of the turmoil of the battlefield, he climbs a stair in a building. Instead of the tarantula's den it is a temple, and of course the temple he envisages is the Christian church, obviously a Gothic cathedral—and that is the nest of the tarantula. Now, we have not interpreted this fully; we are now only so far as to determine that that building is a static, petrified system of ideas. It is petrified spirit.

Mrs. Siggs: There seems to be a development, judging from the pictures he chooses—first the cave or den, then the antique temple, and now the cathedral.

Prof. Jung: Well, here it is already the Gothic cathedral, but he has not amplified the picture enough, so we had better go on and see what comes next.

Verily, he who here towered aloft his thoughts in stone [This is petrification of the spirit.] knew as well as the wisest ones about the secret of life!

The secret of life here is that life surpasses itself and comes to the static condition. But of course one could say, if life starts in a static condition, the secret of life would be the turmoil.

That there is struggle and inequality even in beauty, and war for power and supremacy: that doth he here teach us the plainest parable.

How divinely do vault and arch here contrast in the struggle: how with light and shade they strive against each other, the divinely striving ones.—

This is a clear description of the Gothic cathedral where you really feel that life itself has become congealed—one could say it was congealed life. It is often compared to a wood or to the branches of a tree; all sorts of animals run up and down those columns and spires. It is wood that has become stone, or spirit that has become incorruptible matter, and the architecture symbolizes the struggle from which it arose. One sees the struggle itself represented in Norman art, in those manifold representations of the fight between man and monsters, particularly. In the Gothic cathedral this conflict is fully developed and fully represented in the enormous height and depth, in the light and the shadow, and in the extraordinary complication of all those architectural forms melting into each other, or fighting one another. It is also expressed in the peculiar arches built outside the church to support the walls inside; it gives one the idea of tremendous tension, of a thing that is almost bursting. When you look, for instance, in Notre Dame in Paris, at the tension of the walls inside supported by the arches, you realize how daring the whole enterprise was—to catch so much spirit in matter—and what they had to do in order to secure it. There is no such thing in the Norman cathedrals; they are really made of stone, while in the Gothic cathedrals one begins to doubt the weight of the stone. And a little later one sees the same peculiarity in sculpture. In the *cinquecento* sculpture of Michelangelo and the later men, they seemed to deny the immobility of the stone; up to that time, stone had been practically immovable, even Greek sculpture, but with Michelangelo, the stone began to move with a surplus of life which is hardly believable. It seems as if it either were not stone or as if something wrong had happened. There is too much life, the stone seems to walk away. It begins to move till the whole thing falls asunder. You see, that is what Nietzsche is describing here. He calls them the divinely striving ones that are no longer striving; they have congealed, they have come to rest.

Thus, steadfast and beautiful, let us also be enemies, my friends! Divinely will we strive against one another!

And they are static, like arches that support something. Of course they stand against each other, fight each other as it were, but they are static, no movement; a static tension is expressed. Now, such a view or such a standpoint is only possible when a man is so much in the throes of his conflict that he is simply squeezed out of it. Then he begins to laugh, as it were, and say, "What is it all about? I must have been crazy, I was too much in the conflict." You see, that will start, for instance, with the recognition that what you call good is very bad for other people, or

what they call good is very bad for you. So you come to the conclusion that they are human beings too and they must have their point of view as you have yours. And then you are already out of it, already static, already *au dessus de la mêlée*.¹¹ Of course you can take such a standpoint illegitimately before you have gone through the turmoil, just in order to avoid the conflict; people sometimes like to play that stunt, but that has no merit and they are tempted all the time to climb down into the turmoil. But if you have gone through the turmoil, if you cannot stand you any more, if the unconscious itself spits you out, then life itself spits you out as old Jonah was spit out by the whale; and then it is legitimate that you contentedly sit on the top of life, having a look at it. Then you can congeal the pairs of opposites in a beautiful static structure. That is the real summit which Nietzsche reaches in this chapter.

Alas! There hath the tarantula bit me myself, mine old enemy!
Divinely steadfast and beautiful, it hath bit me on the finger.

He was fighting the tarantulas who were preaching death, standstill, rigidity, authority, and now the tarantula has got *him*. He is now poisoned, he himself has become the tarantula as a matter of fact.

"Punishment must there be, and justice"—so thinketh it: "not gratuitously shall he here sing songs in honour of enmity!"

That is what the tarantula in him says,

Yea, it hath revenged itself! And alas, now will it make my soul also dizzy with revenge.

That I may *not* turn dizzy, however, bind me fast, my friends, to this pillar.

The poison of the tarantula is supposed to make people dizzy and to cause madness, you remember; it is not true but that is the legend. And Nietzsche, being no zoologist, believed that, so the giddiness is an attack of madness; the recognition of the other side meant a stroke of madness to him. This is only my conjecture, mind you, but we will keep this in mind as a sort of hypothesis. After this we would really expect symptoms of *ekstasis*, an invasion of the unconscious, because that whole world which he could judge and tread underfoot now takes its revenge upon him. All the tarantulas in the world will get at him, and the tarantula is the sympathetic nervous system. That means the un-

¹¹ *Au dessus de la mêlée*: above the fray.

conscious; the unconscious will get at him, so we can expect some peculiar phenomena.

Mrs. Crowley: Is there not a connection between it and the buffoon in the beginning?

Prof. Jung: It would be a parallel; the buffoon is a sort of danger. It is his madness that overtook him. Of course it is only madness inasmuch as it cannot be integrated or understood, but in the first onslaught it may cause madness—it may be just too much. You see, when you have fought against a thing your whole life, when you have been convinced that a thing is all wrong and that you are quite right, then that same thing catches you. That very same thing gets into your system, and then you may explode. Perhaps you cannot cope with it and then it gets you naturally. Now, this would be the danger if it were Nietzsche who was talking like that, but it is not exactly Nietzsche. He is identical with that figure of Zarathustra, so he is in a sort of inflation all the time, not quite in control of himself; and then of course he can easily overtake himself as he has already overtaken himself through one-sidedness. You know, his preaching has all been on the side of life, all on the side of the reversal of values, the destruction of old things, having entirely new views, reviling everybody who doesn't share life. Then suddenly that whole thing turns against him. Of course it is just the sting of the tarantula which is not supposed to be mortal; it is simply disagreeable and causes a sort of madness. So he is somewhat protected against it. He realizes the danger that he might turn giddy and begin to rave, and in order that he should not, he says,

Rather will I be a pillar-saint than a whirl of vengeance.

A pillar of the church, mind you, of the cathedral.

Verily, no cyclone or whirlwind is Zarathustra: . . .

What did we read at the end of the last chapter? "Verily, a strong wind is Zarathustra."

and if he be a dancer, he is not at all a tarantula-dancer!

No, he won't join in *that*!

LECTURE V

2 June 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here are two questions. Miss Hannah says, "I see theoretically, as Nietzsche did not accept the inferior man in himself, that this is projected and shows itself—for instance, in the fear of vengeance which occurs constantly in the tarantula chapter. But I find this extremely difficult to grasp or really understand. Would you be willing to say some more about it? Or, to put it differently, the words *vengeance* and *revenge* give me a queer feeling throughout the chapter, as if I had not really understood why there is such an insistence on this note?"

Well, it is quite obvious that the very idea of the tarantula people, as Nietzsche puts it, is a projection, one of the many aspects of the projection of the inferior man. All the chapters in which he reviles certain classes of people contain the projection of the inferior man in himself; they show very clearly that he is not capable of seeing his own shadow, because what he reviles in people is a projection of his own shadow, his own inferiority. That is the usual experience: when we criticize or revile other people it is always because we are projecting something on them. It is perfectly true that you cannot make such a projection if there is not a hook on which to hang it. Inasmuch as people have a shadow, they are always full of hooks—you always have a chance to say something unkind about them. But the fact that you get excited about certain traits or qualities proves that you yourself have them, or why should they sting you? There are certain categories of things which get your goat somehow, and then that is *your* case—that is what irritates you. So Nietzsche rejects his inferior sides in those other people; he quarrels with them and reviles them. And the tarantula is of course such an aspect of the shadow in himself.

You see, when you behave like that with your shadow, when you project it and leave it always to other people, then, since it is a definite personality and all the more so when you repress it or don't recognize it, it becomes a sort of Siamese twin bound to you by a system of com-

municating tubes. You are in connection with it, yet it always appears as if it were in other people. But that thing wants to be with you, to be recognized, to live your life with you. It is just like a brother or anybody else who likes to be with you; and when you simply won't allow it, naturally that personality develops resistances against you. It is irritated and becomes venomous. And every time you revile that fellow, you revile yourself, and then naturally something reacts in you as if it were your enemy. Something always reacts in you against the object of your hatred. If you despise somebody, for instance, or are hostile and attack somebody, you identify with it and develop a resentment naturally, and that is the feeling of revenge. That shadow you have reviled tries to get at you—it comes back with a vengeance. Then it looks as if you had that feeling against all those who have that shadow, but as a matter of fact it is your own shadow which has the feeling of revenge, and at any time it will come back at you. You will see how the shadow comes back at Nietzsche with a vengeance: that is the tragedy of *Zarathustra*.

Then there is a question by Mr. Allemann, "You said in the last seminar that dynamic periods were succeeded by static systems and vice versa. Is it not true that even a static period or system is really efficient only as long as the dynamism of the preceding period is still living—and that, as soon as it is entirely spent, as soon as all the energy is lacking, only the 'ruins of the temple' are remaining?"

"At this point of the development, I should say that even the blackest and most fanatic tarantula would be unable to restore real life to the temple, though it would certainly succeed in making things very disagreeable and even dangerous for the unlucky beings who were still remaining in the temple.

"Is it not true that a religious system is really efficient as long as the dynamism of its outburst is still in it, even if its chaotic and orgiastic trend is slowly replaced by a static system of dogmas, and is not such a religious system at the height of its efficiency and universal acceptability, when the dynamic experience is still strong enough to hold the imagination and feeling, and the dogmatic system already subtle enough to catch the thinking and keep it working?"

"As an example of a religious system at this moment of its development, I think of a few gnostic systems with their ecstatic experience on the one side and their subtle cosmogonic and eschatological speculation and terminology on the other."

I entirely agree, it is quite impossible for a static system to live if there is no *dynamis* in it. The term *reality* or *real* (derived from *res*, "thing") of course doesn't contain the idea of dynamism, but the Ger-

man word *Wirklichkeit* does contain it. Inasmuch as such a static form of religion is efficient, it is *efficiens*, it is working, it is *wirklich*. So it needs the dynamism inside, and as soon as that dies down, the efficiency of the static system vanishes, crumbles away. We can observe that in our days. A static system can only come into existence, then, when there has been a dynamic outburst; only inasmuch as there is a dynamic outburst can a static system exist at all. But when a dynamic outburst loses its efficiency, it is impossible to get it back, because it has left the temple and appears now as the tarantula. And to fill the temples with tarantulas, as you say, would make the situation too uncomfortable for the people who remain inside; they can't worship in a box full of tarantulas. You know, that is proverbial: if you put a lot of spiders together in one box they will devour each other.

So a schismatic movement in a church is already the beginning of the tarantula phenomenon. The spiders then begin to show their real character. If that whole crowd, the four hundred denominations of the Protestant church, were brought back into the Catholic church, they would kill each other. That box has exploded and we have now irreconcilable units out in the world which cannot be brought back again. As Christ said, you cannot put new wine into old skins. But people always think they can—well, they don't speak of new wine, that is too dangerous, they just try to revive the old skins. For instance, there was a movement in the Protestant church to bring back the old liturgies, but those are of course old skins, and whatever there is of new wine simply doesn't go into them. As soon as there is a schism, it means really the end. You see, a static system must be totalitarian, as the church was till about 1200; the original outburst really worked and filled the whole reach of the church, and the church spread as long as that outburst kept on working. Then there was a moment of static immobility, and the schism began and has kept on working ever since. It is working in our days in the German reaction; that is the continuation of the German Reformation. It is now taking a new breath as it were, working now in the same schismatic way that it worked four hundred years ago. And what is happening in Spain is all a part of it; anarchism, communism, socialism are really religious movements, only with an *a* or an *anti*—the negation is the same—and there it is directly against the Catholic church. In Russia also it is exactly the same. Now I don't quite understand why you thought of the Gnostic systems as suitable examples; they never really developed into churches, into static systems.

Mr. Allemann: Yes, but they were religious systems and they had both

sides, a very developed eschatology, very subtle terms, and on the other hand the ecstatic movement, the *dynamis*.

Prof. Jung: Absolutely, but according to my mind they came to a standstill before they really developed into a static building. By a static system I understand not only the teaching, but also the institution, and they never developed institutions. Therefore there was a really extraordinary variation in the Gnostic systems, and they are ill-defined; it is very difficult to make out which is which. But in the Catholic church it is quite different; there it worked out into dogma and ritual, into liturgies and ceremonies and buildings, and into definite symbolism, like the Greek orthodox church. Of course if the Gnostic systems had had a fair chance, they probably would have widened out into sorts of churches. For instance, Manichaeism was really a Gnostic syncretistic system, and that grew into a static system. It was a church.

Mrs. Sigg: It seems to me that Nietzsche's difficulty is that in a Christian church, the priest asks that Jehovah shall be worshipped, and even Jehovah has a tarantula quality because he is revengeful.

Prof. Jung: But that is Protestantism. Protestants are already revengeful in their conception of God, while in the Catholic church that is not the case. There God has definitely forgotten to sting, *zu stechen*.

Mrs. Sigg: But Protestantism is the church as well as Catholicism.

Prof. Jung: The Protestant conception is far more poisonous.

Mrs. Sigg: Yes, I think so too, and I think Nietzsche wants to reform this poison.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes. Of course his idea of Christianity is entirely Protestant; he had no real knowledge of the Catholic church and was not interested in it. To him it was always that foolish question of his age, whether God existed or not. You see, that is a terribly barbarous idea; one never should ask such a foolish question because the answer can never be proved. His reaction was entirely against his German Protestantism which surely contains a dogmatic conception. You can speak of a Protestant dogma, but it is not the strict and severe dogma of the Catholic church. Well now, we will continue our text. We had finished the last chapter and are coming now to "The Famous Wise Ones." By what transition does he arrive at the wise ones after the tarantulas?

Mrs. Crowley: It occurred to me that in the last chapter by the process of *enantiodromia* he stressed the conflict between the opposites. At the end of the chapter, he arrived at the image of the pillar saint, one who had in some way solved the problem by identifying with the self. Now, from that distant perspective, he looks back and down upon those so-called "wise ones," the representatives of ego-conscious reality, who—

from the angle of the saint bound to the pillar—look like inferior fauna struggling in the mud, as if he were denying his former intellectual values.

Prof. Jung: Yes, there is something in that. Has anybody else an idea about it?

Dr. James: They are “stiff-necked and artful, like the ass”; he is looking at these wise men and of course he despises them.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but that doesn’t explain how he comes to the idea of the wise ones after the tarantulas.

Miss Hannah: Is it not sheer green-eyed jealousy of the people who hold the professional chairs and get the money, while he has to go out into the wilderness?

Prof. Jung: Well, in this chapter there is surely a definite resentment on account of that, but what about the tarantulas?

Miss Hannah: The tarantula has bitten him, therefore he himself represents the revenge to a certain extent now, instead of seeing it entirely outside him.

Prof. Jung: You are right. You see, the dramatic picture in the chapter before is that he himself got bitten by the tarantulas. First he reviles all those tarantula people, and then suddenly the tarantulas bite him, so the poison gets into him and there is danger that he might turn giddy. Therefore he says to bind him fast to that pillar, so that he won’t go mad—dancing the tarantula dance. But the poison is in him. Now, the tarantula represents one of the many aspects of the inferior man, and if the inferior man bites him, pours his shadow into his face, it has surely gotten at him and then *he* becomes the shadow. He is filled with that poison so we may expect that he will have a new resentment to spit out, and he arrives now at the wise ones who represent the useful educators of the people—of course, according to his idea, the professors at universities or any other well-meaning and meritorious leaders of the people. He himself now plays the role of the tarantula: he becomes poisonous, and his *ressentiment* is manifest even against people to whom he cannot deny a certain amount of merit.

The people have ye served and the people’s superstition—*not* the truth!—all ye famous wise ones! And just on that account did they pay you reverence.

Here you get the idea. He comes out with the somewhat venomous statement that these wise ones are revered only because they say what people expect of them. They don’t speak the truth.

And on that account also did they tolerate your unbelief, because it was a pleasantry and a by-path for the people. Thus doth the master give free scope to his slaves, and even enjoyeth their presumptuousness.

But he who is hated by the people, as the wolf by the dogs—is the free spirit, the enemy of fetters, the non-adorer, the dweller in the woods.

Now, here he uses a number of metaphors which need some explanation. Why does he use the figures of the wolf and the dogs and the dweller in the woods as a particularly good demonstration of the free spirit?

Miss Wolff: Nietzsche apparently assumes that those wise men are really atheists; they only talk like that to make an impression on people. They still get all the benefits from living collectively, whereas he is really lonely because he does not believe in God.

Prof. Jung: But why just the wolf?

Miss Wolff: Nietzsche's ideas are dangerous, therefore collective man hates him as the dogs hate the wolf.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and now why the dweller in the woods?

Miss Wolff: Perhaps Nietzsche refers here to that chapter at the very beginning where he met the hermit.

Prof. Jung: And do you remember what we said about that dweller in the woods?

Mrs. Crowley: That he represents the past.

Prof. Jung: He represents what had retired into the unconscious; that means whatever is left over in the world, left over and not integrated in the actually existing philosophic and religious viewpoint. Now we have a lead for the interpretation of that dweller in the wood: the hermit is the tarantula. You see, when a static system begins to get feeble, a schismatic movement will ensue. Then a part of the people who were organized in the church turn against it and become tarantulas; they become poisonous. And they go out of the church into the wilderness, as it were, into the uncultivated land. They disappear into the woods. The woods are always a symbol for the unconscious, so they disappear into the unconscious where everything which is not integrated is to be found, everything which is no longer included and living within the static system. Such people or such thoughts are always considered by the people inside the system to be particularly poisonous, dangerous tarantulas. Of course Nietzsche, who is outside the system, calls the people "tarantulas" who are inside, but you must not for-

get that the ones inside call the one outside "the wolf." But he calls those who are inside the wolves also, because they injure each other; they are hostile to each other. So the free spirit is the wolf, the non-adorer, the dweller in the woods; and Nietzsche identifies with that so-called "free spirit," the spirit which is not organized, which is not in a static system. We can designate it quite definitely as a non-Christian spirit.

To hunt him out of his lair—that was always called "sense of right" by the people: on him do they still hound their sharpest-toothed dogs.

"For there the truth is, where the people are! Woe, woe to the seeking ones!"—thus hath it echoed through all time.

This is perfectly understandable. That a thing is true when most of the people believe it, is a certain standpoint. And it is a fact; as long as most people believe it, you can consider it as true. You see, if you consider it a lie you are in the hole. That is your funeral, not theirs, so you had better consider such things true because they work. You can say it is stupid and shouldn't be, but that is a sort of empty talk. It means nothing because you have absolutely no possibility of undoing the apparent error. If everybody shares that error, it is called a truth for the time being. Of course you may think differently, but then you must be careful not to say so openly if you don't want to injure yourself—and I don't see any particular point in injuring oneself on principle. One has to be careful because life wants to be lived, and that is more reasonable than fighting over a thing about which you yourself don't know exactly what to believe. Naturally for anybody with an independent mind it is most trying to see how flimsy what is generally held to be a truth may be, since one can easily see that in ten years, or even less, it will no longer be a truth. Today it is a truth, tomorrow it is no longer, but after tomorrow it will again be a truth. Of course a philosophically minded person will always ask what is truth after all. You see, things that were true two thousand years ago are not true now, but after two thousand years they will be true again.

Your people would ye justify in their reverence: that called ye "Will to Truth," ye famous wise ones!

That is also quite obvious.

And your heart hath always said to itself: "From the people have I come: from thence came to me also the voice of God."

Now this is a bit more serious—this is a terrifying truth really. We have all come from the people—we are the people—and if the majority say; “I am the voice of God,” well then, this is a truth because it works. The majority of the people establish it, and the greater part of myself is collective, made of entirely collective stuff. The molecules of my body are chemically in no way different from the molecules of anybody else. The making of my mind is absolutely the same as everybody else’s. There is only a peculiar variation of the composition, the element in myself that accounts for my so-called individuality. So to begin with, we are 99.99999 percent collective, and just a bit of unaccountable something is individual. But that is the thumbing which is the maker of things, or the grain of mustard that becomes the whole kingdom of heaven. This is a funny fact but it is so. You see, there is a definite valid standpoint that *vox populi est vox Dei*, “that the voice of the people is the voice of God.” For instance, if you are convinced that humanity is a manifestation of the divine will, you must assume that the voice of humanity is a manifestation of the divine voice, and so you must own that the *consensus gentium*, the consent of the majority of human beings, establishes the truth. And it is really so: a truth is a truth as long as it works. We have no other criterion except in cases where we can experiment, but they are very few. We cannot experiment with history or geology or astronomy for example. There are few natural sciences in which we can experiment. So this standpoint that the people’s voice is the voice of God, a superior overwhelming voice, is a very important psychological truth which has to be taken into consideration in every case.

You see, Nietzsche preaches that truth, but of course in an unconscious sense. He blames them for having such a view, but it would be a redeeming truth to himself if he could only accept it. For he is just the one who says that the voice of the people is nonsense, that there is only one truth and that an individual truth. He believes that his truth is the only truth. But how can anyone say his truth is the only one? Yet, that is the individualistic point of view, which leads people far afield and very often quite astray. Of course it is necessary that a person should have his own individual point of view, but he should know that he is then in terrible conflict with the *vox populi* in himself and that is what we always forget. We must never forget that our individual conviction is a sort of Promethean sin, a violence against the laws of nature that we are all fishes in one shoal and in one river; and if we are not, it is a presumption, a rebellion. And that conflict is in ourselves. But the in-

dividual thinks that the conflict is by no means in himself, and whatever individual feeling he has on account of an individual conception, he projects into others: they are against me because I have such a conception—entirely forgetting that he is against himself. If ever you discover an individual truth, you will find that you are in a conflict about it. You are contradicted by yourself and at every turn you meet an obstacle which you think other people have put in your way. Inasmuch as you make individual opinions public naturally you will meet obstacles, and then you take it as a truth that you are persecuted; you develop a sort of paranoia. Therefore whoever discovers an individual truth should discover at the same time that he is the first enemy of himself, that *he* is the one who has the strongest objection to his truth, and he should be careful not to project it or he will develop a paranoia. Now Nietzsche continues,

Stiff-necked and artful, like the ass, have ye always been, as the advocates of the people.

And many a powerful one who wanted to run well with the people, hath harnessed in front of his horses—a donkey, a famous wise man.

He refers here to a famous example in the history of philosophy. Hegel was the Prussian state philosopher, considered to be a famous wise one, and of course Nietzsche was well acquainted with his philosophy. Hegel was a philosopher in a definite political system; one always finds such a fellow in every political system—that is, the ass harnessed by the powers of the earth to the political cart.¹ There have been more or less modest attempts to make Nietzsche into such an ass in front of a political cart, but I should say he was an unreliable ass, not of pure blood. He would be a mule and full of tricks.

And now, ye famous wise ones, I would have you finally throw off entirely the skin of the lion!

The skin of the beast of prey, the speckled skin, and the dishevelled locks of the investigator, the searcher, and the conqueror!

Ah! for me to learn to believe in your “conscientiousness,” ye would first have to break your venerating will.

¹ Hegel (1770-1831), never a favorite of either Jung or Nietzsche, viewed the rational course of history as culminating in the Prussian state. See esp. *The Philosophy of History* (orig. 1837; English trans. 1860).

Well, his criticism is justified. You know, there is a German proverb: *Wess' Brot ich ess, Dess' Lied ich sing*, meaning, "If I eat the bread of somebody, I shall sing his song." Many thinkers have praised certain political conditions because they received their bread from that system; their intellectual conscientiousness was a bit suspect. Nietzsche, of course, could not be accused of such an impurity, yet he simply doesn't see that he also is manipulated by the forces of his time. Creative people often have that difficulty: they think they are the makers of themselves, without seeing at all how they are manipulated by the necessities of the time. Like all the others, they are the megaphones or the microphones of powers in human society which are not realized. You see, that is most difficult: I don't know whether it is at all possible to realize the underlying powers in an actual moment of history. You remember that story of the knight who was caught by his enemies and put down into a dark dungeon, where he was kept year after year until finally he got impatient and, banging his fist upon the table, he said, "Now when are these damned Middle Ages coming to an end!" You see, he got sick of the medieval style—he was the only one who realized that he was living in the Middle Ages. That is like the Pueblo Indians who are always talking about Americans but don't know that they are living in America. Or like the story of Columbus landing on his island: The inhabitants came to the sea to greet him, and he asked, "Are you the natives?" And they replied, "Yes, and are you Columbus?" He said, "Yes," and they said, "Oh well then, there is nothing to be done anymore: America is discovered!"

Well now, Nietzsche was intelligent enough to see that certain professors were preaching the truth of a certain political system, not by virtue of their intellectual integrity, but moved by suggestions and all sorts of unconscious reasons which they had not always realized; they were probably perfectly honest people only not conscious enough to realize their ulterior motives. Some were perhaps unclean devils who consciously said things in order to please the master, or whoever was the boss on top of them, but we can give them the credit that they were mostly unconscious, as Nietzsche himself was unconscious of his leading principle or whoever his boss might be. He spoke out of the spirit of his time and he didn't see it at all. One often clearly feels that he was speaking out of German Protestantism, for instance, or out of the Victorian age, or out of the age of materialism, but he knew it as little as the people who fought in it knew that they were fighting the famous Thirty Years War; they were living in the here and now, as we do. The more primitive civilizations felt that they were living in eternity, that

they always had lived in that way and would live in that way forever. And so it was in other times of history: the time never knew itself. You see, it was just that amount of intelligence and superior criticism which helped Nietzsche to see that certain people were moved by their surroundings and unconsciously represented the voice of the people. But he assumed that he himself did not, and there he was entirely mistaken; he voiced the people perhaps more than all the others. They only voiced a very thin surface, a layer that was thinning out every day, while he voiced the future which was already there under the surface. He voiced something much deeper and more concealed than the other fellows represented, yet he was moved by unconscious motives as much and even more than the others.

Conscientious—so call I him who goeth into God-forsaken wilderness, and hath broken his venerating heart.

So it appeared to him and of course it was also true in his life. In his time it made sense, and anybody who had reached the realization that he had reached really had to choose between the Godforsaken wilderness and a chair at the university. Conscientious as he was, he chose the wilderness. But choosing the wilderness does not always mean conscientiousness. As soon as it becomes a fashion to go to the wilderness, it is no longer conscientiousness that prompts you to go there. You can credit the first hermit that went into the desert with an extraordinary conscientiousness, but think of the tens of thousands that went after him! It was just the fashion; it became a most respectable vocation to be a hermit. They went to the desert because that was the thing one did. If it had been the fashion to go to Aix-les-Bains they would have gone there because they were respectable people.

In the yellow sands and burnt by the sun, he doubtless peereth thirstily at the isles rich in fountains, where life reposeeth under shady trees.

Now here one really can ask why in hell he should go out into the desert to be burnt by the sun and tortured by thirst, instead of living in a community of Christian beings. Well, one could ask the first Christian dwellers in the desert the same question: "Why are you going to the desert? Are you preaching to the sand and to the jackals? Is it better that you should be fed by the pious peasants in the vicinity instead of earning your own living?" I told you that story of St. Anthony when he went to the desert. He thought he was listening to the voice of the devil, but it was the voice of reason: thy devil said most reasonable things to

those hermits. And here again we can ask, "Is it reasonable? Why must he torture himself?" It might be very reasonable if he lived among other people and opened their eyes. You see, there is no authority really in the Bible for a monastic life in the desert or in monasteries; it is really of another origin, before the time of Christianity. The Libyan desert and the Sinai peninsula and the region of the Dead Sea were all cultivated by such funny people living in caves and apparently doing nothing. What prompted them?

Miss Hannah: You can only get the values of the unconscious by going right into it.

Prof. Jung: But did they really seek revelation?

Miss Hannah: Did they not seek the voice of God more or less—which they could not hear for the noise of the cities?

Prof. Jung: That is true, but there is another reason.

Mr. Allemann: They wanted to get out of the way of temptation.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that is also the reason given by the people themselves. They tried to avoid the temptations of the great cities, which must have been great. There are excellent stories about the monks of Egypt in a Coptic text called *The Paradise of Palladius*.² For instance, the story about the monk who had lived in the desert for twenty years and had attained absolute certainty of belief, and then he remembered having heard that an old friend had become bishop of Alexandria; and since he was advanced in age and perfectly fortified against all devilish temptations, he made up his mind to go to visit him. So he packed his bag and travelled to Alexandria, but when he arrived at the suburbs, he came to an inn, and it smelled so lovely of wine and garlic and oil that he thought, "Oh, just a sip." But he never came out of that inn: they discovered him in the depths of slime; he forgot all about his twenty years in the desert and his saintliness, and out came the pig as fresh as on the first day. That story was quoted in order to show how great was the power of the devil. You see, people might hold to their convictions against the obvious beauties of the world, but when it smelt of oil and garlic and onions and wine, you know, they were just gone. So they needed the desert as a sort of protection. Whenever people discovered something which was too much in contradiction with their surrounding conditions, they either isolated themselves, created a sort of

² Palladius, Bishop of Hellenopolis and of Aspona (d. c. 430), a devoted adherent of the controversial St. Chrysostom, wrote an account of a number of Christian ascetics and monastics who lived between A.D. 250 and 400. It has been translated by W. K. Lowther Clarke as *The Lausiaca History of Palladius* (New York, 1918), and by A. Wallis-Budge as *The Paradise of Palladius*.

fence around themselves, or they left the country and their relations in order not to be tempted to another point of view. Of course they would not be tempted to such an extent if they only knew that the worst temptation was in themselves—they were their own worst temptors. When they arrived in the desert they could not get drunk, because there was nothing to drink except some rather bad water, and they could not overfeed because there was nothing much to feed on—food was scarce. But they had carried their conscientious objector with them. He was right there, and who was that?

Miss Hannah: The devil.

Prof. Jung: Of course. They were tempted by devils like anything. As I said, nobody is so gorgeously tempted as the saint; the dreams of saints are simply amazing, the performances that were shown them by the devils. Read *La Tentation de St. Antoine* by Flaubert; there you get it.³ I could not compete with them. No patient of mine ever had such dreams. But then, I never had a saint. So Nietzsche has to remove himself on account of temptation, and the temptation only reaches him because the temptor is already in himself: he has the devil already with him. When he went to the Engadine or any other lonely place it was of course for the same purpose, to escape the temptations of the world that reached him through his own devil, whom he did not see enough.

Now, here is a metaphor, "In the yellow sands and burnt by the sun," which I mention because it is a symbol that occasionally occurs in dreams; people sometimes dream that they appear with their face badly burnt by the sun, which is obviously what Nietzsche refers to here. It is not frequent, and when I first encountered it, it vexed me very much. Then I found out that the symbol usually occurs when something that has been unconscious is exposed to consciousness, so that the light of consciousness, which is the sun of the day, burns it. When there has been too much exposure to the sun of consciousness, that dream symbol turns up. It is apt to happen when something hitherto unconscious wants to leap out into the open just as it had been concealed before in the darkness. But it should be kept in the shadow. If you allow it to manifest, if you show it to everybody, then you dream of the burnt face, so badly burnt sometimes that there are open wounds. And this symbol of the sunburn applies to Nietzsche's case because he discovered a new individual truth and exposed it; he is in a situation where he might have such a dream. We do not know what he did but at all events in his metaphorical language that image comes up.

³ For *The Temptation of St. Anthony*, see above, 3 June 1936, n. 2.

The metaphors in our speech are made of what our dreams are made of: an apt speech metaphor may take the place of a dream. For instance, if you use a particular metaphor in a speech the evening before, you won't dream it, you have anticipated it; you can save yourself many dreams if you give expression to the unconscious in other ways. If you anticipate them by active imagination, you do not need to dream them. Now he continues,

But his thirst doth not persuade him to become like those comfortable ones: for where there are oases, there are also idols.

The idea is quite near to him: why should one live in the desert if there are nice oases near by where one would have sufficient food and shade and water? And here we hear the reason: namely, in the oases there are always idols. The prevailing ideas are the idols to Nietzsche, and they are highly tempting and might make him deviate from his individual truth. You see, when you come out with an individual truth against the whole world, you feel how small it is, how feeble, and how easily wiped out by collectivity, while whoever follows the style and ideas of collectivity always speaks with ten thousand voices.

Hungry, fierce, lonesome, God-foresaken: so doth lion-will wish itself.

Free from the happiness of slaves, redeemed from Deities and adorations, fearless and fear-inspiring, grand and lonesome: so is the will of the conscientious.

Here we see the identification with the so-called free spirit; it is quite clearly an inflation that removes him from ordinary mankind.

In the wilderness have ever dwelt the conscientious, the free spirits, as lords of the wilderness; but in the cities dwell the well-foddered, famous wise ones—the draught-beasts.

Well, we may add, not only they but also those children of the free spirit who can resist temptation, who have dealt with their own devil so that it doesn't tempt them any longer. As soon as the hermit has overcome the tempter within himself he can live among other people or idols—they don't injure him; even if he thinks the idols are fairly interesting, they won't poison him. But if one is still so feeble and collective that one cannot resist such impressions, without losing one's individual idea, of course one cannot stand life in a community.

Mr. Baumann: This problem of the idols in the oases was very important for Islam. The whole Arabic population was divided up into tribes

who lived in and around the different oases, each tribe worshipping a special idol. This contributed a good deal to the many terrible fights between the tribes. To overcome their belief in the omnipotence of their own idols was a major problem to Mohammed in establishing his religion, which stopped the fighting and made that impressive unity of Islamic countries.

Prof. Jung: I don't know whether Nietzsche was aware of that particular piece of Mohammedan history. It is an interesting fact that Nietzsche was not particularly well read on account of his eyes, so when he did read, it always made a tremendous impression on him. Therefore his taste is sometimes a bit queer: he admired things which were not particularly admirable simply because he did not know anything better.⁴ So I do not think that really influenced his style here; he might rather have gleaned such an idea from his knowledge of antiquity. You know, there were famous temples in the oases.

Mr. Alleman: The temple of Jupiter Ammon, for example.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the great oases of Egypt there were many such temples, also in Northern Africa.

For, always, do they draw, as asses—the *people's* carts!

We must keep in mind that Nietzsche is merely unconscious of the fact that he is also drawing the people's carts, but the people of the future. That is the only difference.

Not that I on that account upbraid them: but serving ones do they remain, and harnessed ones, even though they glitter in golden harness.

And often have they been good servants and worthy of their hire. For thus saith virtue: "If thou must be a servant, seek him unto whom thy service is most useful!

The spirit and virtue of thy master shall advance by thou being his servant: thus wilt thou thyself advance with his spirit and virtue!"

And verily, ye famous wise ones, ye servants of the people! Ye yourselves have advanced with the people's spirit and virtue—and the people by you! To your honor do I say it!

But the people ye remain for me, even with your virtues, the

⁴ Not only was Nietzsche's sight dim but his eyes were the source of debilitating headaches. Yet in affirmative moods, he would claim that not reading kept his mind clear and his energy available for thinking and writing.

people with purblind eyes—the people who know not what *spirit* is!

His conception of the spirit is of course not so peculiar to us, but it is peculiar if you consider what the spirit meant in his time. He used the word *Geist*, of course, and the *Geist* was then absolutely dead. Naturally, if you said to a theologian then, that what he designated as spirit was dead, he would not have been pleased—and he would not be pleased today—but as a matter of fact this concept of spirit has become so obnoxious that Klages wrote a volume of about seven hundred pages about the spirit being the enemy of the soul.⁵ Now in no other time do you find the idea that the spirit could be the enemy of the soul; on the contrary, these two concepts have always been confounded, the words used interchangeably. What Klages understands by *Geist* is the idea which developed at the end of the 19th century; namely, intellect in the form of books, science, philosophy, and so on. But never before had *Geist* meant that; it was merely a degeneration of the meaning of the word. To Nietzsche, *spirit* meant the original thing, an intensity, a volcanic outburst, while to the scientific or rationalistic spirit of the second half of the 19th century, it was an ice-cold space in which there were things, but it was no longer life. Naturally if you understand *Geist* in this way, it is the deadliest enemy of the soul you could think of. Now here we see his conception,

Spirit is life which itself cutteth into life: by its own torture doth it increase its own knowledge,—did ye know that before?

You see, that is his discovery. He was born and lived in an age when that death of the spirit became obvious, when the word *Geist* meant only mind, but he experienced spirit as the most intense form of life. He felt it as such because he experienced the spirit that cutteth into itself. He had had a certain *Geist* of course, a certain philosophical conception which was the religious philosophical conception of his time, and then he discovered a new spirit before. Therefore, to him it was a phenomenon of life which apparently was against life. So he would explain the hermit that seeks the desert by such a phenomenon: namely, that that man discovered a new spirit, or a new spirit was made visible by a spirit which cut into his former convictions, into his former conceptions and ideals, and forced him to leave the human community. Nietzsche discovered by the onslaught of the spirit that spirit was life itself, and life which was against life, which could overcome life. And

⁵ For Klages, see above, 23 May 1934, n. 5.

from that experience he rightly concluded that the spirit is a vital power; it is not an empty, dead, ice-cold space, but is warm intense life, even hot life, most dynamic. It can cut a man loose from his community. It can even create hermits. You see, this experience is very much like the religious experiences of the early Christians, like the experience of Paul on his way to Damascus for instance, when the spirit cut into *his* life, and like many other cases of such violent forms of conversion. To those people spirit was a life force that could upset one's whole life as one had conceived of it before. It was nothing mental, nor could it be formulated by mental means. It was a sort of autonomous, divine manifestation.

So Nietzsche's definition of the spirit being life which cutteth into life is absolutely true. That is the phenomenon. But of course nobody who has not had such an experience can follow it. Even now a German philosopher writing about *Geist* would mean what they meant in the 19th century, since a definite experience of the spirit has not taken place. If it had, the people to whom it had happened would not have written about philosophy. They would rather have preferred to write something in the style of Nietzsche: they would have written a confession. Philosophy is no longer a confession, but it used to be. For instance, one of the oldest fathers of the church, Justinus Martyrus who lived about 190, called the Christianity which flourished in the times of Augustus "our philosophy."⁶ It would seem quite absurd now to call it a philosophy, but in those days philosophy and religion were pretty much the same thing, an experience of the spirit. Now, Nietzsche himself had what we would call a definite religious experience, but he called it the experience of Dionysos. It was the experience of the free spirit, the spirit that was against his hitherto prevailing attitude of mind, a spirit that changed his life, that exploded him completely. You see, he was formerly a teacher of Greek and Latin in the public schools, and then a professor at the University of Basel. He was just trying to be an ordinary citizen, just an ordinary professor, and suddenly that thing seized upon him and drove him out of his previous existence. From that moment on he depended for his living upon a very small pension which he drew from the university, and contributions from nice pious rich people in Basel. Otherwise he would not have been able to live. He was the hermit to whom the peasants brought food every week so that he should not starve. So he himself has an experience at first hand of how the spirit can cut into life.

⁶ For Justin Martyr, see above, 20 Nov. 1935, n. 8.

And the spirit's happiness is this: to be anointed and consecrated with tears as a sacrificial victim,—did ye know that before?

Here he tells us exactly what has happened to him. He understands his condition as an "anointed and consecrated condition"; he has entered as it were an ecclesiastic order, or even a kingly office, and the sacred oil by which he has been anointed were the tears which were wept for him—not the tears wept over him, but the tears he wept about himself because he was the sacrificial victim.

And the blindness of the blind one, and his seeking and groping, shall yet testify to the power of the sun into which he hath gazed,—did ye know that before?

You see, he repeats in that epic manner "Did ye know that before?" because he realizes perfectly that his conception of the spirit is entirely new, of course not new in history but new for his age. In the first centuries of Christianity there were plenty of confessions of this kind, or at any other time when people were moved by the spirit, but when he was born things seemed to be established and the spirit had become an extinct volcano. Then suddenly there was that outburst in Nietzsche and naturally he was impressed by it and thought he was the only one to experience it, particularly since he was identical with it. That is the danger when people have such a spiritual experience: they become identical with it and think they are the chosen ones, the only ones, great reformers of the world or something of the sort.

And with mountains shall the discerning one learn to *build*! It is a small thing for the spirit to remove mountains,—did ye know that before?

But it is not a small thing for Mr. Nietzsche to remove a mountain, that is the trouble.

Ye know only the sparks of the spirit: but ye do not see the anvil which it is, and the cruelty of its hammer!

Well, it can smash your whole existence and that is exactly what we have not realized; we have forgotten entirely that the spirit is such a power. We call it a neurosis perhaps and deny that it has any power, because we can say of a neurosis that it should not be, it is wrong. That is as if, when your house burns down, you should say that the fire should not be, as if that made it less obnoxious. But when you have to cure a neurosis you know what it means and you don't think so little of

it; when you know what is behind it, you think more of it. So his proclamation of the spirit is quite right: nobody knows what the spirit is and what a power it is. People think that two thousand years ago human beings were barbarous and wandered into the desert because they were damned fools. Or on Tuesday morning at nine o'clock they sent Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Jones into the arena to be eaten by lions and bears, but such things don't happen any longer. That is our mistake. They may come up at any time again; of course it may not be an arena. It might be a machine gun or a knife or poison gas—we have plenty of means to do away with Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Jones. We prefer other explanations, we rationalize it, but in reality it is the same thing again. That is probably the reason why we have to learn the power of the spirit again, of the spirit that is against us.

Verily, ye know not the spirit's pride! But still less could ye endure the spirit's humility, should it ever want to speak!

What he means by the spirit's humility is pretty cryptic, but it has to do with our mental pride, the pride of our reason of intellect. In comparison with our intellect the spirit has an extraordinary humility, or it forces *us* to an extraordinary humility. Otherwise we cannot hear it. But if you are convinced of the power of the spirit you try to hear it; we even learn to humiliate ourselves so that we may hear it. I once had a patient who always tried in her way to hear the spirit and this problem was presented in a most instructive dream. She had a dream which often repeated itself and she never could remember it (it often happens that one has a dream repeatedly which one cannot quite remember), and then suddenly once she was able to. She was in a very beautiful park, the sun was shining and the birds were singing and she felt that this was it; something was going to happen; she was becoming aware of something. And gradually she knew that she would be able to understand what the birds were singing. It became clearer and clearer, and the moment was approaching when she would be able to understand it. Then suddenly she found herself holding one of those noisy instruments children have at carnival time, and she was making such an awful noise with it that she could not hear what the spirit birds were singing. She preferred to make her own noise, for what the birds say is so humble that we have to assert ourselves. So we never hear what they say.

LECTURE VI

9 June 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Mrs. Crowley: "Last week you said, Nietzsche was born in an age which marked the death of the Spirit, in that *Geist* had become mind, and that in opposition to that Nietzsche expressed the *dynamis* of spirit as if he were one of those megaphones of powers in human society wanting to be released. This is what is unclear to me. If Nietzsche was voicing the new *Geist*, how account for the Superman who seems to epitomize the consciousness of the 19th century with its one-sided power drive? My impression was that Nietzsche expressed the consummation of an epoch, not a beginning. If it had been a beginning, wouldn't he have had the experience of the birth of God rather than his death? I thought that was the clue to his self-destruction, that he couldn't make the bridge to the beginning, but served as a sort of grave digger for the epoch."

This goes of course to the core of the whole problem of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. You see, *Zarathustra* is just everything: it is like a dream in its representation of events. It expresses renewal and self-destruction, the death of a god and the birth of a god, the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new one. When an epoch comes to an end a new epoch begins. The end is a beginning: what has come to an end is reborn in the moment when it ceases to be. That is all demonstrated in *Zarathustra* and it is most bewildering. It is terribly difficult because there are so many aspects. It is exactly like a dream—a whole world of prospects—so you cannot expect cut-and-dried formulas. Whatever one says about *Zarathustra* must be contradicted, as he contradicts himself in every word, because he is an end and a beginning, an *Untergang* and an *Aufgang*. It is so paradoxical that without the help of the whole equipment of our modern psychology of the unconscious, I would not know how to deal with it. We stopped at a place where we were right in the midst of a paradox, where Zarathustra was speaking of the spirit, the *Geist*.

Ye know only the sparks of the spirit: but ye do not see the anvil which it is, and the cruelty of its hammer!

You see he tried, in his very intuitive way, to hint at the nature of the spirit—in a few words to explain or to comment on his own view of it. But he merely throws out some sparks about a thing which would need a thick volume, an enormous dissertation, to make what he is trying to say quite clear. Nietzsche is particularly aphoristic in his thinking as you know. With the exception of his very early *Unzeitgemässige Betrachtungen*, practically everything he has written is aphoristic.¹ And even *Zarathustra*, despite the fact that it is a continuous text, is aphoristic in nature; it is split up into many chapters very loosely hung together, and the chapters themselves are split up by a multitude of intuitive sparks or hints. As I said, as soon as he has an intuition, off he is already to the next one, as if he were afraid to dwell upon one single subject, one single intuition, because it might catch him. And catch him it most certainly would. For instance, he says spirit is the anvil. Well, if you remain with that statement for a while you find yourself between the hammer and the anvil and so you get a most needed explanation. But already in the next sentence, “Verily, ye know not the spirit’s pride,” he jumps away, as if it were plain that the spirit is so inaccessible, so proud, that he cannot get anywhere near it. You see, he approaches for a moment, and then immediately feels that this is too hot—it cannot be touched—and off he goes, to speak about the spirit’s pride, and its humility, an entirely different aspect.

Of course, we must stick to such very awkward statements in order to elucidate them. Jumping over those passages would mean being superficial, reading *Zarathustra* as everybody else reads it: just glancing at it. It is so slippery, you slip off the subject for a moment, hesitate and glance at the next sentence, and already you are spirited away from the thoughts he has intuited. You know, I pointed out last time that Nietzsche was proclaiming here a conception of *Geist* which was entirely different from the intellectual concept of the 19th century, and we are now well on in the 20th century and still our idea of *Geist*, mind, spirit, is very much the same. Not much has changed since, except our collective psychology, which can be seen in the political conditions. To know what *Geist* is, look at the collective mentality of our days; then you

¹ The *Untimely Meditations, or Thoughts Out of Season* (1873-1876). Jung would willingly have added the still earlier *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872), a work he knew well and dealt with extensively in CW 6. Other works combine essays and aphorisms.

get an idea why Nietzsche says that *Geist* is anvil and hammer. Now, these are typical pairs of opposites: the anvil is the Yin part and the hammer is the Yang, the active part, and there must be something in between, but he carefully omits to say what it is. It is man. Between the hammer and the anvil is always a human being.

You see, it is a terrible conflict. Of course, we know there cannot be any spiritual manifestation, which according to Zarathustra's definition is a dynamic and *not* an intellectual manifestation. That was the mistake of the 19th century, or the magic if you like to say so. We thought we were mighty magicians and could fetter the spirit in the form of intellect and make it serviceable to our needs, but Zarathustra rightly points out that this is one of the great mistakes of the age. Such a thing as spirit never could be fettered. It is free by definition—it is a volcanic eruption and nobody has ever fettered a volcano. Now, wherever there is such a mighty phenomenon as a volcanic eruption, there is a mighty possibility of energy; and energy cannot be without pairs of opposites: a potential is needed in order to have energy. So if there is a mighty manifestation of energy you can safely assume the presence of extreme pairs of opposites, a very high mountain and a very deep valley, or a very high degree of heat and a corresponding coldness; otherwise there would not be the potential. That is what he wants to express by the idea that the spirit is an anvil and a hammer. You see, the spirit is not only a dynamic manifestation, but is at the same time a conflict. That is indispensable; without the conflict there would not be that dynamic manifestation of the spirit. The spirit, to repeat, is essentially a tremendous, dynamic manifestation, but what that is, we don't know. Just as we don't know what the state of Europe is essentially; it is a spiritual manifestation but we only see the opposite aspect and complain about the hammer and the anvil. But those are simply the pairs of opposites as in any manifestation of energy.

Now of course, the pairs of opposites in the spirit, the great conflict, is such a hot problem because here the question arises: what are these opposites? You see, Nietzsche says nothing; of course for a fraction of a second he happens to look at it and then instantly he looks away, complaining about the proud spirit that doesn't allow itself to be touched. As a matter of fact, it is too hot, or it is so magnetic, that if you touch it you are instantly caught, and then you are in between the hammer and the anvil. The pairs of opposites in any spiritual manifestation are tremendous contrasts, because you see quite accurately that this point of view is true, and you see just as accurately that the directly opposite point of view is true as well, and then naturally you are in a hole.

Then there is a conflict. For inasmuch as you are caught by a conviction, entirely convicted of something, and are honest, you must say, "Well, if *this* is true, it means something"—you see, such a thing gets a moral rise out of you. Of course there are chess players, people with an absolutely detached intellect, who are never roused by anything. You can make this or that statement, and if it is the truest thing on earth it makes no difference. They don't react to it; they have such a thick hide, or are such a swamp inside, that it simply means nothing. But other people have a certain temperament in that respect so to them a truth really means something. And Nietzsche was such a man. He said that a spark from the fire of justice fallen into the soul of a learned man was sufficient to devour his whole life, which means: if you once understand that this is the truth, you will live by it and for it—your life will be subject to the law of this truth.

That is all very well as long as you know that this is the only truth, and of course we are all educated in that sense; every age has preached to us that there is only one truth and that is a truth forever. It cannot change. There is only that one fact. And necessarily from that conclusion all other values are at fault—lies or illusions. Then as long as we live by a perfectly safe truth—which means a truth by which we can really live—naturally things are quite simple. We know what we have to do; we have a safe regulation of our lives, a moral, practical, philosophical, and religious regulation. But if you should become aware of the fact that the contrary truth is equally true, what then? That is such a catastrophe that nobody dares to think of the possibility. You see, if Nietzsche would stop for a moment, remain with his statement for just a fraction of a second, he would ask, "What is my anvil—that safe, absolutely unshakable basis of truth? And what is my hammer, which is equally a truth but an opposite truth?" Then he would instantly be in his conflict, the conflict of Zarathustra. He would have to say, "Well, inasmuch as Zarathustra is my truth, what is its opposite?" And he must admit that its opposite is equally true. If Zarathustra is the hammer, what is the anvil? Or if Zarathustra is the anvil, what is the hammer? You see, he would be swept into an overpowering conflict; it would tear him to shreds if he should stop to touch it, so it is quite humanly comprehensible that he jumps away. It is too critical, too difficult, nobody would touch such a live wire. He explains his attitude by saying the spirit is proud and didn't allow him to go anywhere near it, but at the same time he says, "Still less could ye endure the spirit's humility, should it ever want to speak," which is just the opposite. Spirit is proud, yet you could not stand its humility—which means that *he*

would not stand its humility. Now, whatever he says betrays an extraordinary pride, so that critics have always complained that Nietzsche suffered from megalomania. But he is quite aware of the fact that the spirit is also extremely humble, so humble that he can hardly stand it. And this is again a new aspect, full of conflict. I continue with Nietzsche's words,

And never yet could ye cast your spirit into a pit of snow: . . .

We must read it: *I* could not afford to cast my spirit into a pit of snow. You see, if he should realize the humility of the spirit, it would mean dipping old Zarathustra into cold water or snow, because he is really too big. And so if Nietzsche should prick the bubble of his inflation, he would collapse till he was the size of his thumb, and that would be spirit too, the spirit being both the greatest and the smallest. The deity itself would necessarily force him to such an extraordinary manœuvre. But Nietzsche himself in his intuitive function is still under the influence of centuries of Christian education, so he is unable to stand the sight of the spirit being the greatest, the proudest, and at the same time the most humble, the greatest and the smallest, the hammer and the anvil. Therefore, he naturally jumps away again, accusing his time that they are unable to dip their spirit in the snow. Yes, then he is very careful not to let the heat rise to such an extent that it would suddenly by *enantiodromia* change into ice. But that is what has happened to him:

ye are not hot enough for that! Thus are ye unaware, also, of the delight of its coldness.

It should be: thus *I* am unaware—that it might be very agreeable to cool down such excessive heat. The spirit is only bearable if it can be checked by its own opposite. You see, if the deity, being the greatest thing, cannot be at the same time the smallest thing, it is utterly unbearable. If the greatest heat cannot be followed by the greatest cold, then there is no energy, nothing happens. So spirit can only be alive inasmuch as it can be very hot and very cold, very proud and very humble. Now of course, the spirit is never proud and the spirit is never humble: those are human attributes. Inasmuch as we are inflated we are proud; inasmuch as we are deflated we are humble. The spirit fills us immediately with an inflation, which means an *Einblasung*, a breathing into. A balloon is an inflation, and since spirit is breath or wind, it has that effect. But an inflation only has a moral or philosophical value if it can be pricked, if you can deflate; you must be able to submit to deflation in order to see what inflated you before. In that which is com-

ing out of you, you can see what has gone into you. Therefore it would be necessary that Nietzsche should submit to his own paradox. But being intuitive he touches it and leaves it: it is too dangerous to him. He continues in the same way his moral exhortation,

In all respects, however, ye make too familiar with the spirit; . . .

It is really true that we have been too familiar with the spirit, making it into an intellect that was to be used like a servant. But all that familiarization of the spirit doesn't touch its real nature; we have gained something by acquiring that most useful and important human instrument, the intellect, but it has nothing to do with spirit. Of course it is only from wrestling with the spirit that we have produced the intellect at all, but the production of intelligence through the contact with the spirit has an inflating effect, for when the spirit subsided we thought we had overcome it. But it simply disappeared, because the spirit comes and goes. For instance, you resist the wind, and after a while it subsides, and then you might say you had overcome it. But the wind has simply subsided. You have learned to resist it, but you make the wrong conclusion in assuming that your faculty of resistance has done anything to the wind. No, the wind has done something to you; you have learned to stand up to it. The wind will blow again, and again your resistance will be tested, and you might be thrown down if the wind chose to become stronger than your resistance. So when we became familiar with what we thought to be spirit by calling it intellect, we made that mistake—we came to the conclusion that we really were the fellows who could deal with the spirit, that we had mastered and possessed it in the form of intellect.

and out of wisdom have ye often made an almshouse and a hospital for bad poets.

Namely, a collection of useful sentences and principles. If anywhere a wind blows, we take a collection of useful sentences and apply one. Or we may use proverbial wisdom to get out of awkward situations, but it is not helpful to our neighbor. "A hospital for bad poets"—very good! I do not need to elucidate that.

Ye are not eagles: [He should say, *I am not an eagle.*] thus have ye never experienced the happiness of the alarm of the spirit.

This translation is hopeless. To be alarmed means to be a bit upset or excited, while the German *Schrecken* means really "terror." The "alarm of the spirit" is poor and inadequate. The fact that this translator has

chosen the word *alarm* shows how little he can imagine the nature of the spirit.² When a hurricane is blowing against you, particularly if you are in a boat on the open sea, you feel absolute terror, and the spirit is such an elemental phenomenon. I remember a case, a very educated man who always had much to say about the spirit, but he didn't see that one could be in any way alarmed or terrified by it—the spirit to him is something quite nice and wonderful. But that same man would be utterly shaken, get into a complete panic, if he were exposed to a more or less disreputable situation. If I should say, "Public opinion is also the spirit, and your terror of it is the terror of the spirit," he would not understand of course—it would be altogether too strange to him. Yet the fact is that the only god he was afraid of is public opinion. In other words, Mrs. Grundy is his god. You see, that is the natural truth: just where we are overcome, where we give out, that is the deity.

You know, whenever something overcomes you, when you are under an overwhelming impression, or when you are merely astonished or upset, you say, "Oh God!"—exactly as the primitives when they hear the gramophone for the first time say, "*Mulungu!*" (which means *mana*), and as we say, "*Gott!*" But in German, one uses that word more freely than in English. You have all sorts of circuitous paraphrases for the name of God on account of your better education, but in the German language one is more or less bound to the truth, not from any kind of sincerity or modesty but because one cannot help it—it just blurts out. So when you are overcome by excitement and wrath, you curse, and there is hardly any curse in which there is not a blasphemy. In anything that has an overwhelming effect, in any kind of affect, you experience the deity. If you are overcome by Mrs. Grundy you know where your goddess is, and if you are overcome by drink, well, God is in the alcohol of your drinks. That is a bitter truth. People do not like such a statement, but it is really the truth. So the spirit, being a dynamic manifestation, is a terror, an insurmountable affect. Now Nietzsche continues,

And he who is not a bird should not camp above abysses.

But a bird never *camps*, particularly not over an abyss. Perfect nonsense! The idea is that only a bird which is aloof and can fly away, is able to live at all above such abysses. It means the untouchable spirit. It needs an eagle with an extraordinary power of flight to stand the

² Holingdale* renders this: "You are no eagles: so neither do you know the spirit's joy in terror."

neighborhood of the spirit. And it is an aloofness—the aloofness of the intuitive type that sees the thing yet will not touch it.

Ye seem to me lukewarm ones: but coldly floweth all deep knowledge. Ice-cold are the innermost wells of the spirit: a refreshment to hot hands and handlers.

Now again an awful translation: “handlers” is wrong.

Mrs. Baumann: In my translation it is “and to them that labour.”

Prof. Jung: That also is not good. The German *Handelnden* is really not translatable. It means those that act, that are doing. The hands are the instrument of doing, so when you dream of the hands it means the doing or executing part of yourself, the way you touch things, the way you handle certain situations—all that can be expressed by the hands. If a finger is cut off, it means a restriction in your way of handling things, or a sacrifice to the peculiar spirit of things, or that you touch them with a partially sacrificed hand, that is, reverently, remembering the gods that are dwelling in them. Therefore you cannot touch a thing immediately with your bare hand and with your full power or grip, but will wear gloves; having to handle people with gloves means also a sort of restriction, or a certain care, a measure of protection. You see, all that refers to acting or to actually doing.³

Here we encounter again Nietzsche’s very peculiar love for the metaphor of ice and snow and cold—all that contrasts with the heat. He understands the spirit chiefly as hot, like a lava flow or a fiery explosion, and the contrast would be extremely cold. That is the same as pride and humility, the pair of opposites in the spirit. The spirit as a manifestation of energy is very hot on the one side and very cold on the other. If one has an inflation, then one is only balanced if the bubble can also be pricked; if you are increased in size by inflation, you must also have the experience of decreasing to an incredibly small size. You can, of course, infect other people by inflation, can cause a sort of mental contagion; people are often inflated and they have an equally inflating influence on other people. Also the contrary is true: when a person is too small for his size he can have a deflating effect upon others. It doesn’t matter whether you are too big or too small, whether you are beyond your size or so far within your own confines that you don’t even touch your frontiers—either can have such an effect. So where there is inflation there is also the contrary; where there is the heat of the spirit there is also the coldness. And since it is not a human

³ Hollingdale* also has “handlers,” but Kaufmann* has “men of action.”

phenomenon—it is just not: it is a nature phenomenon—it has not human proportions. It is too big and too small, too hot and too cold, and whoever gets into that pair of opposites is between the hammer and the anvil.

Respectable do ye there stand, and stiff, and with straight backs,
ye famous wise ones!—no strong wind or will impelleth you.

These wise ones are the people who have resisted the hurricane to such an extent that even the hurricane gave up, and then they think that they have mastered the hurricane.

Have ye ne'er seen a sail crossing the sea, rounded and inflated,
and trembling with the violence of the wind?

Here he himself uses the term *inflation*. But that ship with the inflated sails thinks that she has a very big belly—thinks that *she* is sailing, nobody else, and she doesn't think of the wind that is pushing her. Inflated people never reckon with the fact that that increase of size is really due to an inflating spirit, and of course nobody else would think that they had any particular spirit. Yet they have, otherwise they could not be inflated. Naturally, this conception of the spirit is utterly inapplicable to the Christian idea of the spirit. But if you have a conception of the spirit such as Zarathustra hints at, you can understand the true nature of inflation; there is something visibly negative in it and something very positive.

Like the sail trembling with the violence of the spirit, doth my
wisdom cross the sea—my wild wisdom!

This wild wisdom is the wisdom of nature, of the unconscious that *is* the wind, and anybody driven by the unconscious is in a state of savage natural wisdom which is not human.

But ye servants of the people, ye famous wise ones—how *could*
ye go with me!

Inasmuch as he is the wind, they naturally resist him, so there is no reconciliation between the two. But sometimes the wind is so strong that those famous wise ones are blown away like dry leaves.

Now in this chapter, Nietzsche is really reaching the point where he becomes confronted with the true nature of the spirit; and since this was for his time an entirely new discovery, he is quite justified in feeling that it is an important discovery. Yet we have seen the signs of his hesitation, his shyness in touching that thing; as usual, he just gives a

hint and disappears again. That is the way in which the intuitive generally deals, not only with his problems but also with his life; he creates a situation and as soon as it is more or less established, then off he goes because it threatens to become a prison to him, so his life consists chiefly in movement, in discovering new possibilities. And that goes down into every detail, so we are not at all astonished to find Nietzsche in exactly the same condition when it comes to his confrontation with the true nature of the spirit.

You see, whenever an intuitive escapes a self-created situation, he is only apparently rid of it. That unfinished thing clings to him and will in time lame him; he carries it with him and it has a paralysing effect. For instance, he oversteps the reality of his body, time and again, and the body takes its revenge after a while: it gets out of order and makes him sick. Many intuitives are particularly troubled with all sorts of illnesses which arise chiefly from neglect. Or he may be troubled by his banal situation; always at cross purposes with his surroundings, he loses opportunities and is never settled. He never gets rooted, in spite of the fact that he has a marvelous ability to worm himself into new situations, to make friends and acquaintances and to be well spoken of for a while. Then it becomes a prison to him and he escapes—thank heaven that chance has come! And he forgets that he carries the old situation with him, but it is no longer outside of him, it is inside; and it will go on living as an unfinished thing in himself. For whatever we do and whatever we create outside, whatever we make visible in this world, is always ourselves, our own work, and when we do not finish it, we don't finish ourselves. So he carries that burden all the time with him; every unfinished situation which he has built up and left is in himself. He is an unfulfilled promise. And what he encounters in life is also himself, and that is true for everybody, not only the so-called intuitive. Whatever fate or whatever curse we meet, whatever people we come into contact with, they all represent ourselves—whatever comes to us is our own fate and so it is ourselves. If we give it up, if we betray it, we have betrayed ourselves, and whatever we split off which belongs to us, will follow and eventually overtake us. Therefore, if Nietzsche tries here to avoid the contact of the spirit, we can be sure that the spirit will catch hold of him: he will get into that out of which he thinks he has escaped. You see, this is the introduction to the next chapter. *Zarathustra* is the confession of one who has been overtaken by the spirit.

Nietzsche himself handled all that people then called spirit and still call spirit. In a most brilliant way, he wrote in the style of the best aphorists. He was brilliant in his formulation and expression, and the

mind or the intellect was in his hands like a sword handled by a master. But just that turned against him. Because he handled it so brilliantly, he was convinced that it was his own mind and overlooked the fact entirely that the wind was pushing his vessel. The motor power of his craft was not himself and his ability, but was the spirit, at first invisible or only visible as if it were his own brilliant mind. Then more and more it became clear to him that it was not himself. He even felt when he wrote *Zarathustra* that *Zarathustra* was not himself, and therefore coined that famous formula, *Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei*. In that formula he confessed his conviction that he and the spirit were two. In the part of *Zarathustra* which we have hitherto dealt with, he was practically identical with that spirit, but we may expect that after a while this must come to a head and then he will be confronted with that power which moves him. Here he comes very close to it; he has here the intuition of the true nature of the spirit. People with a considerable inflation are utterly unable to realize their identity with the driving force. It always needs an exaggeration of the inflation in order to explode it, and so it happened to Nietzsche.

Now in the next chapter called "The Night-Song" he realizes the nature of the spirit profoundly; he is still identical with it, but to such an extent that he begins to become aware of the inhuman or superhuman nature of the spirit, and he feels his own reaction against it. In other words, he becomes aware of the hammer and the anvil. This is a great experience: it is the apex of a long development and at the same time an end and a beginning. It is a catastrophe and it is what antiquity would have understood as a *rencontre* with the deity. Whenever that happens in *Zarathustra* his language becomes, one could say, truly divine; it has been sometimes grotesque, often brilliant and intellectual, but then it loses that quality and takes on the quality of music. That is the case here. This is the first place in *Zarathustra* where his language becomes truly musical, where it takes on a descriptive quality from the unconscious which the intellect can never produce; no matter how brilliant the mind, no matter how cunning or fitting its formulations, this kind of language is never reached. It is of course exceedingly poetic but I should say *poetic* was almost too feeble a word, because it is of such a musical quality that it expressed something of the nature of the unconscious which is untranslatable. Now, in the English or French translations you simply cannot get this, as, for instance, you cannot translate the second part of *Faust*. There is no language on God's earth which could render the second part of *Faust*—the most important part. Therefore I should like to read you the first part in German.

Mr. Baumann: May I ask a question? You said Nietzsche did realize the nature of the spirit—you used the word *realize*—and I wonder whether he was really conscious of it or not.

Prof. Jung: No, if I said *realize*, it would be too much. He approaches a realization. He is confronted here with the nature of the spirit. That is as far as he could go and that confrontation has released in him extraordinary reactions. You see, if there were no such passages in *Zarathustra* as “The Night-Song”—and others later on, of course—it would be hardly worthwhile to plow through it for the sake of the psychological enlightenment we get from his formulations, not worthwhile to take all that trouble. When I think of *Zarathustra*, it is of such chapters as “The Night-Song” because that is the substance and the immortal merit of the book.

Mrs. Baumann: Do you think that was the beginning of his tragic end, that he then came in touch with it?

Prof. Jung: Oh, the whole of *Zarathustra* is the catastrophe, you know: every chapter has something in it that is an aspect of the catastrophe.⁴ Well now:

Nacht ist es: nun reden lauter alle springenden Brunnen. Und auch meine Seele ist ein springender Brunnen.

Nacht ist es: nun erst erwachen alle Lieder der Liebenden. Und auch meine Seele ist das Lied eines Liebenden.

Ein Ungestilltes, Unstillbares ist in mir; das will laut werden. Eine Begierde nach Liebe ist in mir, die redet selber die Sprache der Liebe.

Licht bin ich: ach, dass ich Nacht wäre! Aber dies ist meine Einsamkeit, dass ich von Licht umgürtet bin.

Ach, dass ich dunkel wäre und nächtig! Wie wollte ich an den Brüsten des Lichts saugen!

Und euch selber wollte ich noch segnen, ihr kleinen Funkelsterne und Leuchtwürmer droben!—und selig sein ob eurer Licht-Geschenke.

Aber ich lebe in meinem eignen Lichte, ich trinke die Flammen in mich zurück, die aus mir brechen.

Ich kenne das Glück des Nehmenden nicht; und oft träumte mir davon, dass Stehlen noch seliger sein müsse als Nehmen.

That is the first part, and that is the theme of the whole chapter, but from the last sentence I read, onwards, the musical style begins to dis-

⁴ Nietzsche called this “the loveliest of all songs.”

appear and the aphoristic character begins again, until the last part where he comes by *enantiodromia* to the opposite; from the light—that is the fire, the flames—he realizes the ice, and then that musical quality comes back. So I will read you that last part also:

Oh, ihr erst seid es, ihr Dunklen, ihr Nächtigen, die ihr Wärme schafft aus Leuchtendem! Oh, ihr erst trinkt euch Milch und Lab-sal aus des Lichtes Eutern!

Ach, Eis ist um mich, meine Hand verbrennt sich an Eisigem!
Ach, Durst ist in mir, der schmachtet nach eurem Durste!

Nacht ist es: ech, dass ich Licht sein muss! Und Durst nach Nachtigem! Und Einsamkeit!

Nacht ist es: nun bricht wie ein Born aus mir mein Verlangen—nach Rede verlangt mich.

Nacht ist es: nun reden lauter alle springenden Brunnen. Und auch meine Seele ist ein springender Brunnen.

Nacht ist es: nun erwachen alle Lieder der Liebenden. Und auch meine Seele ist das Lied eines Liebenden.—

Also sprach Zarathustra.

Now, it is of course almost impossible to say anything about the intellectual contents of such music. These two passages convey their own meaning. They describe the peculiar emotion of a man who experiences the spirit, its superhuman light and its cosmic coldness. You know, experiencing the spirit means at the same time its denial because it is the positive and the negative at the same time. One could say it was the light and its own overcoming, the light and the darkness in the same moment, the heat and the cold. It is the great paradox, that thing which we cannot express; we have no means whatever to express the paradox of the deity. You see, this is the overcoming effect: *he* is no longer speaking, it is the experience itself that speaks out of him; that which he experiences expresses itself, and that is beautiful. It is indisputable, inexplicable—one has only to submit to it. You can feel the nature of the experience when you allow yourself to dwell upon your own impression from such a passage; then you get a certain idea of the spirit or the deity that expressed itself in that phenomenon. And this experience teaches Nietzsche something: namely, after all the praise of the bestowing one which he has expressed in the former chapters, the praise of the one who spends, he suddenly realizes that he doesn't know the happiness of the one who receives. As soon as this realization comes to him the style changes, and at once that sort of brilliancy comes in which is characteristic of his personal gifts. So when he says

"And oft have I dreamt that stealing must be more blessed than receiving," this is again only brilliant. And that is the point where, to my feeling, the whole rhythm and poetry of the passage before comes to an end. This is also the point where he touches upon his own ego, and there we can begin our critical examination of his text.

It is my poverty that my hand never ceaseth bestowing; it is mine envy that I see waiting eyes and the brightened nights of longing.

This shows to what extent he realizes that he has been driven by something and that he himself is poor. He is not the maker of the wind that drives his vessel, but is practically left alone by that power, so he can say:

Oh, the misery of all bestowers! Oh, the darkening of the sun!
Oh, the craving to crave! Oh, the violent hunger in satiety!

They take from me: but do I yet touch their soul? there is a gap 'twixt giving and receiving; and the smallest gap hath finally to be bridged over.

A hunger ariseth out of my beauty: I should like to injure those I illuminate; I should like to rob those I have gifted:—thus do I hunger for wickedness.

This is a very important statement and again a profound psychological law: namely, those people who give too much become hungry, but the hungrier they get the more they give, and the more they give, the more their giving becomes a taking. Not a real receiving because nobody gives them anything; by their giving they take, they begin to steal, to suck. They become a nuisance through their gifts because they are taking. You see, anybody who knows his own poverty should not go on giving because you cannot give more than you possess; if you give more, you take. You can receive gifts from people who are rich but not from those who are poor, for when poor people give, they take; it is a poisonous gift because they give in order to make you give. *Do ut des*, "I give that thou mayest give." Now if that giving goes on, the inner emptiness increases to such an extent that Nietzsche here begins to speak of robbing. There is such a madness, such a hunger, in him that he would even kill somebody in order to get his food. That is the result of this wonderful virtue of giving. You remember there was a mighty chapter about the virtue of giving; he made a tremendous noise about it, of course exaggerated because he already felt the hunger.

Now this realization comes to him on account of the way in which he

wrote *Zarathustra*; he felt as if he were pouring out of a full vessel. *Zarathustra* flowed out of him till he became aware finally of the inner emptiness caused by it. First, he was pouring it out with the feeling that he should fill the whole world, and then no echo came back, apparently nothing has happened. He had poured out his very blood and nothing came back, and naturally he developed a tremendous hunger, a desire to be filled up again. Then he realized that his desire was just as low as his gifts were high. He had been on a very high level before and suddenly he realized that he was on a very low level. As a matter of fact, after all his giving he was a thief, a beggar, perhaps even a bandit who robs people, because he felt as if he himself had been robbed. But he had robbed himself. Now, that happens regularly with people who are, on principle, so-called altruists: they give and give and don't understand the art of receiving. You can only give legitimately inasmuch as you receive. If you don't receive, you can no longer give. If you give too much you take from your own substance, and then something in you goes down, descends to a lower level, so that finally, behind the virtue of the giving, one appears as an animal of prey. That is what he realizes here.

You see, this is an example of the humility of the spirit: inasmuch as the spirit is shining and hot like the sun, it is positive, but inasmuch as it is cold, it is negative. And inasmuch as a man is filled with the warmth of the spirit he will give, and inasmuch as he is filled with the coldness of the spirit, he will take, but not in a human way. It will be less than human. So to realize the spirit you must be able to think the one thing and the other: namely, that your thought is hot and cold and that *you* are hot and cold, that you are on the one side of god, on the other side an animal of prey. Now if the spirit cannot think that of itself—or rather, the one filled with that spirit, because the spirit is a phenomenon that doesn't think—then he has not realized the spirit. That is the pride and humility of the spirit. Usually inflated people never hesitate to realize the deity in their inflation, but they fail to realize the other side, that they are lowdown animals of prey where every value is just the reverse. So an inflation can look like grace from heaven, yet it is always the famous gift of the Danaides. It is negative, something sub-human at the same time, because it is a phenomenon which is not of human origin.⁵ You see, the realization we spoke of, which did not take place when he was confronted with his own intuition, is now coming to him in the form of an immediate experience.

⁵ Danaus, required by the besiegers of Argos to marry off his fifty daughters, gave each a pin with which to kill her husband on the wedding night.

The irrational type doesn't see or realize by rational feeling or thinking—it always *happens* to him. If he can confess it, like Nietzsche, it is then of course a demonstration which has the value of a vital confession; one sees how it happens, one can experience it with him. If he had had, or had tried to have, a realization through his rational functions, he probably would have written a philosophical essay which we most certainly would not have dealt with in our seminar because there would hardly have been any psychology in it. It might have been interesting to historians of philosophy, but it would not have taken on the aspect of a living experience. That is the advantage of it, but the great disadvantage is that it can destroy him, and he would never know it because it just happened to him. He cannot see that the whole thing is a divine argument represented by the puppet man, that he is entirely instrumental, the instrument of a divine thought in the general unconscious. So the one who has a rational gift can formulate the divine thought that is the unconscious but he acquires relatively little merit. While an irrational type involuntarily represents it and by playing the divine role, he is eventually destroyed by it—but he leaves a living account. Nietzsche always reminds me of those criminals or prisoners of war who were chosen to represent the gods, in Mexico and also in Babylonia. They were allowed every freedom, until the sun went down, and then they were sacrificed to the gods. In Babylonia they had the chance to escape if they could get out of town before sunset, but in Mexico there was no escape—they were simply sacrificed, but they were worshipped as the gods, they themselves being very poor devils. That is Nietzsche all over, being entirely instrumental, a figure on the chess board, giving us a living account through his confession of his experiences. It is an unrealized and undigested experience, but of course with all the advantages and all the virtues of an immediate and living experience.

Withdrawing my hand when another hand already stretcheth out to it; hesitating like the cascade, which hesitateth even in its leap:—thus do I hunger for wickedness!

You see, here he expressed what I anticipated: namely, his hesitation, his shyness, his reluctance to establish an immediate contact with his experience, with human beings or with situations. He doesn't want to make roots and he is forced to pour himself out, which causes the fatal hunger.

Such revenge doth mine abundance think of: such mischief welleth out of my lonesomeness.

My happiness in bestowing died in bestowing; my virtue became weary of itself by its abundance!

He who ever bestoweth is in danger of losing his shame; to him who ever dispenseth, the hand and heart becomes callous by very dispensing.

Mine eye no longer overfloweth for the shame of suppliants; my hand hath become too hard for the trembling of filled hands.

Whence have gone the tears of mine eye, and the down of my heart? Oh, the lonesomeness of all bestowers! Oh, the silence of all shining ones!

Many suns circle in desert space: to all that is dark do they speak with their light—but to me they are silent.

Oh, this is the hostility of light to the shining one: unpityingly doth it pursue its course.

Unfair to the shining one in its innermost heart, cold to the suns:—thus travelleth every sun.

Here he identifies with the sun, the hottest thing we know of; he is entirely identical with Yang.

Like a storm do the suns pursue their courses: that is their travelling.

As if driven by the wind, he thought, but they themselves are the source of their movement; the sun is not driven by a storm. *It is the storm, it is the movement.*

Their inexorable will do they follow: that is their coldness.

Here we see the fact that the sun or the suns, the fixed stars, etc., are following a mechanical principle which is utterly inhuman; therefore they are cold, despite all heat. And that is the image or the allegory of the hunger of the spirit.

Oh, ye only is it, ye dark, nightly ones, that extract warmth from the shining ones! Oh, ye only drink milk and refreshment from the light's udders!

Ah, there is ice around me; my hand burneth with the iciness!

Now he is transforming into the cold aspect of the spirit which is the other side of its inhumanity. I think we will stop here; I have already read you the last part in German. Such things must always be read in the original, just as certain passages of the Mass should not be translated.

LECTURE VII

16 June 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Welsh: "Speaking of Nietzsche's intuitive way, you said, 'When an intuitive escapes from a situation because it threatens to become a prison, he only does so apparently, for the unfinished thing follows him and clings to him and may lame him; he has overstepped the body and it will take its revenge.' Will you say something about the reverse situation of the sensation type. When he gets stuck in a situation and is unwilling or unable to leave it, has something gone ahead in spite of him? Does this pull and worry at him and can this tension also cause the body to suffer?"

This is an interesting question. Of course it is not exactly on the line of *Zarathustra*, but since it is just the opposite of Nietzsche's problem it is perhaps worthwhile to say something about it. The sensation type always finds or creates a situation in which he believes: that is his reality, the thing that *is*; but the thing that is only possible is definitely unreal to him, because the function which is concerned with possibilities, intuition, is in his case the inferior function. And like every other type, the sensation type represses the inferior function because it is the opposite of the superior function and is contaminated not only with the personal unconscious but also with the collective unconscious. It is weighed down by the enormous weight of the whole unconscious world. Therefore, the sensation type will not use intuition and then it works against him, just as the intuitive type is counteracted by his inferior function, sensation.

Now the question is, what is the inferior intuition doing in such a case? Well, it creates possibilities but possibilities unknown to the consciousness of the sensation type, and it does pull and worry because this unconscious intuition creates projections. You know, when the differentiated intuitive function creates a reality from a mere possibility, it is as if it were giving substance to what is nothing but a possibility in itself. So the intuitive can create fabulous schemes and make them

more or less real: he gives reality to his possibilities. Now in the case of the sensation type, where the intuitive function is inferior, the intuition does the same thing, only of course the possibilities are of a more symbolic kind, more primitive. Although it is in an inferior condition, his intuition nevertheless creates a possibility, makes it real, and projects it. You see, a seemingly real possibility cannot be only in yourself; it is always outside too. It does exist somewhere, so the inferior intuition creates a situation as if in space, a phantasy world or existence which is expensive because it drains the forces of consciousness of their energy. The sensation type will therefore suffer a certain loss of energy which escapes, or is drained off, into a sort of mythical or fabulous creation, a wonderland where the things happen which their intuition creates; and that is, as a projection, semi-substantial.

I should make it clear here that we use our libido for such a projection, and libido is energy, and energy is substantial, it has mass. That fact explains the possibility of spook phenomena, materialization and such things, which really do occur. It is an awkward fact, so people prefer to say they do not, since they would then be forced to explain them, but strangely enough, they do exist. So to a certain extent every projection is a substantial entity, and it drains the body, takes substance from the body. Therefore it is quite possible that the body in a sensation type may suffer on account of such unconscious intuitive creations. It is just as if somebody having a definite position, being a cashier, say, were unconsciously creating another business into which the money he earns is secretly flowing away; it disappears in a sort of miraculous way, and then the body begins to suffer from peculiar ailments, ghostly diseases which one often cannot explain properly. It can take all sorts of forms: if there are certain inferiorities or weaknesses in the body already, an inferior stomach or any other organ that is not quite up to the mark, the symptoms will surely begin there. If the digestion is a bit weak, it will become weaker; or if there is a little deafness, that will increase. Perhaps a rheumatic tendency might become more marked, for instance. In the case of the intuitive type, it is chiefly the intestines that suffer, and intuitives seem particularly apt to have ulcers of the stomach, while with the sensation type it seems to be more the bones or the muscle substance that is affected. And we know, in cases of materialization, that it is chiefly the large muscles which lose substance, apparently drained off in order to produce semi-material phenomena. That is my experience, but of course one should make quite specific studies about these things and I have had too much to do in my life to be an intern and work in a hospital, examining the differ-

ent forms of rheumatism exclusively: that is a life work in itself. Now the next chapter is called, "The Dance-Song." How does Nietzsche arrive at this new topic after "The Night-Song"?

Mrs. Fierz: Is it not as if it had become night and that now a sort of vision or phantasy comes up from an unconscious side?

Prof. Jung: And what character would that unconscious side have in his case?

Mrs. Fierz: It would be the female side.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Zarathustra and Nietzsche being practically identical are chiefly Yang, the positive masculine principle, and we can be absolutely certain that after a relatively short time the Yang will seek the Yin, because the two opposites must operate together and the one presupposes the other. He is bound to arrive at the situation where Yang reaches its climax, and then the desire for the Yin will become obvious. In "The Night-Song" we have seen how he is thirsting and longing for the Yin principle, which is nocturnal and everything feminine, just the contrary of the fiery, hot, and shining Yang. So it is quite natural that we arrive now at "The Dance-Song":

One evening went Zarathustra and his disciples through the forest; and when he sought for a well, lo, he lighted upon a green meadow peacefully surrounded with trees and bushes, where maidens were dancing together.

You see the fire, the Yang, seeks its own opposite, the well that quenches the thirst. And there he finds a gathering of maidens.

As soon as the maidens recognized Zarathustra, they ceased dancing; . . .

So they were dancing before he came. Apparently in a nowhere, in an eternity, these maidens were dancing in that lovely spot, in that meadow where there is presumably a well. Now what is this? Have we ever encountered such a symbol?

Mrs. Jung: I think the well is a symbol of life, and this group of dancing girls are elves.

Dr. James: In Masfield's poem, "South and East," maidens were dancing and a man comes along.¹

¹ John Masfield (1874-1967), English poet. In his ballad a young man spies on three maidens who come to a secluded spot, remove their wings, and dance. He falls in love with one of them and seeks her out in her home, which is south of the earth and east of the sun, and after a wearisome journey he succeeds in his quest and is presented with his own wings.

Prof. Jung: I don't know that poem. Well, as you know, the elves form such companies, and these maidens seem to be a sort of eternally existing society; they occur everywhere and they usually dance, like the houris in paradise or the elves in the midst of the woods in the moonshine. In my German seminar on children's dreams, I have just been analysing a dream of a little boy between three and four years old, who repeatedly dreamt that the white maidens came down every night in an airship and invited him to come with them up to heaven. That motif is like one you certainly know which occurs in a famous poem of Goethe.

Mrs. Fierz: *Der Erlkönig*.

Prof. Jung: Yes. *Du liebes Kind, komm, geh mit mir!*² And some of you English people must have seen that most suggestive play by Barrie, *Mary Rose*, about the "Island that wants to be visited," where the child hears the voices of the elves who want to play with him, the Green Folk, presumably those nice maidens who seem to be always ready in the unconscious to entice lonely wanderers or children.³ You might have encountered them also in a recent publication of mine, "Traumsymbole des Individuationsprozesses," where those nymphs are sort of dancing girls. And in the *Songe de Poliphile*, the nymphs are the first thing he meets after the ruined city. (There is a picture of them in the book.)⁴ Now here we have the same symbolism. Who are these maidens and what do they mean psychologically?

Mrs. Fierz: It is a plurality of anima figures.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. You see, the anima by definition is always one that is two, but those two are identical as you will see in this chapter, though of most contradictory qualities, the yea and nay at the same time. But it is a definite person, so definite that every man who is capable of introspection can give a definite picture of his anima. I have often tested men; it needs of course an introduction to the concept and a certain amount of intelligence and introspection, but as soon as they have grasped the idea, the picture is right before their eyes. Now in this case it is not one figure but several so it must be a very particular condition of the anima. What accounts for such a multiplicity of animae? Under what condition would she be so collective?

² In Goethe's poem (and Schubert's song), the Erlkönig summons those whose time has arrived with "Come, dear child, go with me."

³ James Barrie (1860-1937) was an immensely popular Scots playwright and novelist. In one of his lesser known plays, *Mary Rose* (1924), the title character, like Peter Pan, exists off and on in a world where there is no growing old and dying.

⁴ For *Le Songe de Poliphile*, see above, 12 Dec. 1934, n. 6.

Mrs. Crowley: It would be a very primitive condition, inferior.

Miss Welsh: Very unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is it. A multiplicity of anima figures is only to be met with in cases where the individual is utterly unconscious of his anima. In a man who is completely identical with the anima, you might find that plurality, but the moment he becomes conscious of that figure, she assumes a personality and is definitely one. This is in contradistinction to the animus in women, who as soon as she becomes conscious of him is definitely several. If there is a particular personality it is just that one, and there are always several others. The animus is in itself a plurality, while the anima is in itself a unit, one definite person though contradictory in aspect. So from such a symbol you can conclude that Nietzsche/Zarathustra is profoundly unconscious of the fact of the anima. Yet we cannot assume, inasmuch as Zarathustra is the typical wise old man, that he would be unconscious of the nature of the anima—that is excluded since he is always associated with the anima. The myth of Simon Magus and Helena is a typical example, and [the tale of] Faust and Gretchen is another, but not so good because she is too unconscious and he is not wise enough.⁵

Mrs. Crowley: On the other hand Krishna contained all this. Would he be so unconscious?

Prof. Jung: Utterly unconscious because he is the hero god and not the wise old man. That is the *Puer Aeternus* psychology of the heroic age where women were an indefinite multitude consisting of mothers, sisters, daughters, and prostitutes. There was no distinct woman, only a type. Therefore those Wagnerian heroes all had to do with indefinite Walkyries; there is only one definite anima, Brünnhilde, but she is chosen by her father, the wise old man. In the myth of Krishna, they are milkmaids or shepherdesses, you know,. He comes to a society of nice young girls, perfectly indistinct, all alike of course, and he chooses one who becomes his favorite, but he also married seven or eight others. Rhada is chiefly chosen to join him in the mandala dance, the *nritya*, that circular dance which forms a mandala; Krishna and Rhada are in the center, of course representing the god and his shakti.⁶ Now this is

⁵ For Simon Magus and Helena, see above, 5 June 1935, n. 4.

⁶ Jung says elsewhere that some of his women patients have preferred dancing a mandala to drawing one. "In India there is a special name for this: mandala nritya, the mandala dance. The dance figures express the same meanings as the drawings" (CW 13, par. 32). For a reproduction of a South Indian bronze, "Lord of the Dance," see Zimmer Myths, Plate 38.

a very similar situation. Zarathustra is the hero god coming to the dancing girls.

Zarathustra, however, approached them with friendly mien and spake these words:

Cease not your dancing, ye lovely maidens! No game-spoiler hath come to you with evil eye, no enemy of the maidens.

God's advocate am I with the devil: he, however, is the spirit of gravity. How could I, ye light-footed ones, be hostile to divine dances? Or to maidens' feet with fine ankles?

Here the devil enters the game, and how does he come in?

Miss Hannah: It is the spirit of gravity, and that is always the piece Nietzsche doesn't accept, the ugliest man.

Prof. Jung: And what is the spirit of gravity doing?

Miss Hannah: Pulling him down.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he obviously approaches here the inferior function. He comes to his own opposite. He is threatened with sinking down into the depth of the Yin, but he makes light of it. He praises the light-footed ones who are not pulled down by the spirit of gravity, who show him how to dance above the abyss—another Nietzschean term. But I think Zarathustra had a particular fantasy about the maidens' feet with fine ankles. Do you know where a similar passage occurs?

Mrs. Sigg: At the end of *Zarathustra*, in "Daughters of the Desert," Dudu and Suleika.⁷

Prof. Jung: Yes, there is that famous passage:

To a dance-girl like, who, as it seemeth to me,
Too long, and dangerously persistent,
Always, always just on *single* leg hath stood?
—Then forgot she thereby, as it seemeth to me,
The *other* leg?
For vainly I, at least,
Did search for the amissing
Fellow-jewel
—Namely, the other leg—
In the sanctified precincts,
Nigh her very dearest, very tenderest,
Flapping and fluttering and flickering skirting.
Yea, if ye should, ye beauteous friendly ones,

⁷ "Among the Daughters of the Desert," Part IV, ch. 76. The seminar stops short of this final part.

Quite take my word:
She hath, alas! *lost* it!
Hu! Hu! Hu! Hu! Hu!
It is away!
For ever away!
The other leg!
Oh, pity for that loveliest other leg!

You see, that is already the transition to his insanity: he literally got into that form of Yin, and there he became definitely insane. He produced a lot of erotic literature at which his highly respectable sister became so scandalized that she burned it up.

To be sure, I am a forest, and a night of dark trees: but he who is not afraid of my darkness will find banks full of roses under my cypresses.

That is plain.

And even the little God may he find, who is dearest to maidens:

...

Who is this?

Mrs. Crowley: Cupid.

Prof. Jung: Yes.

beside the well lieth he quietly, with closed eyes.

What about that?

Mrs. Fierz: It is like a fantasy of a love garden.

Prof. Jung: And where have you seen such fantasies? What style does it suggest?

Mrs. Sigg: It is rococo.

Prof. Jung: Yes, haven't you seen faded fantasies of cupids and shepherdesses in an old drawing room? In England you still find such lovely pictures, Cupid sleeping and nice shepherdesses round him tickling him—or he tickling them, the old story. But the interesting thing is that Nietzsche has such a lovely picture in mind. Where did he get that? When was Nietzsche born?

Mrs. Sigg: In 1844.

Prof. Jung: Yes, so the rococo is a bit far away, but when did his parents live?

Miss Hannah: In the time of the French Empire.

Mrs. Sigg: The Biedermeier period.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that was an interesting time in France. They made a Roman Imperial style, and in Germany it was Biedermeier, the classical epoch with its wonderful columns and little temples; the style was also in a way imperial but Hellenistic as it were.⁸ It was the philo-hellenistic time, the time of the war for the liberation of Greece, when Byron fought for Greece, which was supposed to be an ideal country in every way—Greek manhood, the Greek citizen, and Greek beauty. They entirely forgot the garlic and all the dirt of Greek towns. That Greek idea was valid practically till the end of the 19th century, and we still suffer from it; it gave us an entirely wrong idea of Greek civilization.⁹ Now, his parents lived then and I am pretty certain that his mother flirted with such pictures. I am sure that you would still discover them on the walls of houses in the country in which she lived, at least I can remember seeing them when I was young. They have perhaps disappeared now because they have a historical value, but in those days they were just the remnants of a foolish past.

Now, this kind of feeling-fantasy is derived from the mother, and it is typical that a man who is entirely unconscious of his anima will first—when he discovers anything of the sort—fall into his mother's feelings, the kind of feelings that have been particularly dear to the mother. So when a man with a plurality of animae discovers Yin, he will surely be the mother. As an example, I can only advise you to read the wonderful English story *Lilith*, by a man named MacDonald.¹⁰ Lilith was Adam's first wife, a particularly evil creature because she didn't want to have children, and later on she became a sort of child-eating monster. You ought to read that novel, it is perfectly sweet, one of the most marvelous demonstrations of the feelings of a man who is wonderfully unaware of his own anima, of how his own feelings look in the whole world of Eros. This man MacDonald would also have the plurality of animae. I don't know whether there is any evidence for it in the book but at all events he developed that kind of psychology. He talks about "the girls," as his mother did: you know, "The girls don't, and I hope you won't," etc., so "the girls" remain a class by themselves, a society of girls, and that causes a plurality of animae.

⁸ The term *Biedermeier* was invented by a Munich humor magazine, *Fliegende Blätter*, to describe a period style, 1815 to 1848, of shallow, realistic, or neoclassical works which were favored by the *nouveau riche*.

⁹ The Greeks fought for their independence from Turkey from 1821 to 1832. Lord Byron arrived in Mesolonghi in January 1824 and by April, at age 35, was dead. Yet he was important in calling the attention of the world to this historic struggle.

¹⁰ For George MacDonald, see 26 Feb. 1936, n. 10.

When a man becomes aware that he should function with his feelings, he will inevitably get into his mother's feeling, as a girl when she develops her mind will be strongly influenced by her father's traditional mind; in other words, the anima develops out of the mother as the animus develops out of the father. So it happens that men who have remained very young for a long time—often till an advanced age—indulge in mother's feelings, and you are never quite sure whether they are really masculine or not. Such men have never discovered what they really feel, as women who live on with an animus can never make out what they really think. They have always represented the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and what they said was marvelously correct, but just off the real thing, and what they really thought was presumably nothing. And so with men in their relationships: you never can tell what a relationship really was because it was always so covered up by the mother, by the way the mother has related. This became the model for his world and surroundings, for women and children particularly but sometimes even for his friends.

Dr. Escher: In the book *Der Landvogt von Greifensee*, all girls and women were called *die Figuren*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that story is a representation of a society of girls with the hero in the center, but you know Gottfried Keller was just such an old boy—that is why he drank so heavily. He was an old *célibataire* and his feelings were in the mother world. He had a perfect mother complex which had to be compensated by a good deal of drink, otherwise it would have been absolutely unbearable—all those girls would have become just too much.¹¹ So we see that the choice of this lovely picture, Cupid lying sleeping by the well and the pretty shepherdesses round him, is a fantasy of the time just before Nietzsche was born—and also the dark trees, the cypresses, and the banks full of roses. *Rosenhänge* might mean garlands of roses, or hanging roses, or slopes covered with roses: you can imagine anything because the German word is absolutely indefinite. That also makes a picture. Do you know such a picture in the history of art.

Remark: There is one by Macquart.¹²

¹¹ Gottfried Keller (1819-1890), often described as the most representative of all Swiss writers, was admired by both Jung and Nietzsche. *The Governor of Greifensee* (1878), translated by Paul Bernard Thomas, is included in vol. 14 of *The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Kuno Francke. In this fine story, the bachelor (*célibataire*) governor stages a party for the three lost loves of his youth.

¹² Macquart? Possibly August Macke, a German painter (1877-1914) whose works ap-

Prof. Jung: Yes. Probably many of you do not know of him but I should advise you, if you ever go to Munich, just to have a look at his painting and then go away and weep. That is also very poetical you know; you find any amount of oil paintings and prints of cypresses and roses—that kind of stuff. And that is more like the fifties, sixties, seventies, so it is more the time of Nietzsche himself. Now why is that little god sleeping near the well? There must be a peculiar connection between Cupid and the well.

Dr. von Bomhard: They are the opposites, the Yin and the Yang.

Prof. Jung: No, they are very close together. The opposites are Zarathustra and the well—he is the fire and the well is the water—but Cupid and the well are sleeping beautifully together.

Mrs. Crowley: It is because the maidens are there.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you see that is just one picture, a sort of mandala: the sleeping Cupid is a little male and the well is of course the female. Nietzsche often compares woman, or the soul of woman, to a deep well over which a dragon watches on account of the treasure that is buried in it. Therefore certain women are called dragons.

Mrs. Crowley: And actually in antiquity were not statues of Aphrodite usually connected with the well?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and there are other examples. For instance, the famous Abraham's pond in Harran; that was a pond for Astarte, and it was full of carp which are the fishes of Astarte.¹³ So this well can be called the Well of Astarte, the love goddess, and here is Cupid her son, the dying and resurrecting god. They form a sort of couple like Krishna and Rhada, or like Shiva and his Shakti. They belong together, but not as a pair of opposites. They may become a pair of opposites if Cupid should by any chance develop into the wise old man, but that is a long way off. Here the pair of opposites are dormant and so well fitted that they are almost one: it is one and the same mood. For instance, one could amplify that picture easily, making of Cupid a more powerful god, and Astarte would be the well, then you have it more or less. But that is the world of the creative mother goddess Astarte, and this is the world of the Yin in a dormant condition; therefore the main characteristic of that Yin world, Cupid, is represented as dormant. Zarathustra discovers him in his sleep and blames him for it:

pear in Munich, among other places; or more likely, C. Macourt (1716-1767), a German who lived for a time in London where he was mainly a portrait painter.

¹³ Harran is a town in southern Turkey, the home of Abraham's family after the migration from Ur. Beside the pond, there is a mosque and a pavilion.

Verily, in broad daylight did he fall asleep, the sluggard! Had he perhaps chased butterflies too much?

To what does that refer? Why should Cupid chase butterflies?

Remark: He is not functioning as he ought; he should be doing something to those girls instead of playing like a little child.

Prof. Jung: But what are the butterflies?

Mrs. Jung: The butterfly is the psyche.

Prof. Jung: Yes, *psyche* is the Greek word for soul. Psyche, the soul, is the butterfly he is chasing—Eros and Psyche. But he forgot the girls and that is what Zarathustra means: he shouldn't go to sleep, he should be busy with the girls. Now, what does it mean that Cupid performs Eros and Psyche? How do we know what they did?

Miss Wolff: Cupid did nothing, and Psyche wanted to look at him. She was not allowed to, so she lost him through her curiosity.

Prof. Jung: Where do you find that story?

Miss Wolff: Apuleius.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in his book *The Golden Ass*, a Roman novel. You see, when he is chasing butterflies he is Amor and Psyche, and presumably Nietzsche, being a classical philologist, knew all about that. The story of Eros and Psyche is a sort of *entremets* in *The Golden Ass*, where Psyche lost Eros because she was too curious.¹⁴

Miss Wolff: I think the idea was that she thought he was a monster—she was a bit alarmed as to what he really was, and therefore of course she wanted to see whether he was young or not.

Mrs. Jung: There is a very beautiful picture by Segantini called *Die Liebe an der Lebensquelle*. It is a landscape of mountains with a well, a young couple and an angel. He painted it in the Engadine and Nietzsche wrote *Zarathustra* in the Engadine.

Mrs. Sigg: There are two pictures by Segantini: one is the *Lebensquelle*, and there is another where a young boy is lying quite naked in his mother's lap. Both pictures are up in the high mountains but they are different.¹⁵

Prof. Jung: It is interesting that Segantini should have had the same vision in the same place in Engadine. Well now, as long as Cupid is

¹⁴ Originally, *The Transformation*, by Lucius Apuleius of Madaura, which is near the birthplace of St. Augustine (who of course hated Apuleius). This second-century work has been much discussed by Jung and Jungians, notably Erich Neumann in *Amor and Psyche: The Psychic Development of the Feminine* (New York/Princeton and London, 1956) B.S. XLVII.

¹⁵ Giovanni Segantini, an Italian painter (1858-1899) who moved from a naturalistic to a symbolic style.

chasing butterflies, it means that it is a phenomenon which takes place entirely in the unconscious: it never reaches the surface, never reaches the woman. Cupid should mean connection, Cupid ought to reach a woman, but he doesn't—he is dormant. Therefore the maidens remain just maidens, indistinct; they don't take on any personal form, don't become complete. One sees that transition in the myth of Krishna. First he is just dancing with the maidens and they become enamored of him. Then he chooses one—well, several others too, but making at least one distinct by choosing her—and inasmuch as he doesn't choose the others they remain indistinct, nameless. That is the case with a man whose feeling is still identical with the feeling of the mother: he doesn't choose the woman, doesn't give her a name, doesn't make her distinct. To him girls are girls and there is only one woman and that is the mother. And his relationship to women is rather like the relation of a mother to so many daughters or children.

Upbraid me not, ye beautiful dancers, when I chasten the little God somewhat! He will cry, certainly, and weep—but he is laughable even when weeping!

And with tears in his eyes shall he ask you for a dance; and I myself will sing a song to his dance:

A dance-song and satire on the spirit of gravity my supremest, powerfulest devil, who is said to be “lord of the world.”—

You see, the advice he gives to Cupid, a sort of encouragement, is like a punishment. This is perfectly good advice: Cupid ought to be busy with the girls; but Nietzsche uses the girls for a purpose which is not legitimate—that their dance should be a mockery, a satire, of the spirit of gravity, so that the lightness of the movement should prove his superiority over the spirit of gravity. While the whole arrangement, the beautiful garden of temptation, the beautiful girls, Cupid, the well—everything suggests a going down, a sort of Venusberg,¹⁶ or a temple of Astarte where he should touch the earth, where he should succumb to the spirit of gravity in order to compensate himself, or in order to transform himself into the opposite, into Yin. Now, this is the necessary procedure for a man whose feelings are identical with the mother; he cannot get rid of that identity, and he will never discover what a woman is, unless he succumbs to the spirit of gravity. So Zarathustra is

¹⁶ Venusberg was the mountain where the goddess of love held her court. In Wagner's *Tannhäuser* (1843-45) the basic conflict is between the spiritual and sensual sides of man, the latter expressed by the shimmering Venusberg music.

making unlawful use of this situation of the girls and the Cupid, just using them for his own ends, against his supremest, most powerful devil, the spirit of gravity. Now what is this devil?

Miss Hannah: Is it not the clown that jumped over him and destroyed him?

Prof. Jung: Of course. The clown who jumped over the rope-dancer deals with dancing again: whenever the dance comes up that danger comes up too. The man who dances on the rope is the one who dances over the abyss with the danger of falling down, of utter destruction. You see, whenever Zarathustra speaks of dancing it is to keep himself suspended over the depths. There is always a dangerous situation, the immediate vicinity of destruction, death or insanity or both. In the catastrophe of the rope-dancer it was insanity as well as death, because the clown that jumped over him was practically insane. And there Nietzsche made the famous prophecy, "Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body," which really becomes true in his own case. You see, he clearly realizes that the arch-devil, that factor which counteracts him the most, is the function which counteracts his intuition, the inferior functions. The inferior function is always the devil. One always feels it as destructive, the thing one is most afraid of and loathes and resists the most, but which is in a way peculiarly fascinating. We often find passages in *Zarathustra* where one sees how he is attracted by the devil, how he is longing for it, but he always tries to escape it again as if something were hindering him from going down into it, as if it would be his complete destruction. Now, do you believe that it would have been his complete destruction?

Miss Hannah: Not if he could have accepted it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but why was he so afraid of it?

Miss Hannah: Because it seems to have been too insane a spot; he could not assimilate it.

Prof. Jung: But it is in practically everybody. It doesn't need an insane spot.

Mr. Baumann: Would it not have destroyed his creative power if he had accepted this gravity?

Prof. Jung: I don't think so, but you are on the right track; you only have to formulate it a bit differently.

Miss Hannah: If he had accepted it, he would have had to live it instead of writing it.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but probably he would have written something different because you cannot kill the creative demon. A demon that you can kill is not the right one.

Mrs. Sigg: He would have lost the vital feeling of life if he had gone down into it.

Prof. Jung: But who would have lost it?

Miss Welsh: He would have had to disidentify with Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the point. Zarathustra is the Yang and he would be reduced to a mere germ, to a mere white spot in a sea of blackness. Any man who was identical with Zarathustra would be afraid to go under, because he would think that he would lose his life, that he would have to sacrifice his spirit. So inasmuch as one is identical with Zarathustra one keeps away from it, one tries to dance over the abyss. But one remains suspended, and then the spirit of gravity is the devil.

Miss Wolff: He doesn't realize at all what he is saying here—he should not speak of a devil. As he has got rid of God, he should have got rid of the devil too, because that is a completely Christian concept. Also that the spirit of gravity should mean the devil is a bit mad; it is earth, matter, everything real, empirical, just the thing he preaches acceptance of. But he cannot. He is still in the Christian attitude of aloofness.

Prof. Jung: Yes of course, but one should not take it too seriously when he speaks of the devil. It is perfectly true that if he denies the existence of God, he necessarily ought to deny the devil too, but when it comes to his inferior function he forgets, naturally, everything. Then there is no old superstition that would not come back. A man who is entirely convinced of the completely sterile condition of the world, that there is no miracle anywhere, no sooner touches this function than the world is full of devils and demons. I have seen the most amazing things in that respect. People who were completely rational and enlightened, when the inferior function came up were just as superstitious as any old witch—perfectly ridiculous. It is like people who laugh about religious feeling. Then something happens and they are drowned in it: the Oxford Movement comes along and they think they have discovered something. The inferior function is touched and down they go into the sheep pen. It is incredible how people can deceive themselves about such eternal truths. You see, that world of demons is still alive—it only needs a certain change in the level of your consciousness and you are deeply in it; then it is as it has always been. For instance, if I put you in a primeval forest and let you go without a compass, in an hour you are reduced to shreds, and in a few more hours the whole world of devils is true again. So the devil comes in quite handy here. He forgets all about his grand statement that God is

dead and preaches the devil, and then it is perfectly true. Of course he is using a speech metaphor, but that does not change his inferior function; he is nevertheless in the hellish depths of the Yin.

And this is the song that Zarathustra sang when Cupid and the maidens danced together:

Of late did I gaze into thine eye, O Life! And into the unfathomable did I there seem to sink.

Here you have it. Now what is the eye of life? How was it indicated in the preceding symbolism?

Mrs. Crowley: The well.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you know those little blue lakes in the Eiffel, poured onto the crust of the earth, are called “the eyes of the sea,” *Meeraugen*. So the well is an eye because an eye reflects the light; when you look into a deep well you see light of the sky mirrored below. And so the eye of life is really that deep well—there is life—and he felt that it was unfathomable and he seemed to sink into it.

But thou pulledest me out with a golden angle; derisively didst thou laugh when I called thee unfathomable.

“Such is the language of all fish,” saidst thou; “what *they* do not fathom is unfathomable.”

He is like a fish caught with a golden hook. And who is pulling him out of that well?

Mr. Allemann: The anima.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is speaking to life as if it were a person and we soon see what person it is.

“But changeable am I only, and wild, and altogether a woman, and no virtuous one:

Though I be called by you men the ‘profound one,’ or the ‘faithful one,’ ‘the eternal one,’ ‘the mysterious one.’

But ye men endow us always with your own virtues—alas, ye virtuous ones!”

Here it is undeniable that life, that deep well, Yin, is the woman in himself. Here he approaches what we call the inferior function and that is a woman, because the anima always represents the inferior function in a man’s case. Therefore, if a man is highly virtuous he can reckon with the fact that when he meets a woman it will be his anima, who will have all those vices which counteract his virtues. She contains all that he is combatting, and—a particularly marvelous stunt of fate—he finds all

the wrong qualities fascinating in her. And then he projects all his virtues into her, while he contains the corresponding vices. He is infected and has to carry now all the vices for which he had the compensation. For if you contact the unconscious you will be contaminated: you must develop the same qualities, otherwise they eat you up. When you have to do with devils you must develop devils in yourself. The mere fact that you have to do with devils creates devils within you, so please use them if they are there. Don't be horrified, they come in quite handy, only you must use them or they will use you, and then you are dissolved. But if you use them they give you the necessary protection against the devils of others, particularly in the case of anima devils. By that process you acquire all the qualities you formerly repressed and which thus had become qualities of the anima. Now if that process takes place the anima changes her quality; inasmuch as you take over those qualities, the anima has a chance to become much better. Somebody must have the devils: either the anima has them or you have them. If you have them, then the anima can wash herself and become very decent and nice because she is then on the positive side. But if you assume that you are the virtuous one, the anima is hell.

Mr. Baumann: There is a famous passage in the Koran about Moses going into the desert with a fish in his basket, and it jumps into a little brook which was running down from an oasis and took it down to the sea.¹⁷ And Islam is like Yang, very masculine, but where is the anima?

Prof. Jung: Oh, they have a plurality of animae. You know, they have a peculiar attitude towards women: they are the houris in paradise, a society of girls, sort of girl scouts, as the Walkyries are Wotan's girl scouts.

Miss Fabisch: I think the Mohammedan woman is veiled.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is another stunt of the anima, particularly when they are transparent veils—then it is hellish. Well now, this temptation, or the fascination of the opposite of himself, is of course teleological: it should compensate a one-sidedness. Zarathustra feels that there is a possibility of sinking down into this depth, and then suddenly an invisible fisherman with hook and rod interferes and pulls him out again. Now we really ought to explain this. We assume it is life that fishes him out of the water according to his text, but life in this case is an anima and one never heard that the anima was a fisherman. One *has* heard of

¹⁷ The story of Moses and Chidr (who was symbolized by the lost fish) is in Surah 13 "The Cave," of the Koran. See "Concerning Rebirth," CW 9 i.

cases where a fisherman has caught a *nixe* in his net, so the anima might be something that was caught, but this is an unheard of abnormality.¹⁸ How can it be that life itself fishes you out of life?—it is unthinkable. But here you must remember Nietzsche's mental condition, and you must remember also that famous *soreites syllogismos* which I made when we were talking about the first chapters of Zarathustra.¹⁹ What was the result?

Miss Hannah: That Nietzsche and Zarathustra are identical.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and now you must only extend that equation, Nietzsche equals Zarathustra equals anima. So you never can tell for sure which is which because all three are identical. A few paragraphs further down, he says, "For thus do things stand with us three." The three are Zarathustra, Nietzsche, and the anima. Then who is the traditional fisherman?

Miss Wolff: Christ.

Mrs. Sigg: Peter.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and what do they fish?

Mrs. Sigg: Human beings.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Then what other fisherman is there?

Mrs. Jung: Orpheus.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is true. There is a thick book by Eisler which contains all the symbolism.²⁰ And there is another famous fisher who is still alive.

Miss Wolff: The Pope.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the symbolism is expressed there in his fisher ring, an antique gem representing the miraculous draught of fishes, for the Pope is the great fisher, he is the fisher king.

Mrs. Crowley: And Vishnu?

Prof. Jung: Yes, but *he* appears in the form of the fish. He develops out of a fish but that is something else, like the fish of Manu.²¹ It is the same motif but we are here concerned with the symbolism of the fish-

¹⁸ A *nixe*, in German folklore, is a water sprite, usually in the form of a woman or a combination of woman and fish. See CW 9 i, par. 52.

¹⁹ See above, 27 June 1934, n. 1.

²⁰ Robert Eisler, *Orpheus, The Fisher* (London, 1921). See CW 9 ii, par. 147.

²¹ In CW 9 ii, par. 176, Jung, citing the Shatapatha Brahmana, writes, "The fish of Manu is a saviour, identified in legend with Vishnu, who had assumed the form of a small goldfish. He begs Manu to take him home, because he was afraid of being devoured by the water monsters. He then grows mightily, fairy-tale fashion, and in the end rescues Manu from the great flood."

erman; that is a definite archetypal figure. The mystic Bakcheus, or Dionysos, is also a fisherman, for instance. Now what have all those figures in common?

Miss Hannah: They are saviors.

Miss Fabisch: *Psychopompoi*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, sort of *psychopompoi*, leaders of souls, the shepherds. Christ has often been represented as the good shepherd in the catacombs, and as Orpheus on the other side taming the wild animals; or as the fisher he is pulling in the net full of the souls of the faithful ones. So the representative of the spiritual power is the leader of souls, a sort of *poimandres*, the shepherd of men is the fisherman. Now in that case who would be the fisherman here?

Answer: Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: Of course. Zarathustra himself would be the fisherman. And when Zarathustra, speaking to life, says, "Thou pulledst me out of the water," what happened in that case?

Mr. Allemann: He identifies with his own anima.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and one calls such a mechanism a projection. Zarathustra is making the projection into life or into the anima, and he assumes that she is of course fishing him out of life, that she is responsible.

Mrs. Jung: It seems to me that the fish that is pulled out of the water is not saved, but is caught.

Prof. Jung: Quite right, the fish is not saved. But you know, it is understood that all the fishes pulled in by the divine fisher are really saved. It is only the devil that advises you to say that they are caught. You should not say such heretical things!

Mrs. Jung: But I think he is actually caught by the anima; he is afraid of life and afraid of being caught by life.

Prof. Jung: Sure! He really is afraid of being caught by life, so if anything gets him out of it, he is only too glad. But the thing that gets him out of life seems to be again the anima, so he never gets entirely out of it. It is a sort of vicious circle into which Nietzsche would inevitably get, since he does not differentiate between those figures. He makes an attempt though—we are presently coming to it—he gets into such a tangle with these figures that one almost feels that he will make a difference. At all events, you see he projects here the fisherman symbol, which is hardly his own, upon life, the anima, and that is a mistake. If either of the two should fish, *he* should be the one to do it and not the anima. Now, the attributes life gives to itself, "the profound one, the

faithful one, the eternal one, and the mysterious one,” are all wonderful anima attributes; you find them, for instance, very beautifully in Rider Haggard’s *She*.

Thus did she laugh, the unbelievable one; but never do I believe her and her laughter, when she speaketh evil of herself.

It doesn’t help very much, even if she tells an unfavorable truth about herself, because whatever she says is fascinating.

And when I talked face to face with my wild Wisdom, she said to me angrily: “Thou wilt, thou cravest, thou lovest; on that account alone dost thou *praise* life!”

This is an excellent dialogue with an anima. You see, something happens here which is like active imagination: he already begins to dissociate into his figures, substantiates his figures and confronts them face to face, has a dialogue, and now he calls life—mind you, the woman, his mysterious woman—“my wild wisdom.” Now is she wisdom?

Mrs. Sigg: She is insofar as the man Nietzsche is *begehrnd*—loving, wishing—because he always wanted to project that.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true. She tells him the truth that he praises life because he is full of longings and desires, which means that he appreciates the anima on account of his own wishes. If he really knew her he would not praise her so much. You see, you always praise the things you want—unless you just want to buy them. But usually one praises what one doesn’t possess. If you did possess them, you presumably would not praise them because you would know them. What you possess is never so good as what you don’t possess—the old story. Now this Wisdom (with a capital) is surely not the ordinary anima that is life. What kind of anima would it be?

Mrs. Fierz: Sophia.

Prof. Jung: That would be the highest form of anima. Sophia has always been represented as a sort of virgin, beautiful, with the highest qualities of virtue and knowledge.²² She is a form of the anima, but it is incredible that such a figure could be meant here, because there is one that is much nearer, and *that* we see in the fact that the wise old man is combined with the anima; then the anima appears as wisdom, one could say, because of the identity, but Zarathustra is wisdom really. You see, she has not attained the highest wisdom. The teaching she

²² For Sophia, see above, 5 June 1935, n. 6.

gives him is just not the highest wisdom, but is only a very clever remark, one which would be worthy of Diotima for instance, the anima of Socrates who made such apt remarks. What she had to say in that famous dialogue about the Eros sounds exactly like this passage.²³ So we must assume it is just the anima that talks here, and the aspect of wisdom is due to the identity with Zarathustra.

Then had I almost answered indignantly and told the truth to the angry one; and one cannot answer more indignantly than when one "tellethe the truth" to one's Wisdom.

To *that* kind of wisdom you see, because it is a typical anima remark. Also the whole course of events described here is very typical of such a discussion. You see, when the anima is projected on a real woman and she talks in that rather pointed way, she invariably gets a man's goat. The anima jumps out of him because that woman is talking through the animus—talking through her hat. "Thou willest, thou cravest, thou lovest," is animus. The animus always puts it onto somebody else, and moreover it is always a little beside the mark, just one inch to the wrong side. Then the man becomes possessed by his anima: he gets indignant and begins to tell the truth to this animus-anima, to the woman who talks in this style. Here it is a case of a projection because he says "And told the truth to the angry one," so *she* was indignant. But she simply made that remark out of playful malice; she is not angry at all. That is the playful way in which the anima talks. She is quite nice in her role, like the woman who plays that role and makes such remarks. She thinks she is objective, but the man gets angry and says *she* is angry. As soon as the anima gets on top, it is projected.

For thus do things stand with us three. In my heart do I love only Life—and verily, most when I hate her!

But that I am fond of wisdom, and often too fond, is because she remindeth me very strongly of Life!

You see the identity: he feels it as three figures but at the same time they are all one.

She hath her eye, her laugh, and even her golden ankle-rod: am I responsible for it that both are so alike?

And when once Life asked me: "Who is she then, this Wisdom?"—then said I eagerly: "Ah, yes! Wisdom!"

²³ In Plato's *Symposium*, Socrates says he learned about Eros from Diotima, a priestess.

16 JUNE 1937

As if he were talking to one woman of another one!

“One thirsteth for her and is not satisfied, one looketh through veils, one graspeth through nets.

Is she beautiful? What do I know! But the oldest carps are still lured by her.”

Those are the fishes in the pond of Astarte.

LECTURE VIII

23 June 1937

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah: "In speaking of the multiplicity of the dancing girls, caused by Nietzsche's unconsciousness of the anima, you alluded to the animus as being a *plurality in itself*. I would be glad to know whether this plurality persists in all stages of a woman's consciousness. Or if it is a compensation for the attitude to the outer world, which, in the higher stages of consciousness, would give way to one figure, the Poimen?"

This question refers to the peculiar fact that Nietzsche's anima was represented by a number of dancing maidens. It is a somewhat rare occurrence but I gave you other examples—the boy who dreamt of those many white maidens, for instance—and I said that a profound unconsciousness in a man of his anima would account for this multiplicity. I also mentioned the fact that the animus as a rule is a plurality, but when a woman is very unconscious, the animus is rather apt to be one, just the opposite phenomenon. The animus is then entirely identical with the father or with the traditional conception of the deity, to be split up later, in the process of becoming conscious, into the ordinary empirical plurality. Now the question is whether in a later, more developed state of consciousness, the animus has the tendency to again become one. And we could also ask whether in a later state of consciousness the anima would not have the tendency to again become a plurality. Well, if consciousness could reach the same extension as the unconscious and could become a universal consciousness, then of course the animus or the anima might reach very much the same condition again. But since such a thing as an all-consciousness is absolutely excluded in a human being we cannot hope to reach such a level—though we might perhaps dream of it.

Mystics always try to get at this all-consciousness, the Yoga experts for instance; but since I have never analysed such a fellow—one who had attained to the highest conditions of enlightenment—I cannot say

whether his anima ever reached the state of plurality again. Also I have never seen a woman who had reached such a state of consciousness that her animus would have become one. So I can hardly answer your question. Theoretically it is quite possible, but empirically the animus is as a rule a plurality, though it is true that there is a tendency to emphasize particularly one aspect of the animus, and that would be the Poimen, the shepherd: there you are quite right. But that never entirely supersedes the plurality because besides that Poimen, there are all sorts of other shepherds and policemen and God knows what, who are always busy creating plots and such things. And in a man's case, the oneness of the anima can be described as a sort of existent, or perhaps a prevailing figure, but there are always certain things hanging back, naturally, which accounts for the fact that the anima can be projected into numbers of very different women and even at the same time—certain aspects of the anima at least. So this oneness could only be reached if an absolutely perfect state of consciousness could be reached, a complete equivalent of the collective unconscious.¹ And since such a condition is superhuman, we cannot hope, and should not even wish to attain to such a height. It would be too inhuman.

Miss Hannah: I really meant to ask how much the plurality of the animus was a compensation for the attitude to the outer world. A woman is usually monogamous and a man polygamous. If a woman should overcome her monogamous attitude, would the animus tend to become one as the anima does in a man?

Prof. Jung: Such a thing happens empirically only under certain conditions; for instance, if there is a certain amount of homosexuality, you are apt to get an animus figure which is almost indistinguishable from an anima—it would have a very mixed sex character. Well now, we remained stuck in the chapter called, “The Dance-Song”—not that it is very much of a song, but more a rather difficult piece of psychology. You remember that the general problem we have been concerned with in these last chapters is the *enantiodromia*, or the transition from a Yang point of view to the Yin, the female aspect. And he gives here a very good description of the anima under the aspect that she really represents: namely, chaotic life, a moving, shifting kind of life, not obeying any particular rules. At least they are not very visible, but are more like occult laws. In my essay about the archetypes of the collective unconscious, you may remember that I identified the anima with life or liv-

¹ See CW 9 i, where such especially prominent archetypes as the Anima, the Mother, the Child, and the Trickster are extensively treated.

ing; the anima is really the archetype of life, as the old man is the archetype of the meaning of life. In the part we have just dealt with, Nietzsche describes the anima very beautifully as being essentially life. He shows in how far life has the aspects of woman, or we could turn it round and say how much the woman is an aspect of life, or represents life. For life comes to a man through the anima, in spite of the fact that he thinks it comes to him through the mind. He masters life through the mind but life *lives* in him through the anima. And the mystery in woman is that life comes to her through the spiritual form of the animus, though she assumes that it comes through the Eros. She masters life, she *does* life professionally through the Eros, but the actual life, where one is also a victim, really comes through the mind.

I realize that these things are hard to understand if one has not had certain experiences to give the necessary empirical material, and to show to what formulations apply. Nietzsche, inasmuch as he is a mind, is always apt to lose himself in the icy heights of the spirit, or in the desert of the spirit, where there is light, yet where everything else is dry or cold. If he gets too lonely in that world, he is necessarily forced to descend, and then he comes to life, but in the form of the woman, so he naturally arrives at the anima. It is always a sort of descent into those lower regions where there is warmth and emotion and also the darkness of chaotic life. You see, when he descends into the Yin, he will realize first of all the anima aspects of life, and then also the wisdom of life—the old man representing the archetype—and the meaning of life, the reflection of life in the mind. He sees now these aspects, and he also sees himself as if betwixt them: he speaks of “us three.” So he makes a trinity of himself, life or the anima, and wisdom, which would be Zarathustra.

That he feels himself as a trinity comes from a certain condition which we have often mentioned. You remember a while ago, we spoke of the infernal trinity: namely, the reflection in hell of the spiritual trinity, the threefold devil. In Dante’s *Inferno* he is in the form of Satan, with the three faces—whitish-yellow, red, and black. Now, since then I have found in a medieval treatise another formulation which states most clearly that there is a trinity in heaven, a trinity in man, and a trinity in hell. Nietzsche becomes aware of the trinity in hell from the fact that he feels himself as a trinity, and that feeling comes from his identity with God, the trinity in heaven. He denied the existence of the Christian deity, and so he would be apt to have first an inflation, and then, by a sort of mirror reflection, he discovers again the trinity, but a

trinity in which he is included. Instead of Father, Son, and Holy ghost, it would be himself, life, and wisdom. Well now, we will continue.

"Perhaps she is wicked and false, and altogether a woman; but when she speaketh ill of herself, just then doth she seduce most."

When I had said this unto Life, then laughed she maliciously, and shut her eyes. "Of whom dost thou speak?" said she. "Perhaps of me?"

And if thou wert right—is it proper to say that in such wise to my face! But now, pray, speak also of thy Wisdom!"

Ah, and now hast thou again opened thine eyes, O beloved Life! And into the unfathomable have I again seemed to sink.—

Thus sang Zarathustra. But when the dance was over and the maidens had departed, he became sad.

"The sun hath been long set," said he at last, "the meadow is damp, and from the forest cometh coolness."

The aspect of life here is alluring. It is represented by those dancing maidens and that is of course rather suspect. It is a superficial, joyous aspect of life, or an aesthetic aspect, as the analogy of Krishna and the milk-maidens is a sort of divine, playful aspect. But when that process has set in—the descent to the Yin—one is apt to come to oneself finally, and not at all to a divine aspect of life or to a sort of playful Shakti creating a world of illusions. This ring of maidens is a kind of shadowy maya, and inasmuch as Nietzsche is divine he can remain in such a world, as God can remain in the changing colors of the world, surrounded by the images of becoming and vanishing, the abundance of created figures. But inasmuch as he is human, the descent goes further: it goes right down into the isolation and singleness of man and he is quite unable to envisage the world as the gods do, as a sort of mirror reflex of himself—at least the Hindu gods do that: they don't suffer from the reality of the world because they assume that it is their own mirage. The Yogin is naturally always striving to reach a condition in which he might be able to envisage the world as his own creation, or his imagery, a self-reflection; but he can only do that—if he can do it at all—by the complete sacrifice of his human existence. He must transcend humanity in order to attain to the vision of God.

Since Nietzsche is human he cannot stand that sight eternally. He cannot keep away from his human side because he is part of that maya, a human being among human beings, not a god. He is neither below nor above humanity, and so he naturally comes to himself. It is as if he

were falling through the veils of maya, not into the deity, but into himself. Naturally, when the darkness comes, when that lovely aspect of the many colors and the abundance of life has departed, then the sun sets. Consciousness goes further down into the night of the Yin, into the darkness of matter—into the prison of the body as the Gnostics would say. That the meadow is damp means that the psyche becomes humid. It was the idea of Heraclitus that the soul becomes water. It is a sort of condensation. The air gets cool in the evening and vapor becoming condensed, falls down to the ground.² Out of the forest, or the darkness, comes the coolness, the darkness being of course the Yin, humidity, the north side of the mountain. And one becomes that substance, a semi-liquid matter. The body is a sort of system that contains liquids, consisting of about 98 percent water. So instantly one is caught in the body, exactly as the god, when he looked down into the mirror of matter, was caught by the love of matter, and so was locked into matter forever. Therefore we can understand when he says,

An unknown presence is about me, and gazeth thoughtfully.
What! Thou livest still, Zarathustra?

One cannot feel a presence if one is God oneself, because it is then one's own presence and there is no other. If all is conscious, one knows of no presence because one is everything, so as long as one is identical with the deity there is no presence. If one feels an unknown presence it means that there is something besides oneself and then one is no longer God. So the moment Nietzsche gets into the dampness and coolness of the Yin, he is by himself, isolated, and then he is capable of feeling a presence—then he suddenly becomes aware that he is not alone. If he were God he would be alone and would never know it, but being man he is capable of feeling alone and therefore capable of feeling a presence. It is not the first time that the man Nietzsche has realized a presence but it is a rare occurrence. And now realizing that Zarathustra is the unknown presence, he asks, "What! Thou livest still, Zarathustra?"—as if Zarathustra had been dead. In a way Nietzsche lost the connection with Zarathustra in getting into the darkness of Yin. It looked as if Zarathustra were dead, or had at least been removed. Therefore this question, "Thou livest still, Zarathustra?"

Why? Wherefore? Whereby? Whither? Where? How? Is it not folly still to live?—

² Heraclitus: "Souls also are vaporized from what is wet" (Freeman*, fragment 12).

meaning that this presence, Zarathustra, could live even outside Nietzsche. You see, he was so completely identical with the spirit that he assumed Zarathustra could only exist because he, Nietzsche, existed. Then suddenly he discovers that the man Nietzsche can exist without Zarathustra and so Zarathustra should be dead, but he is not.

Ah, my friends; the evening is it which thus interrogateth in me.
Forgive me my sadness!

This sadness is depression, he is weighted down. Depression means that one had been much too high and aloof in the upper air, and the only thing that brings one down to earth into one's isolation, into being human, is depression. To become human, he needs depression. He was so inflated that it needed a heavy weight or the magnetic attraction of matter to bring him down, so he rightly says, "The evening is it which thus interrogateth in me." It is the setting of the sun, Yin, which creates that question in him.

"Evening hath come on: forgive me that evening hath come on!"

Thus sang Zarathustra.

As if he had to ask for forgiveness for being human! It is quite understandable that the next chapter is called "The Grave-Song." It is as if we were now continuing into the material human being, into the darkness of matter. He begins,

"Yonder is the grave-island, the silent isle, yonder also are the graves of my youth. Thither will I carry an evergreen wreath of life."

This beginning is very symbolic. What does it mean?

Mrs. Crowley: It suggests rebirth again. He has to go down into it in order to be reborn, and he brings the evergreen wreath of life.

Prof. Jung: We haven't gotten to the rebirth; we now have to do with dying. What is the grave-island and why a silent isle?

Miss Hannah: Isn't it because he tried to cheat that spirit of gravity?

Prof. Jung: Why do you not enter upon the island, why do you all avoid the island? Are you all like Nietzsche?

Miss Welsh: It is the island of himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the island is a very small bit of land in the midst of the sea. An island means isolation, insulation, being one thing only. That is his loneliness: he is a lost island somewhere in the sea.

Prof. Reichstein: May I ask a question referring to the last bit of the

former chapter? Could this conception be reversed—that the unknown presence would not be Zarathustra, but Zarathustra would be the one who is caught in the unknown? Then the situation would be what you mentioned first; it would be the spark of the god instead of the man Nietzsche. He says, *Ein Unbekanntes ist um mich und blickt nachdenklich. Was! Du lebst noch, Zarathustra?*³ That would mean that the unknown one would ask Zarathustra if he were still living.

Prof. Jung: Well, the German text is: *Ein Unbekanntes ist um mich*, so he obviously personifies that unknown presence. It can only look or gaze if it is a sort of person. And the question, “What! Thou livest still?” must be—according to my idea at least—a remark made to the unknown presence that gazes so thoughtfully. Now, we know that Nietzsche has experienced Zarathustra as a sort of second presence already: *Da wurde eins zu zwei, und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei.*⁴ That describes exactly the feeling of a presence, and this is moreover a form of religious experience. (There is an interesting chapter about this experience of the unknown presence in William James’ *The Varieties of Religious Experiences*.⁵ This experience means: I am aware of the fact that I am not alone in this room; there is a presence and an unknown one. This is the experience of the objectivity of the psyche, an experience of the reality of the unconscious. You see, you could not have such a dissociation from the unconscious if the unconscious were nothing but an empty mirage. Such experiences would then be ridiculous illusions. But when a person has once had that experience of the presence, you never can convince him that it was not real. The fact is that it is always experienced as a most significant and important reality. Read William James.

You see, in psychology you cannot judge by your own unconscious or by your own ignorance. If a man has had a certain experience we have to take it for granted that he has had it; unless he definitely lies, we cannot say the experience was an illusion. So when Paul experienced Christ on his way to Damascus, we cannot say that was an illusion; he was obviously gripped by that experience and so it is a fact. Of course, stupid people would say that if someone had been there with a photographic apparatus, he would not have been able to photograph Christ coming down from heaven; that is the way the ordinary idiots

³ This part of *Zarathustra* is translated on p. 1174 above.

⁴ Again, “One becomes two and Zarathustra passes by me.”

⁵ “It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there’ . . .” (William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, 1902, Lecture III).

think. But it is enough that the man Paul was gripped by that experience, that is a fact. Your American humorist Mark Twain in his book about Christian Science gives a description of all their idiotic notions, and then says: "You see it is all obvious nonsense, terribly idiotic, but that is just the reason why it is so dangerous, because the greatest force on earth is mass stupidity, not mass intelligence." Stupidity is the extraordinary power and Mark Twain saw it.⁶

Just because a thing is stupid is it important, for then it appeals to many people. When we think, "Now this is the very thing," it is just *not* the thing, because millions will never see it—two or three perhaps may, but what does that mean? Of course it is very precious but what is the value of a diamond if nobody discovers it? But when a thing is tangibly idiotic, you can be sure that it is very powerful, very dangerous. You see, when we call a thing stupid, we think that we undo it, that we have overcome it somehow. Of course nothing of the sort happens; we have simply made a statement that it is very important, have advertised it, and it appeals to everybody. People think, thank heaven, here is something we can understand, and they eat it. But if we say something is very intelligent, they vanish and won't touch it. So you see, we might say that was only a subjective experience, an illusion. No, it was not an illusion. It shaped Nietzsche's life. There would be no Paul if it had not been for his experience on the way to Damascus, and probably a great part of our Christianity—we don't know how great a part—would not exist if that illusion had not happened. And when you call it an illusion you advertise it—you make that also very important—because the most important thing to man, besides his stupidity, is illusion. Nothing has been created in the world that has not first been an illusion or imagination: there is no railway, no hotel, no man-of-war that has not been imagination.

So the experience of the unknown presence is a very real thing and since Nietzsche has been identical with Zarathustra, it is absolutely necessary that when he comes to the Yin, to the opposite of the spirit Zarathustra, he must realize that he is two: Nietzsche the man, and Zarathustra, the unknown presence. Therefore I think that the unknown presence really refers to Zarathustra, for Zarathustra would gaze

⁶ Samuel Clemens wrote to a stranger in Scotland in 1909 that Christian Science has "just the same value now that it had when Mrs. Eddy stole it from Quimby. . . . It was a tramp stealing a ride on the lightning express" (*Mark Twain's Letters*, ed. A. B. Paine, 2 vols., New York and London, 1917). The subject interested him so much that he wrote a book, *Christian Science* (New York and London, 1907). Once asked to say something about Christian Science, he responded with masterful terseness, "It's neither."

rather thoughtfully if he should see his human carrier in a state of Yin. Yin is the condition that is apt to be difficult for Yang—it may reduce Yang to that famous white spot in the black.

Miss Wolff: You could perhaps also interpret the passage as a summing up of the whole chapter: Zarathustra has met the anima under the form of life. He is fascinated by her, but he has not accepted her because she appears in this youthful and superficial aspect which he feels to be too great a contrast to himself. I would then take the whole passage after the disappearance of the girls as symbolizing Zarathustra's mood after the anima has gone away. The sun sets, evening comes, and Zarathustra feels like an old man for whom life has lost its meaning. He could just as well be dead.

Prof. Jung: But death is included in life, therefore the anima always has the death aspect.

Miss Wolff: Yes, but that doesn't come into this chapter. Life is here seen under a gay and youthful aspect, and the anima as a seductive young woman. This is of course a too superficial aspect for Zarathustra, therefore he rejects her in that form. But then the sun goes down and night comes: everything gets dark and cool. He feels sad and old, and so the unknown presence that asks Zarathustra if he still lives, I would take to personify a strange feeling within him that night and death come when the anima in that warm youthful form has gone.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is perfectly true that in Nietzsche's case this feeling comes on when the anima in the superficial aspect of the dancing girls leaves. When the sun sets, it is natural that the doubt arises whether Zarathustra still lives, because to Nietzsche life meant the dance, meant that warm and youthful aspect, *la gaya scienza*, the gay science. But the evening is another aspect of life; therefore the anima also has the death aspect. As, for instance, Rider Haggard's "She" lives in the tomb, and in Benoit's *Atlantide*, Antinea surrounds herself with the corpses of her dead lovers. Nietzsche has this doubt because he had the prejudice that life had only the beautiful superficial, gay aspect. But now he is scared because life suddenly reveals the other side, the aspect of death. And then he asks, "Thou livest still, Zarathustra?" For Zarathustra was the fellow who always enjoyed the divine, beautiful, positive aspect of life, like Krishna and the milk maidens, and in that picture of eternal bliss, there is no suggestion of death. But since Nietzsche is not God, he has to meet death; since he is not Krishna, he has to see the other aspect of life which includes death. So I think the doubt whether Zarathustra still lives really comes from a feeling which is very much the equivalent of Christ's doubt of his Father on the cross:

Mein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast Du mich verlassen? That is very much the same question.

Miss Wolff: As if Nietzsche, as the son, had lost Zarathustra?

Prof. Jung: Yes, apparently he has lost him, and Zarathustra has become an unknown presence, almost uncanny. An unknown presence has usually the character of something uncanny.

Mrs. Jung: Could one not say the unknown presence is the shadow, because afterwards he comes to this island of the graves, the graves of his youth? And it would make the fourth to add to the Trinity.

Prof. Jung: That is a somewhat difficult aspect. I would not say this unknown presence was the shadow. It is more another aspect of Zarathustra, or another aspect of Wisdom. You see, Zarathustra also has the aspect of death. In the East, you remember, the deities always had two aspects, the positive and the negative; even Kwan Yin, the goddess of boundless kindness, had also a wrathful and infernal aspect. And so the archetypes have always a positive and a negative aspect. Therefore I would rather say that he suddenly sees Zarathustra in another light.

Prof. Reichstein: He says here: *Und ins Unergründliche schien ich mir wieder zu sinken.*⁷ And Zarathustra would be caught in it.

Prof. Jung: Prof. Reichstein thinks that Zarathustra is like the spark of light of the Gnostics, the eternal spirit that falls down into matter and is caught in it. That is perfectly true. It just depends upon the standpoint from which one looks at it. The curse of analysing *Zarathustra* is that Nietzsche is interchangeable with Zarathustra and we have the dickens of a time to discern which is which because the two are always together. From the standpoint of Nietzsche it is an ordinary human experience—well, of course it is most unusual, but there are many parallels in literature—he is first identical with the spirit, uplifted and exalted, and then he sinks down and suddenly discovers an entirely different aspect of things. And where is his beautiful spirit, where is Zarathustra? Now from the standpoint of Zarathustra—and obviously Nietzsche speaks from the standpoint of Zarathustra—things are naturally different. Zarathustra, being the archetype of the spirit is of course not a human being belonging to three-dimensional space and consisting of matter. So be naive, take him for a spirit; he claims to be a spirit—all right, accept it. Well, a spirit has an incorporeal existence. It is in no space; it is four-dimensional. But if that thing enters matter, it comes into space, and then the eternal myth of the descent of the spirit is repeated once more. Zarathustra is linked up with

⁷ "And into the unfathomable have I again seemed to sink."

the man Nietzsche; the man Nietzsche is a sort of tool or vehicle for the eternal four-dimensional spirit of Zarathustra.

And now Nietzsche undergoes a certain change: namely, he becomes aware of the other aspect of things, his sun sets, his consciousness goes into the underworld—and through Nietzsche the eternal spirit has that same experience. You know, the *Nous* of the Gnosis was attracted by his own reflection in the chaotic waters, and instantly the *Physis* leapt up and took him in and he dissolved in matter. Now the result of it was the creation of man, the ordinary man. The *anthropos* was the second man, who was born from that embrace. Zarathustra is something like the first man, the Adam Cadmon of the Cabalists or the Primus Adam of medieval philosophers. And we are the second Adam, one could say. As Adam was the first creation of God, so Christ is the second creation of God.⁸ Zarathustra is really the *anthropos* that has been caught in Nietzsche and shares to a certain extent Nietzsche's experience. You see, we can imagine ourselves, or we can feel into Zarathustra's mind, and we are to a certain extent able to see things from his point of view. But it is very conjectural because we are not archetypes and cannot feel into archetypes enough to know exactly what has happened to Zarathustra. We can feel properly only what happens to the man Nietzsche. We can put ourselves into his situation and we can also understand what he says about Zarathustra, but what Zarathustra feels about it is divine and beyond us.

That is as if I should take you to task and say, "You have a certain complex, perhaps an inferiority complex, which is an autonomous being in you because it comes and goes when it wants and not when you want. You are in the possession of that complex. Now please tell me the story of your complex: how does it feel in you? And what does *it* feel about your experience?" You see it is exceedingly difficult, and that is the case with Zarathustra. It is perfectly obvious that Zarathustra is a superiority complex in Nietzsche, if you want to put it bluntly and without imagination. But it is most unjust to say that the god or his genius is his superiority complex. That is technical slang which is simply out of place when it comes to the real facts, though psychologically it is so of course. We can only give the phenomenology of such a complex, but to feel into it, to establish the romance of that complex, is too difficult. I have no imagination about the way elves experience the

⁸ In the Jewish Kabbalah, Adam Cadmon is the First Man, who is complete—thus equivalent to the Jungian self—containing all the partial persons who come after. The medieval *anthropos* represents much the same idea.

world, or what any fragmentary soul knows or experiences about the world.

You may remember that story about the two elves and the Danish pastor. He had been with a sick man and was very tired, and he was going home late at night by a lonely way over the moors, when he suddenly heard faint and very beautiful music. Then he was thunderstruck to see two people walking over a place on the moors where no man could walk without drowning, and then he found they were elves and it was they who were making the music. (Elves make music, you know.) They approached him and asked who he was and where he came from and said how nice it was that he was a parson. And they were very sad that they had no immortal souls and asked him what they should do to get them. Now that good parson could not think what to do: he couldn't feel into that complex. He had not foreseen such a situation and he did not understand their psychology. But he said they must pray to God to give them souls and the only thing he could think of was the *Our Father*. So he said to repeat after him, "Our Father, who art in Heaven." And they said, "Our Father, who art not in Heaven." "No," he said, "that is wrong, you must say 'who art in Heaven.'" And again they said, "who art not in Heaven." They simply could not say it as he said it. He could not make it out. Of course not, how can a man with a soul feel into a thing that has no soul? If we could do that we would know something about the psychology of stones. I wish I could!

Now, Zarathustra is of course a superior soul, a super-intensity, and we must handle Zarathustra very carefully and reverently because it is Nietzsche's spiritual experience. You see, the questions, "Why? Wherefore? Whereby? Whither? Where? How?" are of course the questions of a man in despair. What about the spirit? What is the purpose? Why should there be such a thing? It is really "My Father, why hast thou forsaken me" and "Is it not folly still to live"? Does life make sense at all? But that is an aspect of life too, that is the chaos; it is no longer the dance, but the night life, and it is not understandable. It is darkness, the complete blackness of despair. Now sure enough, Zarathustra is touching the darkness here; inasmuch as man is affected by that darkness, the spirit that dwells near him—over or above him but contacting him—becomes acquainted with its own opposite, the darkness. There it touches matter and therefore that moment is all important. So what Prof. Reichstein says emphasizes a moment of metaphysical importance, because the question is asked from the standpoint of Zarathustra, the spirit that got into matter. And this is the moment

when the spirit gets into matter. You see, that explains a good deal of the subsequent symbolism.

Mrs. Crowley: In connection with the Trinity, could it not also be the opposites, the Yin and the Yang, and the self?

Prof. Jung: Naturally. For instance, the trinity in medieval philosophy was spirit, soul, and body. The body of course refers to the Yin and the spirit to Yang, and the psyche would be in between.

Now we will go on to the next chapter, "The Grave-Song." I have already read the first paragraph. The grave-island, the silent isle, as is understandable from the general character of the preceding chapters, is a descent into Yin. The ultimate character of the Yang is the extinction into Yin because it is its opposite in character. But one cannot say it is death; it only feels like death when you come from the side of the Yang. It is rather, one could say, the vessel in which the positive activity of the Yang is contained, or it is the possibility through which the Yang can work. Therefore, the Yin can easily be identified with Shakti: it is the vessel of the creator. Or it is Maya, the building material of the world, moved by the creative point in the center, the *Shiva bindu*; that is the god from which all moving forces emanate, but they only become visible through Maya or Shakti.⁹ So the Yin is an indispensable condition to real existence; without it the latent creative power of Shiva would lie dormant forever. And the Yin in itself doesn't mean death, but only a negative condition over against an active condition. But when you come from an identification with the spirit, it looks like death, as if you were buried. It becomes doubtful whether the spirit has ever lived and above all one doesn't see of what use it could be. The real essence of the spirit seems to be denied, improbable—impossible even. So naturally when Nietzsche comes to the realization of himself as a human being apart from Zarathustra, it feels to him exactly like death, or like a prison. At all events, what he realizes in the first place is what he formulates here, the grave-island or the silent isle. And what kind of psychological condition is that?

Mr. van Waveren: A state of introversion.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but when a man is on an isolated island in the sea he probably gazes out to the horizon and that would be rather an extraverted activity. Of course if he sought that island in order not to be

⁹ Maya: Mother of the World. Shakti: spouse or female companion of the god Shiva. *Bindu* means "point," defined as in geometry to be without dimension, which is where creation begins. See CW 9 i, par. 631.

bothered by the world, he would curse every ship that came into the vicinity and would turn his back on the sea, and then you would speak of introversion. But this island has a different tone. What condition does it symbolize?

Mr. Baumann: That all human relations are cut off.

Miss Hannah: Isolation.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is the utter stillness and solitude of the grave. A man is completely cut off on such an island. For who goes there? Only the dead that never return. So it is also an eternal prison, and he himself is a sort of ghost landing there. The psychological condition that he now becomes aware of is his absolute loneliness. Before, he was Zarathustra surrounded by imaginary disciples, talking to crowds in the marketplaces of towns. He had a mission, he represented something. His heart was full to overflowing with all that he wanted to bestow on people; he bestowed his gifts upon nations. And now he is on the island of the dead. That inflation has gone, as even the worst inflation comes to an end at times. You know, a person who has an habitual inflation will have his bad moments when he has the idea he is all wrong, but when actually for the first time he is normal, and so this is a perfectly normal moment of depression. He suddenly realizes his real isolation and falls into himself, into his human existence. Nietzsche was then presumably in Sils Maria or some such place where he didn't know a soul, where he talked to nobody or where he only talked to ghosts. He was absolutely lonely from a human point of view, and when a man under such conditions is left by the spirit, to what is he left? Well, to a sackful of bad memories, or wasps' nests or nettles in which he can sit. And all that is himself.

Resolving thus in my heart, did I sail o'er the sea.—

Oh, ye sights and scenes of my youth! Oh, all ye gleams of love, ye divine fleeting gleams! How could ye perish so soon for me! I think of you to-day as my dead ones.

What has happened here?

Mrs. Adler: It is a memory out of his personal unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he enters here on his personal psychology; he comes to his very personal memories. In my German lecture I showed a chart where you see that the first thing you meet when you turn into yourself is reminiscences. When you are alone things suddenly come into your mind which you had forgotten because there was too much noise, too much activity. So when you come to yourself you get to the world of

thought, of memories.¹⁰ As long as Zarathustra kept Nietzsche busy, his personal life was non-existent, but when he comes to the isolation of his own body he drops into the world of memories. The very first thing you do in an analysis, in order to learn something about yourself, is to fall into reminiscences, and sometimes for months people go on spinning the yarn of their own infantile memories down to the womb of the mother. For memories, reminiscences, are the gate, the entrance to the world within, and as soon as you open the door, out they come. So the first thing is that he sees all those sights and scenes of his youth, those divine, fleeting gleams of love that soon ceased. Here we approach a sphere of *ressentiment*. Something very bad has been done to the poor child: "I could not remain a child, unfortunately enough; bad people have wounded me!" And then up comes the *ressentiment*.

From you, my dearest dead ones, cometh unto me a sweet savour, heart-opening and melting. Verily, it convulseth and openeth the heart of the lone seafarer.

What is this?

Mrs. Fierz: His inferior feeling.

Prof. Jung: Yes, now the feelings come up, and why inferior?

Mrs. Fierz: Because he never lived them later, when he grew up.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, so they never developed. But what is their general quality?

Mrs. Crowley: An insistence.

Miss Welsh: Emotional.

Prof. Jung: They are emotional sure enough, and what is the general quality of the emotions?

Remark: Compulsive.

Remark: They have an archetypal quality.

Miss Welsh: They possess him.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, they are possessive and they insist, they take possession of the subject as if he were a piece of property. An emotion catches you, sits upon you; you cannot get rid of it. It sits upon your neck or clings to your throat. You may say you have an emotion, but usually the emotion has you—that is the trouble. Though it is euphonious to say you have an emotion, an emotion always has the bearer. So the inferior feelings that are now coming up have an extraordinary insistence and penetration: they envelop him, encoil him completely, and he will soon be possessed by them again, which means that he has

¹⁰ See below pp. 1197-98.

always been possessed by them. He even jumped into the world of the spirit, one could say, in order to escape the terrible clutch of the inferior function. That spiritual exaltation was because he could not get along with his inferior feeling life—it was too tough, too touchy, too insistent and penetrating—and instantly one knows that he himself remained under the feeling that he was such a poor beggar that he could be done out by that feeling on the spot. He says,

Still am I the richest and most to be envied—I, the loneliest one! For I have possessed you, and ye possess me still.

You see, he realizes the quality of possessiveness and he even arrives, though with protest, at the admission “And ye possess me still.”

Tell me: to whom hath there ever fallen such rosy apples from the tree as have fallen unto me?

Here he becomes euphemistic as before when he said, “I have possessed you”—I am the richest; the most wonderful rosy apples from the tree have fallen to me. He still tries to cling to the positive aspect. As Krishna sees the world, so Nietzsche, inasmuch as he is possessed by the spirit, tries to see the world in a positive aspect. So even the fact that this feeling renders him completely helpless, he tries to turn to his own advantage, as if *he* possessed his feelings, as if those experiences were rosy apples that fell from the tree for him.

Still am I your love’s heir and heritage, blooming to your memory with many-hued, wild-growing virtues, O ye dearest ones!

That is exactly like a euphemistic invocation to very wrathful gods—or to a wrathful sea, calling it a hospitable sea because it was absolutely inhospitable.

Ah, we were made to remain nigh unto each other, ye kindly strange marvels; and not like timid birds did ye come to me and my longing—nay, but as trusting ones to a trusting one!

Yea, made for faithfulness, like me, and for fond eternities, must I now name you by your faithlessness, ye divine glances and fleeting gleams: no other name have I yet learnt.

Here comes again the anima aspect of the inferior function—that the feelings have an anima aspect, or that these reminiscences or former experiences look like so many love stories, in a personification. One is really quite in doubt whether he doesn’t refer to love stories. But he doesn’t really: it is only the anima aspect of the world. And now he be-

gins to complain about faithlessness; he resents the fact that they should have died so early.

Verily, too early did ye die for me, ye fugitives. Yet did ye not flee from me, nor did I flee from you: innocent are we to each other in our faithlessness.

That means he drifted away from them and they drifted away from him.

To kill *me*, did they strangle you, ye singing birds of my hopes!

Now his resentment comes into the open. He never says who the enemies are that have stolen the feelings. You see, he has an idea that there has been faithlessness: either his early feelings have been faithless and left him, or perhaps he will admit that he also has been faithless to them, that he got away and rescued himself in the world of spirit. But no, nothing of the kind: I am myself with my memories and former experiences, and then there was the devil that came in between and killed those lovely singing birds. "They" have strangled them. Who are "they"?

Miss Hannah: Does he project it upon his parents and everybody?

Prof. Jung: Presumably.

Prof. Reichstein: Is it not his identification with Zarathustra which killed them? He took the way of the spirit and that was the reason why he excluded all this.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true. He identified with the spirit in order to escape the feeling world of his inferior function, and he tries now to explain how it came about that he is no longer in touch with that former world. The idea is that they, those memories, have left him, vanished: they were faithless. And then he also might have drifted away—he admits so much. But his idea is that both were really innocent: "innocent are we to each other"—one could say even in their faithlessness. So he tries to explain this peculiar fact that he could ever have left these beautiful things; he doesn't understand how he got away from them. And this is all the world of feeling. There is no question of the spirit Zarathustra any longer. For now he has entered the darkness and it clutches his feeling first of all, his feeling memories, and now he discovers that the devil has come in between. "They" have come in between; "they" have strangled his lovely birds.

Yea, at you, ye dearest ones, did malice ever shoot its arrows—to hit my heart!

Murderers came in between, who either shot at those lovely memories and feelings, or directly at his heart.

And they hit it! Because ye were always my dearest, my possession and my possessedness: . . .

If he is in a positive mood, he says he possesses *them*, and if he feels low he says *he* is possessed.

on that account had ye to die young, and far too early!

At my most vulnerable point . . . What is all manslaughter in comparison with what ye have done unto me!

He is now a sort of St. Sebastian at the pillar, a complete victim of certain enemies who are shooting arrows at him.¹¹ That is the way in which people ordinarily explain their negative experiences of life. Their enemies are called parents or school teachers, and later on, the analyst, or the newspapers, or the Jesuits, or the Freemasons are the enemies who have destroyed their lives—or it may be the wife. It is very often women who have destroyed them, projected something which they cannot explain to themselves otherwise. Now what is this enemy really? And what has his enemy done to him—I mean, if we don't take it literally that he has been surrounded from early youth by devils? We would say there is surely something in him that has deprived him of his early world.

Mrs. Crowley: It was really his intuition I suppose.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right, in his case it would be intuition, his superior function. You see, our superior function is the devil that takes us away from the lovely things of childhood, because it is the riding animal that takes us right away into the world, that keeps us busy, and then we forget all about that lovely drama which began in our early youth. For then we become sort of professional and one-sided; we get busy, and naturally we forget about ourselves to become acquainted instead with all the possibilities of the world. And so the thing that seemed to us the most useful—and not only seems but actually *is* the most useful, the most probable thing—turns out to be the very devil when it comes to the question of the self. You see, it might be your greatest gift, and if you are very gifted in a certain way, you would be an idiot if you did not make use of that gift. But if you are identified with your superior function, it becomes in a way autonomous; the tenor becomes his voice, the violinist becomes his fiddle, the king is

¹¹ St. Sebastian, third-century Roman soldier and Christian martyr.

nothing but his crown, and the scientist or the professor nothing but his text book. Naturally, if you do not identify, you couldn't do it. You must put out your entire strength in order to produce something—your heart and your body and everything in it. Otherwise you would produce nothing. But you must know that you have to pay for it; you will be separated from yourself, will become a one-sided, cultural product that has lost its roots. We shall see next time what these treasures are that Nietzsche has left behind and is now trying to rediscover.

LECTURE IX

30 June 1937

Prof. Jung:

We had begun with “The Grave-Song” last week, and I want to go over those first paragraphs again. You remember that in these last chapters—“The Night-Song, “The Dance-Song,” and “The Grave-Song”—we are concerned with Nietzsche’s approach to himself. It is a sort of descent to his inferior function, and the Grave-Song is leading now to the precincts of the unconscious. As you know, the unconscious has always been—and is still—projected. Under primitive circumstances the unconscious is the ghostland, the land of the dead. It is completely projected, far more so than with us. We project the unconscious chiefly into our surroundings, into people and circumstances, and are very little concerned with the ghost land. Of course there are exceptions, but it is not an idea that would be part of the general public opinion; it is very unusual for anybody to be bothered by the ghosts of the dead. It would be rather an extraordinary case, or even pathological. People are far more inclined to accept the possibility that they suffer from a neurosis, or even from a slight psychosis; they prefer to think that they have obsessions or compulsions rather than explain their symptomatology by the presence of ghosts. So when Nietzsche approaches the unconscious, he calls it the grave-island or the silent isle in a sort of metaphoric way. He doesn’t mean it too concretely. It is a metaphor but as it is not poetic language, it is also a bit more than a metaphor, and still contains something of the primitive atmosphere, something of the original aspect of an initiation or a descent to the unconscious. You see, an initiation has always to do with ghosts, and the approach to the unconscious therefore has also to do with ghosts in a more or less visible way. Sometimes it doesn’t look like that at all, but in certain cases the approach to the unconscious is like a psychic phenomenon; peculiar things happen. It really looks like ghosts.

I once saw such a case. (It was published in one of my lectures but I

will repeat it now.)¹ A woman, a rather hysterical individual, had gotten to a point when I felt that we should get something from the unconscious. You know, there are such situations. When people are in an impasse and one doesn't know exactly how to get them out of their difficulty, or when things are very unclear, one naturally has the feeling that now something should manifest—one should get a hint, or another factor should come into the game. That was the condition when she told me she had had a peculiar dream which she never had had before. She dreamt that she awoke in the night and noticed that the cause of her waking was that the room was filled with a strange light. First, she thought that she had left the electricity on but the bulb was not lit. The light was diffused and she didn't know exactly where it came from, but finally discovered that it issued from several places where there were sort-of accumulations of luminosity. Particularly in the curtains, which were drawn, she saw those round luminous accretions. And then she woke up, really. That was a dream, but of course it was not an ordinary one. It was a psychic phenomenon—what is called an exteriorization, whatever that is. I don't go much into the theories of these peculiar things; it was a dream, an objectivation of certain psychological things, and we have to be satisfied with this fact.

I told her then that something was on the way, because I knew from experience that when such dreams or similar facts occur, something else will soon come to the daylight. I rather expected that we would discover something that one could call psychological, but instead, the miracle with the glass happened. One morning at about seven o'clock she was wakened by a peculiar cracking and a trickling sound, and discovered that water was trickling down from the glass of water on her night table and that the whole of the rim of the glass had been split off in a perfectly clean-cut regular fashion. She called her maid to give her another glass and tried to sleep again. Suddenly she heard the same noise—the same thing had happened, and of course she got excited this time and thought it quite miraculous. She rang the bell again and the maid brought her another glass. And then the same thing happened once more. So it happened three times—three glasses were split, and all in the same regular way.

Now this is by no means the only case I have observed: I have another glass in my possession which was split in exactly the same way. It is an exteriorized phenomenon and it shows the peculiar reality of certain psychological events. Such things do happen under particular cir-

¹ See CW 10, par. 123.

cumstances. And, as I said, the same phenomenon can take on the aspect of ghosts or of visions. All these phenomena, which of course have been observed since time immemorial, are the reason for the idea of a really existing ghostland, and the descent into the unconscious has always been thought of as a descent into that other world, a reestablishment of the lost connections with the dead. A very good example is in Homer, where Ulysses descends into the underworld, and the blood of the sacrificed sheep makes the ghosts so real that they can speak. He has to wave them away with his sword and only allows certain ghosts to partake of the blood, that they may have substance enough to talk in an audible voice and to appear definitely.² All those stories in antiquity of the descent into Hades are of a similar kind; that was the old, primitive way of approaching the unconscious. And the approach to the unconscious in our days is still often characterized by such peculiar phenomena, which either happen in reality or in dreams of a very particular kind. From these dreams I got the impression that it was a matter of something far less futile or abstract than our conscious psychology; there is something there that approaches a certain substantiality.

So the analogy which Nietzsche uses here is partially a speech metaphor or a poetic image, and partially it is due to primitive reasons. The land of the dead is often an island—the island of the blessed, or the island of immortality, or the island of the graves where the dead are buried or the ghosts are supposed to live. Or it is perhaps a certain wood or a particular mountain—in Switzerland the glaciers are still haunted by the ghosts of the dead. And in the part of Africa that I saw, an especially dense growth of bamboos in the forest, the so-called bamboo-belt on Mount Elgon, was supposed to be the abode of the spirits. One really gets an extraordinary impression there. The bamboo grows very quickly and perfectly huge. The wind goes over the treetops way up above, no air can penetrate, and inside the wood it is completely still. The sound of steps is deadened by the moss and the dead leaves that cover the ground so deep that you sink in over your ankles. No birds live there so it is really soundless, and there is a sort of greenish darkness as if one were under water. The natives were scared to death of the ghosts and tried all sorts of tricks to escape being forced to go into that part of the wood. So Nietzsche's picture of the silent isle in the ocean is quite true to type, and he has to sail over the sea to reach that place where the dead live. You have probably seen the picture called

² *Odyssey* XI.22-33.

"The Island of the Dead" by our famous Swiss painter Böcklin; it is practically everywhere in the form of picture postal cards and such horrors.³ Now what does he meet there? He says,

Resolving thus in my heart, did I sail o'er the sea.—


Oh, ye sights and scenes of my youth! Oh, all ye gleams of love,
ye divine fleeting gleams! How could ye perish so soon for me! I
think of you to-day as my dead ones.

You see, the shadows of Hades that are coming up to meet him are instantly explained as his personal reminiscences—of course a very modern point of view. To a more primitive man it would have been the ghosts of the past—not the shadows, the ghosts of the people who were dead—just as Ulysses meets the spirit of his mother and embraces her again. We would say, "I had a very clear memory of my mother. I saw her as she was in life." But to a more primitive mind it is the mother who appears in reality, as it were, of course in a shadowy form. You know perhaps that story of the little black boy who used to sit with the missionary by the fire in the evening. He noticed that the boy always put a bowl of rice aside and talked and answered as if he were having a discussion with somebody. So he asked him about it and the boy said: "My mother comes every evening and sits with us by the fire and I talk to her." The missionary said, "I didn't know you had a mother and moreover I see nobody here." "Of course," said the boy, "I don't see her either, but she is here. I talk to her and she answers." We would say that in the evening, sitting by the fire, we remember our dead parents or our dead friends. It is the charm of an open fire that one begins to dream and one's dreams of course take the form of reminiscences.

Now this is another aspect of the approach to the unconscious: you get caught by your reminiscences of the past and follow the lure of your reminiscences. I mentioned last week a chart that I made in my German lectures of the structure of the ego. I depicted the ego as a circle, and in the first layer of the psychic structure would be reminiscences, or the memory, the faculty of reproduction (1). Outside (5) are the famous four functions that adapt to outer reality, serving us as functions of orientation in our psychological space; and you handle these functions by your will, giving direction to them inasmuch as they are subject to your willpower. At least one function is as a rule differentiated, so that you can use it as you like, but of course the inferior

³ Arnold Böcklin (1827-1901), a once popular and admired painter of mythological landscapes.

function is as if inside so that it cannot be used at will. The second of these layers round the center consists of affectivity, the source of emotions, where the unconscious begins to break in (2). The further you enter the ego, the more you lose your willpower: you cannot dominate in this inner sphere, but become more and more the victim of a strange willpower one could say, which issues from somewhere here in the center (4), a force you may call “instinct” or whatever you like—libido” or “energy”—to which you are subject. You become more and more passive.



You see, we can rule our reminiscences to a certain extent—can order certain reminiscences to come up, for instance—and use our reproductive faculty that far. On the other hand, we largely depend on the spontaneity of our reproductive faculty to bring memories back. It often happens that they *won't* come back; you seek a name or a fact and cannot remember it, and then suddenly at another time it reproduces itself. Sometimes it is quite annoying, for it behaves like a *kobold*⁴ or an elf: it is there when you don't need it, and when you need it, it is not there. So you are already annoyed by elfish interludes when it comes to your reproducing faculty, but still more when you come to affects (2).⁵ You cannot produce an affect by will: it produces itself, and a real emotion is something that knocks you out of the house. You don't expect it and you have all the trouble in the world to sit on your affect, to

⁴ In German folklore, a *kobold* is an underground gnome, often mischievous.

⁵ In his definition of *affect* (CW 6, par. 681) Jung makes emotion its synonym, meaning a state “characterized by marked physical innervation on the one hand and a peculiar disturbance of the ideational process on the other.” In contrast, for Jung, feeling is a cognitive process, that one of the four basic functions whose object is value.

control it and keep it quiet, and sometimes you are thrown from the saddle. Further in, you come to what I call intrusions, *Einbrüchen* (3), pieces of the unconscious that suddenly break into consciousness and sometimes disturb it very gravely. They come with affect and appear in the form of reminiscences.

So when Nietzsche made his *katabasis*, his descent into the unconscious, he met first his reminiscences that came with affect and carried with it the unconscious. It really *is* the unconscious and therefore he calls it the "island of the dead." This center point (4) is the ocean of the unconscious. Of course I have to represent it by a point, because I approach this central psychical fact from a world of space. In reality it would be just the reverse: outside (5) would be an immense ocean in which lies the island of consciousness; but inside it looks as if the unconscious were the little point, a tiny island in the ocean, and the ocean is also exceedingly small since it is supposed to be inside of us. Those are sort of optical illusions due to the structure of our consciousness. It is interesting to explore the way the unconscious looks from different angles. It is smaller than small yet greater than great.

From you, my dearest dead ones, cometh unto me a sweet savour, heart-opening and melting. Verily, it convulseth and openeth the heart of the lone seafarer.

You see, Nietzsche feels or interprets the thing that is approaching him, or which he is approaching, as reminiscences of the past. But in his first statement it is as if he were travelling over the sea and came to the island of the dead. Then as soon as he is there, he reverses the picture and says the reminiscences were coming to him, so *he* would be the island and the reminiscences crowd up to him. On the one side he is in the picture of the sea, in the boat of Charon, the boat that carries the corpses over the sea to the grave island: he is the seafarer; and on the other side he is the one who had reminiscences. So he mixes up the two statements: namely, the unconscious is that tiny island which he discovers lost somewhere in the sea, and at the same time he is that island to which reminiscences are coming.

Still am I the richest and most to be envied—I, the loneliest one! For I have possessed you, and ye possess me still. Tell me: to whom hath there ever fallen such rosy apples from the tree as have fallen unto me?

Here also you can see the mixture of the two points of view, "I have possessed you," and "ye possess me still," which is just the reverse.

When he assumes that he is the seafarer, he is going to take possession of that island, but if he is the island, the reminiscences possess him: they are then seafarers that come up from the unconscious.

Still am I your love's heir and heritage, blooming to your memory with many-hued, wild-growing virtues, O ye dearest ones!

Ah, we were made to remain nigh unto each other, ye kindly strange marvels; and not like timid birds did ye come to me and my longing—nay, but as trusting ones to a trusting one!

He is now more in the form or the condition of the one to whom the reminiscences come. The unconscious appears first, as I said, in the form of personal reminiscences, and also—a very important point which we were discussing last week—in the form of the inferior function. The reminiscences will be colored to a great extent by the character of the inferior function. In Nietzsche's case, this inferior side is sensation-feeling because he is in the conscious chiefly intuitive, with intellect in the second place. Now, inferior sensation gives a peculiar concretistic reality to reminiscences and that probably accounts for the particularly plastic imagery. For instance, the "sweet savour" of reminiscences, and the "rosy apples" are concretistic details which show the inferior sensation. Then the feeling is obviously not only feeling proper, but sentimentality, so the feeling is not quite trustworthy in this chapter, taking it as a whole. You know, inferior feeling has always that peculiar character of sentimentality which is the brother of brutality. Sentimentality and brutality are a pair of opposites which are very close together and can instantly change from one to the other.

Yea, made for faithfulness, like me, and for fond eternities, must I now name you by your faithlessness, ye divine glances and fleeting gleams: no other name have I yet learnt.

Verily, too early did ye die for me, ye fugitives. Yet did ye not flee from me, nor did I flee from you: innocent are we to each other in our faithlessness.

These thoughts also cast an interesting light upon his relation to his inferior function, particularly to the feeling and to the memories of the past. He speaks here of faithlessness, and you remember Nietzsche's first conception of *Zarathustra* came when he was thirty-seven years old, at the time when the great change comes. That is the age when the ego purpose normally fades from life and when life itself wants to accomplish itself, when another law begins. Before that time, it is quite normal to be faithless to reminiscences, in other words—according to

our diagram—it is normal to move away from the center (5) in order to apply the will to ego purposes. But in the middle of life a time comes when suddenly this inner sphere asserts its right, when we cannot decide about our fate, when things are forced upon us, and when it seems as if our own will were estranged from ourselves, so that we can hold our ego purpose only through a sort of cramped effort. If things are natural, then the will, even when applied to ego purposes, would not be exactly our own choice any longer, but would be rather a sort of command that issues from this center (4) although, by a sort of illusion, we perhaps think it to be our own purpose. But if one has a bit of introspection, one feels or sees very clearly that we don't choose—it is chosen for us. Of course that understanding becomes all the clearer when the command detaches one from the outside world and forces one to give attention to one's subjective condition.

Now, when the inferior function comes up, it forces you invariably to give attention to yourself and it detaches you from the external world, even if it looks as if the inferior function were altogether identical with the external world, and as if you were pulled out of yourself. But you will see if you follow it that you will be detached from the world, because if you come out with your inferior function, you will arouse so much misunderstanding around you, in your family or among your friends, that you will be isolated in no time. When Nietzsche speaks of faithlessness here, he alludes to the fact that for quite a while in the life he had hitherto lived, he had separated from that world of his memory, and he looked forward, away from himself. And now he suddenly realizes that that world does still exist and that it has an enormous spell for him, so he has to explain to himself that it was not faithlessness—he always loved that world—it was only fate that somehow separated him from it. It might look like faithlessness but it really was not. Now comes a new aspect:

To kill *me*, did they strangle you, ye singing birds of my hopes!
Yea, at you, ye dearest ones, did malice ever shoot its arrows—to
hit my heart!

This is not quite easy to understand. Here he suddenly realizes that something has estranged him from his reminiscences. He suddenly feels divorced from his past—something has happened to it—yet he finds himself loving the memory of all the experiences of his past. Sure enough, in that moment of life the past is no more, it is killed. One is no longer the man of the past, because that man lived, turned away from the past and the memories, and now, you see, it is the new man

who is returning to them. So the old man seems to be dead; he cannot reverse the process. Try as he would, he can no longer live in that way. Therefore he feels as if something had been killed; that sort of faithlessness really consists in the fact that his very memories, whatever constituted his former self, are dead. This is a subjective interpretation, of course; it is as if a fiend had secretly murdered his memories, so that they have become shadows. But his memories have not become shadow; he has become a shadow. You see, he has enough intuition to say, "To kill me did they strangle you," and to say that the arrows which hit them also hit him in order to kill him. So he has the intuition that he has become a shadow in a way, not his reminiscences. But he speaks as if they had been killed and that is a projection: he as his own memory, the man of the past, has been killed, because that way of functioning is no longer possible. He cannot return to it. And this is the new experience.

And they hit it! Because ye were always my dearest, my possession and my possessedness: [the two aspects again] on that account had ye to die young, and far too early!

It is not quite understandable why they had to die, but I assume it is a projection of his experiences—that he has become in a way a shadow, that he is no longer the man he used to be. Here it comes quite clearly,

At my most vulnerable point did they shoot the arrow—namely, at you, whose skin is like down—or more like the smile that dieth at a glance!

This imagery shows that his inferior feeling is exceedingly vulnerable; it is like Siegfried, who had one spot on his back which was vulnerable and that spot killed him. That is the weak spot—the reminiscences, the looking back—that is the place from which we come and to which we go, the island of the dead from which the souls come to be reborn, and to which the souls go when they are going to sleep, to wait for the next incarnation, as it were. And that is the unconscious. We come from the unconscious and we go to the unconscious, which in primitive terminology is "the ghost land." So you see, that ghost land from which we come, our origin, forms the weak spot in us. In a way like the navel which denotes the place where the original life streamed into us through the umbilical cord, it is the place which is not well defended and which will eventually kill us, the place through which death will enter again. And since this is the critical point, one tries to get away from it. One lives away from the world of memories, which is very useful and

indispensable if one wants to live at all. If one is possessed by memories, one cannot adapt to new conditions.

One sees people who are forever possessed by the past, who can never adapt because they never understand the new situation: it seems to be always the old one. They cannot forget their memories; the way they adapted to their parents becomes their unforgettable model. So in order to be able to adapt, you must have that faithlessness to your memories and to all those you loved in the past, that innocent faithlessness. You have to drift away, forget what you are, and be unconscious of yourself if you want to adapt at all—up to a certain moment in your life. And then it becomes impossible to go on any longer because if you want to be yourself you cannot forget, and more and more the past comes back. For instance, it is well known that old people think a great deal about their youth. Their youthful memories often come back to a most annoying degree; they are really possessed by their memories of the past and new things don't register at all. That is a normal phenomenon. The only abnormality is when they lose the little bit of consciousness they have and talk of nothing but infantile memories.

Now, that weak or tender spot is like a young bird, easily destructible; it is exceedingly sensitive and touchy and susceptible because it is our inferiority. The memories are the place where we are still children, utterly unadapted—where we still live the past. Therefore, inasmuch as we live the past, we are at the mercy of circumstances. Moreover, when we are unadapted we are touchy, and to be touchy means to be a tyrant who tries to master circumstances by sheer violence. Unadapted people are tyrants in order to manage their lives. They bring about a sort of adaptation by suppressing everybody else; it looks as if an adaptation had been reached because circumstances are beaten down. Now Nietzsche says,

But this word will I say unto mine enemies: What is all manslaughter in comparison with what ye have done unto me!

This shows the extraordinary vulnerability of his inferior function. When he comes to his memories, he suddenly realizes a *ressentiment* concerning his past. It looks to him as if he had been terribly suppressed by his surroundings. And when anybody feels like that, he will be exceedingly touchy and tyrannical with his surroundings, and he will be isolated on account of those impossible feelings. That was of course Nietzsche's own case, and because it was not seen enough, his statement is so hysterical one can almost hear the plaintive sentimental way in which it is said.

Worse evil did ye do unto me than all manslaughter; the irretrievable did ye take from me:—thus do I speak unto you, mine enemies!

Nietzsche explains here what it is that has been taken from him. You see, he has been killed, has become a shadow, but that is what he doesn't know; so he assumes that his memory world has been taken from him—all his early reminiscences of the lovely things that he loved and enjoyed and from which he turned away for a while. And when he comes back to them he discovers that something has happened: they seem to be killed. He doesn't realize that he has changed and is no longer the same man. So he feels that he has undergone an irretrievable loss, an *Unwiederbringliches*, which means something that cannot be brought back. It has gone forever and it looks to him like murder, manslaughter, and he thinks that enemies have done it. Of course he is projecting a perfectly normal fact that has happened to man forever; since he is unaware of it, he projects it.

This is a very ordinary case—many people suffer from the same illusion. From a certain time in their life onward, they believe that people have maneuvered against them, played all sorts of tricks on them. Or they believe that something once happened that was simply fatal; it has very bad consequences and naturally somebody else is responsible for it. By such illusions they try to explain why they have become different, but as a matter of fact it is life itself that has made them different; they have grown into something different from what they supposed they were. Of course you must have a peculiar illusion to assume that you can live in a different sphere of life just as well: *ubi bene ibi patria*. That means, where the circumstances are favorable, you could live and be yourself. But in order to have such an illusion you have to forget what you are and what you have been, for what you are is what you have been: you carry that which you have been with you everywhere. As long as you can put a sort of layer of unconsciousness between what you are here and what you were there, you can manage all sorts of adaptations, can imagine that you are now the fellow who has made himself into such-and-such a thing. Of course you pay for that illusion by the loss of the memory world, by the loss of that which you have been. In reality, however, you cannot really lose it. It is always there, but it is a skeleton in the cupboard, a thing of which you are always afraid because it will undo the thing you have built up. It will contradict it and inexorably remind you of what you are and what you have been. When that thing begins to manifest, if it now attracts that man who has been

in the outer world and makes him into that which he had been, then it looks as if he had been murdered. Of course since he doesn't understand that whole thing, it is again a projection. I have not been killed but my reminiscences have been killed, the beauty of my former world has been taken away, and it is a loss which can never be made good.

Now this is the ordinary neurotic unconsciousness, a typical neurotic illusion. You see, such people mind that they live at all, mind circumstances, and project all sorts of reproaches into other people. They assume that certain events have destroyed something in them instead of understanding that they have changed, have become different beings. And peculiarly enough, what they call a different being, what they think they are, they are not. They say they have never been as they are now, but that is just the thing that they have always been, only they were unconscious of it; so when they come into it, they feel it to be something different. If they were able to see it, it is *they* who have changed; nobody murdered their reminiscences but they died—the former man died. They are now ghosts and no longer what they understood to be a living being. You see, what such people understood to be a living being was that thing that lived away from itself. It was an illusionary being, a role one played, so in a way it was an artificial position which they created. For instance, a man with a good voice is that voice—he is that tenor. Then in the later part of life his voice cracks and he feels of course that the world has injured him. You see, he discovers then what he has always been before he had that voice. His voice helped him to create a perfectly artificial illusionary existence in the world. Of course that is perfectly legitimate: you must sell yourself in order to live, so you must create a position which can be handed out to the world as a sort of value which you will be paid for. But that is not yourself really. It is what you have been, and when that thing vanishes, you find yourself in a sphere that always has been, but it was always unconscious up to the moment when you returned to it again. It is an island which was always there and you have always been on it, but you never were conscious that you were there; and now, when the illusion dies—that fiction which you have held about yourself—and you come back to the island, for the first time the island becomes conscious. But it looks mighty gloomy, yet that is yourself.

Now, Nietzsche is quite unconscious about it, so this is a passage where he somehow gets my goat. It makes me uncomfortable when he speaks of the enemies and what they have done to the poor little child. Naturally I get a professional complex here and think that damned thing ought to be mended. There are certain writers whom I cannot

read on account of that professional complex. Why all that fuss? It is all illusion. Now he continues in the same plaintive style.

Slew ye not my youth's visions and dearest marvels! My playmates took ye from me, the blessed spirits! [The *Erlkönig* and his daughters.] To their memory do I deposit this wreath and this curse.

This curse upon you, mine enemies! Have ye not made mine eternal short, as a tone dieth away in a cold night! Scarcely, as the twinkle of divine eyes, did it come to me—as a fleeting gleam!

Thus spake once in a happy hour my purity: "Divine shall everything be to me."

That is another memory and again a very important characteristic of early memories, of the same order as the playmates who are blessed spirits. These feeling memories point to the archetypal reminiscences of which I spoke in the last Seminar. I mentioned that little boy who was fetched every night by the white maidens that came down from heaven in a zeppelin, to take him to the island that wants to be visited. They were probably the *Erlkönig's* daughters, those wonderful spirits whose playmate he once had been. Now those are reminiscent feelings of a perfect state, a sort of paradise state; in Goethe's poem, *Die Erlkönig*, it is the archetypal images very often in dreams that anticipate death. I have dealt with such a case in one of our dream seminars, a little girl who died of an infectious disease when she was nine. She had these archetypal dreams a year and a half before she died and before there was any trace of illness—dreams that have almost nothing to do with our kind of life or reality.⁶

These early memories often have a glamor and splendor that is quite extraordinary. It is a sort of primeval world out of which the child is born when it may have lived already for many years in this world, but in the mind the child is still in that primeval world and only gradually comes out of it. And there are not a few who get eternally stuck there, and they retain all the innocence and beauty of the primeval world even if they live a kind of life which would be called immoral by everybody in his sense. But it doesn't touch them—it is merely a compensation for a basic innocence. They are still living in the archetypal images and are utterly and divinely unaware of what they live in reality. They live in the slime in reality, but in the fantasy or inner feeling they are still in the primeval world of complete innocence. Now here Nietzsche

⁶ See CW 18, pars. 525-39.

refers to that innocence: one can hardly call it an early experience because it is not really an experience, but was there before there was consciousness. Before this world existed there was the divine world, and any child that comes out of that world still looks at things with divine eyes and says, "Divine shall everything be unto me." Everything has the splendor of divinity, and what things really are remains concealed for many years, sometimes for a lifetime.

I have seen quite a number of people who have never been born, who still live in that original sphere. Of course they had a most miserable life, as you can imagine, but they were always blissfully unaware of it. They were physically ill because the body naturally reacts against such mental unreality. The body has to live in this reality, and the mind is in a primeval condition. Very often one finds cases where it is a matter of a partial or a sort of fragmentary birth, when a part of the mental personality has remained in the primeval world which then forms a sort of inclusion, a sort of enclave in the conscious world. Such people are perfectly adapted and apparently normal, but they have peculiar dreams. The more normal they are, the more they are afraid of that inclusion; and the more abnormal they are, the less it frightens them. The inclusion is like an island belonging to another world which is included in their own world but in no way attached. It is something perfectly strange. One cannot say that such cases are frequent, but they are not very rare. It is a fact which is hardly ever known, however—one seldom hears of it.

Just by chance we discovered such a case in our German dream seminar and it is well worthwhile to mention it because Nietzsche is of that kind. A young man who seems to be adapted—one could not say that he was incapacitated in any way—had a dream that repeated itself from his fourth or fifth year up to his eighteenth year. He is still in the early twenties, so it is not very long ago that this thing subsided, and it is now an inclusion. The dream was always something like this: He finds himself on the surface of a planet, presumably the earth, but it is a cosmic desert, and he is afraid of something or somebody that persecutes him. He is running away when he suddenly falls into a deep shaft. He falls and he falls, and the enemy is now up above looking down through the shaft, and occasionally he gets a glimpse of that fellow who is peeping in. While he is falling into apparently a limitless depth, he sees that at the other end far below are the flames of hell. But the persecutor on top showers a rain of square tablets down upon him, and there are so many of them that they condense the air in the shaft and form a sort of *couche* or layer which prevents him from falling any

further. On a ledge of rock he comes to a standstill and there he sits: the tablets obviously have rescued him. Now the fellow up above is usually the devil, or it may be the face of quite a friendly being, often the face of a god, or the dreamer's own face. He actually made some of those tablets in order to give me an idea of them: each tablet was about six centimeters square and each one contained a different design, but it was always a mandala. So the persecutor showered mandalas down upon him, sort of magic tablets, in order to protect him, and it saved him finally.

You see, he is confronted with a most unusual problem for his age: he finds himself upon the surface of an uninhabited planet, which means loneliness in space, and he doesn't possess the faculty that other people possess of creating the illusion of friendly surroundings. And because he doesn't possess that faculty he is persecuted by the thing he doesn't possess and which he ought to have. He ought to have a god and a devil and a friend and himself, and they are after him and would give him the possibility of creating the illusion of a habitable world where he can take roots and establish himself as a definite human being in friendly relations with his surroundings. Since he was born without the illusion of relationship to this world, all that faculty is still in another world and has to run after him in order to get him finally. And that friend or devil or god, or whatever it is, gets him by that multitude of mandalas which suggest wholeness, the round thing and the four square thing which mean totality; and the two finally become one to a certain extent so that the dream could disappear. It looks, you see, as if the birth had really occurred. When he was about eighteen years old he was able to detach from the primordial world, the world of fairies, which had caused him to see the earth as an uninhabitable planet. That is a vision characteristic of childhood.

I know another instance, the dream of a girl about ten or eleven years old, which also repeated itself rather often. She is in empty cosmic space, walking on something like a path, and far in the distance ahead of her, she sees a round light, which as she approaches becomes bigger and finally is an enormous globe that comes nearer and nearer, and of course she grows afraid. Then when the globe is close to her, the path bifurcates and she doesn't know whether she should go to the right or to the left, and in that moment she wakes up. It is a nightmare. This is a very typical dream of that kind: I call them cosmic dreams of childhood. They are the archetypal experiences of children with strong memories of what the Tibetans would call the Bardo life, a pre-natal condition of the mind, the condition before the birth into this

spatial world.⁷ That shows itself first under its absolute aspect, an empty, dead world to which life is absolutely strange—particularly human life—and it explains also why man has a mind or a consciousness at all. He must have something different, not of the same kind, or he would not be conscious. He must have something which is at variance with the conditions of our space, and it is a fact that the psyche is at variance with the conditions of our space.

Now, Nietzsche's original tendency—"divine shall everything be unto me"—was an attempt to make everything divine so that it would fit in with his primeval experience, with his presupposition of a world, the archetypal world. But the world into which he was born was not archetypal: there were fatal offences against the archetypal world. To begin with, his parents were far from being anything like an *Erlkönig*. So he was soon under the necessity of inventing or remembering a counter-position against his father. He was disappointed at having such a real, human father and could not adapt to it, so his unconscious gave him very early the idea of an entirely different kind of father, Wotan. When he was fifteen years old he had his great Wotan dream. And now you see what he complains of.

Then did ye haunt me with foul phantoms; ah, whither hath that happy hour now fled?

"All days shall be holy unto me"—so spake once the wisdom of my youth: verily, the language of a joyous wisdom!

But then did ye enemies steal my nights, and sold them to sleepless torture: ah, whither hath that joyous wisdom now fled?

He is complaining that his enemies—life, in other words—have haunted him with foul phantoms. That of course refers to all sorts of fantasies. He even accuses his enemies of causing him to have evil fantasies that poisoned his former experiences, all his expectation of the world as it should be—which means as he remembered it. We have already encountered the idea that everything should be divine, and it is expressed again in "All days shall be holy unto me" which was the language of joyous wisdom. Now it is the language of the Bardo life where everything was still archetypal, the language of the beautiful dreams, the beautiful memories of the prenatal past. And that his enemies steal his nights means that they steal his memories, the images of that beautiful world of the past, so all that wisdom has disappeared. The sleepless torture refers of course to his sleeplessness, and that has much to

⁷ For *Tibetan*, see above, 10 Oct. 1934, n. 18.

do with the fact that he lost that quiet peaceful island of memories, the world within to which he ought to return in order to sleep. If he cannot return to the inner world—if that is stolen, if he is isolated, cut off by a thick layer—naturally he cannot sleep. Sleep is the brother of death and one returns to the island of death in order to sleep. But he is far away in his illusion, and the island has been stolen, so he is left to sleepless torture. He says,

Once did I long for happy auspices: then did ye lead an owl-monster across my path, an adverse sign. Ah, whither did my tender longing then flee?

Now what is the meaning of this?

Mrs. Sigg: He had much too much wisdom and therefore his sleeplessness.

Prof. Jung: Why should there be an owl?

Mrs. Sigg: An owl is a symbol of *Weisheit*.⁸ It is the symbolic bird of Pallas Athena.

Mrs. Baumann: I want to ask whether it is an owl-monster. In my translation it is a monstrous owl, which just means big.

Prof. Jung: That is wrong. It is *ein Eulen-Untier*, an owl-monster.

Prof. Reichstein: The owl is a bird that sees in the night.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. It is the bird of Pallas Athena. Because it sees in the darkness, it has an understanding of the dark things, perspicacity. But of course here the owl-monster refers to a sort of wisdom which doesn't fulfill what one would expect of wisdom: it doesn't illuminate his darkness. This owl monster is a sort of fake wisdom. Now, what is the wisdom that has been given to us to teach us the understanding of darkness?

Mrs. Sigg: Religious teaching.

Remark: Philosophy.

Prof. Jung: Well, Sophia is wisdom, and *philosophia* means the love of wisdom: a philosopher is one who loves wisdom. But what about our philosophy? Does that enlighten the darkness of the soul? Not at all. Of course Nietzsche had a philosophical education and perhaps he refers to that, but I think the fact that he had a father who was a theologian points rather to another kind of wisdom, a religious wisdom which did not fulfill its promise. It did not enlighten him about the darkness of the soul. You know, he was concerned with an archetypal memory: we have evidence of that in his life. When he was fifteen years old, he had

⁸ *Weisheit*: wisdom.

the great Wotan dream; that archetypal experience was in him and the darkness was not explained by the religious teaching he got from his father. So the wisdom he was shown was an owl-monster that made everybody afraid. Of course a certain kind of Protestant teaching is quite apt to make people rather afraid, particularly of hell, because it is hardly a moral teaching and it doesn't let them live. It tells them that nothing is allowed, everything is forbidden.⁹ So the only conclusion one can draw is that one had best cease to exist in order to escape committing a sin! The owl is an uncanny bird, it means death. You know there is a kind of owl which is called "the death owl" on account of its uncanny cries in the night, a bird of ill omen. You see, he says, "Once did I long for happy auspices" and then that owl-monster was brought up instead of something auspicious which would have enlightened him.

Mrs. Sigg: In the Wotan dream he heard that voice.¹⁰

Prof. Jung: It is true that he heard then a horrible cry but whether that has to do with the owl I don't know.

⁹ Whereas of course Nietzsche came to believe that since God is dead, everything is allowed, nothing is forbidden. The death of God is proclaimed in *The Gay Science*, book 3, sec. 125 and in section 3 of the Prologue to *Zarathustra*.

¹⁰ Nietzsche's sister, in *N/Life* (p. 18), tells of his recording a dream just after the death of their father and just before that of their young brother: "A grave suddenly opened and my father in his shroud arose out of it. He hurried into the church and in a moment or two reappeared with a small child in his arms." Compare the howling dog, remembered from his sixth year, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, ch. 46, "The Vision and the Enigma," part 2, and see p. 1289 below.

SPRING TERM

May / June 1938

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LECTURE I

4 May 1938

Prof. Jung:

Here we are again at our old *Zarathustra*! And when I looked through the chapters we have dealt with and those we have still to deal with, I must tell you frankly, I got bored stiff, chiefly by the style. The long interruption has done no good to my enthusiasm apparently. As often before—but this time particularly—I was impressed with the unnaturalness of the style, Nietzsche's terribly exaggerated, inflated way of expressing himself. So I came to the conclusion that you have now had enough of this and that we don't need to go further into the actual detail. I think we had better do what the Germans call *Die Rosinen aus dem Kuchen picken*.

Mrs. Crowley: We say "to pick the plums out of the cake."

Prof. Jung: Yes, and so I have made a selection of such plums within the next chapters, where we get the principal ideas or the particular gems of psychology that are characteristic of *Zarathustra*. You know, in dealing with this material, we must always keep in mind, as I have emphasized time and again, that *Zarathustra* is not exactly Nietzsche, as Nietzsche is not exactly *Zarathustra*, yet the two are of course in a sort of personal union; there is an aspect of Nietzsche better called "*Zarathustra*," and an aspect of *Zarathustra* better called "Nietzsche," the personal, all-too-human man. For instance, *Zarathustra* suffers from any number of personal resentments which clearly belong to Nietzsche's professional existence: we cannot saddle *Zarathustra* with such ordinary reactions. Also much of the peculiar style is not to be put down to *Zarathustra*, though I should assume he would naturally prefer a somewhat hieratic style.

Zarathustra is a sort of *Geist*. That is a very ambiguous word; you can use the French word *esprit*, but the English word "spirit" does not cover it; you might say he was a genius though I am afraid that is not ambiguous enough—English in that respect is much too definite. But if you understand what *Geist* or *esprit* mean, you get about the size of *Zara-*

thustra.¹ Zarathustra is a more or less autonomous existence that Nietzsche clearly felt as a double, so we must assume that Zarathustra has in a way his own psychology; yet on account of that most unfortunate identification of Nietzsche with Zarathustra throughout the whole book, there is a continuous mixing of the two factors. From the standpoint of common sense or rationalism, one would naturally say, "But what is the figure of Zarathustra after all? Only a sort of metaphoric impersonation." But that point of view is not psychological; one would just miss the peculiarity of Zarathustra's character, and one would not be able to explain that manifestation. So we have to give him a certain amount of autonomy, and thus far we can call him a *Geist* or *esprit*, as if he were an extension of Nietzsche's own existence. Of course this is a logical process; one calls such a procedure an hypothesis—giving substance, extending existence, to something. This is not a metaphysical assertion, as you will understand, but merely a psychological assertion. There are indubitably psychological factors that have an autonomous existence. You feel such an existence as soon as something *gets* you, particularly if it gets your goat; then *it* gets you—you don't take it, it gets you—expressing thereby the fact that there is an autonomous factor within yourself, in that particular moment at least.

Now we will plunge in. Chapter 34 is called "Self-surpassing," *Selbst-überwindung*, and here are some passages which I should not like to omit. We will begin at the twenty-first paragraph:

Hearken now unto my word, ye wisest ones! Test it seriously, whether I have crept into the heart of life itself, and into the roots of its heart!

Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master.

That to the stronger the weaker shall serve—thereto persuadeth he his will who would be master over a still weaker one. That delight alone he is unwilling to forego.

And as the lesser surrendereth himself to the greater that he may have delight and power over the least of all, so doth even the greatest surrender himself, and staketh—life, for the sake of power.

It is the surrender of the greatest to run risk and danger, and play dice for death.

¹ The ambiguity of *Geist* is such that it is often translated "mind," but often also "spirit"; but as Jung repeatedly explains "mind" is usually wrong and "spirit" insufficient.

And where there is sacrifice and service and love-glances, there also is the will to be master. By by-ways doth the weaker then slink into the fortress, and into the heart of the mightier one—and there stealeth power.

And this secret spake Life herself unto me. “Behold,” said she, “I am that *which must ever surpass itself*.”

This is very characteristic of Nietzsche’s outlook on life. He really produced the psychological power theory first, anticipating, thus, Adlerian psychology, the so-called individual psychology, though it is not individual at all, but is very collective, as one sees from the way Nietzsche states the case.² You know, Nietzsche had already written a large book about power psychology, so here he simply alludes to it.³ It is quite certainly a very important truth, yet it is not the whole truth, but is *one* important aspect. A great many human reactions can be explained by the theory of power. Naturally power is inevitable: we need it. It is an instinct without which we can do nothing, so whenever a person produces anything, he is liable to be accused of a power attitude—if you want to accuse him at all, which is also a sort of power attitude.

People with a power attitude are always inclined to *accuse*, either to accuse in themselves a gesture of power, or anything suggesting such an attitude in anybody else. You see, that so-called power attitude is always expressed on the other side by feelings of inferiority; otherwise power makes no sense. It needs the power attitude to overcome the feelings of inferiority; but then the person with the power has again feelings of inferiority because of his own power attitude. So the two are always together: whoever has a power theory has feelings of inferiority, coupled with feelings of megalomania. Of course it may be realized to a certain extent, or it may be well concealed. In any case it is there.

When the power attitude is concealed, people chiefly speak of feelings of inferiority; even people with an absolutely clear power attitude insist very much on their feelings of inferiority—what modest little frightened mice they are, and how cruel people are to them—so one is perhaps quite impressed by their great modesty and inconspicuousness. But it is all a trick. Behind that is megalomania and a power atti-

* Alfred Adler (1870-1937), Freud’s first important “defector,” replaced the sexual drive by the power drive, though he disavowed Nietzsche as a model or even an influence. He is best known for *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology* (1923). On Freud vs. Adler, see CW 7, pars. 16-55.

³ It is not clear what work Jung is thinking of here—*The Gay Science*, *Untimely Meditations*? As he well knew, *The Will to Power*, the most obvious book to fit the description, was compiled from a multitude of notes only after Nietzsche’s death.

tude. It is a fishing for compliments: such a person laments his incompetence in order to make people say, "But you know that is not true!" It is a famous trick.

Of course other people have the declared power attitude that they are mighty bulls. I had a wonderful chance to observe that on my trip to India; and particularly on the boat coming back I studied the voices of those Indian officials, military and civil servants. I noticed that most of the men had made a sort of culture of the voice. It is remarkable. One man (he was a scientist, however) was a great boomer. I thought it sounded wonderful when he said "Good morning." One felt that it *weighed*. It was like old father Zeus getting up in the morning and saying to his gods, "Good Morning!" Then I overheard him telling another man, "Oh, I hadn't seen that fellow for twenty years, and lo and behold, he came up and asked me if I was not professor So-and-So; he didn't remember my face but he remembered my voice." And because the great boomer was booming himself, you could hear it over half the deck against the wind. At first I thought, what a mighty fellow! But it didn't take me long to see that this voice was just a big cloud, a smoke-screen, and behind was a very nice, modest little man who was afraid that he would not be taken for a full-grown personality, so he cultivated the voice to make *something* big at least. Then I saw the same thing in many others on board.

You see, most of the men on military service are really overcome by the immensity of India, the immensity of their task of being the superior people who uphold or carry the Indian Empire, a great continent of over 360 million people. How can they do it? Well, they must boom it, must make a noise, and so they cultivate that voice. It is the boss that speaks, the fellow that rules twenty slaves or servants, and at least five children, and two secretaries in the office, and he must impress himself—so his voice sounds very disagreeable, bossy, tyrannical, harsh, and arrogant. But those people are really perfectly nice, very ordinary, and very small—simply inadequate to their big task. That is very typical of the English colonial civilization. None of those civil servants or military people talked naturally—except one, and he was a very distinguished man. I did not ask his name, but he obviously belonged to the nobility, and he had the style of the very good boy of the grandmother. He talked very, very softly, had learned the trick of being inconspicuous, and didn't need to boom, but you could see in his face that he actually had the power. All the others only sounded as if they had.

Now, whenever people are called upon to perform a role which is too big for the human size, they are apt to learn such tricks by which to

inflate themselves—a little frog becomes like a bull—but it is really against their natural grain. So the social conditions are capable of producing that phenomenon of the too big and the too small, and create that social complex in response to the social demands. If conditions demand that they should be very big, people apparently produce a power psychology which is not really their own: they are merely the victims of their situation. Of course there are other people who are not called upon at all to develop such a psychology, yet produce it all by themselves, and those are the people who could do better than they do. Because they don't know their capacities, they don't make the effort that they really could make. They have feelings of inferiority and fall into a power attitude. Then there are the people who *can* do something. They are successful, and they are accused of having a power attitude by all those who have feelings of inferiority about their own power attitude. And there is the mistake; there the power theory comes to an end. For to be able to do a thing requires power; if one has not the power, one doesn't do it. Yet for having shown that power one will be accused of a power attitude, and that is all wrong because the power has not been used for illegitimate purposes; a person who can really do a thing is quite wrongly explained as having a power attitude. To use that power is legitimate. So the power instinct in itself is perfectly legitimate. The question is only to what ends it is applied. If it is applied to personal, illegitimate ends, one can call it a power attitude because it is merely a compensatory game. It is in order to prove that one is a big fellow: the power is used to compensate one's inferior feelings. But that forms a vicious circle. The more one has feelings of inferiority, the more one has a power attitude, and the more one has a power attitude, the more one has feelings of inferiority.

Now when Nietzsche sees the power aspect of things—and that aspect cannot be denied—he is quite right inasmuch as there is a misuse of power. But if he sees it everywhere, at the core of everything, if it has crept in as the secret of life even, if he sees it as the will to be and to create, then he makes a great mistake. Then he is blindfolded by his own complex, for he is the man who, on the one side, has feelings of inferiority, and on the other, a tremendous power complex. What was the man Nietzsche in reality? A neurotic, a poor devil who suffered from migraine and a bad digestion, and had such bad eyes that he could read very little and was forced to give up his academic career. And he couldn't marry because an early syphilitic infection blighted his whole Eros side. Of course, all that contributed to the most beautiful inferiority complex you can imagine; such a fellow is made for an

inferiority complex, and will therefore build up an immense power attitude on the other side. And then he is apt to discover that complex everywhere, for complexes are also a means of understanding other people: you can assume that others have the same complex. If you know your one passion is power and assume that other people have such a passion too, you are not far from the mark. But there are people who *have* power, who have good eyes and no migraine and can swing things, and to accuse those people of “power” is perfectly ridiculous, for they create something, they are positive. Then the devil gets them naturally by another corner and that is what the power psychologist does not see.

Now of course, Nietzsche is very much on the side of the inferiority, where the only passion, the only ambition, is: how can I get to the top? How can I make a success, make an impression? So Nietzsche is here the man in the glass house who should not throw stones; he should be careful. His style is easily a power style, he is a boomer, he makes tremendous noise with his words, and what for? To make an impression, to show what he is and to make everybody believe it. So one can conclude as to the abysmal intensity of his feelings of inferiority. Well, the last sentence is,

And this secret spake Life herself unto me: “Behold,” said she,
“I am that *which must ever surpass itself*.”

This is a good conclusion. A power condition making a vicious circle with the feelings of inferiority is most unsatisfactory and it must surpass itself. As a matter of fact, life does surpass itself: it is always undoing itself, always creating a new day, a new generation. Well, it is always imperfect, but it is not necessarily imperfect from that power side. It must follow the law of *enantiodromia*: there must be destruction and creation, or it would not be at all. A thing that is absolutely static has no existence. It must be in a process or it would never even be perceived. Therefore a truth is only a truth as much as it changes. Now we come to the end of the chapter.

And he who hath to be a creator in good and evil—verily, he hath first to be a destroyer, and break values in pieces.

Thus doth the greatest evil pertain to the greatest good: that, however, is the creating good.—

Let us *speak* thereof, ye wisest ones, even though it be bad. To be silent is worse; all suppressed truths become poisonous.

And let everything break up which—can break up by our truths! Many a house is still to be built!—

This is a variation of the other sentence “that *which must ever surpass itself*.” In other words, whatever exists must be destroyed in order to be created into something new. Of course this is also a one-sided truth, but a revolutionary truth. Nietzsche was a forerunner of our revolutionary age, and he felt very much that that was a truth of the time which should not be concealed, that many old things had become over-mature and were really beginning to rot. Therefore he realized the necessity of destruction. And he was clear-sighted enough to see that in the process of life and of becoming, the pairs of opposites come together; good and evil are the classical designations, the idea that next to the best is the worst. So if a bad thing gets very bad it may transform into something good, and when a thing is too good it becomes unlikely—we say it is too good to be true, it undoes itself. This is the natural *enantiodromia*. You see, he expresses a truth here which was already said by old Heraclitus, and it is of course a passage which formulates the modern mind.⁴

Now there is nothing very important in the next chapter, “The Sublime Ones,” nor in the following one, “The Land of Culture,” nor in that chapter called “Immaculate Perception.” (“Perception” is the wrong translation. *Erkenntnis* would mean, rather, cognition or apperception.)⁵ Then, in the chapter called “Scholars,” he chiefly realizes professional resentments, and in the chapter called “Poets,” he chiefly realizes all his resentments when he was called a poet. Of course it is all represented in a generalized form, but is quite obvious that they are his personal resentments. So we come now to the fortieth chapter, “Great Events,” and there we will pick out something right in the beginning.

There is an isle in the sea—not far from the Happy Isles of Zarathustra—on which a volcano ever smoketh; of which isle the people, and especially the old women amongst them, say that it is a place as a rock before the gate of the netherworld; but that through the volcano itself the narrow way leadeth downwards which conducteth to this gate.

Now about the time that Zarathustra sojourned on the Happy

⁴ Heraclitus wrote of each pair of opposites that the latter “having changed becomes the former, and this again having changed becomes the latter.” But “God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, satiety-famine” (Freeman*, fragments 88, 67).

⁵ Translators have not been able to resist the pun, however.

Isles, it happened that a ship anchored at the isle on which standeth the smoking mountain, and the crew went ashore to shoot rabbits. About the noontide hour, however, when the captain and his men were together again, they saw suddenly a man coming towards them through the air, and a voice said distinctly: "It is time! It is the highest time!" But when the figure was nearest to them (it flew past quickly, however, like a shadow, in the direction of the volcano), then did they recognise with the greatest surprise that it was Zarathustra; for they had all seen him before except the captain himself, and they loved him as the people love: in such wise that love and awe were combined in equal degree.

"Behold!" said the old helmsman, "there goeth Zarathustra to hell!"

About the same time that these sailors landed on the fire-isle, there was a rumour that Zarathustra had disappeared; and when his friends were asked about it, they said that he had gone on board a ship by night, without saying whither he was going.

Thus there arose some uneasiness. After three days, however, there came the story of the ship's crew in addition to this uneasiness—and then did all the people say that the devil had taken Zarathustra. His disciples laughed, sure enough, at this talk; and one of them said even: "Sooner would I believe that Zarathustra hath taken the devil." But at the bottom of their hearts they were all full of anxiety and longing: so their joy was great when on the fifth day Zarathustra appeared amongst them.

Here is a bit of legend. These legendary interspersions in *Zarathustra* are always sort of happy isles, because they liberate us from the exaggerated kind of expression and something comes through in the language of a simple tale, showing that here a truth is coming out which is truly Zarathustra. This is not Nietzsche, but conveys something which Nietzsche could not twist into his own style, or his own sermon; it is a piece of nature that breaks through. This is the other one, the old fellow that talks in parables. Therefore all parables, particularly the tale-like parables in *Zarathustra*, have an extraordinary value because they are not over-philosophized; they say what is to be said and are not twisted. You see, after his dissertation about power in these chapters we have just passed, where he creates for himself an exclusive position and criticizes his surroundings, we can almost expect a reaction from below. If one pours out a mouthful, one can be sure that something will happen to teach one the contrary. Now, the main content of this story

is the descent of Zarathustra into Hades. There is the volcano and the fire underneath, the entrance to the interior of the earth, the underworld—there is even old Cerberus, the fire dog—and Zarathustra is now going down into all this. Psychologically it would mean that after all that great talk, there is an underworld and down there one has to go. But if one is so high and efficient, why not stay up there? Why bother about this descent? Yet the tale says inevitably one goes down—that is the *enantiodromia*—and when one gets down there, well, one will be burned up, one will dissolve.

Of course Nietzsche must have known—he was a classical philologist—that Empedocles, the great philosopher, had chosen that form of death for himself: he jumped into the flaming crater of Aetna. I often wonder why he did it. A Latin poet said about him that it was in order to be considered an immortal god. But in the biography of old Empedocles we get the real clue! You know, he was very popular: wherever he appeared, large crowds of people came to hear him talk, and when he left town about ten thousand people followed him to the next one where he had to talk again. I assume he was human, so what could he do? He had to find a place where the ten thousand people would not run after him, so he jumped into Aetna.⁶ It had nothing to do with being an immortal god, but was just in order to have his peace. Now this story is of course also a kind of psychological tale. It may be true that the great philosopher committed suicide in order to escape his ten thousand lovely followers, but it is also a mythological motif. So after that greatness, when Nietzsche felt that he was the savior of the world, the one who tells all the boys what to do in order to get salvation, he would have to make the descent into utter destruction. But it is curious that he does not allude to Empedocles, and his story altogether has a very peculiar ring.

When I was a student I first read that passage, and it stuck in my mind. It was so funny—the noontide hour and the captain and his men—what was the matter with that ship that they go to shoot rabbits near the entrance of hell? Then slowly it came to me that when I was about eighteen, I had read a book from my grandfather's library called *Blätter aus Prévost* by Kerner, a collection in four volumes of wonderful stories about all sorts of ghosts and phantasies and forebodings,

⁶ That Empedocles (484-424 B.C.) jumped into Mt. Aetna's crater is reported by Diogenes Laertius in *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* bk. VIII, ch. 2, secs. 66-69. He in turn cites one Timaeus, not Plato's dialectician but a historian on whom Diogenes leans. Nietzsche often referred to Empedocles favorably, even calling him, in *The Anti-Christ*, Zarathustra's successor.

and among them I found that story.⁷ It is called “An Extract of awe-inspiring import from the log of the ship ‘Sphinx,’ in the year 1686, in the Mediterranean.” I give you the literal text.

The four captains and a merchant, Mr. Bell, went ashore on the island of Mt. Stromboli to shoot rabbits. At three o'clock they called the crew together to go aboard, when, to their inexpressible astonishment, they saw two men flying rapidly over them through the air. One was dressed in black, the other in grey. They approached them very closely, in the greatest haste; to their greatest dismay they descended amid the burning flames into the crater of the terrible volcano, Mt. Stromboli. They recognized the pair as acquaintances from London.

The absolute parallel is of course formed by the rabbits; also the noon-tide, for it was three o'clock in the afternoon when the captain and his men assembled again. It is perfectly clear that it is the same story. I then wrote to Nietzsche's sister and she told me that, as a matter of fact, somewhere between his tenth and eleventh year she and her brother had read *Blätter aus Prävorst*, which they found when nosing about in the library of *their* grandfather, Pastor Oehler. She could not remember that particular story but she said that my theory was quite possible because that book was in the library and she remembered having read such marvelous stories with Nietzsche; she had some reason for being quite certain that after his eleventh year it was out of the question, so it would have been, at the latest, in his eleventh year. Now it is most probable that Nietzsche had forgotten the story, and therefore he produces it so literally, with the funny details. One wonders what those rabbits have to do with the descent of Zarathustra: it is so foolish, but is explained by that parallel. This is what we call cryptomnesia; secretly that memory crept up and reproduced itself. It shows how the unconscious layers of the mind work.

Then you can be sure that, as the unconscious was capable of putting over that story, it is also capable of carrying a truth against Nietzsche's consciousness, against his insight or understanding. Now, the descent into the volcano as described in the log of that ship *Sphinx* would be explained as the vision of two people who had died during the absence

⁷ *The Seeress of Prävorst*. Here the compiler of the lecture notes kindly furnishes the citations: vol. IV, p. 57. Justinus Kerner's work was first published in Karlsruhe. Jung told this story about Nietzsche in his inaugural dissertation, published in Leipzig in 1902, and it is the first item in CW 1!

of the ship from England. Visions were the only sort of radio they had in those days—or perhaps clairaudience or second sight. But of course when Mr. Jones or Mr. Smith dies, it is not yet broadcast by the BBC. and it still happens in this natural way through dreams or visions. You find wonderful accounts of such cases in the *Fantasies of the Living*, a very well-substantiated collection published by the British Society of Psychical Research. And here it means that the spirit is going to die after that exaggerated self-assertion. For nothing is more killing for the spirit than when a man asserts himself to be *it*. That is most unbecoming to *l'esprit*; *esprit* only lives when it is impersonal. If it is personal it becomes a mere resentment and then it is no good. Then it is no longer *esprit*. You see, after that inflation it goes down and ends its life. It is really a catastrophe—not yet a catastrophe in Nietzsche's case, but it is the anticipation of one. It is exactly like a dream which tells you to look out; it is a sort of warning that hell is coming close and is already visible—a fellow is already going down over there.

You know, such stories are recorded because they are edifying. Those two gentlemen from London were big merchants and evidently they were not quite all right, because they are painted with the colors of hell which express sinfulness; one is black and the other grey, whereas they should be wearing white shirts which is court dress in heaven. Formerly at funerals I remember people would be wondering whether the dead man was entering eternal bliss or whether he was going to the bad place. I knew a nice old theologian, a professor of church history, who was an original, and also he was quite deaf. And once he went to the funeral of a man of high repute where all the friends and acquaintances were gathered in the drawing room, as was the custom, whispering to each other in hushed voices, before they went with the funeral cortège. A man was trying to say to the professor that he was so glad to know that the man had passed away so peacefully, and the professor, nodding his head, said in a loud booming voice: "Yes, yes, I know that he had no real joy in dying!"

Now this edifying aspect shows the psychological importance of such a vision and it should be pretty much the same with Nietzsche. He should ask himself, "What is going to happen now? Where have I made such a mistake? How did I get so inflated that I am now threatened with complete dissolution in fire?" Suppose that this parable had been a dream, as it might have been just as well—it functions as such in the flow of this sermon—what conclusion should we draw from it? Very clearly, Zarathustra for the time being is the superior leading

personality in Nietzsche's psychology—not in his mind. Nietzsche naturally would be tremendously impressed by that figure that expressed revelation, inspiration—he even had a certain feeling of its autonomy—and now the tale says he is going to hell. The old helmsman emphasizes it, “Behold! there goeth Zarathustra to hell!” Now, I doubt whether Nietzsche was conscious at all of the example of Empedocles, but he might have been. He *must* have been aware of it, and if he had told me such a dream and I had asked him who once had jumped into a volcano, it would have come into his mind. And naturally he would have been impressed. That was a pretty dangerous enterprise—it ended Empedocles' life. And he would have realized that jumping into melting lava and poisonous gases would be a very unfavorable feeling, a gruesome death. Such a story denotes a terrible disaster really. So in Nietzsche's mood at this moment, when he realizes every thought that comes to his mind, one would expect him to feel the impact of such a danger. Now we will see what he says:

And this is the account of Zarathustra's interview with the fire-dog:

The earth, said he, hath a skin; and this skin hath diseases. One of these diseases, for example, is called “man.”

And another of these diseases is called “the fire-dog”: concerning *him* men have greatly deceived themselves, and let themselves be deceived.

To fathom this mystery did I go o'er the sea; and I have seen the truth naked, verily! barefooted up to the neck.

Now do I know how it is concerning the fire-dog; and, likewise concerning all the spouting and subversive devils, of which not only old women are afraid.

“Up with thee, fire-dog, out of thy depth!” cried I, “and confess how deep that depth is! Whence cometh that which thou snorest up?”

Thou drinkest copiously at the sea: that doth thine embittered eloquence betray! In sooth, for a dog of the depth, thou takest thy nourishment too much from the surface!

At the most, I regard thee as the ventriloquist of the earth: and ever, when I have heard subversive and spouting devils speak, I have found them like thee: embittered, mendacious, and shallow.

Ye understand how to roar and obscure with ashes! Ye are the

best braggarts, and have sufficiently learned the art of making dregs boil.

Where ye are, there must always be dregs at hand, and much that is spongy, hollow, and compressed: it wanteth to have freedom.

‘Freedom’ ye all roar most eagerly: but I have unlearned the belief in ‘great events,’ when there is much roaring and smoke about them.

And believe me, friend Hollaballoo! The greatest events—are not our noisiest, but our stillest hours.

Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values, doth the world revolve; *inaudibly* it revolveth.”

This is his reaction and one must ask who is speaking here. Zarathustra has gone down into the volcano. Who then is speaking? You see, he talks as if he were quite detached from that tale in which he was said to have entered hell. As a matter of fact he is standing on the earth outside and nothing is said about his having gone down to hell to come out again. Whatever has happened, it is very clear that Nietzsche himself takes Zarathustra’s place and *assumes* what Zarathustra might have said to fire-dog. This is now very much the way Nietzsche himself would talk. You see, in a fantasy or dream, if you put yourself at once in the place of an awkward figure and take the word, it is because you are getting frightened. In a nightmare, for instance, you can insist that it is nothing but a dream in order to stop it, because you are afraid to have it go on. Just as when something disagreeable turns up in reality, you try to shout louder than the disagreeable impression. You make a noise in order not to hear the truth. Or if you are afraid that something awkward may be said, you talk all the time; not that you have anything to say, but out of fear you are making a continuous noise. Or people often have an extraordinary difficulty in realizing an unprejudiced flow of fantasy, and with no exception such people are afraid of what they may produce; therefore they stop the fantasies, or they replace them by their own remarks. If one gives any chance to the partner, the animus or anima may say something very disagreeable. So Nietzsche simply jumps in, *assuming* that this is what Zarathustra would say to the fire-dog and the spouting devils, the idea of the flames and the volcano, the original chaos that is still boiling below. And by clinging to the ridiculous figure of the fire-dog he spins out the story, tries to make it unimportant and light, Then that word interview, *Gespräch*, means a

very quiet sort of thing; he is assuming that Zarathustra goes down into the volcano for philosophic interview with the fire-dog, belittling man—that vermin of mankind, that skin disease of the earth; and he says the fire-dog himself is another form of the skin disease. Obviously that is a metaphysical assumption. It is instead of the devil, that old nonsense invented by man: “concerning *him* men have greatly deceived themselves and let themselves be deceived.”

You know, Nietzsche was very much influenced by David Friedrich Strauss, who wrote a famous life of Christ, a very rational conception, like certain later biographies of Christ where the effort was made to explain his traditional life in terms of common sense.⁸ But the point of that story is of course that it is *not* and *should* not be common sense: it makes no point if it is not miraculous. Nietzsche knows here that it may be a mystery—“to fathom this mystery, did I go o’er the sea”—but he says he has seen the naked truth about it, and those old specters and ghosts must be removed. That fire-dog is a ventriloquist of the earth, a deceiver who makes you believe the earth can speak; but you must not be so stupid as to believe that the earth has a voice: that is again the old nonsensical invention.

This is just as if one should say of the unconscious that it was merely an invention, a ventriloquist in everybody talking nonsense. It is the standpoint of that cheap rationalism of the 19th century, the same kind of psychology. As when Edison’s representative was demonstrating the first phonograph at the meeting of the French Academy of Science, a physicist jumped up and took the man by the throat shouting, “You damned ventriloquist!” He was unable to assume that the apparatus had produced that voice. So whatever that hell could produce would be empty smoke and noise with nothing behind it. Of course that is quite certainly Nietzsche’s attempt to belittle it, in order to save himself from it. As a matter of fact, it is one of several attacks of the unconscious; the volcano comes up and attracts Zarathustra and makes him jump into it. It is the first inkling of a danger somewhere connected with the earth. Now, in spite of having belittled the whole thing, he cannot help having another idea about it; he is unable to make so little of the earth, though it naturally should be liberated from

⁸ David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), author of *Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (1835). In the first of his *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche launched a heavy attack on Strauss, with whom he shared many beliefs. It is possible that he was put up to this polemic by Wagner, who had in turn been sharply criticized by Strauss.

such foolish ideas as fire-dogs. So thirteen paragraphs further on, he says:

And that I may also maintain the right, hear the story of another fire-dog; . . .

He invents another figure that impersonates the earth.

he speaketh actually out of the heart of the earth.

Here he recognizes what he suppressed before.

“Gold doth his breath exhale, and golden rain: so doth his heart desire. What are ashes and smoke and hot dregs to him!

Laughter flitteth from him like a variegated cloud; adverse is he to thy gargling and spewing and grips in the bowels!

The gold, however, and the laughter—these doth he take out of the heart of the earth: for, that thou mayest know it,—*the heart of the earth is of gold.*”

This extraordinary statement is a recognition that there is something about the earth—there is even a second fire-dog that betrays the secret that the heart of the earth consists of gold. This is an old mythological idea, but Nietzsche did not know it. It is also an alchemical idea that the core of the earth is gold which originated through the movement of the sun round the earth. Since the sun is identical with gold, its continual revolution round the earth has spun the gold in the center and has created its image in the heart of the earth. This is a recognition that in the unconscious, the volcano, there is not only that first fire-dog, but also something of value: a kernel of gold. And this fits in with his idea that one should become a friend of the earth again. The two streams of thought come together here: namely, the idea that the volcano is really the entrance to the interior of the earth, and his other idea that man is a son of the earth, that the earth should be acknowledged again, contrary to the Christian point of view that the flesh and everything earthly is all wrong. This is another attempt to get rid of the fatal impression of the volcano, trying to apply the thought stuff to one of his hobbies and to the earth in general, omitting entirely the catastrophic character of the picture. Now at the end of the chapter he might be satisfied with the result he has reached: he succeeded in avoiding the impact of that descent into hell, he has overcome the fire-dog, and he has realized that the heart of the earth is of gold. But then he says;

And once more Zarathustra shook his head and wondered.
 "What am I to think of it!" said he once more.

Apparently something has not been answered, the case is not settled.

"Why did the ghost cry: 'It is time! It is the highest time!'
For what is it then—the highest time?"—
 Thus spake Zarathustra.

You see that is not answered. Why this haste? "It is highest time" means that a very short time is left. To what does this refer?

Mrs. Crowley: His own condition.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Soon after he had finished *Zarathustra* the end came, when he died before his body. This is the secret, this is the key to the meaning of that descent into hell. It was a warning: soon you will go down into dissolution. Therefore the next chapter: "The Soothsayer," is an attempt to belittle this warning voice, to say, "Oh, that is nothing but a soothsayer." Now the soothsayer says,

"—And I saw a great sadness come over mankind. The best turned weary of their works.

A doctrine appeared, a faith ran beside it: 'All is empty, all is alike, all hath been!'

Everything has disappeared, everything has gone. This is the way a dying man might speak.

"And from all hills, there re-echoed: 'All is empty, all is alike, all hath been!'

To be sure we have harvested: but why have all our fruits become rotten and brown? What was it fell last night from the evil moon?

In vain was all our labour, poison hath our wine become, the evil eye hath singed yellow our fields and hearts.

Arid have we all become; and fire falling upon us, then do we turn dust like ashes:—yea, the fire itself have we made away."

That is what happens to Zarathustra in the volcano: fire falls upon him, fire swallows him. He is turned into ashes.

"All our fountains have dried up, even the sea hath receded. All the ground trieth to gape, but the depth will not swallow!

'Alas! where is there still a sea in which one could be drowned?' so soundeth our plaint—across shallow swamps."

One might of course think of a sea in which to drown if one were burning in the flames of a volcano.

“Verily, even for dying have we become too weary; now do we keep awake and live on—in sepulchres.”

Thus did Zarathustra hear a soothsayer speak; and the foreboding touched his heart and transformed him. Sorrowfully did he go about and wearily; and he became like unto those of whom the soothsayer had spoken.—

Verily, said he unto his disciples, a little while, and there cometh the long twilight. Alas, how shall I preserve my light through it!

He did not.

That it may not smother in this sorrowfulness! To remoter worlds shall it be a light, and also to remotest nights!

Thus did Zarathustra go about grieved in his heart, and for three days he did not take any meat or drink: he had no rest, and lost his speech. At last it came to pass that he fell into a deep sleep. His disciples, however, sat around him in long night-watches, and waited anxiously to see if he would awake, and speak again, and recover from his affliction.

Here we have the full reaction to Zarathustra's descent, just the thing we missed in the chapter before, and this is most instructive as to the nature of Zarathustra's or Nietzsche's style. When he talks excitedly and exaggeratedly, he is covering up or repressing something, he won't look at it. He makes a noise in order not to hear the voices that come in the “ stillest hour ” of the night. You remember in “ The Night-Song ”: “ Tis night: now do all gushing fountains speak louder. And my soul also is a gushing fountain. ” In the stillness of the night, the fountain of the soul can be heard. Nietzsche spoke so exaggeratedly in order that the voices of the soul should not be heard. But here he gets the full impact of it. This is his true reaction, and here one's feeling can follow, one can sympathize.

And this is the discourse that Zarathustra spake when he awoke; his voice, however, came unto his disciples as from afar:

Hear, I pray you, the dream that I dreamed, my friends, and help me to divine its meaning!

A riddle is it still unto me, this dream; the meaning is hidden in it and encaged, and doth not yet fly above it on free pinions.

All life had I renounced, so I dreamed. [Again the idea of

death.] Night-watchman and grave-guardian had I become, aloft, in the lonely mountain-fortress of Death.

There did I guard his coffins: full stood the musty vaults of those trophies of victory. Out of glass coffins did vanquished life gaze upon me.

The odour of dust-covered eternities did I breathe: sultry and dust-covered lay my soul. And who could have aired his soul there!

Brightness of midnight was ever around me; lonesomeness cowered beside her; and as a third, death-rattle stillness, the worst of my female friends.

Keys did I carry, the rustiest of all keys; and I knew how to open with them the most creaking of all gates.

Like a bitterly angry croaking ran the sound through the long corridors when the leaves of the gate opened: ungraciously did this bird cry, unwillingly was it awakened.

But more frightful even, and more heart-strangling was it, when it again became silent and still all around, and I alone sat in that malignant silence. [That is the stillest hour of course.]

Thus did time pass with me, and slip by, . . . for as yet he knew not the interpretation thereof.

This is again an honest report, as if something like that had really happened to him. It is again a tale or a dream where one hears the impartial, unadulterated voice which has not been twisted into an exaggerated style. It is a reaction to the Hades episode, and now we are going to hear the secret: what he is watching down below. This is the real Zarathustra; he is now in hell, in the castle of death where he watches the graves in order to bring up that secret. No question of its being nonsense any longer, there is a fearful secret hidden down below, of which he *ought* to think, compensating all the hysterical noise he made up above. And now when the door flies open, one sees that it is a roaring wind, and the wind is a spirit; a merciless wind is tearing out with a thousand laughs. That is insanity very clearly—those distorted figures. Insanity is the secret, the utter destruction of his mind. One can understand why he was prostrated. Now, this wind plays a peculiar role in Nietzsche's life. There are several passages where Zarathustra is the wind, and in Nietzsche's biography there is an incident where it appears in a peculiar form. And a little later we come to the dog that howls in the night, that awful cry which belongs in the same complex of forebodings. When he was about fifteen, he already had had such

an experience.⁹ It is in my Wotan article, but unfortunately this passage was omitted by the publishers of the English translation because they thought it would not be met with sufficient understanding. Maybe! I don't know, but it is of course particularly important, the most interesting thing in the whole article.

He tells about taking a walk in the night with a friend, another young boy, and undoubtedly something like this happened in reality, but it is also a fantastical story, a dream. In a dark wood he heard a terrible cry issuing from a nearby lunatic asylum, which means that there already he went into the unconscious—the wood. And then, after a while, in that same dream, they almost went astray in the wood, and they met an uncanny man, the wild hunter. That was Wotan. This hunter wanted to lead them to Teutschtal, which is a real village, but it is of course also symbolic. *Teutsch* is the old form of *Deutsch*, and it was used at the time of the Romantic school to designate those people who already had the same craze about the Germanic blood which we observe now. They were called *Teutsche*, and were represented in caricature with horns and furs and such things. Suddenly, that hunter took a whistle and produced a most awful whistling, and Nietzsche in the dream lost consciousness. Then, when he recovered, he knew he had had a nightmare. Now this shrieking here, this whistling and whizzing, is the cry from the lunatic asylum. It is Wotan who gets him, the old wind god breaking forth, the god of inspiration, of madness, intoxication and wildness, the god of the Berserkers, those wild people who run amok. It is, of course, the shrieking and whistling of the wind in a storm in a nocturnal wood, the unconscious. It is the unconscious itself that breaks forth. This is very beautifully described here: doors fly open and out bursts that wind, bringing a thousand laughs. It is a horrible foreboding of his insanity, and he admits that he does not know the interpretation of this experience. Well, that is humanly understandable.

But the disciple whom he loved most arose quickly, seized Zarathustra's hand and said:

“Thy life itself interpreteth unto us this dream, O Zarathustra!

Art thou not thyself the wind with shrill whistling, which bursteth open the gates of the fortress of Death?

⁹ “Wotan” first appeared in *Neue Schweizer Rundschau* (Zurich, March 1936). It is reprinted in CW 10, pars. 371-99. In Nietzsche's sister's biography (vol. I, pp. 18-19), the story of the howling dog is told.

Art thou not thyself the coffin full of many-hued malices and angel-caricatures of life?

Verily, like a thousand peals of children's laughter cometh Zarathustra into all sepulchres, laughing at those night-watchmen and grave-guardians, and whoever else rattleth with sinister keys."

Belittling!

"With thy laughter wilt thou frighten and prostrate them: fainting and recovering will demonstrate thy power over them."

Fainting and recovering from his descent: that reminds him of what he experienced when he was a youth.

"And when the long twilight cometh and the mortal weariness, even then wilt thou not disappear from our firmament, thou advocate of life!

New stars hast thou made us see, and new nocturnal glories: verily, laughter itself hast thou spread out over us like a many-hued canopy.

Now will children's laughter ever from coffins flow; now will a strong wind ever come victoriously unto all mortal weariness: of this thou art thyself the pledge and the prophet!

Verily, *they themselves didst thou dream*, thine enemies: that was thy sorest dream.

But as thou awokest from them and camest to thyself, so shall they awaken from themselves—and come unto thee!"

This interpretation is of course a desperate attempt to twist it into a favorable statement—that he himself is Wotan. It is of course true: Zarathustra is identical with Wotan. He is also identical with the terrible paradox of the unconscious. That coffin full of laughter is the paradoxical pair of opposites that are mixed up together and form the grotesque and horrible aspects of the unconscious, where there is absolutely no order, where man has gone under completely. Naturally, if you identify with the unconscious, you are gone, because your consciousness is the only element of order. If you *keep* your consciousness in the unconscious you can establish order there, but if you lose consciousness and go under, you become identical with the unconsciousness, and then you are that coffin and the laughter. The attempt at twisting or interpreting the dream winds up, then, with the very weak statement that he has dreamt his enemies. But who is his enemy? His own unconscious—his enemy is himself. So he has dreamt himself;

4 MAY 1938

that is his own case, his own insanity. The danger is always that he identifies with Zarathustra, and Zarathustra is the unconscious.

. . . and all the others then thronged around Zarathustra, grasped him by the hands, and tried to persuade him to leave his bed and his sadness, and return unto them.

LECTURE II

11 May 1938

Prof. Jung:

We spoke last time, in the chapter about the soothsayer, of Zarathustra's dream where Nietzsche's imminent madness was portrayed, and at the end of the dream he was still in a somewhat upset condition.

Zarathustra, however, sat upright on his couch, with an absent look. Like one returning from long foreign sojourn did he look on his disciples, and examined their features; but still he knew them not. When, however, they raised him, and set him upon his feet, behold, all on a sudden his eye changed; he understood everything that had happened, stroked his beard, and said with a strong voice:

"Well! this hath just its time; but see to it, my disciples, that we have a good repast, and without delay! Thus do I mean to make amends for bad dreams!"

The text describes an annihilation of consciousness. He was overwhelmed by a sort of unconscious condition. That has of course to do with the character of insanity; it is a sudden invasion, a flow of unconscious contents of an entirely different mental nature, which suppresses or alienates consciousness. So it is now as if he were coming back from a quite foreign condition—foreign because he has been unconscious of such contents before. This is another demonstration of what we have seen very often, that Nietzsche is utterly unaware of his unconscious, and only one who is so unaware can be completely overcome by it. If you are more or less aware of your unconscious contents, if the area of unconsciousness is not so great, you are never overcome. If the things which come into your consciousness are not entirely foreign, you don't feel overwhelmed and lost, don't lose your orientation. You are perhaps emotional or a bit upset, but you are not surrounded by absolutely strange impressions and views. That can only happen when you are in decided opposition to yourself, when one part is con-

scious and the other utterly unconscious and therefore quite different. With all his insight, Nietzsche was peculiarly unaware of his other side. He didn't understand what it was all about. Now whenever that is the case, the conscious attitude is naturally open to criticism; one is forced to criticise a consciousness which is threatened by an unconscious opposition. because the unconscious opposition always contains the dementia of consciousness. When there is no such opposition, the unconscious can collaborate and then it has not that character of utter strangeness. So we have to be critical all the time of the conscious attitude of Nietzsche or Zarathustra.

Now in the end, he thinks of eating as a means of saving himself from the fatal impression, clinging to ordinary reality in order to escape the uncanny shadow that fell upon him. It is of particular interest to see what he is going to do next, in order to digest that intrusion, so it is quite apt that the following chapter is called "Redemption." The idea indicated in the title is perfectly clear: namely, when the unconscious is so overwhelmed, there is a feeling that one should be redeemed from such a dangerous suppressing influence. As a matter of fact a feeling of the need for redemption always appears when there is great opposition between the conscious and the unconscious. In all cases when the aims of the conscious and the unconscious are quite different, one finds that marked need for redemption. Now the text says:

When Zarathustra went one day over the great bridge, then did the cripples and beggars surround him, and a hunchback spake thus unto him: . . .

Why does he use the symbol of the bridge here?

Mrs. Crowley: It would be that connection between the two.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. He obviously needs a bridge in order to cross the gap between the conscious and the unconscious. And what would that be psychologically?

Mr. Baumann: Usually, we say the bridge is the anima or animus.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, they can serve as a bridge, as the other pillar, the support on the other side, but we have a special term.

Miss Foote: The transcendent function.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is by definition the functioning together of conscious and unconscious. And that such a function can be, is due to such figures as the animus and anima, because they represent the unconscious. In the myth of the Grail, for instance, Kundry is the messenger from the other side, a sort of angel in the antique sense of the word, *angelos*, the messenger. It is as if the anima were standing on the other

bank and I on this bank, and we were talking to each other, deliberating about how to produce a function in between, for we must build a bridge from both sides, not from one side only. If there were no such figure at the other end, I never could build the bridge. It needs such a personification. The fact that the unconscious is personified means that it is inclined to collaborate; wherever we encounter the animus or anima it always denotes that the unconscious is inclined to form a connection with consciousness. You see, consciousness is exceedingly personal, and we happen to be the personification of consciousness and its contents: the whole world is personified in us. And when the unconscious tries to collaborate, it personifies in the counter figure.

Often we think of the animus and anima as if they were disagreeable symptoms or occurrences; they *are*, I admit, but they are also suitable teleological attempts of the unconscious to produce an access to us. Just as any symptom of any kind of disease is not only destructive but also constructive; even sickness itself, the symptomatology of illness, is on the one side destructive, but it is at the same time an attempt at healing. So when a case is particularly bothersome on account of animus or anima, one knows that there is a gap which wants to be bridged, and nature has already made the attempt to bridge it. I emphasize the existence of anima or animus because they are really products of nature, and we make use of them. There would be plenty of reasons for saying this is perfect nonsense, imagination, and so on. Of course it *is* imagination, but that is what nature produces, and if we want to cure an illness we have to use its manifestations, have to use nature in order to cure nature. It is nothing abstract: we can cure by imitating the natural ways which nature herself has invented. Since nature has invented such figures as animus and anima, it is for a purpose, and we are fools if we do not use them; that it produces such figures is a perfectly legitimate tendency in nature. So it is quite logical here for Nietzsche to speak of a bridge, because he is in need of a bridge; the situation is such that he has a most uncanny premonition of things that are still below the horizon, and he feels something ought to be done about them. His unconscious argument would be: "Well, since I contain contents which are so strange to me, I must have a connection, a communication, between those two parts of myself." And so he finds himself on that bridge and there he is instantly surrounded by cripples and beggars. Now why?

Mrs. Sigg: Because he is crippled himself; he is one-sided.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, he is very one-sided. He has a great idea about the superman, he is on the way to the superman, and sometimes it ap-

pears as if he were already the superman. But then that appears also as a compensation for the fact that he is crippled. Moreover, his encounter with the unconscious proves to him that he is wounded; a hole has been created in his system. Whoever has suffered once from an intrusion of the unconscious has at least a scar if not an open wound. His wholeness, as he understood it, the wholeness of his ego personality, had been badly damaged, for it became obvious that he was not alone; something which he did not control was in the same house with him, and that is of course wounding to the pride of the ego personality, a fatal blow to his own monarchy. So it is quite understandable that when he approaches the gulf, he meets the cripples and beggars, as would happen in a dream; for they demonstrate to him that it is really a matter of cripples and beggars, and that he is harboring them, that he is just like them and among them. And in the text, we shall see how very much he realizes that he really belongs to them.

The next part says that he should teach the cripples first; if he could teach them it would prove that his teaching really meant something, would prove that he was up to his task. That, I think, would be the "right method"; you see, that would be the ultimate proof. Whether he can influence the unconscious, whether he can assimilate the unconscious, is the criterion—whether his teaching can express the unconscious so that it flows in and collaborates with him. If he cannot, his teaching is no good. And that is the criterion for any real philosophical teaching; if it expresses the unconscious it is good, if it does not it is simply beside the mark. The same criterion can be applied to natural science or to any scientific theory. If it does not fit the facts it is no good: the test is whether it fits the facts. Now, his next arguments are not very important; he is not aware what the problems really mean and therefore he tries to play with them. For instance,

When one taketh his hump from the hunchback, then doth one take from him his spirit—so do the people teach.

He is simply making images now; he makes a picture of those cripples, talks about externals, making more or less apt remarks about them, about the eyes of the blind man, about the lameness and other mutilations. Then he says,

And why should not Zarathustra also learn from the people, when the people learn from Zarathustra?

Here is an inclination to listen or to take into account: this is more or less the "right method." If such figures appear in dreams or fantasies,

we expect to learn something from them. And here he doubts his attitude a little, whether he should teach them—which is understandable. He might better be taught by them. But he instantly says,

It is, however, the smallest thing unto me since I have been amongst men, to see one person lacking an eye, another an ear, and a third a leg, and that others have lost the tongue, or the nose, or the head.

Minimizing it!

I see and have seen worse things, and divers things so hideous, that I should neither like to speak of all matters, nor even keep silent about some of them: namely, men who lack everything, except that they have too much of one thing—men who are nothing more than a big eye, or a big mouth, or a big belly, or something else big,—reversed cripples, I call such men.

Again, he makes little of the cripples. He has seen things very much worse. Instantly he is talking them away, so one can only assume that he is afraid of what the cripples might teach him. Then he falls into another truth, a very good remark, that there are really other cripples, positive or reversed cripples as he calls them, who would be quite complete if one organ were not overgrown. The usual cripple is of course one who has an organ lacking. And who would the other cripple be?

Miss Hannah: People who have differentiated one function at the expense of the others.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and particularly those who identify with their best function—the tenor with his voice or the painter with his brush. Of course, everybody, if he has a decent function, will most certainly be badly tempted to identify with it.

Mr. Baumann: There is even an expression, *déformation professionnelle*.

Prof. Jung: Yes. You see, he makes there a perfectly good remark, but he is talking the cripples away: I have seen much worse cases than yours, you are nothing, you have no show. This is a means of self-protection, so he rather dwells on it and we are still somewhat in the dark as to why this chapter should be called “Redemption.” One is curious to know why or how that redemption is to be brought about. Now, after a good deal of conversation, of more or less apt remarks about the fragmentary nature of ordinary man, he comes to the conclusion a little farther on that he himself is not quite complete. He admits that he also is human, but in a way a cripple too. You know the motif of the

cripple plays quite a role in *Zarathustra*; this figure appears in different forms. Do you remember a similar figure?

Remark: The ugliest man.

Mrs. Crowley: And the clown.

Prof. Jung: Of course, and there is also the dwarf. Those figures are more or less alike and they keep on recurring. Do you know what they generally mean?

Dr. Henderson: They stand for the inferior function.

Prof. Jung: Yes, being dwarfish, clownish, foolish, mad—all that denotes the inferior function. But cripples or madmen have a different value among primitives. What is their point of view?

Mrs. Sigg: That insane people are godlike.

Mrs. Crowley: They are ghosts or spirits.

Prof. Jung: Well, they are mana people; they are what the Irish would call *fey*.

Dr. Escher: In south Italy there is the custom that if a male hunchback is passing in the street, even educated, very polite ladies go and touch him. But only a male hunchback.

Prof. Jung: That is so in France also.

Mr. Allemann: I think it is quite egotistical. They think it is a good omen, that they will have good luck after that.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it is for good luck—they are after the mana. I saw it once in Italy; a hunchback was in a crowd and a fellow who was passing rubbed his back a bit, which of course upset him very much. They hate it like anything. It is the same idea when people rub their hands on the tomb of St. Anthony in Padua, in order to get the mana of the saint inside. And it is exactly the same when the Central Australians rub their churingas to get the good medicine that is in them, in exchange for the bad mana inside their own systems. All crippled people, people marked by an obvious misfortune, are considered uncanny and they have magic prestige. Either they are avoided carefully, as unlucky people are usually avoided by primitives because they spread bad luck, or they are supposed to contain mana, having obviously been chosen as particular and peculiar vessels. So the gods of magic are often distorted; the figures that have to do with the secret arts, with the magic production of ore, gold, silver, etc., are typically crippled, either hunchbacks or dwarfs. Extraordinary people are always supposed to be mana because their extraordinary aspect causes emotion, and whatever causes emotion is believed to be causal, to have a causal *dynamis*. You see, primitives conclude that that which causes emotion must be

strong enough to cause another emotion—that is perfectly rational, natural primitive logic—so whatever is astonishing, like a man who does not look like an ordinary man in any way, must be causally dynamic. Also women with red hair were apt to be suspected of magic among the village people; they were understood to be not quite safe because it is not ordinary to have red hair. Of course if everyone had red hair they would not be astonished and those red-haired women would not have mana.

Now, this mana aspect of crippled figures always points to the unconscious; whatever arouses emotions has touched upon the unconscious. When you get an emotional impression from something, you can be sure that you have instantly made a projection; otherwise you would not have an emotion—I mean of course an illegitimate emotion, an emotion that you cannot quite control. A controlled emotion, which is a feeling, may be without projection—for instance, when you think something is abominably ugly or despicable but are not upset to the point of losing your self-control. While if you are just caught by an uncontrolled emotion, there is quite certainly a projection, and then you have to fetch the projected contents back again into yourself.

Mrs. Sigg: I think the mana is there, and of such value, because it would really be the only way to redemption for Nietzsche. If he would keep in close contact with the cripples in himself, he would be stronger. But just because it is the only way, the emotion is therefore avoided.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you see, it is quite certain that the cripples are an aspect of the unconscious inferior function—the unconscious approaches him in that form. It was that which caused the great emotion in the dream, the anticipation of madness. In order to draw the legitimate psychological conclusion, he should say to himself, “Here is a manifestation of the unconscious. The cripples have caused this upset, now what do cripples mean to me?” Then he might realize that cripples are mana and are acquainted with the secrets of the interior of the earth. They have eyes that see in the dark, so they know things that man does not know. You see, he would then meet the situation with an entirely different attitude, with humility. He knows that one should have humility in order to meet such an uncanny crowd, yet he tries to minimize the impression, almost to ridicule this peculiar aspect of the unconscious, because he is afraid and his mind cannot think far enough.

It is very curious that Nietzsche, a highly intelligent man, had not a

scientific mind. He could not accept psychological facts in a scientific way and take them for what they are. He behaved exactly like everybody else—it is nothing but a foolish dream and so on—instead of thinking philosophically about the matter of connecting *B* to *A*. *A* is the horrible dream he had, and whatever follows after is under that impression. Why should he deny that such a dream makes such an impression? Why should he lie to himself? But one simply takes a good meal and it is gone. Then something else turns up under very suspect circumstances, and instead of assuming, “This is one of the representatives of the other side; I must be very polite and humble because the whole future depends upon the way I deal with this figure”—instead of doing that—he minimizes those figures and talks them away. That is the most unspeakably foolish and irritating way in which he screws himself into his madness, an awful fatality. And the fatality does not consist of anything tragic or great; it consists of a lack of intelligence, the lack of a scientific and philosophical attitude. It is a sort of avoidance, a sort of impatient gesture. “It is nothing; it is just disagreeable or ridiculous”—putting himself always beyond the facts. The fact that he has had such a terrible dream has impressed him like anything, but he creates a kind of vapor of foolish thoughts, belittling what has happened, and by that he forces the situation. He creates a superficial consciousness which naturally will always be threatened by the intrusion of substantial facts that are far more dangerous. For the flimsier the conscious construction, the more easily it is exploded by contents which ordinarily would not explode consciousness. And this is flimsy consciousness; it lacks a scientific attitude. He behaves like a politician who thinks that when he opens his mouth and makes a big noise, the social problem is solved. Now the question is: what is he going to do—or to *say*, at least—about redemption? Because it is a very big problem. Can one be redeemed from that opponent, or what should be done in such a dangerous situation? And his idea is that the will is the redeemer, that by will one can even work redemption. So he applies now this principle.

To redeem what is past, and to transform every “It was” into “Thus would I have it!”—that only do I call redemption!

Will—so is the emancipator and joy-bringer called: thus have I taught you, my friends!

You see the idea that one could swing it by the will is a perfectly good

and legitimate attempt. At least one can try. So he tries and instantly he realizes something.

But now learn this likewise: the Will itself is still a prisoner.

Now, in what is it imprisoned?

Mrs. Baumann: It is imprisoned in the past which cannot be changed.

Mrs. Adler: The past contains all those tendencies which don't go with the will.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but how does the past influence the will?

Mrs. Crowley: Because all the traditions are in the past and all the unconscious sides of the personality.

Mr. Allemann: The germs of the present and the future are in the past, and the will cannot get away from that fact.

Prof. Jung: And why cannot will deviate? You see, one can suppose that the will is free—a perfectly good hypothesis—but will could then deviate. So what is the fetter?

Dr. Henderson: The body.

Mrs. Crowley: I should say it was the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Well, you can always will something, but the *choice* depends upon the past, upon that which already is. Will in itself could be free, but you must give it an object, and the choice of the goal is very much what you know from your experience of the past. You see, that explains his emotion about the past. He expresses himself very strongly.

"It was": thus is the Will's teeth-gnashing and lonesomest tribulation called. Impotent towards what hath been done—it is a malicious spectator of all that is past.

Not backward can the Will will; that it cannot break time and time's desire—that is the Will's lonesomest tribulation.

Willing emancipateth: what doth Willing itself devise in order to get free from its tribulation and mock at its prison?

So will depends entirely upon the past, and how can will help you if you have not superior insight, almost a sort of revelation, something beyond the ordinary needs? Your will always tries to get at the things of which you already know, for if you don't know of a thing, how can you will it? Therefore if you make will the redeeming factor, you must have inspiration or revelation, an insight beyond what you really are able to understand, or what you have hitherto understood. And who would give you that revelation? Who would give you secret knowledge?

Mrs. Fierz: The cripples.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the dwarfs know the things that are hidden. That is the reason why they come now. For whoever believes in the will, whoever wants redemption and wills to have it, needs revelation, and these little gods, dwarfs or cripples or mana people, have since time immemorial, been supposed to have the secret knowledge. But Nietzsche doesn't see that.

Now this terrible dream, and his upset, is the consequence of the descent into Hades or into the volcano. Zarathustra made that rather unexpected move, but of course if one follows up Nietzsche's thought before, one sees it was absolutely necessary that the spirit Zarathustra should go down into the interior of the earth, because earth is just what he lacks. That Zarathustra makes such a descent means that Nietzsche should understand what is going on: namely, that earth should come into his consideration, that earth is needed and whatever earth means to man. But Nietzsche is so identified with Zarathustra that it is very difficult to differentiate between the two. So that descent into the underworld is on the one side Zarathustra's philosophical problem—now what about the earth?—and on the other, Nietzsche's personal problem, to pay attention to the earth, the body. Psychologically that would mean he should pay attention to the unconscious, because the psychological side of the body is the unconscious, and we reach the body—psychologically, not physically—only through the unconscious. What we call the unconscious is an avenue, an access, to the body. In going to hell, Zarathustra is anticipating what Nietzsche personally ought to do, because danger is threatening from that side. He is really throwing his stone too high and there is danger of its falling back upon him.

He always tries to be above his physical existence, and that means a great strain to the body, particularly to the brain, and it also means a one-sidedness which is again injurious to the proper functioning of the brain. Therefore in order to round out his philosophical outlook, he ought to pay attention to the brain, to return to human measure, to human proportions. That dream is in itself already a symptom of the grave condition of his mind. If one takes it as an ordinary dream one could not yet say for certain that it contained unmistakable signs of organic destruction, but it contains all the signs of a mental condition which may prove to be most injurious for his physical health, including his brain. The cripples, the mutilated ones, point to the same probability: there is some doubt about his completeness. Usually, such a crippled condition is caused by an illness or by a congenital trouble, and presumably his condition is also due to some illness, either congenital

or in a state of becoming, something below the threshold. So it would be most advisable if Nietzsche could relate to his unconscious in order to get that measure which would allow him to have a balanced mind, and to live without doing too much injury to his nervous system.

If Nietzsche had consulted me at that stage and had brought me that dream, I should have said, "Now this is a stiff dose. You are obviously in terrible contradiction to your own unconscious and therefore it appears in a most frightening way. You must listen very carefully and take into account all that the unconscious has to say, and you must try to adapt your conscious mind to its intimations. That doesn't mean taking it for gospel truth. The statement of the unconscious is not in itself an absolute truth, but you have to consider it, to take into account that the unconscious is against you." Of course I should advise him against all such theories as doing it by will, or being superior to it, or teaching it. I would treat him as if I had made the statement that he had a temperature of about 102, or that his heart was wrong, or that he had typhoid fever. I would say, "Go to bed at once, give in, go under with your unconscious in order to be sure of being on the spot." But instead of all this, he turns to the will as the redeeming principle—the will should liberate him from this condition. And there, as we have seen, he begins to doubt whether the will is really so free, whether the will is able to bring about that redemption. He asks towards the end of the chapter,

Hath the Will become its own deliverer and joy-bringer? Hath it unlearned the spirit of revenge and all teeth-gnashing?

And who hath taught it reconciliation with time, and something higher than all reconciliation?

You see, here is a grave doubt as to whether the will is really capable of freeing itself from the past enough to enable it to bring about a new condition, and he speaks of reconciliation, the reconciling of two opposite tendencies, bringing together the right and the left, the here and the there—meaning the bridge of course. Then he goes on to say,

Something higher than all reconciliation must the Will will which is the Will to Power—: but how doth that take place? Who hath taught it also to will backwards?

In other words, how can your will influence or overcome its own condition, the fact that it can only will what you know? What will be the revelation, the vision beyond what you know, that will show the goal to the will?

—But at this point in his discourse it chanced that Zarathustra suddenly paused, and looked like a person in the greatest alarm. With terror in his eyes did he gaze on his disciples; his glances pierced as with arrows their thoughts and arrear-thoughts.

Now here something has happened. When he reached the questions—How can the will be superior to itself? How can the will lead you to that which is beyond what you know?—in that moment something happened. What would that be? What impression do you get from that interlude when he ceased to speak?

Prof. Reichstein: He sees that he has the wrong idea about the will and that he has a possibility of seeing something from the unconscious which he is not able to accept.

Prof. Jung: That is right, but of what does it remind you?

Mrs. Fierz: Of the dream.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is very much the same situation. The dream was such an interlude. It caused terror and here again an intrusion threatens, and “his glances pierced as with arrows their thoughts and arrear-thoughts.” What does that mean?

Miss Hannah: He is trying to project again.

Prof. Jung: He is already doing so. It is as if his disciples appeared to him in quite a different light, as if they contained a secret. Now, under what conditions does such a thing happen?

Mr. Allemann: When somebody is insane.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but what is actually happening in him? Why does he see his mental contents in someone else?

Mrs. Stauffacher: It is too uncomfortable for him.

Prof. Jung: Oh, if it were just not easy for him, he would have thought at once: “This is very disagreeable and therefore I don’t accept it. I prefer to assume that it is in other people.” But it never happens like that.

Miss Hannah: He just doesn’t see it in himself.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, it is so strange that he doesn’t see it in himself. You see, there is no bridge between himself and the other one who is also himself. When he sees that other one he thinks it is a stranger, presumably having to do with those people there. That is typical of an insane condition when it is a matter of something very important. You see, it is a matter here of the whole other side which compensates Nietzsche’s actual consciousness, and now all that appears in other people. It is as if I were preaching to you a very one-sided, ridiculous idea, and naturally my unconscious would ask what in hell I was talking

about. And then I might begin to swear at you, to try to convince you, to talk down upon you, and even to emphasize your extreme stupidity that you cannot understand. But *I* don't understand—something in me doesn't understand. So in this moment it suddenly appears to him as if his pupils were against him; they appear to him in an entirely different light. Therefore that expression of terror and the suspicious glance in his eyes, which is typical of paranoia, of the man with a persecution mania, that peculiar look of fundamental suspicion, of extreme hatred and fear of his fellow human beings, because it appears to him as if they were enemies persecuting him. He is the *persécuteur persécuté*. He is the one who runs away from himself and pursues himself, like a dog who chases his own tail; sometimes he is the tail and sometimes the dog. This is another moment of madness, because he has not succeeded in bridging the gulf. The idea of the will doesn't help at all. He himself undermines the idea of the will, and it is to be understood, for nobody can bridge the gulf between the conscious and the unconscious by sheer willpower. It is not a matter of willpower, but is a matter of submission.

But after a brief space he again laughed and said soothingly:

"It is difficult to live amongst men, because silence is so difficult—especially for a babbler."

He has caught himself again. He picks up the thread. After a moment of intense terror, he ridicules himself and laughs away the terror: nothing has happened. It is only a bit difficult to live amongst men because they are fragmentary, and he himself is a bit fragmentary, being human too. But he doesn't accept his own fragmentariness, doesn't accept the fact that he also is a cripple, or he would accept the mutilation of other people. If he could see that we are all alike, it would not be difficult to live amongst men. That he doesn't accept other people, as he himself has asserted, means that he is in contradiction with himself and then naturally he cannot live with other people "because silence is so difficult." You see, he talks too much and then he ceases because he has an idea that *he* has babbled: he has said a whole mouthful about those poor cripples. But he himself is one; and instead of accepting it, he assumes that he is the great and complete one and they are incomplete. He doesn't accept himself, doesn't accept humanity, or he could not talk like that. The right conclusion after that interlude would be: "Shut up, don't get excited about what other people do, just look at yourself and see where *you* are complete or incomplete." That would be the silence. But he had to speak, therefore the title of the book is

Thus Spake Zarathustra. And that is the case with most people: they continue to talk instead of looking quietly at themselves. Now, the end of this chapter is uninteresting, but the next one, "Manly Prudence," gives us again some valuable insight. It begins,

Not the height, it is the declivity that is terrible!

He is beginning to realize the thoughts which had been behind the scene in the chapter before, as is usually the case.

The declivity, where the gaze shooteth *downwards*, and the hand graspeth *upwards*. There doth the heart become giddy through its double will.

Ah, friends, do ye divine also my heart's double will?

This, this is *my* declivity and my danger, that my gaze shooteth towards the summit, and my hand would fain clutch and lean—on the depth!

Mark the peculiar reversal: in the sentence before, the gaze shooteth downwards and the hand graspeth upwards, and here it is just the reverse. That means that he is thoroughly double and exchangeable, a description of a complete dissociation, a complete duality.

To man clingeth my will; [He has just said he could not live among human beings.] with chains do I bind myself to man, because I am pulled upwards to the Superman: for thither doth mine other will tend.

And *therefore* do I live blindly among men, as if I knew them not: that my hand may not entirely lose belief in firmness.

I know not you men: this gloom and consolation is often spread around me.

In these words he confesses his duality, the dissociation of his mental condition—between Zarathustra, who is merely a spirit, and the man Nietzsche who wants to live among human beings, wants to live *blindly* among human beings, unconsciously. That is of course the way he actually did live. It was not ideal, and that is just the reason why Nietzsche the man could not stand the onslaught of Zarathustra; he preferred to be blind when Zarathustra threatened to appear.

The rest of this chapter is not very important, so we will go now to chapter 44, "The stillest Hour." In the last two chapters he tries to digest that onslaught of the unconscious, tries to deal with it, but with very inefficient means, so we may expect that an undigested impres-

sion will linger on and reappear. And in this chapter the impression does appear again. It begins,

What hath happened unto me, my friends? Ye see me troubled, driven forth, unwillingly obedient, ready to go—alas, to go away from *you*!

Yea, once more must Zarathustra retire to his solitude: but unjoyously this time doth the bear go back to his cave!

What hath happened unto me? Who ordereth this!—Ah, mine angry mistress wisheth it so; she spake unto me. Have I ever named her name to you?

Yesterday towards evening there spake unto me *my stillest hour*: that is the name of my terrible mistress.

And thus did it happen—for everything must I tell you, that your heart may not harden against the suddenly departing one!

Do ye know the terror of him who falleth asleep?—

To the very toes he is terrified, because the ground giveth way under him, and the dream beginneth.

This do I speak unto you in parable. Yesterday at the stillest hour did the ground give way under me: the dream began.

The hour-hand moved on, the timepiece of my life drew breath—never did I hear such stillness around me, so that my heart was terrified.

This is very much what happened to him, a recrudescence of the impression which had not been dealt with sufficiently. In the chapter before we heard that he clung to man, that he wanted to stay and to live with man. But here he has to leave his pupils, because an unknown force, an unknown command, is calling him away. That is of course the superior will of Zarathustra calling him away from his human existence. So he asks who ordered this, and he comes to the conclusion that it was the “stillest hour.” Now, mark the way he describes the “stillest hour”: it is an angry mistress, obviously a “she that wants to be obeyed.” That is the anima, of course, and in a still hour one hears naturally what the anima says—one hears the voices of the other side. The text now is very suggestive: it contains a threatening uncanny note.

Then was there spoken unto me without voice; “*Thou knowest it, Zarathustra?*”

This allusion to a secret knowledge in him is most uncanny.

And I cried in terror at this whispering, and the blood left my face: but I was silent.

That is understandable because “Thou knowest it, Zarathustra?” is the fundamental question. “You know what the dream means, why don’t you confess it? Why don’t you give in?” When the thing comes at him so directly, it is interesting to see how he will react to it, whether he will try to veil it, or to digest and assimilate it so that it will not be so injurious. The way in which he is asked is most insinuating and threatening and therefore his tremendous reaction.

Then was there once more spoken unto me without voice:
“Thou knowest it, Zarathustra, but thou dost not speak it!”—
And at last I answered like one defiant.

Instead of acknowledging it, he is defiant, which is of course utter weakness. The strong man says, “Damn it, that is so!” but the weak man is defiant, as if he could frighten away a whale.

“Yea, I know it, but I will not speak it!”

This is childish obstinacy.

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: “Thou *will* not, Zarathustra? Is this true? Conceal thyself not behind thy defiance!”—

Is that not excellent advice?

And I wept and trembled like a child and said: “Ah, I would indeed, but how can I do it! Exempt me only from this! It is beyond my power!”

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: “What matter about thyself, Zarathustra! Speak thy word and succumb!”

You see, he should be willing to accept even his own destruction. If he could confess it, if he could say, “Yes, that is it, and if I am meant to go under, I go under,” he would have won the battle, but he was not strong enough to succumb. The anima speaks absolutely to the point, as if she were a first-rate psychotherapist!

And I answered: “Ah, is it *my* word? Who am I? I await the worthier one; I am not worthy even to succumb by it.”

An easy way to escape. Yes, you have spoken great words before, but now you pay the price. At least you must be willing to pay the price, like

old Abraham when he had to sacrifice his son Isaac. He did not say, "I wait for a worthier one to sacrifice his son. I am a very modest man. It is not worthwhile to sacrifice my son. He is no good at all, take another one." That is the psychology here. He does succumb but not voluntarily; he simply crumples up and that is not submission.

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: "What matter about thyself? Thou art not yet humble enough for me. Humility hath the hardest skin."—

The unconscious is saying this through its own personification, the anima, "You must learn humility and then you will not be injured. Humility has the hardest skin."

And I answered: "What hath not the skin of my humility endured! At the foot of my height do I dwell: how high are my summits, no one hath yet told me. But well do I know my valleys."

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: "O Zarathustra, he who hath to remove mountains removeth also valleys and plains."—

His valleys and plains are as little important as the summits at the foot of which he imagines himself to be; and now, because he has been flip-pant and superficial, the anima becomes flippant. Instead of realizing that humility is now the test to prove what he can stand, he says, "What have I not endured?" But he has not endured it. And when the cripples appeared, he said he had seen much worse things—that was no news to him—belittling it and pushing it away, instead of accepting it. And then he thinks of the wonderful high summits: here comes in the idea of greatness again. That he is only at the foot of the mountain means that there are possibilities which he might fulfill in the future: he might go much higher. So the unconscious says, "What is this foolish talk about the mountains?"

And I answered: As yet hath my word not removed mountains, and what I have spoken hath not reached man. I went, indeed, unto men, but not yet have I attained unto them."

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: "What knowest thou *thereof*? The dew falleth on the grass when the night is most silent."

This is a very cryptic remark of the anima. It is quite obvious that he now tries to dwell upon his mountain view, and that he has not quite succeeded in putting his ideas over to other men. You see, he has wrig-

gled out of his own responsibility, the fact that it concerns himself. It is now the truth for other men—what he can do for them. That removes the trouble for himself apparently. And she asks what he knows of human beings after all. He has confessed that he didn't know them and yet he wants to teach them. He should learn about himself first. Then after this very absolute statement of the anima, "What knowest thou thereof?" comes the mysterious assertion: "The dew falleth on the grass when the night is most silent." You see, over against the babbling, there is a silence, which would be that " stillest hour" in which he has the chance to realize himself, to hear the voice of the unconscious. Now what about the dew that falls in the stillest hour?

Miss Hannah: It is an alchemistic symbol.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but there is also something in the Old Testament about it, where the alchemists found it originally.

Mr. Baumann: The dew of Gideon.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that was the sign from heaven. Jahveh let the dew fall to show that he was on Gideon's side. It was a miracle, a revelation. So the anima would be saying, "Now keep quiet, don't talk, particularly don't try to teach people, because in the stillest hour the revelation will come to you, as the dew came to Gideon." That is an excellent example of what the anima can do in a critical moment of life. Well, this book is full of such critical moments in Nietzsche's personal life, and you see how he passes them by.

LECTURE III

18 May 1938

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah, "In talking of the Will to Power in the chapter on "Self-Surpassing," you said that Nietzsche, as a man who had not succeeded in life, was necessarily always occupied with trying to make himself felt. In "The stillest Hour," however, the utmost submission is demanded of him. It would interest me very much to know whether it lay in the realms of possibility for Nietzsche, situated as he was, to make this submission?"

Well, we are concerned here with a threatening incursion of the unconscious, and what he is going to do about it. How he is to meet that impact, or onslaught, is a rather poignant question. This was between 1880 and 1890, the time when rationalism and materialism were in full swing, when every science was even more specialized than today. The educated people, the academical people and so on, took pride in the fact that they were nothing but specialists and absolute monarchs in their own field. That is still the case, naturally, but it is no longer so popular, because the general public has become more critical in that respect, more sceptical. But in that time I don't see how Nietzsche could have accepted such a situation, how he could have met it differently. I think it was wellnigh impossible for him to have done anything else—I am unable to see any other possibility—except under one condition: *In habentibus symbolum facilius est transitus*. Quite by chance I found this interesting passage in the 16th-century Latin text of one of my old Hermetic philosophers, where he makes this cryptic statement, which means, "For those who have a symbol, the passing from one side to the other, the transmutation, is easier." In other words, those who have no symbol will find it very difficult to make the transition.¹ Of

¹ No idea is more central to Jungian thought than that of the transformative power of the symbol, for which Jung found anticipation in the mystery religions, in Christianity (thus, the cross as carried by Jesus in the passage from mortality to immortality), and in

course it sounds exactly as if he were talking about human beings; and he was talking of *beings*, but not of *human* beings—rather, of chemical substances, metals, which as you know, were often understood by the alchemists as *homunculi*, the little men of iron or copper or lead. They were the souls of chemical substances, and it was supposed that those souls or metals that had a symbol would have less difficulty in making the transition—the transmutation into another condition.

This is the condition by which any man in any time can make a transition: with the symbol he can transmute himself. Now what does that mean? I speak now, of course, of the symbol in general; the creed, for instance, is called the *symbolum*. It is the system or the symbolic formula to apply when the soul is in danger. The religious symbol is used against the perils of the soul. The symbol functions as a sort of machine, one could say, by which the libido is transformed. For a more detailed explanation of the symbol, I recommend you read my essay, “On Psychic Energy.”² You see, by means of a symbol, such dangers can be accepted: one can submit to them, digest them. Otherwise, as in Nietzsche’s case, it is a very dangerous situation: one is exposed without protection to the onslaught of the unconscious. He wiped out his symbol when he declared that God was dead. God is such a symbol, but Nietzsche had wiped out all the old dogmas. He had destroyed all the old values, so there was nothing left to defend him.

That is what people don’t know: that they are exposed, naked to the unconscious when they can no longer use the old ways, particularly since nowadays they don’t even understand what they mean. Who understands the meaning of the Trinity or the immaculate conception? And because they cannot understand these things rationally any longer, they obliterate them, abolish them, so they are defenseless and have to repress their unconscious. They cannot express it because it is inexpressible. It would be expressible in the dogma inasmuch as they accepted the dogma, inasmuch as they felt that the dogma lived, but that doesn’t mean saying lightly, “Oh yes, I accept the dogma.” For they cannot understand it; they have not even the understanding in these matters of the medieval man. He knew in a way, but his impressions or his rationalizations are absolutely meaningless to us and therefore we reject them. If we had an understanding of the symbols, we could accept them and they would work as they have always worked,

alchemy, wherein the search was ever for the element (e.g., mercury) that facilitates change both in matter and in the psyche.

² The first essay in CW 8.

but the *way* to an adequate understanding is also obliterated. And when that is gone it is gone forever; the symbols have lost their specific value.

Of course it was because those old symbols were utterly gone that Nietzsche could make the foolish statement that God is dead, which is just as if I should declare that the president of the United States is dead, that Roosevelt doesn't exist. But he does exist, and it doesn't matter to him whether or not I say he is dead. Nietzsche thought that somebody once said that God existed and that naturally, when they did not prove it, did not bring any evidence, it meant that God was not. You see, *God* is only a formulation of a natural fact—it doesn't matter what you call it, God or instinct or whatever you like. Any superior force in your psychology can be the true god, and you cannot say this fact does not exist. The fact exists as it has always existed; the psychological condition is always there and nothing is changed by calling it another name. The mere fact that Nietzsche declared God to be dead shows his attitude. He was without a symbol and so, naturally, to make the transition, to leave one condition and to enter another mental condition, would be exceedingly difficult, if not wholly impossible. In this case it was impossible.

Mrs. Sigg: It is somewhat difficult to think that Nietzsche had no symbol; I think he had two symbols, two creeds. He believed in the superman and the idea of the eternal return.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that was the *Ersatz*, the compensation.

Mrs. Sigg: But why was it not valid?

Prof. Jung: Because it was only what his mind did: his mind invented those ideas in order to compensate the onslaught of the unconscious, which came from below with such power that he tried to climb the highest mountains and be the superman. That means above man, not here, somewhere in the future, in a safe place where he could not be reached by that terrific power from below. You see, he could not accept it. It was an attempt of his consciousness, a bold invention, a bold structure, which collapsed as it always collapses. Any structure built over against the unconscious with the mind, no matter how bold, will always collapse because it has no feet, no roots. Only something that is rooted in the unconscious can live, because that is its origin. Otherwise it is like a plant which has been removed from the soil. That Nietzsche tried to build a structure *against* the unconscious, one sees everywhere—in the descent into the volcano, for instance. Instantly he makes light of it: it is twisted into a dialogue with the fire-dog and that collapses as you know. In "The Stillest Hour," the unconscious approaches him in a

most uncanny and menacing way and he has no adequate answer. We are coming now to the third part and there the same thing continues: he is still trying to assimilate the onslaught of the unconscious, and in the next chapter he has to give way. He has to leave his friends and give up his life as he has lived it hitherto, has to go into solitude, in order to meet the demands of that which is coming up from the unconscious. He has not digested it at all. So I would say the superman is an invention, not a symbol.

A symbol is never an invention. It *happens* to man. You know, what we call perhaps dogmatic ideas are all very primitive facts which happened to man long before he thought them; he began to think them long after they first appeared. Our forefathers never thought about the Easter eggs, for instance, or about the Christmas tree, which were just *done*. And so the very complicated rites we observe in primitives, or in old civilizations that are relatively primitive, were never thought of to begin with. They were done, and then after a while thinkers came who asked, "Now why in hell are we doing these things?" There was a Trinity, or a triad of the gods, long before there was a dogma. There was an immaculate conception and a virgin birth before anybody speculated why Mary had to be a virgin. (The miraculous birth out of the virgin happened long before; it was not a recent process.) So for a thing to be a symbol it must be very old, most original. For instance, did the early Christians think that behind the idea of the holy communion lay that of cannibalism? We have no evidence for it, but of course it is so: that is the very primitive way of partaking in the life of the one you have conquered. When the Red Indians eat the brain or the heart of the killed enemy, that is communion, but none of the Fathers of the church ever thought of explaining the holy communion in such a way. Yet if their holy communion had not contained the old idea of cannibalism it would not have lived, would have no roots. All roots are dark.

Well now, the first chapter in the third part of *Zarathustra* is "The Wanderer." The idea is that he has quit his country and he describes climbing over the ridge of the mountain to the other side. The mountains form a divide, and then he descends again to the sea where he takes a boat. That is the old symbol of the night sea-journey, navigating on the sea of the unconscious to reach the new country, and that is the *transitus*. You know, in the ancient mysteries the *transitus* was always difficult; the hero had to undergo the transmutation by performing difficult tasks. For example, Mithras is represented on monuments as carrying the bull, meaning himself in the animal form; he had to shoulder his animal side. And the *transitus* is shown in the passing of

Christ on the cross—that is, going from life to death, carrying that symbol of the cross. In the cult of Mithras it was carrying the bull that is himself, as Christ was the cross—whatever that means. And in the cult of Attis it was the carrying of the tree, which was Attis, into the cave of the Mother. Also the so-called *athla*, the heavy work, the trials or tests which people had to undergo in the initiations, belong to the *transitus*.

There is a neolithic initiation place, a Hypogaeum, an underground temple, at Hal Safliena in Malta, where I have seen a transition place. It was very probably a mother cult. Before coming to the most sacred place in the depths of the temple, there is, one could say, a multicellular womb, a central round cave with adjoining little caves like manholes in the wall, so that a man could just creep through one of those partitions into the next cave; and then he was in the retort or bottle, or the uterus, where he had to be hatched. Incubation symbols, terracotta figures of women in the incubation sleep, have been found there. Then, before reaching the innermost place, there is a cut in the descent, about two meters deep, which was filled with water, so whoever was descending in the darkness—or perhaps it was lighted by torches—had to go through the water, to be metaphorically drowned, in order to come out on the other side. The Christian baptism was of course the same idea, part of the transmutation process, and people were literally submerged. It has degenerated now into the few drops that are administered in our existing Christian church, but formerly people were really put in the water, as if drowned. You see that is a danger, a sort of metaphorical death which one has to pass through in order to reach a new attitude, the transmutation of oneself. So the crossing of the mountain is part of the *athla*, the heavy work, and Nietzsche expresses this in the text. He has very depressing thoughts which of course make the transition particularly disagreeable. Then when he sees the sea, he says,

Ah, this sombre, sad sea, below me! Ah, this sombre nocturnal vexation! Ah fate and sea! To you must I now *go down*!

The sea is, of course, the unconscious to which he has to descend, and it means fate also, because the unconscious is fate. There the roots are, and whatever your roots are, is what you will get. So the descent into the unconscious is a sort of fatality; one surrenders to fate, not knowing what the outcome will be, as that neolithic man who fell into the water in the darkness did not know what was going to happen next. It was perhaps a test for his courage; at all events it was disagreeable to

drop into the dark, cold water, not knowing how deep it was, or whether something awful was in it. That is Nietzsche's feeling now; he knows he has to go down. He is giving way in an unexpected manner to something which he belittled and made very light of before. You see, he could have learned when he went down into the volcano, but it was too disagreeable—he could not realize it. He held onto his consciousness, which was entirely rational, and made nothing of the volcano, and then he thought it was dealt with, overcome. But now it comes again. As Faust in one place says: *In verwandelter Gestalt, Ueb' ich grim-mige Gewalt* ("In another form I apply a cruel power").

Before my highest mountain do I stand, and before my longest wandering: therefore must I first go deeper down than I ever ascended.

This is an attempt to make it acceptable, a sort of rationalization or solution. He says, "Ah well, I have to go down into this awful thing; it is unavoidable," as one might think something an awful threat to one's existence but say hopefully, "Well, *reculer pour mieux sauter!*"³ Or as one might say, "Oh, I am just going down to the unconscious," or "I have a bad attack, simply because I am putting up the Christmas tree, but it will be very nice afterwards." In the initiations one stood all the pain in order to be redeemed; one would be illuminated or have some secret knowledge. But in reality it doesn't feel like that, but feels exactly like going down into the cold sea with all its monsters and no promise of a Christmas tree afterwards. Nietzsche promises himself that the mountain will come afterwards—that is the superstructure—and we shall see how he constructs that high mountain which is not to be overcome.

—Deeper down into pain than I ever ascended, even into its darkest flood! So willeth my fate. Well! I am ready.

So after his helpful thought that the mountain would come afterwards, again he says, "No, you go down." That is, of course, very difficult, a big order, and a little further on he says,

Everything as yet sleepeth, said he; even the sea sleepeth. Drowsily and strangely doth its eye gaze upon me.

But it breatheth warmly—I feel it. And I feel also that it dreameth. It tosseth about dreamily on hard pillows.

Hark! Hark! How it groaneth with evil recollections! Or evil expectations?

³ "Step back in order to jump better."

Ah, I am sad along with thee, thou dusky monster, and angry with myself even for thy sake.

Ah, that my hand hath not strength enough! Gladly, indeed, would I free thee from evil dreams!—

This is a very remarkable passage. You see, he is trying to formulate what he feels in standing upon the mountain looking down at the sea. The aspect of the unconscious is like a dormant sea; one doesn't know what it will be when it wakes up. For the time being, it is mysterious, very still, like someone dreaming. But it breathes—it is alive with dreamlike life. And the sound of the surf is described as groaning; the sea suffers from evil recollections or perhaps from evil expectations. That is, of course, a projection. *He* has evil recollections and even evil expectations, as we have heard already. And now having made that projection, instantly he is liberated from the weight of his own evil, and he really considers curing the sea, the unconscious, of its bad dreams and recollections. But the unconscious has no bad recollections, as the sea has no bad recollections. That is anthropomorphic: man has bad expectations, man suffers from his recollections, and he may have dreams. But how could one ever imagine being able to free nature from her world-creating dreams? Those dreams are divine, creative thoughts—the very life of nature. The question is, of course, how he can free himself from these evil dreams, and Nietzsche might have drawn this conclusion if he could have afforded it. But that is pathological; he cannot afford that honesty. He is always called the most honest philosopher, but he could not afford to be honest with himself. Yes, in a hundred thousand minor details he was honest—he saw the truth in other people—but when it actually happened to himself, he could not draw correct conclusions. That he could not in this situation shows that he either did not want to see it, or he may have been blindfolded by the idea that he was a great fellow who was writing a book which was quite objective, not himself.

Many a writer thinks his book is not himself, that it is objective, as if he were a god dismissing a world from his bosom: "There is a world which goes by itself, that is not I!" In this case, however, Nietzsche surely should have realized that the idea of curing the sea of its evil dreams was an extraordinary assumption; it is a god-almighty likeness, and it is even a sort of aesthetical test, which tact should have prevented. But it makes an excellent paradox, makes good reading. It sounds marvelous to say to nature, "Shall I free you from dreams?" One is already the great mountain. It shows an extraordinary con-

temptuousness, yet that great mountain trembles with fear, and that is what he could not afford to see. It was too much. Therefore I absolutely believe he was not able to. He has a certain realization of it, however, as we can see in the next paragraph:

And while Zarathustra thus spake, he laughed at himself with melancholy and bitterness. What! Zarathustra, said he, wilt thou even sing consolation to the sea?

Ah, thou amiable fool, Zarathustra, thou too-blindly confiding one! But thus hast thou ever been: ever hast thou approached confidently all that is terrible.

Every monster wouldst thou caress. [Making light of it!] A whiff of warm breath, a little soft tuft on its paw—: and immediately wert thou ready to love and lure it.

Not knowing what it was all about. You see, even that little insight was not taken seriously, but playfully, as people with an aesthetical attitude take things. It was Nietzsche himself who said, in his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*: After all, the world is an aesthetical problem.⁴ But it is not, it goes right under the skin. That is what he was always trying to escape, but he did not escape it, though he tried to deny it.

Miss Hannah: Your speaking of the aesthetical attitude made me wonder whether it would have been possible for Nietzsche to have achieved submission by giving a freer rein to himself as an artist? Some passages (in "The Night Song," for instance) prove that sometimes he could be a very great artist.

Prof. Jung: He *was* a great artist, but he was also a philosopher and we expect a philosopher to think. His work ran away with him and that was his weakness. Such a thing would not have happened to Goethe, or Schiller, or Shakespeare. That was his weakness: he was a genius with a big hole in him.⁵

⁴ In a sense, the principal motif of Nietzsche's essay, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth," is that it is art, not religion or morality or politics, that addresses and in some measure solves life's problems. From the fact that art is a reflection "of a simpler world, a more rapid solution of the riddle of life—art derives its greatness and indispensability" (sec. 4). In a time when language is sick, it remains for music to provide "correct feeling, the enemy of all convention" (sec. 5) "Thoughts Out of Season," tr. Anthony M. Ludovici, in *N/Complete*, vol. I, part I. Or again, in *WP*, "We have art in order that we not perish from the truth" (book III, n. 822).

⁵ Thomas Mann wrote, "Nietzsche inherited from Schopenhauer the proposition that life is representation alone . . . —that is, that life can be justified, only as an aesthetic phenomenon." "Nietzsche's Philosophy in the Light of Recent History," *Last Essays* (New York, 1951), p. 141.

We are now coming to the chapter, "The Vision and the Enigma." And here we come again to a story, an adventure, and, as I said, these stories in *Zarathustra* are always particularly valuable because they are events that speak objectively. When Nietzsche is talking, he twists, he transforms, he assimilates; he is always doing something to his material. While in such stories something happens to him. Therefore they are so valuable. They give an extraordinary insight into the real events, the real processes, of his unconscious. Now, he went over the mountain and on board the ship, to sail over the sea of the unconscious, to make the *transitus*.

When it got abroad among the sailors that Zarathustra was on board the ship—for a man who came from the Happy Isles had gone on board along with him,—there was great curiosity and expectation. But Zarathustra kept silent for two days, and was cold and deaf with sadness; so that he neither answered looks nor questions. On the evening of the second day, however, he again opened his ears, though he still kept silent: for there were many curious and dangerous things to be heard on board the ship, which came from afar, and was to go still further. Zarathustra, however, was fond of all those who make distant voyages and dislike to live without danger. And behold! when listening, his own tongue was at last loosened, and the ice of his heart broke. Then did he begin to speak thus:

To you, the daring venturers and adventurers, and whoever hath embarked with cunning sails upon frightful seas,—

To you the enigma-intoxicated, the twilight-enjoyers, whose souls are allured by flutes to every treacherous gulf:

—For ye dislike to grope at a thread with cowardly hand; and where ye can *divine*, there do ye hate to *calculate*—

To you only do I tell the enigma that I *saw*—the vision of the loneliest one.—

Gloomily walked I lately in corpse-coloured twilight—gloomily and sternly, with compressed lips. Not only one sun had set for me.

In these words he describes how he enters the kingdom of gloom, the darkness of the unconscious. Or the darkness of consciousness, one had better say, and it is a very disagreeable formulation: a "corpse-coloured twilight" is not beautiful. That is the taste of death hovering about the unconscious, for the unconscious is not only a storehouse of

life, but is a storehouse of death in which there are many corpses. For the past and the future are one: whatever is left over from the past still lives, and the germ of the future is living in the unconscious too. So, under a certain aspect, it is a graveyard, the inside of the tomb, and from another standpoint it is a blossoming field; it all depends upon the attitude of the one who enters it. To Zarathustra, life is all on the surface and in the sunlight—only the conscious lives—and when he enters the unconscious, he finds the graves of all the things that have died or have been. So he says “not only one sun had set for me”—but a number of suns, a number of conscious lights: enlightening, helpful ideas that give orientation, insight, and so on. All that comes and disappears and has to disappear. Otherwise, he cannot see the twilight, the darkness.

A path which ascended daringly among boulders, an evil, lonesome path, which neither herb nor shrub any longer cheered, a mountain-path, crunched under the daring of my foot.

Mutely marching over the scornful clinking of pebbles, trampling the stone that let it slip: thus did my foot force its way upwards.

Upwards:—in spite of the spirit that drew it downwards, towards the abyss, the spirit of gravity, my devil and arch-enemy.

He is again embarking upon a compensatory attempt. He has gone down already, is in the gloom, in the darkness of the sea. And now here he is remembering his ascent. He describes the upward climb *against* the spirit that drew him down towards the abyss, where he actually is.

Upwards:—although it sat upon me, half-dwarf, half-mole; paralysed, paralysing; dripping lead in mine ear, and thoughts like drops of lead into my brain.

That is the spirit of gravity. His description of it is very interesting.

“O Zarathustra,” it whispered scornfully, syllable by syllable, “thou stone of wisdom! Thou threwest thyself high, but every thrown stone must—fall!

O Zarathustra, thou stone of wisdom, thou sling-stone, thou star-destroyer! Thyself threwest thou so high,—but every thrown stone—must fall!

Condemned of thyself, and to thine own stoning: O Zarathustra, far indeed threwest thou thy stone—but upon *thyself* will it recoil!”

You see, this is the dwarf speaking. In this passage he is really already in the kingdom of gloom, surrounded by it, like a diver or a man drowning. This is an overpowering situation which he has to combat, and he tries to bring himself back on the upper path, to remember how he felt when he was climbing up to a region of safety high above the sea. And he now transforms his actual experience into a personification, as if it were merely that spirit of gravity which is always weighing him down. This is a very peculiar twist which I should criticize in a patient's fantasy, for instance. If he were going down into the darkness of the sea, and then suddenly something seemed to happen and he was out of it, I should say, "You did not remain true to your theme; because it has beaten you or burned you, you jumped away from it into another condition." So Nietzsche really jumps out of his first mood into a different situation, where he is not going down, but going up.

You see, when you jump away from the theme in a fantasy, you aggravate the situation; when you don't accept the situation as it comes along, you make it more aggressive. Say you dream of a pursuing animal; a lion or a wild bull is after you. If you run away or try to rescue yourself into another situation, in most cases the thing gets worse. If you could face it, if you could say this *is* the situation, you have a reasonable chance that it will turn, that something will happen to make it better. For example, if you have a horrible dream and conclude, "Ah, I am very much at variance with my unconscious or my instincts, therefore I should accept this monster, this enemy," then it changes its face almost instantly. What you were deadly afraid of becomes relatively harmless; if you accept that awful lion or terrible bull, in the next dream it is a dog or a mouse and finally it disappears, merging with you perhaps in a friendly way. It is only a terrible face because you make a terrible face at it; if you don't make that face, it is quite reasonable and nice. It only persecutes you because it wants to live with you. It is a terrifying ghost because you make it into one, but if you say, "You are my friend, you belong to me, you are myself too," it merges with you, and of course you receive an effect, but it has received your effect just as well. While if you jump away, it becomes all the more aggressive—and you really only jump away because you assume that it is strange and has nothing to do with you.

Now I don't say this is an absolute rule: there is no rule without exceptions and these laws I am teaching are not laws but rules of thumb which suffer many exceptions. One exception I should like to mention, though it is treacherous and gives you a pretext for saying that a fantasy is strange and doesn't belong to you. There are cases where it *is*

strange, where it really doesn't belong to you; you can dream other people's dreams, can get them through the walls. It is not usual, but you had better look out. For instance, if you are observing the series of your dreams, keeping in contact with your unconscious, and then have suddenly a very strange dream, it would be fair to assume that a strange influence had taken place. On the other hand, if you have not carefully recorded the series, you do not know. You cannot say that the dream is strange, no matter how strange you feel it to be. It is perhaps not strange at all, but is only something in you that is strange to yourself. I would say that in one hundred cases, or not even as many, you might find perhaps one or two where the strangeness is objective, where you have dreamt the dream of another person.

Mr. Baumann: I think this idea of running away from the fantasy is beautifully expressed in the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, chiefly at the end where rebirth is coming and the dead woman is persecuted by the spirits. She tries to run away and hide in a hollow tree, and because she does that, she is reborn in a very inferior condition.

Prof. Jung: In the womb of an animal perhaps. I am glad that you mentioned the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*. There you find this drama of making things much worse through running away, making your enemy still more aggressive, still more dangerous.⁶ That happens now to Zarathustra; he holds off the realization of his actual situation and then the unconscious becomes personified. This is on the one side a great danger; on the other side, it is an asset. And what would the advantage of a personification be?

Mrs. Jung: It can be discriminated better, better realized.

Mrs. Baumann: You can talk to it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, when a thing is personified it has autonomy and you can talk to it. It is like the poodle in *Faust*. Faust is concerned with the black poodle that is running in circles round him. Sometimes it seems to be an ordinary dog and sometimes it seems very uncanny, and he cannot establish any kind of rapport with the thing. When he thinks it is just an ordinary dog, he can be sure that he has made too little of it. Then it is no longer what it seemed to be, but becomes dangerous. It increases its size and suddenly the whole thing opens like a box and out comes the devil. Then Faust says, *Das also war des Pudels Kern!* ("So that was the kernel of the poodle.") The poodle then is personified—it can talk—and so the discussion with the devil begins.

Mrs. Sigg: Would not the Indian king who carried the corpse be a

⁶ *Tibetan*, book 1, part 2, 11th day.

good example? He was so very patient and had not such a negative attitude as Nietzsche has to the dwarf.⁷ Nietzsche says "Thou! Or I!" as if one of them must die, while the king in the Indian tale is very patient and carries the corpse, accepting it in order that the ghost shall teach him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is also a very good example.

Mrs. Jung: It seems to me he tries to give himself courage: he doesn't want to run away, but he is afraid; what threatened him was not something that turned into a nice comrade, but something utterly destructive.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we are coming to that. Of course he is trying to compensate. He jumps away because he is afraid and naturally he must have courage. He succeeded in personifying it in the form of a dwarf, which is very small and apparently unimportant, but again he overlooks the fact that a dwarf has cunning and is mana—a very mythological figure, something like an evil jinn. Of course he doesn't believe in devils so it seems to be nothing but a dwarf, and he calls it the spirit of gravity. But that is the eternal sloth, eternal inertia, the spirit of lead, "the man of lead" as Zosimos called him. (In astrology old Saturn, the planet, is called "the man of lead.")⁸ And Democritus said that lead contains a most impertinent demon, a very angry demon indeed, and that whoever releases that demon is in great danger of becoming insane: he destroys the mind. You see, that was their experience: those Hermetic philosophers knew that dwarf, that spirit of lead, that lead-like heaviness, and they knew that you should not tickle it or make light of it because it contains an impertinent demon that causes the perils of the soul. In alchemy that meant insanity.⁹ They were quite aware of it and always repeat that numbers of people could not stand it and went mad. So that universal medicine, the essence of the minerals, which

⁷ A virtuous king was told to cut down a hanged man and bring the corpse back to the palace. He did so, but the hanged man managed to ask a complex moral question to which the king conscientiously replied, only to have his interlocutor fly back to his scaffold. This was to repeat itself twenty-four times, at which point the king is transformed. Zimmer, *The King and The Corpse: Tales of the Soul's Conquest of Evil* (Princeton, B.S. XI, 2nd edn., 1956), pp. 202-45.

⁸ Jung deals with this thirteenth-century Hermetic writer in CW 13, pars. 85-86: "I am the leaden man and I submit myself to unendurable torment." This is taken to mean that lead is to be rejected.

⁹ This is not the ancient Greek atomist but the pseudo-Democritus, a mystic of the first or second century A.D. In CW 13, par. 430, Jung cites the sixth-century Olympiodorus on lead as containing a demon that drives people mad.

they tried to extract, was chiefly a medicine to cure the afflictions of the soul or the mind, *afflictiones mentis*.

Dr. Escher: A good example of the autonomy of figures is *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, the play by Pirandello.¹⁰ He puts six figures on the stage with himself and he tells them what they must do. Then they say: "You have created us but we do as we like," and they have a fight. He is furious with them but they go on doing whatever they wish. It is psychologically very interesting.

Prof. Jung: I don't know that play of Pirandello, but it is a good idea, the demonstration on the stage might give one a vivid idea of how that thing functions. It is really like that. There is the same motif in Goethe, the idea of the thing you have created taking on life of its own. It is also the Golem motif.¹¹

Mr. Bash: There is another example in a tale by Edgar Allan Poe, where the hero of the story is accompanied by his double, who leads him into disgrace after disgrace. He is finally killed by the hero, but at the moment of being killed he tells the hero that it is he who has created him—the double.¹²

Prof. Jung: That would be similar, the self-created thing that becomes more powerful than the creator.

Mrs. Sigg: Is that not an illustration of what you said—that because Nietzsche doesn't accept the cripple, it comes now as a dwarf?

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is all one line.

Miss Hannah: And *The Picture of Dorian Gray* by Oscar Wilde¹³ is the same.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, it is really a very frequent occurrence that something which one assumes one has created, which one assumes to be one's own thought, is not one's thought really. One must be mighty careful of saying a thought is one's own creation. It is then as if it lived all by itself. It is quite possible, when one thinks one has created a thought, that it really grows by itself. Then there is the possibility that it *overgrows* one, and then suddenly one is up against it. That is exactly

¹⁰ Luigi Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author: A Comedy in the Making* continues to attract directors and audiences by virtue of its ingenious presentation of characters who "precede" their author.

¹¹ By "the Golem motif," Jung means a demon with magical powers, such as Mephisto in *Faust*, which Jung interprets as a projection of unconscious contents. Gustav Meyrink in *The Golem*, a novel which Jung often cites, wrote a story of the appearance of this mysterious figure in a ghetto. See *Dream Sem.*, pp. 507-9; CW 6, par. 205; et al.

¹² In *William Wilson: A Tale* (1839), Edgar Allan Poe (1804-1849) tells of this protagonist's footsteps being dogged over many years by his non-fraternal twin.

¹³ Oscar Wilde published this, his only novel, in 1891.

what has happened here. Zarathustra rejects it because he is afraid and then it comes up against him. That dwarf holds trumps of which Nietzsche knows nothing apparently and he says awful things to him: "Yes, yes, you can climb Mont Blanc and throw a stone higher than anybody has every thrown one, but it is a superstructure that has no roots and it will fall back upon you." This is again a forecast of what is going to happen—that the Superman will fall back on him; it is a stone thrown high in the air which has no basis. Nietzsche himself has no basis so how can he sustain a superman? And the stone has another interesting aspect. The dwarf calls Zarathustra, "thou stone of wisdom," and says, "Thou threwest thyself high." So Zarathustra is the stone, and the dwarf thinks he has thrown himself too high, that it is a mighty effort but in vain. For to jump into the air doesn't increase one's size, and he comes down with a crash and falls upon himself, that miserable self on the surface of the earth. You see, here is a fatal critique of the whole of *Zarathustra*. Of course we are in a fortunate situation, we can understand, but it was too close to Nietzsche: it was his own fate and he could not fully realize what it meant. Though he must have had his premonitions; otherwise he could not have written *Zarathustra*.

Mr. Baumann: I would like to point out the difference between Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* and the real Zarathustra. The real Zarathustra's religion was very spiritual, but at the same time he said that man should be a peasant, an animal.

Prof. Jung: Quite. Only the spirit can rise because the spirit is a vapor anyway, but man lives in the body and belongs to the earth. While Nietzsche's idea of the superman doesn't encourage that at all, for the idea of the Superman is to create something that is beyond man, beyond reality.

Prof. Reichstein: This situation was anticipated also in the scene of the rope-dancer.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is one continuous line, that jumping into the air and then the fatal fall. The dwarf's terrible prophecy has an extraordinary strength because he knows the future. That is a piece of the real unconscious, it is nature—not Nietzsche. Nature speaks and gives him the right prognosis. Now he continues.

Then was the dwarf silent; and it lasted long. The silence, however, oppressed me; and to be thus in pairs, one is verily lonelier than when alone!

I ascended, I ascended, I dreamt, I thought,—but everything

oppressed me. A sick one did I resemble, whom bad torture wearyeth, and a worse dream reawakeneth out of his first sleep.—

But there is something in me which I call courage: it hath hitherto slain for me every dejection. This courage at last bade me stand still and say: “Dwarf! Thou! Or I!”—

For courage is the best slayer,—courage which attacketh: for in every attack there is sound of triumph.

He got a fatal blow, that is quite visible, and the reaction is courage, a “quandmême” against whatever he has realized; of course we don’t know in how far he has realized it. This is surely a very brave reaction, this is the greatness of Nietzsche. He was a *déséquilibré* genius,¹⁴ but it was just his genius that he did not show cowardice in such a moment, but had to assert himself. Now he goes on talking about courage and he says finally in the paragraph next to the last.

Courage, however, is the best slayer, courage which attacketh: it slayeth even death itself; for it saith: “*Was that life?* Well! Once more!”

In such speech, however, there is much sound of triumph. He who hath ears to hear, let him hear.

This passage shows that there is a certain realization—here is the courage that faces death—so we can assume that Nietzsche perhaps took it as a premonition of death. Or it might be a speech metaphor, we don’t know. At all events the word *death* is here, and the conclusion is the new idea that comes in here; we don’t know when it originated in him but it became the main idea in an essay which was posthumously published by one of the secretaries of the Nietzsche archives. It is the idea of *die ewige Wiederkunft*, the eternal return of all things. We have had hints before in *Zarathustra* of the eternal return, his idea of immortality.¹⁵ Why should one be afraid of death since everything eternally returns? So the onslaught of the dwarf brings out in him the idea of the eternity of life.

¹⁴ A *quandmène*: an “even so.” *Déséquilibré*: disequilibrated.

¹⁵ Nietzsche said that the “fundamental concept” of his *Zarathustra* was “the idea of Eternal Recurrence, the highest formula of affirmation that can ever be attained.” See his section on *Zarathustra* in *Ecce Homo*.

LECTURE IV

25 May 1938

Prof. Jung:

We got to the second part of "The Vision and the Enigma" last time. It begins,

"Halt, dwarf!" said I. "Either I—or thou! I, however, am the stronger of the two—: thou knowest not mine abysmal thought! *It*—couldst thou not endure!"

Then happened that which made me lighter: for the dwarf sprang from my shoulder, the prying sprite! And it squatted on a stone in front of me. There was however a gateway just where we halted.

You remember in the first part, the dwarf was sitting on Zarathustra's back. That is a typical demonstration of a possession: evil spirits are always supposed to sit on the backs of their victims. Therefore certain primitive tribes wear peculiar amulets at the back of the neck, sort of scowling faces to protect them against the evil eye or against the spirits that come after them. You see, spirits are often associated with the archetypal form of the shadow that follows after. The Greeks had formulation of this idea in one word meaning "the one that follows behind." Now whatever follows behind is in the sphere where we have no eyes, no consciousness, our consciousness being closely associated with the sense of vision. We know that from our everyday speech, when we understand or become conscious of a thing, we say, "I see," or "It dawns upon me." And the metaphors that we use to explain the essence of consciousness are analogies taken from the world of light and of seeing. When it is a matter of a feeling realization, on the other hand, we choose our analogies from the sense of hearing. "I hear" means something quite different from, "I see." "I hear" means that the thing has penetrated your system more, been taken more to heart, while "I see" need not imply that at all. For instance, the German word *Gehör* meaning "hearing," "having an ear for a thing," is related to *gehorsam*

meaning obedient, or *gehorschen*, to obey. When the Lord speaks to Samuel, and he answers, "Oh Lord, I hear," it means "I obey, I submit," but if Samuel had said, "Oh Lord, I see, yes Lord, I see what you mean," it wouldn't mean that he would necessarily be *gehorsam*, that he would submit and be obedient. It would sound almost blasphemous, preposterous. So whatever comes from behind comes from the shadow, from the darkness of the unconscious, and because you have no eyes there, and because you wear no neck amulet to ward off evil influences, that thing gets at you, possesses and obsesses you. It sits on top of you.

Therefore if a patient in analysis feels obsessed, it is the task of the analyst to dispossess him of his anima or animus, and in such a case one turns him round and says, "Now look at the thing." And in that moment it gets off him. He can objectify it. That is the reason why one should objectify unconscious figures. We make a figure of the animus and the anima, because in nature they are not visible as figures, but are invisible possessions; they occur as if they were really in one's system. The man who carries an evil spirit on his back doesn't know it, doesn't know that this thing behind is manipulating his brain and causing a peculiar expression on his face. It often happens that people who as far as they know have perfectly harmless nice thoughts, yet betray something quite different in their faces; the face is not at all in accordance with their conscious mental contents, but is in accordance with the sprite, the jinn, that is sitting on their backs. They are being unconsciously manipulated by a possessive spirit. Now, if they turn round and face that thing, then instantly it becomes objective, and therefore personified. For it is impossible to perceive an object which is not something in itself. As long as they don't turn round, as long as they are possessed, it has no form—they cannot imagine a form.

People have the greatest difficulty in understanding what one can possibly mean by an anima or an animus, because they never turn round. To make it objective is to them quite unnatural, against nature, for they prefer to act on impulse, even when admitting that they do things which are strange to themselves, which react on themselves, and which they will be sorry for. Afterwards, they don't understand how they could ever have done such a thing. Nevertheless, they go on behaving in that way, apparently thinking that possession is justified because it is quite natural. It is indeed quite natural; it is, one could say, the original condition of mankind. Man is always a bit possessed: he is necessarily possessed inasmuch as his consciousness is weak. Primitive consciousness is very frail, easily overcome; therefore primitive people

are always suffering from loss of consciousness. Suddenly something jumps upon them, seizes them, and they are alienated from themselves. In a dance they easily get into an ecstatic condition in which they are no longer themselves, and knowing this, they even apply that knowledge in their rites. They induce that condition. The Central Australian aborigines say that they perform the Alcheringa rites in order to become some one that ordinarily they are not. They identify with their ancestors of the Alcheringa time, a sort of heroic age long ago, as the time of the Homeric heroes would be to us. They return to that condition, become their ancestors in the Alchuringa time, and as such they perform the rites; otherwise the rites are not valid.¹

The Pueblo Indians have the same idea. The master of the religious ceremonies who accompanied me to the buffalo dances, told me he could not dance himself that day because he was not purified. Then he explained to me that at sunrise all the men went up on the roofs of the houses—the pueblos are built like skyscrapers, the houses piled up on top of each other, pyramid-shaped—and there they watch the sun the whole day long until evening. They turn slowly with the sun until they are in a state of complete identification with it, the sun being their ancestor, their father. Then they are the sons of the sun and as such they can dance. But if they are not reidentified with the divine ancestor, they cannot perform the rites. Or if they did, it would be merely a theatrical performance and would have no magic effects—that is what he told me. You see, that is another application of the same fact, that they know these phenomena of psychological possession so well that they even apply them for their own ritual use. This is a primitive piece of psychology which is pretty difficult for us to understand, but it shows clearly how general and normal that fact is with them.

Now of course, that all lives in us: we have the same brain, the same metabolism—our whole system is the same—and therefore we can observe the same phenomena in ourselves. Here Nietzsche, in his poetical language, blurts it out. But we express the same fact when we say to someone in a very bad mood, “What in hell has gotten into you?” or, “We will discuss this matter again tomorrow when you are yourself.” That is a recognition of the fact that one is alienated by a strange possession, which in true primitive style one could symbolize here by that little demoniacal thing, the dwarf that sits upon his back. The right procedure, as I said, is to turn round and face it. You say you are pos-

¹ On alcheringa time, see Lévy-Bruhl, p. 1382, and below, 8 Feb. 1939, n. 2.

sessed, and you ask by whom, and then you get the answer. You reconstruct the figures; you try to find out what that thing is in you.

This is not my invention, but is an age-old idea. Leon Daudet has arrived at the same idea; in his book *L'Hérédé* he speaks of *auto-fécondation intérieure*, by which he understands an inner transformation caused by the reawakening of the soul of an ancestor.² In other words, an inner self generated in oneself, a secondary personality which can become a possessive spirit. For instance, your grandfather or your uncle may generate himself within you and become a possessive personality which for years, for the better part of your life even, supplants your own personality. Daudet thought it was a great discovery and cites certain cases which are perfectly convincing if one knows anything about it. Any case of a neurotic split personality would be an equally good example. For instance, one often hears that until he was twenty, So-and-So was a very nice boy, but he is quite different now and one doesn't know what has got into him. Or the other way round: somebody who had a very negative personality turns out very positive. And it can be a real possession, quite against the personal character; one becomes a different individual.

That comes from the original weakness of consciousness. There is so much unconscious matter outside, that consciousness can be overrun at any time and a strange complex simply takes the seat. Then what you assumed yourself to be disappears into the shadow and becomes an unconscious complex. Perhaps someone who had really a very doubtful character to begin with suddenly turns out to be a saint and dies a saint. To know what he really is, one must study his dreams or visions; that is most instructive, most interesting. The visions of St. Anthony, for example, show quite a sensuous, lascivious character, which was supplanted by a decent one.³ Then one is in doubt as to who the real fellow may be, or what he would be like if he were not a mere conglomeration—if he were, instead, a composition, a synthesis. The original condition of a personality is an absolutely irrational conglomeration of inherited units. A part is from the grandfather on the mother's side, another from the grandfather on the father's side; the nose comes from 1750 and the ears from 1640, and so on. And it is the same with your different qualities, a certain artistic quality for instance, or a

* Leon Daudet published *L'Hérédé* (Paris, 1916), which Jung elsewhere called "Confused but ingenious." CW 9 i, par. 224. Interior auto-fecundation has to do with the presence in all of us of ancestral elements which occasionally manifest themselves, a variant on alcheringa time.

³ For St. Anthony's visions, see above, 3 June 1936, n. 2.

mental quality. All that is in the family tree, but unfortunately we have not careful records of our ancestors, but only have occasional portraits or perhaps there are some letters left, or old tales, which allow us a certain insight. The grandmother may have said that one child was like her own grandmother, and so we reach back some generations. But we know nothing certainly; we are a conglomeration, not a composition, and only become a composition when the parts know about each other. And when you know about your own society of dwarfs, all the minor personalities in you—when you confront them and get the full shock of that mood—you almost lose your head over yourself: “Who in hell am I?”

That was Schopenhauer’s question—I have often told you that story. He was walking in the public gardens in Frankfurt one day, lost in thought, so he strayed into a flower-bed. And the guardian rushed at him: “Hey! Get out of there! Who are you anyway?” And Schopenhauer said, “Exactly, that is what I want to know.” You see, he was concerned with the identity of the ego—who *is* that fellow? Now, anybody can have that doubt; there is always the possibility of doubt, because it might be something else there—really something else. Sure enough, when you come to those split compartments in yourself, conglomerations that are not your own, you do ask yourself who you are. If St. Anthony had asked himself about his visions, naturally that would have been an awful question to him: “Am I the fellow who produces such awful stuff or am I a saint?” He would have been in profound doubt.

Athanasius, the Bishop of Alexandria wrote a collection of excellent stories about the “mourning ones,” the hermits in the desert. One saint, for instance, had lived twenty years in the desert and was absolutely sure that he was watertight and could meet the world again; he felt completely detached. Then he remembered that he had an old friend who had become a bishop somewhere and he decided to pay him a visit, so he left the desert and went out into the world. And when he came to the outskirts of the town, he was passing an inn which smelt so lovely of meat and wine and garlic and so on, that he thought, well, he might try, and in he went. But he never came out. He went under completely: he ate and drank and forgot that he was a saint and lost himself in the world again. That was a fellow who had made an artificial compartment and thought he was that and nothing else.

So we should always be a little in doubt about ourselves. That is quite healthy and not primitive; a primitive would be in horrible doubt about himself if he could think at all. But *we* think; at least we assume we do, and in certain cases it is a fact that one does think and therefore

there is doubt. While if someone has no doubt at all, if he has absolute conviction, absolute certainty, we can be sure there is a compartment: he is bordering on a neurosis. That is a hysterical condition; certainty is not normal. To be in doubt is a more normal condition than certainty. To confess that you doubt, to admit that you never know for certain, is the supremely human condition; for to be able to suffer the doubt, to carry the doubt, means that one is able to carry the other side. The one who is certain carries no cross. He is redeemed: you can only congratulate him and have no further discussion. He loses the human contact, redeemed from the humanity that really carries the burden. That the redeemed one is redeemed from his burden is the tragic split in any religious conviction.

Dr. Escher: There is a funny story of the inferior man in Nietzsche the wise philosopher. He had a quarrel with his tailor who brought him a frockcoat.

Prof. Jung: I remember—a most unphilosophical scene. I could tell you very similar anecdotes about Schopenhauer and Kant—human, all-too-human. Even the great philosopher is a very small man occasionally. Well, we are perfectly satisfied with the fact that Nietzsche had a shadow. So this scene with the dwarf is one of the incidents in the great drama which begins now, the coming up of the unconscious. First there was the symbol of the volcano, the descent into the volcano, and now the volcanic material is coming up. He approaches it slowly and very carefully. We have seen the attempt to minimize and to mitigate, because he is afraid it might be too much—which it was, of course, in the end. The unconscious appears here in the form of the possessive dwarf, and the very fact that he understands him to be nothing but a dwarf is minimizing the danger. So instead of asking the dwarf who he is and where he got that funny kind of power, sitting on his back and causing him to have terrible feelings (which would be the natural question) he begins to preach. He addresses the dwarf in a sort of sermon:

“Look at this gateway! Dwarf!” I continued, “it hath two faces. Two roads come together here: these hath no one yet gone to the end of.

This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward—that is another eternity.”

Whatever he tries to convey to the dwarf here, it is clear that he handles him as if he were nothing but his own thoughts, as if he were another mood or something like that, as if it did not matter at all what the

dwarf might say. That is apotropaic, a means we often apply. If you expect a rather disagreeable discussion with somebody, for instance, which you would like to ward off, you begin to talk rapidly, in order to prevent the other fellow from saying anything. We were speaking the other day of that reason for so much uninterrupted talk. And those people like to talk fluently and in a loud voice: they are so convinced that something disagreeable might be said that they think they had better start in right away and force it into a certain shape.

I remember such a case. The famous Professor Forel was an alienist here; he had formerly been the director of the Psychiatric Clinic, but later he was chiefly occupied with propaganda for total abstinence.⁴ And one day he suddenly burst into our office where a number of young doctors were working and instantly assumed that of course those young devils were not total abstainers. So he buttonholed a man who happened to be a fervent member of the most orthodox Verein against alcohol—I think he was the president of it—and shouted, “You probably don’t know about the awful effects of alcohol, the terrible hereditary effects” and so on. The young man took a breath and tried to reply but Forel was just going at him hammer and tongs, on and on like a torrent, till he had to stop to take breath. Then the young doctor began, “Er . . . , pardon . . .” but Forel was already on top of him. “I know what you are going to say, but it is all wrong!” Of course Forel was under the impression that everybody was contradicting him. There was naturally some criticism, so he applied that mechanism. Sometimes you have not the faintest idea what the disagreeable subject could be which you might mention, but you can be sure if people get at you in that way, that they want to prevent you from saying something disagreeable. So here Nietzsche talks the dwarf down. Now, of these two ways he says:

“They are antithetical to one another, these roads; they directly abut on one another:—and it is here, at this gateway, that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: ‘This Moment.’

But should one follow them further—and ever further and fur-

⁴ August Henri Forel (1848-1931) was director of the Burghölzli before the more famous and influential Eugen Bleuler, who was Jung’s superior when he went there directly after medical school. Both men were militant teetotalers. Jung said of Forel’s book *The Sexual Question* (1905) that it “not only had an enormous sale but found a good many imitators” (CW 10, par. 213).

ther on, thinkest thou, dwarf, that these roads would be eternally antithetical?"—

"Everything straight lieth," murmured the dwarf, contemptuously. "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle."

"Thou spirit of gravity!" said I wrathfully, "do not take it too lightly! Or I shall let thee squat where thou squattest, Haltfoot,—and I carried thee *high*!"

You see, he instantly tells the dwarf that it is he, Zarathustra, who is carrying him high. But the point is that the rider controls the horse, and not that the horse carries him—it is self-evident that the horse has to carry him. Zarathustra doesn't realize that in taking the part of the horse, he makes a point in his favor out of what is a clear defeat. The dwarf is triumphant: he is the rider, and he is using Zarathustra as his riding animal. Now the dwarf says here, "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle, everything straight lieth." How does that sound to you?

Mr. Allemann: It is a natural truth.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but what is its character? Whose truth is that?

Mr. Henley: Zarathustra's.

Prof. Jung: Of course. All truth is crooked, the snake's way is the right way, every straight way lieth, time itself is a circle—the idea of the eternal return—that is the teaching of Zarathustra himself. And he calls it the "spirit of gravity," and then later he adopts just these ideas. So the dwarf is really the rider, Zarathustra's higher mind. Zarathustra behaves here like a schoolboy with a very intelligent teacher whom he cannot understand, so he calls him an old idiot. We usually say a man is stupid when we cannot understand him. In this case, Zarathustra talks as if he were on a mighty high horse in order not to recognize his defeat, but the dwarf is the higher mind which Zarathustra will come to soon after. We have already met in the text the idea of the eternal return: it was hovering over him, but he has not yet a realization of it. So what we recognize as an evil spirit has often a superior insight. Therefore we should not shout it down, but should at least give it the benefit of the doubt. We should ask, "What have you to say? What is your idea?" Usually when people make the attempt to objectify such a figure, they talk it down. They know better, just on account of that primitive fear of the overwhelming power of the unconscious. That one is unable to give such a figure the right of independent speech proves that consciousness is still too weak. It is always a sign of a strong consciousness when one can say, "Talk, I listen." The weak one will not

risk giving the other one that chance, for fear that it might get on top of him.

“Observe,” continued I, “This Moment! From the gateway, This Moment, there runneth a long eternal lane *backwards*: behind us lieth an eternity.

Must not whatever *can* run its course of all things, have already run along that lane? Must not whatever can happen of all things have already happened, resulted, and gone by?

And if everything have already existed, what thinkest thou, dwarf, of This Moment? Must not this gateway also—have already existed?

And are not all things closely bound together in such wise that This Moment draweth all coming things after it? Consequently—*itself* also?

For whatever can run its course of all things, also in this long lane outward—must it once more run!—

And this slow spider which creepeth in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and thou and I in this gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things—must we not all have already existed?

—And must we not return and run in that other lane out before us, that long weird lane—must we not eternally return?”

Thus did I speak, and always more softly: for I was afraid of mine own thoughts, and arrear-thoughts. Then, suddenly did I hear a dog howl near me.

The dwarf has already said this. This is the thinking of the dwarf, “Everything straight lieth . . . all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.” This is great language, and Zarathustra assimilates it, but he dilutes it and he thinks that they are his own ideas. But the dwarf has brought up these ideas in Zarathustra. These monumental short words of wisdom come from the intestines of the world. They are like the words of Laotze, or Pythagoras, or Heraclitus—short and pregnant with meaning. Then a man, or a mind, that speaks like that is called dark, obscure. It is still assumed that Heraclitus was a somewhat confused old bird; he is called “mystical,” “the dark one.” But that is because everybody else felt dark when he spoke; because he was too bright, they felt the extreme darkness in their own heads. What happens here is what usually happens when people have slow understanding: by the slow process of solution and digestion it comes to their minds again and then they think they have discovered it. Then they say, “But why didn’t

you say so before?" Now Zarathustra, as I said, has realized here what the dwarf told him, but he realizes it as if he had thought it, and he doesn't admit any indebtedness to the dwarf, doesn't give him any credit for it. He even speaks as if the dwarf had said something quite different. But this idea of the eternal return, which to Nietzsche was most inspiring, really belongs to the spirit of gravity. The dwarf is the originator of this idea, which is perfectly paradoxical—just the thing which he reviles as the spirit of gravity is the originator of this most inspiring wisdom. This is one of the passages where one sees how little reasoning there is in this book. There is no reasoning, no thinking—it just runs away with him, flowing on. He has no standpoint against it, no critical point of view. He is the victim of a process. That is characteristic of any incursion of the unconscious: when the unconscious comes up like this, the danger is that one will be hopelessly carried off one's feet. There seems to be no coming back to a clear point of view, a clear division: this is I and that is he, this is this and that is that. It is just a torrent of mental contents with an individual present to reason about them. Here he should have seen, as any thinker would have seen without any trouble at all, that what he reviles as the spirit of gravity was the origin of the most inspiring thought.

Now he says, "Thus did I speak, and always more softly: for I was afraid of mine own thoughts, and arrear-thoughts." Well, if he is frightened by his own thoughts, why does he make them? That they are not his thoughts is just the trouble; therefore he is afraid of them. You see, one is not afraid of something one can do and undo; the potter doesn't need to be afraid of the pots he makes, because he can break them up if he dislikes them—that is in his power. But what Nietzsche calls "mine own thoughts" are just not his own thoughts, and then one can understand his fear, because those thoughts can affect him. If he only could *say* they were not his own. Why should you be afraid of anything of your own manufacture when you can change it? But he doesn't discriminate. He simply identifies with the thing and runs with the herd. You see, this is the critical moment; he cannot help admitting that he is afraid of these thoughts. In other words, he is afraid of the spirit of gravity, afraid of the thing that possesses him. But he calls it "mine own" and there is the fatal mistake. Now, in such a moment one could expect a reaction from the side of the instincts. You see, when people are threatened by the unconscious so that they are carried away by it, really afloat and really frightened, then the instinctive unconscious, the animal instincts, realizes the danger, and that is now the dog that begins to howl:

Then, suddenly did I hear a dog *howl* near me.

Had I ever heard a dog howl thus? My thoughts ran back. Yes! When I was a child, in my most distant childhood:

—Then did I hear a dog howl thus. And saw it also, with hair bristling, its head upwards, trembling in the stillest midnight, when even dogs believe in ghosts:

You see, even dogs believe in ghosts, but not he. This is an indirect admission nevertheless that the dwarf is a ghost. If he could only *say* it was a ghost! But then Mr. So-and-So would come along and say it was superstition, as if that were a criterion. You must make ghosts if there are none, otherwise you are possessed; therefore make one—or several—as quickly as you can. If it is all your own thoughts you are in hell; then they run away with you. While if you say a ghost possesses you, you can attribute certain thoughts to him and others to yourself. Then you have a standpoint. The reason why we say everything is white, or are absolutely convinced that everything is black, is in order to have a standpoint. We need to create such a standpoint because there are plenty of other thoughts in us to say that what we call white is really black. And that is possible: that what we think of as white is black at the same time is psychologically true. There are thoughts in us which tell us: what you call good is bad; what you call virtue is cowardice; what you call value is no value at all; what you call good is vice; what you praise you loathe, perhaps. That is the truth, but it is so awkward that we make a fence around ourselves and project it into other people, and then we set ourselves against other people, create archenemies. It is enemy No. 1 who says it. But that is all ourselves.

Now, since ghosts are mental factors—surely it is a psychological fact that people believe that there are ghosts—so it doesn't matter whether you can weigh them, or photograph them. That is absolutely irrelevant. If you can make a photograph of a ghost, all the better. If you cannot, it doesn't matter. If you have never observed any psychic phenomena, with materializations or anything of the sort to prove their existence, it is too bad, but that makes it all the more necessary to insist that they exist because you need them in your functioning. You have to attribute your thoughts to somebody, for if you say they are your own, you will go crazy like our friend here; you will uproot yourself entirely, because you cannot be yourself and something else at the same time. So you are forced to be one-sided, to create one-sided convictions; for practical purposes it is absolutely necessary that you should be this one person who is assumed to have such-and-such con-

victions. Therefore we believe in principles, knowing all the time, if we are honest enough, that we have other principles just as well and that we believe in other principles just as well. But for practical purposes we adopt a certain system of convictions.

Now in order to be able to hold to one principle you have to repress the others, and in that case they may vanish from your consciousness. Then of course they will be projected and you will feel persecuted by people who have other views, or you may persecute them—it works both ways. You will then become a conscientious objector, and all your fighting spirit will exhaust itself in conscientious objections. But that fighting spirit exists, and the very thing you fight against, you will be using in fighting for the right cause. You see, nobody wants war, but everybody goes to war because they all assume they don't want it. That is the truth. But at the same time, we play with the idea of war, because it is a wonderful sensation. Yet we do not recognize this. Therefore, we are convinced that we don't want a war, and we project it. That was true in the world war: nobody wanted it, but nobody could stop it—nobody could get in control of the situation. And the terrible part is that human beings did it. Now, if a terrible god were influencing mankind, or a dangerous devil, we could ask ourselves what we could do to propitiate him and prevent such a catastrophe. But we think there is no such thing: no devil, no god, no ruling power. If anybody wants war it is the Germans or the French, the English or the Italians. If you can find the slightest trace of a tendency to war in them, you are sure it is they who want it. We don't assume responsibility; we simply say *they* want it. While all the time nobody really wants it consciously. Probably nobody in this room wants a war consciously, and just as little do people outside in the world want it. Who then makes a war?

Well, just as we don't want a war, we are also capable of wanting it, only we don't know it. That we could wish for a war is a terrible thought, but let us assume there are too many people in the world, too great an increase in the population, so that we are too close to one another, too crowded upon each other, and finally we hate each other. Then the thoughts begin to develop: "What can we do about it? Could we not cause a conflagration? Could we not kill that whole crowd in order to get a little space?" Or suppose that life is too hard, that you don't get a job, or the job doesn't pay, or other people take it away from you. If there were fewer people life would be much easier to live than it is now. Don't you think that slowly the idea would dawn upon you that you want to kill that other fellow? Now, we must admit that in no other time have there been so many people crowded together in Europe. It

is a brand new experience. Not only are we crowded in our cities, but are crowded in other ways. We know practically everything that happens in the world; it is shouted on the radio, we get it in our newspapers. If someone falls off his bicycle in Siam we get it in the post next day; we are impressed with an unheard-of misery when we hear of so many people having been drowned in China, so many starved in Siberia, so many killed in Spain, and perhaps a railway accident in Norway, and always a revolution in South America. You see, we are impressed with all the misery of the world, because the whole world is now shouting in our ears every day. We enjoy it and we don't know what it is doing to us—till finally we get the feeling that it is too much. How can one stop it? We must kill them all.

When I was in India, I talked with certain people of the Swaraj party who want Home Rule. I said, "But do you assume that you can run India with your party? Do you not realize that in no time you would have a terrible quarrel between the Mohammedans and the Hindus? They would cut each other's throats, kill each other by the hundreds of thousands." "Yes, naturally," one said, "they would." "But don't you think that is awful? They are your own people." "Oh well, for those worthless chaps to cut each other's throats is just right. We have an increase in population of 34 millions these last ten years." Now, India has always been threatened by famine; even by increasing the irrigated area, the greater part of the Indian population would be underfed. The cattle are underfed already. You see, if you wipe out all epidemics, too few people will die; therefore that awful politic idea. No politician would dare to admit such ideas here. But that is the East. There they are not hampered with such sentimentalism, such honest lies as we cultivate; they just admit it and that is right. They would have disorder and epidemic, but India has always had that and it needs it really. The Chinese population would increase to such an extent under European civilization that they couldn't possibly be fed, so when a number are drowned by one of those big rivers, that is right. All well-meaning people are terribly concerned with the fast-increasing population. What they are going to do about it? And there is no answer.

But nature will answer. We think we are good and we are, yes: we have the best of intentions, sure enough, but do you think that somewhere we are not nature, that we are different from nature? No, we are in nature and we think exactly like nature. I am not God, I don't know whether, according to the standpoint of God, there are too many people in Europe. Perhaps there must be still more, perhaps we must live like termites. But I can tell you one thing: I would not live under such

a condition. I would develop a war instinct—better kill all that crapule—and there are plenty of people who would think like that. That is unescapable, and it is much better to know it, to know that we are really the makers of all the misfortune which war means: we ourselves heap up the ammunition, the soldiers and the cannons. If we don't do it, we are fools; of course we have to do it, but it inevitably leads to disaster because it denotes the will to destruction which is absolutely unescapable. That is a terrible fact, but we should know it.

So we should say—and I should like to say—that there is a terrible demon in man that blindfolds him, that prepares awful destruction; and it would be much better if we had a temple for the god of war, where now, for instance, with all this trouble in Europe, we could say: “The god of war is restless, we must propitiate him. Let us sacrifice to the god of war.” And then every country would be going to the temples of the war god to sacrifice. Perhaps it would be a human sacrifice, I don't know—something precious. They might burn up a lot of ammunition or destroy cannons for the god of war. That would help. To say that it is not we who want it would help because man could then believe in his goodness. For if you have to admit that you are doing just what you say you are not doing, you are not only a liar, but a devil—and then where is the self-esteem of man? How can he hope for a better future? We can never become anything else because we are caught in that contradiction: on the one side we want to do good and on the other we are doing the worst. How can man develop? He is forever caught in that dilemma. So you had better acknowledge the evil—what you call it doesn't matter. If there were priests who said that the god of war must be propitiated, that would be a way of protecting yourself. But of course there are no such things, so we must admit that *we* prepare the war, that *we* are just thirsty for blood, everybody.

Now this dog represents, as it always does, the instinct of man that accompanies him. He is a true servant of man and through the acuteness of his senses he protects him. He has a very fine sense of smell; he scents the danger and warns him. So in this moment when Nietzsche ought to realize that there are thoughts and tendencies in man which he should not attribute to himself, the dog gives the warning. Now Nietzsche alludes to a time in his childhood when he once heard a dog howl like this. I don't know to what he refers here, but it might be to that terrible howl he heard from the lunatic asylum in the night, the dream in which Wotan appeared, that I mentioned three or four weeks ago. You see, the dog howling in the midnight, apparently at nothing, conveys the idea to Nietzsche that one ought to believe in

ghosts: one should personify such thoughts and attribute them to a definite figure, because even the dog, the instinct, does that. Instinctively we say, "*I* never thought such a thing," and so we invent fiends and enemies, trying to make somebody responsible for our own inimical thoughts. While the dog naturally would suggest that it is better to say that these thoughts belong to somebody else, perhaps to a ghost.

—So that it excited my commiseration. For just then went the full moon, silent as death, a glowing globe—at rest on the flat roof, as if on some one's property:—

Thereby had the dog been terrified: for dogs believe in thieves and ghosts. And when I again heard such howling, then did it excite my commiseration once more.

What has happened here? You see, it was definitely uncanny to Nietzsche, particularly on account of the memory of that terrible scream from the lunatic asylum. So in order to combat that deep impression he again invents a rationalization: namely, it is not ghosts, but just the moon, and dogs are supposed to howl at the full moon—it means nothing. Yet if you understand it as symbolism, you come to the same conclusion. Now what about the moon?

Prof. Reichstein: He spoke some time ago of the slow spider which creeps in the moonshine; it might be connected with this.

Prof. Jung: Quite. But what is the spider then?

Prof. Reichstein: His thoughts which he doesn't admit.

Prof. Jung: Well, the spider has no cerebro-spinal system, but has only a sympathetic nervous system, which is analogous to our own sympathetic nervous system. When a thing is deeply unconscious in us it is not in the cerebro-spinal system, but the sympathetic system is disturbed on account of contents which should be further up, which should be admitted to consciousness at least. Then one dreams of such insects, or one may have a pathological fear of them. So the spider means an unconscious tendency, and the fear of the spider is the fear of poison and also the fear of its way of killing its prey. It envelops its prey, and sits on it and sucks it. It is a horrible death and it is particularly suggestive because it symbolizes a psychological fact which can happen to us, the fact that the unconscious is circulating round us. It is always somewhere in us, and we don't know where. It spins a web around one, and one is caught by it, lamed by it, and finally it sits on one and saps one's life like a vampire. It is the evil spirit that sucks one's blood. Now the moon, which is obviously associated with the spider, is a well-known symbol for what?

Mr. Allemann: Lunacy.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the moon is the light in the darkness of the night, and it is always said that moonshine is most treacherous, that it causes illusions; so since time immemorial, all states of mental alienation are associated with the moon. We still have that meaning in our language: the German word *Mondsucht*, moon sickness, is practically never used, but it is not quite obsolete. It was the old name for epilepsy and is still used by peasants. So when Nietzsche explains or rationalizes the howl of the dog by the moon, he puts his foot in it again. It would mean that the dog is afraid, not of ghosts, but of insanity.

Mrs. Sigg: In Germany people believe that if you hear a dog howling in the night it means that somebody is dying in the neighborhood.

Prof. Jung: It means the same here, as you see in what follows:

Where was now the dwarf? And the gateway? And the spider? And all the whispering? Had I dreamt? Had I awakened? 'Twixt rugged rocks did I suddenly stand alone, dreary in the dreariest moonlight.

But there lay a man! And there! The dog leaping, bristling, whining—now did it see me coming—then did it howl again, then did it cry:—had I ever heard a dog cry so for help?

And verily, what I saw, the like had I never seen. A young shepherd did I see, writhing, choking, quivering with distorted countenance, and with a heavy black serpent hanging out of his mouth.

Had I ever seen so much loathing and pale horror on one countenance? He had perhaps gone to sleep? Then had the serpent crawled into his throat—there had it bitten itself fast.

My hand pulled at the serpent, and pulled:—in vain! I failed to pull the serpent out of his throat. Then there cried out of me: "Bite! Bite!

Its head off! Bite"—so cried it out of me; my horror, my hatred, my loathing, my pity, all my good and my bad cried with one voice out of me.—

Ye daring ones around me! Ye venturers and adventurers, and whoever of you have embarked with cunning sails on unexplored seas! Ye enigma-enjoyers!

Solve unto me the enigma that I then beheld, interpret unto me the vision of the loneliest one!

For it was a vision and a foresight:—*what* did I then behold in parable? And *who* is it that must come some day?

Who is the shepherd into whose throat the serpent thus crawled?

Who is the man into whose throat all the heaviest and blackest will thus crawl?

—The shepherd however bit as my cry had admonished him: he bit with a strong bite! Far away did he spit the head of the serpent—: and sprang up.—

No longer shepherd, no longer man—a transfigured being, a light-surrounded being, that *laughed!* Never on earth laughed a man as *he* laughed!

O my brethren, I heard a laughter which was no human laughter,—and now gnaweth a thirst at me, a longing that is never allayed.

My longing for that laughter gnaweth at me: oh, how can I still endure to live! And how could I endure to die at present!—

This spake Zarathustra.

LECTURE V

8 June 1938

Prof. Jung:

Last time I read to the end of the chapter "The Vision and the Enigma," but we didn't have time to deal with the famous story of the shepherd into whose mouth the snake crawled while he was asleep. You have now had a fortnight to think about it—though I admit that isn't enough—and I should like to ask if you know of a parallel—or any similar story?

Mrs. Fierz: The snake in the initiation mysteries of Sabazios?

Prof. Jung: That is a ritual and we shall come to that—just keep it in mind—but I should like to know now of a parallel story, or perhaps one that contains the contrary.

Mrs. Mellon: Jonah.

Prof. Jung: Yes, Jonah was swallowed by the whale but he didn't crawl in, the whale seized him.

Mrs. Sigg: The contrary would be the Kundalini snake.

Prof. Jung: No. You see, here the shepherd is about to swallow the snake, and the contrary would be that the snake swallows the shepherd. That is the ordinary form of the story: it is simply the hero myth, the hero that fights the dragon. This is a peculiar twisting round of that motif.

Mrs. Jung: Could one say that Christ crushing the head of the snake was a similar story?

Prof. Jung: Crushing the head is similar to biting off the head, but it is not quite the idea of swallowing it or the interpenetration of the two. The descent into hell would be a parallel if hell were represented by a dragon's belly.

Mrs. Fierz: How about the Nordic fairy tales of the snake coming out of the mouth of a sleeper, representing his soul?

Prof. Jung: The soul of a dying person—or when the soul leaves the body in a dream? Yes, that would be a sort of parallel, this being of course the reverse case. Well, as a matter of fact there are no exact par-

allels as far as my knowledge goes. I cannot remember one, so I assume this is rather a contrast to the usual hero myth where the dragon—or the whale or the serpent—swallows the hero. And here for certain reasons, that motif is turned round and transformed into its opposite. Now, Mrs. Fierz has just mentioned the rites from the mysteries of Sabazius.

Mrs. Fierz: During the course of the initiation, they pulled a snake down through the dress of the initiate, as if it were passing through him.

Prof. Jung: It was not a real snake, but a golden imitation, and it was pushed in at the neck and pulled down under the robe and out again at the feet. The idea was that the snake had entered the initiate and had left his body *per via naturalis*. Then there is another example.

Mrs. Mellon: The statue of Aion in the Mithraic rituals is depicted as a lion-headed god with a snake in his mouth.

Prof. Jung: No, it is coiled round him, and the head of the snake projects forward from behind over the lion's head. That is the *deus leontocephalus*, the syncretistic symbol for Zrvanakarana, that Iranian or Zarathustrian idea of the "infinitely long duration" or the infinitely long time.¹ But that has nothing to do with this symbolism. There are other snake rituals however.

Dr. Henderson: The Hopi Indians dance with snakes in their mouths.

Prof. Jung: And what does it mean in that case?

Dr. Henderson: It is the idea of the assimilation of the ancestral mana, which the snakes are supposed to bring up from the underworld.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the snakes actually live in clefts in the rocks and down in the ground, and there the Hopis gather them before the festival. Then in their ritual dance, they even put the snakes into their mouths. We have a picture in the Club of a Hopi snake dance, where one of them has a rattlesnake in his mouth. That is very near the symbolism here. Also keep in mind that the snake represents the chthonic mana of ancestors that have gone underground; the snakes bring it up, and taking the snakes in their mouths means that they are eating the mana, one could say. It is a communion with the mana, the power, left by the ancestors. It is at bottom of course a magic fertility ritual, for the purpose of increasing the fertility of the earth, as well as the fertility or the power of man. The idea is that life is strengthened by uniting

¹ In the Foreword of *Aion*, CW 9 ii, Jung says that the Mithraic god, represented as a human figure with lion head and a torso entwined by a serpent, symbolized the *aeon*, an immense period of time. See too the frontispiece of that volume.

oneself to those underground chthonic forces. Like the giant Antaeus in Greek mythology, who was powerful as long as he had his feet on the earth; in order to conquer him, Hercules had to lift him off the ground. So the ancient Greeks apparently had very much the same idea of the chthonic powers.

It was in Greece of course that the very interesting Eleusinian mysteries took place, though they have never been quite understood because we have no text or any other exact evidence of what happened there, the actual functioning. But we have monuments where the mystes is depicted kissing or fondling a pretty big snake, representing the earth power. There was nothing spiritual about the Eleusinian mysteries though in later times people made a fuss about them, assuming that they were very wonderful and spiritual. That was a great mistake, however; we would probably have been terribly shocked at what went on at Eleusis. It was a chthonic performance which made the collaboration of the earth with the higher man quite clear. We have evidence for that in the famous ritual celebrated by the women, the *Aischrologia*. The ladies of Athens gathered yearly in Eleusis, and there they celebrated their own mystery to which the men were not admitted. They arranged a very good dinner, plenty of food and good wine, and after dinner the priestess of Demeter, the earth mother, and the president, who was one of the noble ladies of Athens, started the ritual of the *Aischrologia*, which consisted of telling obscene jokes, smutty stories, to each other. This was supposed to be good for the fertility of the fields in the coming season. One can see how it worked: the fact that they could tell such stories, which ordinarily they would not tell, had a certain effect upon those noble ladies. It was the earth in them that was helped and since they were identical with the earth, the earth itself was helped. They naively supposed that what was good for them would also be good for the fields.

Of course we cannot understand these things now because our women are uprooted. They are no longer identical with the earth—perhaps identical with a flat but not with the earth. But one sees it under primitive circumstances. I have seen it in East Africa, though I don't know how long it will be before the missionaries succeed in destroying the original order of things. The woman there owns the *shamba*, the plantation. She is identical with her estate and has the dignity of the whole earth. She *is* the earth, has her own piece of ground, and so she makes sense. She is not up in the air, a sort of social appendix. So you see, the two apparently disconnected facts—that kissing and fondling of the snake on the one side, and the *Aischrologia* on the

other—belong together, start from the same original idea: namely, the serpent represents the magic mana in the earth which has to be brought up for man to again establish communication with that fertile power, and the Aischrologia also augments the fertility of the earth. It is pretty much the same idea, expressed in another form. Then we have another parallel with the reach of Christianity, which may be a derivative of the Eleusinian mysteries.

Mrs. Sigg: In *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* you spoke of a Christian sect, the Ophites, that kissed the snake.²

Prof. Jung: You are right, but the main point in their ritual was something else.

Mr. Allemann: They let the snake crawl over the bread.

Prof. Jung: Yes, they had a basket containing the snake on the communion table, and they made it crawl over the bread they were to use in the communion, the host. They celebrated communion with the bread which had been magically endowed with power by the chthonic snake. Then it contained the proper nutritive quality, then it was right for use; it was what the Christians called the *panis immortalis*, the food of immortality. It is the same idea that the chthonic powers bring fertility, health, duration, strength, and so on.

Mr. Henley: The East Indian snake cults, where they permit themselves to be bitten by a poisonous snake, are similar.

Prof. Jung: All those rites in which snakes figure were originally fertility rites. In India one still sees temples in which snakes are crawling about. And one finds those stone nagas nearly everywhere; they are supposed to be sort of goddesses or demons that come up from the ground. The river Ganges is represented as such a naga, woman above and serpent below. Then in Mamallapuram on the East coast of India, on the bay of Bengal, is the famous rock that is carved all over and called *The Birth of the Ganga*; the naga is in a cleft of the huge boulder, and that is the source, the origin, of the heavenly river Ganges. The Ganges is the main river of India and it spreads fertility over the greater part of the country, in contradistinction to the Indus which is also a great river but flows through vast deserts. It is a peculiar fact that the west of India is far less fertile. While in the east there are no such deserts. The Ganges, or any river belonging to the same system, always flows through rice fields or cultivated places. Well now, all this material should aid us in approaching this peculiar symbolism. But there is one

² See CW 5, pars. 563-77 where Jung discusses the snake rituals among the Ophites. There too, he refers to this episode of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

other parallel which I should like to use here to help us understand the union of serpent and man. As I said, the origin of this symbol in *Zarathustra* is the swallowing of the hero by the serpent or the dragon; turned round it is the swallowing of the serpent by the hero, and if you keep both things in mind, you get a sort of interpenetration, which would be represented by a symbol which has played a very great role, and which we should remember here in dealing with this modern symbolism. What would that be?

Mrs. Fierz: There was the idea that the hero had snake eyes, that there was something of the snake in him naturally.

Prof. Jung: The hero himself has qualities of the snake. The dragon, for instance, was supposed to have an invulnerable skin, and in the Siegfried saga the hero has to bathe himself in the blood of the dragon in order to acquire the same skin. And a Nordic saga says that heroes can be recognized by the fact that they have snake eyes, that peculiar rigid, magic expression of the eyes. But there is a real symbol of interpenetration.

Mrs. Fierz: I don't know whether it is too farfetched, but the journey of the dead to the Egyptian underworld seems to me to contain a similar symbolism. Pictures of this underworld show it to be full of snakes—every door, for instance, has a snake depicted on both sides, as in *The Book of the Dead*.³

Prof. Jung: Well, in *The Book of the Dead* there is the eternal struggle of the sun god Ra with the great serpent Apepi. It is the daily repetition of the hero myth. Always in the seventh hour of the night the great fight begins, where Ra is depicted as a he-cat, fighting and overcoming the snake that has wound itself round the ship in which the sun god travels through the sea of the underworld. Only when the cat, or the hero, succeeds in killing the serpent, aided by the ceremonies of the priests in the temples, can the sun rise. Therefore, in the primitive hero myths, the sun rises at the moment that the hero comes out of the belly of the monster. With the first rays of the sun, consciousness again dawns from the nocturnal unconsciousness; so life is once more victorious over death and destruction, having overcome that state of being swallowed by the monster. But you see, that is only one side of it. It is the serpent swallowing the hero, not the hero swallowing the serpent, and the two belong together. We have a definite symbol for the interpenetration.

³ *The Book of the Dead*, Introduction and translation by E. A. Wallis-Budge (New York, n.d.).

Miss Hannah: Is it not Christ as the serpent?


Prof. Jung: That is the hero again. The snake always means resurrection on account of shedding its skin. According to an African myth, there was no death on earth originally; death came in by mistake. People could shed their skins every year and so they were always new, rejuvenated, until once an old woman, in a distracted condition and feeble-minded, put on her old skin again and then she died. That is the way death came into the world. It is again the idea that human beings were like snakes originally: they did not die. It was a snake that brought the idea of death to Adam and Eve in Paradise. The snake was always associated with death, but death out of which new life was born. But what is that definite symbol? A great deal has been said about it lately.

Miss von Franz: The *ouroboros*.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The tail eater, or the two animals that devour each other. In alchemy that is represented in the form of the winged dragon and the wingless dragon that devour each other, one catching the tail of the other and forming a ring. The simplest form is of course the dragon or the serpent that bites its own tail, so making the ring; the tail is the serpent and the head is as if it belonged to another animal. The same idea has also been expressed by two animals, the dog and the wolf, devouring each other, or the winged and the wingless lion, or a male and a female lion, always forming a ring, so that one cannot see which is eating which. They are eating each other; both destroy and both are destroyed. And that expresses the idea that once the hero eats the serpent and once the serpent eats the hero. You see, in these Gnostic rituals, or the ritual of Sabazios, man is superior to the serpent in a way—he makes use of the serpent. That the golden snake descends through the body of the initiate means that the initiate asserts himself against the divine element of the snake: he is then a sort of dragon that eats or overcomes the other dragon. So it is one and the same symbolism whether expressed in this form or that. In primitive myths it is usually the dragon that devours everything. Even the hero, who by sheer luck and at the last moment succeeds in destroying the monster that has eaten him, cannot overcome the monster by a frontal attack, but he is able to defend his life and destroy the monster from within by the peculiar means of making a fire in its belly. Fire is the artificial light against nature, as consciousness is the light which man has made against nature. Nature herself is unconscious and the original man is unconscious; his great achievement against nature is that he becomes conscious. And that light of consciousness against the unconsciousness

of nature is expressed, for instance, by fire. Against the powers of darkness, the dangers of the night, man can make a fire which enables him to see and to protect himself. Fire is an extraordinary fact really. I often felt that when we were travelling in the wilds of Africa. The pitch dark tropical night comes on quite suddenly: it just drops down on the earth, and everything becomes quite black. And then we made a fire. That is an amazing thing, the most impressive demonstration of man's victory over nature; it was the means of the primitive hero against the power of devouring beasts, his attack against the great unconsciousness, when the light of consciousness disappeared again into the original darkness.

Now, in the alchemistic symbol of the two animals that devour each other, that peculiar functional relationship of man's conscious to the natural darkness is depicted, and it is an astonishing fact that such a symbol developed in a time when the idea of the manifest religion was that the light had definitely overcome the darkness, that evil—or the devil—had been overcome by the redeemer. In just that time, this symbol developed, where darkness and light were on the same level practically; they were even represented as functioning together in a sort of natural rhythm. Like the operation of the Chinese Yin and Yang, the transformation into each other, being conceived and born of each other, the one eating the other, and the one dying becoming the seed of itself in its own opposite. This symbol of the Taigitu expresses the idea of the essence of life, because it shows the operation of the pairs of opposites. In the heart of the darkness, the Yin, lies the seed of the light, the Yang; and in the light, the day, the Yang, lies the dark seed of the Yin again. This is often represented in the East as two fishes in that position, meaning the two sides or the two aspects of man, the conscious and the unconscious man.



Now this preparation should make us understand the situation of the shepherd and the serpent. What does it mean in the psychology of Nietzsche-Zarathustra that he suddenly discovers that shepherd in deadly embrace with the serpent? He is apparently swallowing the snake, but the snake is attacking him at the same time, penetrating him. Why such an image, or symbol, at this place? You remember in his discussion with the dwarf just before, the dwarf was already the chthonic power.

Miss Hannah: Was he not trying to escape from the chthonic, and is it not getting back at him by attacking his throat? When he met the gateway, "This Moment," he really took no notice of it, but merely

asked if we do not eternally return, putting countless millions of moments on either side of it. No doubt this is an inspiring idea in itself but it seems to me to rob the moment, the here and now, of its whole importance and thereby to deny the body and the chthonic.

Prof. Jung: Well, in the actual text, he says to the dwarf, “. . . what thinkest thou, dwarf, of This Moment? Must not this gateway also—have already existed? And are not all things closely bound together in such wise that This Moment draweth all coming things after it? *Consequently*—itself also?” Here he gets hold of the important idea of the eternal return, and one can see that this is an attempt at getting out of the moment. For if you are confronted with the unique moment and regard it as merely a moment that has repeated itself a million times before and will repeat itself a million times afterwards, you naturally don’t take much notice of it, as Miss Hannah says. And then you can say you are out of it. But why should he deny the uniqueness of the moment? How would it have been if he had not tried to get out of it—if he had said, yes, this is the unique moment, there is no eternal return?

Miss Hannah: He would have to take up his responsibilities as man in the flesh.

Prof. Jung: What would that mean?

Miss Hannah: Giving that dog a bone so that it doesn’t howl.

Prof. Jung: No, we know nothing of the dog now.

Mrs. Jung: He should have realized in that moment what threatened him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, if he takes this moment that has been emphasized by both the dwarf and himself in mutual collaboration, as a unique moment, with no return, no repetition, then he would be forced to realize it completely. You see, when someone makes a sort of bold statement, you will always find certain people who say they knew it already, and then the wind is taken out of his sails: all the juice has gone, it means nothing, it is only repetition, an idea known long ago. Now such people are always hoping that the whole thing will fall flat, so that they won’t have to realize it. Unfortunately it is true of many things that they have been already and will be again, and it is a sad truth that many things in human life are flat—that is also a fact. But if you see flatness only, you cease to exist—there is only an immense continuity of flatness, and that is of course not worthwhile. Why should we continue such a string of nonentities, mere repetitions? So when you hear some one asserting that what you say has long been known, you know that he has an interest that that moment should not be realized because it would be dan-

gerous or too disagreeable. We have a proof here. He says, " 'And must we not return and run in that other lane out before us, that long weird lane—must we not eternally return?'—Thus did I speak, and always more softly: for I was afraid of mine own thoughts, and arrear-thoughts." And then the dog began to howl, which means that he talked in that way because he was afraid of his own thoughts, of what he *might* think.

So when Nietzsche says that the moment will repeat itself and has already repeated itself many a time, he makes it into a thing we are used to; it is an ordinary day, an ordinary hour, so why bother about it? And he repeats that as often as possible to himself, but always more softly because it doesn't help exactly. He asks himself: "Now why do I say that? Why do I try to make it as flat as possible?" Then the howling dog, the instinct, is the reaction against that attempt to get out of the realization. Now, those thoughts of which he is so afraid should be realized, but it is too much, he cannot do it, he is trembling in a sort of panic. That volcano is always threatening to burst out, and he is fighting on the edge against the fire which comes nearer and nearer. This idea which he invents—that one has gone through this moment many times and will go through it many times again—is the attempt of a consciousness which resists realization out of fear of what might be contained in the unique moment. If he admits that this is the unique moment, he has to realize what is in it and why it is unique.

Dr. Escher: It is the situation of the provisional life instead of keeping to the here and now.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. You see, the full realization of the here and now is a moral accomplishment which is only short of heroism: it is an almost heroic achievement. You may not believe that, but it is true. These ideas are strange to us so I speak—perhaps at boring length—about that question of realization. Our civilization is ignorant of these terms; we have no such conceptions, because we always start with the idea that our consciousness is perfect. It never occurs to us that it could be dim, or that it might develop. That notion is left to the East, where they are fully aware of the fact that our consciousness is at fault. It is true that the Eastern consciousness, when compared to our own, seems to be dim; but that is only because we see it and measure it against our own—we see it only from our side. For instance, when it comes to writing or mailing a letter at a definite time, doing a given thing at a given moment, calculating how much time is needed to go to another town, do an errand, and return by airplane in the shortest time possible, there of course our consciousness is very bright and the Eastern con-

consciousness is exceedingly dim. To write on a letter, *inshallah*, by the grace of Allah, as they do, means if it please God the letter will arrive. But we have no such notion; we think it is the duty of our mail system to see that a letter arrives in time. It is due to man and not to God's grace. There we meet the Eastern mind where it is the dimmest. When it comes to that concept of realization, however, our consciousness is very dim indeed: very few of us know what realization is, and even the word *realize* is pretty vague. How would you define it? When would you say that some one had realized a thing? You are never sure that it is actually realized. Already in the sixth century B.C., Buddha made the extraordinary attempt to educate consciousness, to make people realize, and that has gone on until now. Zen, the most modern form of Buddhism, is nothing but the education of consciousness, the faculty of realizing things.

Here I will tell you a story from the first century after Christ, of the way a master of Zen made a pupil understand its meaning. Zen is the Japanese word for the Indian *dhyana* which means enlightenment; they have another word *satori*, and also *sambodhi*, which mean the same—illumination. A Chinese statesman, a follower of Confucius, came to the master and asked to be initiated into the mysteries of Zen, and the master consented, and added, "You know, your master Confucius once said to his disciples: 'I have told you everything, I have kept nothing back.' " And the statesman said that was true. A few days later the master and the statesman took a walk together in the hills at the time when the wild laurel was in bloom and the air was full of its perfume. Then the master said to his initiate: "Do you smell it?" And the initiate replied that he did. Then the master said: "There, I have told you everything, I have kept nothing back." And the statesman was enlightened. He realized. It broke through into consciousness. Understand that if you can!

We may be aware of the fact that our consciousness is not what it ought to be, but we are still quite naive in that respect, and so we have great trouble in understanding attempts at an increase or improvement of consciousness. We think that we need, rather, a widening out of consciousness, an increase of its contents, so we believe in reading books or in an accumulation of knowledge. We think if we only accumulate the right kind of knowledge, that will do. We always forget that everything depends upon the kind of consciousness that accumulates the knowledge. If you have an idiotic consciousness you can pile up a whole library of knowledge, but you remain nothing but an ass that carries a heavy load of books, of which you understand nothing. It is

perhaps not necessary to read a book if you have a consciousness which is able to realize, a penetrating consciousness. But that idea is utterly strange. Yet it is as simple as the difference between eyes that see dimly and eyes that see accurately, or the difference between myopic eyes and eyes that see far. It is a different kind of seeing, a more penetrating, more complete seeing, and that is what consciousness would do.

It is quite obvious that Nietzsche is in an impasse with his faculty of realization. He feels the presence of these thoughts, but he is afraid and prefers not to see them. So the unconscious makes the attempt to bring them close to him, to force something upon him, and he fights a sort of losing fight against it, resisting, trying to put some shield between himself and that realization which should come. And so naturally he increases the danger. When you fight against a realization, you make it worse. Each step you make in fighting it off increases the power of that which is repressed, and finally it takes on such a form that it cannot be realized: it becomes too incompatible. But you have done it, have manoeuvred it into such a corner that it took on an impossible form. Here Zarathustra fought off the realization with the effect that it got out of his hands when he talked to the dwarf—well, the dwarf is perhaps not quite human, but an elemental or something of the sort. He told him what to think, tried to take the conversation out of the dwarf's hands and to envelop him in his own mind, in order to get rid of that other thought which he is up against; and therefore he brought about the howling dog. Then there again he tried to make little of it; he couldn't help being impressed, but he made belittling remarks—that dogs see ghosts and naturally they howl when they are frightened by the full moon—hoping thereby to make the dog so unimportant and small that he could rid himself of the bad impression. He was so impressed nevertheless that suddenly he saw that the dwarf was no longer there. "Where was now the dwarf? And the gateway? And the spider? And all the whispering? Had I dreamt? Had I awakened? 'Twixt rugged rocks did I suddenly stand alone, dreary in the dreariest moonlight." So he is now very much in the position of the dog, which means he did not succeed in fighting off that bad impression: the realization is coming nearer. And now he sees the horrible picture of the shepherd and the snake. That is the concretization of his feeling about what is approaching him, and the *dramatis personae* are of course himself and the young shepherd and that thing that tries to get him.⁴ Now, why just a young shepherd?

⁴ For Jung the internal personifications of the psyche constitute its *dramatis personae*.

Prof. Reichstein: Is that not a Christian idea coming in here—Christ as the shepherd?

Prof. Jung: Maybe, but I think Christ would not be represented as a young shepherd; he would be, rather, a *Poimen*, the leader, the shepherd of men.

Mrs. Fierz: It reminds me of John the Baptist, the forerunner of Christ, who is often depicted as a sort of young shepherd with a staff and a fur.

Prof. Jung: Well, that represents less the shepherd than the hermit—eating wild honey and locusts and wearing a camels-wool coat. A young shepherd conveys the idea of something very innocent, like the German *Hirtenknabe*,⁵ who proverbially knows nothing and always says, “Ich weiss von nichts”—the innocent child of nature, completely naive. He walks with a staff amidst little lambs on nice meadows, straying through nature playing the flute; about the most that could happen in his life would be a young shepherdess. Unfortunately, it is most descriptive of the situation here. Zarathustra is the shepherd boy, knowing of nothing, but completely innocent, and therefore the contrast is particularly horrible—that poisonous black snake attacking this innocent, lovely youth. But you see, that is a special brand of European consciousness. Like the *deutsche Michel*, whom you have seen in a white nightcap in cartoons innumerable times; he never knows anything, he is just a jackass—always misunderstood and always with a wonderful feeling of innocence.⁶ That is just the primitive unconsciousness that forever feels innocent and never sees itself as the cause of anything; causes are always somewhere else but never in that fellow. He always meant the best. He is quite simple, only drinks milk and eats cheese, and he has rosy cheeks and blue eyes that never see anything black. Such a fellow stands open to such an attack sure enough, because his other side, the shadow side, his second self, is the black snake.

And that is what Nietzsche cannot realize—that to everything positive there is a negation; with everything great or grand, there is something very small. He cannot see these pairs of opposites as belonging to himself; he cannot see that he casts a shadow, represented by the horrible serpent. This is the thought which is trying to get at him, the thought he is fighting off in order to be something marvelous and great. One might say to him: “Yes, it is wonderful how well you can de-

⁵ *Hirtenknabe*: shepherd boy.

⁶ The *deutsche Michel* is a legendary naïf, one who unwittingly always supports law, order, and authority.

fend yourself against the realization, but I am afraid nature sees nothing wonderful in it: nature merely destroys chaps who don't realize." Therefore the ambition of mankind, its highest aspiration, has always been an improvement of consciousness, a development of realization—but against the most intense resistances. It almost kills people when they are forced to come to a certain realization. All the trouble in the work of analytical psychology comes from that resistance against realization, that inability to realize, that absolute incapacity for being consciously simple. People are complicated because the simple thing is impossible for them apparently. It is in fact the most difficult thing to be simple, the greatest art, the greatest achievement, so it might be better that we all remain very complicated and let things stay in the dark. We always say we can't see because it is so complicated, but as a matter of fact we are unable to see because it is so simple. Of course when things have come to such a pass that the other side is a black snake, one understands that there is an incompatibility, that it is almost impossible to accept such a horror. Nevertheless, the two sides should come together: one should see the other side.

So we reach the conclusion that he really should swallow that serpent in order that the regular thing should happen. Then the eternal rhythm of nature would fulfil itself, which is an approach to perfection. It is not an approach to perfection when one sees only white; to see both white and black is the proper functioning. If we can see ourselves with our real values, with our real merits and demerits, that is proper; but to see ourselves as wonderful and full of merit is no particular art, rather, just childish. The only heroic thing about it is the extraordinary size of the self-deception; one might say that it was almost grand that a fellow could deceive himself so, that there was something wonderful about his thinking himself a savior. But I never would say this was a desirable accomplishment. If such a fellow plays the role of the savior for the sake of people who cannot realize themselves, one might say it was very decent of him, provided that he knows he is playing that role, that he does it as a performance, an educational achievement, a sort of Kultur film for educational purposes. But he must know that he is in a Kultur film.

Now, here the whole impossibility of Nietzsche's situation is depicted. He says, "Had I ever seen so much loathing and pale horror on one countenance?" Well, that is his own countenance and the black disgusting snake is just his other side: we can of course understand that he is horrified. Nevertheless, it is just the thing he should accept. And now he comes to the conclusion that the shepherd ought to bite off the

serpent's head. But the head had bitten itself fast in the sleeper's throat. The snake bit first and has such a hold that Zarathustra cannot pull it out of the shepherd's mouth. That means that they are already almost one: it needs that *tour de force* of biting off the snake's head in order to liberate the man from the serpent. Of course we must realize that if it were a poisonous snake, he would die in spite of having got rid of the serpent. I don't know whether Nietzsche thought of it as being poisonous—he doesn't say so—but one is almost forced to assume that such an awful black serpent would be poisonous. It would be a more or less unadventurous story if it were just an ordinary water snake for instance, which is an absolutely harmless animal and usually eats mice. Of course no snake would creep into the mouth of another animal—that is impossible, too—but the poison seems to belong to this picture. In that case, of course, biting off the head would not be helpful at all. You see, Nietzsche handles this case as if the snake were something loathsome which one could get rid of, with no idea of what it really is. Here he makes an attempt at realization, in saying, "For it was a vision and a foresight:—what did I then behold in parable? And who is it that must come some day? Who is the shepherd into whose throat the serpent thus crawled? Who is the man into whose throat all the heaviest and blackest will thus crawl?" But there is no question of what the serpent may be. It is interesting that he wants to know all about the shepherd without stopping for a moment to consider the serpent. The serpent is the other side and he is not interested in that other side.

Mrs. Baumann: But he says what it is—all "the heaviest and blackest."

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, but that is seen from his side. The question of the snake is not included in the realization.

Mrs. Jung: Why did you say that it was no use to bite off the head? I think it is the only thing he could do.

Prof. Jung: Oh, on account of the poison. It would be no use because the poison would be in his body. Of course, that is an assumption. Naturally to get rid of the snake he has to bite off the head. But I don't see how he can spit out the head if it is caught in his throat.

Mrs. Jung: But if the snake is dead?

Prof. Jung: The question is whether it opens its fangs, and we must assume that it does. Well, there are many little impossibilities in this picture; we can't be too accurate or meticulous about it. It is a very questionable story anyhow.

Miss Wolff: In the previous chapter, "The Wanderer," Nietzsche does point out more or less what the black snake is to him when Zarah-

thustra says that he has to go into the deepest pain and the blackest waters of despair in order to climb to the highest mountain.

Prof. Jung: Naturally he has his ideas. He knows about the snake, but he only knows what *he* knows about it and doesn't realize the snake.

Miss Wolff: He only describes how the snake feels to him.

Prof. Jung: I pointed that out because I should like to know what that serpent really means and why it gets at him. I am not much interested in what the shepherd has to say, because the snake is the important figure in that drama. The shepherd is so far only an innocent shepherd boy—all his name betrays. But the serpent is really interesting. Moreover, we know from historical parallels that the serpent is a pretty important figure. What does it represent?

Dr. Henderson: It is a personification of all the inferior aspects of the unconscious, the underworld.

Remark: It is Satan, the devil.

Prof. Jung: In that example of the golden snake, the initiate through whom the serpent went was *entheos*, filled with the god. The serpent represents also the god. He is the *deus absconditus*, the god concealed in the darkness. When Ra is not shining in heaven he is in the underworld hidden in the coils of the snake. When you look at the god you see the snake. The god is hidden in the snake, but he is both the snake and the sun. Therefore, he is that movement, the rotation of day and night. He is the whole, a circle. So this is the dark god and the god that died, the god that Nietzsche declared to be non-existent. The god appears here as a demoniacal power in the old way—when the god appears from below he is a snake. Even the lord Jesus is a serpent, as you know from the Evangel of John; and the *agathodaimon*, the redeemer, was represented by the Christian Ophites as a serpent, so this is a healing serpent, really. Nietzsche doesn't realize it because he is so frightened by that aspect that he stops thinking.

Now after the shepherd has bitten off the head of the serpent, he is no longer the same. He went through a tremendous experience, and therefore Zarathustra says, "No longer shepherd, no longer man—a transformed being, a light-surrounded being, that laughed!" You see, that is the sunrise in a way: the shepherd got rid of his snake form but then he was "no longer man." So what is he? Either an animal or a god: that is the only possibility. One might say "superman" but between superman and god there is no difference—that is only a *façon de parler*. A transfigured being would be a god: "light-surrounded" means that he is the sun which rises after the seventh hour of the night. It is the eternal mystery happening before Zarathustra's eyes, but he doesn't

realize it; he is only fascinated by that very uncanny laughter. "Never on earth laughed a man as he laughed! O my brethren, I heard a laughter which was no human laughter. . . ." Well, the gods laugh on Olympus. Or it might be that the coffin he dreamed about was spouting forth a thousand peals of laughter, the mad laughter of the madhouse. He was transfigured, so we can say that Nietzsche hears the laughter of a superhuman being, the laughter of a god that has transformed himself, that has got rid of his snake form and become the sun again. But that is not for man to imitate; he can't get rid of his snake form because he can't rise like the sun. He can participate in the events of nature, can see how the sun rises out of darkness, but if he thinks that he is the sun, he has to accept the fact that he is the snake, and he cannot be both. So this is a mystery that happens in his unconscious mind, from which we cannot detach it.

If we assume that we can take a leap into heaven and be the sun, then you may be sure our other side would be right down in hell. It would be the serpent, and it would be only a question of time until that shadow caught us. And then naturally we shall be afraid of that other aspect, of which, in our naiveté, we did not know. Nietzsche is fascinated by that performance: he says, ". . . and now gnaweth a thirst at me, a longing that is never allayed. My longing for that laughter gnaweth at me: oh, how can I still endure to live! And how could I endure to die at present!" This is his identification with the shepherd and this is the god in his positive form. We come now to what Prof. Reichstein alluded to, the good shepherd as a divine figure. The good shepherd is a famous old figure. Orpheus, for instance, is something like a shepherd; and the Poimen or the Poimandres is a shepherd, a leader of men. Also Krishna is a sort of shepherd—in India he is the figure that leads the herd of mankind. And Buddha is called "the shepherd" because he is the perfect one, the Poimen, as Christ is the Poimen of mankind. Of course, that is exactly what Zarathustra wants to be, and so that fascination, that thirst which gnawed at him, is the longing to be identical with the god. But this scene should show him that he cannot identify with the god because he would then be also the serpent, and that is what he rejects: that is the tragedy. If he could realize that he could not be the Poimen, he would be spared; then he need not be the serpent. It is like that famous dream of Hannibal before he went to Rome: he saw himself with his hosts conquering cities and fighting battles, but then he turned round and saw a huge monster crawling behind him, eating up all the countries and towns. That was his other aspect. From that dream we may conclude that in his consciousness he

had a very positive idea of himself, probably a sort of savior for his own people, or for the Carthaginians at least; and he did not realize that he was also a terrible monster.⁷ It is inevitably true that the savior is also the great destroyer, the god is also the black serpent. We don't realize that in our extraordinary shepherd-like naiveté, but the East knew it long ago; the East knows that the gods have a wrathful aspect, that they are not only bright light, but also abysmal darkness.

⁷ For Livy's story of Hannibal's dream, see above, pp. 598, 598n.

LECTURE VI

15 June 1938

Prof. Jung:

We talked last week of that shepherd who was in danger of being penetrated by the black snake, and I find here a contribution: the dream of a young Swiss girl thirteen years old who also dreamt of a snake, but she behaved quite differently with it. She dreamt that she was on a road with many adult people, and as they were about to reach the crossroad, she became suddenly aware of a huge grey snake that was moving along beside them, looking as long as the road they were on. The snake said, follow me, but the adult people preferred to go in another direction. The girl, however, obeyed; in spite of the fact that she was afraid, she followed the snake. Of course, she didn't know how to protect herself against such a monster, but as she followed along, the snake became more and more benevolent and less and less dangerous. The way on which she was then walking was bordered by great boulders, and she saw that the way the other people were following was bordered, not by stones, but by huge scarabs. First, they were ordinary scarabs but as the people approached them, they increased in size until they were as large as human beings; she describes them as horrible animals, and she was very glad that she had not to pass them. You know, scarabs live on rotten matter: they dig into carrion in order to bury their eggs in it, or they make balls of manure to feed on and deposit their eggs in, so they are not particularly nice animals in that respect, though they look all right. If they attain human size they would be quite dangerous, naturally; those people who have chosen the other way, the way that is not parallel to the snake, would be in danger of being eaten up by them. Now what is a scarab? It is a very typical symbol, but one cannot assume that this child had any notion of its meaning.

Mr. Baumann: The scarab is male and female at the same time.

Prof. Jung: That is the old legend, but that is only one aspect. What

would the scarab denote under all conditions? What is the beetle anyhow?

Mrs. Fierz: It is coldblooded.

Prof. Jung: Well, a snake is coldblooded also. No, I mean the fact that it has a sympathetic nervous system and no cerebro-spinal system. To dream of a worm would have the same meaning—they stand for the sympathetic system. Now I don't know how man knows that. I assume that it is as a wasp knows that the third dorsal ganglion of the caterpillar's sympathetic system is the motor ganglion and puts its sting just into that, so it lames the caterpillar without killing it; and then the eggs which the wasp deposits thrive on that still living caterpillar. It is the wisdom of nature itself apparently, and with that knowledge as key, one can unlock the dream. Then, you remember, the scarab was the symbol of resurrection in Egypt, the transitory form of Ra when he is invoked as Cheper or Chepra, the rising sun. Ra in the form of the Chepra is buried in the ball of dung, and then he rises as the sun. That means man in the incubation sleep, in a state of rebirth, man buried in the sympathetic system when consciousness—which is a function of the cerebro-spinal system—is entirely extinguished. So the beetle represents the state of man when there is only deep unconsciousness. Now when the dream says that those people are threatened by such animals, what would it mean?

Miss Hannah: That they are being caught by the unconscious.

Prof. Jung: Well, to be caught by the unconscious, or devoured by the unconscious, would mean what?

Miss Hannah: Madness in its worst form.

Prof. Jung: It might be madness, or it might also be a neurosis, or simply being at variance with one's unconscious, hollowed out from within, a loss of libido, a loss of intensity of life. Sure enough, people who don't follow the serpent suffer from a loss of life; they are drained from within, for the faculty of realization is lacking. It is as if the unconscious were all the time sapping their vitality, so something gets lost; they are only fragmentary. They are usually in contradiction with their unconscious; therefore circumstances are unfavorable and they become neurotic—or if it is not exactly a neurosis they are at least only half existing. The world is full of such people. Now, this child of thirteen is of course at the age when she would encounter the serpent, namely, the whole force of the instinctive being. If you choose to follow the way of fear, you are sure of experiencing the totality of life, because the snake is the mediator between the conscious and the unconscious worlds. Therefore, the snake is the symbol of the savior, the

agathodaimon, the good daimon, the redeemer that forms the bridge between heaven and hell, or between the world and god, between the conscious and the unconscious. In the Evangel of St. John, Christ likens himself to the serpent that was raised by Moses in the desert, against the many poisonous snakes that were killing the people. That is exactly the same motif, but instead of the beetle, it was the serpent directly. If one is at variance with one's cerebro-spinal system plus the sympathetic system, it would be expressed by the poisonous snake. Many people resist not only their sympathetic system, but the cerebro-spinal system as well, and they are of course directly threatened by the serpent. The snake then becomes poisonous. There is no question of Nietzsche's being threatened by the sympathetic system, for that would be very little in comparison with his dissociation from the cerebro-spinal system. He raised himself too high, onto the point of a needle, with his idea of the superman, so he is naturally in contradiction to his human side and that forms the black snake. This dream is most typical. This is a normal child and it shows what the normal solution would be.

Now, we are not yet through with that vision of the shepherd and the snake. We tried to explain it last time from the standpoint of Nietzsche and Zarathustra. Today I should like to look at it from our own point of view. You see, it remains rather distant and perhaps more or less incomprehensible as the vision of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, but if we try to realize what such a vision could mean if it happened in our own life today, it looks somewhat different. At all events it gains in intensity and immediate importance. Nietzsche would not have had such a vision if it had not been a problem of that time and the following decades. He anticipated, through his sensitivity, a great deal of the subsequent mental development; he was assailed by the collective unconscious to such an extent that quite involuntarily he became aware of the collective unconscious that was characteristic of his time and the time that followed. Therefore, he is called a prophet, and in a way he is a prophet. He is the man who said that the next century would be one of the most warlike in human history, which was quite true, unfortunately—at least up to the present moment. And he foretold, as you know, his own end. So his life and fate, one could say, was a collective program; his life was a forecast of a certain fate for his own country. It is not exaggerated, therefore, to assume that we also might have such a dream, because we are in a way in his situation; everybody is a bit at variance with his own cerebro-spinal system.

Now, if a modern man knowing of analysis, should have such a vision, or let us say, if Nietzsche himself had known about it, what could

he have done? Of course, such a speculation is like asking what the old Romans would have done if they had had gunpowder and rifles. To be sure they had no such thing and therefore it is futile to speculate about it, and so here too it is in a way futile to make such a speculation. But Nietzsche is so close to us that he might almost have had that knowledge. You see, I was a boy when he was a professor at the university. I never saw him, but I saw his friend Jakob Burckhardt very often, and also Bachofen,¹ so we were not separated by cosmic distances. Nietzsche's mind was one of the first spiritual influences I experienced. It was all brand new then, and it was the closest thing to me. So we could easily assume that he might have known what I know now. Why not? What do you think he would have done, then, if he had had analytical knowledge?

Mrs. Sigg: He could have compared the two visions. He could have asked why Zarathustra himself was bitten on the outside of his neck by this snake before, while here the shepherd is bitten inside, in his throat.

Prof. Jung: And if you compare the two, what conclusion would you come to?

Mrs. Sigg: I ask you because I do not know.

Prof. Jung: Does anybody know? You see, that is a perfectly apt argument; that is very good. The two visions, or events: Zarathustra being attacked by that snake before, and now the shepherd, are practically one and the same experience. Of course it is a variation of the same experience, but most characteristic. Have you a solution?

Mrs. Sigg: No, but there is one little point which would help perhaps—that Nietzsche meets the black snake again at the end of *Zarathustra*. He said the black snake came to die then, so I think it was something out of his early childhood that came again at the end.

Prof. Jung: We must not anticipate. That is an assumption and it would not answer our problem. But how would you understand it? What does it mean when Zarathustra is bitten externally?

Mrs. Sigg: It is not so bad as the internal bite.

Prof. Reichstein: Has not the bite of the snake in the region of the

¹ Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887), a professor at Basel when Nietzsche was there, is remembered mainly for his *Das Mutterrecht* (Stuttgart, 1867), a work that probably influenced Jungian thought about the mother archetype. See *Myth, Religion and Mother Right: Selected Writing* (B.S. XCV, 1967). Nietzsche said of him that he was neglected by his contemporaries: "His time had not yet come. I have resigned myself to being posthumous" (*Letters*, vol. II, p. 299). Jacob Burckhardt (1819-1887) was perhaps Basel's most famous scholar.

throat something to do with the speech center? He was always preaching and he tried to put others down instead of hearing what they had to say.

Prof. Jung: I should say that was right, because Zarathustra has talked a lot since he was first bitten by the snake, and of course the throat has to do with speech. You see, a tenor who has sung a great deal, or a speaker, might be bitten in the throat, because a neurosis always reaches one in the main function. A singer would develop symptoms in his voice, and a man who is inclined to eat too much would develop his neurosis in the stomach. I once treated an infantry officer who had hysterical symptoms in his feet, while a man who uses his brain chiefly will develop a sort of neurasthenia, a headache or certain symptoms in the head. It is always the main activity which is threatened in a neurosis. Now at first, the snake did not penetrate his throat, but it attacked his neck, so we can be sure the neck is meant.

I make that clear because we are about to realize what that vision would mean in ordinary life, say to ourselves; you surely remember certain pictures of black snakes or black animals, or an indefinite sort of monster that approaches a human body; and it is of the greatest importance to make out where it attacks the person—whether he is attacked on the head or at the throat, for instance, or whether it enters the body. Also, just what form it takes is very important; it is not always a snake: sometimes it is a black bird, or a dark crocodile, or an elephant, or a mouse, or a rat, or a black panther. Of course they all mean the cerebro-spinal system, yet in each case there is an important symbolic variation, which has to be translated in a somewhat different way. It may also be black foodstuff—it is not necessarily an animal. Or just blackness alone may be emphasized and then the cerebro-spinal system is not in it. The blackness can detach itself, and in that case, it is not a matter of the sensitivity of the cerebro-spinal system but a blackness that has to do with the mind. You see, the blackness is detachable, it can go by itself, or it may be connected with the black dragon, but they are not always together.

So it is quite certainly most important that Zarathustra is attacked from the outside in the beginning—that is a hint from the unconscious: look out that you don't talk too much. The organ of speech is in the neck and there the snake will jump at him—there he will be attacked by the enemy. Sure enough, the actual text of *Zarathustra* is all talk, not writing. It should be a dialogue but it is really a monologue: all through the book he talks to an invisible audience. Yet now it is no longer Zarathustra who is attacked, but the shepherd boy who has this

peculiar *rencontre* with the snake. Now, why the shepherd boy? That is the *deutsche Michel*, the youthful, blue-eyed, blond innocence. What is the relation between this figure and Zarathustra? We said last time that Zarathustra was a shepherd himself, the poimen, a leader of men; and the shepherd boy is a small leader: he is a shepherd but a shepherd of sheep. Zarathustra is the big figure and the shepherd is the small figure. And that shepherd is inside of Zarathustra. It is illuminating that Zarathustra or Nietzsche is confronted here with the small shepherd. What does that mean?

Dr. Henderson: The shepherd is the undeveloped side.

Prof. Jung: Zarathustra is the exaggerated sort of swallowing-up figure, an inflated big figure, and the other side is the simple naïve shepherd, something extraordinarily small for a compensation—unimportant and very nice, an altogether too modest simplicity. Plenty of people cannot stand that simplicity and therefore they take something into the mouth which makes them explode. There are many quite simple and modest individuals who would be all right if they only could be what they are, but they think they should be something better, that they are not good enough, and then they begin to ornament themselves with feathers and I don't know what, in order to be big and wonderful. But they are quite wonderful when they are simple. You see, we have had a lot of huge talk and now out of it creeps the shepherd. Again one can say, *Das also war des Pudels Kern*.² In *Faust*, the poodle was swelling up like anything and there it was the devil, while here the shepherd is behind that dangerous swelling of Zarathustra, who is always walking on mountain tops six thousand feet above good and evil. Now, what would this vision convey under that aspect?

Miss Hannah: He should give up his inflation and become what he really is.

Dr. Henderson: He should live his ordinary human life, should come down to the earth.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but to take it humanly. That is too technical. Ordinary people don't talk of inflation, nor of coming down to earth.

Mr. Allemann: Be simple and stop talking.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, just that. It would mean, "Now look here, that nice, simple thing in you is threatened—that blue-eyed, very simple (perhaps a bit dotty) individual that is simply unconscious life itself. You have overtalked yourself; you became a balloon that went up to the moon, and in the meantime your simpleton inside is going to hell.

² "So that was the poodle's stone."

One has to use straight, plain language in such a case. Nietzsche should have had a human feeling toward that shepherd. One doesn't get away with big talk when one has such a dream; one cannot say, "Oh, god is entering me!" It simply means: stop talking and see what happens. For if one can be simple, if one can realize such a thing, nothing can happen. The best antidote against madness is to settle down and say, "I am that little fellow and that is all there is to it. I went astray and thought I was big, but I am just that unconscious fool wandering over the surface of the earth seeking good luck somewhere." Then he would be safe, because that would be the truth. You see, that is *Hans in Glück*, or that other *dumme Hans* who has luck and finds something, the stupid fellow in the fairy tale who knows nothing and tumbles into the valley of diamonds.³ But one only gets there by one's dumbness and not by big talk or intelligence; one gets there by stupidity, by simplicity. If one can accept that, what can happen to one? Such a fellow cannot go mad, because if madness comes alone, there is nothing on the throne. It is like the great Mara experience of Buddha. When he was attacked by the devil with his whole host, the city of Buddha was empty. He had the great simplicity to say, "What is all this talk about the great Buddha? He is not, he is a void." We wonder how he could say of himself that he was the perfect one, the accomplished one, the *Tathagata*, but that was because he knew he was a void, that he did not even exist; such a big sounding word as *Tathagata* can only be compensated by a void. If you have reached the stage where you are not even the *dumme Michel*, where you are less than the simpleton, then you can use a very big word on the other side without being attacked by the devil. But as long as you are feeling that you *are* something, the devil will attack you. So you had better doubt it. We are not *Tathagata*.

Mrs. Fierz: What is *Tathagata*?

Prof. Jung: *Der Vollendete*, the perfect one, the complete one. That is a term for Buddha in the original collection of sermons. Buddhism is very interesting in that respect. One might mind those exaggerated terms, as in a way one must mind it that Jesus said, "I am the way, the truth and the life"—that is terribly big; then one understands that he had to undergo the divine punishment, the crucifixion, the dismemberment. The Buddha said "I am the perfect one," but at the same time he said, "I am not"; and he himself said that, so it is possible. But the

³ Hans in *Hans in Glück*, a Grimm fairy tale, is a kind of *Candide*. Everybody cheats him and he always congratulates himself on his good luck. The other Hans in *The Poor Miller's Boy and the Cat*, a *dumme Hans*, goes from blunder to blunder to—a wealthy wife.

one without the other is too big. It would be impossible for us because we feel that we are *something*; we don't know what, but no matter how small, it is there, so we cannot use the big words.

Now, supposing one of you had had such a vision. I should say, "Now look here, it is not so bad as long as you realize that you are a little shepherd." That is quite possible to accept; but of course it is difficult to accept that you should be attacked or killed as such. And so Nietzsche might say, "Since I am *not* old Zarathustra and I am not that legendary shepherd, since I am Professor Nietzsche of Basel University and this happens in my psychical sphere, it is not exactly my personal concern. Of course, I am afraid. I am between the hammer and the anvil. Inasmuch as I imagine I am Zarathustra I am too big, and in order to be able to stand the onslaught of such greatness I must be very simple on the other side." Then that attack the shepherd had to undergo would be terrible, but he could say he had brought it on by talking too much, and his simpleton really had to suffer, because it was owing to that unconscious simplicity that he did not realize in time that he was not his big mouth. So a tenor should realize that he is not his voice, and the painter should realize that he is not his brush, and the man with a mind should know that he is not identical with his mind, lest the gift run away with the man. For each gift is a demon that can seize a man and carry him away. Therefore in antiquity they represented the genius of a man as a winged being or even as a bird of prey that could carry away the individual, like the famous capture of Ganymede. The eagle of Zeus carried him off to the throne of the gods; he was lifted up from the soil upon which he should remain. That is a wonderful representation of the way they conceived of an enthusiasm, of the divine gift.

Now this shepherd in Nietzsche should die. It is a horrible catastrophe after identifying with Zarathustra, but if one identifies with the big figure, one dies miserably. If Nietzsche had remained the shepherd, he might have had an experience like Ganymede, but since he identified with the great figure, he has to end in the small compensatory figure, and the catastrophe is unavoidable. Inasmuch as you identify with one or the other figure, it is your catastrophe; it is not your catastrophe if you don't identify. You see, since Zarathustra is there with his great words, Nietzsche has to realize Zarathustra; he cannot afford not to listen and he cannot avoid hearing them. But he should say, "What amazing big words! That fellow has to come down somehow." If he has that attitude he will also realize an extreme simplicity against that greatness, and then he will understand that it is the gods' play on the scene

of man's mind. Our mind is the scene upon which the gods perform their plays, and we don't know the beginning and we don't know the end. And it is well for man if he doesn't identify, as it is well for the actor not to identify with his role; to be Hamlet or King Lear or one of the witches forever would be most unhealthy.

Prof. Reichstein: I should like to ask about the laughter of the shepherd. It reminds me of the legend that Professor Abegg told here about the real Zarathustra, the legend that the real prophet was born, not with a cry, but with laughter.⁴ There is a connection here because this is a kind of rebirth.

Prof. Jung: Of course we don't know in how far Nietzsche was informed about the legend of Zarathustra. I assume that story would be in the original form of the Bundahish⁵ which was known in Nietzsche's time, and it is possible that laughter plays such a role with him just because he knew that story about the Persian founder of the religion. I don't know. But the laughter here has to do with the thousand peals of mad laughter when the coffin was split open. The shepherd went mad—that is perfectly clear. That is the inevitable outcome when one integrates one of the performers of the divine play. That is Nietzsche's madness: it explodes his brain-box. Therefore the last part, the transfigured shepherd, is so terribly tragic. You remember when Nietzsche became mad he signed his letters Dionysos Zagreus. (Zagreus was the Thracian Dionysos.) He also became Christ: he was identical with the figure of the mediator or the god. There is a book by Salin,⁶ a professor in Basel, about the friendship of Nietzsche and Jakob Burkhardt, in which he quotes from one of Nietzsche's letters the statement that as a matter of fact he would much prefer to be a professor in Basel, that it was terribly awkward to have to produce a new world, but alas, since he was god, he could not avoid seeing the thing through, so he had no time to occupy himself with the ordinary affairs of man. This bears out what I said in the beginning, that by denying the existence of god, in declaring God to be dead, he himself became God; and he realized that it would have been better to have remained a professor in Basel.

Now to ask what would happen if a person who knew about psychology had to deal with such a vision is really futile because presum-

⁴ For Emil Abegg, see above, p. 4.

⁵ This story of Zarathustra's mirthful birth is told in the Bundahish, the Persian scripture which was written over the long period 226 to 640. Nietzsche once wrote, "I should actually risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their laughter" (*BGE*, no. 291).

⁶ Edgar Salin, *Burckhardt und Nietzsche, der Briefwechsel* (Heidelberg, 1948, 2nd ed.).

ably such a person would never had had such a vision. He would not have gone so far, but would have left that road long before. As a matter of fact it is an altogether artificial assumption that he *could* get so far, because he would have realized that to be a prophet like Zarathustra was too big an order. He would have been mistrustful, or he could not have had a real knowledge of psychology. So even that assumption is impossible. But one can ask—and I think that would be a fair question—what the solution of such a problem would be if it were not expressed by such exaggerated figures and so had not come to such a head.

You see, the question was already asked when Zarathustra was first attacked by the snake. Anyone who knows something about psychology could easily have such a dream—that is within our reach. I assume our realization would begin then and there. One would ask oneself, “Why am I persecuted by that serpent?” Well, that is the personification of my cerebro-spinal system, or my system of instincts, with which I am obviously at variance, and now I have to keep still and see what it does to me, what it is when I accept it. That is the ordinary case. In the practical treatment and development of an individual, it would be the union with the instincts, the acceptance of the instincts, by which you have also to accept a specific humility. For you cannot accept your instincts without humility; if you do, you have an inflation—you are up in heaven somewhere, but in the wrong one. You can only accept them humbly, and then you remain simple. Then you have the simple human fate, the happiness and the misery of ordinary human life, and something on top, because you have accepted it. Of course people are particularly interested in that something on top, the tip you get by living the ordinary life, and I always hate to talk about it because it is not good for them to know it: then they accept life merely *because* of the tip. You have to accept a thing for better or worse, have to accept it unconditionally, even without hope. If you do it for the tip you hope for, it is no good: you have cheated yourself.

Mr. Baumann: I recently heard of two dreams of very different people, but both are good Catholics; one is a priest and the other is very much wrapped up in Semitic philosophy. The dreams are very similar and one point is that they are running at a tremendous speed with a black serpent. And they think they have to run beside the serpent, not to follow it. It is like a race.

Prof. Jung: There is a very clear interpretation of course: namely, that in consciousness they have an exceedingly static philosophy which has not changed for 1500 years practically, and the compensation is

the rapid movement of a very lively cerebro-spinal system which they ought to follow. But there is a complete dissociation between the conscious and the unconscious. For instance, I am quite certain that if they had submitted this dream to a priest of the 12th or 13th century, when they were still occupied with the interpretation of dreams, that the father confessor would have told them they were forced by the devil to run along with him, that their carnal man was under the influence of the devil. The black snake would most certainly be the devil, the serpent of temptation. Of course within the last centuries the church has not taken dreams into consideration, at least not openly. (I don't know whether there are still individual priests in monasteries who do so.) But formerly it was a recognized fact that certain dreams were messages sent by God, so they had a certain dignity. Also they were aware that the demon sometimes sent dreams which were very upsetting. You see the medieval man would be upset by such a dream, but we make a wall and don't recognize that we are influenced by them. So I don't think that the men you speak of would confess such dreams now. Formerly, when a dream was an experience, they would have believed that they had had communion with a demon, or a demon had appeared to them, and they would have felt sinful. Since they had been touched by the demon they needed purification, so they naturally would have brought it up in confession. Nowadays, I assume that no Catholic would think of mentioning a dream; I have analyzed several but I never saw that they had the slightest idea that one could be responsible for one's dreams.

You remember St. Augustine said, "I thank thee Lord, that thou dost not make me responsible for my dreams." So we may conclude that he had very nice dreams indeed—well, in a saint, one must expect that. But he declared himself irresponsible—God did not make him responsible—and that is an attempt at making light of dreams in order to get out of it. Of course they could do that, knowing so very little about their meaning. Already at that time, thousands of dreams were excluded from consideration because they were supposed to be futile. Just as the primitives believe that the dreams of an ordinary man don't count at all; only the dreams of the chief or the medicine man count, and then only their big dreams. They were limited to dreams that were important, where one felt a certain responsibility. That was true in antiquity. For instance, in the middle of the first century the daughter of a Roman senator dreamt that Minerva complained to her that her temple was neglected and crumbling to pieces. So this Roman woman went to the Senate and told them the dream, and the Senate voted a certain


sum for the restoration of the temple. And a certain Greek poet had a dream which repeated itself three times: A famous golden vessel had been stolen from the temple of Hermes, and they could not find the thief. Three times the poet was told by the god the name of the thief and where the vessel was hidden, so he felt responsible and announced it to the Areopagus, the equivalent of the Roman Senate, and they found that thief and the golden vessel. Such things do happen in dreams and we have no reason to believe that these are just legends. You see, they felt the responsibility. But with the beginning of Christianity, particularly in the fourth century, that began to vanish.

Mr. Henley: It seems that these things repeat themselves. Our President Roosevelt told a number of Representatives recently that he dreamed that he got out of bed and walked to a window of the White House and stood there looking out. The scene before him was the present Washington airport. Suddenly a terrible airplane crash took place. So he is going to get a new landing stage outside Washington!

Prof. Jung: But think of the *Chambre de Députés* in Paris: if some one should stand up and say, "Gentlemen, I must tell you that I have had a dream." They would send him to the lunatic asylum on the spot. And even in the confessional, dreams no longer play a role. Of course it is quite different when you begin to realize the meaning and the importance of dreams; then you develop the sense of psychological responsibility—an idea of it at least.

Prof. Reichstein: There are attempts in *Zarathustra* to see the snake not only from the negative side. He says it is identical with wisdom and understanding for instance, and there is a scene where the eagle was flying with the snake round its neck, which would be an attempt to reconcile them.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and he even calls the eagle and the serpent his two animals; they would be divine attributes. But the eagle and the serpent are Zarathustra's animals and when Nietzsche identifies with Zarathustra, the impossible situation arises that he is lord of the serpent and the eagle. Zeus is lord of the eagle so he is putting himself in the place of divinity; and the lord over the serpent is a chthonic god perhaps—in Christianity it would be the devil. The eagle and the serpent simply mean the union of the opposites, and Zarathustra is the lord of the thing beyond the opposites. You see, the eagle and the serpent form that symbol of the *ouroboros*, the tail-eater, and the thing beyond; the lord of the two, the figure that unites the opposites, is the god Zarathustra. The mediator or the redeemer is always the redeemer from the opposites and the outcome of the opposites, so the center of that



circle, of the *ouroboros*, is the deity. The deity has always been represented as the unchanging center of the circle, and the circle is the rotation of the universe, the extension in space that is the *ouroboros* that returns into itself. And the unchangeable, immovable center is God as static eternity, and time and space at the same time. So Zarathustra and his two animals really symbolize a deity, like Zeus with his eagle, or the Holy Ghost with a dove, or Christ with the lamb, or any number of Indian gods associated with certain animals or expressed by them.

Dr. Escher: In the Catholic church the snake is considered evil, an enemy, but in Milan in the old church of St. Ambrogio there is a huge bronze snake on a pillar in the middle of the church, just opposite a pillar that has a cross on top. It is not the *ouroboros*. It is very old and very simple.

Prof. Jung: What it is meant to be depends very much upon its age, of course. They would not represent the devil—that is certain—so it may be the old idea of Christ as the serpent. That figure, or metaphor, was frequently used by the Latin Fathers of the church. They made free use of Christ as the serpent, and it was well prepared historically in the pre-Christian mediator: the *agathodaimon* of the Hellenic-Egypt-

tian mysteries was represented as a serpent. So if that serpent in Milan dates from the 9th to the 11th century, or even as late as the 13th century, it is quite possible that it represents Christ; if it is later it becomes doubtful. They had to be careful, naturally, on account of the infernal meaning of the serpent.

Mrs. Sigg: This answer of Zarathustra to the poisonous snake is very strange: Take back your poison, you are not yet rich enough to make a present to me. Does it mean that Zarathustra is above the savior?

Prof. Jung: Oh, that is one of those big things he has to say because he is afraid of the serpent. He assumes a higher position against the danger. We have seen that technique all along, and we shall see it again when he is up against something. He hopes to take the wind out of its sails in that way. Now the beginning of the next chapter, "Involuntary Bliss," is not very important, but at the bottom of the second page he says,

My past burst its tomb, many pains buried alive woke up—: fully slept had they merely, concealed in corpse-clothes.

So called everything unto me in signs: "It is time!" But I—heard not, until at last mine abyss moved, and my thought bit me.

Here is a confession which we have not heard before. He is referring back to his descent into the volcano with the cry, "It is time! it is highest time!" He repeats that here; at that time he would not have admitted what he is admitting now. Even when the coffin was splitting up and spouting out a thousand peals of laughter, Zarathustra was the coffin, and he was the big wind and the thousand peals of laughter—and there was no danger at all. But here we hear another tune, "My past burst its tomb." Where, then, is Zarathustra? He has entirely forgotten that the roaring, whistling wind and the uncanny coffin, which was thrown out, were all Zarathustra, his power and his greatness; he was that dangerous laughter and the overwhelming fact of the wind. And now we hear it is his past, a demon really of his past, that has burst open the tomb, and "many pains buried alive [repressed contents] woke up"—they had only slept deeply as if they were corpses. "So called everything unto me in signs: 'It is time!'" An entirely new interpretation of "It is time":—it sounds quite different. Here he himself understands it as a warning, "But I heard it not." He realizes that he had not even listened before. You see, it was too dangerous: it would have overcome him. Here he is more used to the whole situation. He begins slowly to realize that he did not listen then; the abyss had to move, the volcanic eruption had to follow, in order to call his attention to the fact

that there was something behind that moved *him*. But “my thought bit me” is again an attempt at declaring his possessiveness, that the serpent is his own thought. He is trying to convey the idea that he is naturally the fellow who has such dangerous thoughts, that he makes them at will. He lets them come and he lets them disappear: he controls them. That is of course a tremendous exaggeration. The serpent is not his invention, but is a power that gets at him. Yet in the moment when he has to realize that the thing has got at *him*, that the abyss moves, that the serpent has bitten him—even then he says that he has bitten himself. He continues,

Ah, abysmal thought, which art my thought! [Again this tragic misunderstanding.] When shall I find strength to hear thee burrowing, and no longer tremble?

But if it is his own thought, why should he tremble? When I hear an uncanny noise in the night, I call it an hallucination: something has rustled, or a paper has fallen to the floor. I combat a nocturnal fear by such rationalizations, saying it is only my nocturnal fear that produces such phenomena. Why should one tremble unless one is afraid of something which one cannot control? If there is something you do not control, you don’t call it yourself. If you know the dog that is barking at you is yourself, why should you be afraid? You say, “Don’t make a fuss, you are myself, why such a noise?” But you see, you are only sure that *you* know it; you are not sure that the dog knows it too. So Nietzsche is sure he knows all about it. But when the unconscious knows it, you *should* begin to tremble; then you had better say, “I am not that thing; that is against me, that is strange to me.” Everybody makes the same mistake; no matter how much afraid they are, they talk about *my* thought, *my* dog.

To my very throat throbbeth my heart when I hear thee burrowing! Thy muteness even is like to strangle me, thou abysmal mute one!

Now could one put it better? In formulating it, he confesses that this is not himself, but a strange opponent. Our foolish, almost insane prejudice is that whatever appears in our psyche is oneself, and only where it is absolutely certain that it is outside, can we admit it—as if we could only grudgingly admit the reality of the world. That is a remnant of the god-almighty-likeness of our consciousness, which naturally has always assumed—and is still assuming—that whatever is, is oneself. It is the old identity of man with his unconscious that is the world creator.

Inasmuch as you are identical with your unconscious, you are the world creator, and then you can say, "This is myself." By that technique, when you learn not only with words but with your whole head and heart, to say, "*Tat twam asi*," "That is thou," or "Thou art that," do you make the way back to the deity, and become the super-personal Atman. You can make the way back to your divine existence because that idea starts really from the condition in which you are still identical with the Unconscious, and the Unconscious is the world creator. They are absolutely identical. The Unconscious is in everything because it is projected into everything; it is not just in the brain-box, but is all over the place. You always encounter the unconscious outside. When you encounter it inside of you and say, "This is my thought," it is already approaching the psychological sphere, which means that it is partially conscious. In claiming a thought as your own, you are partially right but it is misleading, for inasmuch as it is a phenomenon it is not exactly your thought. For instance, if you say, "This is my light," it is true to a certain extent: it is in your brain and you would not see that light if you were not conscious of it. Yet you make a big mistake when you say light is nothing but what you produce: that would be denying the reality of the world. Inasmuch as you are conscious of it, it is yours, but the thing that causes you to have an idea of that which becomes what you call "light" or "sound," that is not your own; that is exactly what you do not possess, something of the great unknown outside. So when Nietzsche says, "This is my thought, that abyss is mine," it is only his inasmuch as he has a word for it, inasmuch as he makes a representation of it, but the thing itself is not his. That is a fact, and you never can call it your own fact.

Mrs. von Roques: That is what Goethe says:

Wär nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne könnt' es nie erblicken.
Wär nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnte uns das Göttliche entzücken?⁷

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the old Latin poet, Manilius, had the same idea: it is an antique thought really.⁸ Now, Indian philosophy makes use of

⁷ A prose translation of Goethe's poem reads: "If the eye were not sun-like, it could not see the sun; if we did not carry within us the very power of the god, how could anything god-like delight us?" *Great German Poetry*, tr. David Luke (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1964).

⁸ Jung would be thinking of some such expression of this first century Roman poet's Stoic emphasis upon cosmic sympathy as: "Who after this can doubt that a link exists

the fact that we have that primitive prejudice, that the world, inasuch as it is my thought, is really nothing else than my thought; and by saying this they make the conscious return to the original condition, to the universal Atman. They bring the world to an end, deny the existence of the world, by bringing the thought back to its source, to the Atman or the *Purusha*.

Here again would be a wonderful chance for Nietzsche to realize that one should make a difference between one's own thought and the thing that makes the thought, whatever that is, and to realize, when he is afraid, that he is not afraid of his own representations, but of the thing that causes those representations to be. You see, it is just as if you came home and found somebody in your place; you don't see who it is but you see that he is walking about in your clothes. You are not afraid of your clothes naturally, but you would be afraid of the thing that is inside your clothes. The clothing would be our thought forms, but the thing that fills the thought forms, that makes the thought forms live and act, is something of which one can be rightfully afraid, for it is really uncanny. Nietzsche expresses that here too. But nobody in those days ever really grasped this, though Schopenhauer, who was Nietzsche's master, said as much: in his philosophy the world is seen as will and representation, but he made the mistake of identifying the world with his representation.⁹ He assumed that nothing would be left of the world if there were no representation of it, and that is a mistake, because the representation can be caused by that world outside. On the other hand, natural science believes exclusively in the outside world and not in the representation—the representation is nothing; it is the world outside that causes the representation to be. And so the materialistic prejudice came about that *Der Mann ist was er isst*, "Man is what he eats."¹⁰ That prejudice makes even your mental health dependent upon physical or tangible facts.

between heaven and man, to whom, in its desire for earth to rise to the stars, gifts outstanding, did nature give . . . and into whom alone indeed has God come down and dwells, and seeks himself in man's seeking of him . . . ? Who could know heaven save by heaven's gift? . . . Who could discern and compass in his narrow mind the vastness of this vaulted infinite . . . had not nature endowed our minds with divine vision . . . ?" See *Astronomica*, vol. 2, pp. 105-22, tr. G. P. Goold (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1977). Another of Jung's favorites who makes this point is Meister Eckhart; see *Meister Eckhart*, tr. R. B. Blackney, p. 172.

⁹ Schopenhauer's four volume masterwork is translated both as *The World as Will and Idea* and as *The World as Will and Representation*. The original was published in 1819.

¹⁰ Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893), German materialist, is today remembered exclusively for his dogmatic epigram.

Mr. Baumann: There is a very interesting Indian idea of a chain which has ten or twelve links. One of the twelve is consciousness and that is represented by a monkey because it can only imitate.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is a Buddhist idea, the so-called *nidana* chain. There is first consciousness, then follows the becoming, from the becoming follows birth, from birth follows age and death, and from age and death follows suffering. I only mention a few, there are ten or twelve. Now if you stop the *avidya* of the beginning, there is no becoming, and if you stop the becoming there is no birth. If you stop birth there is no age and death, and if you stop age and death there is no suffering, and so on. So the whole world of suffering is abolished. Therefore Buddha says consciousness is like a monkey, a mere imitator, a sort of playful thing. That is the true Eastern point of view. Now Nietzsche continues.

As yet have I never ventured to call thee up; it hath been enough that I have carried thee about with me! As yet have I not been strong enough for my final lion-wantonness and playfulness.

Here you get it. He is trembling with fear really and he admits that this "abysmal mute one" is formidable, but he has not ventured to call him up yet. It has been enough that he has carried him about—as if he had the ghost of a chance not to carry him! Then he says he has not been strong enough for his "lion wantonness and playfulness"—to play with that thing! But he admits that it needs the strength of a lion. Well, the lion is a very cowardly animal in reality. It is not true that he has a great heart and great courage, but let us assume that he has great courage, for Nietzsche, indirectly at least, admits that it needs a lion's heart, a lion's strength, and a lion's courage, to deal with his thought, and he doesn't see that he is just blind to that fact.

Sufficiently formidable unto me hath thy weight ever been: . . .

As if he had the choice of not carrying that formidable weight!

but one day shall I yet find the strength and the lion's voice which will call thee up!

But he is at the time talking as if it were nothing, as if it were his own thought and really within his reach.

When I shall have surmounted myself therein, then will I surmount myself also in that which is greater; and a *victory* shall be the seal of my perfection!—

This peroration follows that admission from the tomb. "It is time!" Because he had not heard that, his abyss began to move and now he winds up with an anticipation of victory.

Meanwhile do I sail along on uncertain seas; chance flattereth me, smooth-tongued chance; forward and backward do I gaze—, still see I no end.

As yet hath the hour of my final struggle not come to me—or doth it come to me perhaps just now? Verily, with insidious beauty do sea and life gaze upon me round about:

O afternoon of my life! O happiness before eventide! O haven upon high seas! O peace in uncertainty! How I distrust all of you!

Again a wonderful admission—that the situation is not at all trustworthy, that all the big words are very doubtful pretexts.

Verily, distrustful am I of your insidious beauty! Like the lover am I, who distrusteth too sleek smiling.

As he pusheth the best-beloved before him—tender even in severity, the jealous one—, so do I push this blissful hour before me.

You see, he has the feeling that a certain cheat is going on, that he is cheating himself in making light of certain things, and that behind the imagined beauty is something quite different. We shall see next time what that is.

LECTURE VII

22 June 1938

Prof. Jung:

I have brought that book, *Jakob Burckhardt und Nietzsche*, by Edgar Salin, which I mentioned to you last time, and I will translate literally a passage from a letter dated January 6, 1889, written to Burckhardt by Nietzsche in Turin. He says: "Alas, I would have much preferred to be a professor in Basel rather than God, but I did not dare to push my private egotism so far as to omit the creation of the world on account of that professorship. You see one has to sacrifice something,—where and how one lives." This was in the beginning of his disease and it shows how he understood his role: he really believed he had become God, or something like God, and had to create a new world, and therefore could not be an ordinary human being.¹ Now, last week we stopped in the middle of the chapter called "Involuntary Bliss" where Nietzsche had that very irrational feeling of happiness. According to all expectations, he should have realized there what was threatening him, but instead, what he calls the blissful hour suddenly overcame him. He had just been asking himself, "When shall I find strength to hear thee burrowing and no longer tremble?" And the answer would be that he should screw up his courage and approach that thought which was burrowing in him. There was no reason for any particular happiness, but unexpectedly and irrationally enough, it is as if he were anticipating a final victory. He says, "When I shall have surmounted myself therein, then will I surmount myself also in that which is greater; and a victory shall be the seal of my perfection." He puts himself into the mood of one who has already overcome his fear and won that victory, while actually he leaps over the fear and gets into a sort of ecstasy of anticipation of a victory that has not even been fought for. Yet he feels

¹ In the months just before this letter, Nietzsche had continually expressed an uncanny bliss that permeated even the most ordinary aspects of his life, such as eating in his regular restaurant. See his letters of October and November 1988.

that this blissful hour is not quite trustworthy, that there is some cheat in it, and therefore he says, "Like the lover am I, who distrusteth too sleek smiling." And he continues:

Away with thee, thou blissful hour! With thee hath there come to me an involuntary bliss! Ready for my severest pain do I here stand:—at the wrong time hast thou come!

Here is the insight which one would expect of him; he should be making ready for his severest pain: happiness is absolutely inappropriate. But that is due to his peculiar sort of hysterical mechanism; it is like the laughter one observes in hysterical cases: in a moment of great distress or real despair they begin to laugh. Or like the *Hexenschlaf*, the witches' sleep: when the pain of torture becomes unbearable they fall into a sort of somnambulistic condition, a state of anaesthesia—they are completely narcotized; that is one of the signs of witchcraft mentioned in the *Malleus Maleficarum*, the *Witches' Hammer*, a very famous book written in the 15th century.² Then he goes on:

Away with thee, thou blissful hour! Rather harbour there—with my children! Hasten! and bless them before eventide with my happiness!

There, already approacheth eventide: the sun sinketh. Away—my happiness!—

This is surely a decent attempt at facing the dark, dangerous thoughts.

Thus spake Zarathustra. And he waited for his misfortune the whole night; but he waited in vain. The night remained clear and calm, and happiness itself came nigher and nigher unto him. Towards morning, however, Zarathustra laughed to his heart, and said mockingly: "Happiness runneth after me. That is because I do not run after women. Happiness, however, is a woman."

You see, this is again that element which makes light of danger, which plays with dangerous things, like that laughter which comes to him in the face of his dark thoughts. Where he should be exceedingly serious and perhaps weep, his mood simply changes; something hinders realization. He cannot control the mood. It is astonishing that in the face of the very black and dangerous thoughts such an uncontrollable mood of happiness should arise, but he can control his thoughts no better. He has no control over his unconscious whatever, and therefore

² For the *Witches' Hammer*, see above, 23 Jan. 1935, n. 9.

the situation is generally dangerous. Whether it is an unexpected happiness or a great fear, a panic, it is the same. It is an uncontrolled function and sometimes one takes the lead and sometimes the other. As I said, one often finds that condition in hysteria, when it is a matter of two sides of the character for instance, when the positive consciousness is in opposition to a sort of negative character—one can call it the shadow. That is the prevailing conflict in hysteria, and therefore the hysterical character is always trying to make a positive impression, but they cannot hold it, cannot be consistent, because after a while the other side comes up and then they spoil everything: they deny everything positive they have said before. So one of the prejudices against hysterics is that they lie, but they cannot help it; their inconsistency is the play of the opposites.

Now, if it is not a matter of two personalities, as it were, but of several or if it is a matter of a number of dissociated aspects, that is something else—that approaches schizophrenia. When different aspects of a personality become so independent of each other that they are able to manifest themselves one after the other, with no control and no inner consistency or relatedness, there is a very justifiable suspicion of a sort of schizophrenic condition. And that is the case with Nietzsche. Of course the disease which followed has been understood to be general paralysis of the insane, which is without exception a syphilitic infection of the brain. His case was not typical however. According to my idea, there is plenty of evidence that it was more a schizophrenic than a paralytic condition; probably both diseases existed in a peculiar mixture, for through the whole course of development of his disease, there were numbers of indications which would not point to the usual diagnosis of paralysis only. He often behaved very queerly and said very strange things which one is unlikely to hear from anyone with general paralysis of the insane. So he cannot control his happiness—it simply gets him—and now he gives word to it. He expresses in the following chapter, “Before Sunrise,” the contents of that happiness. It begins,

O heaven above me, thou pure, thou deep heaven! Thou abyss of light! Gazing on thee, I tremble with divine desires.

Up to thy height to toss myself—That is my depth! In thy purity to hide myself—that is mine innocence!

The God veileth his beauty: thus hidest thou thy stars. Thou speakest not: thus proclaimest thou thy wisdom unto me.

Something happens here which we have seen many times before: namely, he is almost unable to give a definite or a decisive value to any-

thing outside of himself, but must take it into himself, must introject those values. We have seen that he uses that mechanism in order to belittle dangerous situations or dangerous figures. He simply says, "Oh, you are just my thought," introjecting that figure into his own system. That is, of course, absolutely against analytical principles. When the unconscious makes a careful attempt to show a figure as something outside of yourself, you had better take it as something outside of yourself.

You see, you are a whole world of things and they are all mixed in you and form a terrible sauce, a chaos. So you should be mighty glad when the unconscious chooses certain figures and consolidates them outside of yourself. Of course that may be in the form of projections, which is not recommendable. For example, perhaps you have a sort of hostile element in yourself that crosses your path now and then, or a poisonous element that destroys all your attempts at a decent adaptation, and it is so mixed up with everything else that you never can definitely lay your hand on it. Then you suddenly discover somebody whom you can really declare to be your archenemy, so you can say *this* is the fellow who has done this and that against you: you succeed in constructing your archenemy. Now, that is already an asset which makes you sit up, because you know that there is the definite danger which can injure you. Of course it is in a way quite negative because it is not true; that fellow is not really the devil, but is only your best enemy and you should give him the credit. As a human being he is just as much in the soup as you are. But inasmuch as you succeed in creating a figure, in objectifying a certain thing in yourself which you hitherto could never contact, it is an advantage.

Now, the analyst will tell you that you cannot assume Mr. So-and-So to be the arch-devil with a hand in your own soul. That is just a projection, and then of course follows the ordinary reflux of projection, till the patient gradually gets to the point of saying, "Oh very well, then *I* am the devil"—hating it like hell naturally and nothing is gained. Then the devil falls back into the sauce and instantly dissolves there. So you must prevent that. Then follows a sort of philosophical teaching—against which philosophers would kick of course. The analyst has to say, "Now look here, in spite of the fact that you say there is no terrible devil, there is at least a psychological fact which you might *call* the devil. If you should not find a devil, then you had better construct one—and quickly—before he dissolves in your own system. *Make* a devil, say there is one, and if you doubt it, suppress your doubts as much as you can. For it is just as if you were building a house because

you know you need one, and then conclude that there never was a house there and destroy whatever you have started to build; so of course you never will have a house. Therefore in order to construct a devil you must be convinced that you have to construct him, that it is absolutely essential to construct that figure. Otherwise the thing dissolves in your unconscious right away and you are left in the same condition as before."

You see, patients are quite right when they say this is merely a projection, and this would be a wrong procedure were it not that I must give them a chance to *catch* the reflux in a form. I cannot tell them it is a projection without providing a vessel in which to receive the reflux. And that must be a sort of suspended image between the object and the patient; otherwise—to compare it to water—what he has projected simply flows back into himself and then the poison is all over him. So he had better objectify it in one way or another; he mustn't pour it all over the other person, nor must it flow back into himself. For people who make bad projections on other people have a very bad effect upon them. They poison them or it is as if they were darting projectiles into them. The reason why people have always talked of witchcraft is that there is such a thing as psychological projection; if your unconscious makes you project into other people, you insinuate such an atmosphere that in the end you might cause them to behave accordingly, and then they could rightly complain of being bewitched. Of course they are *not* bewitched and the one who makes the projection always complains in the end: *I* have been the ass, *I* have been the devil. The devil in the one has caused the devil in the other, so there is wrongness all over the place. Therefore if anything is wrong, take it out of its place and put it in the vessel that is between your neighbor and yourself. For the love of your neighbor, and for love of yourself, don't introject nor project it. For love of mankind, create a vessel into which you can catch all that damned poison. For it must be somewhere—it is always somewhere—and not to catch it, to say it doesn't exist, gives the best chance to any germ. To say there is no such thing as cholera is the best means to cause a world epidemic.

So you had better make an image in order to be able to put your finger on it, and to say, *this* is this thing. You can call it nothing but a figure for the development of your consciousness, for how can you develop consciousness if you don't figure things out? Do you think anyone would ever have thought of gravitation if Newton had not figured it out as a species of attraction? God knows whether it is an attraction—that is a human word—but he figured out that phenomenon. Nobody

had ever figured out before why things didn't fall from below to above; nobody wondered. But Newton wondered and he figured it out: he made a vessel and did not take it for granted. So I don't take it for granted that a poison should spoil my system. I am going to do something about it. I don't take it for granted that everybody else is an angel and I a devil, or that I am an angel and everybody else a devil.

Mrs. Sigg: Would not what you said about the devil dissolving in the system be the best explanation of the poisonous black snake getting into Zarathustra? Nietzsche had given too much beauty and perfection in consolidating the figure of Zarathustra, and therefore it would be the natural consequence that he remained too poor and ugly himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is inevitable. Having constructed a figure like Zarathustra he is bound to construct the counter figure; Zarathustra casts a shadow. You cannot construct a perfect figure that is nothing but pure light. It has a shadow and you are bound to create a shadow too. Therefore as soon as you have the idea of creating a good god you have to create a devil. You see, the old Jews had no idea of a devil; their devils were just funny things that hopped about in deserted villages and ruins, or made noises in the night. The real devil came along in Christianity—or earlier, in the Persian religion where you have the god of pure light, and the devil of pure darkness on the other side. It is unavoidable: if you split the opposites you cannot content yourself with light only. It is not true, as some of our modern theologians say, that evil is only a mistake of the good, or something like that; for if you say good is absolute you must say in the same breath that evil is absolute. But that is what Nietzsche did not realize. He did not see that in the wake of Zarathustra follows the grotesque parade of evil figures, dwarfs and demons and black snakes that all together make up Zarathustra's shadow. He was unable to draw conclusions, because he was unwilling to admit that they were true. He was too Christian—that was just his trouble: he was too Christian.

Mrs. Sigg: Could you not tell us something about the art of creating a real devil, because the black snake is too primitive?

Prof. Jung: That is a long story. But it is always something simple; you see, it is an act of devotion.

Mrs. Sigg: To create the devil?

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is an act of devotion. Therefore my formula: for the love of mankind and for the love of yourself—of mankind in yourself—create a devil. That is an act of devotion, I should say; you have to put something where there is nothing, for the sake of mankind.

Mrs. Baynes: Would it be too big a jump to go back to the Yale lectures and the question of the devil?³

Prof. Jung: No, since we are dealing with the devil.

Mrs. Baynes: Well, if you admit the devil into the quaternity, as you explained in the lecture, how should we avoid devil worship?

Prof. Jung: You cannot avoid it, in a way. I call it an act of devotion, for devotion in the actual sense of the word is not what we call divine worship. It is a hair-raising fear, a giving due attention to the powers; since you give due attention to the powers of the positive gods, you have also to take into account the negative gods. In antiquity the evil was all incorporated in the gods along with the good—as, for instance, when Zeus got into fits of rage and threw about his thunderbolts. All those gods were very doubtful characters, so they did not need the devil. And Jahveh also led a very wrathful existence—well, he was generous in a way but full of moods. The most horrible picture of Jahveh is depicted in the Book of Job, where he bets with the devil as to who could play the best trick on man. Suppose I created a little child, knowing nothing, blind as man is blind in comparison to the gods, and then bet with some bad individual whether that little thing could be seduced! That is Jahveh as he is presented in the Book of Job. There was no judge above him; he was supreme. He could not be judged so whatever he did, one could only say it just happened like that—one didn't know why. He is an amoral figure and therefore of course no devil is needed; there the devil is in the deity itself. But in Christianity it is quite different. There the evil principle is split off and God is only good. I cannot go into the historical structure of Christianity here, but I spoke about the problem in my Yale lectures.

Miss Wolff: In answer to Mrs. Baynes' question one might say that she seems to overlook the fact that when the fourth principle, which in Christianity is the devil, is added to the Trinity we have an entirely different situation. The principles of good and evil are then no longer in absolute opposition, but are inter-related and influence each other, and the result is an entirely new configuration. And when there is no devil in the Christian sense anymore, there can be no devil worship either. The bewilderment we feel is perhaps due to the theological formulation of the problem. If we look at it from the side of human ex-

³ In the Terry Lectures delivered at Yale University in 1937, Jung argued that the embodiment of evil in the figure of a devil better recognized the dark side of the world than the supposition that evil is merely the absence of good (CW 11, pars. 248, 463).

perience, from the moral aspect for instance, we know quite well that we cannot be only good, but our bad side has also to be lived somehow.

Prof. Jung: I understood Mrs. Baynes to mean that if there was an idea of a positive god and a negative god, there would be what one could call “devil worship,” but I should call it a consideration: it has to do with consideration more than with obligation or devotion. To consciously take into account the existence of an evil factor would be the psychological equivalent of devil worship. Of course that is quite different from those cults that worshipped the devil under the symbol of a peacock, for instance. That was just the Christian devil, Satan, and they worshipped him because they thought he could do more for them than God. So in the 12th and 13th centuries in France, in those times of terrible plagues and wars and famines, they worshipped the devil by means of the black mass. They reverted to the devil because they said God didn’t hear them any longer. He had become quite inclement and didn’t accept their offerings, so they had to apply to some other factor. They began to worship the devil because, since God didn’t help, they thought the devil would do better and it could not be worse. But of course it has nothing to do with all that; when you come to psychology you cannot keep on thinking in the same terms as before.

For instance, when you know you have created a figure, you naturally can’t worship it as you could worship a figure which you have not created. If you grow up in the conviction that there is a good God in heaven, you can worship that good God, as a little child can worship the father who he knows does exist because he can see that god. That is a sort of childlike confidence and faith, which is no longer possible if you have begun to doubt the existence of a God—or the existence of a good God at least. So it is quite impossible to fall back into devil worship when you know that you have just barely succeeded in constructing a very poor devil—a pretty poor figure you know. It will be a poor vessel because you will be eaten away by doubt all the time you are constructing it. It is just as if you were building a house and the weather was beating it down as fast as you build it. You will have the greatest trouble in the world to create such a figure and assume it does exist, just because you yourself have created it. The only justification for the effort is that, if you don’t do it, you will have it in your system. Or the poison will be in somebody else and then you will be just as badly off. But if you succeed in catching that hypothetical liquid in a vessel in between you and your enemy, things will work out much better. You will be less poisoned and the other will be less poisoned and something will have been done after all. You see, we can only conclude from the effect

and the effect is wholesome. If I am on bad terms with somebody and tell him he is a devil and all wrong, how can I discuss with him? I only shout at him and beat him down. If we project our devils into each other, we are both just poor victims. But let us assume that neither of us is a devil, but a devil is there between us to whom we can talk and who will listen. Then, providing my partner can do the same, we can assume that for the love of mankind, sure enough we shall be able to understand each other. At least we have a chance. And if we cannot, we shall conclude that here the separating element is too great: we must give way to it—there must be a reason. For I am quite against forcing. For instance, if a patient has an unsurmountable resistance against me, there must be a reason, and if I cannot construct the corresponding figure, if I cannot figure it out, we give in; he goes his way and I go mine. There is no misunderstanding, no hatred, because we have both understood that there is a superior factor between us, and we must not work against such a thing. It is a case of devil-worship again, and we must give in to the separating factor.

Mr. Baumann: You have just mentioned the confidence and faith that children have in a good God. What do you think about the saying of Christ: if you are not like a little child you will not enter the kingdom of Heaven? Is that wrong?

Prof. Jung: No, that is right—but not according to the ordinary theological understanding of it. Their idea is that if you don't remain a child, if you don't develop your childlike feeling, you won't be able to enter the kingdom of heaven. But that is a downright lie. Christ said, if you do not become *like* children and "become" means that in the meantime you have become highly adult. Also you must remember that he preached to the Jews and not to the good Christians of our days, and the Jews believed in the law and in following the law. Their belief was that if the father and mother died the good son had to give them a decent burial. But Christ said unto them, "Let the dead bury their dead." And in the temple, as a boy twelve years old, he said to his own mother: What have I to do with you? What I am belongs to me, you must vanish.⁴ That was against the law; the teaching of Christ was that they should give up their belief in the law, that he was the fulfiller of all laws, of all predictions. So he demanded a complete revolution, which is adult business. That is a supreme decision which cannot be

⁴ Jesus: "Let the dead bury their dead" (Matthew 8:22). Here Jung conflates two incidents. The question was asked at the wedding at Cana (John 2:4). As a boy in the temple he said to his mother who has been anxiously searching for him, "Did you not know that I had to be in my Father's house?" (Luke 2:46-49).

made in a childlike spirit. Those people had to overcome an inevitable conflict, for it is good to behave according to the law, and it is bad not to respect the law.

For instance, when Christ spoke to that man who was working on the Sabbath in the fields: If thou knowest what thou art doing thou art blessed. Naturally the disciples must have jumped out of their skins. It is as if I should say to a criminal: If you *know* that you are a murderer, you are blessed. Of course we could not stomach such a thing. To work on the Sabbath was a mortal offence in those days. It means nothing to us naturally. If a man even on Christmas day is chopping wood perhaps, we don't consider it a mortal offence—but it looked like murder to those old Jews. So when he says we must become like children, it means: be as adult as you can, suffer that supreme conflict, that terrible collision between duty to the law, to your parents, to the whole tradition. And on the other side is the insight that the law is not the last word, that there is another word, redemption from evil. The law never gives you that; Christ gives you redemption from evil. This was a new thought. Now the decision can only be made by an adult mind, and when you have made that decision, *then* become like a little child. That is what Christ meant, not that we should become like sheep.

Mrs. Jung: The attitude of the child doesn't only consist of complete confidence; it includes also the fear of dark powers.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, when Christ says you should become like unto children he obviously means that you should have the attitude of a child, and then we have to discover what that is. Is it a rational attitude? Is it philosophical? No, it is exceedingly simple; a child's attitude gives way to all the intimations of nature. And then we understand that apocryphal saying of Jesus: "The fowls of the air, and all beasts that are under the earth or upon the earth, and the fishes of the sea, these are they that draw you; and the Kingdom of Heaven is within you."⁵ This means that the instincts then come into play. You see, these ideas began to get very difficult, because a child has implicit faith. It is not unlike an animal—therefore that saying about the animals and about the lilies in the field, for instance—and that complete confidence is an extraordinary sacrifice, almost impossible. So it is nothing simple from the standpoint of an adult being, and this demand of Christianity has forever remained unfulfilled because it cannot be fulfilled.

Mrs. Sigg: I think Prof. Zimmer has given us a most valuable contri-

⁵ Jung is here citing an attempted restoration of the mutilated third-century *Oxyrhynchus Papyrus*. See *Apocrypha*, p. 26.

bution to the question of accepting the reverse side, in his description of the way the Indian deals with that question. It is in his book *Kunstform und Yoga in Indischen Kultbild*. There he gives a real technique.

Prof. Jung: There are many ways of dealing with this problem. I mentioned the Christian way of becoming like a child; but there are Eastern ways which are quite different, and even in our Middle Ages we had a different way. You see, the way of the child has been preached by the church, the church taking the attitude of being the father and mother, and all the others being children. The pope never had to assume that he was perhaps one of the children, nor did the cardinals. But we must not be unjust; the pope has a very simple priest as father confessor, which shows that they make it as true as possible and that even the pope is as human as possible. It is quite unjust when the Protestants accuse the pope of megalomania on account of the claim that he is invulnerable; that has only to do with his office. There is the same assumption in another field, in the claim that the church is a divine institution and therefore invulnerable. There are doubts about that however. We are not certain that it is a divine institution. That is a compromise of man, and the fact that one ought to become like a child is not fulfilled.

Mrs. von Roques: A child understands so very well; if a child is naughty he will say, "Send the naughty dog away," for instance. The child understands that there is something in him which can be sent away.

Prof. Jung: Well, there are many reasons why Christ said what he did about children, and one can go a long stretch along the road with him on that question of the child. But the theological interpretation causes trouble in the end; ultimately it becomes impossible. That is the reason why there is no *consensus gentium* about it; only a sort of school, I should say, prefers that solution. In the East, and even in Europe in the Middle Ages, they had another idea, but you know it was not very healthy to have other ideas, as today it is not very healthy.

Dr. Escher: There are historic examples of devotion to the devil as a sort of moral act, the sacrifice of the most valuable things to a cruel god. The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians threw their first-born child into the fiery mouth of the statue of Baal, hoping that he would work in their favor afterwards. Abraham was the first to turn the sacrifice of a child into the sacrifice of a ram (*Agnum pro vicario*). And sacrificing their virginity in the temple of the *Magna Mater* was supposed to bring good luck to women for the rest of their lives.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we have plenty of evidence in the old cults that there

were very gruesome deities. There was no hesitation in calling the earlier gods devils, as there was no hesitation in calling Zeus and all the other inhabitants of Olympus devils later on, on account of the fact that they were a peculiar mixture of good and evil. People have always taken care just of the more dangerous gods—naturally you would pay more attention to a dangerous god than to one from whom you would expect something better. The primitives are shameless in that respect. They say; “Why should we worship the great gods who never harm mankind? They are all right. We must worship the bad spirits because they are dangerous.” You see, that makes sense and if you apply that very negative principle to our hero Zarathustra you reach pretty much the same conclusion. The figure of Zarathustra is practically perfect, and the dangerous thing that causes no end of panic to Nietzsche is the shadow, the dark Zarathustra. If Nietzsche could give more recognition, or even a sort of homage, to all that negative side of Zarathustra, it surely would help him. For he is all the time in the greatest danger of poisoning himself in assuming that the dangerous thoughts of that fellow are his own thoughts; and since he makes such introjections, he cannot help including the big figures. He has to introject Zarathustra too and even the heavens, which of course makes quite a nice speech metaphor but it is not healthy. One could say one was Zeus himself and the blue sky above, and it is very wonderful, but then one must admit that one is everything in hell underneath. The one leads inevitably into the other. So we had better decide that we are neither this nor that; we had better not identify with the good, for then we have not to identify with the bad. We must construct those qualities as entities outside ourselves. *There* is good and *there* is evil. I am not good and I am not evil, I am not the hammer and I am not the anvil. I am the thing in between the hammer and the anvil. You see, if you are the hammer, then you are the anvil too; you are the beater and the beaten, and then you are on the wheel, eternally up and down.

Mrs. Sigg: In the very moment when Nietzsche wrote that letter to Burckhardt, identifying himself with God, after the great catastrophe in Turin, he identified with Caesar Borgia and with a lust murder.

Prof. Jung: Naturally in his disease all these things came out and it is coming out here already—in the way he identifies with the heavens, for instance. If I had looked over his shoulder while he was writing this paragraph I should have said, “Now hold on, think of what you are writing here—this is dangerous. You say that beautiful blue sky you worship, or whatever heaven means to you, is *your* depth, and that means it is yourself, so either heaven is very small or you are very big.”

Of course that is the intuitive. He just doesn't stop to pay attention. He swallows the most amazing whales of thoughts and pays no attention at all, and if he has indigestion and headache afterwards, he wonders what has happened.

Whenever Nietzsche makes such a statement we should interfere and ask what it means, what are the implications. You see there he is too much poet and too little philosopher; he doesn't stop to question. He says that heaven is his depth and his innocence—but what then? Or in the following paragraph, “. . . thus hidest thou thy stars. Thou speakest not, thus proclaimest thou thy wisdom unto me.” One would think that inasmuch as heaven is himself, he would have learned so much from heaven that *he* would not speak, thus proclaiming his wisdom—but he does speak. Of course he has to speak inasmuch as he is human, but then he is not heaven. Now, all that realization is missing here; he is driven by his intuition. He cannot wait for a realization, and so he swallows one whale after another, which naturally causes a tremendous inflation and indigestion in the end. There are realizations in the subsequent paragraphs, but they are only realizations of possibilities, intuitions, and he draws no conclusions. So that whole thing really passes by him without his realizing, and one can only say it is too bad.

Mrs. Sigg: In my translation he does not say he is heaven. He says, “To throw myself in that height, that is my depth.” He doesn't identify with heaven really.

Prof. Jung: Oh, that is pretty much the same: he throws himself into the depths of the heavens, extraordinary distances, and since he couldn't jump so high, it would mean a sort of falling into abysmal depths. And he says it is *his* depth, which is perfectly true.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not the *tabula smaragdina*—the microcosm and the macrocosm?⁶

Prof. Jung: I wish it were. You see, that is a realization, but he doesn't make that realization really. He uses again this unfortunate shield that it is his own—simply introjects it and it remains a speech metaphor. You know the *tabula smaragdina* is a philosophical or metaphysical statement about the structure of the universe: “Ether above, Ether below, heaven above, heaven below, all this above, all this below—take it and be happy.” But we can introject into the macrocosm just as well. We can say heaven is here and earth is below: we have all that in ourselves too. In later Hermetic philosophy it surely has been understood

⁶ See pp. 1533-34 below.

in that way. But the trouble is that Nietzsche is inclined to take it only in the way of a speech metaphor, as his own mental phenomenon. Mind you, if he should say that this world was an illusion and the depth of the heaven was the depth of his own being, it would be true, but then he would write quite a different philosophy. He would not talk about the Superman he was going to create, he would not shout. He would be a hermit or an Indian sage or something like that. And he could not call the beauty of heaven or the superman his own; it is not his, but is outside of him. It is neither this nor that, and later on he will tell you as much. That is the trouble. It is no use defending Nietzsche here; it is a lack, a defect. Now he continues in his quasi realization.

Mute o'er the raging sea hast thou risen for me today; thy love
and thy modesty make a revelation unto my raging soul.

This is the idea of that vision of heaven which would be a remedy for the turmoils of his soul. If he could ask himself, "Why do I think of heaven? Why do I say 'my depth?'"—then he would realize that there was a part which is all peace and another part which is all turmoil, and just as he had to name the part of peace "heaven," he could name the other side, the counterpart, "hell," and it would not be himself. Otherwise he would find himself completely isolated in the world; he would be heaven and we would be something else. So he must create a form in between, which means heaven, and another which means hell—two principles, a pair of opposites, with which he is not identical. You see, the simplicity and modesty of heaven would be helpful if he could only realize it.

In that thou camest unto me beautiful, veiled in thy beauty, in
that thou spakest unto me mutely, obvious in thy wisdom:

Oh, how could I fail to divine all the modesty of thy soul!

As he said before that heaven was his soul. This could be, "How could I fail to divine the modesty of *my* soul?" But then why not behave accordingly? Why talk? And if that is his soul, then where is the turmoil?

We have been friends from the beginning: to us are grief, gruesome-ness, and ground common; even the sun is common to us.

We do not speak to each other, because we know too much—: we keep silent to each other, we smile our knowledge to each other.

Art thou not the light of my fire? Hast thou not the sister-soul of mine insight?

Together did we learn everything; together did we learn to ascend beyond ourselves to ourselves, and to smile uncloudedly:—

—Uncloudedly to smile down out of luminous eyes and out of miles of distance, when under us constraint and purpose and guilt steam like rain.

And wandered I alone, for *what* did my soul hunger by night and in labyrinthine paths? And climbed I mountains, *whom* did I ever seek, if not thee, upon mountains?

And all my wandering and mountain-climbing: a necessity was it merely, and a makeshift of the unhandy one:—to *fly* only, want-eth mine entire will, to fly into *thee*!

It would be better to lay less emphasis upon himself and more upon the heaven, since the heaven is decidedly a bigger thing than the individual. But if the emphasis is on the human individual, then—according to the Indian notion—the *Purusha* is more than heaven. Heaven would be only the visible expression of the nature of the *Purusha* and decidedly less than the *Purusha*, since the *Purusha* is the whole, the sole and only thing. It is clear that there is no such insight, or there would have been entirely different consequences. Then it would be a sort of philosophical understanding, in the highest sense of the word, from which would necessarily result a philosophical attitude. But that is exactly what does not result in his case, only a sort of ecstasy, an identification with a superior principle, a sort of godlike being—like father Zeus who sits upon Olympus. He says, “Uncloudedly to smile down out of luminous eyes and out of miles of distance,” but that is much too big. And he trembles at what he calls his own thoughts, but can you imagine him being troubled by thoughts which he doesn’t even know, merely supposing that they must be evil? It is a lack of philosophical consciousness, a lack of thinking. We can well believe that he longs to fly into that heaven, and we don’t need to assume that this is an old infantile desire to fly into the Christian heaven. Probably it was in the beginning, but we can credit him with a more developed point of view. But it doesn’t really make much difference. It is the desire for redemption, the desire to be redeemed from turmoil. He feels in himself a clarity above the chaos, an order against the confusion. All that is perfectly clear, only as I said, it remains words—perhaps beautiful words—but there is no philosophical realization.

Now, the next paragraphs contain the idea of disturbances, things that disturb the view of heaven. After having sung that praise of heaven he instantly feels the onslaught of the dark powers; once more

the clouds come up, and he hates the thunderstorms which veil the sight of heaven till he can no longer see it. That is the acknowledgment that there are powers in him which cloud this perfect beauty. Then at the bottom of this page, after he has spoken of the thunder, the angry drummer, he says,

For rather will I have noise and thunders and tempest-blasts,
than this discreet, doubting cat-repose; and also amongst men do
I hate most of all the soft-treaders, and half-and-half ones, and
the doubting, hesitating, passing clouds.

He realizes all this in himself, but it is projected into those other fools who do such things. Here he should realize that that is exactly what he is doing. By seeing things without realizing them, he talks about them and doesn't make them true because he doesn't *draw* conclusions, and so he is in the fray as the half-and-half one, the one who has seen and not seen, the one who knows and doesn't know, the one who speaks the great word and doesn't believe it. He is really reviling himself in this paragraph. Now that is the difference between the believer in words, or the fellow with a merely aesthetic attitude that is enchanted by some beauty of thought or of color or of music, and a real philosopher—by which I don't mean a professor of philosophy, who *per definitionem* is never a philosopher, because he merely talks about it and never lives it. A real philosopher draws conclusions which are valid for his life: they are not mere talk. He lives his truth. He doesn't mean a string of words, but a particular kind of life; and even if he doesn't succeed in living it, he at least means it and he *lives* it, more or less.

I have seen such individuals. They were not very wonderful specimens of humanity, but they did not think of a philosophical truth as a string of words, or something sounding clever which was printed in a book. They admitted that a truth is something you can live, and that, whether you live your life or not, the only criterion is life. They were even quite ready to admit that they had perhaps failed in such-and-such a way, or they would tell some small lies about it but they would at least feel apologetic about it and would concede so much to your criticism. I know a fellow, an Eastern philosopher, who I am quite certain plays some dirty tricks like a true Oriental, but he would say that he didn't do such things, and it would not be just a mean lie. He would lie in spite of his conviction that a truth is only a truth inasmuch as you live it. But our philosophy—heavens, it is perfectly ridiculous! To a Western professor of philosophy, no way of life has ever to do with his philosophy. That is a theory of cognition and life is a different case: it

doesn't touch cognition. You see, that is our Western prejudice, our belief in words, and it seduces Nietzsche and handicaps him. We don't understand what realization means. The Eastern man says that is the main thing, and we don't even understand the problem. We say, "*what realization?*"—it means nothing to us. When you find yourself saying, "That is my depth," what do you mean? What are the implications of that thought? What are the ultimate consequences when you try to live it, to make it true? You see, we cannot realize: we are those fellows who are half-and-half, who live in between, who live something quite different from what we think and profess.

Mrs. Sigg: In these chapters, I think the wrong high tones are because Nietzsche was lifted up to those ideals by the school and the church.

Prof. Jung: Of course, that is exactly what I mean: the intellectual milieu in Germany was handed out to him by tons.

Mrs. Sigg: And therefore, to counteract that tragic inclination, forced on him by the spirit of the time, it would seem that the world really needed the word of a Swiss psychologist: Thou shalt not strive after the good and beautiful, but after your own being.

Prof. Jung: Well, unfortunately his friend Jakob Burckhardt did not tell him that the only thing to do was to keep as mum as possible. Burckhardt was an anxious soul who did not like to mix himself up in such matters. He even preferred to say he was too old and too stupid. He was too sly an old fox to put his finger into that pie.

Mrs. Sigg: But I did not mean Jakob Burckhardt.

Prof. Jung: But *I* meant him!

Mr. Allemann: Buddhists consider the aptitude for realization as necessary in order to progress on the path of knowledge, and in order to convey the meaning of "realization" they give the following example: Everybody comes into contact with illness, old age, and death, but most people simply register the fact and pass on. When Buddha came to see illness, old age, and death, he realized that to live meant to suffer and he began his search for a way out of the wheel of Samsara.

Prof. Jung: That is an excellent example. To know what the East means by realization, read the sermons of the Buddha, chiefly those from the middle collection of the Pali-canon.⁷ They are quite illuminating, a most systematic education toward the utmost consciousness.

⁷ "In Ceylon, about 80 B.C., the early Buddhistic canon was committed to writing. This corpus of sacred literature—the often cited Pali canon—is preserved, probably without much alteration to the present" (Zimmer/*Philosophies*, p. 499).

He says that whatever you do, do it consciously, know that you do it; and he even goes so far as to say that when you eat and when you drink, know it, and when you satisfy your physical needs, all the functions of your body, know it. That is realization—not for one moment to be without realization. You must always know what you do, and also *who* is doing it. And that is exactly the realization which is lacking with us. You see, nowadays the thing which is shouted into our ears all the time—and probably all over America too—is that we must take the responsibility for this or that: “There is a fellow who takes on the responsibility, he says he will do it!” That sounds, of course, wonderful; we are all waiting for such a fellow. But is nobody going to enquire who that fellow is? For instance, if your business was in a mess and a fellow came along and said to hand it over to him and he would take care of it, you would naturally say, “That is all right, but who are you?” But you might be blindfolded; if you have only the collective consciousness of actual Europe, you would be thankful and assume that this was really the fellow who would take care of it. And then you hear that the fellow is bankrupt in his own business, which he knew nothing about, and is perhaps a swindler, so how can he take over the responsibility? But we don’t ask that; we are quite satisfied that somebody takes it on. Look at all the politicians! Well now, there is only one thing more to mention in this chapter. Half way down on the next page, Nietzsche says,

“Of Hazard”—that is the oldest nobility in the world; that gave I back to all things; I emancipated them from bondage under purpose.

This freedom and celestial serenity did I put like an azure bell above all things, when I taught that over them and through them, no “eternal Will”—willeth.

This wantonness and folly did I put in place of that Will, when I taught that “In everything there is one thing impossible—rationality!”

This is like that very witty philosopher who said: “Nothing is quite true and even that is not quite true.”⁸

A little reason, to be sure, a germ of wisdom scattered from star to star—this leaven is mixed in all things; for the sake of folly, wisdom is mixed in all things!

⁸ E. D. Decker, an obscure nineteenth-century Dutch philosopher who wrote under the name of Multatuli.

This insight we owe to Nietzsche. He is one of the first protagonists for irrationalism, a great merit considering that he lived in a time of extreme positivism and rationalism. In our days it doesn't make so much sense any longer; we have to go back fifty or sixty years to understand the full value of such a passage. He was surely the only one of his time who had the extraordinary courage to insist upon the thoroughly irrational nature of things, and also upon the feeling value of such a world. A world that was exclusively rational would be absolutely divested of all feeling values, and so we could not share it, as we cannot share the life of a machine. It is as if we were now thoroughly convinced of the fact that we are living beings, and a machine after all is not a living being but a premeditated rational device. And we feel that we are not premeditated rational devices; we feel that we are a sort of experiment, say an experiment of nature, or, to express it modestly, of hazard. Things somehow came together and finally it happened that man appeared. It was an experiment and forever remains an experiment. So we can say it is the oldest nobility in the world, that we all come from a sort of hazard, which means that there is nothing rational about it; it has nothing to do with any device.

That is a very important realization because it breaks the old traditional belief, which was almost a certainty, that we are sort of useful and intended structures and are here for a certain definite purpose. Then we are naturally in a terrible quandary when we don't see the purpose, when it looks almost as if there were none. That simply comes from our prejudice that things *au fond* are somehow rational, but that is impossible—probably a childish prejudice which still has to do with the idea that God premeditated a machine which turned out to be the world, and which works in a way like a clock. We have been infected with that point of view, but that is trust in a father, in a premeditating, exceedingly wise and clever old man who sits in his workshop and pulls the strings, having calculated the clockwork of the whole world. Inasmuch as we believe that, we are just *filis à papa*, we live provisionally. But it is absolutely necessary, if we want to get anywhere, to cut off those imaginary strings, for there *are* no strings. And that is what Nietzsche tried to do, to convey the idea that there are no such strings, no such premeditations, no such *papa à fils* that sits behind the scene and manipulates the string that leads him from the stage of the dear little child to the good, better, best. It may be, and it is even probable, that the thing is not arranged, that it is really accidental.

And here I want to remind you of those old books by Daudet, *Tar-*

tarin de Tarasçon and *Tartarin sur les Alpes*.⁹ Tartarin thought that the dangers of the Alps were simply arranged by a limited company who had bought those places and arranged them to look dangerous, so he walked up the Jungfrau as if it were nothing. He knew all about it. But then he went up Mont Blanc and there he suddenly discovered that the thing was not fake. Then doubt assailed him and instantly he was in an absolutely blue funk. You see, that blue funk is what we try to prevent—we might feel lost. But only if we can feel lost, can we experience that the water also carries us; nobody learns to swim as long as he believes that he has to support his weight in the water. You must be able to trust the water, trust that the water really carries your weight, and then you can swim. That is what we have to learn from the world.

⁹ Alphonse Daudet, father of Leon Daudet, *Tartarin de Tarasçon* (1877), and *Tartarin sur les Alpes* (1885). Tartarin was a genial teller of tall tales.

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LECTURE I

19 October 1938

Prof. Jung:

Ladies and Gentlemen: On the way of the “eternal return” we come back to our old *Zarathustra* once more. We will begin with the 49th chapter, “The Bedwarfing Virtue.” It would be impossible to give a résumé of what has been said in the preceding chapters. As a matter of fact so much has been said that it becomes wellnigh impossible even to remember it. *Zarathustra* is such a bewildering phenomenon, there are so many diverse aspects, that one could hardly make a whole of it. Moreover, *Zarathustra* itself is not a whole; it is, rather, a river of pictures and it is difficult to make out the laws of the river, how it moves, or toward what goal it is meandering.

If you take the preceding chapter, “Before Sunrise,” and now “The Bedwarfing Virtue,” you cannot see exactly why the one should follow the other. You only have a sort of dull sensation that somehow it is moving correctly, somehow making sense, but nobody could say what sense. This is a very typical quality of all products of the unconscious. The unconscious contents flow out in such a seemingly chaotic river, which meanders on through nature, and only the water can tell what the next move will be. We cannot tell because we are unable to perceive the small differences in the potential, the incline of the soil, but the water knows and follows it. It seems to be a thoroughly unconscious, unpurposive movement that just follows natural gravity. It happens to begin somewhere and it happens to end somewhere. One cannot say that this makes any particular sense, as one cannot say—as was formerly said—that it is due to the wonderful foresight and grace of God that a river is near every town, another proof of the divine providence in nature. One has the uncanny impression of something inhuman, and it is impossible to speculate about it because there is absolutely no ground for speculation; one is simply impressed with the abysmal depths of the meanings of nature.

Nevertheless, one has all the time a certain feeling that somewhere

there is perhaps a secret goal. Otherwise, we would never be able to concentrate upon such a book, as we could never concentrate upon the enormous problem of why the Danube is making for the Black Sea, or why the Rhine runs north. Works like *Zarathustra* are at least born out of man; it is the nature process in a human psyche. And it would be absolutely desperate if we should come to the conclusion that, where consciousness doesn't give purposes or ends, the natural functioning of the psyche necessarily leads to a merely incidental solution, that it ends in the Black Sea. For then it would not be worthwhile to speculate about the life of the psyche. Since, however, we have a certain intuition, or a feeling, of some purpose underneath, we think it worthwhile to concentrate upon such a work, and to try to find out whether there is not really a secret design in the whole thing, perhaps one which never appears clearly upon the surface, or in other words, a purpose which has never become conscious to the author himself. Now Nietzsche begins this chapter in the following way,

When Zarathustra was again on the continent, he did not go straightway to his mountains and his cave, but made many wanderings and questionings, and ascertained this and that; so that he said of himself jestingly: "Lo, a river that floweth back unto its source in many windings!" For he wanted to learn what had taken place among men during the interval: whether they had become greater or smaller.

In his remark: "Lo, a river that floweth back into its source in many windings!" we have that meandering movement we were speaking of, and also the extraordinary idea that the river doesn't flow on to its natural end, but back to its own source. What form would the river produce by that movement?

Mrs. Schevill: The snake, winding back on itself.

Mrs. Baumann: The *ouroboros*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the snake biting its own tail, which forms the symbol of eternity and was one of the main subjects of medieval speculation. It returns to the place where it started and so it forms something like a circle, even though the circle may be interrupted by many meanderings. So that gives us at once a symbol. And Zarathustra is himself struck by his movements; he seems bewildered that he is not going straight to his cave. He wonders about his meanderings—as he says, "wanderings and questionings," many hesitations, stumbling over this stone and that stone—and he comes to the conclusion that it is like a river which seeks its own source, not its end but its source. We don't

know whether Nietzsche himself realized what that means, presumably not, because he makes nothing of it. It remains one of his ideas which he leaves there on the shore while he continues his wanderings, paying no attention to it. But later on that idea will come up again and again; this is another indication of that future thought, one of Nietzsche's most important thoughts.

Mrs. Sigg: Die ewige Wiederkehr.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the idea of the eternal return is indicated here, the idea that life, or the life of the psyche more probably, is an eternal return, a river which seeks its own source and not the goal, the end. It returns to the source, thereby producing a circular movement which brings back whatever has been. Here we can use another nice Greek term, the *apokatastasis*, which means the return of everything that has been lost, a complete restoration of whatever has been. We find that idea of the eternal return also in Christianity, in the Epistles of St. Paul, where he speaks of the mystical or metaphysical significance of Christ, and our importance in his work of redemption. He says that all creatures are sighing in fetters and expecting the revelation of the children of God, meaning that man has an importance as the savior for the whole of nature. All creation groaneth and travaileth in pain, fettered, unfree, and through the manifestation of the children of God, the whole of nature will be led back into the original state of completeness and innocence. The same idea is in the cabala of which St. Paul was a connoisseur. Who was his teacher?

Mrs. Sigg: Gamaliel.

Prof. Jung: Yes, Rabbi Gamaliel the Elder, who was a Jewish Gnostic, what was called later on a "cabalist." The old cabalistic tradition about paradise was, that when God saw that the first parents had been imprudent enough to eat of the fruits of the tree, he cast them out, and shut the gates of paradise, and since it was no longer any good, he moved paradise into the future. There you have the same idea. Paradise was the origin of life, where the four rivers arose, and he removed the origin of life into the future and made it a goal. So those rivers which issued from paradise will flow back into paradise in the future. It is a circle, the eternal return. That is probably the historical origin of the idea of the *apokatastasis*, but that life is a circle is psychologically an archetypal idea. Where have we evidence for that? Ethnologists to the foreground!—or primitive psychology, mythology!

Mrs. Fierz: I always wondered whether one could not take that way of burying people in a sitting position as symbolizing a return to the original position of the embryo in the womb.

Prof. Jung: That comes into it.

Mr. Allemann: In German mythology, after the world is destroyed, it returns again to the primordial condition.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the eternal return. And there is also the typical hero-myth, where the idea of the restoration of all the past is very clear. When the dragon has swallowed the hero and absolutely everything belonging to him, his brothers, his parents and grandparents, the whole tribe, herds of cattle, even the woods and fields, then the hero kills the dragon, and all that the dragon has devoured comes back as it was before. You see, the idea that everything returns as it has been would mean that time comes to an end. To express it more philosophically, if the flux of time can be done away with, then everything is, everything exists, because things only appear and disappear in time. If time is abolished, nothing disappears and nothing appears—unless it is already there and then it needs must be! So that idea of the eternal return means really the abolition of time; time would be suspended.

Now, this chapter about the bedwarfing virtue is one of the mean-derings. He is now coming again to human beings and wonders about men.

And once, when he saw a row of new houses, he marvelled, and said:

“What do these houses mean? Verily, no great soul put them up as its simile!

Did perhaps a silly child take them out of its toy-box? Would that another child put them again into the box!

And these rooms and chambers—can men go out and in there? They seem to be made for silk dolls; or for dainty-eaters, who perhaps let others eat with them.”

And Zarathustra stood still and meditated. At last he said sorrowfully: “There hath everything become smaller!

Everywhere do I see lower doorways: he who is of my type can still go therethrough, but—he must stoop!

Oh, when shall I arrive again at my home, where I shall no longer have to stoop—shall no longer have to stoop before the small ones!” And Zarathustra sighed, and gazed into the distance.

The same day, however, he gave his discourse on the bedwarfing virtue.

He is particularly impressed with that change in size. What has happened to Zarathustra that he suddenly becomes aware of the exceedingly small size of his contemporaries?

Mrs. Fierz: He has become bigger.

Prof. Jung: Yes, since it is not very probable that many people would change in any particular aspect, since they are practically the same as they ever were, changing perhaps in millions of years but not in a hundred years, it is very much more probable that Nietzsche the man has changed. And that would be symptomatic for what psychological condition?

Mrs. Fierz: His inflation.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Now we have long ago discussed the fact very thoroughly that Zarathustra himself is the archetypal figure of the wise old man. Therefore Nietzsche chose the name of Zarathustra, who was the founder of a religion, a great wise man. So that name should express the peculiar quality of the archetype by which Nietzsche himself is possessed. You see, anyone possessed by an archetype cannot help having all the symptoms of an inflation. For the archetype is nothing human; no archetype is properly human. The archetype itself is an exaggeration and it reaches beyond the confines of humanity. The archetype of the wise old man, for instance, is nothing but wise, and that is not human. Anyone who has any claim to wisdom is always cursed with a certain amount of foolishness. And a god is nothing but power in essence, with no drawback or qualification. Another reason why the archetypes are not quite human is that they are exceedingly old. I don't know whether one should even speak of age because they belong to the fundamental structure of our psyche. If one could ascribe any origin to the archetypes, it would be in the animal age; they reach down into an epoch where man could hardly be differentiated from the animal. And that entirely unconscious background of the archetypes gives them a quality which is decidedly inhuman. So anybody possessed by an archetype develops inhuman qualities. One could say that a man possessed by his anima was all-too-human, but all-too-human is already inhuman. You see, man is a certain optimum between all-too-human and superhuman or inhuman, so all-too-human is on the way to inhumanity. Therefore, inasmuch as Nietzsche is possessed by Zarathustra, the archetype of the wise old man, he loses human proportions and becomes uncertain about his size.

Sometimes people who are possessed by an unconscious figure—the anima or the animus or the wise old man or the great mother, for instances—become uncertain even about their own looks. I had a patient who always carried a little mirror in her pocket in order to make out what she was like, and if she didn't look in this mirror before her analytic hour, she couldn't remember. Or this inhumanity may be pro-

jected into the analyst, which explains why people have often believed that I have a wonderful white beard and blue eyes, or that I am blond at least. Many people are uncertain about their looks. They are always astonished when they look in the mirror—either shocked or they think they look quite nice perhaps, which merely shows that they are unacquainted even with themselves. And one's feeling about one's size can also be affected; one sometimes feels decidedly small for instance. We have an expression for this in our Swiss patois: we say that one feels three cheeses high, which would be about the size of a dwarf. One feels perhaps that one's size has decreased, or that one is suddenly very tall, and that is always according to the size of the possession. One is possessed by a certain thought which was originally an archetype, and if one personifies that thought or possession one arrives at an archetypal figure. To be possessed by a dwarf makes one feel small, and to be possessed by a great figure makes one stretch and grow tall, and one likes or dislikes one's looks accordingly. So what has happened here to Nietzsche is a symptom of inflation and of possession and it is a very ordinary human feeling. Nietzsche himself, the author, expresses its value to him but he projects it. Now why does he project such subjective conditions?

Remark: He doesn't realize it.

Prof. Jung: That is the point, and therefore he could project it. But why should he not realize that he is bigger? When something happens to us and we project it into other people, why don't we recognize that it is our own fact, that it belongs to us?

Mr. Allemann: Because we are not conscious of it.

Remark: Because we are possessed by it.

Prof. Jung: But why are we not conscious of it? Why are we accessible to possessions?

Miss Hannah: Because its realization is too disagreeable.

Prof. Jung: And what is so disagreeable about the feeling of being possessed? What might it produce?

Miss Hannah: It might go as far as madness.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but I want to know how you would feel about a possession if you knew of it?

Miss Hannah: Horrid, because you don't know what is going to happen next.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it would be just as if you were sinking into your bed and then discover that somebody is already there. It is questionable whether you would like that. Or as if you were alone in your house and suddenly hear a funny noise and think someone else must be in the

place too. Or as if you should climb a mountain thinking you were the very first to reach the top, and then find an old bottle there; you are anticipated, your exertion has been in vain. It is intensely disagreeable to feel that one is not master in one's own house—it is like a defeat. So when one discovers a possession there is a fear about possible events; anything may happen then. One doesn't know what that other fellow might do. He has already taken the liberty of stepping into my room through the window without asking my permission, and he might be up to any kind of trick. That is the reason why we prefer to deny the possession even if we know it. Therefore if you hear a queer noise when you think you are alone in your house, your first reaction is: it is not possible. Because it would be disagreeable to have burglars in the house, you try to deny that you have heard anything and hope it was a mouse, or the wind, or that a piece of furniture has creaked. You hope there is a perfectly natural and indifferent explanation. It is exceedingly disagreeable and uncanny to realize a possession, so we prefer to say that nothing has happened at all. If anything has happened, it has happened to the other fellow: *I* am not disagreeable at all; *you* are the disagreeable devil. *I* would be perfectly all right if *you* were not there. That is the way in which we project and that is of course what Nietzsche-Zarathustra is doing here. He doesn't realize his own inflation, but thinks that other people have become smaller. Now if you assume that all the other people become smaller, what would be your conclusion in regard to such a perception?

Mr. Allemann: I am all right and all the others are wrong.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and that gives tremendous satisfaction—I am the fellow. To be beyond human size gives you a great advantage over the others. Not that you are in any way supernatural, you may admit you are only the normal size, but the others are underfed and undersized. Then you are on top of the whole business. But you also might draw another more edifying conclusion if you are intellectual or have a more scientific mind, which Nietzsche decidedly has not. Or you need only have an imagination plastic enough to make a picture of such a case—that you are in a crowd of people who are all two feet high, while you have remained the ordinary size. What would a scientific consciousness say then?

Mrs. Sigg: That something is not quite right.

Prof. Jung: That is too vague. You would say it was a miracle. And a scientist might say: "It is an optical delusion; I have perhaps the wrong spectacles." Or: "*They* are human beings, and I am a human being too. Nothing has happened to me, so how do I explain this?" He would look

at himself at once and thus he would discover that that projection of smallness was because he himself had decreased in size. He would discover that they were normal and he had diminished; he had projected it. This would be a very normal conclusion. And Nietzsche would inevitably come to the same conclusion if he could only apply a scientific consciousness. You see, in an inflation, you as a human being are smaller than ever before, because vis à vis the possessive spirit or whatever it is, you have lost your importance. So anyone who is possessed is really very small; his humanity has fallen below its normal size and has become a dwarf. Nietzsche himself is here a dwarf and therefore he arrives at the funny title, "The Bedwarfing Virtue." And whatever he says in this chapter will be a *ressentiment* against that thing which has bedwarfed him. He would not admit that he was dwarfed, and he doesn't see what is dwarfed—he only has the *ressentiment* from being dwarfed—and like everyone having a possession, he accuses the whole world of being against him, underrating him and making him small, which is absolutely unjust.

In the next part, Nietzsche steps down to the bedwarfed people and busies himself with a very thorough critique of their psychology. I won't read the whole text but I recommend your studying it attentively. You will see that he is moved by a strong resentment against the small people; he reviles them properly. That is of course somewhat disproportionate; he should be quite satisfied with the fact that they are now little dwarfs who are punished enough and could be passed by. But that they are already punished by fate doesn't satisfy him in the least. Why not?

Mrs. Sigg: Because he himself is so small in some parts of his being.

Mrs. Fierz: But he must always be again confronted with this fact; something in him always pushes him into a situation where he is confronted with it, so that he may get another chance.

Prof. Jung: Well, that is the typically neurotic way—it is a neurotic fact in Nietzsche. He projects that idea of smallness, which is not of course satisfactory. If it were real, he could have pity on them that fate had punished them so awfully, but something in him knows that they are not small, so he must make them smaller; therefore his projection. You see, you are not satisfied when you project, so you must help it along, because you are always threatened with the disagreeable possibility of suddenly discovering that it is only a projection. So you must defend your projection with great insistence on account of that fear lurking in the background of discovering that you are wrong. It is rather unfair that those people are so punished by God; one would

think he could let it go, but no, he insists upon it. And so he goes on through several paragraphs reviling the dwarfs, which would make no sense at all if it were true. But it isn't, and therefore he has to insist upon it.

Now, when people have such a critical and resentful attitude they will of course make many mistakes in their judgments and criticisms of others, but since we are all human, naturally we always have somewhere a hook on which a projection can be hung. And a projection often hits the nail on the head—a nail, at least; not every nail. There is something in it, so in a certain way you can say a projection is also an organ of cognition. Of course it is wrong to make a projection, but there is that much justification, for you thereby discover the nail on which you have hung something. The coat which you have hung on that nail naturally covers the whole figure and that gives it a wrong aspect, a wrong quality, but if you take the coat off the nail, that nail remains and is true. So when someone who is increased by a projection becomes very critical of his surroundings, he will discover a number of nails which he has not noticed before and his projection will hit those nails on the head. A projection is an unjustifiable exaggeration, but the nail is not. So certain points which Nietzsche sees and criticizes are absolutely correct, and they show him to be a remarkable psychologist; he is one of the greatest psychologists that ever lived, on account of his discoveries.¹ He saw certain things very clearly and pointed them out even cruelly, but they are truths—of course disagreeable truths. If such truths are declared in a certain tone of voice, it is undermining, destructive and inhuman.

Now I will pick out some remarks which seem to me to be particularly interesting and important for our psychology. Thus, he says,

Some of them *will*, but most of them are *willed*. Some of them are genuine, but most of them are bad actors.

There are actors without knowing it amongst them, and actors without intending it, the genuine ones are always rare, especially the genuine actors.

Here he makes a very apt remark which is also characteristic of himself; in fact, if he realizes what he is saying here he really ought to see his projection. For he sees clearly that very few individuals have con-

¹ For Nietzsche as psychologist, see above pp. 120, 120n, 745-46. Jung's tribute to Nietzsche as psychologist is like Nietzsche's to Stendhal and Dostoevsky, and Freud's to Shakespeare and other poets.

scious intentions, or are capable of conscious decisions, of saying "I will." Most of them are willed, which means that they are the victims of their so-called will. Naturally he should turn that conclusion round and apply it to himself. He should ask himself, "Am I the one who wills, or am I perhaps willed—am I perhaps a victim? Am I a genuine actor or a bad actor?" But it is characteristic of Nietzsche throughout the book that very rarely does his judgment return to himself. We shall presently come to a place where suddenly that whole difficult tendency turns round to himself, and only with great difficulty could he ward it off and keep it in a box where it wouldn't hurt him too much. But here he shows no sign of applying it to himself; he simply harangues the others. Of course he is right in his conclusion that most people are not capable of willing; they are willed, they simply represent the living thing in themselves without deciding for or against it. Even their decisions, even their moral conflicts, are mere demonstrations of the living thing in them; they merely happen.

And it is very difficult to say to what extent we all function in that way. Nobody would dare to say that he is not a mere actor of himself, of the basic self that lives in him. We cannot tell how far we are liberated, or partially liberated, from the compulsion of the unconscious, even in our most perfect accomplishments or highest aspirations. We are perhaps the actors, the implements, the toolbox of a being greater than ourselves, greater at least in having more volume or periphery in which we are contained. This difficulty always exists because we don't know enough about the unconscious; the unconscious is that which we do not know, therefore we call it the unconscious. We cannot tell how far it reaches, and we can never say, "Here I am absolutely free," because even our freedom may be a role assigned to us which we have to play. It may be that we are all genuine actors to a certain extent, and then to another extent bad actors and even fools, who have thought the truth to be "I will." For man is most foolish when he says "I will"; that is the greatest illusion. The idea that one is a bad actor is a smaller illusion, and the idea that one is a genuine actor is the smallest illusion if it is an illusion at all.

It is curious that Nietzsche should not arrive at such conclusions, but there was a lack of knowledge, for which one cannot make him responsible. It would have helped him if he could have known a bit more about Eastern philosophy—if he had known, for instance, such a sentence as this, "One should play the role of the king, of the beggar, and of the criminal, being conscious of the gods." This is a piece of Eastern wisdom: namely, that the one who is king should be conscious of the

fact that he is king only as another is a beggar, or a criminal, or a thief. It is the role he is given: he *finds* himself in a certain situation which is called "king"; another one is called "beggar," or "thief," and each one has to fulfil that role, never forgetting the gods that have assigned the role to him. This is a very superior point of view which we miss in Nietzsche altogether through a lack of consciousness of himself in a way, a lack of self-critique, never looking at himself in a reflective way, never mirroring himself in the mirror of his own understanding. He is only infatuated with himself, filled with himself, fascinated, and therefore inflated.

Of man there is little here: therefore do their women masculinise themselves. For only he who is man enough, will—*save the woman* in woman.

This is a very curious remark. If he meant by "man" the human being, it would be rather understandable, for the less one is conscious of one's own role, or the less one is conscious of oneself, the less one is human, because one is then inflated—as he is. But he obviously means man in the sense of sex, a masculine being, and therefore the conclusion that the women masculinize themselves. So he finds a sort of effeminacy in the men of his actual time; the tendency of women to masculinize themselves corresponds to the effeminization of men. Now this is a strange fact. The emancipation of women, which began in his time, was one of the first symptoms of this tendency in women. He doesn't speak of the corresponding tendency in men—of course not—but he makes that statement, which was of course a blow in the face of his time, because those men did not imagine that they were particularly effeminate: men never assume that. But in women it became disagreeably obvious, in Mrs. Pankhurst and such people for example;² that whole tendency of making sort-of men out of women was particularly striking. The effeminization of men was not so obvious, but as a matter of fact there is something very peculiar about the men of today: there are very few real men. This comes from the fact, which you discover when you look at men closely and with a bit of poisonous projection, that most of them are possessed by the anima—practically all. Of course I exclude myself! And women are all slightly possessed by their

* Emmeline Gouldner Pankhurst (1858-1928) began her career as suffragist mildly enough, but grew increasingly ostentatious and even violent. She was jailed in 1914 after an attempt to storm Buckingham Palace, but by 1918 she had helped extend the suffrage in England to women.

ghostly friend the animus, which causes their masculine quality. Now if you mix man and woman in one individual, what do you produce?

Miss Hannah: The hermaphrodite.

Prof. Jung: Yes. So we are all consciously or unconsciously aiming at playing to a certain extent the role of the hermaphrodite; one finds marvelous examples in the ways of women at present in the world. And men do the same, *nolens volens*, but more in the moral sense. They cultivate deep voices and all kinds of masculine qualities, but their souls are like melting butter; as a rule they are entirely possessed by a very doubtful anima. That the unconscious has come up and taken possession of the conscious personality is a peculiarity of our time. I, also, came across that idea quite independently. As a student I read *Zarathustra*, and in 1914 I read it again, but I did not discover that passage. Of course my unconscious might have cast an eye on it, but I would not say that Nietzsche was responsible for that idea in me because I found it myself in the world, in human beings. I consider it a fact: Nietzsche observed correctly, according to my idea. Now what accounts for this fact of the mingling of sexes in one individual? It is the welling up and the inundation of the unconscious. The unconscious takes possession of the conscious, which ought to be a well-defined male or female; but being possessed by the unconscious, it becomes a mixed being, something of the hermaphrodite.

Mrs. Crowley: Has it to do with the extreme emphasis upon rational consciousness in our time—so that there would be a proportionate drag from the unconscious—as if we were more susceptible to its influence because of a one-sided attitude? It could also have to do with his image of the eternal return. We have a parallel in the symbol of the Yang and Yin expressing the eternal alternation of the archetypes. While Yang dominated we had the emphasis upon Logos. Now Yin brings a new code of values and naturally while the old one is disappearing, there is a conflict in the unconscious which has a very disturbing effect upon consciousness.

Prof. Jung: That is a fact, but we ought to have a reason why the unconscious comes up so close to consciousness just as consciousness is detaching itself. There must have been a reason why that did not happen long ago, for we must admit that the consciousness of man has not increased very much since the Middle Ages. We have only gained a sort of horizontal knowledge as it were, but the size of consciousness and its intensity has increased very little. Those men of the Middle Ages were capable of extraordinary concentration of mind—if you consider their works of art for instance, that assiduity, love of detail and so on. They

had just as much as the men who work at the microscope in our days. Of course from a dogmatic point of view we are different but, as William James said in speaking of the natural science of our time, our temper is devout. The temper in which we live and work is the same as that of the Middle Ages only the name is different; it is no longer a spiritual subject, but is now called science.³

Mrs. Crowley: But then too, there was a sort of marriage of religion and science in the Middle Ages.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but what does account for the fact that now the unconscious is coming up?

Mrs. Baumann: It is because religion doesn't work any longer.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is one the main reasons. Religion is a very apt instrument to express the unconscious. The main significance of any religion is that its forms and rites express the peculiar life of the unconscious. The relationship between religion and the unconscious is everywhere obvious: all religions are full of figures from the unconscious. Now, if you have such a system or form in which to express the unconscious, it is caught, it is expressed, it lives with you; but the moment that system is upset, the moment you lose your faith and your connection with those walls, your unconscious seeks a new expression. Then naturally it comes up as a sort of chaotic lava into your consciousness, perverting and upsetting your whole conscious system, which is one-sided sexually. A man becomes perverted by the peculiar effeminate quality of the unconscious, and a woman, by the masculine quality. Since there is no longer any form for the unconscious, it inundates the conscious. It is exactly like a system of canals which has somehow been obstructed: the water overflows into the fields and what has been dry land before becomes a swamp. Moreover, Zarathustra is a religious figure and the book is full of religious problems; even the style in which it is written is religious. It is as if all the backwash of Christianity were flowing out; Nietzsche is inundated with all that material which has no longer a place in the church or in the Christian system of symbols. James Joyce at his best is the same, only in his case it is the negation of the Catholic church and the Catholic symbols;⁴ the under-

³ For William James (1842-1910), science, unlike religion and his kind of philosophy, was remote, general, and above all impersonal. Though like Jung with a medical degree, he was highly critical of scientists making a religion of their dedication. See especially Lectures XIV and XX in *Varieties of Religious Experience* (London, 1902). Jung got to know James a little when he went to Massachusetts in 1909.

⁴ As his protagonist said in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, written in 1916, "I will

ground cloacae come up and empty their contents into the conscious because the canals are obstructed.

Miss Wolff: Is the ineffectiveness of the dogma not a parallel phenomenon, rather than a cause, to the overflow of the unconscious? Because we could ask further: what has happened that the Christian symbol does not contain the unconscious any longer?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that would be a further question. Why have we lost our hold on the dogma? But that leads far afield; that is a historical question which has to do with an entirely different orientation of our intellect, the discovery of the world and all that that meant. And it has to do with the necessity of a new understanding which has not been found. The old understanding was that somewhere—perhaps behind the galactic system—God was sitting on a throne and if you used your telescope you might perhaps discover him; otherwise there was no God. That is the standpoint of our immediate past, but what we ought to understand is that these figures are not somewhere in space, but are really given in ourselves. They are right here, only we do not know it. Because we thought we saw them in cosmic distances, we seek them there again. Just as astrologists speak of the stars and of the particular vibrations we get from the constellations, forgetting that, owing to the precession of the equinoxes the astrological positions differ from the astronomical positions. Nothing comes from the stars; it is all in ourselves. In these matters we have not yet made much headway, because it seems to be unspeakably difficult to make people understand the *reality of the psyche*. It is as if it didn't exist; people think it is an illusion, merely an arbitrary invention. They cannot see that in dealing with the psyche, we are dealing with *facts*. But of course not with such facts as they are commonly understood. When, for instance, Mr. X says, "God is," then it neither proves that God is or that he is not. His saying so does not produce God's existence. Therefore people say it means nothing, i.e., it is *no fact*. But the fact is, that Mr. X. believes in God quite irrespectively of the question whether other people hold that God is, or that he is not. Psychical reality is, that people believe in the idea of God or that they disbelieve in it. God is therefore a psychical fact. Neither stones nor plants nor arguments nor theologians prove God's existence; only human consciousness reveals God as a fact, because it is a fact that there is an idea of a divine being in the human mind. This is not the famous argument of Anselm of Canterbury ac-

not serve that in which I no longer believe whether it call itself my home, my fatherland or my church" (New York, 1964, p. 245).

cording to which the idea of the most perfect being must necessarily include its existence; otherwise it would not be perfect.⁵

Now the actual psychological circumstances, this peculiar mixture in the character of the sexes, is according to my idea an excellent point. Nietzsche saw that, and of course he could see it so clearly because he had it in himself. A projection is really like having a projector throw your psychology on the screen, so what is small inside you, what you cannot see, you can see there very large and distinct. And so with your projection upon other people; you have only to take it back and say, "That comes from here; here is the lamp and here is the film, and that is myself." Then you have understood something, and that is just what is lacking here. Nietzsche is chiefly critical because his psychology is born out of that resentment. On the one side, he has feelings of inferiority and therefore on the other side the tremendous sense of power. Wherever there are feelings of inferiority there is a power scheme afoot, because one measures things from the standpoint of power: Is he more powerful than I? Am I stronger than he? That is the psychology of feelings of inferiority. Nietzsche is the author of the *Will-to-Power*, don't forget. So naturally, since his critique is created by a resentment, his judgment is often too acid, unjust; but as I say it often hits the nail on the head. Here, for instance:

And this hypocrisy found I worst amongst them, that even those who command feign the virtues of those who serve.

"I serve, thou servest, we serve"—so chanteth here even the hypocrisy of the rulers—and alas! if the first lord be only the first servant!

To what does he refer—belonging to his time?

Mrs. Sigg: Frederick der Grosse, because he said that the king must be the first servant of the State.⁶

Prof. Jung: Yes, and closer to him, Bismarck said something very

⁵ St. Anselm (1033-1109). His "ontological argument" is still a matter of serious debate in theological and philosophical circles.

⁶ Frederick was something of an amateur scholar and given to putting his thoughts on paper on a wide variety of topics. With the help of Voltaire he wrote a book on the duties of a prince of state, *Anti-Machiavel*, which was published at The Hague in 1740. As a biographer has said about the passage Jung cites, "In truth Frederick could say he was going to be the first servant of his subjects, for no one would dispute his 'complete freedom to do right' which he claimed for serving them" (Pierre Gaxotte, *Frederick the Great* [New Haven, 1942], p. 152).

similar; "In the service of my fatherland I consume myself."⁷ That was in everybody's mouth in Nietzsche's time.

Mr. Allemann: And now!

Prof. Jung: But now it is a reaction. That is why I point out these verses. That hypocritical attitude has now found its revenge or its compensation. The sentimental hypocrisy of service and devotion has of course much to do with late Christianity. In reality it was just the contrary: the Christian slogan was used to cover what was sheer will-to-power. The Victorian era created a mountain of lies. Freud was like Nietzsche in that the main importance of those men lay in their critique of their time. Nietzsche, not being a doctor, did the social part of the critique as it were; and Freud, being a doctor, saw behind the screen and showed the intricacies of the individual—he brought to light all the dirt of that side.⁸ And in the following chapters there are allusions which indicate that Nietzsche also had an insight into what one could call the medical side of things. But such figures as Freud and Nietzsche would not come to the foreground—they would not exist or be seen—if their ideas did not fit into their time. Of course they may not be fully true—it is a one-sided aspect, a necessary program for the time being—and then the time comes when it is no longer necessary, when it is the greatest error, when it makes no sense at all. But in Nietzsche's time it hit the nail on the head. When one said, "I serve, thou servest, we serve," it was just a lie; but times are coming, or they are already here, when it is no longer a lie, when what has been a lie has become a bitter truth. Whole nations now chant, "I serve, thou servest, we serve," and we are close to the condition, even in the democratic countries, in which we do nothing but serve the state! Everything we do is for the state or for the community. That is no longer an awful lie, it is an awful truth.

⁷ As one scholar has said of Bismarck, "He spoke the truth when, some years before leaving office, in a moment of gloom and disappointment he wrote under his portrait, *Patriae inserviendo consumor*." Kuno Francke, "Bismarck and a National Type," in Kuno Francke, ed., *The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1914), vol. 10, p. 9.

⁸ In his "Sigmund Freud in His Historical Setting," Jung dilated on his claim that "Like Nietzsche, like the Great War, and like James Joyce, his literary counterpart, Freud is an answer to the sickness of the nineteenth century" (CW 15, par. 52).

LECTURE II

26 October 1938

Prof. Jung:

I spoke last time of the *apokatastasis*, which means complete restoration, and I find here this quotation from St. Paul:¹

In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.

For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.

So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory.

O Death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory.

Mrs. Flower contributes this and asks if it is the Christian equivalent of the *apokatastasis*. The bodily resurrection is surely one aspect of it, and there is another which I referred to last week. Now we will continue in the second part of "The Bedwarfing Virtue":

Ah, even upon their hypocrisy did mine eyes' curiosity alight; and well did I divine all their fly-happiness, and their buzzing around sunny window-panes.

So much kindness, so much weakness do I see. So much justice and pity, so much weakness.

Round, fair, and considerate are they to one another, as grains of sand are round, fair, and considerate to grains of sand.

Modestly to embrace a small happiness—that do they call "submission"! and at the same time they peer modestly after a new small happiness.

In their hearts they want simply one thing most of all: that no

¹ I Corinthians 15:52-55. *Apokatastasis*: restitution, repristination.

one hurt them. Thus do they anticipate every one's wishes and do well unto every one.

That, however, is *cowardice*, though it be called "virtue."—

I won't read it all; as you see, Nietzsche is criticizing the good and mediocre people whom he hates like the pestilence. This criticism is based upon a particular psychological fact in Nietzsche, which has to do with a particular realization: these preceding chapters and the ones following contain the slow realization of something which is now welling up in him, something which is exceedingly difficult to him. What is that fact which he is trying to cope with?

Mrs. Crowley: Is it not his own future fate?

Remark: His inferior man.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the inferior man in himself, his shadow. This began some time ago, after his terrible vision, where he was threatened by the power from below, where he already had an intuition of his potential madness and tried to escape. Of course the inferior man is not necessarily mad, but if one doesn't accept the inferior man, one is liable to become mad since the inferior man brings up the whole collective unconscious. And why is that so?

Miss Hannah: Because of the contamination.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. The inferior man, being an unconscious factor, is not isolated. Nothing in the unconscious is isolated—everything is united with everything else. It is only in our consciousness that we make discriminations, that we are able to discriminate psychical facts. The unconscious is a continuity; it is like a lake—if one taps it the whole lake flows out. The shadow is one fish in that lake, but only to us is it a definite and detachable fish. To the lake it is not, the fish is merged with the lake, it is as if dissolved in the lake. So the shadow, the inferior man, is a definite concept to the conscious, but inasmuch as it is an unconscious fact, it is dissolved in the unconscious, it is always as if it were the whole unconscious. Therefore we are again and again up against the bewildering phenomenon that the shadow—the anima or the wise man or the great mother, for instance—expresses the whole collective unconscious. Each figure, when you come to it, expresses always the whole, and it appears with the overwhelming power of the whole unconscious. Of course it is useless to talk of such experiences if you have not been through them, but if you have ever experienced one such figure you will know of what I am speaking: one figure fills you with a holy terror of the unconscious. It is usually the shadow figure and you fear it, not because it is your particular shadow but because it repre-

sents the whole collective unconscious; with the shadow you get the whole thing. Now inasmuch as you are capable of detaching the shadow from the unconscious, if you are able to make a difference between the fish and the lake, if you can catch your fish without getting the whole lake, then you have won that point. But when another fish comes up, it is a whale, the whale dragon that will swallow you:—with every new fish you catch you pull up the whole thing. So when Nietzsche is afraid of his shadow or tries to cope with it, it means that he himself, alone, has to cope with the terror of the whole collective unconscious, and that makes things unwieldy.

Now when one is possessed by the unconscious to a certain extent, when a man is possessed by his anima for instance, he has of course a very difficult time in dealing with it, so as a rule people simply cannot do it alone. One cannot isolate oneself on a high mountain and deal with the unconscious; one always needs a strong link with humanity, a human relation that will hold one down to one's human reality. Therefore, most people can only realize the unconscious inasmuch as they are in analysis, inasmuch as they have a relation to a human being who has a certain amount of understanding and tries to keep the individual down to the human size, for no sooner does one touch the unconscious than one loses one's size.

Mrs. Flower: It seems to me to be the most difficult problem—that one must learn to discriminate while surrounded by the collective unconscious. Often it seems that one will be torn limb from limb.

Prof. Jung: Naturally, it is impossible to realize the collective unconscious without being entirely dismembered or devoured, unless you have help, some strong link which fastens you down to reality so that you never forget that you are a human individual like other individuals. For as soon as you touch the collective unconscious you have an inflation—it is unavoidable—and then you soar into space, disappear into a cloud, become a being beyond human proportions. That is what happened to Nietzsche. In his solitude he tapped the unconscious and was instantly filled with the inflation of Zarathustra: he became Zarathustra. Of course he knows all the time that he is not Zarathustra—Zarathustra is a figure of speech perhaps, or a more or less aesthetic metaphor. If anybody had asked him whether he was Zarathustra he would probably have denied it. Nevertheless he handles Zarathustra—or Zarathustra handles him—as if they were one and the same. You see, he could not talk in that style, as if he were Zarathustra, without getting infected. So throughout the whole book we have had the greatest trouble on account of that constant intermingling with an arche-

typal figure. One is never sure whether Zarathustra is speaking, or Nietzsche—or is it his anima? This is not true, that is not true, and yet everything is true; Nietzsche is Zarathustra, he is the anima, he is the shadow, and so on. That comes from the fact that Nietzsche was alone, with nobody to understand his experiences. Also, he was perhaps not inclined to share them, so there was no human link, no human rapport, no relationship to hold him down to his reality. Oh, he was surrounded by human beings and he had friends, a few at least—there were people who took care of him—but they were in no way capable of understanding what was going on in him, and that was of course necessary.

Therefore I say, an analyst is that person who is supposed to understand what is going on in such a case. But if there had been analysts in Nietzsche's days and one had told him that he was undergoing an experience of the collective unconscious and that those were archetypal figures, he would not have found a welcome in Nietzsche. You can only talk with such a man by entering into his condition. You might say, for instance, "What happened last night? Was it black? Did it move? How interesting! Heavens, what you are going through! I will come with you, I believe in Zarathustra, let us take a flight with him." You must be duly impressed, and you must undergo the same affect that the patient undergoes; if he succumbs, you must succumb also to a certain extent. You can help only inasmuch as you suffer the same onslaught, inasmuch as you succumb—and yet hold onto reality. That is the task of the analyst; if he can hold to human reality while his patient is undergoing the experience of the collective unconscious, he is helpful. But with one leg the analyst must step into the inflation; otherwise he can do nothing. You cannot be reasonable about it, but have to undergo the affect of the experience. Naturally, Nietzsche's time was most unfavorable for such an experience. In those days there was not the slightest possibility of anyone understanding. There were plenty of individuals of course—there always are—who would go crazy with him voluntarily; every fool finds followers. There is no gifted fool who remains without a large school of equally gifted followers. But to find a man who could keep his feet on the ground and fly at the same time was too big an order.

Mrs. von Roques: But what did people think when he wrote this?

Prof. Jung: That he was crazy. I remember when *Zarathustra* came out and I know what people said, what Jakob Burckhardt said, for instance. They all thought that *Zarathustra* was the work of a madman, though they had to admit that certain things were exceedingly intelli-

gent. But they could not cope with it, they did not understand it, because in those days they kept away from such an experience in an amazingly careful way. They lived in a sort of artificial world of nice, differentiated feelings, of nice illusions. And that is exactly what Nietzsche was criticizing. Naturally, he was undermining their cathedrals and their castles in Spain, their most cherished ideals, so to them he was not only a lunatic, but also a dangerous one. All the educated people in Basel were horrified at the spectacle, shocked out of their wits in every respect. They considered him a revolutionary, an atheist—there was nothing that was not said against him then. And at the same time they were frightened because they felt an amazing amount of truth in what he said. It needed half a century at least to prepare the world to understand what happened to Nietzsche.

Of course it is no use speculating as to what would have happened if Nietzsche had had an understanding companion. We only speculate about such matters because we know something now about the experience of the collective unconscious; what to do in such a case is to us almost a professional question. Nietzsche's case is settled, but we must understand what happens to a man without the aid of that understanding. Nietzsche is an excellent example of an isolated individual trying to cope with such an experience, and we see the typical consequences. His feet don't remain on the ground, his head swells up and he becomes a sort of balloon; one is no longer sure of his identity, whether he is a god or a demon or a devil, a ghost or a madman or a genius. Now such a man, as we have seen in the preceding seminars, is always threatened by a compensation from within. Naturally when one gets an inflation, one begins to float in the air, and the body then becomes particularly irksome or heavy—it begins to drag, often quite literally. People in that condition become aware of a heaviness somewhere, of an undue weight which pulls them down, and since they are identified with the body, they often try to strangle it. The Christian saints used to deal with the problem in that way: they mortified the body in order to get rid of its weight. Nietzsche was a man of the 19th century, and that was no longer the right way. On the contrary, he makes a great point of the body; he preaches the return to the body. But he makes such a point of it that he inflates the body; he makes it inaccessible through overrating it. It is really the shadow that bothers him; while praising the body he doesn't see that the shadow is representing the body. Then the shadow takes on extraordinary importance, and since he is no longer identical with the body it becomes a demon.

As you know, I personify the shadow: it becomes “he” or “she” because it is a person. If you don’t handle the shadow as a person in such a case, you are just making a technical mistake, for the shadow *ought* to be personified in order to be discriminated. As long as you feel it as having no form or particular personality, it is always partially identical with you; in other words, you are unable to make enough difference between that object and yourself. If you call the shadow a psychological aspect or quality of the collective unconscious, it then appears in you; but when you say, this is I and that is the shadow, you personify the shadow, and so you make a clean cut between the two, between yourself and that other, and inasmuch as you can do that, you have detached the shadow from the collective unconscious. As long as you psychologize the shadow, you are keeping it in yourself. (I mean by psychologizing the shadow, your calling it a quality of yourself.) For if it is simply a quality of yourself the problem is not disentangled, the shadow is not detached from you. While if you succeed in detaching the shadow, if you can personify the shadow as an object separate from yourself, then you can take the fish from the lake. Is that clear?

Mrs. Flower: It is clear, but nonetheless difficult, since in most places people still feel as they did in Nietzsche’s time.

Prof. Jung: I admit that it is a very difficult question. For the shadow jumps out of you—you may get on very bad terms with people through your shadow—and also with the collective unconscious. Since “people” means the collective unconscious, it is projected onto them. Everybody touches the fate of Zarathustra in analysis: it is the greatest problem. But when you can make that difference between the shadow and yourself you have won the game. If you think that thing is clinging to you, that it is a quality of yourself, you can never be sure that you are not crazy. If you cannot explain yourself to people, if you become too paradoxical, what difference is there between yourself and a crazy man? I always say to my patients who are such borderline cases, “As long as you can explain yourself to a reasonable individual, people cannot say you are crazy, but the moment you become too paradoxical it is finished, the rapport is cut.” Therefore, I say to detach the shadow and—if you can—to personify it, which is really the sign of detachment. For instance, if you have a friend with whom you feel almost identical, so that you have every reaction in common, so that you never know which is he and which is yourself, then you don’t know who *you* are; but if you can say, “That is his way and he is a person independent from myself,” you know which is which, who you are and who he is. It is of course a difficult question to know in how far the shadow belongs to you, in how

far you have the responsibility. For as you have the responsibility for people who belong to you, so you have a responsibility for the shadow; you cannot detach the shadow to such an extent that you can treat him like a stranger who has nothing to do with you. No, he is always there; he is the fellow who belongs. Nevertheless, there is a difference, and for the sake of the differentiation you must separate those two figures in order to understand what the shadow is and what you are.

Inasmuch as Nietzsche is identical with Zarathustra, he has the shadow problem. He could not detach the fish from the lake, and as Zarathustra overwhelms him completely at times, the shadow also overwhelms him when it comes up in the fear of insanity—which is the same as the fear of the collective unconscious. In the preceding chapters we have evidence for this. The shadow appeared as a dangerous demon and Nietzsche used every imaginable trick to defend himself against its onslaught. He belittled the shadow, he made light of him, he ridiculed him, he projected the shadow into everybody. And now in these chapters he criticizes and accuses everybody, the mediocrity of the world and of all those qualities which adhere to Nietzsche himself. For instance, he says it is the sincerest wish of all those mediocre people not to be hurt. But who was more susceptible to being hurt than Nietzsche himself?

There is a characteristic story about Nietzsche: A young man, a great admirer, attended his lectures, and once when Nietzsche was speaking about the beauty of Greece and so on, he saw that this young man became quite enthusiastic. So after the lecture he talked with him, and he said they would go to Greece together to see all that beauty. The young man couldn't help believing what Nietzsche said, and Nietzsche most presumably believed it also. And of course the young man liked the prospect, but at the same time he realized that he had not a cent in his pocket. He was a poor fellow and being Swiss he was very realistic, and thought, "The ticket costs so much to Brindisi and then so much to Athens; does the professor pay for me or have I to pay my own fare?" That is what he was thinking while Nietzsche was producing a cloud of beauty round himself. Then suddenly Nietzsche saw the crestfallen look of the young man, and he just turned away and never spoke to him again; he was deeply wounded, never realizing the reason of the young man's collapse. He only saw him twisting around, getting smaller and smaller and finally disappearing into the earth, through a feeling of nothingness which was chiefly in his pocket. That is the way Nietzsche stepped beyond reality; such a natural reaction was enough to hurt him deeply.

There you have a case: that young man represented the shadow; that mediocre little fellow whom Nietzsche always disregarded—there he was. Nietzsche could not see the real reason, because that is what never counted in his life. And we must not forget that those mediocre people he is reviling were the ones who provided for his daily life. I knew the people who supported him financially and they were exactly those good people. I knew an old lady who was a terribly good person and of course did not understand a word of what he was saying, but she was a pious soul and thought, “Poor Professor Nietzsche, he has no capital, he cannot lecture, his pension is negligible, one ought to do something for the poor man.” So she sent him the money, by means of which he wrote *Zarathustra*. But he never realized it. As he never realized that in kicking against those people who sustained his life, he was kicking against himself. Well now, he goes on in the third part, the fourth paragraph:

And when I call out: “Curse all the cowardly devils in you, that would fain whimper and fold the hands and adore”—then do they shout: “Zarathustra is godless.”

And especially do their teachers of submission shout this;—but precisely in their ears do I love to cry: “Yea! I am Zarathustra, the godless!”

Those teachers of submission! Wherever there is aught puny, or sickly, or scabby, there do they creep like lice; and only my disgust preventeth me from cracking them.

Well! This is my sermon for *their* ears: I am Zarathustra the godless, who saith: “Who is more godless than I, that I may enjoy his teaching?”

I am Zarathustra the godless: where do I find mine equal? And all those are mine equals who give unto themselves their Will, and divest themselves of all submission.

I am Zarathustra the godless! I cook every chance in my pot. And only when it hath been quite cooked do I welcome it as *my* food.

Here is his hybris, his *superbia*; proclaiming his godlessness, he becomes God. And this God-almighty-likeness is quite evident from which sentence?

Mrs. Fierz: “I cook every chance in my pot.”

Prof. Jung: Exactly. For who can cook his chance in his own pot and make his own fate? Only the master of fate, the lord of all fate. No human being can do that. Is he in any way in control of chance? Can he

assimilate chance, make it his chance? That is what *happens* to man, and he has no chance of making it *his* chance. It is as if a man who was attacked and eaten by a lion should say, "This is my lion."

Mrs. Baumann: Might I ask what the German word for *chance* is? In my translation it is *event*.

Prof. Jung: Zufall. That really means chance, and the very German *zu Fall* expresses the objectivity of the thing, namely, a thing that *mir zufällt*—it falls to me, it falls to my lot, I have nothing to do with it. For instance, if a stone falls on my head I cannot say, "Ah, my stone which I have kicked falls upon my head." A lord of all fate can say it is his stone, because he is all in all—the hunter and the hunted one, the slayer and the slain—but no human being can assert that safely. Nietzsche did, as you see, but it was not safe. So his bedwarfing criticism, his underrating of the so-called good and mediocre people, causes an underrating of his own mediocrity, of the real man in himself. In such a case one instantly lifts oneself up to too high a level, and anyone who lifts his consciousness up to such an impossible, superhuman level is threatened by a specific catastrophe. What would that be?

Remark: He would fall into the hands of the demons.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, but in what way does it show?

Mr. Allemann: He would be responsible for everything that occurs.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he would become God-almighty-like, but when a human mind becomes like God what happens to it? To remain in the simile I gave you, what happens to the fish?

Miss Foote: It is dissolved.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the fish dissolves in the lake again, the mind dissolves completely. No human mind is capable of being universal, the All. Only the mind of God is All. So when Nietzsche dissolves into the mind of God he is no longer human. Then the fish has become the lake; there is no distinctness, a complete dissolution. This is the goal of certain religious practices.

Mrs. Crowley: The Yoga.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in Yoga, the state of *samadhi* or bliss, or *dhyāna* which means a sort of *ekstasis*, ends in what the Indians call superconsciousness, or what we call the unconscious. I had great difficulty in India in translating what we understand by the collective unconscious. I had to explain myself in Sanskrit terms, which are the only philosophical terms they really understand, and I found no corresponding word. I first thought that *avidya* might do, but it doesn't do at all; *avidya* means simply darkness and absence of knowledge, so it doesn't cover the idea of the unconscious. Then I soon found out that *buddhi*, the idea of the

perfectly enlightened mind, or, still better, *samadhi* was the right term for the dissolution of the conscious in the unconscious. As a matter of fact a man who comes back from the void, from a not-knowing which is positive, comes back with the feeling of knowing all; yet he cannot bring the sea with him because he has become the fish again. And the fish is not the sea and cannot include the sea: that remains what it always was. To go into *samadhi* means that the fish is dissolved in the water and becomes the whole sea—it is the sea—and since the sea has no form but contains all forms, it cannot be transmitted by one of the forms, for instance, the fish.

Now among all Nietzsche's critical remarks about the mediocre, all-too-good people, certain ones deserve our attention. I will omit the negative remarks, though from a psychological point of view his critique is often quite valuable. He has the great merit, for instance, of having seen that virtues are based upon vices, that each virtue has its specific vice as a mother; also that virtue only makes sense, in a way, as a reaction against vice, and that the necessary consequences of certain virtues are vices. That peculiar functional interrelation between good and evil, day and night, is a point of view of great psychological value: it makes of Nietzsche a great psychologist. But we can only deal here with the general tendencies, and it is quite obvious that his critique is again a *ressentiment* which is not quite just; it is true to a certain extent, but as a whole it really goes too far. Nevertheless, in giving free rein to all his critical ideas, certain things come out which allow us to look down to a deeper layer of his thought; behind his superficial critique we can see ideas of great importance.

You know, Nietzsche often liked to think of himself as a religious reformer; not in vain did he take the name of Zarathustra to express his historical role. He took that name, as you know, because Zarathustra was the originator of the idea of good and evil, of the moral opposites; it was he really who caused that great split in humanity of the moral problem. And now Zarathustra as a Saoshyant, a new savior, has to come back in order to heal the wound he caused. Nietzsche's idea of a superman would be the man who was beyond that wound, who had healed that wound. One finds this idea in the Grail mystery, in the suffering king who is to be cured by a savior; he is the Christian man who carries that moral wound, as the Persian man was rent asunder by Zarathustra's teaching. Nietzsche's idea was that his task in the history of the world was to cure man of that incurable wound he has suffered from hitherto. And he was not simply playing with this idea. It was a deep-rooted conviction in him amounting to a sort of mystical experi-

ence. This accounts for the fact that Zarathustra to him was always more than a speech metaphor; it was a more or less real figure. Therefore the famous saying: *Da wurde eins zu zwei und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei*, which clearly expresses the visionary living nature of the Zarathustra experience.

On this basis it is quite understandable that a certain truth, important for our time and important in history, must also come to the foreground. Nietzsche was a contemporary of Richard Wagner, and it is not without meaning that Wagner occupied himself with *Parsifal*, which contains this very problem. And curiously enough it was just *Parsifal* which caused the bitterest estrangement between the two former friends. Nietzsche finally accused Wagner of having broken down before the cross, which was a bitter shaft, because in his consciousness Nietzsche could only see the so-called Christian gesture or the Christian sentimentality; he was not aware of the deeper meaning of that whole fact.² I am not speaking now of Wagner's opera *Parsifal*, but of the fact of the occurrence of that idea at that time. It was practically the parallel of Zarathustra: Zarathustra is the other aspect of the same thing, only expressed in entirely different terms. It is the same idea but expressed in an unhistorical milieu, in a setting which was beyond history. Zarathustra is in a way historical, but Wagner remained very much more in the tradition, using a legend which was well known and still much appreciated. And he only went back to the Middle Ages, while Nietzsche made a much further regression, going back into the 8th or 9th century B.C. to fetch his figure or analogy, his myth. But the actual ideas are very much the same—the idea of the cure of the incurable wound.

So we are quite justified in accepting most important statements in *Zarathustra* as to the nature of the cure, or as to verities which are beyond even Nietzsche's mind. As dreams can tell us things which are far more intelligent than we are, far more advanced than our actual consciousness, so even to a man like Nietzsche it may happen that his unconscious tells him things that are above his head. Then in retelling them he is apt to twist them slightly, to give them an aspect which is entirely due to the more restricted sphere of his personal consciousness, so that they appear to be, say, contemporary social criticisms. In this chapter, for instance, where he very clearly gives vent to all his re-

² Although Nietzsche had been early moved by *Parsifal*, he came to believe that "The Parsifal music has character—but a bad character . . ." (to Franz Overbeck, September 1882, Letters/Middleton).

sentment against his surroundings, there is a passage which I should not like to omit, the last verses of the third part, where he says,

“Love ever your neighbour as yourselves—but first be such as *love themselves*.

—Such as love with great love, such as love with great contempt!” Thus speaketh Zarathustra the godless.

If you read through the chapter superficially, this remark easily escapes your attention, because it seems to be in keeping with the other critical and really bedwarfing remarks. But here he says something which has a double bottom; this is a synthetic thought. Of course it sounds like one of the paradoxes Nietzsche likes so much; to love your neighbor but first to love yourself, sounds like a demonstration of *sacro egoismo*—a phrase the Italians invented when they joined the Allies in the war—but here a mistake is possible. When you love your neighbor it is understood that the neighbor is meant who is the one that is with you, in your vicinity, that you know as a definite person; and when you love yourself one would be inclined to think that Nietzsche means by “yourself” just yourself, this ego person of whom you are conscious, and in that case it is self love, it is *sacro egoismo*—or not even *sacro*—ordinary mean egoism. Nietzsche is quite capable of saying such a thing, yet Zarathustra speaks these words and Zarathustra, don’t forget, is always the great figure, and quite apt to utter a great truth. In that case I should mistrust a superficial judgment. I should say those words, “love thyself,” really mean the self and not the ego. Then you would say, “Inasmuch as thou lovest thy self, thou lovest thy neighbor.” And I should like to add that if you are unable to love yourself in that sense, you are quite incapable of loving your neighbor. For then you love in people all of which you are conscious when loving yourself in the egoistical way; you love that which you know of yourself, but not that which you do not know. There is an old saying that one can only love what one knows—there is even an alchemistical saying that nobody can love what he doesn’t know—but it is very much in keeping with the whole style of Zarathustra to love what one does not know: namely, to love on credit or on hope, on expectation, to love the unknown in man, which means the hope of the future, the expectation of future development. Then if you can love yourself as that which you are and which you are not yet, you approach the self. And such a love enables you to love your neighbor with the same attitude, to love your neighbor such as he is and such as he is not yet.

Now, Zarathustra says of that love that it means loving with great

love and with great contempt. This again sounds like one of those famous paradoxes which are rather irritating, but here it makes extraordinary sense, and I am quite certain that Nietzsche himself felt that it went right down to the root of things. For this is the formula of how to deal with the shadow, of how to deal with the inferior man. It is simply impossible to love the inferior man such as he is, to do nothing but love him; you must love him with great love and also with great contempt. And that is the enormous difficulty—to bring the two things together in the one action, to love yourself and to have contempt for yourself. But there you have the formula of how to assimilate your shadow. Therefore this saying of Nietzsche is really the key to the cure of that split between the superior and the inferior man, the upper and the lower, the bright and the dark. I am absolutely convinced that this passage is one of those which Nietzsche really felt, for Nietzsche was a great genius, and it is in the deepest sense in keeping with his whole style and tendency. Unfortunately, all too often this greatness is undermined or disintegrated by love of the play of words, too much emphasis, neurotic tendencies that come in between; but all those shadows fail to hinder, time and again, a very great truth from appearing. Now immediately after this he continues,

But why talk I, when no one hath *mine* ears! It is still an hour too early for me here.

Right away the resentment comes in again: what is the use of such profound truth? There is nobody here who listens, nobody has my ears—those big ears, the elephant ears of a god, the big ears of Buddha.

Mine own forerunner am I among this people, mine own cockcrow in dark lanes.

It often happens that when Nietzsche comes out with a very personal resentment—which is, alas, all too understandable but very sad—he then makes a mistake in his taste. “Mine own forerunner am I among this people” goes well enough, but “mine own cockcrow in dark lanes” makes one think of a dark chickenyard where a cock crows alone—his cock. It is ridiculous. The smallness of the inferior man in Nietzsche comes in here and spoils the impression. He might have finished the chapter by: “Thus speakest Zarathustra the godless,” which would have made sense, but he goes on, “Why talk I”—he returns to himself, he becomes small. That remark about loving with great love and with great contempt explains why Zarathustra is godless, and what he means really by emphasizing his godlessness. But to do that is bad taste

and in our days, worse than ever, it is idiotic, which was not the case then. You see, he means that man or that being who is beyond the ordinary suffering man, the man with the great moral split; he means the superman that is capable of loving with great love and with great contempt. That is God: only God is capable of such a thing, because that is the whole. To love with great hate would be the same. He unites the opposites, reconciles them completely by that; he creates the most paradoxical being which God needs must be if he is whole. *If* he is whole—that is what one always forgets.

For instance, when the Protestant theologian says God can only be good, then what about evil? Who is evil? To say man is evil does not explain the great evil in the world; man is much too small to be the creator of all evil. There must be a god of evil as well. If you make a good god, then make a god of evil too. In the Persian religion, Ormazd is the god of good and Ahriman is the god of evil. If you have a god that can only be good, then you must have a devil that can only be bad, and this dualism, though it is a logical consequence, is insupportable. It somehow makes no sense. What about the omnipotence of God if he has to suffer the existence of a partner in the cosmic game? That question bothered me already when I was a little boy. I gave my father a bad time over this problem. I always used to say, "If God is omnipotent, why doesn't he prevent the devil from doing evil?" If our neighbor has a bad dog that bites people, the police come and fine the man. But God has a bad dog apparently, and there are no police to fine him for allowing it to bite people. Then the theologian has to say that God has permitted Satan to work for a while in order to try people. But why make people like that? Since he is a good potter he must know whether the pots he has made are good; he doesn't need to try them to know whether they will hold out. The vessel should be perfect, and if it is not, then he is not a perfect potter, and then it is a foolish game. One gets an idea of the foolish game in Job, where God bets with the devil as to who could get the best of old man Job. And the same idea is in *Faust*; of course Goethe took it from the Book of Job, but it is an impossible point of view.

You see, when you try to create the idea of a universal being, you must bring the two things into one, and that you cannot do unless you can first do it in yourself. You cannot conceive of something which you cannot conceive of in yourself. You cannot conceive of goodness if there is not goodness in yourself. You cannot conceive of beauty if there is no beauty in yourself: you must have the experience of beauty. And to conceive of a being that is both good and evil, day and night,

you should have the experience of the two beings in yourself. But how can you arrive at such an experience? Only by passing through a time when you no longer project good or evil, when you no longer believe that the good is somewhere beyond the galactic system and the evil somewhere in the interior of the earth, in the eternal fire of hell, but that the good is here and the evil is here. In that way you introject the qualities you have lent to the gods. Naturally, by introjecting them you pass through a time of inflation when you are much too important. But you are important just in the fact that you are the laboratory, or even the chemical vessel, in which the solution is to be made, in which the two substances should meet.

You cannot get them together somewhere in an abstract way. You can only do it in your own life, in your own self. There the two cosmic principles come together, and if you experience the oneness of the two, the unspeakable and inexplicable oneness of darkness and light, goodness and badness, you get at last the idea of a being which is neither one nor the other. If you have had that experience of being both, the one and the other, neither one nor the other, you understand what the Indians mean by *neti-neti*, which means literally "not this nor that," as an expression of supreme wisdom, of supreme truth. You learn to detach from the qualities, being this and that, being white and black. The one who knows that he has those two sides is no longer white and no longer black. And that is exactly what Nietzsche means in his idea of a superior being beyond good and evil. It is a very great psychological intuition. Of course when you have had that experience, then you must descend the whole length of the ladder, you must come back to the reality that you are not the center of the world, that you are not the reconciling symbol for which the whole world has waited, that you are not the Messiah or a perfect person or the superman. You must come down to your own reality where you are the suffering man, the man with a wound—and the wound is as incurable as ever. It is only cured inasmuch as you have access to that consciousness which knows: I am white and I am black.

Mr. Baumann: I have sometimes experimented with making people contemplate simple geometrical designs for about a minute, and one man with a rather scholastic mind, who puts all his thoughts in the proper place in his mental system, had a vision when he contemplated the square. He had never made fantasies or drawings such as we make here, but he saw Christ in the center of the square, and in the upper right corner, Ahriman, and in the lower left corner, Ormazd. I asked

him if he had had anything to do with that myth and he said no, it just came like that.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is a revelation from the unconscious. The unconscious is several lengths ahead and told him of a problem of which he was not aware: namely, that Christ is in a way a mediator between Ormazd and Ahriman. The paradox that God descended into the imperfect body of man, that God could be included in an imperfect physical body, has given the church a lot of trouble. They had to make all sorts of hypotheses as to what that body consisted of, whether body and soul (or God) were one, or whether Christ was of two natures. So the Catholic church finally made that formula of real man and real God, a monotheistic conception which is a tremendous paradox. But we have to leave it at that. I don't know whether your man was interested in such ideas.

Mr. Baumann: No, not consciously.

Prof. Jung: I should say it was rather unlikely, for if he has been accustomed to express himself in the historical Christian terms, in terms of that conflict, concerning the nature of Christ for instance, he would not have chosen Ormazd and Ahriman to express the dilemma; that is more on the line of Nietzsche, of what we are discussing today. You see, our unconscious is really rather on the lines of Nietzsche when we allow it to work freely; it would express itself in such forms rather than on the lines of the Christian dogma, because our unconscious is in the world and not in the books about history. That fantasy absolutely formulates the idea of Christ as the superman, the man that is a paradox, both god and man. Where was God when he was in Christ? Of course inasmuch as Christ felt as a man he would exclaim, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"—or, "Our Father, who art in heaven." But if he is God himself, he would be talking to himself as if he were his own father. That God is father and son, his own father and his own son, is again an absolutely incomprehensible paradox, but it is really a psychological truth, for man can experience being his own father and his own son.

For instance, he can quite vividly be that which he used to be; you have only to watch a regression in a patient to see the man who has been, who is the father of the future man who is quite different, who is the son. If you live in the future you are your own son or your own daughter, and if you live in the past you are the father of that son—which is really the idea of God being the father of the son in one person. That is the projection of a human experience, of an experience which is not a human thought invented by a philosopher or any such

intellectual person, but a human thought which is also a highly mystical experience, a divine experience. Therefore you can say, "This is not myself, this is God." But though you know that the experience of God is your own experience, you must always add that it is not your personal experience. It is a mystical experience; you feel that it is a divine experience. It is that which enabled people formerly to say that such an experience happened either in the remote past or that it is always happening, an eternal truth in metaphysical space. The transformation of the elements, of the substance of the holy communion, is the sacrifice of Christ, and that always happens. It is outside of time. The crucifixion of Christ is a historical fact and therefore it has disappeared, but the church holds that that sacrifice is a metaphysical concept. It is a thing that happens all the time—all the time Christ is being sacrificed. So whenever the rite is repeated, with the due observance of the rules and naturally with the *character indelebilis* of the priest received through the apostolic succession, it is really the sacrifice of Christ. Therefore, when a good Catholic is on a train passing through a village where there is a church, he must cross himself. That is the greeting to the Lord that dwells in the host in the ciborium on the altar; the Lord really lives there in that house, a divine presence. It is exactly the same idea as the eternal sacrifice of Christ.

LECTURE III

2 November 1938

Prof. Jung:

I will first answer these questions as well as I can. Mr. Allemann says, "If I have not misunderstood, you said last week that 'collective unconscious' could be translated by the Sanskrit term *samadhi*. Is not *samadhi* rather the *action* of diving voluntarily into the collective unconscious or the *state* of the individual during a voluntary dissolution in, or union with, the collective unconscious? In using the simile of a lake with its contents as representing the collective unconscious, would not 'active phantasy,' *dharana* and *dhyana*, mean the actions of a man standing on the shore of the lake and looking into it, or sitting in a boat floating upon the lake, or swimming in the lake, being well aware that he is not identical with the water? He may even draw fish out of it and risk being drawn in if the fish are too big for him. But when after careful preparation he dives voluntarily into the lake and becomes one with it temporarily (with a fair chance of getting out of it again) then he is in the state of *samadhi*. Hauer translates Patanjali III/11: 'Wenn in der seelischen Welt (Chitta) die bewusste Beziehung zu jeglichem Gegenstande aufhört und das In-Eins-Gesammeltsein (Ekagrata) eintritt, so ist das die Bewusstseinschwingung, die man 'Einfaltung' (Samadhi) nennt.'"¹

Samadhi is one of those terms which was used in the past in India, and is still used in the actual religious movements of the present time. But it is used with no very definite meaning. To think that these Indian concepts have a definite meaning is one of our Western mistakes; that is doing them an injustice. The Indian mind is peculiarly indefinite, and they try to make up for it by a lot of terms which are very difficult

¹ Patanjali (2nd century B.C.) was the founder (or synthesizer) of Yoga. An English translation directly from the Sanskrit is: "When the mind has overcome and fully controlled its natural inclination to consider diverse objects, and begins to become intent upon a single one, meditation is said to be reached." *The Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali*, tr. William Q. Judge (New York, 1912). Judge was a theosophist.

to translate, the difficulty chiefly consisting in the fact that we give them a definite meaning which does not belong to them. And their mind is extraordinarily descriptive; they want to give a picture of a thing rather than a logical definition. But in trying to give a good description, it sounds as if they were trying to give a definite concept, and that is the cause of the most baffling misunderstandings between the Indian and the Westerner; that we give a definite meaning to a concept which is not definite in itself, which only sounds definite, brings about endless misinterpretations. The terms, *samadhi*, *dhyana*, *sahasrara*, and so on, apparently have a definite meaning but in reality they have not. Even the Indians are absolutely at sea with these concepts.

For example, there is a statue of Sri Ramakrishna in the temple of Belur Mutt, made from a photograph which was taken of him quite against his will. He is clearly in what we would call a state of *ekstasis*—a somnambulistic or hypnotic condition—and they call it *samadhi*. But at the same time they call the superconsciousness which is reached in that state *samadhi* and also *dhyana*. Of course, there are definitions in literature; in the Patanjali *Yogasutra* there is a definition, but then you find another one somewhere else. In the different schools these terms have different definitions. You can only be sure that you are not wrong when it has to do with superconsciousness; every Indian will understand you when you use the term *samadhi* in that sense, for then he instantly has a picture of a Yogin in that state of *samadhi* or *dhyana*. The word *tapas* is too classical—it would only be understood by a connoisseur of Sanskrit. Every educated Indian has a certain knowledge of Sanskrit, however; he understands many of those terms. When you compare the translation of the Patanjali *Yogasutra* made by Hauer with the one by Deussen, and with the English translation, you see at once the difficulty; they have all been put to the greatest pains to find the proper Western terms.* That is due to the Eastern mentality which, despite all their efforts at terminology, remains indefinite; such painstaking terminology is always a compensatory attempt to make certain of something which is not certain at all. As I said before, if you want a blade of grass or a pebble, they give you a whole landscape; “a blade of grass” means grass and it means a meadow and it is also the green surface of the earth.

Of course that conveys truth, too, and leads eventually to Chinese

* Jung elsewhere defined the Sanskrit word *tapas* as “self-incubation through meditation” (CW 5, par. 588f.).

It was from Paul Deussen that Nietzsche learned something of Buddhism.

concepts—the peculiar way in which the Chinese mind looks at the world as a totality for instance, where everything is in connection with everything else, where everything is contained in the same stream. While we on the other hand are content to look at things when they are singled out, extracted, or selected, we have learned to detach detail from nature. If I ask a European, even a quite uneducated man, to give me a particular pebble or leaf, he is capable of doing so without bringing in the whole landscape. But the Easterner, particularly when it is a matter of a conscientious mind, is quite incapable of giving one a piece of definite information. It is somewhat the same with learned people: you ask a learned man for some bit of information and would be perfectly satisfied with yes or no, but he will say yes-under-such-conditions, and no-under-such-conditions, and finally you don't know what it is all about. Of course for other learned individuals this is excellent information: a trained mind would get very definite information in this way, but for the ordinary mind it is less than nothing. In my many conversations with Indian philosophers, I remember that their answers seemed less like yes-under-such-and-such-conditions, and more like a yea-and-nay-but-under-no-conditions. We think it is a sort-of unnecessary clumsiness, but when you look carefully at what they give you, you see really a marvelous picture; you get a vision of the whole thing.

The best example I ever came across is the story Prof. McDougall³ told me, of his attempt to inform himself about the concept of Tao. Now, Prof. McDougall is a man whose turn of mind would not suit the Eastern mentality, but naturally he was rather curious as to the meaning of their concepts. He therefore asked a Chinese student what he understood by Tao, expecting a clear answer in one word. For instance, the Jesuit missionaries called Tao simply "God," a translation which can be defended, yet it does not render the Chinese concept of Tao. It has also been translated as "providence," and Wilhelm called it *Sinn*, or "meaning." Those are all definite aspects of a thing which is far more indefinite and incomprehensible than any of those terms; even the concept "God" is much more definite than the concept of Tao. The Chinese student told him many things but MacDougall could not follow, and finally after many attempts the Chinaman, in spite of his politeness, got impatient, and taking him by the sleeve he led him to the

³ William McDougall (1871-1938), British social psychologist who taught at Oxford, Harvard, and Duke. A number of his theories were unpopular in academic circles, including those which endorsed Lamarckism and psychic research. See "The Therapeutic Value of Abreaction" CW 16, pars. 255-93.

window and asked him: "What do you see out there?" The professor replied: "I see trees." "And what else?" "The wind is blowing and people are walking in the street." "And what else?" "The sky and the clouds and a streetcar." "Well, that is Tao," said the Chinaman. That gives you an idea of the way the Eastern mind works.

I owed it to this story really that I was fairly capable of following the arguments of my Indian interviewers. I kept that experience in mind and it helped me to understand their mentality. They could not understand what I meant by the "collective unconscious," any more than I could understand what they meant by "superconsciousness," until I saw that it was what happens in a state of *samadhi* or *dhyana*. *Samadhi* means to them the condition of superconsciousness. Or the Tantrist would understand if you spoke of *bodhi* or of *sahasrara* or of the *ajna* consciousness.⁴ All these terms really describe what we call the collective unconscious. Of course, the very term *collective unconscious* shows how we approach the problem, as their terms show their way of approaching it. You see, these two ways depend upon what one calls reality. When they say you ought to "realize," or talk about "the realization of truth," they mean something entirely different from what we would mean. I won't go into a long and complicated philosophical definition of reality because you know what it means in the Western sense. Now in contrast to what we assume reality to be, the Indian means his own conscious realization of reality, not a tangible thing like this desk, which is reality to us. But that is *Maya* to the Indian—that is illusion.

Now here is another question. Miss Hannah says, "The verse: 'I am Zarathustra the godless! I cook every chance in *my* pot. And only when it hath been quite cooked do I welcome it as *my* food' still bothers me. Do these words *in themselves* necessarily imply a God-identification? Or could they mean: I take every chance (*Zufall*) that falls to my lot; I suffer its pain till the last drop is cooked in my pot, for only in this way can I digest it? The next verses make it quite clear that Nietzsche did as usual identify with God, but is not the cooking verse in itself one of those deep truths that shine through *Zarathustra*?"

Here again it is a matter of a passage which might have a double meaning. In this case I decided not to be too benevolent with Nietzsche's text, because he says "in *my* pot," "*my* food," and goes on

⁴ *Ajna* and *sahasrara* represent the two highest chakras in the Kundalini ascent. In the *ajna* center or the "Lotus of Command," the mind is "completely free of the limitation of the senses," and in *sahasrara* one experiences "The fulfillment and dissolution of the world of sound, form, and contemplation" (Zimmer/Philosophies, pp. 515, 585). *Bodhi*: knowledge, wisdom, enlightenment.

clearly identifying with God. Therefore I took it as what it appears to be: "I am the maker of my fate; I even choose my chance and say it is my chance," rather than in the way you, with far more benevolence, would interpret it. It needs too much kindness to see this deeper meaning in it. But it is possible. Of course we are quite free to say this case looks like providence, as we can say of any chance event that it is *surely* a case of providence. The question is only, have we enough evidence to make such a statement? If not, we had better not play with such hypotheses. There is surely a fair amount of evidence in *Zarathustra* of this peculiar double aspect of things. We are now moving in chapters where we continually stumble over passages in which one meaning is apparent, and yet another is apparent also—where there are two aspects, an aspect of profound truth and an aspect of *ressentiment*, criticism, and so on. This is often the case in such products; a sort of psychological raw material was just flowing out of him, and he had no time to criticize it or to ask the material: what do you mean? That element of self-criticism is entirely lacking in *Zarathustra*. Therefore, time and again I say, if only Nietzsche had asked himself, "Why do I say this? Why is this figure coming out of me? What does it mean to me?" But those questions never come up or only indirectly; we shall presently see such a case in our text. But it merely happens to him, it is not his doing. So we are forced to apply a great deal of criticism, and when he doesn't give us enough rope to explain in a benevolent way, I don't do it. For I don't want to overdo my benevolence; otherwise I create resistances to Nietzsche in myself. You see, when you have to be too kind and patient all the time, you get quite nasty behind the screen—I would suddenly burst forth once and curse the whole of *Zarathustra* to hell.

Miss Hannah: The last thing I wanted to be was benevolent.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but here it has happened to you: you got too nice and too understanding according to my idea.

Miss Hannah: I asked because you said those words could only be used in an inflation or even megalomania and I felt I could have used them myself.

Prof. Jung: Of course you could use them if you took them out of the context and concentrated upon that verse exclusively, but in the context your interpretation becomes a bit doubtful. Now here is a question from Mrs. Jay: "Last Wednesday you touched upon the parallels between Parsifal/Zarathustra, and Wagner/Nietzsche. Could you go a little further into that? You said something about the wound of Amfortas

and the spear which healed it. What is the relation to Zarathustra? Is it that both become wise through compassion?"

That is a chapter in itself; if we were to treat that question, we should be reading *Der Fall Wagner*,⁵ where we get the whole problem, instead of *Zarathustra*. Also that parallel between the mystery of the Grail and the meaning of *Zarathustra* must remain a mere allusion for the time being. But it would be stretching the point considerably to assume that Nietzsche/Zarathustra and Parsifal had in common that they were both "wise through compassion." That is a point which would find no welcome in Nietzsche. In the end of *Zarathustra* he curses compassion, so he is just on the other side; that is one of the things which explains the difference between their points of view. You see, as a human being Wagner was not compassionate at all, while Nietzsche surely suffered from his great compassion for the world; therefore he curses compassion and Wagner praises it. One often sees that.

Then I find here quite a number of quotations and remarks concerning the question of the *apokatastasis*. One passage that I had in mind has not been mentioned, but of course all these passages from the Epistles of St. Paul and Revelations, which have to do with a sort of return of paradise, refer to the *apokatastasis*, the ultimate restoration of all things to God from whom they have emanated. From a perfect condition everything fell into an imperfect condition, and through the action of the savior everything will return to the state of perfection in the end. This return to perfection is the *apokatastasis*. There are plenty of passages in the New Testament where one finds that idea of the complete restoration of everything that has degenerated and become imperfect through the fall of the first man—the fall of God's creation. Of course it is an interesting question in itself that that happened. One could say that God had made things imperfect with a very definite purpose, but man's mind cannot understand that apparently—otherwise we would not have theologians. Now we will continue our text. You remember we were last speaking of that way of loving—with great love and with great contempt.

But why talk I, when no one hath mine ears! It is still an hour too early for me here.

⁵ Nietzsche published *The Wagner Case* in 1888. His earliest—and most benign—treatment of Wagner was the last essay in *Untimely Meditations*, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." *Human All-Too-Human* appeared in 1878 and 1879, a work Wagner thought indicative of a nervous breakdown on Nietzsche's part, and Nietzsche's *Contra Wagner* came out in 1895.

Mine own forerunner am I among this people, mine own cock-crow in dark lanes.

But their hour cometh! And there cometh also mine! Hourly do they become smaller, poorer, unfruitfuller,—poor herbs! poor earth!

His attitude is the same as in the chapter before, contempt of his contemporary world, despising the smaller people. This is clearly a *ressentiment* against people who cannot appreciate him. Well, it is human all-too-human—one can understand. I told you how he was received with his new ideas, so it would have been a miracle if he had not had a strong resentment against such a reaction. He goes on:

And soon shall they stand before me like dry grass and prairie, and verily, weary of themselves—and panting for fire, more than for water!

O blessed hour of the lightning! O mystery before noontide!—Running fires will I one day make of them, and heralds with flaming tongues.

Herald shall they one day with flaming tongues: It cometh, it is nigh, the great noontide!

Thus spake Zarathustra.

There is a good deal of Old Testament in this passage—the Lord God being the living fire that will devour the peoples. There Nietzsche is identifying with the deity like an Old Testament prophet, and the style imitates the language of the prophets. His allusion means of course that he will burn up all that chaff. But it means more than that: it means also a descent of the Holy Ghost in the form of fiery tongues, not to devour people but to turn them into heralds. So the Old Testament destruction through fire is coupled here with the Pentecostal miracle of the descent of the Holy Ghost in the form of fire that puts their tongues on fire, that gives them the gift of *glossolalia*, talking in foreign tongues. So the fire is not only destructive, it is also productive: it produces the gift of languages. This is a sort of message that fire has a double aspect, a negative one, destruction, and a positive one, that gift of the Holy Ghost. Now, fire symbolism plays no small role in dreams, so if we are allowed to treat this speech metaphor like a dream image, we must compare it with dreams in which fire occurs. That a fire has broken out in one's house, for instance, is a very usual motif. What does the fire motif mean in dreams?

Mrs. Crowley: It means a great disturbance in the unconscious.

Mrs. Fierz: An outbreak of emotion.

Prof. Jung: Yes, an emotional outburst flaming up. And an outburst of emotion is supposed to be hot. Why is that?

Miss Hannah: Because it hurts.

Prof. Jung: No, people are often not hurt at all—the other people are hurt.

Remark: It makes them warm.

Prof. Jung: Yes, when you have an emotion, the hot blood rises to your head: you get red hot in the head. Therefore violent emotions are always symbolized by fire or blood or heat. All languages are full of such metaphors on account of that physiological condition. When somebody is making you angry, you keep cool as long as you don't feel the blood rising to your head; you can handle the situation, you can calmly say, "You make me very angry." But the moment you feel that your blood is getting hot you can no longer control the situation, you flare up like a flame, you burn yourself up in violent anger. This fact is the reason for the so-called "James-Lange theory of affects."⁶ They say that as long as the inciting cause does not bring about a physiological disturbance, the dilation of the blood vessels or a certain fast beating of the heart for instance, one has no affect, no emotion, but as soon as there is that physiological reaction, one gets the psychological affect as a consequence. The dilation of the blood vessels, the fast beating of the heart, is the first effect, and then follows the psychological emotion. That is really so. Of course it follows in quick succession, but it is true that it is the physiological reaction which causes the psychological affect. Fear, for instance, is caused by the heart phenomenon; after that the real panic occurs. A thing may be rather gruesome or dangerous, yet you know you can deal with it as your heart has not reacted to it; but when your heart reacts you get into a panic, the real fear, for that takes the ground from under your feet. You feel that you are gone, demoralized—you suffocate. Therefore they have made that funny-sounding theory. But it is a fact that as long as you can control the physiological sequence, you can control the situation; and when your heart begins to race, or your head gets too full of blood, you are unable to.

Now, these physiological phenomena are at the basis of such pictures. Fire symbolizes emotions and whenever you dream of fire it means a very critical situation on account of intolerable affects. To

⁶ The theory arrived at independently by William James in America in 1884 and by C. G. Lange in Denmark a year later.

dream that a fire has broken out in the cellar or the attic of your house, means that in such-and-such a place in your psychology there will be a strong emotion. A fire in the attic will be in the head; you will be set on fire through certain ideas. If it is in the cellar, it will be in the abdomen and whatever the abdomen stands for; the fire will come from below. It might be sexual passion or a terrible anger or any other violent emotion based upon animal instincts. When it is in the attic, it might come from an anima or an animus insinuation. In women the fire often starts in the head; the instincts might be perfectly quiet and the whole situation normal, but the animus perhaps has a wrong conception or passes the wrong judgment, and then there is terrible confusion.

Now of course, Nietzsche is looking forward with a sort of mystical hope that this fire, the noontide, will come. He often speaks of the noontide, the great mystical hour. What does that mean?

Answer: The highest degree of heat at twelve o'clock.

Remark: The whole world suffers from the sun.

Prof. Jung: No, Nietzsche likes the sun.

Mrs. Fierz: It is the hour of Pan, of nature.

Prof. Jung: Well yes, the panic fright, the hour of ghosts in the south, and Nietzsche is playing a good deal on that note too. But that would not explain it; we cannot assume that this would apply for the whole world, and noontide for him is always a time of complete fulfilment.

Miss Wolff: It is the time when Zarathustra will be revealed to the world.

Prof. Jung: Yes. In the chapter called "Noon-tide" you will see that that is the hour of the complete revelation of Zarathustra. And what is the revelation?

Mrs. Schlegel: The coming of the superman.

Prof. Jung: Yes, Nietzsche's evangel is *Zarathustra*, the message to the world of the superman, the idea that man, this human world, should develop to the superman. What does that mean psychologically?

Mrs. Baumann: For Nietzsche himself it meant the middle of life, the change to the second half of life; therefore Zarathustra is the self, the non-ego.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. He wrote *Zarathustra* when he was thirty-eight or thirty-nine, the midday of life; *Zarathustra* is the experience of noontide, the great transformation that takes place at 36.⁷ Of course only in exceptional cases does that transformation become con-

⁷ More commonly, Jung spoke of the beginning of the second, more reflective period of life as beginning between thirty-five and forty, normally.

scious, and then it is always a great revelation. But what does noontide really mean psychologically—and literally?

Mrs. Crowley: Would it not be the fullest point of consciousness?

Prof. Jung: Absolutely. The light of the sun is the day, and consciousness is the day of man. Consciousness coincides with the day and it is probably just as miraculous as it was to that child who asked why the sun shone only during the day. The child had not yet drawn the conclusion that the day and the sun are identical, and we have probably not yet drawn the conclusion—or we have forgotten it—that consciousness is the day, the sun, the light. Therefore when you are unconscious, in dreams, or when you are talking about consciousness, you always speak in terms of seeing; and as you can only see in the light, you use terms deriving from light. When you become conscious of something, you say, “Now it dawns upon me”—*ein Licht ging mir auf*.⁸ We have plenty of such terms; if you examine the speech metaphors connected with the phenomenon of consciousness you will find that we always speak in terms of light, of seeing. When you understand or perceive something that is said to you, you say “Yes, I see.” Why don’t you say, “I hear,” which would be more apt really? “I see,” simply means “I agree with you, I take a note of it.” You don’t say, “I hear,” because that has to do with something else that is below consciousness. In that case, you say, “I hear”: Lord, I hear your command, I obey, I receive your words, not in consciousness, but a little bit below, in my heart. Hearing goes to the heart, has to do with the feeling, while seeing has to do with the eyes, the intellect, the mind.

So noontide means the perfect, complete consciousness, the totality, the very *comble* and summit of consciousness, and that of course is the superman, the man with an absolutely superior consciousness. And Zarathustra tries to teach his contemporaries to develop their consciousness, to become conscious of the moral paradox of consciousness, of the fact that you are not only a moral individual, but also on the other side a most despicable character; that you are not only generous but also miserly; that you are not only courageous but also a coward, not only white but also black. To be fully aware of that paradox, I would call the consciousness of the superman. Therefore it will be noontide when he appears, when the sun has come to its culmination. But that means at the same time the destruction of all chaff, of all those worthless people who are unable to produce that paradoxical consciousness. We would be largely included in the chaff naturally, for

⁸ Literally, “a light goes on in me.”

such a perfect consciousness is a very exceptional condition. And there Nietzsche falls down—falls down over the imperfection of man. You see, he has the same aspiration which one finds in the Yogin in India for instance, who also tries to reach that superconsciousness where one can say, not merely in words but in fact, “I am the hunter and the hunted one; I am the sacrificer and the sacrificed.” That is exactly like Nietzsche’s paradoxical consciousness—that you are and are not, that you are both this and that. This is such an achievement that the Indians long ago realized that no one is able to achieve such superiority without going through endless Yoga practices in all the different aspects. They even came to the conclusion that the highest degree of consciousness, the most complete absence of illusion, is only achieved at death.

You see, Nietzsche had very little knowledge of the East. The only knowledge which was available to him was Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and that is not the right vehicle for Indian philosophy, since Schopenhauer only knew what one then called the “Oupnekhat,” a Latin translation of a very incomplete Mohammedan collection of the Upanishads. We have now a translation from the original work, but any knowledge that people had of it then was mixed up with Buddhistic and German philosophy. When Nietzsche was a young man it impressed him very much; one realizes what it meant to him when one reads the chapter about Schopenhauer in the *Unzeitgemässige Betrachtungen*.⁹ I am more or less convinced that his idea of the superman originated there, in that idea of the one who is able to hold a mirror up to the blind will, so that the blind primordial will that has created the world may be able to see its own face in the mirror of the intellect. This is very much like the Indian idea really, like the psychological education Buddha tried to give to his time, the idea of looking into the mirror of knowledge or understanding in order to destroy the error and illusion of the world. This is interminably repeated in his texts and sermons and in the Nidana chain of causes. Again and again Buddha says that coming into existence causes such-and-such desires and illusions, and that man proceeds through that chain of causes and effect, invariably ending in disease, old age, and death; and the only means to disrupt that inexorable chain of cause and effect is knowledge and understanding.

That is the very essence of Buddhism, and that became the integrating constituent of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, where Nietzsche found it. He was probably unconscious of that derivation from the Buddhist

⁹ “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874), the third essay in *Untimely Meditations*.

conceptions in Schopenhauer, and as far as I know there are no allusions to it in literature, but psychologically that would be the real source. And Nietzsche is a man in whom one might find the strange faculty of cryptomnesia, whereby something one has read or heard makes an imprint upon one's unconscious, which is later literally reproduced. We had that famous example last term, where Zarathustra appeared on the volcanic island and was seen to descend into the flames of the volcano in order to fetch the hound of hell, Cerberus. That passage, you remember, is an almost literal quotation from a book in the library of Nietzsche's grandfather, Pastor Oehler, which he read when he was eleven years old, or before that date. I found this out from Frau Förster-Nietzsche who helped me to locate the time. I happened to have also read the book, so when I came across the passage later in *Zarathustra*, it brought up the memory of that story, particularly the detail about the rabbits. That is such a case, so it is quite possible that the figure of the superman is partially derived from the Buddhist ideas which he got from Schopenhauer,¹⁰ and from the concept of Prajapati or the *Purusha* in that version of the *Oupnekhat*.

You see, *Purusha* is the original man, the *homo maximus*. Or if one be disinclined to assume such a derivation, the *Purusha* or the Superman or the *homo maximus* would be nevertheless an archetype. That the world has the form of a human being or a Superman is an idea which one finds in Swedenborg, and in other forms in India and in China, and it also plays a great role in alchemy; the *Purusha* is an archetypal idea.

Mrs. Crowley: I thought the Superman was a little different.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right, he is not the *Purusha* of the Upanishads. The *Purusha* is also a world creator like Prajapati, and he is a collateral concept like the Atman. Of course one can say there is all the difference in the world between the concept of the *Purusha* and the concept of the Atman, but there again one sees, from the way the Indians themselves handle this concept, that the Atman and Prajapati and the *Purusha* are practically the same. For our purposes there is no point in insisting upon the different aspects or shades of meaning of that concept; it is what we would call in psychology "the self"—namely, the totality of the conscious and the unconscious. The *Purusha* is a psychic fact, not only a psychological concept; the self is not a psychical fact, but an archetypal fact, an experience. It is the same as the idea of Christ in the Middle Ages, or the idea Christ had of himself and his

¹⁰ See above, 15 June 1938, n. 9.

disciples when he said, "I am the vine and ye are the grapes." Or the same as that early iconographic representation of Christ as the zodiacal serpent carrying the twelve constellations, the signs of the zodiac, representing the twelve disciples; or carrying the twelve disciples each with a star over his head. Those are old representations, meaning the path of the zodiacal constellations through the year, with Christ as the way of the serpent or the way of the zodiac. Christ represents the Christian year containing his twelve disciples, as the zodiacal serpent contains the twelve constellations of the zodiac. He is the individual, the self, containing a group of twelve that makes the whole.

Therefore, the representation of Christ in the form of *Rex Gloriae*, the king of glory, surrounded by the four evangelists, forming a mandala. The medieval mandalas always represented Christ in that form—Christ on the throne in the center, and in the four corners the evangelists—the angel, the ox, the lion, and the eagle. That even became a beloved ornamentation in the 12th and 13th centuries; one sees it frequently on the doors of cathedrals or as an illustration in books. And that again means the great individual, the great self containing the others—they are just parts—which is exactly the idea of the universe being the *homo maximus*, everybody having his specific place in that great man. The learned people are in the head, and soldiers and men of action are in the arms, and heaven and hell are also contained in the *homo maximus*. So at the source of Schopenhauer's philosophy lies that age-old idea. Of course the idea in itself doesn't occur in Schopenhauer, but the psychology of the Upanishads by which he was affected, is coupled with that idea. The *Hiranyagarbha*, the so-called golden germ, or the golden egg, or the golden child, is another form of Prajapati. Prajapati was making *tapas*, brooding over himself, hatching himself out, and he became the *Hiranyagarbha*, the grain of gold, the golden child, which is again the symbol of the self.¹¹ This is, one could say, the *homo minimus*, the smallest form—that is, the germ of the *homo maximus* in every individual.

One finds this kind of development of symbolism also in Egypt: Osiris was originally the immortal part of the king; then later on, of the noble or wealthy people; and then in the time just before Christianity, Osiris began to descend into the heart of everyone: everyone had an immortal or a divine soul. And the idea of that great self born or being

¹¹ "He who is the source and origin of the gods who . . . beheld the Golden Germ (*Hiranya-garbha*) when he was born. May he endow us with clear intellect" (*Svetasvatara Upanishad* 4.12, Hume, p. 404).

contained in everybody became an essential truth of Christianity; Christ was eaten by everybody. They ate and drank him in Holy Communion. Thus they were impregnated with Christ; Christ lived in them. That was the Osiris which comes to life in everybody. Osiris was also represented as wheat growing up from his coffin; it was his resurrection in the form of wheat. And Christ is the wheat; therefore the host has to consist of flour of wheat made from the grain which grows out of the ground. There was the same idea in the Eleusinian mysteries long before Christ appeared: in the *epopteia* the priest showed the ear of wheat as the son of the earth, with the announcement that the earth had brought forth the son, the *filius*.¹² That was an Evangel almost like the Christian Evangel, and it was connected with the hope of eternal life after death—the mysteries of Eleusis instilled that great hope. You see, it is exactly like the idea of the Holy Communion, the bread and the wine being Christ. So Christ impregnates everybody: he creates a germ in everybody that is the great self.

Christianity is another source of Nietzsche's ideas of course, but since he did not criticize his own thought, he never discovered it. His idea was that he was preaching a truth entirely different from any other. This is the same infernal mistake the church made, not in the time of Christ but later, when they got hold of the Christian message—the idea that the god had descended upon earth for the first time, that it was a new truth which had never existed before. We are still handicapped by that belief. Theology tries to make it appear that nobody ever had such ideas before, when, as a matter of fact, these ideas were known all over the world; but they have a tremendous resistance against such parallels; they find them awkward. The Catholic church is a bit more intelligent in that respect. They call any historical parallel an anticipation; they say that God has shown the truth time and again in the past, not only in the Old Testament but also in pagan religions—in the Isis and Osiris myth for instance. Since only fools could deny that analogy, the Catholic church admits it and says that God permitted the anticipation of the truth which was to come, that in a sort of indistinct, incorrect way they perceived the ultimate truth: God becoming man, God being born from the Virgin, the sacrifice, and the role of the savior.

¹² In his "The Meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries," at the 1939 Eranos Conference, Walter F. Otto (1874-1958) explains this ritual in the *epopteia*, the initiation into the greater mysteries. He credits Hippolytus the Roman with the report of how the ear of wheat was displayed. The lecture appears in *The Mysteries*, Vol. 2, Papers from the Eranos Yearbook, ed. Joseph Campbell, Princeton (B.S. XXX) 1955.

So even Nietzsche's idea of the Superman is nothing new, but an age-old symbolism, and therefore I think we are quite justified in reducing this idea to its historical source. He had ample material for handling his idea from the Christian side on account of his family; and the philosophical background is also well established since he was a great admirer of Schopenhauer and very much influenced by him. These ideas had gone into him and the ultimate result was that he produced a mystery teaching very much like the mystery teachings I have mentioned, either the *Purusha* mystery in the East, or the savior mystery in the Hellenistic syncretism which includes the savior mystery in Christianity. And he uses the same kind of phantasmagoria: the ultimate fire, for instance, that will devour the chaff, destroy the people who are not ready to receive the savior and accept the message; and the inspiration and transubstantiation, as it were, of those who receive the tongues of fire from the Holy Ghost. They will announce and continue the message. He calls that the great noontide. You see, that is the day of judgment, with the great sun of justice, where there will be no night any longer. And there will be no pain, because all the evildoers will be roasting in hell or burned up, and the world with its errors and imperfections will have come to an end. That is the good old Christian idea of ultimate redemption with all the paraphernalia of the Apocalypse.

You see, the fire symbolism has that aspect too: when a fire breaks out in a house, panic is next door and panic is insanity. One sees that in practical cases when people have funny ideas and get too emotional about them, in the fear that something might happen to their reason. If you can keep them from getting into a real panic, you can often save them. For when you see how insanity starts, the stages through which people pass before they become insane, you realize that it is always panic which drives them really crazy. As long as they can look on without being too emotional about it, they are saved; it is panic that gets people into such abnormal states. So the fire here is a great revelation, but of a very different nature: it is the revelation of insanity. Now we will omit the next chapter because Nietzsche just goes on feeling his resentment against the small people and exaggerating it to such an extent that his whole nature gets sick of it. It is not himself really, it is his psychological situation that cannot stand it any longer. So something is going to happen in this chapter, "On Passing-By." He begins:

Thus slowly wandering through many peoples and divers cities, did Zarathustra return by round-about roads to his mountains and his cave. And behold, thereby came he unawares also to the

gate of the *great city*. Here, however, a foaming fool, with extended hands, sprang forward to him and stood in his way. It was the same fool whom the people called "the ape of Zarathustra": for he had learned from him something of the expression and modulation of language, and perhaps liked also to borrow from the store of his wisdom. And the fool talked thus to Zarathustra:

Where have we met the fool before?

Mrs. Crowley: The harlequin who jumped over him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and what was the situation exactly?

Miss Hannah: The rope-dancer came out on the rope, and the fool followed him and jumped over him. Then the first one lost his head and fell.

Prof. Jung: And who was the rope-dancer?

Remark: We said it was the shadow.

Mrs. Crowley: It was Nietzsche himself.

Prof. Jung: Yes, or one could say the inferior man of Zarathustra/Nietzsche. Then who would the fool be?

Miss Hannah: I suppose he really was the negative side of the self.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we interpreted him as the negative aspect, an overwhelming fear of the inevitable, inexorable power of fate that was following him. That was insanity of course. For when the rope-dancer falls down to the ground, Nietzsche comforts him by saying what?

Miss Hannah: Thy soul will be dead before thy body.

Prof. Jung: Prophesying thus his own fate: his body lived on for eleven years after he had become totally crazy. Now is this the same fool? Was that fool the ape of Zarathustra?

Mrs. Fierz: One might say that Nietzsche, in the chapters we have just read, was behaving like a rope-dancer in a way, so he would be the same.

Prof. Jung: Well, it would be just a repetition of that first scene. And that is absolutely typical of the way in which the unconscious works. First, there is generally an allusion to a certain situation, and then the motif goes on and on, returning from time to time in a more definite form, a more definite application. One sees that in a series of dreams. Already in the first dreams one finds a definite symbolism, and again and again it returns, becoming more and more elaborate, more and more typical. So we have here a repetition of the first scene: namely, the rope-dancer is Nietzsche himself making little of humanity, dwarfing and reviling his contemporaries, forgetting all the time that he is one of those poor little things that live in great cities, that are human

and imperfect and incapable and have every vice under the sun. Also something in him doesn't understand, and he should see it; that there is something which he cannot grasp is what excites and irritates him so much. On the one side, he is a great philosopher, a great genius, but he doesn't see that on the other side he is almost infantile.

For instance, he wrote letters to his sister calling her "my dear Lama," and such childishness shows that there is still an infant in him that has not given up the nursery language. And how could that side of his character follow the great genius? You see, Nietzsche didn't know where the idea of the superman started, nor the idea of the eternal return. To him it was a great revelation. He didn't know that those ideas had prevailed for many centuries. He didn't know that the idea of the eternal return is as old as mankind practically—historical mankind at least. He thinks he is the first man to discover them. He is like a little child with astonished eyes coming into the world of these ideas. He had a historical education as well as a mind, so he had the capacity to criticize himself, yet he never did. Because he was a child, he merely played. A child doesn't wonder why it is playing with just that doll, or where it comes from or why it has such-and-such a style; it is just that doll, and nobody else ever had such a doll or played such a game. It is his invention. Of course it may be that the idea came to the child without conscious transmission—nobody said the child had to play like that—but as a matter of fact all children play like that.

Mrs. Crowley: Would it be possible psychologically that he was mocking his contemporaries because he is feeling himself being drawn away from the world, that it was a peculiar way of detaching from it, that he feels the insanity but doesn't know what to do about it?

Prof. Jung: That is also true, it is a well-known phenomenon. This is a farewell kick. It is like the fox saying the grapes are too sour when as a matter of fact he cannot reach them. So when one is convinced that one has to give up a certain relationship, for instance, one is always tempted to make up all sorts of things about the partner to account for the detachment. That is the case with Nietzsche, and that is also the reason for his ideas of persecution. People who find it difficult to detach from humanity invent all sorts of things—that human beings are all devils who are against them, for instance—in order to explain to themselves why they draw away from them. They invent those stories because something in them wants to go away, to detach; they feel it and it needs to be explained, so they explain it by such ideas. And that is like the beginning of insanity. Nietzsche's resentment is really too much. It is pathological, so one can explain it as a preparation for the final insanity.

LECTURE IV

9 November 1938

Prof. Jung:

We began last time the 51st chapter, "On Passing-By." On his round-about way back to his cave, you remember, Zarathustra came unexpectedly to the gate of the great city. Now it is questionable what his intention was there. In the preceding chapters he has been reviling the small people that live in small houses where he has to stoop low to enter, so why does he stop at this city?

Mrs. Fierz: One might say that he was turning into the missionary now; he considers them silly, so he wants to tell them how they ought to be.

Prof. Jung: That is quite possible. But psychologically, what should we say in such a case? You see he stops there "unawares."

Mrs. Fierz: That something in him of which he is unconscious wants to go among them.

Mrs. Baumann: It seems as if he had a secret wish to get into contact with that inferior man, because here he is not reviling him; it is something secret in him that wants it.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, he is attracted. When a person reviles something very thoroughly, what conclusion may one draw?

Mrs. Crowley: That it fascinates him.

Prof. Jung: Yes. One sees that in societies for the prevention of immorality. There are the most amazing stories. I remember the case of a member of such a laudable organization: A man had made a collection of five thousand pornographic pictures, which he offered to the society to burn up; and they only accepted his very generous gift under the condition that they could first study the collection thoroughly so that everybody would know how awful people really were. So they had a meeting in which the five thousand photos were carefully examined and they were all duly shocked. People who are fascinated by immorality often join such societies. There was another wonderful case: The secretary of an international society to prevent vice suddenly disappeared, and at the same time the police caught a man they had long

been looking for on account of his sexual attacks on boys in Berlin. He would not say who he was, but they discovered that the international secretary had disappeared, and he was soon identified. So the reason Zarathustra stops at this city is that he feels an unholy attraction. The city is the connection with all that rabble, the crowd of miserable non-entities that he has reviled, and yet he cannot let them go. Then the foaming fool appears. He has already turned up once in the beginning of the book, where the rope-dancer was practically killed by the fool who jumped over him on the rope. And we said last week that the rope-dancer was Nietzsche himself and that he there foretold his own fate. His frequent allusions to dancing always allude to the dancer in himself. Now what does this dancing mean really?

Mrs. Crowley: Would it have something of the same nature as the dancing spirit of Shiva?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the same symbol, and what does Shiva's dancing denote?

Mrs. Crowley: It is both the creative and destructive side. It is the movement of nature, the complete expression of nature.

Prof. Jung: That is aesthetical, but if you take it psychologically, what is the characteristic of the dancing Shiva?

Answer: That he is dancing on the dead.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he is often represented as dancing upon a corpse, but that is a particular case; he is then a female, a sort of Kali dancing in the form of Shiva. He looks exactly as if he were a woman. That refers to a special Kali legend. The corpse in that case is not a corpse, but is the body of Shiva himself, and she is a sort of Shakti—Shiva has many aspects. The story is that Kali was once in such a fit of rage with everybody and everything that she danced upon the corpses in the burial-ground and nobody could stop her. Finally they asked her husband Shiva to stop her, and the only way he knew was to place himself among the corpses, so she danced on him. But when her foot touched him he looked up, and she saw he was her husband, and then she instantly ceased dancing and shamefacedly hung her head; she was shocked that her foot had stepped upon her own husband. From that story you can see what mental attitude is denoted by the dancing. How would you feel if you were one of the many corpses and such a demon was dancing on you?

Mrs. Sigg: It is the same idea as when we say in German: *Ich pfeife auf alles*.¹

¹ "I whistle at everybody." "I couldn't care less."

Prof. Jung: Exactly. It is most reckless, really ruthless. One would call such an attitude utterly inhuman. So the dancing Shiva is most inconsiderate; it is the cruelty and indifference of nature that destroys with no regret. He is in a dream of ecstasy and in this condition he creates and destroys worlds—a sort of playful attitude with no responsibility whatever, with no relationship even to one's own doing. And who would have such an attitude—I mean within human reach? What kind of mind or type?

Mrs. Crowley: An extremely creative type.

Prof. Jung: Not every creative mind is like that.

Mrs. Sigg: An unbalanced intuition.

Prof. Jung: Not exactly unbalanced but unchecked intuition, an intuition that roams about uncontrolled and in no relation to the human individual. When intuition is entirely playful it behaves like that. So whenever Nietzsche is dealing with particularly difficult or painful subjects, he invents dancing, and then skates over the most difficult and questionable things as if he were not concerned at all. That is what unchecked intuition does. When one has to do with such people in reality one gets something of that kind, one sees then that everything is indifferent to them really. It only matters inasmuch as it happens to be in the limelight of their own intuition, and plays a role as long as it fits in with a scheme of their own. When it no longer fits in, it doesn't matter at all. So they handle people or situations all in the same way; whatever they are focussing on is suddenly brought out as *the* thing, and the next moment there is nothing—it is all gone. Intuition goes in leaps and bounds. It settles down and bounces off in the next moment. Therefore intuitives never reap their crops; they plant their fields and then leave them behind before they are ready for the harvest. Now that dancing attitude, the intuitive attitude, is always compensated by what kind of unconscious attitude?

Mrs. Sigg: It is really despair at the root.

Prof. Jung: No, that is not a compensating attitude, that is a personal reaction perhaps.

Mrs. Sigg: I think Nietzsche danced when he was in utter despair. At the end I mean.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, sometimes, but he was not always in despair. What is the compensating attitude to intuition, to this dancing?

Mrs. Fierz: It is sensation.

Prof. Jung: Naturally. An almost pathological relationship to reality is the compensating attitude. One can call it the spirit of gravity. Therefore intuitives develop all sorts of physical trouble, intestinal dis-

turbances for instance, ulcers of the stomach or other really grave physical troubles. Because they overleap the body, it reacts against them. So Nietzsche leaps over the ordinary man, just those small people he has been reviling, and then the moment comes when all the smallness of that man who lives in the body overtakes him. Nietzsche is exactly like the rope-dancer, and now once more he encounters the foaming fool. You remember the passage where he complains about those small people not hearing him, but the one who doesn't hear is himself. He doesn't know that he is really reviling the small man in himself, himself as the real individual that leads a visible existence in the body. And not realizing it he leaps over himself. He says "Mine own forerunner am I among this people" and "But why talk I, when no one hath mine ears!" But as a matter of fact he doesn't hear what he says to himself; he doesn't realize that he is really preaching to his own inferior man. So he is the fool that leaps over himself, exactly the situation already described in the beginning of the book. You see, the fool is the shadow, the thing which is left behind; the rope-dancer dances ahead, and behind him is a very active shadow, identical with the inferior man, with the man who is not up to the rope-dancer, the man who is underneath, watching him dance high up in the air. All the time that Nietzsche is identifying with Zarathustra—saying a whole mouthful—he is followed by a hostile shadow that eventually will take his revenge. So this fool is an activated shadow that has become dangerous because Nietzsche disregarded him too long and too completely. Under such conditions, an unconscious figure may develop into a very dangerous opponent. Now the fool is called the ape of Zarathustra. Why an ape?

Mrs. Fierz: He is not yet man, but is still at the animal stage.

Prof. Jung: Exactly, the shadow is not only the inferior man but also the primeval man, the man with the fur, the monkey man. One calls an imitative person a monkey, for instance, as the devil was called God's ape, meaning one who is always doing the same thing apparently but in a very inferior way, a sort of bad imitation. But that is exactly what the shadow does. It is like the way your shadow behaves in the sunshine; it walks like you, it makes the same gestures, but all in a very incomplete way because it is not a body. And when the shadow gets detached from you, then watch it! I have spoken before of that wonderful film, *The Student of Prague*, where the devil lured the student's reflection out of the mirror and away from him, and then that shadow figure, the second personality of the student, began to live on his own and behaved in a correspondingly inferior way.² That was the

² See above, 20 June 1934, n. 11.

root of the tragedy in that story, and it is what happens here. The rope-dancer removes himself so far from the human sphere, puts himself onto such a high rope above the heads of the crowd, that he also becomes detached from his own inferior personality. So the shadow gathers in strength, and as Nietzsche moves off toward the very great figure of Zarathustra, his shadow moves backwards to the monkey man and eventually becomes a monkey, compensating thus the too great advance through the identification with Zarathustra. That is the tree which grows to heaven, whose roots, as Nietzsche himself said, must necessarily reach into hell. And that creates such a tension that soon the danger zone will be reached where the mind will break under the strain.

Dr. Frey: Should it not be the ape of Nietzsche instead of Zarathustra?

Prof. Jung: No, it is the ape of Zarathustra. Zarathustra is an archetype and therefore has the divine quality, and that is always based upon the animal. Therefore the gods are symbolized as animals—even the Holy Ghost is a bird; all the antique gods and the exotic gods are animals at the same time. The old wise man is a big ape really, which explains his peculiar fascination. The ape is naturally in possession of the wisdom of nature, like any animal or plant, but the wisdom is represented by a being that is not conscious of itself, and therefore it cannot be called wisdom. For instance, the glowworm represents the secret of making light without warmth; man doesn't know how to produce 98 percent of light with no loss of warmth, but the glowworm has the secret. If the glowworm could be transformed into a being who *knew* that he possessed the secret of making light without warmth, that would be a man with an insight and knowledge much greater than we have reached; he would be a great scientist perhaps or a great inventor, who would transform our present technique. So the old wise man, in this case Zarathustra, is the consciousness of the wisdom of the ape. It is the wisdom of nature which is nature itself, and if nature were conscious of itself, it would be a superior being of extraordinary knowledge and understanding. The glowworm is a pretty primitive animal, while an ape is a very highly developed animal, so we can assume that the wisdom embodied in the ape is of immensely greater value than that relatively unimportant secret of the glowworm.

That is the reason why primitives feel so impressed or fascinated by the animal. They say that the wisest of all animals, the most powerful and divine of all beings, is the elephant, and then comes the python or the lion, and only then comes man. Man is by no means on top of cre-

ation: the elephant is much greater, not only on account of his physical size and force but for his peculiar quality of divinity. And really the look of wisdom in a big elephant is tremendously impressive. So this ape is the ape of Zarathustra, and not of Nietzsche, who is not such a ridiculous person in himself that he could be characterized as an ape, nor does he contain the extraordinary wisdom which would need the utter foolishness of a monkey as compensation. Naturally, the monkey is never the symbol of wisdom but of foolishness, but foolishness is the necessary compensation for wisdom. As a matter of fact there is no real wisdom without foolishness. One often speaks of the wise fool. In the Middle Ages, the wise man at the king's court, the most intelligent philosopher, was the fool; with all his foolishness he could speak profound truths. And naturally the fool was a monkey, so he was allowed to imitate and make fun even of the king, as a monkey would; a monkey is the clownish representation of man in the animal kingdom. Now, that activated shadow, which only comes about through Nietzsche's identification with Zarathustra, is overtaking him again, but not in the same dangerous way as in the beginning. Why was it apparently far more dangerous in the beginning?

Mrs. Fierz: It was then a sort of vision of what would happen, and that is now slowly happening.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the beginning Nietzsche was not confronted directly with the monkey, but with a rope-dancer, so one could take it as a warning picture: if you identify with that rope-dancer, you must be careful or the shadow will overtake you. But that is only a warning inasmuch as one *considers* it a warning; one might have a warning dream and not allow oneself to be warned by it. So Nietzsche has in a way been warned, but the tragedy is that he did not take it into account. This time it is Nietzsche who is confronted with the fool, and the case seems to be less dangerous. He apparently can cope with it, but as a matter of fact it is more dangerous, because the prophecy in the beginning is now fulfilling itself: Nietzsche is now on the rope. Therefore he meets the fool. He is now about to be leapt over, and that is exceedingly dangerous though it doesn't look so here. It is of course somewhat impressive when that foaming fool suddenly springs forward with extended hands. Nietzsche might have been shocked, but apparently he was not. He says,

It was the same fool whom the people called "the ape of Zarathustra": for he had learned from him something of the expres-

sion and modulation of language, and perhaps liked also to borrow from the store of his wisdom.

Here is the connection with the wisdom which Zarathustra represents, and if the ape likes to borrow from the source of wisdom, it is because he simply takes from what he is; that wisdom is of his own structure. It is himself even.

And the fool talked thus to Zarathustra:

Oh Zarathustra, here is the great city: here hast thou nothing to seek and everything to lose.

Why wouldst thou wade through this mire? Have pity upon thy foot! Spit rather on the gate of the city, and—turn back.

Now why does the shadow talk like that?

Mrs. Jung: Because an archetype does not belong in collectivity.

Prof. Jung: That is one aspect, but there is another.

Miss Hannah: Because he knows that he will see it again all outside of himself, it will be the same thing over again.

Prof. Jung: That is it. So what is the good of going into the city? He will do the same thing again: he will revile those people, put himself onto a high rope, and then fall down again. The shadow is very helpful in telling Zarathustra not to repeat the same nonsense, not to go into the city to revile those people because he really is reviling himself. Of course it is not said in those words. That is the shortcoming of the shadow that it cannot express itself precisely, as it is the shortcoming of nature which also shows in our dreams. People complain, "Why does the dream not tell me directly? Why doesn't it say: 'Don't do this or that' or, 'You should behave in such and such a way'? Why is it so inhuman?" I am sure not one of you has not thought that about your dreams. It is a most maddening thing that dreams cannot talk straight. Certain dreams are so extraordinary, so much to the point—yet they are always ambiguous. Now why does nature behave like that?

Miss Hannah: Because it cannot differentiate.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the unconscious is nature, the reconciliation of pairs of opposites. It is this and that and it doesn't matter. Because it is an eternal repetition, death and birth and death and birth, on and on forever, it doesn't matter whether people live or die, doesn't matter whether they have lived already or are going to live. That is all contained in nature. And so the unconscious gives you this and that aspect of a situation. Now, if you are wise, you use it as a source of information. As I always say, one uses the compass in order to navigate, but not

even the compass shows the way—it doesn't even show exactly where the north pole is, the magnetic north pole being not identical with the geographical north pole. So the compass is a very doubtful means. Provided you have definite information as to the position of the north pole you can use the compass as a valuable means of orientation. And it is the same with the unconscious: provided you know about the laws of dreams you can use them. The dream is nature and it is up to you how you use it; it never says you *ought* to, but only says: it *is* so. The unconscious shows such-and-such a reaction, but it doesn't say whether it is right or wrong, or that you should draw such-and-such conclusions; you are free to draw certain conclusions as you are free to use the compass—or not. So the fool, being the shadow, is of course not Nietzsche's consciousness, but Nietzsche/Zarathustra in his negative edition; and so also the wisdom is in its negative edition. That the fool tells him not to go into the city is just like a dream. This is merely a compensation for Nietzsche's tendency to enter the city, and since that is against the instincts, since it is utterly futile to go on repeating the same thing, the unconscious simply says, "Don't go always in the same way; you have turned to the right long enough, now go once to the left." So what the fool says is quite mistakable, and you will presently see how Nietzsche takes it. He misunderstands it completely.

Mrs. Sigg: Yet in the beginning of the book, the fool spoke rather clearly. He said to leave the town, that he only escaped the danger of the city because he was humble enough to carry the corpse. But Nietzsche did not know the meaning.

Prof. Jung: That is a very good point. It was shown to Nietzsche that he ought to carry the corpse, and he did carry it and it was a protection. I cannot remember whether we dealt with that question, but will you tell us what it means?

Mrs. Sigg: I have not yet fully understood it. I think it is like the idea of carrying the corpse in Zimmer's work, *Die Geschichte vom indischen König mit dem Leichnam*. But it is not only in Indian mythology. The same motif was used by our greatest painter, Dürer; by our greatest writer of church-hymns, Paul Gerhard; and by our greatest musician, Johann Sebastian Bach.³ Dürer used it in his picture of the Trinity, where the King, the God-Father, carries the dead Christ in his arms; Paul Gerhard used it in one of his most beautiful hymns; and Bach in-

³ For Zimmer's *The King and the Corpse, Tales of the Soul's Conquest of Evil*, see above, 18 May 1938, n. 7. Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528), German painter and engraver. Paul Gerhard (1607-1676), German poet and writer of hymns and other songs. Johann Sebastian Bach (1696-1750).

troduced several verses of this hymn into his Passion-music. And his arrangement of the old melody of the hymn is most perfect in the accompaniment of the verse which touches our problem. I think it occurs very seldom in art. But it seems to be a law for a creative person that the king in him must carry the corpse.

Prof. Jung: Yes, Professor Zimmer's interpretation of that myth was that the king had to carry a corpse as a sort of ordeal, and thereby he learned the greatest wisdom. That is a very wonderful myth, an extraordinary piece of psychology. The corpse represents the *corpus*, the body. The English word *corpse* coming from the Latin *corpus*; and the German word *Leichnam* comes from *Lîcham* (Middle High German) which also means just the body. So the protection against inflation, against possession through an archetype, is carrying the burden—instead of the corpse, just “a burden,” which is a sort of abstraction. Carrying the burden is a motif from the mystery cults. It is called the *transitus*, which means going from one place to another, and at the same time bearing something; that of course is not expressed in the word *transitus* itself.

Mrs. von Roques: There is a story that the wise men enter the world in a certain town, carrying the burden of the gods—the relics the gods gave them—in a bag on their backs, and then they must find a place on the earth to live in.

Prof. Jung: The burden would be the body—the gods gave man the body.

Mr. Allemann: Is not carrying the cross the same thing?


Prof. Jung: Absolutely. And in the cult of Attis they carried the fir tree which represents Cybele herself or the god. Then in the Mithraic cult the god Mithras carried the world bull upon his shoulders. And Hercules carried the universe which Atlas had supported before. In the Christian mystery, it is the cross, a dead tree, a symbol for the mother. I quoted in *The Psychology of the Unconscious* an old English legend, a dialogue between the mother, the cross, and Mary. Mary accused the cross: “Cross, thou art the evil stepmother of my son.” It is the same as the mother, the mother cross—exactly the idea which underlies the cult of Attis.⁴

Mrs. von Roques: Is Aeneas carrying the father the same?

Prof. Jung: Probably, but I don't know that that myth has ever been used as a mystery legend, whereas Mithras carrying the bull was part of the mystery teaching. I remember in this connection a dream a clergy-

⁴ For a fuller account of this dialogue, see CW 5, pars. 412-15.

man had as a child: when he was about five years old he had the clergyman's dream. He dreamt that he was in a water-closet which was outside the house, and suddenly somebody forced him to take that whole little house upon his back. He made a drawing of it for me, saying that in reality such a house would never have such a form. And he did not see that the outline, the groundplan, of the house was like this: He had to carry that water-closet with all the contents. And that is where we are all closeted—in this corruptible body of dirt—and we have to carry it. A child five years old had that intimation from the unconscious.



Mrs. Baumann has just called my attention to the fact that the legend of the king and the corpse exists in an English translation called *The Vikram and the Vampire*.⁵ And I have been asked about the corpse—why it is just a corpse. One reason is that it is based upon that linguistic connection, corpse and *corpus*, and *Leichnam* and *Lîcham*. There is a sort of identity in the very words, which comes from the fact that the body, being matter, is supposed to be dead in itself, and only living inasmuch as it is animated by Prana, the indwelling breath of life. Therefore the same word is used for the living and the dead body. That is also seen in the idea of the burden: Mithras carries a dead bull, the sacrificed bull, or he is in the act of sacrificing or killing the bull, as on the Heddernheim relief in the museum at Wiesbaden, which is reproduced in *The Psychology of the Unconscious*.⁶ Then on the other side of that relief Mithras and Helios are depicted conversing about the condition of the dead bull, which is in a state of transforming into all sorts of living things.⁷ In Christianity the cross is a dead body in itself, like a man with extended arms. Therefore in an early medieval representation, Christ is standing in front of the cross, not crucified. When one stands in the sunshine with arms outstretched, one casts a shadow like the cross, so there the cross represents the shadow, the dead body.

Now, what the living body represents is a great problem. Of course the historical symbolism, as far as we know it, refers to the animal. The life of the body is animal life. There is no difference in principle between the physiology of the monkey and our own physiology; we have the physiology of an animal with warm blood. Another analogy is with the plant and so with the tree. Therefore the cross of Christ is also called the tree; Christ was crucified upon the tree. And an old legend

⁵ Sir Richard Burton, *Vikram and the Vampire or Tales of Hindu Devilry, from the Baital-Pachisi* (London, 1870).

⁶ See CW 7.

⁷ For the Heddernheim Relief, see CW 5, Pl. XL.


says that the wood for the cross was taken from the tree of paradise which was cut down and made into the two pillars, Achim and Boas, in front of Solomon's temple. Then these were thrown away, and discovered again, and made into the cross. So Christ was sacrificed on the original tree of life, and in the *transitus* he carried it. The plant or the tree always refers to a non-animal growth or development and this would be spiritual development. The life of the body is animal life: it is instinctive, contains warm blood, and is able to move about. Then within the body is spiritual or mental development, and that is always expressed as the growth of a flower or a miraculous plant or an extraordinary tree, like the tree that grows from above, the roots in heaven and the branches down toward the earth. That is Western as well as Eastern symbolism. The famous tree of Yoga grows from above, and Ruysbroek, the Flemish mystic, uses the same symbol for the spiritual development within the Christian mysticism.⁸ So in the one case the body or the corpse would mean the animal—we have to carry the sacrificed animal—and another aspect is that we have to carry our spiritual development which is also a part of nature, which has to do with nature just as much.

Then there is a further point to consider. Occasionally in my experience with patients—not only in that legend of Vikram—it is less a matter of a corpse than of the dead thing generally, a sort of preoccupation with the dead. This hangs together with the fact that the body is a sort of conglomeration of ancestral units called Mendelian units. Your face, for instance, obviously consists of certain units inherited from your family; your nose comes from an ancestor in the 18th century, and your eyes are perhaps from a relative in the 17th century. The characteristic protruding lower lip of the Spanish Habsburgs dates from the time of Maximilian; that is a Mendelian unit which occasionally appears in a very pronounced way in certain individuals. There is also an insane streak in the Spanish Habsburgs, which appeared in the 15th century and then disappeared, and then, according to the Mendelian law, it appeared again after two hundred years. Then there is an English family named Whitelock, which is characterized by the fact that most of the members, particularly the male members, have a tuft of white hair in the center of the skull; therefore they are called Whitelock. That is again a unit of a particular tenacity. So our

⁸ Jan van Ruysbroek (1293-1381), Flemish mystic. See, for instance, *The Spiritual Esponsals*, tr. Eric College (New York, 1953), pt. I, B, a.

whole body consists of inherited units from our father's or mother's side, from our particular clan or tribe for centuries past.

Now, each unit has also a psychical aspect, because the psyche represents the life or the living essence of the body. So the psyche of man contains all these units too in a way, a psychological representation; a certain trait of character is peculiar to the grandfather, another one to a great-great-grandfather, and so on. Just as much as the body derives from the ancestors, the psyche derives from them. It is like a sort-of puzzle, somewhat disjointed, not properly welded together to begin with, and then the mental development of the character, the development of the personality, consists in putting the puzzle together. The puzzle is represented in dreams sometimes by the motif of a swarm of small particles, little animals or flies or small fishes or particles of minerals, and those disjointed and disparate elements have to be brought together again by means of a peculiar process. This is the main theme of alchemy. It begins with the idea of totality, which is depicted as a circle. This is called "chaos," or the *massa confusa*, and it consists of all sorts of elements, a chaotic collection, but all in one mass. The task of the alchemist begins there. These particles are to be arranged by means of the squaring of the circle. The symbolic idea is to arrange the particles in a sort of crystal-like axis, which is called the quaternity, or the *quaternion*, or the *quadrangulum*, the four, and to each point a particular quality is given.



That is what we would call the differentiation of the psychological functions. You see, it is a fact that certain people start with an intuitive gift, for instance, which will become their main function, the function by means of which they adapt. A man who is born with a good brain will naturally use his intelligence to adapt; he will not use his feelings which are not then developed. And a man who is very musical will surely use his musical gift in making his career and not his philosophical faculty, which is practically non-existent. So one will use his feeling, another one his sense of reality, and so on, and each time there will be a one-sided product. The study of these one-sided human products led me to the idea of the four functions, and nowadays we think that we should have not only one differentiated function but should take into consideration that there are others, and that a real adaptation to the world needs four functions—or at least more than one. And this is something like the ideas of those old alchemists who wanted to produce out of chaos a symmetrical arrangement of the quaternity. The four quarters of the circle indicate the fire, the air, the water, and the earth regions, and when they are arranged they will make in the center

the *quinta essentia*, the fifth essence; the four essences are in the corners and in the center is the fifth. That is the famous concept of the *quinta essentia*, a new unit which is also called the *rotundum*, the roundness, or the round complete thing. It is again that circle of the beginning but this circle has now the *anima mundi*, the soul of the world, which was hidden in chaos. At first all the elements were completely mixed in that round chaos, and the center was hidden; then the alchemist disentangles these elements and arranges them in a regular figure, like a crystal. That is the idea of the philosopher's stone in which the original round thing appears again, and this time it is the spiritual body, the ethereal thing, the *anima mundi*, the redeemed microcosmos.

The motif of the swarm of little fishes or other little objects is also found in alchemy, representing the disjointed elements. And it is often in children's dreams: I have dealt with such a case in one of my dream seminars at the E.T.H., a child who died unexpectedly about a year after she had produced a series of the most extraordinary dreams, practically all containing the swarm motif. There was a cosmological dream where it was clearly visible how the swarm comes into existence, or how it is synthesized, and how it is dissolved into the swarm. The Mendelian units join together physiologically as well as psychically and then disintegrate again. That anticipated her death: her psyche was loosely connected, and when something adverse happened it dissolved into these units. Now, each of those particles is a Mendelian unit inasmuch as it is living; for instance, your nose is living. You live inasmuch as these Mendelian units are living. They have souls, are endowed with psychic life, the psychic life of that ancestor; or you can call it part of an ancestral soul. So inasmuch as you are like your nose, or can concentrate upon your nose, you become at once identical with the grandfather who had your nose. If your brain happens to be exactly like that of the great-grandfather, you are identical with him, and nothing can help you there—you have to function as if you were entirely possessed by him. It is difficult, or quite impossible, to indicate the size of Mendelian units; some are bigger, some are smaller, and so you have either large areas or small areas of ancestral souls included within you. At all events, you are a collection of ancestral spirits, and the psychological problem is how to find yourself in that crowd. Somewhere you are also a spirit—somewhere you have the secret of your particular pattern.

Now, that is in this circle of chaos but you don't know where, and then you have to go through that whole procedure of the squaring of the circle in order to find out the *quinta essentia* which is the self. The alchemists said it was of a celestial blue color because it was heaven, and

since it was round, globular, they called it "heaven in ourselves." That is their idea of the self. As we are contained in the heaven, so we are contained in the self, and the self is the *quinta essentia*. Now, when someone is threatened with dissolution, it is just as if these particles could not be united, as if the ancestral souls would not come together. I am telling you all this in order to explain that other aspect of the dead: it is not only the dead body, but the spirits of the dead. So if a primitive wants to become a medicine man, a superior man, he must be able to talk to the dead, must be able to reconcile them. For the dead are the makers of illnesses, causing all the trouble to the tribe; and then the medicine man is called upon because he is supposed to be able to talk to the ancestral spirits and make a compromise with them, to lay them or to integrate them properly. That is necessary for everybody in order to develop mentally and spiritually. He has to collect these spirits and make them into a whole, integrate them; and that difficult task, the integration process, is called the carrying of the corpse of the ancestors, or the burden of the ancestors.

Mrs. von Roques: There is a very clear example in an Irish myth. The hero Fionn⁹ goes out with his mother. First she carries him, then after a while they change and he carries his mother, but he gradually loses parts of her until he has only her feet, and those he throws into a lake belonging to a witch. Then he enters the house of the witch and she tells him he must go and fish in the lake, and he catches two fishes which are the feet of his mother. After that, he has to cook them and they must not have any spots from a too hot fire. But they do get spots and he puts his thumb on them and burns it, and from that day, he is wise when he sucks his thumb.

Prof. Jung: That is part of such a mystery, the integration and disintegration. Being carried by the mother means being carried by the unconscious, and carrying the mother would of course mean carrying the unconscious. The mother, as the basis, the source, the origin of our being, always means the totality of the spirit world, and in carrying the mother one is doing what Christ has done; Christ carried his mother (the cross) and also his whole ancestral heaven and hell. So the past was fulfilled. Being of royal (King David's) blood, Christ had to carry the promise of the past, and in order to fulfil it he had to become king of a spiritual world. The Christian idea of the miraculous draft of fishes also means the integration of all parts into one. For instance, the Pope's

⁹ A popular favorite of Irish folktales, this is the Finn of *Finnegans Wake* which Jung read at least in part in its serial publication as *Work in Progress* (CW 15, par. 165).

ring, the Fisher Ring, is an intaglio with the miraculous draft of fishes engraved on it. The same motif is in the book of the so-called *Shepherd of Hermas* (about 15 A.D.), where the multitude is represented by people coming from the four corners of the world.¹⁰ Each one brings a stone or is himself a stone, and they fit the stones and themselves into a tower; then instantly the stones melt together with no visible joints, which of course makes an extraordinarily strong unit. It symbolizes the construction of the church. Hermas was said to be the brother of the second bishop of Rome, and the main problem then was the construction of the church. But it is also an individuation symbol.

Mr. Baumann: There are documents about the building of the pyramids, in which it is said that the surface was built of very diverse stones—alabaster, granite, limestone, etc.—and the joints were so carefully made that not even a knife-blade could be put between.

Prof. Jung: Yes, presumably it is the same idea, the building symbolizing absolute unity, no joints left. And so the original, somewhat disjointed and unadapted Mendelian units are to be fitted together so finely and closely that they can no longer separate. If they separate in life, it means schizophrenia, the dissociation of the mind. Then there are cases where one or another of these units cannot be fitted in, and that may be the cause of a neurosis, or it may be a latent psychosis, or any other trouble. It is like a sort of inclusion. I call these cases *Einschlüsse*, which means something locked in. It is like those peculiar phenomena where a teratoma is found to contain parts of an embryo, teeth or fingers or hair or something like an eye. They are parts of an unfinished foetus which was included in the body of the twin. The same phenomena occur in mental conditions also—a second personality, a psychological twin included in the psychical organism. That may cause much trouble. We have such a case also in the dream seminar.¹¹

¹⁰ *Shepherd of Hermas*, see *Dream Sem.*, pp. 185-86, and p. 106n above.

¹¹ See *Dream Sem.*, p. 311.

LECTURE V

16 November 1938

Prof. Jung:

We were speaking last week about the multitude of the collective man in the unconscious of one individual, and I mentioned the idea of the medieval philosophers, that the alchemical development—which of course is a psychological development—starts from *chaos*. They understood chaos to be a multitude of fragments of units, which they represented as an assembly of the gods, like the Olympian gods, for example. In Egypt there was a small company and a large company of gods, with the peculiarity that the last of the series of the large company was always double but counted as one. This is a very strange idea which one also finds in the book by Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, under the heading, “The Companies of the Gods.”¹ And there is the same idea in alchemy in the uncertainty about the 3 or 4 or the 7 and 8. It is as if the last number were always double, whatever that means; I just wanted to call your attention to it. These companies represent the psychical multitude, or the multitudinous quality of the unconscious. The unconscious consists of the multitude and is therefore always represented by a crowd of collective beings. The collective unconscious is projected into the crowd, the crowd represents it, and what we call “mob psychology” is really the psychology of the unconscious. Therefore, crowd psychology is archaic psychology. This peculiarity of our unconscious was realized long ago. Those companies of the gods represented it, and in the Middle Ages it became the alchemists’ idea of chaos. By that time the old idea of the assembly of the gods, the pantheon, had practically disappeared, or was reduced to a triune god.

The three were a company originally, it was really a triad, but under the influence of monotheism it was distilled or sublimated to a unity. The Trinity still contains the idea of the triad however, and it was a tre-

¹ E. T. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. (London, 1904).

mendous difficulty for the western mind to produce the idea of three persons in one. Since nobody takes it very seriously nowadays, since nobody bothers his head about it, it has ceased to be a problem; but the moment it is taken seriously, one will be confronted with that extraordinary puzzle of making three into one. It is a sort of compromise, an attempt to give a head to the multitude of the collective unconscious. You see, the original monotheism, like Jahvehism in Israel, or the monotheism of Amenhotep IV in Egypt, was possible because it was a sort of reformation against a background of extreme polytheism. There were the gods of the Babylonians, and of the Phoenicians, for instance, and Jahveh was the god of Israel, but by no means the only one. In the course of time he had undergone the evolution which was characteristic of the Egyptian gods—practically every god in Egypt arrived at the dignity of the world creator. Sometimes it was the god of Heliopolis, at another time, of Thebes, or of any other town, and each one was supposed to be the world creator. There was a sort of antagonism amongst the priests, an ambition to make their god the only one. That was the original monotheism, but later on, in Roman and Hellenistic antiquity for instance, there were very marked attempts to create the one god; the writers of the time already began to speak of one god, quite apart from Christianity.

For example, you may remember a legend from very early times which I have quoted here before, about the sea-captain who arrived in Ostia and demanded immediate audience with the Emperor, in order to tell him very important news: As his ship was passing a certain Greek island, they heard such a tremendous clamor there in the night that they approached and found that the people were wailing and lamenting because the great god Pan had died. You know Pan was originally a very minor god, an inferior local demon of the fields, but his name suggests the Greek *tò pan* which means the All, the universe, so he became a universal god. That was a serious attempt at monotheism out of polytheism. Buddha's great reformation in India was such an attempt, against the immense crowd of two and a half million Hindu gods. Buddha reduced them all to the one figure of the Perfect One, the Buddha himself—in that case a man but with the idea of absolute perfection. You know, in Buddhism, even the gods must become human, must be born as men in order to be redeemed. A god is merely a being that lives much longer than the ordinary human being and under very much more favorable circumstances; he lives perhaps for aeons of time, yet the end will come. Even the supreme gods, the so-called Brahmas, were supposed to have their appointed time and then

they also would suddenly come to an end; when their karma was fulfilled, they would die or be reborn. That is described in one of the Buddhist texts which I have mentioned here: when the karma of the semidivine beings that surround Brahma is fulfilled, they suddenly vanish, nothing is left. So we have plenty of evidence for the idea of the multitude that becomes transformed into one supreme being.

I have brought you today some pictures of the alchemical chaos. The first is a classical representation, the frontispiece of the *Songe de Poliphile*. At the bottom of the page, chaos is in the form of a circle containing irregular fragments which are also characterized by the planetary signs. This is a company of the gods—the planetary signs, as you know,





refer to the gods. For instance, iron is the sign of Mars, tin, the sign of Jupiter, silver, the sign of the moon, and copper, the sign of Venus. Sometimes instead of these fragments, the gods are presented as a collection of minerals or metals in the subterranean cave, as if they had degenerated into terrestrial bodies.

Then I want to show you the so-called Ripley scroll. It is from the British Museum, a ms of the 16th century. In this, chaos is not a collection of fragments but it is also a dark sphere, and it is represented as the basis of the alchemical process. Out of the dark sphere of chaos, vaporous exhalations rise. It is a sort of cosmic representation, like the earth in a primordial state, still a glowing globe from which those fumes issue. Then out of this glowing vaporous globe, the whole alchemical procedure starts, and it ascends to the company of the gods above. The idea is that the fumes are spirits or breath-beings, that develop, transform, and finally reveal their nature up above as the company of the gods. And all those gods are now contributing to the vase in which the *coniunctio* takes place, out of which comes the divine being. This is the *Puer Aeternus*, or the *Rebis*, the hermaphrodite. Then another kind of *coniunctio* takes place, belonging in another system of thought, which we shall presently meet in *Zarathustra*, namely, the union with the cerebro-spinal being, the toad, snake, or lizard. That is a sort of anima which becomes united with the *Puer Aeternus* and together they make the hermaphrodite. Also there is the idea here of the *nyagrodha* tree growing from above, the roots in heaven. Out of that comes the female part of the male god. This is the unit, the *quinta essentia*, of the company of the gods, the summing up of the transformation of the company of the gods into the one being, the process beginning in the dark sphere that represents chaos. The round sphere is also often represented by the *ouroboros* that eats its own tail.


Similar representations occur in practical psychology: these symbols are repeated fairly often in the beginning of the individuation process. I will show you the original of an unconscious picture which I used to illustrate one of my Eranos lectures.² The patient herself is represented as grown fast to the rock—in other words, identical with the unconscious which is the earth. The boulders are egg-shaped and really mean eggs, or the seed substance that is to be transformed. The next stage is in this picture of lightning striking the earth, and instead of the

² Jung delivered his paper "A Study in the Process of Individuation" at the Eranos Conference of 1933. As revised and expanded it appears in CW 9 i under its original title. The two paintings, with others from the same case, are reproduced in color following p. 292.



human being there is a perfectly round incandescent sphere, like the earth in a primeval incandescent condition, split off from the surrounding chaos—a bit of chaos is now cut loose from the surrounding chaos, as on the frontispiece of the *Songes de Poliphile*. The lightning means an influence which suddenly starts the individuation process: namely, that separation of a certain area of chaos. It is as if the individual, as depicted here, had been partially buried in chaos, only the upper part of her body being detached. You see, she was singled out, a separate being with a consciousness of her own, but in the lower stories she was not at all separated from the universe, one could say. And then through this lightning she suddenly appears as a whole, a circle or a globe, separated from the *participation mystique* with chaos, or, as we would say, with the collective unconscious. She is still a piece of chaos, and every piece contains chaos, is chaos, has chaotic quality, but the further development of this series leads into a differentiation of this primordial incandescent globe.

Then here are two photographs of pictures made by another patient. In the first, one gets the impression of a terribly cut-up condition: it looks like sort-of spiders' webs. This is a state of complete chaos,



with many splits in it, and a close analysis shows that it is a dissolved human body; one can discern an eye in it, and in the original, which is larger, one can make out other organs and blood. This would point to a schizophrenic condition, but it is a liquid schizophrenia, not a congealed case—a latent psychosis, not very serious but dangerous enough. It is as if those sharp splits, like splitting wood or ice with sharp edges, might eventually cut the whole human being into fragments. Then the next state is the big snake, and here we see the close association. She herself is almost crushed in the coils of an enormous serpent. This is again chaos but in the form of the great leviathan, as chaos is often represented in alchemy by the *ouroboros*, the great dragon. That change took place practically from one day to the next. On one day in the beginning she was perfectly chaotic, and the next move was a transformation of the original chaos into the serpent of chaos. This was a great advance, for the chaos was then in a form and the splits had disappeared; that sort of dead chaos became vivified in the form of the great original serpent. In other words, the chaos lost its multitudinous quality and became, as it were, personified; it was



gathered together and shaped into one being, a representative of the cerebro-spinal system.

Physiologically it would probably mean the transition from the state of the sympathetic nervous system into the cerebro-spinal system. Anything that is in the state of the sympathetic system has the character of a multitude, and if the sympathetic system is disturbed, there are often dreams which point to the dissolution or disintegration of the body, death dreams—or it may be mental death, a certain kind of destruction of the brain having the character of a multitude. This is a particularly important symptom for the doctor in making a diagnosis or a prognosis. I have a series of children's dreams in which the multitude occurs in the form of swarms of ants or flies. I mentioned a case last week where the whole series of dreams were premonitory of the child's death, the dreams anticipated the end; she died about a year later from an acute disease. I got the dreams before the child was ill and instantly had a fatal impression, but I was not sure whether it meant schizophrenia or the dissolution of the body. One cannot always tell, but that it meant something fatal was quite clear.

Then one can sometimes conclude as to the localization of the trouble. I had another case, a man who was himself a doctor and an alienist. He had had a peculiar kind of paralytic attacks, and the diagnosis was G.P.I. (general paralysis of the insane), but there was no syphilitic infection. He himself and some of his colleagues thought it was epilepsy, or a psychogenic trouble—that there was nothing the matter with his nervous system, that he was just hysterical—and he came to me for my diagnosis. He wanted to know exactly what it was because the attacks were quite alarming. Since there were no sufficiently decisive symptoms, I asked him for his dreams, and found that he had had a very remarkable dream at a time when he was particularly worried about his illness. He dreamt of a sort of hollow place, perhaps a gorge, where there had formerly been a lake. This had left a deposit of slime in which a prehistoric animal, a mammal something like a rhino, had been caught and had become fossilized. I assumed that his dream would have to do with his condition, taking into account that he was a doctor himself of course, so I made the following argument with myself: There is something the matter with the nervous system—his symptoms did not impress me as being psychogenic at all—and the animal in the dream is a relatively low prehistoric animal, belonging to a different stage of development from the actual brain of the present time, so it must refer to the lower stratas, the ganglia below the main brain. Because these animals have a small and unimportant development of the cerebrum, only the lower part of the brain would be de-

veloped, and that localizes the seat of the disease. Now what kind of disease? Well, there was an inundation which left a deposit. What can that be? Too much water probably in one of the caves, in one of the ventricles of the brain, an inundation, an inflammation, causing this serum which contains a lot of floating fibrous material, so when the water gets low it leaves a deposit. Therefore it must be the remains of an inflammatory process which had taken place in the ventricles.

Then I enquired into his history and it turned out that shortly before this disease had begun, he had a recrudescence of an old wound he had received in the war, a compound fracture of the thigh with a very bad infection. The whole thing was cured and nothing remained, yet these symptoms began soon after. I told him my guess and he did not know of course; it was a very adventurous way to arrive at a diagnosis. But he went then to one of the great Harley Street brain specialists who said it must be the remains of an inflammation of the ventricle. Well now, in the case of that other patient, the chaos becomes personified or synthesized in the next move by the serpent, which is a low cerebro-spinal animal. A higher form would be one of these prehistoric pachyderms, a mammal with warm blood.

Now I have here two more representations where the symbolism is quite plain. They are from the *Viridarium*, a book containing a number




of symbolic pictures attributed to famous old alchemists. This collection was made by Michael Majer who dates only from the 16th century, but the picture I am showing you is attributed to Avicenna the Arab, an alchemist of the 13th century.³ An eagle is flying above with a chain on his talons which reaches down to earth, where a toad is fastened to the other end of it. The verse that goes with it says,

Bufonum terrenum Aquile conjunge volanti,
In nostra cernes arte magisterium.

That means: "Connect the earthly toad with the flying eagle and thou shalt understand the secret of our art." The flying eagle can be compared to Zarathustra's eagle and the toad corresponds to his serpent, the eagle representing the spirit or the mind, or a flying thought-being that consists of breath, while the toad just hops on the earth, an utterly chthonic animal. The second picture shows the company of the planetary gods in the interior of the earth.

Now we will continue chapter 51, "On Passing-By." As you know,



³ Michael Maier (Majer), 16th-century alchemist, was a major source of Jung's alchemical lore. Daniel Stolcius de Stolcenberg, *Viridarium Chymicum* . . . (Frankfort on Main, 1624). Avicenna, 10th-11th century, Persian philosopher, physician.

this town is a representation of the multitude; it represents the collective man in Nietzsche himself, and we have already asked what his purpose was in lingering there. Having reviled the collective man enough already, why should he care to be irritated by him again? And then the fool comes and warns him not to enter the city. This is as if Nietzsche/Zarathustra had been quite unconscious of what he was really looking for in that place and had said to himself, "Don't be a fool, you know you despise those people. Why should you enter the city? What have you lost there?" And as if that tendency, that reaction, then became personified. Now would you say that this fool was pathological or abnormal? I should say that this fool makes sense.

Why wouldst thou wade through this mire? Have pity upon thy foot! Spit rather on the gate of the city, and—turn back!

Here is the hell for anchorites' thoughts: here are great thoughts seethed alive and boiled small.

Here do all great sentiments decay: here may only rattle-boned sensations rattle!

Smellest thou not already the shambles and cookshops of the spirit? Steameth not this city with the fumes of slaughtered spirit?

Seest thou not the souls hanging like limp dirty rags?—And they make newspapers also out of these rags!

Hearst thou not how spirit hath here become a verbal game? Loathsome verbal swill doth it vomit forth!—And they make newspapers also out of this verbal swill.

They hound one another, and know not whither! They inflame one another, and know not why! They tinkle with their pinchbeck, they jingle with their gold.

They are cold, and seek warmth from distilled waters: they are inflamed, and seek coolness from frozen spirits; they are all sick and sore through public opinion.

You see, the fool reviles the great city; he is really reiterating the words of Zarathustra. But it is against Zarathustra's apparent tendency. We assume that he wants to differentiate himself from the collective man, to make sure that he is not like that rabble, that *canaille*, and to tell his world what one should be really. Yet instead of going home to his cave he lingers there at the gate of the city, and then the fool comes out saying just what he has been saying himself. This is pretty bewildering. Why should that fool, obviously a compensatory figure, simply repeat Zarathustra's words? Yet he seems to have a noble intention: namely, to prevent Zarathustra from stepping into that mire. Now, that is a typ-

ical example of the way certain dreams work. Do you know what I mean?

Mrs. Fierz: I don't know what you mean, but I thought that it was a sort of mirror.

Prof. Jung: Absolutely, yes.

Mrs. Fierz: And a sort of overdone mirror, but pointing it all out very sharply so that the man has a chance to see what he is doing.

Prof. Jung: That he has a chance, that is it. Those among you who are interested in dreams will inevitably come across certain dreams which rub it in; that is, dreams which seem first to work in a direction which is just the direction you are afraid of. You think, "Now, too bad," for instead of compensating, the dream says "Go on, follow that road"—painting that road in marvelous colors. You can see that in love affairs, for instance, which in every respect are absolutely wrong and destructive, but the dreams say, "Just go on, that is the right way, is it not marvelous?"—and they force people, perhaps quite against the judgment of the analyst, on an obviously wrong way because it is a destructive way. Then of course you feel that you have to do something about it, but the only thing open to you is to deny the compensation theory of dreams, to say: "Your conscious is absolutely destructive and your dreams as well"—and that is not what one calls compensation.

Now India has a very helpful idea in that respect. Their idea of the great illusion, Maya, is not mere foolishness. One might ask why the god should create the world when it is only his own illusion, but Maya has a purpose. You see, matter is Prakrti, the female counterpart of the god, the goddess that plays up to Shiva, the blind creator that doesn't know himself—or to Prajapati, another name of the creator. In the Samkhya philosophy Prakrti dances Maya to the god, repeating the process of the great illusion innumerable times so that he can understand himself in all his infinite aspects. Thus the veil of Maya is a sort of private theater in which the god can see all aspects of himself and so become conscious. The only chance for the creator god to know himself is when Prakrti is performing for him. And this is despite the fact that it is his illusion, that it is Maya and should be dissolved because illusion means suffering and suffering should be dispelled. One might say, "Stop your illusion as soon as possible, your illusion will make you suffer." Prakrti nevertheless goes on dancing Maya because the point is, not that you should not suffer, but that you should not be blind, that you should see all aspects. So the compensation is there, only it is on a much greater scale than we thought. If you have dreams that recommend the wrong way, the destructive way, it is that they have the pur-

pose—like the dancing of Prakrti—of showing you all aspects, of giving you a full experience of your being, even the experience of your destructiveness. It is a gruesome game: there are cases which are just tragic, and you cannot interfere. Nature is awful, and I often ask myself, should one not interfere? But one cannot really, it is impossible, because fate must be fulfilled. It is apparently more important to nature that one should have consciousness, understanding, than to avoid suffering.

So that fool is now playing the helpful wrong role, he continues the arch-error of Zarathustra in reviling the collective man. A certain amount of critique is quite right—he should see and know the collective man—but no use reviling him because he is then simply reviling his own body, his earthly existence, the ordinary man who is the actual supporter of life. In his mind alone he doesn't live; it is the banal collective man who lives, the man who carries on his existence in a heated room and eats three times a day and even earns money to pay for his needs. That very ordinary creature is the supporter of life, and if Nietzsche reviles that part of himself, he scolds himself out of life, exiles himself. Then he becomes nothing but an anchorite's thoughts, which will naturally be destroyed when they come into contact with collectivity. So the fool is really making the attempt at driving Zarathustra away from the collective man, and if Zarathustra keeps on returning to the big city, it indicates a very unrealized desire, or a need, to make a contact again with the collective man, in spite of the fact that he has reviled him consciously. Now I think we can leave this fool who exaggerates and compensates Zarathustra's attitude, and see how Zarathustra reacts to his own exaggeration. It is in the middle of the next page:

Stop this at once! called out Zarathustra, long have thy speech and thy species disgusted me!

Why didst thou live so long by the swamp, that thou thyself hadst to become a frog and a toad?

The fool was talking exactly in the style of Zarathustra, and now suddenly Zarathustra turns against him—as if he, Zarathustra, had not said the same. What is happening here?

Miss Hannah: It is a case of having to meet yourself, is it not?

Prof. Jung: That is true. When you hold an exaggerated position and then encounter it objectively, either you are unable to recognize it, or you refuse it, deny it. It works in this way, I have a good example: I had an uncle who was a mechanical genius and when Edison invented the

phonograph, he read about it and made one for himself. His wife was a sort of Xanthippe—though of course she had her point too, you can imagine such a man is not quite easy for a wife—and once she went for him and gave him a furious sermon. He meanwhile quietly let the phonograph take a record of it. Then the next day when she had quieted down, he said, “I must show you something funny, and turned the phonograph on. And she said: “That is not true, I never said such a thing!” She simply denied that objectivation of herself. Thus far the role of the fool has worked in the same way: the fool took over Zarathustra’s own mind and objectified it, and when Zarathustra saw it, he denied it completely. And he accused the fool of having lived so long by the swamp that he had become a frog and a toad. These metaphors are quite interesting. What do they mean?

Mrs. Fierz: The swamp is the birthplace of low forms of life, and a frog or a toad is a low form of the human body.

Prof. Jung: Well, the interesting fact is that the frog or the toad is the first attempt of nature to make a being with two legs and two arms and no tail. That is the first edition of man, but it is on the level of cold-blooded animals. You see, whatever one may think from the biological side about such an analogy, that analogy has been made. It is not my invention that man comes up from the swamp—the unconscious—where all the little beasts abound, where life begins to develop from germs practically. The swamp is an exceedingly fertile place, teeming with low life; every drop in it is filled with low life, and that is an excellent image of the collective unconscious, where everything is breathing and breeding. And then up comes a primitive man, almost non-human, a very low form that is almost unacceptable. There is a certain fairy tale in that connection: A princess lost her golden ball. It fell into a well and was gone, and the frog was the only one who could dive down and get it. But she had to submit to a series of conditions which in the long run transformed the frog into a prince, the redeemer.

You see, it is very apt that the fool should be called “a frog,” since he is a very primitive being, a sort of low animal that comes up from the collective unconscious. Of course he ought to be accepted by consciousness, and here again Nietzsche makes a tragic mistake: he doesn’t reflect about it, doesn’t try to explain that figure to himself, never stops to ask why the fool should appear and what it means. If he could only realize that the fool was repeating his own words, he would instantly draw the conclusion, “I have been the fool, Prakrti shows me that I am the fool.” Then he would ask himself, “But why do I talk like a fool? Well, something is driving me crazy, something is at me.” And

he would see that the frog, a low man, the fool who was called Zarathustra's ape, his more primitive self—that thing wanted to get at him. Then he could ask himself, "But why does that low thing want to get at me?"—and the answer would obviously be, "Because I am too differentiated, too high, too flimsy and airy; I have an exaggerated mind." He might then conclude that the frog man was the bearer of the good news; he might see that the unconscious was offering him something which would be most useful. While he is talking, the unconscious flows in and gives him that healthy and useful symbolism, but he only uses it as a new means of reviling a seeming opponent.

This idea that the primitive being from the collective unconscious is a frog, we encounter again, at least in an illusion, on the Ripley scroll, where the dragon is persecuting a small frog.⁴ The frog is the being that comes from below, and the dragon—originally the *ouroboros*—represents chaos underneath, and naturally he will try to catch the frog and prevent its becoming the thing above. For the frog becomes the *Puer Aeternus*; it will appear in the assembly of the gods. One could call the assembly of the gods the brain, and there in the brain, in consciousness, the frog appears as the *Puer Aeternus* plus the being that comes from above. Quite on top is a female with a salamander's tail and the feet of a frog: it is half frog or lizard and half human. That is a typical old representation of the anima, or the consort of the gods. In India you see this figure in the famous rock sculpture at Mamallipuram, where the birth of the Ganges river is represented as a goddess, female above and serpent below. And that is the classical representation of Lilith, Adam's first wife, who is also identified with the serpent on the tree of knowledge in paradise, the supposed devil that tells Adam and Eve that they should eat of the fruit. And it is the same in these medieval alchemistic pictures, which means that the female is only partially human, and partially she is a cerebro-spinal animal, half woman, half serpent, being stuck in the lower parts of the nervous system.

Now Zarathustra goes on reviling the fool:

Floweth there not a tainted, frothy, swamp-blood in thine own veins, when thou hast thus learned to croak and revile?

Why wentest thou not into the forest? Or why didst thou not till the ground? Is the sea not full of green islands?

He only becomes conscious of this very good advice when the reviling is objectified.

⁴ Sir George Ripley (c. 1415-90) was an English alchemist very often cited by Jung in the CW.

I despise thy contempt; and when thou warnedst me—why didst thou not warn thyself?

It is really amazing that a man in his senses could write such contradictions. If he only could have stopped, waited a moment, and asked, "But what have I done? What am I doing? It is irritatingly like what one reads in the newspapers nowadays.

Out of love alone shall my contempt and my warning bird take wing; but not out of the swamp!

He thinks he would take it if a golden eagle would come and serve it on a golden tray. But a frog out of the swamp! What is the good of something coming out of the unconscious, the swamp in oneself! That is the Christian prejudice.

They call thee mine ape, thou foaming fool: but I call thee my grunting-pig,—by thy grunting, thou spoilest even my praise of folly.

Here he discovers that he even contains a grunting pig, a particularly bad one, a pig with its nose in the mire, a dirty, disgusting animal. But of course he doesn't realize what that means.

What was it that first made thee grunt? Because no one sufficiently flattered thee:—therefore didst thou seat thyself beside this filth, that thou mightest have cause for much grunting.

This is a tremendous realization, really, so one could expect some humbleness. After such a recognition one could almost expect Nietzsche to take what he is saying a little more into consideration.

That thou mightest have cause for much vengeance! For vengeance, thou vain fool, is all thy foaming; I have divined thee well!

But not himself. He sees very well where the fool is wrong but unfortunately he doesn't know that he himself is the fool.

But thy fools'-word injureth *me* [*me* emphasized] even when thou art right! And even if Zarathustra's word were a hundred times justified, thou wouldst ever—do wrong with my word! [Because it is against him.]

Thus spake Zarathustra. Then did he look on the great city and sighed, and was long silent. At last he spake thus:

I loathe also this great city, and not only this fool. Here and there—there is nothing to better, nothing to worsen.

Woe to this great city—and I would that I already saw the pillar of fire in which it will be consumed!

For such pillars of fire must precede the great noontide. But this hath its time and its own fate.—

This precept, however, give I unto thee, in parting, thou fool: Where one can no longer love, there should one—*pass by*—

Thus spake Zarathustra, and passed by the fool and the great city.

So he really loved the great city: that was the reason he waited so long. But why did he revile what he loved? Exactly as he tells the fool: because they did not sufficiently flatter him. So he has feelings of vengeance, he is resentful. It is tantalizing that Nietzsche did not realize it. Now there is a peculiar metaphor in the last verse, the pillars of fire. Why *pillars* of fire?

Mrs. Sigg: It is in the Old Testament, the pillar of fire in the desert.⁵

Prof. Jung: Yes, Jahveh leading his people in the desert, in the day a pillar of cloud, in the night a pillar of fire. Jahveh is a fiery god, a devouring fire. This is a very Protestant vision, absolutely in the style of the Old Testament. It means: I wish that Jahveh's fire would fall upon the heads of the crowd, as in Sodom and Gomorrah. I wish that the pillar of fire would eat up that rabble. This would be to him the great noontide, the consuming fire of Jahveh would be the sign that the great noontide was beginning. But then he himself would be consumed of course. Because he wishes that on the ordinary collective man in himself, he wishes it on his own body; but his soul will die first just because his body is consumed. That is the fire of madness, the outburst of mad passion. As in dreams, a fire in the house always means an outburst of passion or a panic. So this fire, Jahveh's fire, is a sort of destructive panic, and it is the terrible god. The fear of God is just as important as the love of God, for he is not only a loving God, but also terrible; otherwise what would be his power? Man never appreciates what is lovely—he appreciates what he is afraid of. So the curse Nietzsche pronounces here works directly against his body, against the banal human creature in himself upon which he lives. By that curse he prepares his own downfall. He thinks that this pillar of fire precedes the great noontide, but it would be the holocaust. If that fire comes it will be a terrible conflagration. I rather insist upon these passages, because we are now exactly in the beginning of the holocaust.

⁵ Exodus 13:21.

LECTURE VI

30 November 1938

Prof. Jung:

In the preceding chapter, you remember, Zarathustra had that interview with the fool who repeated practically everything Zarathustra had said. He took on Zarathustra's role for the obvious purpose of making him conscious of something. Now what was the fool intending?

Mrs. Crowley: Did we not already say, to be a mirror? It was to mirror his shadow in a sense.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is a compensation exactly as it is in dreams. Nietzsche, in his identity with Zarathustra, reviles the collective man without realizing that he is a collective man himself, so he is really reviling himself. And so he creates a gap between his consciousness and the biological fact that he is like everybody else; his stomach, his heart, his lungs are exactly like everybody's organs. The only difference between himself and the ordinary man is that his thoughts reach a bit farther and his mind is a bit richer. Of course he may criticize collective man, but to revile him amounts to a *ressentiment* against himself, creating, as I said, a tremendous gap, a split, in his own personality. Now, when one goes to the extreme in such an endeavor, one usually encounters a reaction on the part of the unconscious; one has a dream or some other experience which shows what one is doing. So this encounter with the fool could be a dream just as well; it is as if he dreamt of a madman assailing him and saying, curiously enough, exactly what Nietzsche had already said. From this we see that Nietzsche is identical with the fool—the fool is only another side or aspect of himself,—and when he shouts down the fool, it means he is shouting himself down. He even creates the fool a second time, you see, to show him what he ought to do, but he does it unconsciously, naively, without realizing that he is really correcting himself, his own views. And because it is done unconsciously, what may we expect in the subsequent chapter?

Miss Hannah: A repetition.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he goes on in the same style because he has not re-

alized the experience. No sooner is that episode dealt with than he simply goes on as before, as if nothing had happened in between. Even the title of the next chapter, "The Apostates," shows that he is continuing to revile his contemporaries, giving vent to all his resentment. For instance, he says in the fourth verse,

Verily, many of them once lifted their legs like the dancer; to them winked the laughter of my wisdom:—then did they bethink themselves. Just now have I seen them bent down—to creep to the cross.

He is now attacking the good Christians, and that goes on all through this chapter and the next, "The Return Home." It is hardly worthwhile to spend time on these critical remarks because they are so clearly based on his resentment. I only want to call your attention to the last verse, where he says,

The grave-diggers dig for themselves diseases. Under old rubbish rest bad vapours. One should not stir up the marsh. One should live on mountains.

Here he eventually reaches a sort of insight. He was just grave-digging before; he dug graves for all the people he was criticizing, saying that they should all be done away with, burned up like wood or chaff. But he comes to the conclusion here that it is not really worthwhile to dig graves—it is even obnoxious. In the German text it says *Die Totengräber graben sich Krankheiten an*, which means that they have dug graves for others so long that they even caught their diseases. A certain insight is beginning to dawn, and therefore he says one should not stir up the marsh: it contains too many bad vapors—one should live on the mountains instead. That is of course again the wrong conclusion. The lower regions are perfectly ordinary and normal; they are only bad because he makes them bad. Unfortunately enough, he has certain thoughts which transcend the lower regions, but that doesn't mean that he is identical with those high thoughts. In that respect he is exactly like the tenor who thinks he is identical with his high notes; but the tenor is a very ordinary man, and the more he identifies with his beautiful high notes, the lower his character will be, if it is only by way of compensation. So Nietzsche's insight remains only half an insight; he doesn't draw the right conclusions, and again he makes the attempt to lift himself up out of the marsh of other people. He says,

With blessed nostrils do I again breathe mountain-freedom.
Freed at last is my nose from the smell of all human hubbub!

That is his extraordinary illusion. He thinks when he is climbing up to the Engadine, filling his lungs with the wonderful mountain air, that he had gotten rid of himself. But he carries all the collective hubbub with him up to the mountains, because he himself is the ordinary man.

With sharp breezes tickled, as with sparkling wine, sneezeth my soul—sneezeth, and shouteth self-congratulatingly: “Health to thee!”

The sneezing refers to the first sneeze of the new-born child. The primitives assume that in the moment when the child sneezes for the first time after birth, the soul enters the body. In Genesis it is said that God breathed the breath of life into the nostrils of Adam, and in that moment he became a living soul. That is the moment of sneezing. So when a negro king happens to sneeze, the whole crowd bows for about five minutes and everybody congratulates him, because it means that a new soul has entered the king; in other words, an increase of life, libido, mana, vital energy. Therefore we still say, “Health to thee” when someone sneezes, because the old archetypal idea that a new soul has entered the body when we sneeze is still alive. It is a lucky moment but also a dangerous one, for it is not sure what kind of soul it may be, so one must say “Prosit. Health, Luck to thee,” hoping thereby to propitiate the moment, to make it a lucky moment. A bad ancestral soul or any bad soul may be hovering over a person, and by that good wish one tries to prevent its entrance, or to turn the bad luck into good luck. So Nietzsche understands the moment when he leaves the lower regions as a sort of rebirth of his own soul, as if a new soul has entered him.

Mrs. Baumann: In English the old-fashioned way is to say, “God bless you” when anyone sneezes.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the same propitiatory mantra. And you see it also denotes the moment of a change of mind apparently. He has been occupied too long with the lower people, and now he realizes that, by being their grave-digger, he might get infected by their diseases. So there is a sort of renewal. Now, what may we expect after this?

Mrs. Fierz: That the character of the new soul will become visible.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we may expect a change. We might expect that his continuous sermon about the misery and inferiority of his fellow beings would come to a definite end. Since a new soul means an increase of life, we might expect something more positive. In the last

chapters he became so negative and sterile that it was even boring. The next chapter, the 54th, is called "The Three Evil Things"—which doesn't sound very hopeful, but right in the beginning something has happened to him: he has had a dream. A dream often accompanies or denotes a new situation, a new access of libido, a new increase of energy. After the sneezing it is quite proper that in the night he should have the corresponding dream, showing an entirely different situation, a change of mind, presumably for the better. Now he says,

In my dream, in my last morning-dream, I stood to-day on a promontory—beyond the world; I held a pair of scales, and *weighed* the world.

Alas, that the rosy dawn came too early to me: she glowed me awake, the jealous one! Jealous is she always of the glows of my morning-dream.

Measurable by him who hath time, weighable by a good weigher, attainable by strong pinions, divinable by divine nut-crackers: thus did my dream find the world:—

My dream, a bold sailor, half-ship, half-hurricane, silent as the butterfly, impatient as the falcon: how had it the patience and leisure to-day for world-weighing!

Did my wisdom perhaps speak secretly to it, my laughing, wide-awake day-wisdom, which mocketh at all "infinite worlds"? For it saith: "Where force is, there becometh *number* the master: it hath more force."

How confidently did my dream contemplate this finite world, not new-fangledly, not old-fangledly, not timidly, not entreatingly:—

—As if a big round apple presented itself to my hand, a ripe golden apple, with a coolly-soft, velvety skin:—thus did the world present itself unto me:—

—As if a tree nodded unto me, a broad-branched, strong willed tree, curved as a recline and a foot-stool for weary travellers: thus did the world stand on my promontory:—

—As if delicate hands carried a casket towards me—a casket open for the delectations of modest adoring eyes: thus did the world present itself before me to-day—

—Not riddle enough to scare human love from it, not solution enough to put to sleep human wisdom:—a humanly good thing was the world to me to-day, of which such bad things are said!

Our hypothesis that the sneezing was a good omen is substantiated by this beginning. He has discovered a more positive aspect, which becomes particularly obvious in the paragraph, "As a humanly good thing did it come unto me, this dream and heart-comforter!" He should have added "of which I have spoken so negatively," but that is not realized because the whole process of thought is peculiarly unconscious. There is a lack of that mirroring because Nietzsche never stands aside, looking at a thing or reflecting upon it: he is merely the process. So the whole thing happens in a sort of *clair-obscur*, in twilight, and one always misses the human reaction on his part. He is the process itself. You see, he says that the dream is a bold sailor, half ship, half hurricane; there are really three figures. But the sailor is by no means the ship and by no means the wind—that is a hybrid picture, and it is most characteristic of Nietzsche himself. The dream has again functioned as a sort of mirror, which his intellect should have provided. But if his intellect doesn't provide it, the dream will provide it. This is usually the case with people who don't think, who take a pride in blindly living, flowing on like a river with no self-reflection. Then the unconscious functions as a mirror; the dream takes over the function of the intellect.

We are usually simply unable—even if we try—to think or to realize what we live. We just live without knowing what we live, and of course it would be an almost superhuman task to realize oneself completely. The Indian philosophers are aware of this fact, far more so than we in the West. We praise a life that is just living, that is not really lived because there is no subject, but only an object to it. A life that runs away with a man seems wonderful to us. There is no subject because we only know of the will that inhibits life; we use our intellect or willpower to inhibit life. And we know very little about reflecting and mirroring life, accompanying this life. Therefore we know so little about a symbolic mentality, a symbolic mind that creates and at the same time formulates life. The East is fully aware of our peculiar incapacity for knowing what we are living, and there they insist upon *realizing*; one often hears that word out there. And then the Westerner says, "Realize what?" Well, realizing what one is, what one lives, what one does. To a stranger such talk is bewildering, but if one is able to enter a bit further into the Eastern mind, one sees what they mean, and one then profoundly realizes the fact that we do not realize enough. So any Eastern philosophy—or Yoga, rather, for it is not philosophy in the Western sense—begins with the question, "Who am I? Who are you?" That is the phil-

osophic question *par excellence* which the Yogin asks his disciples. For the goal and the purpose of Eastern philosophy is that complete realization of the thing which lives, the thing which *is*. And they have that idea because they are aware of the fact that man's consciousness is always behind the facts; it never keeps up with the flux of life. Life is in a way too rich, too quick, to be realized fully, and they know that one only lives completely when one's mind really accompanies one's life, when one lives no more than one can reflect upon with one's thought, and when one thinks no further than one is able to live. If one could say that of oneself, it would be a guarantee that one really was living.

For what is a life or a world of which one is not aware? If there is a great treasure which nobody knows exists, it is as if there were no treasure. Schopenhauer, who was influenced by Buddhist philosophy, was practically the only one in the West to realize that the world would not exist if we did not know it existed; that is the *sine qua non* of existence. Consciousness is appreciated very little in the West; everybody talks as if the world were going to exist even beyond consciousness.¹ But we are by no means sure whether anything exists beyond consciousness. As long as America was not discovered, our world went on as if it were not there, America only began to exist when we discovered it. So it is futile to discuss the possibility of anything existing unless we know it exists.

Now, Nietzsche was in a more or less unconscious condition practically all the time that he was writing this book, and that shows itself very clearly in this hybrid image, the sailor, the ship, and the hurricane; for his dream is himself. He himself is the sailor and the ship and the hurricane: "silent as the butterfly, impatient as the falcon." The dream begins with the statement that he is standing on a promontory. Why just on a promontory? He has been on the plain in the midst of the human hubbub, in the big town where the swamp of humanity dwells, and he is now seeking solitude. I was under the impression that he had gone up to the wonderful, clear atmosphere of the Engadine, that he was breathing the pure air six thousand feet above good and evil. But it turns out that he is on a promontory, and that is usually a precipitous point of land jutting out into the sea.

¹ Jung, in making Schopenhauer so nearly distinctive in this respect is presumably thinking simply of those who strongly influenced Nietzsche. Other idealists like Berkeley and Hegel do not figure at all prominently in Nietzsche's (or Jung's) philosophical education. As he occasionally explains, Jung does not mean to say that the universe is merely a content of human consciousness, but rather that for the purposes of life, that which is outside of consciousness is as if it did not exist.

Mrs. Baumann: But it is not an ordinary promontory, because he is outside of the world.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right, but I should like a more definite formulation.

Mrs. Jung: In reality there is a sort of promontory on the lake of Sils, and it was a favorite spot of Nietzsche's.

Prof. Jung: That is true. Part of *Zarathustra* was conceived on a promontory in reality. His eternity song was created on the so-called Chastè, which is a little promontory jutting out into the Silsersee. There is an inscription there to commemorate it.

Mrs. Sigg: Another favorite place of Nietzsche's, the place he liked best, was the promontory of Porto Fino.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he worked on *Zarathustra* there also, and he is speaking in this passage about the sea; obviously his image does not refer to the lake of Sils but to the Mediterranean: Porto Fino is on the Riviera. So the idea of a promontory plays rather an important and very concrete role in Nietzsche's mind. But of course it is a symbol too, so what does it mean when a man arrives on a promontory?

Mrs. Schlegel: It is the end of the world.

Prof. Jung: Yes, like Finisterre or Land's End: those are promontories; he is really at the end of the world where the infinity of sea begins. And that means what psychologically?

Mr. Allemann: Where his conscious ends and the unconscious begins.

Prof. Jung: Yes, he comes to the end of conscious knowledge, conscious views, *terra firma*, and he is now vis-à-vis the infinite and indefinite sea, which has forever been a symbol of the unconscious state of mind, where new things may begin. Something may come up from the sea. For the time being, he has definitely reached an end.

Mrs. Crowley: He has really been annihilating the world.

Prof. Jung: Yes, nothing good was left in his world. Everything became negative and was trampled underfoot, and now he is at the end of his rope one could say—there is Finisterre. So he might expect a new island to appear, or that he would discover new contents. Therefore the picture of the bold sailor, the ship, and the hurricane; that image, his mental process, leads him out to the sea. Now into what further does that process lead him? In order to weigh a planet, where would he have to be?

Mrs. Baumann: Outside the world.

Prof. Jung: Of course, in space somewhere. And then how does the earth appear?

Mrs. Fierz: Like a sort of apple.

Prof. Jung: Yes, so that hurricane, or that adventure he is undergoing, now leads him not only beyond humanity but beyond the planet, in a sort of extra-mundane condition; he takes his position in space and looks down on the earth as if he were God. Where do we encounter that symbolism—where the world appears as an apple?

Miss Wolff: The *Reichsapfel*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the apple that represents the world in the hand of the Emperor. It was not an apple really, but a golden globe which the Emperor held in his hand at the coronation, denoting that he was *in loco Dei*, that he was God's lieutenant. Therefore his head was the sun, and his crown expressed the celestial rays issuing from the sun. And the *pallium*, the coronation tunic, symbolized the firmament, decorated with stars and with the zodiacal signs. His body was covered with stars, orders, and decorations, like the old Babylonian kings and the kings of Assyria. To wear stars upon their bodies meant that they were gods. The king was a manifestation or an incarnation of the deity upon earth, so he was able to carry the earth in the hollow of his hand. Nietzsche has here unwittingly slipped into the role of the deity even, and is now weighing the earth in his hand; from that very remote standpoint he is judging the world. Where does that image—weighing the world in the scales—come from?

Answer: The Apocalypse.

Mrs. Fierz: From Egypt.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is in Revelations, and there was an Egyptian ceremony where the heart was weighed. It is an age-old idea. In the *Book of the Dead* by Sir Wallis Budge there is a picture of the heart of the king being weighed. Only the king's heart was weighed in the beginning, and then very much later, in the Ptolemaic era, when Osiris became the personal Osiris of everybody, that chapter in the *Book of the Dead* was applicable for the funeral rites of any ordinary person. But originally it was only the king's heart which was weighed. If it was found to be righteous, he could enter eternal life, and if it was found to be worthless, it was thrown to Tefnut, the hippo-crocodile monster of the underworld that swallowed the hearts of those men whose evil deeds outweighed their good deeds. That is the picture here: Zarathustra is weighing the world as if it were the heart in order to judge its value. This is one of the clearest cases of Nietzsche's God-Almighty identification.

Now, there is a peculiar idea in these two paragraphs: "As if the big round apple presented itself to my hand, a ripe golden apple, with a coolly-soft, velvety skin:—thus did the world present itself unto me:—

As if a tree nodded unto me, a broad-branched, strong-willed tree, curved as a recline and a foot-stool for weary travellers: thus did the world stand on my promontory." This is rather interesting. It is as if he had encountered a tree growing on that promontory, with a golden apple hanging on it, and as if he had weighed that apple on the scales of his judgment. Our assumption was that he had been whirled out into space like a ship driven by a hurricane, and from the cosmic distances of space was now judging the world, since the world, seen from afar, looks the size of an apple. We were not prepared for this image of the tree on the promontory. Therefore the suspicion arises here that two pictures are mixed up and interfering. And this other image, a bold sailor, half ship and half hurricane, is perfectly nonsensical. So this is an unconscious contamination of pictures which one easily passes over in reading the text. If one thinks about it, one knows it is impossible as a picture, but in just reading it over, it sinks into one's mind without arousing any further comment because it fits somehow the peculiar condition of the images in the unconscious. What is that condition?

Miss Hannah: Contamination. There is a mixture of everything, so nothing comes up pure.

Prof. Jung: Yes, they are interchangeable; anything can be mixed with anything. Unfortunately it is impossible to have a look into the unconscious without disturbing it, for no sooner do you look than it is already disturbed. It is like trying to observe the process in the interior of the atom; in the instant of observation, a disturbance is created—by observing you produce distortion. But let us assume that you could look into the unconscious without disturbing anything: you would then see something which you could not define because everything would be mixed with everything else even to the minutest detail. It is not that certain recognizable fragments of this and that are mixing or contacting or overlapping: they are perfectly unrecognizable atoms so that you are even unable to make out to what kind of bodies they eventually will belong—unrecognizable atoms producing shapes which are impossible to follow. If a dream, for instance, comes out of that depth of the unconscious, you cannot remember it, or if by great good luck you are able to remember a detail of it, it is utterly chaotic and almost impossible to interpret. The reason why you cannot remember dreams is because the fragments of which they are composed are too small to be recognizable; you cannot say to what one fragment belongs, or what it would be if integrated with a more tangible connection. Well now, that tree standing on the promontory at the end of his consciousness is

surely the idea of the world-tree upon which the sun is an apple, and the whole universe, the planets, the starry sky, just the blossoms or fruits. But this tree is standing upon *his* promontory.

Mr. Bash: Is not the idea here like the tree with the golden apples of the Hesperides on the edge of the world—that he has finished his conscious living and launches out as the souls did?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the garden of the Hesperides is in the West, at the end of the known world in antiquity; that would be this “*finis terrae*” where the tree grows. Of course the garden of the Hesperides is an application of an archetypal idea—that when you come to the end of things you will find at last that tree. But you also find the tree at the beginning of things. And where would that be?

Miss Hannah: In the Garden of Eden.

Prof. Jung: Yes, with the marvelous apples.

Mrs. Crowley: Also in the Osiris legend there is a wonderful tree, with all the birds flying over it.

Prof. Jung: You mean where he transforms into a tree? That is also at the end of things. And in the Germanic sagas when the end of the world comes, what happens to the last couple there?

Mrs. Brunner: They go back into the tree.

Prof. Jung: Into Yggdrasil, the world-tree. And the first couple came from trees. There was the same idea in Persia.

Now I have just been asked about the dream and the unconscious, in reference to the peculiarly fragmentary condition of the unconscious of which I was speaking. That fragmentary condition is the unconscious without disturbance, the presumable state of images in a truly unconscious condition. It is impossible to have a complete experience of such a state, because inasmuch as you experience the unconscious you touch it, you disturb it; when the rays of consciousness reach the unconscious it is at once synthesized. Therefore, I repeat, you cannot have an immediate experience of the original or elementary state of the unconscious. Certain dreams refer to it, or I would not dare to speak of that state, but such dreams only happen under very extraordinary conditions, either under toxic conditions or in the neighborhood of death or in very early childhood, when there is still a sort of faint memory of the unconscious condition from which the first consciousness emerges.

It was in connection with these remarks that I was asked how it is that in the beginning of the analytical treatment, dreams are usually much more complete, more synthesized, more plastic, than in the later stages. That fact has really nothing to do with the original or essential

condition of the unconscious; it has very much more to do with the peculiar condition of consciousness in the beginning of the analytical treatment, and towards the end of it or in a later stage of it. In the beginning there is a very fragmentary consciousness in which many things which should belong to consciousness are not represented. These contents are semi-conscious; they are dark representations, or dark contents, which are not completely black. They are not in a completely unconscious condition, but in a relatively unconscious condition, and they form a substantial part of the personal subconscious.² It is a sort of fringe of semidarkness, and because there is so little light people assume that they can see nothing. They don't like to look; they turn away from it, and so they leave many things there which they could see just as well if they would take the trouble to be conscious. Therefore Freud quite rightly speaks of repressions. People disregard the contents of this fringe of consciousness because they are more or less incompatible with their ideals, their aspiring tendencies. But they have a vague consciousness of something there, and the more of that consciousness there is, the more there is that phenomenon of repression. There is a wilful inattention, a preference not to see or to know these things, but if they would only turn their head, they could see them.

It is a fact, then, that there are such highly synthetical contents in the unconscious, the shadow for instance, of which many people are unconscious—though not totally unconscious. They have a pretty shrewd notion that something is wrong with them on the other side. That highly synthesized figure appears in dreams and informs us of that other unconscious sphere. And these dreams are synthetical because they are built up of that synthetical material, which could be conscious just as well. Often it is a sort of negligence that it is not conscious. Now, if you analyze that material, if you integrate it into consciousness, you gradually remove the synthetical contents from the unconscious and clear up that sphere of twilight, the so-called subconscious, so that the collective unconscious can appear. The collective unconscious is normally in a state of absolute chaos—an atomic chaos—and that cannot become conscious; only synthesized figures can become conscious. Just as you cannot see the atomic world without applying all sorts of means to make it visible, so you cannot enter the unconscious unless there are

* In his published writing, Jung rarely used the concept of "the subconscious," but here it serves to distinguish the personal from the collective in the vast realm that lies outside consciousness.

certain synthesized figures. Now these later dreams are far less clear, far less synthetical than those in the beginning, because you have removed all the synthetical parts since they were capable of becoming conscious. But the collective unconscious is not inclined to become conscious, but needs very special conditions for it to become conscious at all. It needs a peculiar subjective condition, a sort of fatal condition—that you are vitally threatened by an external or internal situation, for instance, or that you are deeply connected with the general mind in a very serious crisis. Under such conditions the collective unconscious attracts so much consciousness that it begins to synthesize; then it forms the compensatory figures to the conscious.

So when the case is very serious, even in the second or third or 101st part of your analysis, you may suddenly develop a highly synthetical dream, which of course has then the character of a big dream, a big vision; such dreams often have a visionary character. But all the ordinary dreams in between are singularly chaotic and apparently not very meaningful. The rule is, that when you have gone through the inevitable analytical procedure, you will be left in the end with very few dreams, often none for months. Of course you always dream really, but they are impossible to remember, just a string of fragments. When you do happen to remember such dream material, it is very distorted, an unclear chaotic sequence, sometimes very difficult to interpret. Of course those dreams which you can remember can be tackled, because they are more or less synthetic. In the first part of an analysis, then, dreams are synthetic and well composed on account of the fact that they live on synthetic material. In the end the synthetic material is all gone, and you usually cannot remember the dreams; only very rarely do you have an important one. But that is as it should be. You see, dreams are, according to my idea, not aids to sleep as Freud says, but disturbers of sleep. When you remember your dreams the whole night through, you have a very light sleep. So it is perfectly normal when dreams are weak or seem to fail altogether, and if you only rarely have an important dream, that is all you can wish for. You see, that has nothing to do with the theoretical question of the actual state of the unconscious without the interference of consciousness. Well now, Mrs. Baumann has a contribution to the tree symbolism.

Mrs. Baumann: I thought it was very interesting that in the prehistoric mythology of the island of Crete, of which practically nothing is known, there is another example of a world-tree. In a picture on a gold seal ring called the "Ring of Nestor," the tree is depicted in connection with scenes in the underworld. The trunk of the tree and two large

branches divide the picture into four scenes. In the first, there are two butterflies and two chrysalises over the head of the Mother Goddess, and they seem to represent the souls of a man and a woman who are shown greeting each other with surprise. In the lower part of the picture is a judgment scene, and the Mother Goddess is standing behind a table on which a griffin is seated, as the souls are brought before her by strange bird-headed beings. Another point is, that in some of the graves, miniature scales made of gold have been found. They are so small that they must be symbolic, and a butterfly is engraved on each of the golden discs which form the balance, so it looks as if the souls were weighed as butterflies, not as hearts as in Egypt. The highest development of the Minoan civilization in Crete was contemporary with that of Egypt, its earliest beginnings dating as far back as 3000 B.C.

Prof. Jung: That is a remarkable contribution to the tree and the butterfly symbolism. You remember Nietzsche applies that symbol of the butterfly to himself—quite aptly, because nobody gets beyond the world, outside the field of gravity, where he might see the world as an apple, unless he has become a soul. One must be a sort of ghost to get to such distances. To step out of the body and become the spirit or the soul itself, denotes a kind of *ekstasis*. Now, we have a number of associations about that tree, and we should try to understand what it means practically when Nietzsche reaches the promontory, the end of his world, the end of his consciousness, and meets there the tree. You have heard that the tree is always the symbol of the end as well as of the beginning, of the state before man and the state after man.

Mr. Bash: Would the tree not be the symbol of the *collectivum* out of which man is differentiated and into which his elements dissolve?

Prof. Jung: That is certainly so, and why is that *collectivum* symbolized by the tree?

Mrs. Sachs: The tree means vegetative life.

Prof. Jung: Yes. It might be the snake or any other animal or the earth, but no, it is the tree, and the tree means something specific; that is a peculiar symbol. It is the tree that nourishes all the stars and planets; and it is the tree out of which come the first parents, the primordial parents of humanity, and in which the last couple, also representing the whole of humanity, are buried. That of course means that consciousness comes from the tree and dissolves into the tree again—the consciousness of human life. And that surely points to the collective unconscious and to a *collectivum*. So the tree stands for a particular kind of life of the collective unconscious, namely, vegetative

life, as Mrs. Sachs rightly said. Now what is the difference between the life of the plant and the life of the animal?

Miss Wolff: Two things. The plant is rooted to the spot and able to move in growth only, and then the respiratory system of the plant is different from that of the warm-blooded animals.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a tree is unable to move in space except for the moment of growth, whereas the animal can move about. And all animals are parasites on plants, while the tree lives on the elements. Or one can say that the plant is the kind of life which is nearest to the elements, a transition as it were, or the bridge, between the animal and inorganic nature.

Dr. Escher: The plant lives by the sun.

Prof. Jung: The source of energy for plant life is the sun, but that is true of animals also, since they are parasites on plants. But the plant depends immediately upon the sunlight, which is also one of the elements of life, while the animal depends on it only indirectly. Of course we need sunlight, most animals would perish without sunlight, though there are a few that are adapted to living without it.

Dr. Wheelwright: In plant life, anabolism exceeds katabolism. That is to say, as long as the tree is living, it is growing, whereas human beings stop growing at a certain point and their bodies begin to retrogress.

Prof. Jung: Yes, another characteristic of vegetative life is that it continues to grow till the end, while at a certain time an animal ceases to grow.

Mrs. Sigg: The tree receives its nourishment from above and below, which is like man in a way.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in contradistinction to the animal that expresses its life in horizontal movement. One can make the statement that vegetative life is vertical; it functions in living from below to above or from above to below. Therefore vegetative life is another aspect of the psyche within ourselves as well. So the plant is forever the symbol of what?

Answer: Of the soul.

Mrs. Crowley: Of the psychical experience.

Miss Hannah: Of impersonal life.

Prof. Jung: I would call it more definitely spirituality. The plant represents spiritual development, and that follows laws which are different from the laws of biological, animal life; therefore spiritual development is always characterized by the plant. For instance, the lotus is very typical as the symbol of spiritual life in India: it grows out of absolute darkness, from the depth of the earth, and comes up through the medium of the dark water—the unconscious—and blossoms above

the water, where it is the seat of the Buddha. Or several gods may appear in the lotus.

Mrs. Crowley: Is there not also that idea of a serpentine movement?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, that is another detail which of course points to the serpent, and the serpent is an animal. The roots of the tree have that obvious serpentine character, and water-plants look like snakes. Also plants under water seem to have snakelike movements due to the flowing water; the water flowing upon a flexible body naturally gives that undulating effect. There the two things come together: namely, that part of the psyche which approaches plant life is the snake—that is, the cerebro-spinal system, which leads down and eventually transcends into the vegetative system, the sympathetic nervous system. And there we approach the lowest form of life, a sedentary life that is rooted to the spot, like the sea-anemone and those colonies of the siphonophora that are exactly like plants; and they all have the undulating movement which is characteristic of the sympathetic nervous system. So even in animals we can see the transition into plants, and that is indicated at least in the oldest nervous system in the world, the sympathetic nervous system; there we are bordering upon plant life. If we have any idea of plant life it is through that analogy.

Now, the plant or the tree is clearly beyond human experience, but the snake is within human experience. That is, you can experience the life of the cerebro-spinal system within your own body, but you cannot experience the life of the tree in your own body: you have no connection, your whole being is totally different from that of a plant. Therefore the tree represents, one could say, a transcendental experience, something that transcends man and is beyond him; it is before his birth and after his death, a life which man has not within himself. So he has no experience of it, yet peculiarly enough he finds the symbol of it in the tree. You see, a sacred tree means to a primitive his life. Or sometimes people plant a tree when a child is born, with the idea of their identity. If the tree keeps well and sane, the child's health will be good; if the child dies, the tree will die, or if the tree dies, the child will die. This old idea is a representation of that feeling in man that his life is linked up with another life. It is as if man had always known that he was, like any other animal, a parasite on plants, that he would perish if there were no plants. Of course that is a biological truth, and it is also a spiritual truth, inasmuch as our psyche can only live through a parasitical life on the spirit. Therefore no wonder, when you come to the end of your conscious life, stepping out onto that promontory as Nietzsche did, that you begin to realize the condition upon which your

life ultimately rests. And then the tree appears, the tree that is the origin of your life as it is your future abode, the sarcophagus into which your corpse will disappear; it is the place of death or rebirth.

Mr. Bash: How would you explain as spiritual symbols all the totemic symbols, for instance, which are almost always animals?

Prof. Jung: There are of course many symbols for psychic facts. If the symbol is a totem animal, it is clearly a matter of what an animal means: namely, it is a matter of the reconciliation or the reunion of man with his cerebro-spinal system, or, more probably, with his sympathetic system. But not with the tree. The tree symbolizes something much higher and much deeper. It has a specifically transcendental character. For instance, it is far more wonderful when a tree speaks to you than when an animal speaks to you. The distance between man and animal is not very great; but between the tree and the animal is an infinite distance, so it is a more primitive and yet a more advanced symbol. Therefore we find the tree as a symbol of the Yoga, or for the divine grace in Christianity. It is very advanced symbolism and at the same time exceedingly primitive.

Mr. Allemann: One important difference is that the tree is in Tao, following nature absolutely and accepting everything—there is no separate impulse; whereas in every animal there is that impulse.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and therefore deviation from the divine law. The animal is in a way already a deviation from the divine law because it doesn't surrender absolutely and indifferently to all the conditions provided by the creator, but is able to dodge them. And man with his consciousness has a far more wonderful opportunity for deviation. While the tree symbolizes the kind of life that cannot deviate for one single inch from the divine law, from the absolute law of conditions; it is rooted to the spot, exposed to every enemy that attacks it. There is a very nice story in one of the Buddhistic treatises, the *Samyutta Nikaya*, about the *devāta* of a tree; that is a sort of tree-soul, a semidivine being living in a tree. The story describes the despair of the *devāta* upon seeing that the termites are approaching the tree, because it cannot get away. The *Samyutta Nikaya* is an original collection of stories told by the disciples of Buddha, and containing many authentic sayings of Buddha himself, so it would go back to the 6th century B.C.


LECTURE VII

7 December 1938

Prof. Jung:


Here is a very valuable contribution from Mrs. Baumann, a photograph of Nestor's ring, that famous *intaglio* with the representation of the world-tree.

And here is a contribution from Mrs. Crowley about the tree in Egypt: "In the early Pyramid texts, there is a passage in which the Pharaoh on his way to Rê, comes upon a tree of Life on the Mysterious island, situated in the midst of the Field of Offerings. 'This king Pepi went to the great isle in the midst of the Field of Offerings, over which the gods make the swallows fly. The swallows are the imperishable stars. They give to this king Pepi this tree of Life, whereof they live, and Ye-Pepi and the Morning Star may at the same time live thereof.'



This image belongs, prior to the Osiris faith, to the Solar religion of the old kingdom, about 3000 B.C.”¹

This tree in the photograph is not exactly the world-tree, but has more the aspect of the tree of life, what they called in India the soma tree, the *nyagrodha* tree. You know, the tree has many different aspects. It appears first in ancient mythologies as the cosmic tree, the tree of development—of cosmic as well as human evolution, like the great tree of the Germanic sagas, Yggdrasil. Another more specific aspect is the tree of life, the tree which gives life to human beings and animals and to the universe. And this tree has also the aspect of the world axis: the branches up above are the kingdom of the heavens; the roots below form the kingdom of the earth, the nether world; and the trunk is the world axis round which the whole world revolves, and at the same time a life-giving center or the main artery of life throughout the world. So the tree is more or less equivalent to the spinal column in a human body. You know in the interior of the cerebellum, a certain part in the middle part branches in such a way that it has a treelike appearance and is called the *arbor vitae*, the tree of life. Also this famous symbol of Osiris, the Tet, is a sort of tree form. It is identified with the *os sacrum*, that part of the spinal column which is inserted in the middle of the pelvic basin, and it also refers to the whole length of the spinal column, which maintains the straightness of the body and carries the arteries along the backbone. These anatomical facts are the same in animals, so naturally they have been known forever, practically. Moreover, they knew that the arteries carried the blood, which was supposed to be the seat of the soul, so blood is itself a symbol for the soul, as warmth and breath symbolize blood, the indispensable essence of life. Then another aspect of the tree is the tree of knowledge. It is the carrier of revelation: out of the tree come voices; in the whispering of the wind in the tree words can be discerned, or the birds that live in the tree talk to one.



We have endless material as evidence for those traditions. The tree of paradise, for instance, is really one and the same tree but with a three-fold aspect: the tree which carries the evolution of the world, the tree which gives life to the universe, and the tree which gives understanding or consciousness. Then there is the Indian idea of the sacred

¹ Mrs. Crowley is drawing upon James Breasted (who cites the Pyramid text of 1212-1216), *The Dawn of Conscience* (New York, 1933), p. 134.

inverted tree. And the *nyagrodha* is the sacred tree of Buddha at the monastery of the Holy Tooth at Bodh Gaya, that famous Buddhist place of pilgrimage and worship in Ceylon. It is really a pipal tree, and looks like a willow. The soma tree is also sacred in Hinduism. According to its oldest definition, soma is a life-giving or intoxicating drink, but is also called a tree because it has the life-giving quality. One sees no resemblance to a tree, yet because it is life-giving they are identical. That is the primitive way of thinking: when two things function in the same way, even though they are utterly incommensurable, they are supposed to be one and the same thing. For instance, things that give life in the way of nourishment are identical. They say a sort of life-power or mana circulates through these different things, uniting them, making them one.

Then the tree is a very central symbol in the Christian tradition, having even taken on the quality of death—just as Yggdrasil is not only the origin of life, but also the end of life. As life originates in the tree, so everything ends in the tree of evolution; the last couple enters the tree again and disappears therein. So the mummy of Osiris transforms into a tree. And Christ ends on the tree. As I told you, the Christian cross was supposed to have been made from the wood of the tree of life, which had been cut down after the fall of the first parents and used later on for the two obelisks or pillars, Aachim and Boas, in front of Solomon's temple. Those are analogous to the Egyptian pillars or obelisks that flanked the way on which the sun-barque passed to and fro. One is now in Rome and another is in Paris, but happily enough, there are still a number left at Karnak. When Solomon's temple was destroyed those two pillars were thrown into one of the ponds of the river valley and much later discovered again, and tradition says the cross was made from the wood of those ancient beams. So Christ was crucified on the tree of life. Therefore those medieval pictures where Christ is represented as hanging crucified on a tree with branches and leaves and fruits. And that idea of Christ on the tree is not only medieval—there is also a famous antique representation of Christ among the vines. Do you remember it?

Mrs. Baumann: The chalice of Antioch.

Prof. Jung: Yes. It is now in America in a private collection, but was discovered together with other antique silver vessels at the bottom of an ancient well and is supposed to be part of the treasure of an early Christian church which had been thrown into the well at the time when Julian the Apostate was persecuting the Christians and destroying their churches. It consists of silver filigree work around a much more

ancient silver bowl; it has even been suggested that it might be the vessel which Christ used at the Last Supper. But the chalice is most remarkable for its symbolism: Christ is represented as sitting among the leaves and grapes in the branches of a huge vine which is like a tree. That is the traditional antique form in which the Caesars were often depicted. There is a very similar representation of the Emperor Augustus, linking him up thus with Dionysos or Bacchus. Now, Christ was closely associated with Bacchus at the beginning of our era, and also with Orpheus, as we know from that famous inscription on the Gnostic seal. Orpheus and Bacchus were both old mystery gods of the period. Eisler's book *Orpheus—The Fisher* gives us the peculiar symbolism of those Bacchic mystery cults.² According to archeological discoveries, in Pompeii for instance, fish and fishing symbolism belonged to a contemporary cult—or possibly a pre-cult—of Bacchus. The seal to which I referred is in Berlin, and it represents quite indubitably the crucifixion, with the inscription "Orpheus-Bacchus," so those two heathen gods were obviously competitors of Christ in those days. We know from other sources also that there was a mystery god like Orpheus, who was therefore also called "Orpheus" and was explained by the same symbolism as both Orpheus and Dionysos. That representation of Christ also links him up with the age-old traditions about the tree of life, and the crucifixion would mean, according to that symbolism, a retrogression or a recession of Christ into the tree from which he originally came. Therefore in the medieval dialogue, Mary is confronted with the cross as the mother that has given birth to Christ and taken his life as well.

Miss Wolff: There are early medieval representations of the genealogical tree of Christ. On the branches, as the fruits of the tree, are the prophets and all Christ's ancestors. The roots of the tree grow out of the skull of Adam, and Christ is its central and more precious fruit.

Prof. Jung: Well, the tree sometimes grows out of Adam's naval, and on the branches, as you say, sit the prophets and kings of the Old Testament, Christ's ancestors, and then on top of the tree is the triumphant Christ. That life begins with Adam and ends with Christ is the same idea, or one might put it, that the fate of the wood of the cross parallels that tradition or symbolism. So the tree is a symbol which is found almost everywhere with a number of somewhat different meanings. I have given you the main aspects but there are a quantity of

² Robert Eisler, author of *Orpheus—The Fisher* (London, 1921). He spoke at Eranos in 1935 on "The Riddle of the Gospel of St. John."

lesser ones. Now we come to this tree on the promontory and also to the big round apple. I will read those two paragraphs again:

As if a big round apple presented itself to my hand, a ripe golden apple, with a coolly-soft, velvety skin:—thus did the world present itself unto me:—

As if a tree nodded unto me, a broad-branched, strong-willed tree, curved as a recline, and a foot-stool for weary travellers: thus did the world stand on my promontory:—

This is a most extraordinary way of putting it, unimaginable if you understand it as a world. Our idea of the world as a sort of globe would make a funny picture on that promontory. But a tree makes sense, and a bit farther on we shall see that he refers to a tree on the promontory again. So one could say the promontory stood for what in his imagination? Where is the tree of life?

Remark: In the Garden of Eden.


Prof. Jung: Of course, in paradise. Those who heard my German lecture will remember that I spoke of the *bodhi-druma*, the bodhi tree. Now where is the bodhi tree?

Mrs. Brunner: In paradise, on the round terrace of enlightenment.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and the text called it “the bodhi mandala.” It is the *circulus quadratus*, which is a sort of *circumambulatio*, and in the center is the bodhi tree. So the promontory is the Garden of Eden. And that is characterized by what?

Mrs. Fierz: By the four rivers.

Prof. Jung: Yes. The tree is in the center and the four rivers issuing from the Garden of Eden make it the typical mandala. And the bodhi mandala contains also the idea of the square building inside, the corners of which are identical with the cardinal points of the horizon. North, south, east, and west are called the four corners of the world, or the four winds, and that gives the basis, the natural pattern, for the squaring of the circle. And inside the circle is a sort of stupa, a container, in which are the sacred relics. The most precious thing, the *cinta mani*, the pearl beyond price, is contained in the vessel in the center of the temple with the four corners.



Then if you follow it up psychologically, you arrive at the fact that consciousness has four corners as it were, four different ways or aspects, which we call the four functions. For since psychological consciousness is the origin of all the apperception of the world, it naturally understands everything, even the system of that axis, from that basis,

as a sort of necessary bridge to all observation of facts. For instance, in looking through a telescope, you observe a cross inside of two thin threads, by which you measure the position of everything in the field of vision. That is an exact image of our consciousness, and the indispensable basis of all understanding, of all discernment; it is an intrinsic quality of consciousness that there are four elements or four different aspects. You could also say 360, but it must be a regular division of the horizon and the most satisfactory division is by four. Naturally it can be divided by five or six or by three, but that is more complicated or in some way not so satisfactory. If you want to divide a circle, you had best do it crossways. If I should give you the task of dividing it by five, I am sure a number of you would not know how to do it—it would demand all sorts of instruments. To divide a circle by four is the easiest and simplest way, and that comes from the fact that it coincides with the constitution of consciousness.

For you must have a function which tells you that there *is* something, and that is sensation. Then you must have a function which tells you what the thing is, and you can call that thinking. And then a function which tells you what it is worth to you, and that is feeling. You would then have a complete orientation for the moment, but the time axis is not considered: there is a past and a future, which is not given in the present moment, so you need a sort of divination in order to know where that thing comes from or where it is going, and that is called intuition. Now if you know of anything more, tell me. You see, that gives you a complete picture. We have no other criterion that I know of and need no other—I have often thought about it but I could never find any other—from the data these four functions give me I have a complete picture. It is the same as logic: when you examine carefully the aspects of causality, for instance, you arrive at a fourfold root. Schopenhauer has even written a treatise *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom Grunde*, and it really has four aspects to which you can add nothing.³ As you cannot add some other dimension to the horizon when you have named the four points, the four corners; that is enough, it is complete.

Apparently the ancients already had an intuition about it. So the saying that the soul is a square, and that four is the number of all living things, was attributed to Pythagoras by his pupils; he probably has an important vision or intuition about this truth. You can go on speculat-

³ Schopenhauer's Inaugural Dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root of the Ground of Reason*, was published in 1813.

ing about it forever—there is plenty of matter for speculation. For instance, the main building material of the body is carbon, and carbon or coal is characterized chemically by the number four: it is chiefly quadrivalent; and the diamond is native carbon crystallized in the isometric system, often in the form of octahedrons. Then you know that the *lapis philosophorum*, the stone, is often called “the white stone,” or “the white light,” that perfect transparency which comes out of utter darkness. Coal is black and the diamond of the purest water is composed of the same substance. We know that now, but in those days of course nobody knew about the chemical formula of a diamond; it was taken to be like a ruby or an emerald. Now, the promontory which juts out into the ocean seems to be half in the sea and half on *terra firma*, so it is something between the sea and the earth. What does that remind you of?

Answer: A mandala that is half in the earth and half in the sky.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is like the famous stupas of Sanchi or of Anuradhapura in Ceylon, the mandala composed of two bowls, one bowl being embedded in the earth and the other half in the air above. The two bowls make a globe, and the one underneath is supposed to contain the remains of the Lord Buddha. So that promontory in Nietzsche’s unconscious is really a place of individuation, the very central place. He is in the place of the Emperor. There the apple is given to him. And there is always an increase of personality there; it is the coronation place, the place of exaltation. In mystery initiations the initiate climbs up the seven planetary steps to that place where he is worshipped as Helios, the sun god; he is supreme, there becoming the first man under the tree of paradise, or the very last man, who at the end of his days is again confronted with the tree. So Nietzsche is really at the origin and also at the top of the world. That is the psychology of the mandala, that is what mandalas mean and why they are made or imagined; they indicate the sacred place, the sacred condition, in which man is at the beginning as well as at the top of the world, where he is the child just being born and at the same time the lord of the universe. Now he goes on with the “as if”:

As if delicate hands carried a casket towards me—a casket open for the delectation of modest adoring eyes: thus did the world present itself before me today:—

What about this casket “open for the delectation of modest adoring eyes”?

Miss Wolff: In the German text it is a shrine, therefore it must mean a casket for relics, a holy thing.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. The shrine usually contains the sacred figure or the relic, the most precious objects of worship. And that bears out what we were saying about the promontory and the contents of the mandala.

Mrs. Baumann: I wondered if the fact that it is a reliquary with dead bones in it might have something to do with the fact that he does not mention water here. It might mean that this is the tree of death rather than the tree of life. There is no mention of the four rivers of paradise or of the water of life. The world-tree is nearly always associated with a spring of living water, but here there is none—and it seems queer because Zarathustra has often before mentioned a well-spring.

Prof. Jung: The idea of water is completely absent, and it is true, as you say, that water is usually associated with the tree. You remember, at the foot of Yggdrasil there is a double spring in the alchemical colors, which is most remarkable. Also the tree of Pherekydes in Greek mythology is always associated with the idea of fertility.⁴

Miss Wolff: But Nietzsche's text implies not a well, but the sea.

Prof. Jung: The sea is also the water of life under certain conditions, but it is not exactly the life-giving water, rather the life-preserving water. The life-giving water is usually fresh water, like a spring. That idea is absent here, and why it is so is a question. Well, we have to state the facts: it just is so. Now this shrine surely expresses the idea that a most precious thing is contained or shown here for the delectation of adoring eyes. One is also reminded here of certain Christian motifs.

Mrs. Brunner: Of the Host?

Prof. Jung: Yes, of course, but why not be simple? There is something much nearer. Have you never seen a typical adoration?

Miss Foote: The Christ Child.

Prof. Jung: Yes, think of Christmas: there is the tree. The adoration of the Child that is given under the tree or by the tree. And here we are in Advent and don't remember that! Now Nietzsche goes on:

Not riddle enough to scare human love from it, not solution enough to put to sleep human wisdom:—a humanly good thing was the world to me to-day, of which such bad things are said!

If you meditate upon that sentence in the light of what we have seen in the symbolism, you can understand a good deal of Nietzsche's dream.

⁴ Pherekydes of Syros was a middle sixth-century B.C. mythologist and cosmologist—on some lists, one of the Seven Wise Men.

Now, would you assume that it was a dream, or was it a so-called poetical invention, or was it a vision? We have these three possibilities.

Mrs. Fierz: Is there not underlying it the vision of a woman? All through this text the picture of a woman is suggested. First there is the apple with its soft skin; out of it comes the winking tree, then the delicate hands bringing a shrine. The text also says that the world *stands* on the promontory, just as if it were a person. It reminds me of the statue of "Frau Welt" on the Basel Cathedral, which Nietzsche must have known: the woman with smiling face and devils and apes behind her. After having looked only at the devils and apes for such a long time, it is as if Nietzsche finally could see "Frau West" smiling. Anyhow, the picture of a woman is always underneath.

Prof. Jung: My question is: is it a vision or a dream or an invention? So you would be in favor of a vision, whatever that may mean. We shall come to that.

Mr. Allemann: It is surely not a poetical invention; it may be a dream or a vision.

Prof. Jung: And why do you assume that it cannot be a poetical invention?

Mr. Allemann: Because it hits the nail on the head. It must come directly from the unconscious, it couldn't be an invention.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it goes too deep, absolutely to the core of things. It is so incredibly rich, one cannot assume that a mere invention could express the essence of all mythologies, of all creeds, in three lines. It is too amazing.

Mrs. Jung: There is to me something not quite satisfactory in this whole imagery because there is such an inflation in it. I doubt whether one would have a feeling of being on top of the world if one were in the center of the mandala.

Prof. Jung: That is true, it is all seen through that awful veil of inflation. But we have thrown away for the moment that sad veil of inflation in order to see what appears behind the veil, in order to do justice to the background. We must be critical of the foreground, that is sure. There is that unsatisfactory element of inflation, and he identifies with it. His attitude is of course not at all correct. That still further proves that it is not invention. He himself doesn't understand it, doesn't know what is happening. But he cannot help it; he can do nothing against it. It appears in all the confusion and turmoil of his very restricted consciousness; the old picture that is at the bottom of all religious experiences comes through. For instance, if I should tell James Joyce that that came through in his *Ulysses*, he would deny it, as Spitteler would

deny that anything came through the walls of his prejudice.⁵ But it did nevertheless, and so it has happened to Nietzsche; despite his attitude, his inflation and identification, the eternal picture breaks through all those veiling mists and becomes visible—to us at least.

Miss Hannah: I think that it must have been a dream because it is so far from his conscious point of view.

Prof. Jung: You think it is a dream. What do you say, Mrs. Schevill?

Mrs. Schevill: I think it must be a vision because at the beginning of the chapter he says, “In my dream, in my last morning-dream,” and that is generally the time of the coming of the vision. It is the end of the dreams of the night, and the beginning of day and of the coming of consciousness. Therefore the two things come together in the vision.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Physiologically that is true: the curve of sleep drops far down and then it gradually rises again. We drop out of consciousness, and then approach consciousness again towards morning; the dreams are then increasingly associated with consciousness. So when he accents the last morning dream, it probably means that it was the last thing which was still in the unconscious and yet already mixed up with consciousness. Comparing this with dreams of patients in general, I would say it was a vision. For a dream it is too synthetic; a dream is more grotesque. There is nothing grotesque about this. It is tremendously synthetic, as a matter of fact; that picture of being on a promontory weighing the world is synthesized to the utmost. We could not expect that of a dream. A dream may be very powerful and very beautiful but it would use a language which was not so near to consciousness; there would be something more like primitive lore, or there would be obvious allusions to certain mythical formations.

You see, he could have said just as well, “I am now as if standing on a ledge of rock jutting out into the ocean and behind me is the land of the living. I am looking out to the endless sea, the symbol of death, of non-existence; and I am weighing life, the whole of existence, all of humanity, against this fact of no humanity at all, this fact which was before humanity and which will be after humanity, when man is no more.” For Nietzsche was the man who, when he looked at the Alps, realized the feeling: *Crimen laesae majestatis humanae*.⁶ Those glaciers and peaks and snow fields—all that icy primeval world neither knows nor needs man; it will be itself, live its own life, in spite of man. It isn’t

⁵ For Jung’s ambivalent response to *Ulysses*, see CW 15. Jung was irritated by Spitteler’s claim that his works were only tales and not at all symbolic.

⁶ Vexing complaint about human majesty.

concerned with man in the least. That is the horror of the cold-blooded animal also: a snake simply doesn't take man into account. It may crawl into his pocket, behave as if he were a tree trunk. One world is human and the other is inhuman, before man and after man, and Nietzsche is now weighing the two worlds in his scales. So he weighs his own world which he comes from; that is almost a conscious thought, and it is of course a direct logical outcome of the chapters before, where he came to the conclusion that it was all Maya and the people could go to hell—to be burned up like chaff was the only thing they were good for. He is at the end of the world and has to weigh the question whether existence in general is worthwhile or not. Is it worthwhile to live, to go on? If you consider the chapters before and put yourself into his place, you will realize it; but if you do not realize what went before, if you have no feeling heart, you are naturally confronted with a great riddle. But it is "not riddle enough to scare human love from it." Now he says,

How I thank my morning-dream that I thus at today's dawn,
weighed the world! As a humanly good thing did it come unto me,
this dream and heart comforter!

We must go a little into the detail of this. He speaks of the "humanly good thing." What does he mean by that?

Mrs. von Roques: Good and evil together.

Prof. Jung: It is certain that if a thing is human, it is both good and evil, but he doesn't mean evil here.

Mrs. Sigg: It might mean something that remains in human proportions, not so very wide and not so very high.

Prof. Jung: That is a good idea.

Miss Hannah: I thought it made him not hate people quite so much.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it is positive, after his having said so many negative things. He must be afraid of human beings because they will strike back when they hear them.

Miss Hannah: He is afraid of revenge—that they will do the same to him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the reason he is so critical about people—he anticipates their revenge, their misunderstanding. He was tremendously interested in the question of how *Zarathustra* would be taken by the public, whether they would revile him as he had reviled them. There was plenty of reason for being afraid that the public would turn down his book; after saying such unkind things he must naturally expect a bad reply. Now this vision gives him a positive feeling after all that negative feeling; it has a human character one could say, and a hu-

manizing effect. He is no longer an outcast from the world, an exile who has driven himself into solitude. He heaped so much prejudice upon the world that he drove himself into isolation on the promontory, and this vision has a soothing reconciling effect. Also, he seems to realize—and this is probably important—that the expression “humanly good thing” alludes to something really human. This is evident in the line Mrs. Fierz alluded to: “as if delicate hands carried a casket towards me.” So it is a sort of personification of the humanly good thing that carries this shrine or reconciling gift to him. Here we are allowed to consider a personification, and a woman’s figure is the most likely. Now the main symbolism in the immediately preceding verses is the tree. You see, the tree produces the apples, the food of immortality, the golden apples of the Hesperides, or the revivifying apples from the tree of wisdom. And the tree itself is often personified as a woman; in old alchemistic books, for example, sometimes the trunk of the tree is a woman, and out of her head grow the branches with the golden apples, the fruit which gives new life to those who are fettered in Hades. This reminds one of the famous vision of Arisleus, one of the first visions, or the only big one really, in Latin alchemy. In Greek alchemy there are others, the visions of Zosimos, for instance, or of Krates.⁷

Arisleus sees, in his vision, himself and his companions on the shore of the sea, in a land where nothing thrives; the fields are not fertile, the cattle are sterile, and the people are sterile too, because the men mated with men and the women with women. The King, the Rex Marinus, therefore has Arisleus brought to him and asks him what to do about it. And Arisleus tells him that he needs a philosopher in his country, and advises that the king’s two children, Gabricus and Beya, who were born out of his brain, should now copulate. But in so doing the prince dies (in some versions of this story Beya is said to have swallowed him), so the king is very much upset. Arisleus, however, promises to revivify the prince with the aid of Beya. The king then locks him and his companions with the dead prince and Beya, into a glass house with three

⁷ Zosimos of Panopolis, a third-century Gnostic and alchemist, recorded a number of visions on which Jung comments at length, CW 13, pars. 85-144. It is perhaps worth noting too that Zosimos sometimes cited Zoroastrian texts and counted Zoroaster a prophet on the level of Jesus. Arisleus was a legendary alchemist, the presumed author of the *Turba Philosophorum* which is included in the compendium, *Theatrum Chemicum*, 6 vols. (Strasbourg, 1602-1661). The *Book of Krates* is yet another alchemical text, probably by an ancient Greek, but transmitted by the medieval Arabic scholars and reprinted in *La Chimie au moyen age*, ed. Marcell in Berthelot (Paris, 1893), vol. III, p. 50.

walls, deep under the sea; the house is like three vessels or alembics of glass, contained one in the other. There Arisleus is heated, practically boiled, so he is in great misery. He also suffers from hunger, as the hero in the whale-dragon's belly always suffers from hunger; but in that case the hero sustains himself by cutting off and eating part of the monster's body, usually the liver, *die Leber*, which is the life and soul according to primitive ideas. He nourishes himself from the life of the monster. And now, in the glass house, Arisleus has another vision: he sees his master Pythagoras and asks him for help. So Pythagoras sends a man named Horfoltus (also called Harpocrates) who brings the fruits of a mystical tree to those who are caught under the sea—in the unconscious. By that food, which is the *pharmakon athanasias*, the medicine of immortality, the prince is brought back to life, and the lives of Arisleus and his companions are renewed. They are all released from their prison, and Gabricus and Beya rule over the country thereafter. They have many children, and their people and their cattle and their fields all become fertile and prosper.

This old myth is very clearly a psychological archetype of initiation, or the revivification of an attitude which has gone dead, become sterile and useless, and so has disappeared into the unconscious, where it had to be boiled over, made new again. And it is also an old spring myth, the renewal of vegetation.

Now the tree from which the wonderful fruit comes is, as I said, represented as a woman in a certain alchemical treatise. And there are other pictures where the life-giving tree is represented as a woman, or the life-giving woman is represented by a tree. One also sees this in mere ornamental figures. It is used as an ornamental motif in those famous medieval chandeliers, for instance, where the tree is represented by the horns of a stag growing out of the head of a woman, usually a sort of nymph with bare breasts curving beneath and the stag's horns on top, each branch of the horns carrying a light. That is the light-giving woman. So it is quite within the symbolism when we encounter here this idea that delicate hands carry the shrine or the casket towards him. According to the primitive idea, it would be the tree-soul personified that in its kindness gives him the jewel. Now, since the tree is the world and since there is that association with the woman, the tree would be the positive aspect of his world which he has been reviling. It is as if his vision were saying to him, "This is the world, and when you come to the end of things and begin to weigh the world—when you make the ultimate judgment as if you were lord of the universe—you arrive at the conclusion that this world is mother nature and that she is

kind and human.” So it is an entirely compensatory vision, and it is quite understandable that he has a very positive feeling about it. But he doesn’t realize what it means, so he cannot make the right use of it. He doesn’t say to himself, “Here I made a great mistake. I should realize that the world and humanity is not so bad after all.” He should be in a much better frame of mind. Of course he is already in a somewhat better frame of mind, but he doesn’t come out of his state of inflation. So he continues,

And that I may do the like by day, and imitate and copy its best,
now will I put the three worst things on the scales, and weigh them
humanly well.

You see he is backing his superior frame of mind, continuing that role which was really forced upon him by his solitude. He should say, “unfortunately enough I am forced to be the last man and the man at the beginning of the world. I am unfortunately made into God’s own son.” But he rather enjoys it and that is his misfortune.

He who taught to bless taught also to curse: what are the three
best cursed things in the world? These will I put on the scales.

Voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness: these three
things have hitherto been best cursed, and have been in worst and
falsest repute—these three things will I weigh humanly well.

Well! Here is my promontory, and there is the sea—it rolleth
hither unto me, shaggily and fawningly, the old, faithful,
hundred-headed dog-monster that I love!

Well! Here will I hold the scales over the weltering sea: and also
a witness do I choose to look on—thee, the anchorite-tree, thee,
the strong-odoured broad-arched tree that I love!

In the face of his tree, which means life, knowledge, wisdom, consciousness, he is now weighing the three vices that carry the curse: voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness. Here we see how modern Nietzsche really is and to what extent he is a psychologist. If he had lived in our days, he couldn’t have helped being an analyst; he would have gone into it right away. He was really more a psychologist than any philosopher except the very early ones, a psychologist inas-much as he realized that philosophy is *au fond* psychology. It is simply a statement made by an individual psyche and it doesn’t mean more than that. To what extent he is a modern psychologist we can see from the statement he makes here, for what does he anticipate in these three vices?

Miss Hannah: The present day.

Mrs. Fierz: Freud, Adler, and you.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Voluptuousness, the lust principle, is Freud; passion for power is Adler; and selfishness—that is myself, perfectly simple. You see my idea really is the individuation process and that is just rank selfishness. And Freud is supposed to be nothing but sex, and Adler nothing but power. Those are the three aspects and in the right order, mind you. First came Freud, then Adler who was about my age but an earlier pupil of Freud. I found him in the Freudian society when I went to Vienna the first time; he was already on the premises and I was newly arrived—so surely passion for power comes next. And mine is the last, and peculiarly enough it includes the other two, for voluptuousness and passion for power are only two aspects of selfishness. I wrote a little book saying that Freud and Adler looked at the same thing from different sides, Freud from the standpoint of sex, and Adler from the standpoint of will to power; they observed the same cases but from different angles.⁸ Any case of hysteria or any neurosis can be explained just as well from the side of Freud as from the side of Adler, as unfulfilled sex wishes or as frustrated will to power. So this is in every respect a clear forecast of the way things actually developed. Nietzsche was really an extraordinary fellow. And it is true that “these three things have hitherto been best cursed, and have been in worst and falsest repute.” Well, divide by two—he is always a little exaggerated—for the repute is not absolutely false; it is bad I admit but not really false, because these three things are definite vices. There is no doubt about that.

But you see, our religious point of view is that all vice is wrong, and that needs some rectification. We are not sufficiently aware that even a bad thing has two sides. You cannot say that any one of those vices is entirely bad. If it were entirely bad and you wanted to be morally decent, you could not live at all. You cannot prevent voluptuousness, because it *is*; you cannot prevent power, because it *is*; and you cannot prevent selfishness, because it *is*. If you did prevent them, you would die almost instantly, for without selfishness you cannot exist. If you should give all your food to the poor, there would be nothing left, and if you eat nothing you die—and then there would be nobody left to give them the food. You cannot help functioning; those vices are functions in themselves.

Such a judgment comes from the assumption that someone could es-

⁸ “The Psychology of the Unconscious,” in CW 7, pars. 1-201.

establish a definite truth, could decide that such-and-such a thing was definitely bad for instance; but you never can. At no time can you make such a statement, because it always depends upon *who* has done it and under what conditions. There is no one vice of which we can say it is under all conditions bad. For all those conditions may be changed and different, and they are always different in different cases. You can only say if a thing happens under such-and-such conditions, and assuming that other conditions happen along the same line, that the thing is then most probably bad. You can judge to that extent, or you can say such-and-such a thing is in itself bad under such-and-such conditions, but all exceptions suffer when exposed to reality. So the mistake we make is in passing a moral judgment as if it were possible, as if we could really pass a general moral judgment. That is exactly what we cannot do. The more you investigate the crime, the more you feel into it, the less you are capable of judging it, because you find when you go deep enough, that the crime was exceedingly meaningful, that it was inevitable in that moment—everything led up to it. It was just the right thing, either for the victim or for the one who committed the crime. How can you say that particular man was bad, or that the victim was bad and deserved it? The more you know about the psychology of crime the less you can judge it; when you have seen many such cases, you just give up.

On the other hand if you give up judgment, you give up a vital function in yourself: namely, your hatred, your contempt, your revolt against evil, your belief in the good. So you come to the conclusion that you cannot give up passing judgment; as a matter of fact, practically, you have to pass judgment. When a man breaks into a house or kills people, you must stop it; it is disturbing to live in a town where such things are permitted, and therefore you must stop that fellow. And how do you do it? Well, you must put him in jail or behead him or something like that. And sure enough if somebody asks why you put that man in jail, you say because he is a bad man. Yes, he is bad, you cannot get away from it. Even if you yourself do something which is against the general idea of morality, no matter how you may *think* about it, you feel awkward, you get attacks of conscience—as a matter of fact you develop a very bad conscience. Perhaps that is not apparent: a man may say, “Oh, I haven’t a bad conscience about what I have done as long as I know that nobody else knows it.” But I hear such a confession from a man who comes to me with a neurosis, not knowing that his neurosis is due to the fact that he has offended his own morality. And so he excludes himself, for inasmuch as he has a neurosis, he

is excluded from normal humanity; his neurosis, his isolation, is on account of the fact that he himself is a-social and that is on account of the fact that he is amoral, so he is excluded from regular social intercourse.

When you offend against those moral laws you become a moral exile, and you suffer from that state, because your libido can no longer flow freely out of yourself into human relations; you are always blocked by the secret of your misdeeds. So you suffer from an undue accumulation of energy which cannot be liberated, and you are in a sort of contrast and opposition to your surroundings, which is surely an abnormal condition. And it doesn't help that you have particularly enlightened ideas about good and evil, like Nietzsche, who said he was beyond good and evil and applied no moral categories. *It* applies moral categories for you; you cannot escape the judge in yourself. You see, that whole moral system in which we live has been brought about by history, by thousands of years of training. It is based upon archetypes of human behavior. Therefore you find the same laws in the lowest society as in the highest. As a matter of fact, there is no fundamental difference between the laws of a primitive society and those of a very highly developed society; the aspects may be different but the principles are the same. Everybody suffers when they commit an offense against the instinctive law, out of which the universal morality grows. It doesn't matter at all what your convictions are; something is against you and you suffer from a corresponding disintegration of personality, which may amount to a neurosis.

Now in such a case, you may have to sin against your better judgment. For instance, you observe a human being clearly forced to a certain course of life, to a certain kind of misdeed, and, understanding it, you can pity such an individual, can feel compassion, can even admire the courage with which he can live at all. You think: is it not marvelous, magnificent, the way he or she takes on that awful burden, lives that dirt? Nevertheless, you have to say it is bad, and if you don't, you are not accepting yourself. You commit a sin against your own law and are not fulfilling your own morality which is instinctive. And you don't do justice to the other fellow either, for the fellow who has to live like that must know that he is committing misdeeds, and if you tell him you admire his courage he says, "Thank you, that is awfully nice, but you see *I need* to suffer from my misdeed." A man is dishonored by the fact that he is not properly punished. His misdeed must be punished, must have compensation, or why in hell should he risk punishment? The things which are not allowed are full of vitality, because in order to put them through, you risk something. So if you deny a depreciative judg-

ment, you perhaps deprive your fellow being of his only reward. He is merely attracted by the danger, by the adventure, the risk of being immoral, which is wonderful in a way; and you must give him the reward and call him a doer of evil deeds. And if it happens to yourself, if you yourself misbehave, you will be forced to admit that you are a doer of evil deeds, and it gives you a peculiar satisfaction. You can repent, for instance, and there is no greater and more wonderful satisfaction than to repent a thing from the bottom of your heart. I am sure that many people commit sins merely in order to repent; it is too marvelous, a sort of voluptuousness. You must watch them when they do it. Go to religious meetings; there you will see it.

So when you consider that whole problem, from whatever side you look at it, you come to the conclusion that it is perfectly understandable that those things are bad. And it is also quite understandable that people cannot avoid living them, doing them, and at the same time nobody can avoid cursing the people who do them. Therefore, whatever happens must happen, it is inevitable: that is the comedy of life. We know it is a comedy, we know it is illogical, but that is life, and you have to live that if you want to live at all. If you don't want to live, you can step out of all that nonsense; you don't need to pass the judgment. But the moment you fail to curse an offence, or call it "nothing but" a vice, or say it is admirable that this man is able to commit such marvelous crimes—such courage of life!—then you are no longer real, but are on the way to a neurosis, just a crank. Life is in the middle of all that comedy. For it is essentially a comedy, and the one who understands that it is illusion, Maya, can step out of it—provided it is his time. Then he doesn't risk a neurosis because he is then on the right way. So in the second half of life you may begin to understand that life is a comedy all round, in every respect, and that nothing is quite true and even that is not quite true; and by such insight you slowly begin to step out of life without risking a neurosis.

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January / February 1939

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LECTURE I

18 January 1939

Prof. Jung:

We stopped before Christmas at the 54th chapter, "The Three Evil Things." We were nearly at the end of the first part, but there is still one point in the last two verses which I should like to speak of.

On what bridge goeth the now to the hereafter? By what constraint doth the high stoop to the low? And what enjoineth even the highest still—to grow upwards?

Now stand the scales poised and at rest: three heavy questions have I thrown in; three heavy answers carrieth the other scale.

Now in order to link up what is coming with the past, we must realize where we stand in *Zarathustra*. How does he arrive at these three evil things? You remember they are voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness. What is the connection here? It is most difficult, but absolutely necessary, to keep one's head clear in wading through *Zarathustra*; one easily gets lost in the jungle of his talk. Therefore it is very useful to know the general theme with which we are concerned, the general trend of the whole argument, not only of the last chapter but of all the chapters before it.

Mrs. Brunner: He is always approaching the inferior man.

Prof. Jung: Exactly. All the previous chapters deal with the problem of the inferior man, or the shadow. And when did he first meet the shadow?

Answer: When the fool approached him in the beginning of the book.

Prof. Jung: And what was his attitude to it then?

Answer: He reviled the shadow.

Prof. Jung: And not only did he revile the inferior man in himself, but collectivity in general, representing the inferior man. For collectivity is practically always shadowy, always inferior, because the more people there are together, the more they become inferior. Just recently

there has been an article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* about a book, *The Mass Soul*, in which a man expressed his disagreement with the idea that the individual is lowered in a crowd.¹ Of course everybody in a crowd thinks that *he* is a fellow, that he is even quite superior to that rabble. Notice the way the crowd in a theater look at each other! You see everyone thinks God-knows-what of himself, something very wonderful. Therefore they all put on their best clothes and their jewelry, so that everybody will see that they are the superior people. They even stand up in the front rows and turn their backs on the orchestra—in such a position everybody must see them—and then they make important faces and stick out their bellies and stare up at the boxes. But that of course just shows how inferior they are. The fact is, when a man is in a crowd he is inferior, no matter what idea he may have about his greatness. The morality of a crowd is lower than the morality of each individual in the crowd. A crowd is overpowering naturally, since thousands are more than one, then one is overpowered; and to be overpowered or to overpower the others is inferior. So what can you do? You are just caught in inferiority and you are inferior too.

Nietzsche reviles not only his own shadow but also the shadow in masses, the collective man. I have often pointed out the stupidity of that, because he lives on the inferior man—perhaps a monkey man, perhaps an ape psychology. But that is the stuff of life and the source from which we spring, so there is no use in reviling it. Now in his attack on the inferior man and in his arguments concerning him, he cannot help discovering certain truths; he is now just about to recognize the demerits of the shadow as great merits. So in denying or reviling the shadow he enters the house by the back door. For instance, he says that collective man is a low brute, and then he slowly realizes the merit of brutality; he begins to recognize that the motives which move the collective man are really virtues. So he takes the three outstanding demerits of the shadow man, his voluptuousness, his lust for power, and his lust in himself, his selfishness, and makes them into virtues. He is now going to concern himself with that theme. But here he says something which is of particular importance; he asks, “On what bridge goeth the now to the hereafter? By what constraint doth the high stoop to the low? And what enjoineth even the highest still—to grow upwards?” Can you give the answer?

¹ Almost certainly Jung is here referring to José Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses*, which appeared in Spanish in 1930 and was anonymously translated into English in 1932 (New York). It is this work by the Spanish philosopher that made current the expression “mass-man.”

Miss Hannah: Individuation.

Mrs. Fierz: I would say just by living.

Prof. Jung: No, it is so simple that you don't see it. It is already said here: By voluptuousness, by passion for power, and by selfishness. There the scales stand poised. You see these things are powers of life, therefore they are really merits. They are vital virtues because they are vital necessities in that they build the bridge to the hereafter. Virtues and high accomplishments are always an end; the incomplete is a beginning. The incomplete, the undifferentiated is the bridge to tomorrow; the fruit that is not ripe or that is a mere germ today, is the ripe fruit of two months hence. And what are the forces that move the world—that constrain the high to stoop to the low, for instance. Surely not merits, because they help him to rise even higher. He rightly says it “enjoineth even the highest still—to grow upwards,” namely, to move far away from the low, because the effort to compensate vice forces you to great heights of virtue. If you had not to combat a very deep shadow you would never create a light. Only when it is very dark do you make a light, only when you are suffering from a vice do you begin to develop the virtue that will help you to grow upwards. Also, if you are high, what helps you to stoop to the low ones? Just such vices. By voluptuousness, by the will to power, you can stoop low, you can deteriorate. The man who assumes power over others simply lowers himself with their loss of power. He gives them the power they want but he has. He is just as low as those he is ruling. The slave is not lower than the tyrant; the slave receives the power of the tyrant and the tyrant takes power from the slave. It is the same coin whether you take it from someone or give it to someone. And that is so with power, or with voluptuousness or with selfishness: it is all the same. But those are the powers which make things move on. Unfortunately, the good thing, the high thing, the virtue, is always an accomplishment, always a summit, and the summit leads no farther. Only when you are down below can you rise, as only after the summit can you descend. But if there is nothing below, you cannot descend. Now that is Nietzsche's idea and it is to be considered.

Mrs. Fierz: Why is it that just at this moment the scales are even?

Prof. Jung: There is a sort of *enantiodromia* here, as I pointed out.

Mrs. Fierz: Is it because he has not yet accepted these three things?

Prof. Jung: But he has.

Mrs. Fierz: Then why doesn't it go down?

Prof. Jung: Ah, that is just Nietzsche's style. He recognizes the thing but other people must practice it. He merely preaches it, but it doesn't

concern him. He doesn't realize when he preaches house-cleaning that it might be his own house. Everybody else has to clean house because his own house is dirty. It is like those people who always talk about the weeds in other people's gardens but never weed their own. He never asks: "Now what does that mean for myself?" That he never looks back on himself is the tragedy of this book; otherwise he would benefit from his book. But he looks for something else, for fame, or that other people should approve of it. It is as if he didn't want to know whether it was also right for him. You see, he recognizes these evil things as important powers of life, but again comes to the conclusion that of course those ordinary people do *not* recognize these facts, that they discredit these powers of life; again we see that the shadow, which consists of just these qualities, is reviled under that assumption. Naturally the inferior man doesn't recognize the philosophical aspect, but he is moved by these forces, he lives the shadow; and being overcome by these forces, he realizes their evil side. So the inferior man likes to be taught how to be different, how to extricate himself from such powers.

You see, a man who is not at home in his house is not held fast to his own personal and corporeal life, and so doesn't realize in how far he is overcome by these dark powers. Such a man naturally comes to the conclusion, which Nietzsche reaches, that they are merits because he doesn't possess them, doesn't see them or touch them. While one who is fettered, imprisoned, by these powers—who knows that he cannot extricate himself from voluptuousness, from passion for power, from selfishness—such a one gladly hears that he can liberate himself from these evils. These are the powers of hell, and here is the god who will help you to overcome them. To him it makes sense to liberate himself because he is too much under their suggestion. But the one who is quite outside and unaffected by them will gladly return to these powers, because to him they mean something positive. From the distance it looks fine, like the blond beast, a wonderful voluptuous beast, a powerful selfish beast, a sort of Cesare Borgia. The poor, amiable, half-blind Professor Nietzsche is anything but that, so if he could get something of the red beard of Cesare Borgia, or something of the voracity and power of the lion, or of the sexual brutality of a bull, it would naturally seem to him all to the good. So he begins to revile again the sad creatures who cannot see how wonderful these three vices are. In the sixth verse before the end of Part II he says, speaking of this blessed selfishness:

Bad: thus doth it call all that is spirit-broken, and sordidly-servile—constrained, blinking eyes, depressed hearts, and the false submissive style, which kisseth with broad cowardly lips.

And spurious wisdom:—

That is a bad translation of *After-Weisheit*. Instead of spurious wisdom, it really should be “mock wisdom.”

And spurious wisdom: so doth it call all the wit that slaves, and hoary-headed and weary ones affect; and especially all the cunning, spurious-witted, curious-witted foolishness of priests!

The spurious wise, however, all the priests, the world-weary, and those whose souls are of feminine and servile nature—oh, how hath their game all along abused selfishness!

And precisely *that* was to be virtue and was to be called virtue—to abuse selfishness! And “selfless”—so did they wish themselves with good reason, all those world-weary cowards and cross-spiders!

He just goes on reviling the ordinary man for not seeing what wonderful advantages, what marvelous powers of life, those three vices are, not taking into account that there are people who are just the prisoners of these powers. He only sees himself and projects himself naively all over the world as if his case were the universal one. He has grown outside of himself with his intuition, he is not in his body, but is an abstract number, and how does an abstract number feel with no blood for feet and hands and body to give him some relationship to such things? Of course he would welcome being a bit more overcome by the powers of life. But the vast majority of people are the victims of life, and you do them a great service in showing them the way out of their captivity—not into it. You can imagine the effect if he preaches such ideas to those who are in captivity, who are selfish and suffer from their selfishness; now they must realize that selfishness is a great virtue, that they must be more selfish, have more will to power. Then the inferior men become the canaille; then they are really the rabble which before they were not. Perhaps they were modest, and now they become immodest, because the vices from which they suffer—and there was a time when they knew that they suffered from them—are now called virtues. Then they take over the power, and see what becomes of a fellow like Nietzsche! What he has produced is just the contrary to what he tried to produce. If he had only looked back once, he would have seen the

shadow behind him, and then he would have known what he produced. But he never would have had the realization that Hannibal, for instance, had. You remember Hannibal had a remarkable dream when he was on his way to Rome: He felt that something was following him and that he should not turn his head to see what it was; but he did turn his head and he saw that it was a terrible dragon monster that devastated a whole world. As you know, the outcome of his campaign against Rome was the complete destruction of Carthage, which was not exactly his plan, not what he was looking for. But that is what often happens to people who do not see the shadow; they think they only mean the best for a nation or for the whole world, never reckoning with the fact of what they actually produce. If they looked back they would see. Hannibal saw what he produced: first Italy was destroyed, and finally Carthage was definitely and completely destroyed.

You see, one should always ask *who* is teaching a thing. As if it mattered what the man says; it only matters that *he* says, not *what* he says. In order to criticize it, you must always ask *who* has said it. For instance, suppose you are in a bad financial situation, and somebody comes along and says to give him your books and he will handle everything, he will take over the responsibility. But I ask: who is that fellow that is going to take the responsibility? Then we find out that he has gone through a dozen bankruptcies already, that he is really a swindler, and the man who would put his affairs into his hands would be a fool.

And so in reading a philosophy, it is not only the thought itself but the man who produced the thought that counts. Ask what it meant to him, for in reading those words you cannot help comparing them with what he himself was. Or who delivers a sermon? Go back to his reality and see whether it fits. You see, from the context you could conclude here that a *condottiere* from the Renaissance, a hell of a fellow, was speaking. While in reality you find a kindly, very nervous, half-blind man who suffers from headaches and doesn't touch the world anywhere; he is up in a corner of a little house in the Engadine and disturbs not a fly. Then you would say that he was apparently monologizing and that you must turn that thing round and see what was happening. And you would decide that it should be broadcast chiefly in university circles, but forbidden to any ordinary and instinctive creature; that it was only to be handed out to doctors and professors who suffer from insomnia and headaches and nobody else should read it. You see if Nietzsche's inferior man could hear what he, the man above, was preaching, his prophecy would be right, namely:

But to all those cometh now the day, the change, the sword of judgment, the great noontide; then shall many things be revealed.

Revealed to Herr Professor Nietzsche you see.

And he who proclaimeth the ego wholesome and holy, and selfishness blessed, verily, he, the prognosticator, speaketh also what he knoweth: "Behold, it cometh, it is nigh, the great noontide!"

To Professor Nietzsche, actually living in Sils Maria, it would be the great noontide, where the evening joins the morning, where all things become complete, where he could come together with his shadow. But to nobody else.

Now we come to the next chapter, "The Spirit of Gravity." Nietzsche would never have spoken of the spirit of gravity if he had ever come down to it really. He never touched the shadow, but projected it into other people. If he had contacted his own shadow, this chapter would have had no purpose. But he realizes here that something is pulling him down, feels the gravity, an enormous weight, and therefore this chapter, "The Spirit of Gravity," follows. You see, he is still hovering six thousand feet above good and evil, still avoids the three evils which are such great virtues, and so feels the weight, the gravity of things. He rightly begins with the words, "My mouthpiece—is of the people"—not his own. The funny thing is that here he is not talking as if he were Professor Nietzsche; the shadow, the inferior man is talking out of him because the inferior man wants to be heard. And Nietzsche doesn't realize it—in spite of the fact that he is the megaphone of the worst people. You see, this is a very important anticipation.

My mouthpiece—is of the people: too coarsely and cordially do I talk for Angora rabbits.

That is stupidly translated. Nietzsche uses the word "*Seidenhasen*." Now rabbits are very cowardly and stupid animals, very tender, with silky fur; this does not mean Angora rabbits, but means that his opponents are touchy, tender-skinned, foolish, narrow-minded rabbits, living in holes and gnawing cabbage stumps. Of course those are all professors at Basel University. There are some like that sure enough, but he himself belongs to them: *he* is touchy and tender-skinned, and shrinks away from every coarse touch. Every cold wind tells on him. He cannot live in Basel on account of the mists in winter.

And still stranger soundeth my word unto all ink-fish and pen-foxes. *Who* lives by ink and pen?

My hand—is a fool's hand: . . .

That means: my shadow's hand, this is the work of my shadow. But he doesn't realize it at all.

woe unto all tables and walls, and whatever hath room for fool's sketching, fool's scrawling!

He is filling the empty space round himself with the noise of his own words, demonstrating his own ideas; nobody else is concerned with them. As other people write the name of their sweetheart on the walls, or obscene jokes, or their own name, as if that were of interest to anybody but themselves. So he says that of his own sermons; his own chatter, his own wisdom is the fool's voice.

My foot—is a horse-foot; . . .

Who has a horse's foot? The devil. So he is not only a fool, but is also the devil.

therewith do I trample and trot over stick and stone, in the fields up and down, and am bedevilled with delight in all fast racing.

Now we have the picture. He has horse's feet, so he cannot help his feet running away with him. He is chasing up and down through the fields—as if that were particularly helpful to the fields. He is simply destructive, running about like a mad horse. If Jakob Burckhardt had been malicious, he could have said of Nietzsche that he was like a mad bull in a china shop, or like a rhinoceros in a flower bed. He did not because he was too polite, and because he was definitely afraid of Nietzsche. And here Nietzsche takes the words out of his mouth; he is criticizing himself:

My stomach—is surely an eagle's stomach? For it preferreth lamb's flesh. Certainly it is a bird's stomach.

Do you think that a bird has a good stomach?

Mrs. Fierz: They can swallow anything, and then they make it into a ball in their stomach and spit it out.

Prof. Jung: That is the so-called *Gewölle*.

Mrs. Fierz: And they have sort-of stones in their stomachs, so they can grind things.

Prof. Jung: Yes, like iron balls. But Nietzsche's stomach was so weak

that he often suffered from vomiting and so on—an extraordinary contrast! Then that his eagle stomach particularly liked to digest lamb's meat refers to what?

Mrs. Fierz: To the Lamb in Christianity.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that most certainly refers to the *Agnus Dei*, so the eagle is a god-eater. Naturally Christ, as the *Agnus Dei*, the Lamb of God, would be dead, a dead lamb, and that is what eagles do eat; and Nietzsche is the great devourer of Christianity and he has an excellent stomach. Now that is not the conscious Nietzsche, but the shadow speaking all along, and it would be up to Nietzsche to realize that something had been said, and that perchance it was himself who was speaking. Then, as any reasonable individual would do, he should ask what that meant. Just as you naturally ask, if someone tells you that he has written such-and-such a thing, "But how did you arrive at it? What does it mean to you?" So Nietzsche might say to himself, "Eagles have wonderful eyes, but you are half blind; birds have wonderful stomachs, but your stomach is weak. [If it had been an ostrich, that would have been the acme of a stomach because—proverbially—they can even digest iron nails!] You say you are a most destructive devil trampling down the wheat fields of the peasants, but you see you are a fool, filling every empty space with this silly writing. Now what on earth does that mean?" But it is only today apparently that we begin to ask ourselves such a question, or to reflect at all upon such things. Formerly it seemed only important that something had been said and no matter by whom. At least that was Nietzsche's psychology—something has been said—it happens that I have said something; not *I* have said, but I have said *something*. That prejudice is very important psychologically: namely, that only the thing outside matters, the thing that is produced and not the person by whom it is produced. Then he goes on,

Nourished with innocent things, and with few, ready and impatient to fly, to fly away—that is now my nature: why should there not be something of bird-nature therein!

How do you interpret this?

Mrs. Fierz: It is an illusion about bird nature really, for why should they be nourished with innocent things?

Prof. Jung: Ah, but the Lamb, the *Agnus Dei*, is innocent food and that is very becoming! It is very nice of the eagles to eat innocent lambs or the innocent chickens; therefore they are so much liked by the peasants! This simply means also that the bird of prey is not a particularly

constructive animal and is much hated by mankind. And what does "ready and impatient to fly away" mean?

Miss Hannah: He is still wanting to escape the inferior man, to live above it.

Prof. Jung: Well, it is the shadow speaking. This is a French expression: *prendre son vol*. He is now on the wing, he can fly to the top. This is the liberation of the shadow. And what will happen when the shadow is liberated—when it becomes a bird?

Mrs. Fierz: It will descend upon something.

Prof. Jung: Yes, pounce on a prey. Now, what kind of picture do you see? There is a famous picture from antiquity.

Mrs. Fierz: Ganymede.

Prof. Jung: Of course, fetched by the eagle of Zeus. And we have another connection.

Mrs. Jung: Prometheus.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the classical case. There the eagle has found its prey and killed it practically. So when the shadow puts on wings and becomes a bird, when the shadow is liberated, it is an independent, autonomous thing, and it swoops down on Nietzsche and takes him up into another world. Eventually, the eagle will eat out his life exactly as the eagle of Zeus ate the liver of Prometheus when he was chained to a rock, chained to earth. There we have the whole story. Then he says,

And especially that I am hostile to the spirit of gravity, that is bird-nature:—verily, deadly hostile, supremely hostile, originally hostile! Oh, whither hath my hostility not flown and misflown!

This is a statement as to the attitude of the bird of prey that is now ready to take its flight. The shadow speaks here as an eagle; he has become a volatile being, a bird, and as such he is hostile to the spirit of gravity. We have had passages enough before where Zarathustra expressed his particular disgust with the spirit of gravity, with anything that pulled him down, and here it comes to the acme. His idea is that the very nature of the bird is hostile to the spirit of gravity, and he cannot do enough to enhance this hostility. He repeats it three times: "verily, deadly hostile, supremely hostile, originally hostile!" He wants to express a complete, hopeless contrast, things which never come together, and he even acknowledges that his hostility is so great that it may mislead him—"misflown," he says. You see, he identifies here completely with the bird-being and our inference is that it is an eagle, because he speaks of an eagle's stomach and it is a bird of prey that kills lambs. And that means a spirit hostile to Christianity and to all innocent

things, and particularly is it hostile to the inferior man, to the spirit of gravity that is held in the prison of the earth. So it is a being that is intensely hostile to ordinary humanity or to everything human. One cannot help thinking here of the totem animal of the place from which Nietzsche comes, as more or less the model for such symbolism. And what is that totem animal?

Mrs. Crowley: The eagle.

Prof. Jung: That is the totem animal of the whole country, but Nietzsche's immediate background was my good town of Basel, and there it is the basilisk, a sort of winged dragon with a scorpion's tail, also a flying thing, but with a very poisonous sting at the end of its tail. Now, one of the characteristics of people who come from Basel is their *médiance*, their poisonous sting. There is a story that in the Middle Ages, when it happened that a rooster produced an egg—at all events it was the assumption that he did, for nobody else could have produced that egg—the police arrested the rooster. They had a trial and the judge issued a sentence: the rooster was condemned to death, given to the executioner, and burned like a heretic. For if a rooster produces an egg in the country where the basilisk is the totem animal, it is quite possible that a toad will discover that egg and hatch it; and when a toad hatches a rooster's egg, a basilisk will creep out. Then the totem animal would have become real, which would have been the most awful catastrophe for the town of Basel. Therefore the rooster had to be declared a witch and removed. That this case happened in Basel is of course the expression of their fear of the totem animal. So the totem animal is a reality in Switzerland. There is another town here where they keep the totem animal alive, Berne.

They say the word *Berne* comes from *Bär*, but this is of course the vulgar etymology. The fact is that in the old Celto-Roman settlement—which was not exactly at Berne but on the next peninsula—the river making a loop there—they excavated the *Dea Artio*, a bear goddess. So a sanctuary of that pre-Christian goddess was there already, which explains why the local totem is the bear. And that idea is still so much alive at Berne that they have to have living bears in the *Bärengraben* in order to feel all right. Like the primitives, when they have lost their totem they are gone. Therefore we have to take such allusions very seriously. In this case the bird coincides with the bird that is characteristic for the whole country, the eagle. You can now draw your conclusions if you like. We don't need to do it publicly; we can do it in private meditation. So Nietzsche says:

Thereof could I sing a song—[I could sing a song too!] and *will* sing it: though I be alone in an empty house, and must sing it to mine own ears.

There was nobody to listen, nobody would understand; he was quite alone with that intuition, of course, in his days. Now, in the next part we will skip the first four verses, and then continue:

One must learn to love oneself—thus do I teach—with a wholesome and healthy love: that one may endure to be with oneself, and not go roving about.

This is a very reasonable idea, a very good intention obviously. In the verse before we find a measure of precaution and a realization:

Not, to be sure, with the love of the sick and infected, for with them stinketh even self-love!

So we are quite sure he doesn't mean the egotistical autoeroticism of a morbid being. But when one says, "Of course I don't mean that awful kind of self-love, that egocentric attitude of neurotics," one must be quite sure that one is not a neurotic oneself. Otherwise an indiscreet individual of our day will enquire, "Are *you* the one with that right kind of love?" And then one must be sure that one has a clean sheet, that one doesn't also suffer from egocentricity or neuroticism. Therefore, when Nietzsche says he doesn't mean that stinking kind of self-love, that is not enough. For *who* has been talking? The shadow, the inferior man, who, we know, has even become a bird that in time may swoop down upon Nietzsche, sweep him off his feet and carry him away. This bird is the fool who jumped over him in that first fatal vision. When Nietzsche-Zarathustra was a rope-dancer, the fool that leapt over him as if he were flying, was already this evil bird that would take possession of him; and that fool caused the downfall, the death even, of the poor rope-dancer, whose mind would be dead before his body. That was the prophecy even then. So when this bird-man is speaking, as he was definitely in the chapter before and still is here, we have to be critical. For even a truth works in the wrong way when spoken by the wrong man; the right means in the hands of the wrong man works evil. We will go back to the first verses in this second part of the chapter where it says.

He who one day teacheth men to fly will have shifted all landmarks; . . .

The one who can teach men to fly is the flier, the bird-man, and he will thereby shift all landmarks. So there will no longer be any definite borderlines. What does that mean?

Mrs. Fierz: It means just chaos.

Prof. Jung: Yes, indistinctness. Nobody knows what belongs to himself and what belongs to his neighbors; it will be a complete mixup. The bird-man will produce chaos.

to him will all landmarks themselves fly into the air; . . .

Now what are landmarks really? What would you call a landmark, Miss Hannah?

Miss Hannah: Something that is always there, that one is absolutely used to.

Prof. Jung: Well, you are used to a midday meal. Is that a landmark too? Please give me a definite description of a landmark.

Mr. Allemann: All laws or conventions, everything that has been exactly defined, like the two hedges between which a road goes. If they disappear in the air you don't know where you are.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a landmark is a definite characteristic of a country. It can be a boundary stone, a hedge, a river, a hill, a tree—any outstanding feature of a countryside is a landmark. And if all such features should fly up to heaven—which of course is a perfectly nonsensical picture—what happens then?

Mr. Allemann: No orientation is possible.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but we must be concrete. When a landmark flies into the air, what happens?

Mrs. Fierz: Then gravity has stopped.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Now if that should really happen on the earth, if there were no gravity, nothing would be changed in the moment, but I would only need to press on this table and I would float into the air and remain there. You lift your chair and up it goes to the ceiling and you remain with it. The slightest shock causes your house to rise into the air, and so everything, the whole surface of the earth, would be floating through space. So Nietzsche describes here a condition where gravity is gone completely, where every landmark rises into the air. And the text goes on,

the earth will be christen anew—as “the light body.”

The earth has no weight, it is the light body. He has obliterated gravity, so the earth itself becomes a bird. Of course that is madness.

The ostrich runneth faster than the fastest horse, . . .

He could not suppress the ostrich on account of its stomach, and the horse's hoofs, the devil, must be brought in again . . .

but it also thrusteth its head heavily into the heavy earth: thus is it with the man who cannot yet fly.

Nor could he suppress this picture, because it is again an opportunity to revile the inferior man who is already a bird, but he still has his head buried in the earth. He is again reviling the shadow, but the shadow is still speaking. That the shadow reviles itself is the devilish cunning of the unconscious. The old Fathers of the church have already pointed out that the devil is not dangerous as long as he appears with claws and a tail, or as long as he utters blasphemies, or causes one to sin. He is not even dangerous when he reads the Bible and sings hymns. But when the devil tells the truth, look out! For you then have to ask *who* has told it, and since that is never asked, there the greatest danger lies. Then it is like assuming that the tenor with a wonderful voice has a noble character.

Heavy unto him are earth and life, and so willeth the spirit of gravity! But he who would become light, and be a bird, must love himself: thus do I teach.

Here is the devil, the bird-man who says you cannot get rid of the spirit of gravity without loving yourself. You see, this love of himself serves the aims of the bird-man, so that is not the right teaching. It leads into complete annihilation of order and law, and of nature as well, the nature that is heavy and has definite landmarks. It upsets the natural order of things, creating beings that have no soil under their feet. It changes everything heavy that has its own place in nature, its own uniqueness, into something indistinct and means the destruction and dissolution of all definite individual values. The end is a soup: everything is in the soup. This great truth is to be met with severe criticism, because the spirit or the bird-man is going to teach this truth to everybody indiscriminately. He says one must learn to love oneself with a wholesome and healthy love, but is everybody ready to understand and to accept such a teaching? That it is right for everybody is of course very questionable. Therefore one asks, "Did you apply that teaching to yourself? Did you love yourself with that love? Show me the result." And then Prof. Nietzsche is produced, with an upset stomach,

taking a sleeping draught every night. Is that the bird-man or the spirit-man, or in any way a superior man? No, it is a poor sick man.

But the truth of this sentence is valid under certain conditions; if you understand properly what it means to love oneself with a wholesome and healthy love, that one may endure to be with oneself and not go roving about, then it is a very excellent truth. If that is told to the right man by the right man in the right moment, it is an excellent truth, and one of the most modern, most moral tasks you can imagine. For you have to love yourself just as you are, and then there is no reviling of the inferior man any more: there is no reviling at all. Then you are forced to even love the inferior man in yourself, the ape man perhaps; then you have to be nice to your own menagerie—if you can realize what that means. It is difficult to realize it, because you have to love them with such a love that you are able to endure being with yourself. Now, how can you endure to be with your menagerie unless you have your animals in cages? The only thing to do is to have cages, perhaps very nice cages with different species of water plants and such things, a sort of aquarium such as Hagenbeck makes for his animals: deep moats round your cages, no iron bars.² It looks as if they were free but they are not. So you see, you can only say, “Ah, I am civilized man but my menagerie has to be looked after.” You can make a very cultural zoo of yourself if you love your animals.

For instance, innocent animals—antelopes, gazelles, and such animals—can be kept walking about as long as they cannot escape. But if they escape you have lost something. Even your birds must be kept in a *volière*; but it can be spacious and well equipped, so that they have a sort of Garden of Eden. That was the original idea: the Garden of Eden was a sort of cage for man and animals from which nobody could escape without getting into the desert, or a zoo where the animals had a pleasant existence and could not eat each other. That would be very awkward for the birds of prey, so we must assume they got horseflesh from outside perhaps, since they would not eat apples. This is of course an entirely different picture from what Nietzsche dreamed of. But if you don't love your menagerie, I don't see how you can endure to be with yourself. You couldn't very well be in the monkey cage or with the snakes—it would be too uncomfortable, and you would not

² Carl Hagenbeck (1844-1913), *Von Tieren und Menschen* (Berlin, 1909); abridged version, tr. H.S.R. Eliot and A. G. Thacker (London, 1909) under the title *Beasts and Men*. Hagenbeck was a German pioneer of the modern zoo.

love yourself when exposed to the hardships day and night, to the stench and also to the danger. So you must produce a relatively decent existence for yourself. You have probably a nice little house near the zoo, perhaps inside near the bird cage where you don't smell the wolves or the foxes. They are a bit further away, also the snake house. It must be nothing more and nothing less than a little Garden of Eden in which you are the lord god walking about and enjoying the different species of animals and plants.

Mrs. Jung: You said before that the shadow was speaking. Now, from the standpoint of the shadow it would be understandable that he wishes to lose his gravity so that he would become more differentiated.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the shadow was speaking, but we now detach that whole sentence from the shadow and take it for an impersonal truth. We put it under conditions where the right man uses the right means in the right moment with the right people. We assume the best possible conditions for this truth. Here it is not the best possible condition because it is told by the bird-man to everybody indiscriminately; and that is a great danger because the inferior man will not understand it properly. If you teach the inferior man to follow his voluptuousness, follow his passion for power, to have it all his own way, you will soon have a communistic chaos: that would be the inevitable result of such teaching. But here we are imagining that this truth is now told, not by the bird-man but by the right man; not to everybody, but to the right people; not just at any time in the world, but now, profiting by the right moment. For a truth in the wrong moment can have an entirely wrong effect. It must be said in the right moment. You see, when we assume that things are at their best, we can then make an extract of that truth, which is universal. And it is a tremendous problem of course: How shall we deal with all the different aspects of human nature? If you love the inferior man, if you love all those inferior qualities as you should, what does that mean?

For instance, if you love flies and lice, which you also have to do to a certain extent, they will simply eat you up in the end. But you have other animals that you have to love, so you must give each part of yourself a decent existence. Then naturally the different kinds of animals will check each other. The birds of prey will hinder a superabundance of mice or other little vermin. The big animals of prey will eat many of the sheep and cows, so there will not be an overproduction of milk and butter and so on. It is exactly the same in the human constitution: there are innumerable units with definite purposes, and each can overgrow

all the others if you insist upon one particular unit. But if you love yourself, you have to love the whole, and the part has to submit to the necessities of the whole in the interest of democracy. You can say it is perfectly ridiculous, but we *are* ridiculous. The management of the whole psychological situation, like the management of a country, consists of a lot of ridiculous things. Like all nature, it is grotesque—all the funny animals you know—but they do exist and the whole is a symphony, after all. If it is one-sided, you disturb the whole thing: you disturb that symphony and it becomes chaos. Then it is also an excellent truth that one should not go roving about, as Nietzsche defines it:

Such roving about christeneth itself “brotherly love”; with these words hath there hitherto been the best lying and dissembling, and especially by those who have been burdensome to everyone.

Those are the people who go about and tell everybody how much they love them or what they ought to do for their own good, always assuming that they know what is best for them. Or the people who want to get rid of themselves, so they unburden themselves on others. There are certain lazy dogs who want to get rid of their own destiny so they put it on somebody else by loving them. They fall on the neck of someone saying, “I love you,” and so they put the bag on his back; they call that love. Or they go to someone and burden him with what he really ought to do and *they* never do. They never ask themselves what is good for themselves, but they know exactly what is good for him. Do it yourself first and then you will know if it is really good. So here Nietzsche tells other people they ought to fly—as if *he* could. He cheats them as he has cheated himself. It is the same mechanism that he blames Christian love for. But there is Christian love and Christian love. When someone applies Christian love in the right way, it is a virtue and of the highest merit; but if he misuses Christian love in order to put his own burdens on other people, he is immoral, a usurer, a cheat. You see, if he loves other people with the purpose of making use of them, it is not love; he simply uses love as a pretext, a cover under which he hides his own selfish interests. To really love other people, he must first give evidence that he can love himself, for to love oneself is the most difficult task. To love someone else is easy, but to love what you are, the thing that is yourself, is just as if you were embracing a glowing red-hot iron: it burns into you and that is very painful. Therefore, to love somebody else in the first place is always an escape which we all hope for, and we all enjoy it when we are capable of it. But in the long run, it comes back

on us. You cannot stay away from yourself forever, you have to return, have to come to that experiment, to know whether you really can love. That is the question—whether you can love yourself, and that will be the test. So when Nietzsche blames Christian love, he is simply blaming his own type.

LECTURE II

25 January 1939

Prof. Jung:

We left off the second part of the 55th chapter at the verse:

One must learn to love oneself—thus do I teach—with a wholesome and healthy love: that one may endure to be with oneself, and not go roving about.

This, as you remember, is said in connection with all the preceding chapters about the shadow man. Nietzsche has talked so much about him and has reviled him so often, that we might almost expect a reaction to take place: he should develop beyond it. You know, when you have occupied your mind with an object for a while, particularly when it is such an emotional object—or subject—as the shadow, you are almost forced into a reaction. For whether it is the shadow or any other unconscious figure, the preoccupation is of a rare, emotional kind, and you are drawn into the problem of it: you become almost identified with it. The fact that Nietzsche reviles the shadow shows to what extent he is already identical with it, and his vituperation is really a means of separating himself from it. You often find people swearing and kicking against things with which they are too closely connected: then they develop inner resistances and make attempts to liberate themselves. So it seems as if we might now expect something to happen, and here we find a trace of something new—one could almost say a way to deal with the shadow properly—though you cannot expect Nietzsche in his vague unconsciousness to deal quite clearly or properly with the shadow. Nevertheless, ways may suggest themselves. Even in dreams, where one is also in an unconscious condition, more or less clear statements may come through, which you can use if, with consciousness, you can understand them. While if you leave them in the dream state, they have only a faint effect and you can never really use them.

Therefore, I have often been asked what was the use of having a healing or helpful dream when you cannot understand it. That is ex-

actly why we try to understand dreams, for the fact of having a helpful dream doesn't mean that you are really much helped. You may be benefitted even if you don't understand it—it may have a certain positive effect—but as a rule it is a transitory effect. It is too unimportant, too faint, and vanishes too soon, so that practically nothing happens. It is in order to gain ground, to enlarge our understanding of them, that we make the attempt to interpret dreams. It is just as if you had discovered that there was gold in the ground under your feet; you must dig it up or it always remains there. Or you may know that there is three or four percent of gold in a certain rock, yet it is so distributed in the substance of the rock that it is of no use to you. Therefore you must invent a special chemical procedure to extract that gold; then you get it, but it needs your conscious or even your scientific effort.

Of course in Nietzsche's case, there is nothing of the kind; he is in a sort of dream process. He swims along with the current of his problems, and only with our knowledge of psychology are we able to see what they really are. The problem of how to compensate the shadow appears on the surface and disappears, and then comes up again, like a log carried along by a muddy river; and there is nobody there to fish out that log and make a good beam of it. He is simply carried along by the stream of his associations, and he does bring up something of great value, but it is we who know it is of great value. He also has a feeling that it is worth something, but it is as if he didn't know that he could make that log into a pole which would be the foundation of a bridge perhaps, or which could be shaped into a boat to carry him across the river. So he lets it go, it passes by and forms a part of that great river, the eternal movement of life, and the river flows down into the sea. It is coming to an end. This book begins with the statement that this is the down-going of Zarathustra, the sunset—the river is nearing the end; and the mere moving current reveals many things, but nothing comes of it because there is nobody to take a hook and fish something out. What he says here is a great truth and an extraordinarily helpful one, the formula by which he could deal with or overcome his shadow. But if he did realize it, he would have to strike out with a blue pencil all the chapters before, for he would not be reviling the shadow because he would also *be* his shadow. And how could he love himself if he reviles himself? He could not blame the inferior man, because to love oneself means to love one's totality, and that includes the inferior man.

You see, the idea in Christianity is to love the least of our brethren, and as long as he is outside of us, it is a wonderful chance; we all hope that the least of our brethren is, for God's sake, outside ourselves. For

you cut a very wonderful figure when you put a tramp at your table and feed him, and you think, "Am I not grand? Such a dirty chap and I feed him at my table!" And the devil of course is not lazy in that respect: he stands right behind you and whispers in your ear what a wonderful heart you have, like gold you know, and you pat yourself on the back for having done it. And everybody else says, "Is he not a wonderful fellow, marvelous!" But when it happens that the least of the brethren whom you meet on the road of life is yourself, what then? I have asked certain theologians this question, but they can only whisper that they don't know. Otherwise it would appear as if they were kind to the least of their brethren in themselves, that they didn't despise him on account of his inferiority; while the ordinary practice is that they revile themselves, so that again everybody will say, "What a grand fellow! What self-criticism! He sees his mistakes, his vices, and he rebukes himself." And then the whole of collectivity will agree.

Now, Nietzsche discovered the truth, that if you have to be kind to the least of your brethren, you have to be kind also when the least of your brethren comes to you in the shape of yourself, and so he arrives at the conclusion: love thyself. The collective Christian point of view is: "Love thy neighbor," and they hush up the second part "as thyself." Nietzsche reverses this; he says, "Love thyself," and forgets "as thou lovest thy neighbor." That is the anti-Christian point of view and so the truth is falsified both ways. It really should be: "Love thy neighbor as thou lovest thyself; or love thyself as thou lovest thy neighbor." That is a complete truth—if you love at all, or if you can afford to love at all. One could say also, "Hate your neighbor as you hate yourself, or hate yourself as you hate your neighbor." Nietzsche's understanding is quite complete, one could say—only he doesn't realize it. One *should* love oneself, one *should* accept the least of one's brethren in oneself, that one may endure to be with oneself and not go roving about. And how can we endure anything if we cannot endure ourselves? If the whole of mankind should run away from itself, life would consist on principle of running away all the time. Now that is not meant; God's creation is not meant to run away from itself. If the tiger runs away from itself and eats apples, or an elephant runs away from itself in order to study at the university library, or a man becomes a fish, it is a complete perversion. Therefore, the very foundation of existence, the biological truth, is that each being is so interested in itself that it does love itself, thereby fulfilling the laws of its existence. The individual gets cut off from his roots if he tries to use the roots of other people. Inasmuch as we run away from ourselves we are trying to use the roots

of other people, to be parasites on other people, and that is a perversity, a monstrosity. That deviation or separation from oneself is what Nietzsche calls “roving about,” and he explains in the next paragraph:

Such roving about christeneth itself “brotherly love”; with these words hath there hitherto been the best lying and dissembling, and especially by those who have been burdensome to every one.

Here he makes a statement which is absolutely true. The Christian brotherly love is exactly that, loving thy neighbor and suppressing the second part of the sentence. In that case you are running away from yourself, so you come to your neighbor as the man who doesn't love himself, and then naturally you burden your neighbor with the task of loving you. You love him in the hope that he will love you again because you don't love yourself. Because you don't feed yourself, you tell your neighbor you love him, with the secret hope that he will feed you. Or because you don't earn money yourself, you tell your neighbor you love him in the hope that he will give you money. That is damnable. It is: “I give that thou givest,” and that is not exactly what we call love. It is a plot, or an insinuation, or an intention, a definite plan to get something for yourself, and that contradicts the very idea of love. So when you hate yourself and pretend to love your neighbor, it is more than suspect, it is poison. You see, when you cannot love yourself, then in a way you cannot love, so it is really a pretense to say that you love your neighbor. The love of the man who cannot love himself is defective when he loves somebody else. It is like saying one cannot think one's own thoughts, but can only think the thoughts of other people. But that is not thinking; it is mere parrot talk, a sham, a fraud—one is simply pulling the wool over other people's eyes. So if you are full of desires and needs and pretend to love somebody else, it is merely in order that they shall fulfil what you really desire and need. That is what Nietzsche is emphasizing. Then he goes on,

And verily, it is no commandment for to-day and tomorrow to learn to love oneself. Rather is it of all arts the finest, subtlest, last and patientest.

This is perfectly true: one could call it a great art, and I should say a great philosophy because it is the most difficult thing you can imagine, to accept your own inferiority. It needs more than art: it needs a great deal of philosophy, even of religion, in order to make that bond between yourself and your shadow a lasting one. When Nietzsche assumes that it is an art and even the highest art, he doesn't put it

strongly enough, because he doesn't realize what it is. Now he continues,

For to its possessor is all possession well concealed, and of all treasure-pits one's own is last excavated—so causeth the spirit of gravity.

He understands sloth, or whatever it is which hinders us from excavating our own treasure, to be the spirit of gravity. That is because it is understood to be, not a treasure, but a black hole full of evil spirits.

Almost in the cradle are we apportioned with heavy words and worths: "good" and "evil"—so calleth itself this dowry. For the sake of it we are forgiven for living.

This means that the moral categories are a heavy, even a dangerous, inheritance, because they are the instruments by which we make it impossible to integrate the shadow. We condemn it and therefore we suppress it.

And therefore suffereth one little children to come unto one, to forbid them betimes to love themselves—so causeth the spirit of gravity."

Here is a clear reference to what?

Miss Hannah: To Christ's remark.

Prof. Jung: Yes, so we see he means Christianity all along the line.

And we—we bear loyally what is apportioned unto us, on hard shoulders, over rugged mountains! And when we sweat, then do people say to us: "Yea, life is hard to bear!"

But man himself only is hard to bear!

This is a very important statement from a psychological point of view. We forget again and again that our fate, our lives, are just ourselves; it is in a way our choice all along. Of course one can say that we are born into overwhelming conditions, but the conditions don't depend upon the weather, don't depend upon the geological structure of the surface of the earth, don't depend upon electricity or upon the sunshine. They depend upon man, upon our contemporaries, and we are included. We are born into the after-war world, but we are the people who live there. We have the psychology that produces an after-war world, so we are in it, participating in those conditions, and if we have social responsibilities, it is because we are the makers of that kind of psychology. If everybody in his own place and in his own self would correct the atti-

tude which has brought about those conditions, they would not exist. So we can only conclude that whatever we meet with, inasmuch as it is man-made, is the thing we have chosen, the result of our peculiar psychology. We are always inclined to say: "Oh, if *they* had not done this or that." But who are they? We are they too, for if you take one man out of the crowd that you accuse, and ask him who "they" are, he will say, "*You!*" You are in the same crowd, life is yourself, and if life is hard to bear, it is because it is very hard to bear yourself. That is the greatest burden, the greatest difficulty.

The reason thereof is that he carrieth too many extraneous things on his shoulders. Like the camel kneeleth he down, and letteth himself be well laden.

Is that logical? He has just said, "But man himself only is hard to bear," and now he calls it the burden of life. It is the burden of himself, man is the burden.

Mrs. Jung: I thought it referred to what he said before, that one teaches the people good and evil, and because he thinks those are extraneous things, that might be what he means by the burden.

Prof. Jung: Quite so. No doubt Nietzsche assumes that those things would not have grown in that individual if he had not been taught them. But inasmuch as those so-called extraneous things are also in himself, he participates in it: he is also one of those who shares such concepts.

Remark: I thought it might mean that he has to carry the burden because of other people.

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, one can enumerate a number of things that are forced upon one by so-called external conditions. For instance, a person with an objectionable persona can say circumstances forced him to have such a persona. Perhaps he is stiff, proud, gives other people no access to himself; perhaps he refuses everything and is obstinate, and he can explain exactly why he is all that, can give me a complete list of the causes that made him into such a thing. He can say if his parents had behaved in a different way he would be quite different, or Mrs. So-and-So, or his professor in the university, or his wife, his children, his uncles and aunts—they all account for his attitude. And it would be perfectly true. But then one asks, "Why is his brother, who lived with him in the same family, an entirely different persona with an entirely different attitude to life? He was under the same influence, was at the same school, had the same education; but he has chosen a different attitude, has made a different selection. So it is not true that these exter-

nal conditions have caused him to be what he is; he has chosen those external conditions in order to be what he is. If somebody else had chosen them, the very same conditions would have been made into something quite different. And the life of the one is miserable on account of his attitude, and the life of the other fellow is much nicer on account of *his* attitude. The life of the individual is his own making. So when the one is overburdened by a moral teaching, it is because he chooses it. Another one, taught the same thing, doesn't care a bit for that moral teaching. He takes it lightly, doesn't believe it perhaps, or he models those concepts to his own liking. He is not at all overburdened because he did not choose to be overburdened, did not accept it. You cannot blame external circumstances, but can only blame yourself for taking on that persona, for allowing yourself to be poisoned by circumstances.

So Nietzsche makes here a complete contradiction. For man himself is his own difficulty and if anyone is to blame, it is himself, because he has chosen it, has swallowed it. He was not critical enough, or he has preferred to make a special selection of circumstances in order to prove his point, which is himself. And if that proves to be wrong, perhaps, in the long run, it is not the world that is wrong: it is himself. Therefore, when he says: "Like the camel kneeleth he down, and letteth himself be well laden," we can only say, "Well yes, he *is* a camel, he is an ass." Now why does Nietzsche say a camel? He writes in German, and when a German says *Kamel* he can't help realizing the double meaning of that word. To a German-speaking man, a camel is not necessarily the wonderful ship of the desert that faithfully carries its loads, a true servant of man, the highly prized domestic animal of the nomad. Of course he knows that, but when I say to a man. "You are just a camel," he never will think that he is the true servant of God. He knows exactly what I mean and he will sue me for libel. So when Nietzsche designates himself as a camel, he needs all that exaggeration in order not to see what his unconscious really means. For he is that fellow who allows himself to be burdened, the camel that kneels down and laps up all the stuff he has been taught.

Especially the strong load-bearing man in whom reverence resideth.

He has to pat himself on the back for all the things he has carried. Yes, it is nice if it is not stupid.

Too many *extraneous* heavy words and worths loadeth he upon himself—. . .

Well, it is the camel that is doing it: it allows itself to be overburdened; that is just the difference between man and the camel. A man knows when the limit is reached and how much it is reasonable to carry, but a camel is supposed not to know that exactly. It is supposed to be a pretty stupid animal, and well deserves that "then seemeth life to him a desert!"

And verily! Many a thing also that is our own is hard to bear!

Here he cannot help coming to himself. Naturally he would have come to himself long ago if he had realized what he was saying, but only now does it begin to dawn upon him that it is hard to bear oneself. This just shows again how little he realizes in the moment the meaning of his words. One thinks, because he says it, that he knows it, but he doesn't know it: it just flows out. As little as the river knows what it is carrying along, does he know what he is saying. It is as if he were slowly waking up and coming to the conclusion that even many a thing that is really our own, that is part of our own psychology, is hard to bear. So he is now going on in the same style, slowly realizing that this thing reaches pretty far, that it even reaches into the depths of psychology.

And many internal things in man are like the oyster—repulsive and slippery and hard to grasp.

This is the resistance one naturally feels against the fact that the shadow is a reality; one can talk a mouthful about it, but to realize it is something else.

So that an elegant shell, with elegant adornment, must plead for them. But this art also must one learn: to have a shell, and a fine appearance, and sagacious blindness.

One could not add much to this. It is perfectly true. But I should say that for the time being it would be very important if he could pierce the shell.

Again it deceiveth about many things in man, that many a shell is poor and pitiable, and too much of a shell. Much concealed goodness and power is never dreamt of; the choicest dainties find no tasters!

Yes, one must admit that sometimes even great values are concealed, but also things which are not particularly valuable. Now we will skip the next paragraphs and go to:

Verily, I learned waiting also, and thoroughly so,—but only waiting for *myself*.

I emphasize this passage only because it will soon be completely contradicted. The idea of learning to wait, learning patience, would indeed be a good realization, and particularly to be patient with oneself. That would be the greatest asset. It would mean that he knew how to deal with himself, that he knew what it means to endure oneself, to be kind to oneself, to carry oneself. One is, of course, deeply impressed with this immense truth, but here again one has to understand that Nietzsche does not realize what he is saying. If he were really waiting for himself, why should he wait for man? Why does he wait and hope for the moment when he can leave his isolation in order to come down to overburdened man? One sees what such great insight is really worth from the second paragraph after this:

With rope-ladders learned I to reach many a window, with nimble legs did I climb high masts: to sit on high masts of perception seemed to me no small bliss;—

—To flicker like small flames on high masts: a small light, certainly, but a great comfort to cast-away sailors and shipwrecked ones!

So when he is isolated, when he is waiting for himself, he is really waiting for a shipwreck somewhere, waiting to be a beacon light of orientation to shipwrecked sailors, but for heaven's sake, not to himself. He must hope that many people will suffer shipwreck, otherwise he would not function at all. Now what is that flickering on high masts?

Miss Wolff: The fire of St. Elmo.

Prof. Jung: Yes, an electrical discharge which takes place when there is great electric tension. One sees it also on mountains before a thunderstorm: the electricity streams out of the top of the mountain, one feels it directly. So he compares himself to a sort of electric phenomenon that happens only on the summits of very high mountains. That is the truth: he is climbing into a world of very high thoughts. He is on the top of very high masts, just like such a flickering flame, a will o' the wisp which never settles down, has no roots—an intuitive function only. Of course that is only a side glance at his psychology. Now the next chapter, "Old and New Tables" should be "Old and New Tablets" really, like cuneiform writing tablets. That was the original idea, the parallel of those cuneiform tiles upon which the law of Moses was inscribed. In those days everything was written on clay which was then

burned. So it means old and new laws, and here we can expect some further code of prescriptions of how to deal with the inferior man. He begins:

Here do I sit and wait, old broken tables around me and also new half-written tables. When cometh mine hour?

The hour of my descent, of my down-going: for once more will I go unto men.

This means: why in hell should I stay with myself? Why can I not escape at once the unendurable self?—which of course would come to him with tremendous realization. You see, when he is a flickering light on mast-tops he is escaping himself. He is only on the highest masts and what is there below? Apparently he doesn't know. He doesn't realize that all his intuitions mean nothing whatever if they don't become reality in himself. He is the *materia* through which these intuitions ought to come into life, to become really true, and then he would know what they mean. He can hardly wait for his coming down from the mast-tops, but that doesn't mean coming to himself, into his ordinary human reality, but out into a crowd; it means an audience to talk to and tell them what they ought to be. Now he says,

For that hour do I now wait: . . .

He had better say, "I wait for myself," but no, he waits for the hour when he can give up the task of himself.

for first must the signs come unto me that it is mine hour—namely, the laughing lion with the flock of doves.

Think of the picture—a laughing lion and a circle of pigeons sitting round him.

Now, I find that there is a little uncertainty about that question of being alone with oneself and going down to humanity. You see, in Nietzsche's case it was really a question of physical solitude, and man meant to him just society. Of course, enduring oneself would not mean sitting in the observatory on the top of Mont Blanc where there is nobody for the better part of a year. That is no opportunity for finding yourself; you don't find yourself in such utter solitude, but only fall into your own unconscious. What is meant is, that you should be *with yourself*, not alone but with yourself, and you can be with yourself even in a crowd. Inasmuch as you are in connection with other people, it makes sense to be with yourself, but it makes no sense at all when you are just alone, because solitude, if it is a bit exaggerated, is most con-

ductive to becoming unconscious. Therefore a human being who wants to lose himself seeks solitude as a sure means of making him unconscious of himself. But the point is *not* to be unconscious: the point is to picture the unconscious of oneself but to be with oneself.

That forced, or chosen, solitude in which Nietzsche lived was a temptation, and one of the reasons why he lost himself in the unconscious. Because of his peculiar lack of realization, he got into the swift current of that stream which carried him away. If he had been forced to explain himself to a number of people whose connection he could not afford to lose, he would have been forced to self-realization; but if nobody has a claim, there is no contradiction, no opposition, no discussion. Then he is not forced to hold on to anything, even to himself. He can let go of himself, let himself disappear into that great underground river of the unconscious where one necessarily loses one's self-realization. That he desires company, that he wants to go down to humanity out of his solitude, is quite right; but inasmuch as he fails to realize that he doesn't possess himself in his solitude, but is possessed, then most certainly when he comes down among other people, humanity in general, he will be as if possessed. Then he will be as if surrounded by a glass wall, isolated against humanity, because he is possessed by an undigested unconscious. If he had digested his unconscious, if he had been in connection with people whom he could not afford to lose, he would have constantly broken through that wall of isolation. If you observe a man who is lost in the unconscious, possessed by the unconscious, simply identical with it, you always feel that peculiar isolation, that glass wall; you see him and he sees you but there is no connection. You cannot touch him; he is as if removed from human contact. Wherever you find a person of whom you have that feeling—provided that it is not yourself and that you project it—you can be sure that such a one is possessed.

I told you the alchemistic myth of Arisleus and his companions. You remember he got into the threefold glass house under the sea, which means that he went into the unconscious and was caught in the threefold glass house. You see, that is correct psychologically: he was not only under the sea, which would be enough in itself but he was even shut into a threefold glass house, which means that he was completely isolated against his surroundings. Of course, that may have also a positive aspect: there is no situation so bad that it has not some redeeming feature about it. In such isolation you may develop such a heat that it burns through the glass, in the end. In this case of Arisleus it was the preparation for resurrection, a rebirth. That it was so terribly hot in-

side the glass house is of course difficult to understand, but it was heated from within. Another simile is the old man in a glass house who is so hot that the vapor of his perspiration covers the glass walls and becomes a precious substance because it is sublimated: it is the dew of Gideon in the Old Testament. And that is the marvelous, divine or eternal water by which transformation is produced. So by that isolation, or within that isolation, something rises from you, something that is forced out of you in your tortured condition. The same situation is depicted in the biblical story of the three men in the fiery furnace where a fourth appeared. The fourth one is the Redeemer, the angel of God. Of course it isn't said there that he was the result or the outcome of the three, but in alchemy the idea is that by heating up the three, the fourth appears. You see, the glass house in which Arisleus and his companions, or the old man, suffer from heat, is a sort of sweat lodge, such as we find with the North American Indians. In India they call it *tapas*, which means creating a fertile warmth, a sort of brooding, hatching oneself out by evaporation. By remaining in that isolation one is heated up, and then something emanates which is the looked-for precious substance.

Now, to show psychologically what that substance is, is not so easy. If it were, those old philosophers would not have used such varied symbolism to explain it. That *aqua divina*, the divine water, has already been symbolized in innumerable ways—if I say a thousand it is too few—so you can be sure nobody has ever expressed what it really is, and you can be sure that if I should try to formulate it I would meet with the same obstacles. But we know what happened to Nietzsche in his isolation: this semidivine figure of Zarathustra, the word of Zarathustra, flowed out of him, a river of psychical material personified. Zarathustra represents the self, and that wonderful thing which is produced by the attempt, or enterprise, or by the opus of Hermetic philosophy, is the *lapis philosophorum*. So the divine being, a sort of subtle body, divine or semidivine, has been also called the *lux moderna*, which is greater than any light in the world. It is something like Christ himself, a Christ that comes after Christ, a new Savior. Or it is the Paraclete, the Comforter, that was promised by Christ. Or the baptismal water that brings a new fertility into the world, a transformation of something low into something that is valuable—so there is the idea of redemption.

Now, Zarathustra is all that too: the water of redemption. He tries to renew the world, to make man over into the superman that should rise up from the river of Zarathustra or from the glass house. So in this case

the divine water is that flow of meaningful, helpful ideas or revelations which emerge from the state of torture in the fire. And it is again a case of that age-old symbolism of the hero who for the sake of mankind—or for his people, or for his friend—goes down into the belly of the monster, where it is so hot that he loses all his hair. He is quite bald when he comes out, like a new born child—which is of course the idea. Then he brings out the spirits of the dead, his parents, his friends, all the things that have been devoured by the great beast of time, and so he makes the world anew. This is very much the same thing, always the same old myth. And in our days we could give a psychological interpretation of that divine water as a sort of spiritual product—spiritual with the meaning of sublimated—something simply evaporated or perspired from him, the expression of immense torture. So this state of real isolation, real solitude, may be productive.

But what we are really looking for is the result. Is it really helpful? Did it really help him? Did Nietzsche have a full realization of what he produced? Or is he the one who inadvertently fell into the valley of the diamonds and thought they were pebbles or only semiprecious stones. I am afraid he is like an alchemist who has found a red or yellow or white powder, never knowing that that was *the* thing, or only half realizing it. Of course Nietzsche himself thought very highly of *Zarathustra*. It was a revelation to him; he even knew that he had encountered a god, and therefore he called it a Dionysian experience. In the first German edition of this book there are some comments upon Nietzsche's own understanding of *Zarathustra*, and we have other evidence also, from which we may conclude that to him it was really a sort of divine revelation. He really thought that he had produced something like a new religion. But there again is a mistaken idea, for no one can found a new religion. It is one man's experience and everything else is a matter of history. No one could say, or prophesy, that a thing one has produced is a revelation.

For instance, Meister Eckhart had an extraordinary revelation of truth, so he was the fellow who could have been followed by a great religious movement. But nothing happened. On the contrary, a certain sect who were influenced by Meister Eckhart and called themselves Brothers of the Free Spirit became sort-of highwaymen. They were so eaten up by the spirit and the feeling of the futility of life that they robbed people on the road, took their money and wasted it. They said it was not good for people to have money—it was sinful—so they must take it away; it was a merit to destroy it. They were sending it into eternity. They were sort of spiritual anarchists. That is what followed,

and for six hundred years Meister Eckhart went under. His writings were condemned and one hardly knew of his existence. He died on his way to Rome, where he should have given an account of his ideas, and his works were only piece by piece discovered, here and there in the libraries of Switzerland. In Basel we have one of his manuscripts in his own handwriting, but it was only in about the middle of the 19th century that an edition was made of his works. Now of course we have practically the whole opus. You see, that is a case where nobody could have foretold what the development would be: he was thoroughly anachronistic. And Nietzsche too was anachronistic, for people were not ready to understand these truths, particularly because they are so enveloped, one could say. They are not on the surface; we have a lot of work in bringing out his specific ideas. They are all swimming along in one stream with so much talk, so much boasting, so many contradictions, that we never know whether it is really valuable or not. For instance, one might conclude when Nietzsche says "Love thyself," that it was just egocentricity; people have drawn the most ridiculous conclusions from *Zarathustra*.

One sees pretty much the same thing in the way the Christian revelation has been dealt with in the subsequent centuries. It has not developed to the realization that Christ himself meant, as we know from the Evangelists. For instance, he said, "I will leave you a Comforter,"¹ which means that the holy spirit was to be there instead of himself, that every one should be filled with the holy spirit. That is, the Holy Ghost, that Comforter, was to be a source of original revelation in everybody. And what did the church make of it? They monopolized Christ as God, which put the whole thing into the past. Christ could be made real again by the rites of the church, by his incarnation in physical elements, the bread and the wine, but that was the prerogative of the church, came about only through the magic word of the church—which means the priests. Otherwise Christ's existence was in the past, and the Holy Ghost was merely the prerogative of the assembly of the highest priests. If anybody had been convinced that he possessed a revelation from the Holy Ghost, he would have gotten into hot water, or really into hot fire, for having such ambitions. So even Christ's very clear intention to leave a Comforter was obstructed. It did not work, and the whole thing became something quite different from what he intended. Nobody could have foretold that. The time was not ripe, and

¹ "And I will pray the Father and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you forever" (John 14:16).

one really cannot see how it would be possible for everybody to be a source of revelation. In those days, and even today, it would be perfectly impossible; no one could found any such organization on such nonsense. One person would say, "My god has three—or four or five—heads," and no one would care. Therefore the church had to repress every attempt along that line. You see, we have to be careful with everything Nietzsche says. I try to give both the positive and the negative aspects so that you can see Nietzsche from all sides, a man who received a sort of revelation, yet in a mind which was clouded, an understanding which was not quite competent, so he was unable to realize the meaning of his own words.

Now, here he is anticipating going down to man: "For once more will I go unto men." And a picture appears before his inner eye of how that will look, for when *his* hour comes, that laughing lion with the flock of doves will appear. This is most extraordinary, and you remember that whenever Nietzsche uses such a picture, there is always something behind it. When he wrote that, he surely did not represent it to himself concretely, or he would have understood that one could express it also in other words. What parallel could you give—a sort of proverbial metaphor which would be an equivalent for this laughing lion and the flock of doves?

Miss Welsh: The lion lying down with the lamb?

Prof. Jung: Well, that is another aspect, the chiliastic idea of the state where the pairs of opposites are united, where the animal of prey is united with the innocent animal.

Mrs. Brunner: The *Salonlöwe*.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the lion of the salon, the *bel homme* in the drawing room with a flock of young girls round him. And then there is the rooster and the hens. That is a very covert metaphor for somebody whose audience contains a greater number of ladies.

Miss Wolff: It perhaps doesn't belong just here but I should like to recall the first appearance of the lion in the chapter called "The Three Metamorphoses": first the camel and then the lion and then the child. It may have some connection.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and now he is trying how the lion would do. That he really means something like that is rather evident from the next paragraph:

Meanwhile do I talk to myself as one who hath time. No one telleth me anything new, so I tell myself mine own story.

So the laughing lion is obviously himself with an audience, and the doves are specifically feminine birds.

Mr. Allemann: It is the bird of Astarte, and of Aphrodite.

Prof. Jung: Yes, or Venus, the Asiatic form of Aphrodite. So the laughing lion is surrounded by lovebirds. The dove is also the symbol of the Holy Ghost, since the nature of the Holy Ghost is exceedingly feminine. How is that shown—and according to what interpretation?

Miss Hannah: As Sophia.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Gnostic interpretation, which has also played a great role almost within the church: the “Acts of Thomas” contain that famous invocation to the Holy Spirit as the mother. And one finds ample evidence of the Gnostic interpretation in the *Pistis Sophia* as well. The Holy Ghost was supposed to be the wife of God and the mother of Christ, and Mary was herself the Holy Ghost. There is the same idea in the second part of *Faust*.²

Dr. Frey: Is it not interpreted also as the church?

Prof. Jung: Oh yes, but that is the official interpretation. That the church was the embodiment of the Holy Ghost was the way they taught it, the church as the great mother being very clearly the result or the production of the Holy Ghost, the crystallization as it were. So this flock of doves means really an assemblage of lovebirds. And what about the laughing lion?

Mrs. Sigg: Perhaps this connection of the lion and the doves is a remembrance of the Piazza di St. Marco in Venice.³

Prof. Jung: You are quite right. And, mind you, the Baroque lion is often laughing. That combination of doves and the laughing lion in the Piazza di St. Marco is surely the external origin; it is most impressive and Nietzsche was of course under that impression. But what is the interpretation of the lion? That is only the external origin of the picture.

Mrs. Fierz: The lion is the animal of hottest summer, of great heat, and that would relate to what you said about the heat of the lonely

* The Acts of Thomas contains the invocation to the Holy Spirit as mother: “Come Holy Dove, mother of two young twins. Come Hidden Mother, revealed in deeds alone” (Mead*, p. 423). On the *Pistis Sophia*, see Mead*, pp. 471-72. Jung often refers to that part of *Faust II* which deals with the Realm of the Mothers. In a Victorian translation: “Ye Mothers, in your name, who set your throne / In boundless Space, eternally alone, / And yet companioned! All the forms of Being, / In movement, lifeless, ye are round you seeing.” (*Faust*, tr. Bayard Taylor [Boston, 1888]).

³ Nietzsche often went to Venice, especially to visit his young musician friend, Peter Gast.

man. And if the lion is laughing, it would mean that Nietzsche had begun to like it.

Prof. Jung: He sees some light!

Mrs. Fierz: Yes, it is a kind of acceptance of the humor of it, instead of the terrible anger he has always expressed before. I mean, it is a contrary mood.

Mr. Allemann: Is it not the wise man who is above it all and laughs at the foolishness of the world?

Prof. Jung: That is the picture, you are quite right. But there is also a secret joke behind it which Mrs. Fierz was just trying to formulate. You see, in interpreting the lion we have to take into consideration that it is the age-old symbol of the sun, and the sun in July and August particularly, the *domicilium solis*. So for thousands of years the lion symbolized the hottest time of the year; it is the flashing sun itself. And the sun was a very powerful god, often the only god, of course with his consort the moon. The sun and the moon were representations of divine power, the divine parents in heaven. Now, we must assume that there was a time when the lion did not laugh. If he were always laughing there would be no point in even mentioning it; one would think it was just a silly animal—as people who always laugh are silly, while people who only laugh sometimes might be very witty. So when the lion doesn't laugh he is obviously in a condition where things don't move or develop as he wants them to; but when fulfillment comes, when he sees a light ahead or when a door opens, then he laughs: "Ah, there it comes!" Nietzsche doesn't see it exactly, but he senses something of the kind—that he might be the lion of the drawing room with the lovely flock of lovebirds. One supposes that the lovebirds would make a circle round him, as the pigeons on the Piazza di St. Marco are all over the place, swarming around the statue of the lion, so this is the female hovering round him. Zarathustra compares himself again and again with the setting sun and the rising sun, or the sun that comes out of the dark clouds, or out of the cave, and so on. It is very clear, therefore, that this lion is Zarathustra, and he is laughing because he sees the fulfilment, senses a completion. Completion is a circle and here it is a circle of lovebirds. That is the Shakti circling round Shiva. That is of course a pretty grand idea and not necessarily something to laugh about. But when that becomes concrete, the animal god in Nietzsche laughs. Then Eros comes up, and of course everybody will say, "I always told you so, that is the end of it." As Erasmus wrote to a friend when Luther married, "*Ducit monachus monacham*," meaning, "That is the end of the story: the monk has married the nun." We would say nowadays that he simply

got a bit funny on account of his celibacy, and we must now wait and see what comes of marriage. Then the animal laughs and says, "That is what I was looking for." Don't forget that in the end of *Zarathustra* comes "The Ass-Festival," and when he became insane Nietzsche produced the most shocking erotic literature. It was destroyed by his careful sister, but Professor Overbeck had a glimpse of it, and there is plenty of evidence of his pathological condition. He could not withhold that information—it slipped out—for the farther the river flows, the lower it goes, and finally it arrives at the bottom. Zarathustra turns into his own opposite, practically, by the law of *enantiodromia*. The book begins with that great spiritual solitude, and at the end come the Dionysian dithyrambs. Now arrives the ass, beautiful and strong, but the ass is the symbol of voluptuousness, which Nietzsche, as a philologist, knew very well. And when you look through his poems you see the same element.

Miss Wolff: Another meaning of the image of the lion and the doves might be this: In the lines just above, Zarathustra says that he is waiting for his hour of descent and decline. Once more, for the last time, he intends to go down to humanity. The image of the lion and the doves gives the idea of how this going-down is brought about. The image corresponds in a way to the astrological symbol of the solar course. The highest position of the sun, its greatest heat and strength, are expressed by the sign of Leo. Then follows Virgo, which is the first sign of the decline of the sun. Virgo would correspond here to the circle of doves, the feminine birds, and the birds of Aphrodite. So the lion, or sun, or hero, is confronted with the feminine principle, and that leads to the decline of Zarathustra.

Prof. Jung: The hour of descent is the hour of the coming-up of Yin, the feminine substance.

Miss Wolff: And by the coming-up of the feminine principle, the hero image is always overcome.

LECTURE III

1 February 1939

Prof. Jung:

Here is a question by Miss Hannah: "In speaking of the camel Nietzsche says: 'Too many extraneous heavy words and worths loadeth he upon himself.' As Nietzsche should preach to himself and does preach to other people, would not those 'heavy words' add themselves to his load? And are not the 'worths' of the best enemy the most annoying of all 'worths,' so would Nietzsche not have to carry this annoyance as a compensation for reviling his projected shadow? In this sense could not the word *extraneous* be correct? [This is a bit involved!] In other words does not projection, in spite of the apparent relief, actually *add* to the weight of carrying oneself?"

Well, one can only say, yes, it does. That is the drawback of any projection: it is only an apparent relief; it is like a narcotic: only apparently are you casting off a load. As a matter of fact, it cannot be cast off because it belongs to your own contents as part of the total of your personality. Even if it has become unconscious, it forms part of yourself, and if you throw it away you are still linked up with it. It is as if an elastic connection existed between that cast-off thing and yourself. So it is a sort of self-deception when one projects. Of course you really don't *make* projections: they *are*; it is a mistake when one speaks of *making* a projection, because in that moment it is no longer a projection, but your own property. It cannot be detached just at that moment perhaps; it may linger on as a relative projection, but at all events you know of your connection with that particular thing. So any kind of neurotic measure—a projection, a repression, or a transference, for instance—are mere self-deceptions which happen to you, and they have really a very transitory effect. In the long run, they are no asset whatever. Otherwise it would be wonderful: we could simply unload ourselves. There are certain religious movements which train people in just that respect—teach them to unload.

In the very modern Oxford Movement you unload all your sins

upon Christ; anything that is bothering or annoying you, you hand over to Christ and he takes care of it.¹ And I have a very pious woman patient—she is not in the Oxford Movement, but in the Middle Ages—and whenever anything goes wrong or she wants something, perhaps something immoral like cheating (which she cannot accept in herself), she simply unloads it on Christ. She gets him to take it over for her. Then, marvelously enough, Christ decides upon a very modern trick, how to cheat the state of taxes, for instance. She has a wonderful economic system: so much set aside for the poor in one envelope, so much for the hospitals in another, and so on, and she is not allowed to take anything out for a different purpose. But Christ may decide that she can easily take five francs out of the envelope for the poor in order to pay the chauffeur of a taxi. If she has some pricks of conscience still, she asks me without telling me that Christ has already decided, and as a rule I happen to agree with Christ, so she has complete confidence in me because I also help her to cheat the poor or the state. You see, that principle must be broken through. It is impossible to live according to principles; you have to allow the necessary exceptions to every rule. Otherwise there would be no rules. So Christ decides in the higher sense of living realities. She would not be able to decide by herself on account of too narrow a consciousness. Of course it is a most medieval mental condition, but plenty of people nowadays are still living in the Middle Ages. They are absolutely unable to decide for themselves, so they need such a figure as Christ or God who can decide for them.

My point of view concerning projections, then, is that they are unavoidable. You are simply confronted with them; they are there and nobody is without them. For at any time a new projection may creep into your system—you don't know from where, but you suddenly discover that it looks almost as if you had a projection. You are not even sure at first; you think you are all right and it is really the other fellow, until somebody calls your attention to it, tells you that you are talking a bit too much of that fellow—and what is your relation to him anyhow? Then it appears that there is a sort of fascination. He may be a particularly bad character, and that is in a way fascinating and makes you talk of him day and night; you are fascinated just by that which you revile in him. Now, from that you can conclude as to your own condition: your attention is particularly attracted; that evil fascinates you.

¹ The Oxford Movement was an attempt dating from 1833 within the clergy at Oxford to reinstate in the Church of England certain doctrines and rituals of the Roman Catholic Church.

Because you have it, it is your own evil. You may not know how much is your own but you can grant that there is quite a lot; and inasmuch as you have it, you add to it, because as Christ says, "Unto everyone which hath shall be given," so that he has it in abundance.² Where there is the possibility of making a projection, even a slight one, you are tempted to add to it. If an ass walks past carrying a sack on its back, you say, "Oh, he can carry my umbrella as well, because he is already carrying something." If a camel passes you, anything which you don't want to carry just jumps out of your pocket onto the back of that camel.

There are people who even attract projections, as if they were meant to carry burdens. And others who are always losing their own contents by projecting them, so they either have a particularly good conscience or they are particularly empty people, because their surroundings have to carry all their loads. Empty people, or people who have an excellent opinion of themselves and cherish amazing virtues, have always somebody in their surroundings who carries all their evil. That is literally true. For instance, it may happen that parents are unaware of their contents and then their children have to live them. I remember a case, a man, who had no dreams at all. I told him that that was abnormal, his condition was such that he must have dreams, otherwise somebody in his surroundings must have them. At first I thought it was his wife, but she had no undue amount and they cast no light on his problems. But his oldest son, who was eight years old, had most amazing dreams which did not belong to his age at all. So I told him to ask his son for his dreams and bring them to me, and I analysed them as if they were his own. And they were his own dreams, and finally by that procedure they got into him and the son was exonerated.³

Such things can happen: a projection is a very tangible thing, a sort of semisubstantial thing which forms a load as if it had real weight. It is exactly as the primitives understand it, a subtle body. Primitives—also the Tibetans and many other peoples—inasmuch as they are aware of such things at all, understand projections as sort of projectiles, and of course they play a role chiefly in their magic. Primitive sorcerers throw out such projectiles. There are three monasteries in Tibet mentioned by name by Lama Kagi Dawa-Sandup, the famous Tibetan scholar who worked with John Woodroffe and Evans-Wentz, where

² Matthew 15:19-20.

³ In mentioning this case (CW 17, par. 106), Jung identifies the father's problems as erotic and religious.

they train people in the art of making projections.⁴ And that term was used by the alchemists for the final performance in the making of the gold. It was supposed that they projected the red matter—or the tinctura or the eternal water—upon lead or silver or quicksilver, and by that act transformed it into gold or into the philosopher's stone. It is interesting that they themselves explained the making of the stone as a projection. That is to say, it is something that is detached from one; you detach something and establish it as an independent existence, put it outside yourself. Now, that may be quite legitimate inasmuch as it is a matter of objectifying contents; or it may be most illegitimate if it is used for magical purposes, or if it is a simple projection where you get rid of something. But people are not to be blamed directly for making other people suffer under such projections because they are not conscious of them.

You see, our whole mental life, our consciousness, began with projections. Our mind under primitive conditions was entirely projected, and it is interesting that those internal contents, which made the foundation of real consciousness, were projected the farthest into space—into the stars. So the first science was astrology. That was an attempt of man to establish a line of communication between the remotest objects and himself. Then he slowly fetched back all those projections out of space into himself. Primitive man—well, even up to modern times—lives in a world of animated objects. Therefore that term of Tylor's, *animism*, which is simply the state of projection where man experiences his psychical contents as parts of the objects of the world. Stones, trees, human beings, families are all alive along with my own psyche and therefore I have a *participation mystique* with them.⁵ I influence them and I am influenced by them in a magical way, which is only possible because there is that bond of sameness. What appears in the animal say, is identical with myself because it *is* myself—it is a projection. So our psychology has really been a sort of coming together, a confluence of projections. The old gods, for instance, were very clearly psychical functions, or events, or certain emotions; some are thoughts and some

⁴ Lama Kazi Dawa-Sandup was the translator of *The Bardo Thodol* or *Liberation by Hearing on the After Death Plane*, which W. Evans-Wentz compiled and edited as *The Tibetan Book of The Dead* (see *Tibetan*); John Woodroffe (Avalon), *The Serpent Power* (Madras, 3rd rev., 11th edn., 1931), is an interpretation of Kundalini Yoga.

⁵ Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) English evolutionary anthropologist, invented the concept "animism" to explain how "the notion of a ghost-soul as the animating principle of man" can be readily extended to "souls of lower animals, and even lifeless objects. . . ." *Primitive Culture*, 2 vols. (Gloucester, Mass., 1958; orig. 1917), vol. I, p. 145.

are definite emotions. A wrathful god is your own wrathfulness. A goddess like Venus or Aphrodite is very much your own sexuality, but projected. Now, inasmuch as these figures have been deflated, inasmuch as they do not exist any longer, you gradually become conscious of having those qualities or concepts; you speak of *your* sexuality. That was no concept in the early centuries, but was the god, Aphrodite or Cupid or Kama or whatever name it was called by. Then slowly we sucked in those projections and that accumulation made up psychological consciousness.

Now, inasmuch as our world is still animated to a certain extent, or inasmuch as we are still in *participation mystique*, our contents are still projected; we have not yet gathered them in. The future of mankind will probably be that we shall have gathered in all our projections, though I don't know whether that is possible. It is more probable that a fair amount of projections will still go on and that they will still be perfectly unconscious to ourselves. But we have not made them; they are a part of our condition, part of the original world in which we were born, and it is only our moral and intellectual progress that makes us aware of them. So the projection in a neurosis is merely one case among many; one would hardly call it abnormal even, but it is more visible—too obvious. Nowadays, one might assume that a person would be conscious of his sexuality and not think that all other people were abnormal perverts; because one is unconscious of it, one thinks that other people are therefore wrong. Of course that is an abnormal condition, and to any normal, balanced individual, it seems absurd. It is an exaggeration, but we are always inclined to function like that to a certain extent; again and again it happens that something is impressive and obvious in another individual which has not been impressive at all in ourselves. The thought that we might be like that never comes anywhere near us, but we emphatically insist upon that other fellow having such-and-such a peculiarity. Whenever this happens we should always ask ourselves: Now have I that peculiarity perhaps because I make such a fuss about it?

You see, whenever you make an emotional statement, there is a fair suspicion that you are talking of your own case; in other words, that there is a projection because of your emotion. And you always have emotions where you are not adapted. If you are adapted you need no emotion; an emotion is only an instinctive explosion which denotes that you have not been up to your task. When you don't know how to deal with a situation or with people, you get emotional. Since you were not adapted, you had a wrong idea of the situation, or at all events you

did not use the right means, and there was as a consequence a certain projection. For instance, you perhaps project the notion that a certain person is particularly sensitive and if you should say something disagreeable to him he would reply in such-and-such a way. Therefore you say nothing, though he would not have shown such a reaction because that was a projection. You wait instead until you get an emotion, and then you blurt it out nevertheless, and of course it is then far more offensive. You waited too long. If you had spoken at the time, there would have been no emotion. And usually the worst consequences of all are not in that individual but in yourself, because you don't like to hurt your own feelings, don't want to hear your own voice sounding disagreeable and harsh and rasping. You want to maintain the idea that you are very nice and kind, which naturally is not true. So sure enough, any projection adds to the weight which you have to carry.

Mr. Bush: Would you then endorse the concept of Dewey that whenever there is a conflict between the individual and his environment, the projection is an expression of that conflict and a provisional attempt to get rid of it?⁶

Prof. Jung: Well, I would avoid the idea of the conflict because one cannot always confirm the existence of a conflict; it is simply lack of adaptation, that you are not up to the situation. That very often causes a conflict, it is true, but it is not necessarily *caused* by a conflict. I think you get nearer to the root of the matter when you call it a lack of adaptation, because to be emotional is already on the way to a pathological condition. Any emotion is an exceptional, not a normal, state. The ego is momentarily suppressed by the emotion: one loses one's head, and that is an exceptional state. Therefore, primitives are always afraid of emotions in themselves as well as in their fellow beings. An emotion always has a magic effect, so they avoid emotional people, think they are dangerous and might use witchcraft or have a bad influence. So to have an emotion is to be on the way to a morbid condition, and a morbid condition always being due to inferior adaptation, one could call an emotion already an inferior adaptation. An old definition of disease is that it is a state of insufficient adaptation—one is incapacitated and so in an inferior state of adaptation—and that is also true of an emotion.

Dr. Frey: But you cannot forget the positive side of emotion. In the fire of emotion the self is created.

⁶ Mr. Bush is alluding to Dewey's teaching that difficulties which impede customary action promote thinking to resolve the problem. See, for instance, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1916), *passim*.

Prof. Jung: Quite so. Emotion is on the other hand a means by which you can overcome a situation in which you are inferior; the emotion can then carry you over the obstacle. That is the positive value of the emotion. So it is like that patient of mine who dares not decide by herself, but leaves it to Christ to decide for her. That carries her a long way naturally: he can carry her way beyond her moral scruples, so that she can do something which is not very nice or reasonable. And that is of course her emotion—Christ is her emotion.

Mrs. Sigg: Is it not that she has perhaps in her youth already projected some animus contents into the figure of Christ? So instead of saying the animus is her leader, she says Christ is her leader.

Prof. Jung: She has naturally had the Christian education and she smelt a wonderful opportunity, as all good Christians do, to say that Christ is *there* to facilitate life, to eliminate our sorrows. We are told that there is a good god, a shepherd of men, who will carry our burden. And anyone who says he didn't know how to decide and gave it to Christ to decide, will be considered an example of goodness: What a pious man! What belief in God! So no wonder that she adopted that mechanism. You see, she is far from any animus theory; the animus theory would not work in the Middle Ages. There are far more tangible figures than the animus; with her it is a real thing, not only a *façon de parler*. It is bordering on magic.

Mrs. Jung: It seems to me that there are cases where it is more adapted to have an emotion than to have none; it is not normal to have no emotions.

Prof. Jung: One could say that in certain circumstances it would be more normal to have an emotion, but you also could imagine mastering the situation without an emotion, and if you *can* handle it, I would not call it an emotion. For instance, suppose a patient behaves in a way which I cannot support—perhaps he won't listen at all. I say "You are not listening." But that makes no impression at all. Then I say, "If you don't listen you will gain nothing from your work." It doesn't register. I persist, "Well, if you don't listen, if you get nowhere, I can only kick you out." It doesn't register. So I decide that this is obviously a mental deafness. "*Damn you! You get out of here!*" That is primitive and that registers. I can kick somebody out of the door—if it is necessary you have to—and then I light my pipe. There are people who must be manhandled. In dealing with African primitives, it doesn't help to *tell* them things. It is a civilized idea that you can tell people what they should or should not do. I am often asked to tell such-and-such a nation how they should behave, that it is not reasonable to behave as they do. As if that

would make any impression! Of course, you can apply emotion, but then it is not emotion, it is a force. You have an emotion when you are moved yourself; when you move others, it is not necessarily your emotion—it becomes your force, your strength. You can use emotion as strength where force is needed. But that is quite different from falling into an affect; that is on the way to morbidity, an inferior adaptation. While to speak forcefully means that one is adapted, for here is a block of lead and you can't brush it away with a feather, but have to apply a crowbar. So I understand emotion in the sense of an affect, that one is affected by an outburst of one's own unconscious.

Now of course that may be very useful. In an exceptional situation, for instance, or in a moment of danger, you get a terrible shock and fall into a panic—you are absolutely inferior—but it makes you jump so high that you may overcome the obstacle by a sort of miracle.⁷ [. . .]

Another instance is that story which I have occasionally quoted of the man on a tiger hunt in India, who climbed up a tree near the waterhole where he expected the tiger to turn up. He was sitting in the branches of the tree when the night wind arose, and he got into a most unreasonable panic and thought he must get down. Then he said to himself that was altogether too damned foolish. He was in the tree in order to be out of reach of the tiger and to climb down would be walking into the tiger's jaws. So his fear subsided and he felt normal again. But a new gust of wind came and again he got into a panic. A third gust came and he could no longer stand it—he climbed down. Then a fourth gust came, stronger than before, and the tree crashed to the ground. It had been hollowed out by termites. I read that story in a missionary report and the title was, "The Finger of God." God helped that man down from the tree, he interfered.

But whoever has travelled in the jungle knows that when you pitch your tent in the evening, you must always examine the trees. Naturally you pitch your tent under a tree on account of the shelter, but it must never be under trees which you have not examined. Even trees that still have their foliage may already be hollowed out by termites to a dangerous degree. But you can see it, and if a tree is in such a bad condition that a gust of wind will blow it down, you couldn't help noticing it, particularly when you climbed it. Moreover, the tree is covered by canals. The termites never expose themselves to sunlight, but always work in the dark, making tunnels out of that red earth till there is a

⁷ Jung repeats here the story of a man who, confronting a huge snake, leapt over a wall.

hole in the tree; and when a tree is really so foul and rotten, you feel that it is hollow in touching it. So that man could easily have seen that it was not safe, but in his excitement over the tiger hunt, he did not notice it. Of course, a man who goes to hunt tigers in the jungle is not a baby; he knew it, but in his excitement he paid no attention to it consciously, or he thought it was not so bad after all. He could have been aware of it himself, but he simply was not. Then the wind rose, and then he knew it, and when you are several meters high, there is danger of a bad fall. So sure enough it was the hand of God—it was his emotion which carried him out of the reach of danger. In that sense emotion can produce a miracle; it can have a very positive effect in such a unique situation. But many people have emotions in very banal situations which are not unique at all. They have emotions over every nonsense out of sheer foolishness and laziness; they have emotions instead of using their minds.

Now we must continue our text. You remember we were concerned with that most edifying symbolism of the laughing lion and the flock of doves. We will skip some of the following pages and look at the fourth part. This chapter consists of a series of parts which contain the old and new tablets, a system of values, a sort of decalogue like the laws of Moses, but a very modern edition. The fourth part reads as follows:

Behold, here is a new table; but where are my brethren who will carry it with me to the valley and into hearts of flesh?—

Thus demandeth my great love to the remotest ones: be not considerate of thy neighbour! Man is something that must be surpassed.

Here we have a statement which we have encountered already. Instead of loving your neighbor, Nietzsche emphasizes the contrary: “be not considerate of thy neighbour.” What mistake does he make here?

Mr. Allemann: He goes too far to the other side.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the original suggestion was: “Love thy neighbor,” with the famous omission of the second part “as thyself.” But he only thinks of the first part, and then makes the anti-Christian statement: “be not considerate of thy neighbour,” and the necessary compensation “as thyself” is again omitted. For if you cannot love yourself, you cannot love your neighbor.⁸ [. . .] Whether you say you love or hate

⁸ Nietzsche often proclaimed the importance—the necessity—of self-love. For instance, “The noble soul has reverence for itself” (*BGE*, no. 276). Or again, “We have cause to fear him who hates himself, for we shall be the victims of his wrath and his revenge” (*Daybreak*, no. 517). Two repetitive sentences are omitted here.

your neighbor, it is just the same, because it is an uncompensated statement, the self is lacking. Then what does it mean, that "man is something that must be surpassed"? You see, Nietzsche doesn't hold that he is the only living being. He also speaks of brethren, and when some brother says, "Be not considerate of Mr. Nietzsche or Mr. Zarathustra," what then? If everybody surpasses everybody, everybody denies everybody, and what is the result?

Mrs. Jung: He only wants to consider the *Übermensch*.

Prof. Jung: Naturally, for inasmuch as he considers that he is the *Übermensch* himself, nobody can surpass him or leap over him: everybody has to consider him. He must be considered and he has to consider nobody because they only deserve to be overleapt. So naturally there can be only one Superman; if there were more they would be overleaping each other all the time and then the whole story would be in vain. It would be exactly like those boys who found a toad. One said, "I bet you five francs that you wouldn't eat that toad." And the other replied, "If you give me five francs I will eat it." He didn't think the first one had five francs, but he had, so he ate the toad. Then after a while they found another toad, and the one who had lost the five francs was quite angry, so he said, "Will you give me back the five francs if I eat this toad?" And the other one said he would, so he ate it. Then after a while they both had indigestion and they said to each other, "Now why have we eaten those toads?" And that would be the case if there were two or three supermen. They would eat each other and then ask, "Now why have we become supermen after all?" If Nietzsche were not in such an infernal haste, he would stop and think and would see what nonsense he was talking really. The text continues:

There are many divers ways and modes of surpassing: see *thou* thereto! But only a buffoon thinketh: "man can also be *overleapt*."

What distinction is Nietzsche making here when he says that man can also be overleapt—by a buffoon mind you, *ein Narr*?

Miss Hannah: He is talking of that time when the buffoon jumped over the rope-dancer.

Prof. Jung: And what makes him think of that? Something must have reminded him of that scene.

Mrs. Baumann: He has just said practically the same thing in different words.

Mrs. Jung: In German it is: "das überwunden werden muss," not *über-sprungen*.

Prof. Jung: That is it, he makes a difference between leaping over a

thing, and surmounting or surpassing it, a rather subtle distinction which should not be omitted. Perhaps in the following verses we shall get some light on this. He continues,

Surpass thyself even in thy neighbor: . . .

That has nothing to do with it, but there is obviously a distinction in his mind between overleaping and surpassing, which makes him think of the fool who jumped over the rope-dancer and killed him. He also surpassed man in a way, but by leaping over him. This is only an allusion, but he lets us feel that he has the difference in mind and evidently intends to make a discrimination.

Dr. Wheelwright: It is the difference between intuitive attainment and real attainment.

Prof. Jung: Yes, an intuitive attempt would be overleaping, disregarding reality; and surpassing would be a rather laborious attempt at surmounting or overcoming man. So what he understands by surpassing is an effort, real work perhaps, at all events a somewhat lengthy and laborious procedure—it should not be just an intuitive leap. It is a critical distinction and a very important one, so one is again astonished that he doesn't insist upon it. It would be well worthwhile to remain here for a while and dwell upon that distinction. We should then hear how he understands the procedure by which the ordinary man of today would transform into the Superman; he would be forced to say how he images that procedure. But here he just touches upon it and instantly goes on, saying,

and a right which thou canst seize upon, shalt thou not allow to be given thee.

This means first of all that to be a Superman is a right, and you can seize upon it, steal it: you don't need to wait until it is given to you. Even if somebody were quite ready to give it to you you must not wait. Hurry, take it by force. You see, he is just storming away over this most critical point. If anyone who is really serious, who really wants to know, asks, "But how on earth can man transform into the Superman, how is that done? Tell me," he only says that one would be a fool to jump over it. But what one ought to do he doesn't say. So he behaves intuitively with the problem, only touches upon that point, and of course it is *the* point. Once more we have to regret that Nietzsche is merely intuitive; he is always in that infernal haste, never settles down with the problem and chews on it to see what will come of it. He very clearly feels that here is something shallow, a danger zone, so he mentions it—then off

he goes. So one doesn't see how that transition of the ordinary man into the Superman can be accomplished: the most interesting question in the whole of *Zarathustra* if it comes to practical issues—if one were to try to apply it.

Mrs. Sigg: Could it not be that we have a sort of self-regulating system in the psyche which helps us to keep it balanced?

Prof. Jung: We have it inasmuch as we are really balanced, but if one is unbalanced one is just unbalanced—that mechanism is out of gear. Of course Nietzsche is a very one-sided type, a fellow in whom one function is differentiated far too much and at the expense of the others. He is a speculative thinker, or not even speculative,—he doesn't reflect very much—he is chiefly intuitive and that to a very high degree. Such a person leaps over the facts of sensation, realities, and naturally that is compensated. This is the problem throughout the whole book. For about two years we have been working through the shadow chapters of *Zarathustra*, and the shadow is creeping nearer and nearer to him, his inferior function, sensation. The actual reality is ever creeping nearer with a terrible threat and a terrible fear. And the nearer it comes, the more he leaps into the air, like that man who saw the rattlesnake behind him. He performs the most extraordinary acrobatic feats in order not to touch or to see his shadow. So we have on the one side his extreme intuition, and on the other side the shadow always coming nearer.

Dr. Frey: But was he not nearer to the problem in the beginning—when he carried the corpse and buried it in the tree?

Prof. Jung: Yes, and not only in the beginning. In the course of *Zarathustra* he apparently deals with the shadow a number of times; his mind or psyche seems to function as everyone's psyche functions. There are always attempts at dealing with the problem. But then he again jumps away and doesn't deal with it adequately: things get difficult and he reviles and suppresses it. For instance, you remember that chapter not very long ago, where the fool came up and talked exactly like Zarathustra, reviling the low-down inferior people. And Nietzsche could not accept it; he reviled the fool despite the fact that he was repeating his own words, practically. You see, that was an attempt of the shadow, by disguising himself in the language of Zarathustra, to say, "I am yourself, I talk like yourself, now do accept me." When you hear a person cursing someone and quoting him—"He even said this and that"—you know those are the views of that fellow himself, of the one who is complaining. And if you said, "But that is what you say too," it might dawn upon him that what he was reviling in the other was so

very much like himself that he didn't see it. So Nietzsche might have said to himself, "Since the fool talks my own language, is he not identical with me? Are we not one and the same?" And mind you, there are passages where he speaks of Zarathustra as the fool.

Some of you surely remember that famous *soreites syllogismos* which I made in the first *Zarathustra* seminar. That is a figure of logical conclusion, a statement with no preconditions; since the premises are true, the conclusion is true. There I proved that every figure we encounter in *Zarathustra* is Nietzsche himself. So he is the shadow, and if Nietzsche had only stopped to think for a moment, he would have seen it. Even here is an opportunity: Nietzsche says man is something that must be surpassed, which is what the fool showed him. He showed what one ought or ought not to do, for there the rope-dancer died, there Nietzsche should have learned that man is killed by that overleaping, that he himself would be killed. And he made there the famous prophecy that his mind would die before his body. You see, here again he remembers the fool, so here again he has a chance to understand that he is identical with him in that he is overleaping man. For what does he mean by surpassing man? He has never shown us how that is done. He definitely feels here that something is wrong; he feels that he should make a distinction so that the fool may be removed, so that he has not to acknowledge the buffoon. That is of course an exceedingly important point; we would expect here definite evidence that Zarathustra is not a buffoon. Nietzsche should by all means stop here and explain the difference between overleaping and surpassing. But having touched it a bit, he goes off as if he had touched a red hot iron. Yet he even goes so far as to say concerning the surpassing, "Don't wait until you get it legitimately. Take it by force, hurry, anticipate it. It must be caught at once." You have heard that tune before; you heard it in September: *Es muss jetzt sein und jetzt sofort*. Don't wait until it comes about quite naturally, take it by any means whatever, no time to wait. That is the wind nature: the wind doesn't wait, the wind moves, and quickly, at once. Farther on, Nietzsche comes to that statement that the wind is at work. Now we will skip what follows and go to the sixth part:

O my brethren, he who is a firstling is ever sacrificed. Now, however, are we firstlings!

We all bleed on secret sacrificial altars, we all burn and broil in honour of ancient idols.

To know how he gets to this idea, we must look at the end of the preceding part.

One should not wish to enjoy where one doth not contribute to the enjoyment. And one should not wish to enjoy!

For enjoyment and innocence are the most bashful things. Neither like to be sought for. One should *have* them,—but one should rather *seek* for guilt and pain!

What kind of language is this?

Mrs. Crowley: It is Christian language.

Prof. Jung: Yes, it sounds exactly like Tertullian, who admonished his young Christians to seek the arena rather than to avoid it. This is exceedingly Christian teaching. Therefore the next part begins with that idea that he and his brethren are firstlings to be sacrificed.

Mrs. Sigg: It is like the language of the New Testament, Christ being the firstling.

Prof. Jung: And what does that mean?

Mr. Allemann: The first fruits have always been sacrificed.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Romans called the firstlings of spring, sacrificed to the gods, *ver sacrum*. The Christian analogy to this pagan custom or rite is that Christ, being the first born of God, is sacrificed. Nietzsche is now apparently in a very Christian mood, and one should ask what on earth has produced it in him.

Mrs. Crowley: In the chapter before, was he not saying that he had brought a new religion to man? We were discussing it.

Prof. Jung: That is a general reason. “Zarathustra” is the name of a founder of a religion, and of course it is something like a new religion. Also the new commandments he gives instead of the old suggest a new religion. But what is the immediate thought which produces this Christian analogy?

Dr. Wheelwright: It is the reaction against the desire to create a thing quickly. It is a compensation for that.

Prof. Jung: I would explain that, rather, as an immediate reaction against touching the hot iron, the shadow. Therefore he says to grasp that right to be a Superman quickly. Jump at it, take it by force, don’t wait until it is given to you by a regular procedure! He as much as says that he doesn’t want to know what the surpassing consists of. He feels that it would mean a long dissertation, one he should dwell upon a long time in order to tell us how to pass over from the ordinary man into the state of the Superman. And that is annoying to him because it is only reality. This is the impatience of the intuitive reaction against the

half-conscious realization that that surpassing means something on which he could not dwell without getting into hot water.

Mrs. Jung: Because he has broken the old tables and put up a new law, he is the firstling of that new law and the victim at the same time.

Prof. Jung: That is certain, but I want to know the logical transition in the text.

Miss Hannah: One cannot possibly go in for a new religion like that without dealing with one's old religion, which he has not done. He has leapt over it; he has not come to any terms with his old religion.

Prof. Jung: That is true, but can't you see in the text how that transition is done in reality?

Miss Hannah: We are all burning and broiling in honor of ancient idols, and the new things burn and broil too, but he has not taken the trouble to find out what is burning and broiling him.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but I want you to establish the connection between the fifth and sixth parts. In the end of the fifth part we find that he has assumed an exceedingly Christian attitude, which explains in the beginning of the sixth part that he is a firstling that is to be sacrificed. Now I ask how he gets into that Christian attitude.

Mrs. Baumann: Are we allowed to read something which you did not read? There are the last two verses of the fourth part:

What thou doest can no one do to thee again. Lo, there is no requital.

He who cannot command himself shall obey. And many a one *can* command himself, but still sorely lacketh self-obedience.

Prof. Jung: There you can establish the connection. Now Mrs. Baumann, what is the connection between the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth parts? What follows from that—or why does he say that?

Mrs. Baumann: Because he has said that, he then becomes a sacrifice.

Prof. Jung: But how do you explain it?

Mrs. Baumann: He is jumping along intuitively but he feels it underneath just the same, because he is preaching that one can grasp something immediately without overcoming it. Then follows this about commanding and obeying.

Mr. Allemann: He says that there is no retribution, *Es gibt keine Vergeltung*, and then he has to realize the retribution, to become a sacrifice.

Mrs. Fierz: But does it not follow directly, when you want to find a way to surpass yourself, that a way then presents itself? But that is the Christian way so he thinks of it unwillingly.

Prof. Jung: Well, you and Miss Hannah are both about right, but I wanted you to establish the connection in the text.

Miss Hannah: He says one should command oneself but he cannot command his shadow, he thinks he can but he cannot, and therefore he has to be sacrificed. He is one who has to be commanded, and he makes the awful mistake of thinking he commands.

Prof. Jung: That is again near the truth—he says that himself.

Mr. Bash: Is the shadow, then, not the element which still remains in himself and in contrast with the Superman, which commands him but not consciously, not in accordance with his boasted ideal of the Superman, so that he obeys—but in a sense does not obey—himself?

Prof. Jung: Well, the subsequent paragraphs elucidate the point. But I should have liked you to establish the connection through the fifth part, beginning in the fourth. You see, Nietzsche overleaps his own statement that one ought to surpass man, for he doesn't know how that is done and it is disagreeable. So he jumps away from it and says to seize that right to be the Superman; don't wait for the disagreeable procedure which is making you into the Superman. Now of course that still rankles in his mind: how on earth is it done? It is like making a pretty broad statement with a doubt in your mind whether it is right. Then it begins to worry you, it nags at you. While you are talking big stuff, it bores its way further and further. It keeps on nagging at you. So that problem he has overleapt is not completely extinguished; it appears again in, "He who cannot command himself shall obey." This immediately points to the commandments—say Moses' commandments—and that is in fact the way by which something can be done: you simply command it, you make a statement and say, "Thou shalt." That is generally his intention here; instead of showing the way, he orders, makes laws, laws of behavior or laws of thinking, thereby establishing a new system of commandments by means of which one can surpass or surmount. But can everyone command himself? Obviously there are a number of people who cannot. There is the beginning of Nietzsche's doubts about the possibility of that development into the Superman. For instance, my shadow won't obey me. Well then, my shadow simply *has* to obey. "And many a one *can* command himself, but still sorely lacketh self-obedience." What does that mean?

Mr. Allemann: Many can see what would be good for them but cannot find the way to do it.

Prof. Jung: Man can invent all kinds of ways. He can say, "This is the right thing to do," and command himself to do it. But would you call that self-obedience? Whom would you be obeying then? You see, the

ordinary case of moral behavior is that you obey a command which you hear or invent yourself. You give a command; you say, "I think this is the thing to do in this case? I am going to do it." Now have you then obeyed the self?

Mrs. Fierz: No, Mr. One.

Prof. Jung: Yes, if *I* think this is good for everybody, therefore *I* shall do it, I am obeying public opinion. That is not the self. Or you are obeying your unconscious, or the devil: *it* thinks and you do it; so you have obeyed a ghost. The command was simply given by the unconscious, by a fool perhaps. Therefore you should examine the ghosts that are whispering in your ear, because you are never quite sure whose voice it is. The spirit can say very funny things sometimes, so as St. Paul says, *prüfet die Geister*.⁹ That old patient of mine tells me that Christ sometimes makes obscene jokes, particularly in church, which is shocking and makes it hard for her to maintain the theory that it is Christ. I don't say this is wrong: it happens as a necessary compensation for a pious attitude which is not too real. Then necessarily you would have obscene fantasies in order to see who you are. So the fact that you are able to command yourself doesn't mean that it is a particularly good thing to do, or that the self is really the source of that command. Even a man who can command himself and is able to obey his own command, may not obey the self. This passage betrays profound doubt in Nietzsche as to the usefulness of his commandments.

Yet that is the only way which is known—we don't know other ways. For instance, suppose you are in a psychological situation where you feel very inferior and would like to get out of it. So you go to an ordinary parson and ask his advice, and he says you ought to do this or that. But you know that as well as he and that is exactly what you cannot do. The reason you don't go to a parson is because you know exactly what he is going to say; you know it will be done in the way of a commandment or an order because this is the way that is known. And Nietzsche naively attempts the same way in making new commandments, because that is the only way *he* knows—it has been practically the only way for two thousand years. But that God could work it out in yourself by a slow and painful procedure is for curious reasons not accepted. Why is that idea, really a religious idea which would give us confidence in God, not generally accepted? Why should we suffer the law all the time?

Miss Wolff: Because we *want* a law. We want to be irresponsible, and

⁹ "Try the spirits" (John 4:1).

so we expect to be guided. We are no exceptions ourselves. We say, "I don't know what to do, but I shall have a dream about it." So somebody else is deciding for us, and we are getting out of all moral trouble.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you can always say, "Oh, I don't need to think; I simply behave according to the law." It gives us a sort of security. The law is a sure direction and a reliable staff, so we don't need to worry. But why should we not assume that God could work it in ourselves?

Mrs. Fierz: Because he is not so entirely good.

Prof. Jung: That is it—nor so entirely reliable; there is a certain risk about it. God might do something quite unconventional.

Mrs. Flower: May I ask how one knows that it is God who is replying?

Prof. Jung: That is exactly the point. If we knew for certain, *we* could make a law. The Catholic attitude is very reasonable in these matters. They say, "Anybody can suggest anything and call it God's own word, and how do we know? Well, we have the tradition of the church, the collegium of the cardinals, the concilium of priests, and that enormous apparatus is a measure by which to decide. If it agrees with the holy tradition it is good, if it does not agree it is bad. Now if we decide like that, what happens to God?"

Mrs. Baumann: He is eliminated.

Prof. Jung: Yes, and who is eliminating him?

Mrs. Sigg: Man in collectivity.

Prof. Jung: Well, the popes and the cardinals or the Fathers of the concilium decide about such matters. There is a funny story about the concilium: They didn't know what to do about certain books, so they put them under the altar in the hope that God would decide about them. Then certain books were miraculously picked up and placed *upon* the altar, so they decided those were the right books, and the others that remained below were no good. So it is really man's own work, man's own mind, which decides that one thing is good and another bad. The attitude of the Catholic church is perfectly legitimate because it is built upon the system of commandments; the church must give sure guidance. The church is the stable for the herd or for the sheep, so that they won't get lost or be attacked by wolves. They are well protected within the walls of the church. That makes sense and therefore the church rightly holds: *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, "outside of the church there is no salvation," only perdition. But the question is: *is* it only perdition? Or is it possible that God is free? For according to the teaching of the church, God cannot be free, having limited himself to the commands of the church. Of course theoretically they say: Naturally God is free, God's will is supreme and he can decide. But prac-

tically, since God has instituted the sacraments he cannot forsake them. So if the rite of baptism is administered, the grace will be there. In other words, when the priest is consecrated by the apostolic blessing and performs the rite of baptism or any other sacramental rite in the correct way, the rite has a magic effect upon God. God has to be there and he won't go back on his promise, he won't forsake his own institutions, he will support the rite with the presence of his grace. By that argument the church avoids the reproach that they believe in magic, that a priest is working magic in carrying out the correct rite. As a matter of fact, practically, God is limited: he is fettered by the magic rites of the church—he can't stop giving his grace. And since he never promised to give his grace to anything else, nothing else receives the grace of God. So one is held entirely in the church. If God wants to work at all, it must be in and through the church; he cannot work outside the church nor can he publish any other news, perhaps a still newer Testament. The last edition appeared two thousand years ago—nothing new since then. It would be too upsetting if there were, because it would be outside the dogma and that cannot be countered. So our whole idea of spiritual development is entirely linked up with the idea of commandments.

LECTURE IV

8 February 1939

Prof. Jung:

Mrs. Crowley calls our attention to the fact that the saying, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," is already contained in Leviticus, chapter 19, the 18th verse: "Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord."

Now we are still concerned with the question of the transition from the fourth part of the 56th chapter, which we had dealt with, to the sixth part. Have you thought about it?

Miss Hannah: I thought about it, but I am muddled about it. I wish you would repeat the question.

Prof. Jung: You remember we skipped the fifth part and went on to the sixth, which begins, "O my brethren, he who is a firstling is ever sacrificed." My question was, "How does Nietzsche arrive at the idea of the firstling? To what—or to whom—does that clearly point?"

Miss Hannah: To the Christian lamb really.

Prof. Jung: Yes, to Christ himself, who is the firstling among the dead, *der erste der Toten*, the paschal Lamb that is sacrificed in Spring. Now how does Nietzsche arrive at this idea from part 4? What is the transition? Please stick to what Nietzsche himself says in his text.

Mrs. Brunner: He preaches overcoming himself to himself, but he realizes that he cannot overcome himself, so he is thrown back to the Christian state of mind.

Prof. Jung: That is pretty close to the truth.

Mrs. Sigg: I think we should not overlook the fact that this chapter has for a title "Old and New Tablets," and the question of the firstling, the reason why the firstling must be sacrificed, is treated in just this chapter where breaking the tablets is discussed. There is a clear connection. So I think the identification with Moses plays an enormous role in *Zarathustra*, since Moses was the one who broke the old and made new tablets.

Prof. Jung: The idea of the firstling is based upon the Mosaic law, but Moses himself has nothing to do with this question of the transition from Part IV to Part VI.

Remark: He says, "Be not considerate," and then that is put against him. He meets his own lack of consideration at once, for one is one's own neighbor.

Prof. Jung: Yes, you are also quite near to the truth.

Mr. Bash: It seems to me there are two trends of thought here: in the first place a feeling of his own inadequacy, which is given expression in the sentence, "And many a one can command himself, but still sorely lacketh self-obedience." Then he says later, one should not wish to enjoy, and somewhat later, that one should rather seek for guilt and pain. I wonder if those have not a personal application to himself as the first revealer of a new religion, which he rather self-consciously is, and if he does not still feel his own inadequacy to carry out his prophecies. He is the first prophet of the Superman, but he is not the Superman and never can be; furthermore, he feels that he himself must be overcome, that he himself must not command, but must be sacrificed to the real Superman, who is yet to come.

Prof. Jung: You are quite right, and you hit upon the decisive point in that question of seeking guilt and pain. That is an exceedingly Christian attitude which late Christianity has been blamed for: namely, that morality chiefly consists of doing unpleasant things, that to be moral one should do something unpleasant on principle. At certain times in the Middle Ages the highest ideal of piety, the highest ethical attitude, was that one should really seek torture, that one should seek only guilt and pain. That amounts to a complete suppression of the natural man, through a very one-sided ethical attitude. Well, we can now reconstruct the inner bridge of thought. You see, Nietzsche always induces us to skip things, to glide over them as he glides over abysses, creating the illusion that there is a bridge. We think we have passed an obstacle quite easily, when as a matter of fact we have only skipped it. We have not gone through it, we have not worked to overcome it, we have simply taken an intuitive flight—leaping like a grasshopper—and skipped it. So one has to pull oneself together and force oneself to go deeper into the underlying meaning of his words in order to become aware of the enormous difficulties he just leaves behind him.

In the fourth part, you remember, he is again reminded of the buffoon, the fool who thinks exactly like himself. In chapter after chapter Nietzsche has reviled the collective man, shown that he is no good at

all, not worthwhile. He has said so many negative things about the natural man that in the end he himself admits that only a fool could talk like that. The realization comes to him that he is talking almost like the buffoon who overleapt the rope-dancer. So he says only a fool would think that the ordinary man can be overleapt—one has to *surpass* him. Now, in this case we really could expect—as in such places before—an explanation of the method, or the way, to integrate that inferior man, so that he will not be merely overleapt. But here he says, “Surpass thyself even in thy neighbour,” as if that were different from overleaping thyself even in thy neighbor, yet he doesn’t say of what the surpassing consists. Instead of going into the depths of the problem, he simply takes another word, as if something had thereby been done. But nothing is done. He immediately gets impatient again and says, “. . . and a right which thou canst seize upon, shalt thou not allow to be given thee!”—for heaven’s sake don’t wait, you must anticipate the Superman, seize upon the result even if you have no right to it, don’t be patient, don’t wait until the Superman naturally grows in you. Now, could anything be more overleaping than such an attitude? He leaps over the ordinary man all along the line.

You see, the natural man waits until a thing comes to him. To usurp a place means too much spasm and cramp, he must make an enormous effort to grasp anything which doesn’t come to him naturally. If you force people to jump at a conclusion, or to usurp a right which would come anyhow, you are forcing them into an entirely unnatural attitude. All this demonstrates clearly that he is not at all minded to take the inferior man into consideration: again the inferior man is overleapt. Then in that statement that “many a one *can* command himself, but still sorely lacketh self-obedience” there is the doubt whether even someone who is apparently in command of himself can obey the intimations of the self. The very justifiable doubt is naturally aroused in him, whether he himself would be able to obey the command of a self that is thought of as being supreme, or at least superior to the “I” that is able to command himself. As Mr. Bash has pointed out, Nietzsche has the feeling that he himself cannot live up to this superior heroic attitude. Yet in the fifth part, he assumes an attitude which is again overheroic: namely, one should not seek pleasure, but should seek pain and guilt. That is a most unnatural attitude, because any natural being seeks pleasure: it is morbid if he doesn’t. And what has Nietzsche said before about those people who are so degenerate that they only want to suffer? Now he adopts that attitude simply because it fits in with what he has said about the treatment of the inferior man—that

the inferior man is and shall be overleapt, *surpassing* being merely another kind of *overleaping*. So he quite consistently comes to that conclusion that the inferior man is not to be taken into account at all, because the ideal is to look only for pain—and no butter please, no pleasure.

We have heard that before. Such an overheroic attitude leads directly to the figure of Christ who overcomes the weakness of man, who sacrifices himself and identifies with the paschal Lamb. This is no criticism of the problem of Christ—that attitude, or symbol, was needed then, but nobody is allowed to identify to that extent with Christ unless he can have the same attitude. Mind you, Nietzsche *has* that attitude now. He is more than medieval in that seeking of guilt and pain: We are all followers of Zarathustra, we are the firstlings, we only live to be sacrificed. This is the attitude which you now find substantiated in Germany: it is the mood and the attitude of the *ver sacrum*, and it certainly overleaps the inferior man. You see, there is one continuous stream of thought through these chapters, a sort of Christian undercurrent, which clearly comes to the surface now and gives one the impression that Nietzsche, as a Christian individual or an individual who had once had a Christian education, had yet never understood what Christianity really meant. It was apparently something that merely happened in churches, or in the head.

And now, in the moment when the dogmatic ideas are discarded, they suddenly reappear in a psychological attitude. That is the tragedy of our time. Whatever was a creed in the Middle Ages, whatever ideal people kept before their eyes, was lost, and it is now in the flesh. So we see a whole nation really becoming Christian in a way, but without the idea of Christianity—with even an anti-Christian idea. But the idea that everybody must now be a sacrifice is essentially Christian. Never mind all the things you miss and that life is very hard anyway: everybody must sacrifice himself. That is *plus papal que le pape*, more Christian than ever before. We know of no time in history when a pope or a bishop would have educated his nation as Germany is now being educated under a so-called anti-Christian rule; it is much worse than it has ever been, without mercy, without redemption, without explanation. It is done in the name of the state, but it is a thoroughly Christian attitude. Now that is Nietzsche's logic, and that has come off as a political or sociological condition. In these paragraphs we have the same kind of thought, the same development. The Christian imagery is abolished, yet the psychological fact of Christianity remains. It is as if that child had been beheaded; as long as he had a head he was human, but now he has no head. There is simply the body of the child with all its

strength, doing just what it was doing before but with no head, with no understanding of what it is doing. And so naturally everybody has to be sacrificed, not on the altar of any temple or deity or church, but on the altar of the state—a fiction. So Nietzsche continues:

Now, however, are we firstlings!

We all bleed on secret sacrificial altars, we all burn and broil in honour of ancient idols.

In the Middle Ages, they burned and broiled the heretics, and now people are doing it to themselves in honor of or in the name of the state. What is apparently a most advanced conception, as a matter of fact, is an old idol, and behind that are pagan gods that are not named. But they are secretly embodied in the state.

Our best is still young: this exciteth old palates. Our flesh is tender, our skin is only lambs' skin:—how could we not excite old idol-priests!

How do you explain this passage?

Mrs. Brunner: He is the paschal Lamb.

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is clear, but understood not as a sacrifice exactly, more as the victim of an old idol-priest. Now, who are the old idol-priests?

Miss Hannah: Is it not Wotan? They actually did sacrifice sheep, did they not, at the beginning of the New Paganism movement?

Prof. Jung: Yes, they did. And old Wotan had human sacrifices offered to him: prisoners of war were suspended on a tree and speared in his honor, because that was the sort of sacrificial rite Wotan himself had undergone when he was suspended on the world-tree and wounded by the spear. His own original fate was repeated in the sacrifice of the prisoners of war. Of course the god of our time is Christ, and his symbol is the lamb: he was the sacrificed lamb. So if people were to be sacrificed in his honor, it should be a repetition of his own myth; they should be sacrificed as sheep. Now, that sheep are exceedingly gregarious is even proverbial, so that great crowds should be slaughtered: herds of sheep would be the appropriate sacrifice. In what easy way could such sheep sacrifices be performed in reality?

Miss Hannah: By war.

Prof. Jung: Yes, we have excellent machinery for that purpose: in a few seconds several thousand people could be killed. So the collective slaughter, the slaughter of the sheep, can be done technically quite easily by war. War is the sacrificial knife by which that can be accom-

plished. Now, the sacrificial knife does nothing by itself—a hand guides the knife—so if war is the sacrificial knife, who then is the priest?

Miss Wolff: The state that orders war.

Prof. Jung: Yes, but the state is supposed to be a modern concept, and behind the state are ancient deities, so who would the sacrificial priest be in reality?

Miss Hannah: Wotan.

Prof. Jung: You can say Wotan, or it would be a god of war; that is the ancient idol. The state is merely the modern pretense, a shield, a make-belief, a concept. In reality, the ancient war-god holds the sacrificial knife, for it is in war that the sheep are sacrificed. The Christian herd of sheep is now without a shepherd; it is brought to the sacrifice of the firstlings and killed gregariously, the most efficient way being war. That is the psychology which threatens Europe generally. The old shepherd is done for in practically every country—the herd is no longer led by a benevolent shepherd. Even the Pope, or any bishop in the past, was a more benevolent shepherd than the state. The state is impersonal, a dark power, the power which rules the masses—and that is forever a barbarous deity. So instead of human representatives or a personal divine being, we have now the dark gods of the state—in other words, the dark gods of the collective unconscious. It is the old assembly of the gods that begins to operate again because no other principle is on top. Where there is no recognized leading principle, the collective unconscious comes up and takes the lead. If our *Weltanschauung* is no longer in existence or is insufficient, the collective unconscious interferes. Wherever we fail in our adaptation, where we have no leading idea, the collective unconscious comes in, and in the form of the old gods. There the old gods break into our existence: the old instincts begin to rage again.

That is not only the problem of Germany; Germany is only a symptom. It is so in every country. For instance, France has finished with the old shepherds. It was not the shepherd idea that came back in France, but was rather the wolf idea: namely, the dissolution and disintegration of the people by socialistic ideas. Then the wolves come in. With the Germans the idea of the shepherd remained, but it took on the form of the old wind-god that blows all the dry leaves together, a funny kind of shepherd, an old sorcerer. But that is only the other aspect. The effect is just the same whether it is wolves, which also kill gregariously, or the wrong kind of shepherd. It is the same condition all over the earth that causes the disease. The old gods are coming to life again

in a time when they should have been superseded long ago, and nobody can see it. That is now the problem of those old idol priests.

Miss Wolff: In the first part of chapter 9, "The New Idol," Nietzsche says the same thing, almost literally: the state is the new idol.

Prof. Jung: Yes. Just before that was the chapter on "War and Warriors," and then followed "The New Idol." There we have the same idea already.

Miss Wolff: I wondered if in this chapter we are dealing with now, the old idols and old priests are for Nietzsche not the Christian priests—as if the whole sacrificial idea were reversed, and the old priests or idols were slaughtering the new idea.

Prof. Jung: Naturally, to him it looks as if it were the old Christian priests. But as a matter of fact, they were never able to control a nation as is being done now by the state.

Miss Wolff: But he doesn't say it is a nation here. The firstlings seem to be himself and a few other firstlings.

Prof. Jung: Of course not—because he didn't know it. If he could have seen it clearly, he never would have spoken so clearly. Only inasmuch as they are modern people are they firstlings. Modern people follow Zarathustra. But he did not see that he was really anticipating the whole future development, that there would be a time when what he says here would come true. It is as if the whole world had heard of Nietzsche or read his books, and had consciously brought it about. Of course they had not. He simply listened in to that underground process of the collective unconscious, and he was able to realize it—he talked of it, but nobody else noticed it. Nevertheless, they all developed in that direction, and they would have developed in that direction even if there had been no Nietzsche. For they never understood it. Perhaps I am the only one who takes the trouble to go so much into the detail of Zarathustra—far too much, some people may think. So nobody actually realizes to what extent he was connected with the unconscious and therefore with the fate of Europe in general, for it is the same trouble all over the world.

Mrs. Crowley: I wondered if something you said last week was possibly another way of seeing it; you referred to projection and affect, and you spoke of the antique gods having been reassimilated by modern man because we have taken in their virtues or their powers, and that was done by overcoming them. Now, could you not say, in a way, that this complex of the modern world—which I see as a savior complex rather than a sheep complex, because everybody wants to save—is this same idea? We really assimilated the Christian God, but by overleaping

instead of overcoming or surpassing. We have produced the shadow of the Christian God, because it was done by affect instead of by realization. That is what you mean, is it not?

Prof. Jung: Yes, it was by overleaping. If you simply destroy it, you create a ghost of the old value and you are possessed by that thing. So when we destroyed Christianity—of course it just happened that it was destroyed, to a great extent it destroyed itself—the ghost of Christianity was left, and we are now possessed. The Christian sacrifice is now produced in actuality, in the flesh. And so it was when the people threw away the old gods. They then had the conflict of their emotions in themselves, and had to assume an attitude which would rescue them from those battles and intrigues the gods were always having. Therefore, these savior religions arose, which saved the people from the gods in themselves. They were then planetary gods; it was the astrological influence, the continuous fear of the *heimarmene*,¹ all that compulsion of the bad stars. The soul was burdened with the influence of the bad stars; that was the so-called handwriting which was imprinted on the soul when it descended to earth through the spheres of the planets. And that had to be washed off by a savior; people had to be saved from the inexorable law of the old gods. The old gods were not exactly destroyed by Christianity: they died before Christ came. Therefore Augustus was obliged to regress to old Latin rites and ceremonies in order to do something toward restoring the old religion which was already giving out. It simply became obsolete, and then already people were filled with what the gods had been before. The gods became integrated in them.

For as soon as you cannot call an affect by a certain name—for instance, Cupid—it is in yourself. If you cannot say it is somewhere in space, in the planet Mars perhaps, it must be in yourself, and cannot be anywhere else. That causes a psychological disorder. We are apparently pretty far from these old facts because we don't realize the power of the archetypes; and we don't realize the mentality of a time when there were many gods, don't know what it would be like to be surrounded by divine, superior, demoniacal powers. We have the poetic conception, but that is nothing like the reality. So we don't know what it means to have lived in a time when these old gods descended upon man, when they became subjective factors, immediate magic. A wave of superstition went through the world at that time, the first centuries in Rome were swarming with sorcerers and amulets and magic of all

¹ *Heimarmene*: destiny in the Poimandres vision.

descriptions. People were as if beset by superstitious parasites, because they didn't know how to defend themselves. So they did the most amazing things in order to get rid of the swarm of gods that had settled down upon them like fleas or lice. That accounts for their extraordinary desire to be redeemed, liberated—to be lifted out of that awful swarm of vermin which infested the world.

Now, just as that happened in antiquity, a parallel phenomenon—of course not exactly the same thing—is taking place in our times, when the medieval Christian world is beginning to disappear. The essential truth comes back to us. Whatever has been in a metaphysical heaven is now falling upon us, and so it comes about that the mystery of Christ's sacrificial death, which has been celebrated untold millions of times by the masses, is now coming as a psychological experience to everybody. Then the lamb sacrifice is assimilated in *us*: we are becoming the lambs, and the lambs that are meant for sacrifice. We become gregarious as if we were sheep, and there will surely be a sacrifice. Now, we will go on with our text. Nietzsche says here.

In ourselves dwelleth he still, the old idol-priest, . . .

Of course Nietzsche doesn't mean this as we would interpret it; he means the old priests who preached a sort of metaphysical religion, and that we with our belief still support that old prejudice. What he says is true, but in an entirely different way, in a psychological way. The old idol-priest is *really* an old idol-priest, an archetypal figure of the priest-god or the sacrificed god; and "in ourselves dwelleth he still" means that we should never forget that the old gods, Wotan or any other, are still ready to spring up again when hitherto valid forms become obsolete.

who broileth our best for his banquet. Ah, my brethren, how could firstlings fail to be sacrifices!

This means the wholesale sacrifice, and they are all meant to die the ritual sacrificial death in order to produce redemption, as Christ chose death in order to become transformed. And into what did he become transformed through his death?

Miss Hannah: Into the subtle body.

Prof. Jung: You never read that in the New Testament!

Miss Hannah: The everlasting body, the resurrection body.

Prof. Jung: That is Paul's interpretation, but according to the dogma, what did Christ become after his death?

Answer: God.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the second person of the Trinity. He became the Logos, and then returned to God, to the metaphysical state in which he ever was; having been man he returned to God. So when we are sacrificed, we are all supposed to return to God. Now we will pass over the seventh part, and go to the last verse of the eighth part.

“Woe to us! Hail to us! The thawing wind bloweth!”—Thus preach, my brethren, through all the streets!

Here we have Wotan, the thawing wind. When things are generally at a standstill, when nothing happens and things are undecided, then someone is sure to see Wotan making ready. There are legends of his having been seen as a wanderer, and soon after a war would break out. When Wotan appears, it is like the thawing wind in Spring which melts the ice and snow, as Nietzsche says here very clearly. Now we will go to the ninth part:

There is an old illusion—it is called good and evil. Around soothsayers and astrologers hath hitherto revolved the orbit of this illusion.

Once did one *believe* in soothsayers and astrologers; and therefore did one believe, “Everything is fate: thou shalt, for thou must.”

This is antiquity, you see.

Then again did one distrust all soothsayers and astrologers; and therefore did one believe, “Everything is freedom: thou canst, for thou wilt!”

This is modern times, exactly what I have been pointing out. We will pass on now to the eleventh part, the third paragraph:

A great potentate might arise, an artful prodigy, who with approval and disapproval could strain and constrain all the past, until it became for him a bridge, a harbinger, a herald, and a cock-crowing.

What does he anticipate here?

Miss Hannah: The dictator.

Prof. Jung: Yes, a big fellow who welds the whole thing together with a hammer, doing away with the past, making it a bridge for the future. This is a very wonderful vision of the future.

This however is the other danger, and mine other sympathy:—he who is of the populace, his thoughts go back to his grandfather,—with his grandfather, however, doth time cease.

Now what is that?

Miss Hannah: All the dictators come from the populace.

Prof. Jung: As we know them now, they come from the populace, and their ideas do go back just to the grandfather—that is the funny thing. That would be the 19th century or thereabouts. Before the grandfather, time ceases; there is no time. That is the case with the primitives. The so-called *alcheringa* or *altjiranga* time is before the grandfather.² You see, no primitive knows of anything further back than the grandfather, so the heroic times when the great miracles happened, the time of creation, was the time before the grandfather lived. Only a few generations away we would say, but for the primitive it is utterly remote: their knowledge of the past goes no further. Before the grandfather was the *Urzeit*, the *alcheringa*, when the wonderful things happened. That is exactly what Nietzsche says here. One sees examples of such primitivity in the examinations of recruits for the army. They have heard of Napoleon—he was a contemporary of William Tell and Caesar. That all happened practically at the same time; the old Romans came just before Napoleon, and Martin Luther and Professor So-and-So are close together. They have no feeling for the length of time and an extraordinary lack of historical vision, with only a few dim scenes in their heads about heroes in the past and they are all jumbled together. The discovery of America would have to do with Genesis.

Mr. Bash: Is there not a parallel to this impression in Greek mythology, where there were just three generations of gods—Saturn, Chronos, and Zeus—and before that nothing?

Prof. Jung: Yes, that is the very primitive fact. The grandfather is the utmost limit; before the grandfather, time comes to an end. The Homeric time in Greece is an absolute parallel to the *altjiranga* time. The *altjirangamitjinas*, to their primitive descendants, are the heroes of that time when there was no time; as noble Greek families were supposed to be descendants of Agamemnon or Odysseus or any of those Homeric heroes. Moreover, the heroes of the Homeric times were half man, half beast, which explains the fact that the first founder of Ath-

² Ancestral souls, half man and half animal, are reinvoked by Australian aborigines in a religious rite. CW 9 i, par. 114. Jung learned about this from Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's *Primitive Mythology*. See above, 23 May 1934, n. 3.

ens, Cecrops, was half man and half snake; and Erechtheus was worshipped in the form of a snake down under the Erechtheon on the Acropolis. There was the idea that heroes transform into snakes after death. The idea of the heroes being half beast is also related to the fact that all gods had animal attributes. Even the Evangelists had animal attributes. And the animal ancestors have been symbolized by the heraldic totemic animals, like the British lion and the unicorn, or the eagle, or the cock of France. The Eastern peoples have eagles because they have more to do with the wind: birds are their totemic animals. So those old ideas have left their traces.

Now, Nietzsche has an intuition of the danger that that great dictator might be of the populace, and that his thoughts would go back to his grandfather, which means that he would have somewhat antiquated ideas. And that is true of the present really prominent dictators, of Hitler himself, for example. In his book *Mein Kampf*, one sees that one set of his ideas comes from socialism—he imitates it, gets certain basic ideas from socialism (he himself says he is just one point better)—and the other set is from the Catholic church. Socialism is one aspect of realized Christianity, brotherly love with the ensuing disorder; and the other aspect is the Catholic church—discipline, organization, with the ensuing prison. These two are the main features of his ideas, the grandfather ideas. Now we will see what Nietzsche says about this.

Thus is all the past abandoned: for it might some day happen for the populace to become master, and drown all time in shallow waters.

It is obviously possible when the leader is one of the populace, that the populace may get to the top; it has often happened that a dictator has been carried away by the masses he has roused.

Therefore, O my brethren [now he comes to the remedy], a *new nobility* is needed, which shall be the adversary of all populace and potentate rule, and shall inscribe anew the word “noble” on new tables.

The remedy for all dictator habits and dangers would be a sort of oligarchy, a few rulers of noble quality, of noble birth. But that is of course the idea of any dictator. The Communist party is the nobility in Russia; they are paid several dozen times better than anyone else, have automobiles, etc., and they rule the workman who has nothing to say. He is a mere slave, worse than in the old feudal times. In Germany they are imitating that idea of nobility too. In those schools of the Ordens-

burgen, the young s.s. boys receive an education which makes them into a new order of knights—the knights of the new state. All that is foreseen, exactly as Nietzsche says here. But of course he doesn't mean that; he means a real nobility—not one that is made but one that creates itself. So he says,

For many noble ones are needed, and many kinds of noble ones,
for a new nobility!

People who are noble in themselves, not *made* into a sort of nobility, given a title or social prerogatives as is the case in Germany. Particularly in Russia they are given social prerogatives as members of the communist party.

Or, as I once said in parable: "That is just divinity, that there are Gods, but no God!"

So what he means by the sacrifice of the many is that they are thereby transformed into gods. This bears out what we were assuming, that if one continues the Christian attitude of self-sacrifice—wholesale sacrifice or wholesale slaughter—the inevitable outcome, according to the Christian dogma, is transformation. In that way gods should be made. Any sacrificial death has that meaning. That was true in the mysteries, and primitives always put the initiates through a symbolic death. Among the Kavirondos, a tribe in East Africa, the young men in the puberty initiations, for instance, are told that they are now going to die, or that they are already dead and have transformed into new beings, sort-of spirits; they get a new name, don't know their own family—their mother is no longer their mother, and so on. They are made anew into sort-of spirit beings. In modern times, of course, it happens more frequently that the young people do not undergo the initiations. They are not encouraged to do so, stupidly enough, by the officials, who, if they are military, don't believe in it and don't care anyway; and if they are missionaries they are absolutely against it because it is not Christian. They don't understand it at all; they even have a prejudice against it. But those who have undergone initiation say that the refractory ones are not human; they are nothing but animals, because they have not the spiritual quality which can only be acquired through the sacrificial death.

Mrs. Baumann: The American Indians have another expression for that: they speak of raw persons and cooked persons.³

³ See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked*, tr. J. and D. Weightman (New York, 1969).

Prof. Jung: That is very good. It is exactly the same idea. Those who are cooked have gone through the pain and torture of the fire, have been transformed through pain. The essence of it is, of course, a sacrificial death. You see, in this way the Christian idea infiltrates into man and becomes real—it realizes itself; but then it happens blindly, which is, or can be, exceedingly dangerous. That accounts for the actual situation in Europe. The communistic state is equal to the dictator state inasmuch as it functions. If it is merely socialistic it doesn't function but simply disintegrates, as you have seen in France. Therefore automatically someone must pull the thing together and say, "Now we shall make order." So they are practically the same: the one is pulling asunder, the other is just disintegration. People say it should not be like that; of course it is never ideal. Both forms of social life lead into the most unsatisfactory condition, because they are automatically fulfilling the idea which has been the leading idea before. But now it is blind; it simply happens in reality, and the meaning is lost. So Nietzsche's idea that there should be a new nobility, an oligarchy of the good and valuable people, is the socialistic idea—all the socialistic leaders are very wonderful people naturally! In reality of course, they are corrupt. The dictators should be very wonderful people but look at them! Sure enough, there should be a nobility but it cannot be made; that can only grow. If it is fated that there shall be such a nobility, it must grow somehow. But it is surely not a social phenomenon, at least not at first. We have a parallel phenomenon in early Christianity in the idea of the elect: "Many are called, few are chosen" to form the kingdom of heaven, or the kingdom of God.⁴ That is the nobility, but they stand against the world. That was the natural nobility of those days.

Mrs. Crowley: Is that not the *enantiodromia* in the progress of Christianity? Christ was the elect—the one—and with him a handful of people who had nothing to do with the state; and now we have again the one and the many who have only to do with the state.

Prof. Jung: Christ was the shepherd, the leader, a spiritual sort of dictator. That is all contained in his understanding that his kingdom was not of this world, but a spiritual kingdom of God—that form of nobility. It was not a sociological but a spiritual phenomenon, because it is only the contradiction of the spiritual with worldly affairs which creates that nobility.

Mrs. Jung: He says just before in Part VI ("But so wisheth our type," etc.) that the lambs or gregarious people really ask for the dictator, and

⁴ Matthew 22:14.

therefore in a socialistic or communistic state there must be a dictator. The nobility on the other hand, is not gregarious: it consists of individuals.

Prof. Jung: Quite. Nobility cannot be a gregarious affair. Therefore I say it cannot be a social phenomenon. I call it spiritual, but you can call it a psychological affair. Those people must possess nobility of soul. Otherwise it is an utterly impossible idea.

Miss Hannah: Is it not the same as Buddha's idea: the people who are off the wheel?

Prof. Jung: Absolutely. Buddha formed such a nobility; the Buddhist Sangha is the community of the elect who have forsaken the illusions of the world. Those who don't participate in the blindness of Maya, who are freed from the wheel of the Samskaras—the cycle of repeated incarnations—those who have passed out of the state of concupiscentia are the elect ones, the leaders. It was the same in Manichaeism, where the term *electus* meant a definite degree of initiation. It is even possible that Mani, who naturally knew the Christian tradition since he lived in 220 or 230 A.D., got that idea of the elect from St. Paul who based himself upon the Christian tradition: "Many are called but few are chosen"—*electus*.

Miss Wolff: There is a parallel idea in the mystery cults of antiquity, only there one was not *electus* because, being initiated by one's own effort, one became the special or outstanding one: one became "deified."

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the pagan mystery cults, or among the primitives, the initiates were passed through those mysteries, and the achievement happened to them; while in Buddhism or Manichaeism or Christianity, it was really an individual achievement to be an *electus*. Naturally the more such a thing is an institution, the more it becomes a sort of machine, so that anybody, practically, can become a chosen one. In the Middle Ages any worldly prince could become a priest. He was simply passed through the consecration in a mechanical way, and it was not at all a spiritual achievement, but entirely a worldly affair. Of course that sort of thing upsets the apple cart after a while. Then that system, which had become a factory for consecrating priests, was destroyed. The spiritual ideas disappeared through routine. Therefore, the Reformation.

Now we must say a word more concerning this last sentence, "That is just divinity, that there are Gods, but no God!" We know that Nietzsche has declared God to be dead, and here it appears as if God were not so dead; that is, as if there were no personal or monotheistic God, but there was divinity. In the language of Meister Eckhart, it

would be the Godhead, not God.⁵ The divine element, the divine factor, is still there, but not in the form of the monotheistic God, and Nietzsche thinks here of a peculiar transformation: namely, that through the abolition of Christianity the divine element will leave the dogmatic idea of God and will become incarnated in man, so there will be *gods*. That is a sort of intuition of an individuation process in man, which eventually leads to the deification of man or to the birth of God in man. Then we are confronted with that dilemma: is it the deification of man or the birth of God in man?

⁵ Meister Eckhart uses *Godhead* when his emphasis is upon more than one member of the trinity as in "... persons in the godhead—on the one side, the begetter or Father, on the other, the offspring. . . ." "Commentary on John" in *Meister Eckhart*, tr. Bernard McGuise (New York, 1981), p. 143.

LECTURE V

15 February 1939

Prof. Jung:

I find here two contributions. One is a prayer, but because I am not God I cannot fulfil it. The other is from Mrs. von Roques: "There is a Russian fairy tale of a Czar who bade his three sons 'seek his traces and pick his flowers.' The two elder sons do not succeed, although they are given the best horses. But the youngest son takes the poorest horse, transforms it (by killing and magic) into the best of stallions, sits on it backwards and thus rides to his grandfather's cellar, strengthens himself by drinking his grandfather's wine, takes saddle and head-harness from there, and then is able to fulfill his task. In this case the 'grandfather' (dead) is regression 'pour mieux sauter,' and is probably 'pars pro toto' for *all the other side*. (Perhaps it is also the first step on the way.) Feeling at home there gives him (the hero) the necessary strength and possibilities."

I am not quite clear about this.

Mrs. von Roques: Nietzsche says in the fourth verse in part 11: . . . he who is of the populace, his thoughts go back to his grandfather,—with his grandfather, however, doth time cease." In this story, it is a going back also, but it has a more positive meaning; with Nietzsche it is negative.

Prof. Jung: Naturally it would be negative, but it also has a positive meaning—that the grandfather, as the term denotes, is the aggrandized father. In your fairy tale the grandfather is the primordial being that asks the great question, or sets the great task.

Mrs. von Roques: The father sets the task, and then the hero goes back to the grandfather.

Prof. Jung: Well, the grandfather really sets the task. He is the origin, because he is the representative of the *altjiranga*, which means psychologically, the representative of the collective unconscious. Since the collective unconscious, through the archetypes, sets the task, it is often called "the grandfather" directly. The primitives use that very term.

They call those powers that make people do the particular things, "grandfathers." They are the originators of the arts and crafts, for instance, and they have the knowledge of the country, the planting and hunting, the knowledge of medicinal herbs, and so on; all that is the grandfather's work: he taught it. But by "the grandfather" they mean the half man, half beast, that was in the beginning, in the *alcheringa* time, when they performed all those labors and tasks on the earth which became the models for mankind—what they must do in order to attain their ends. For instance, the half man, half beast—whatever he was—once came to a spot where he planted rice, which means that he transformed into rice, became the rice man, as you can still see. A stalk of rice has roots, a stem, a head, and even hair on the head; the roots are the feet, the stem is the body and neck, the grain is the head, and the little spikes are the hair. So it is clear that the grandfather was transformed into rice. And from that he transformed into something else, perhaps a bird. He is even believed to have transformed into a hoe which clearly consists of a head and a neck and a body.

Mrs. von Roques: So the hero goes back to the grandfather, and Nietzsche also.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the grandfather is simply the primordial image of the hero: the hero is embodied in the grandfather; or the grandfather is the first model of what a hero should be. The head man of a certain water-totem, for example, is a sort of grandchild of the grandfather, because he knows best what the *alcheringa* grandfather has done in order to produce the water—he transformed perhaps into rain—so he will repeat by a magic ceremony what the *alcheringa* ancestor did: he will be the rain-maker. Nietzsche is all depreciation. To him the grandfather's time conveys absolutely no meaning except that it is old-fashioned and antiquated—old nonsense even. We only spoke of the other significance of the grandfather because of Nietzsche's peculiar remark, "With his grandfather, however, doth time cease." He says those people who have the views of the grandfather never see further back, but merely repeat the ways and the words of the grandfather, because that is the only knowledge of history they possess. But curiously enough that fits in—that is exactly what happens with the primitives. Beyond the third or fourth generation there is nothing. Then comes the *alcheringa* time and there time comes to a standstill: as the Central Australians say, the time when there was no time. Only when man appeared was there time, and even then, having a time, they are still surrounded by no time because *altjiranga* is eternal. So the grandfathers, half man and half beast, have only gone underground; they sank down

into the earth and left certain stones or trees or hillocks of plants as their relics. Therefore, there are certain sacred spots in which their respective ceremonies are celebrated, and they cannot be celebrated anywhere else.

In modern times farmers have taken land which originally belonged to the natives, and if they happened to occupy such a sacred place, the primitive was in this way killed. The vital ceremonies can only be celebrated in that one place, and if that is used for agriculture or any other purpose, it is desecrated. They cannot perform the *alcheringa* rites because the necessary food cannot be supplied. The relationship to nature is lost because the relationship to the ancestors is lost—only there are the *altjirangamitjinas* present and accessible. It is as if their connection with nature had been severed, and then those people are doomed; they decay when they lose the inner connection. All those primitive tribes are fertile and quite well off as long as they live in their natural haunts and have their natural religious relationship with nature, but the moment that is disrupted, they are gone. Then they form a sort of physical and mental proletariat—no good for anything. Like the so-called “mission boy” in Africa, who is no good at all. He is an animal speaking a sort of Christian slang which he doesn’t understand. One sees at once that it is all bunk. They say, “I am a good Christian like you, I know all those fellows, Johnny and Marky and Lukey”; and when one asks about Jesus, they say he is a grasshopper and sing a hymn “Jesus, our grasshopper.” To preach a highly developed religion, which even we do not understand, to such people is utterly ridiculous. Our missionaries work pure magic out there: they teach them prayers which they repeat with their lips, but their hearts cannot follow. Of course the missionary is much too uneducated to understand what he is doing. Even in the Catholic church where the priests are supposed to have a good education, one must seek far to find one who can tell you about the symbolism of the Mass or any other rite; they are just magically caught and don’t know what they are doing.

Now I should like to speak again about the sentence in the end of the eleventh part: “That is just divinity, that there are Gods, but no God!” Nietzsche expresses something here which he has never said before, but we talked about it in the beginning when Nietzsche made the statement that God is dead. We said then that by that statement he dissolved the hitherto prevailing conception of a God existing in his own right. He destroyed that projection—the assumption that there is a God quite apart from man. For since God is not a mere assumption of pure reason but a very emotional fact, a very psychological fact, even a

psychic fact, you deprive that fact of an abode when you say that God is dead. By that, you are saying that God no longer exists, but Nietzsche even means that there is no god, that God is not. Then that psychological fact which was originally called "God" has no place. It is no longer visible where you would expect to find it, in whatever form you have projected it into space—say, a venerable old man with a white beard, a father sitting on a throne in heaven and surrounded by a choir of angels singing eternally. Some such idea has been destroyed. In such a case the psychological fact, which is God, returns into the unconscious and one may say God is dead.

Nietzsche himself instantly reacts with an inflation and a dissociation, as we have seen. So he has to produce out of himself this one peculiar figure, Zarathustra, in order to have something in place of the fact, God. Zarathustra is the wise one, the great prophet, the founder of a religion, something like the messenger of God himself, as any great founder of a religion is considered to be. Christ is considered to be the son of God; and Mohammed is considered to be at least the messenger or prophet of God, as Moses, for instance, is a messenger of God, bringing the divine law. And so Zarathustra is the face of God, the Angel of the Face (*angelus* means messenger); he is that which is called in mystical Islam, in Sufism, the green one, the visible god Chidr. The prophet, or the messenger, or the angel of the god is always the visible god. Since all these religions have an idea of god which is unimaginable, you cannot make a picture of the deity, but you can at least make a picture of the messenger of God, the Angel of the Face. (That is the cabalistic expression. He is called the *metatron*.)¹

Nietzsche was inflated by the regression of the image of the God into the unconscious, and that forces him to balance himself by a new projection in the form of Zarathustra. But Zarathustra is Nietzsche himself. Therefore throughout the whole text Nietzsche is somewhere in between Nietzsche the man and Zarathustra the messenger of God: they can hardly be separated. Only in certain places does it become apparent that Zarathustra is very probably speaking, and in other places that it is more like Nietzsche. Now here, in his decalogue, where he produces the new tablets which are meant for humanity, he realizes what happens when one declares that God is dead. He thinks here more or less in terms of his audience. He assumes that they have listened to his words and that they all agree with him that God is dead.

¹ *Metatron*, a word found in the *Zohar*, is yet another name for primordial man, the first human self that continues to exist in all his descendants. See CW 13, par. 168.

But then they are all gods. Here he has realized that if he declares God is dead, he is then the god; and if all his listeners or pupils have the same conviction, they also become gods: God regresses into them. The original projection of the image of God is destroyed, so God enters into them and they are gods. Now do you know the Christian model for that process? There is a wonderful example in the New Testament. Of course it is somewhat awkward for theologians.

Miss Wolff: After Christ is dead and risen to Heaven, the Holy Ghost descends upon the disciples at Pentecost.

Prof. Jung: That is it, the Pentecostal miracle. Christ said he would leave a Comforter, the Paraclete, and the spirit of God descended upon everyone present at that gathering. As the Holy Ghost was seen descending upon Christ in the form of a dove at the moment of his baptism in the Jordan—there he was made into the son of God. Then if the Holy Ghost descends upon every one of the disciples, they are also made into sons of God: every one of them becomes a Christ, an immediate son of God. Now, that was Christ's idea. But the Church has disregarded this fact in spite of its being authentic. It cannot be wiped out of the New Testament as a very much later interpolation. It is related in the Acts of the Apostles, as a peculiar *post mortem* phenomenon, one of the authentic *post mortem* effects; and inasmuch as we still celebrate Pentecost in the church it should be taken into account. It has been taken into account to a certain extent. Do you know in what institution the Holy Ghost really gives the character of divinity?

Mrs. Schlegel: In the consecration of the priests.

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the so-called Apostolic Succession in the Catholic church. The idea is that St. Peter received the immediate blessing of the Lord, so he stood in the place of the Lord. He was the Lord's deputy, and St. Peter passed on his blessing to his successors, the bishops of Rome. The Apostolic Succession goes on through the centuries in the Catholic church. It is something like a gift of the Holy Ghost, as the emanation of Christ would be the Holy Ghost. The Apostolic blessing is a small Holy Ghost, a small parcel of mana handed out to St. Peter and his successors, and therefore it gives an absolutely indestructible character to the priest, the *character indelebilis*. Even if the one who has received the Apostolic blessing is excommunicated, or even if he is a criminal, the *character indelebilis* cannot be taken away from him. He is marked by that touch. That is a special prerogative: only the priest has a *character indelebilis*, so he is separated from the rest of humanity as a sort of outstanding Superman. He holds a divine prerogative; in having received the Apostolic blessing, which means a part of Christ, the

character indelebilis of the priest is a minor degree of deification. Therefore he is able to perform the rites, and above all the transubstantiation in the Mass, which is a miracle. The head of a nunnery, the abbess, cannot celebrate the Mass, so each nunnery has an affiliated priest who through his *character indelebilis* is able to do it for them. They entirely depend upon him because only a man can receive that divine character.

Now if the Holy Ghost *in toto* descends upon people, they receive the full imprint of divinity. The divine form enters them and they are even more than the priests; they *are-instead-of-the-deity*—as Christ, having received the imprint of God through the Holy Ghost, *is-instead-of-God*. He is the second person of the Trinity, between the Holy Ghost and the Father. Inasmuch as Christ promised that he would leave a Comforter and inasmuch as this Comforter has descended upon the disciples, they have received the divine imprint and they *are-instead-of-Christ*—not only St. Peter. He was selected by Christ himself and given the Apostolic blessing, but the others have the divine character nevertheless. The church doesn't dwell upon that however; the church dislikes this idea: no conclusion has ever been drawn from it.

Mrs. Brunner: Already St. Paul wrote against it.

Prof. Jung: Yes, right in the beginning that fact was hushed up. It was impossible for those days. It could not be maintained because it included the fact that God was not outside, but meant that he was within those people.

Miss Wolff: But then logically the same thing ought to happen after the Holy Communion because Christ is in the Host; in eating the Host one is eating Christ.

Prof. Jung: Yes, one should draw the same conclusion there. And the primitives do draw such a conclusion. They think that by eating the totemic animal, they integrate all its virtues into themselves; inasmuch as the totem animal is the ancestor of the tribe, they integrate all the qualities that originally made the tribe. The original ancestors created the tribe by transforming into the first men and women of the tribe—the original idea of creation being not creation out of nothing, but transformation. As if in Genesis, instead of creating heaven and earth, God in the beginning transformed himself into heaven and earth. We still have a trace of that primitive idea in a classical text of the time of Alexandria, the so-called *tabula smaragdina*, the emerald table. The story is that in the grave of Hermes the Thrice Greatest, a tablet of emerald was found, upon which a text was engraved saying that the world was created in the beginning through adaptation. This is a very peculiar

idea. Adaptation means to fit one thing to another, or to shape a thing into an image; one adapts a thing to oneself or to a certain use. For instance, the idea that God has created man in his image is adaptation.

Now if God creates an image of himself, what is the difference? Since this image represents the deity, then if it is a living image, it is the deity. It is the face of the deity, the Angel of the Face. That is man, and since the Angel of the Face is God's power and virtue itself, man is that also; he is made in the image of God, created through adaptation. In the text of the *tabula smaragdina*, the whole world is made in the image of God, so the world represents God, is God, is the imaginable, perceptible, understandable, accessible God. Therefore the world is essentially round because God is round, perfect. It is said in Genesis that God himself was satisfied with the state of affairs, which means that it was perfect, like his image—except on the second day. Then he created the two things—there he made a split in the world, and he did not say it was good. The same idea is in the Old Zarathustrian religion, where the fatal split between Ormazd and Ahriman comes from a doubt, or a doubtful thought, in the divine mind, so it was perhaps due to that Persian influence. However that was, we have the incontestable fact that the *binarius* which God created on the second day never quite pleased him. I didn't find that out—an old alchemist wrote a long article about it.² That is only in parenthesis however. I wanted to give you a history of this peculiar statement that there is a sort of unconscious continuation of the problem of the descent of the Holy Ghost in the Acts of the Apostles. That idea continued. It remained as an open question which has never been properly answered, and it is quite understandable why it could not have been answered.

Mrs. Jung: The faith in the efficiency of the Holy Ghost seems not to have been very great, because the *character indelebilis* is not extended to the priest as a human person, but only in as far as he is a priest. If the Holy Ghost was really efficient, the whole person should be influenced by it.

Prof. Jung: It should be, but it is not.

Mrs. Jung: If it is believed to be real then its effect also ought to be real.

Prof. Jung: Absolutely, but you see it was altogether too obvious that the *character indelebilis* did not show in the person. Therefore that

² The second created thing introduced distinction (thus consciousness, in Jung's system) into what had been serenely single. This point was made by Gerhard Dorn, a 16th-century German alchemical physician whose writings are collected in *Theatrum Chemicum* (Strasbourg, 1659).

thought could not be pursued—it was impossible. Even with the Apostolic blessing it was not believable that those old bishops were divine. Well, of course man was never divine, as people understood divinity.

Miss Wolff: When the Pope took on his character of infallibility, did he connect it with that idea of the Holy Ghost?

Prof. Jung: Oh, quite. The infallibility of the Pope is exactly the same as the *character indelebilis*, only very much more so. A priest would not be able through his *character indelebilis* to establish a dogma, while the Pope, being the immediate successor of St. Peter, being in the place of the Lord—not as a human being mind you, but *in officio*—is filled with the Holy Spirit. He is a sort of incarnation of the Holy Spirit, so he *can* establish a dogma.

Miss Wolff: Is he only infallible in establishing the dogma?

Prof. Jung: Yes, only in this function is he infallible; as the head of the Collegium of the cardinals he can establish a dogma by his ultimate decision. But not even as the Pope has he an infallible character.

Miss Wolff: I would like to ask, in connection with Mrs. Jung's question: is not a priest supposed to be dead as a human being? Therefore his human side would not come into consideration. I mean, his human character is not important for the priest: he is sort of dead as a human being; so of course those prerogatives would not extend to his humanity, which is unimportant.

Prof. Jung: That is perfectly true. His humanity is in a way completely unimportant if he is looked at as a priest. But if he is a rascal, then where does his *character indelebilis* show?

Miss Wolff: He can be excommunicated.

Prof. Jung: Naturally, on account of his fallible humanity which is not touched by the *character indelebilis* of his priesthood. But one would expect that it would be touched if the *character indelebilis* really exists, and that was the original assumption. It was so much the assumption that Tertullian was convinced that a man who had received baptism could not sin any more, and if he did sin again, one should find out whether he had been baptized in the correct way. And even if one could not detect a fault, one should repeat the rite. Then if he sinned again he was lost, meant for eternal hell: then God simply had not allowed the rite of baptism to work in that case.

Mrs. Jung: I think the fact that a priest has to confess shows that they are considered as human beings; if they were considered non-existent as human beings, they would not have to confess.

Prof. Jung: Yes, even the Pope has a confessor. You have just read in the papers about the Pope's last confession. On the one side the Pope

is a human being, and on the other side a priest, and he has that divine character in the highest degree because, besides the consecration as a priest, he is the representative of the Lord.

Mrs. Flower: Is the Holy Ghost transferred by the laying on of hands in the ceremony?

Prof. Jung: Yes, in the consecration of the priest, the bishop conveys the Apostolic blessing by laying on his hands. The mana goes through the hand, as Christ conveyed the divine mana by his hands. That also is a prerogative of the bishop; the priest cannot convey it. The bishop is supposed to contain more mana. Those are very primitive ideas and therefore peculiarly right.

Mrs. Crowley: When they made this separation between the office of the priest and his human side, is it not like the doubt in the deity's mind when he separated heaven and earth?

Prof. Jung: It is of course that psychologically, but the church has no intention of creating a dissociation between the priest's human character and his divinity. Experience shows, however, that there is a most regrettable little gap between the two, which of course has to do with the fact that God created the *binarius*, the two, that split which he did not call good. Perhaps he thought, "Now I am not quite certain whether that is right." The original Persian idea was that he himself was not quite certain whether the dogma would be a favorable one.

Well now, here Nietzsche fulfils, one could say, an unconscious expectation, for time and again in the Middle Ages that idea of the Holy Ghost played a very great role. Do you know where?

Mrs. Flower: With the Albigenses?

Prof. Jung: Yes, the Albigenses assumed that the descent of the Holy Ghost was the active religious principle, but that standpoint was not elaborated by the church.³ Yet in the Middle Ages they already began to speak of the Kingdom of the Father representing the Old Testament, the Kingdom of the Son representing the New Testament, and the third Reich was the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost. This is the mystical hook in that term which catches on—that the third Reich is the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost. Unfortunately the Holy Ghost has the wind quality; it is a thawing wind, it is *pneuma*. Therefore a mighty wind filled the house at the time of the descent of the Holy Ghost. But it can have two aspects: the wind quality which is external, physical, and then it is a kingdom where the wind-god rules, a god of breath and

³ The Albigenses were members of a Catharistic sect of southern France (Albi) in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries.

wind; or it may be the spirit within. And it is possible that the two things happen at the same time, that the one is a reaction against the other. The outside very often instigates the creation of the inside; the unfavorable external aspect can produce a reaction which contains the real meaning, or the meaningful thing, while the externals are utterly mistakable. That again explains something which quite decidedly belongs to this part. We are now coming to part 12, where the argument we have begun is continued: we are in the channel of Nietzsche's own thought.

O my brethren, I consecrate you and point you to a new nobility: . . .

He is bestowing consecration upon all his imaginary disciples, his brethren. That he consecrates them means that he bestows the Apostolic blessing upon them, that he is in possession of the Holy Ghost or the Apostolic blessing originally received from Christ himself, and he thereby points them to a new nobility.

ye shall become procreators and cultivators and sowers of the future;—

He is sending them out into the world, as Christ also said to go out into the world and preach the Evangsels.

—Verily, not to a nobility which ye could purchase like traders with traders' gold; for little worth is all that hath its price.

Let it not be your honour thenceforth whence ye come, but whither ye go! Your Will and your feet which seek to surpass you—let these be your new honour!

It is clear from the text that he understands their new character as a will for the future, that the gold which is to be attained gives them their nobility. The task which he sets them, and the goal, is the mana. So it is not because they have received a certain character from the past: it is rather the task assigned to them which gives them their meaning and their goal. In other words, it doesn't matter who you are, provided that your goal is so-and-so; that you want to attain such-and-such a goal gives you character, not what you are but what you are looking for. Of course that is a very important point of view. It is really true that an individual is not only characterized by what he was originally, by birth and by inherited disposition; he is also that which he is seeking. His goal characterizes him—but not exclusively. For you sometimes set a task for yourself which is merely compensatory for what you are in

reality. It is not an entirely valid goal inasmuch as your original disposition is not valid under all conditions. Your own condition may be at fault—you may have a very faulty disposition. Any human disposition is somewhat imperfect, and the more it is imperfect, the more you will seek a goal of perfection which compensates your defect. But then the goal is equally faulty. Then the goal doesn't coincide with the goals of other people, and under those conditions you really don't collaborate with them.

For instance, a generous character with a certain tendency to wastefulness naturally will seek economy. And a thrifty person, or somebody who suffers from self-inflicted poverty, naturally will seek riches. Now how do those two goals coincide? Therefore it is by no means indifferent where you come from or what you were originally. It depends very much upon whether you start from a basis which in itself is solid or healthy, or whether you start from a faulty basis. Also when you say, *my* goal is so-and-so, you are perhaps using a sort of slogan, and I don't know what kind of goal it may be. And it doesn't mean that you are the one who is going to attain that goal, or that you are even the one who will work for it in a satisfactory way. With all doing there is always the question, "*Who* is doing it? *Who* is the man who is so willing to accept responsibility?"⁴ [. . .]

Here again Nietzsche simply swings over to the other side. He thinks a man is sanctified, almost deified, by the great goal he has in mind. But he might be a miserable fool who never could attain to such a goal, who has such a goal only because he is a fool. Of course you may say, "We have no goal, we go nowhere, but we have quality, we have character," and that is no good either. You must have the two things: you must have quality, virtue, efficiency, *and* a goal, for what is the good of the qualities if they don't serve a certain end? But Nietzsche simply swings over to the other extreme by the complete denial of all past values, of all the truth of the past, as if he were going to establish brand new ideas, as if there had never been any past worth mentioning. In that way he would create people who forgot all about themselves. They would now be quite different, as they never had been before—entirely new beings, capable of very great accomplishment. As if that were possible! A goal can only be realized *if* there is the stuff by which and through which you can realize the goal. If the stuff upon which you work is worth nothing, you cannot bring about your end. Now in the third paragraph further on, he says.

⁴ Here there is an excision of a repeated anecdote.

Nor even that a Spirit called Holy, led your forefathers into promised lands, which I do not praise: for where the worst of all trees grew—the cross,—in that land there is nothing to praise!

He is obviously referring to the crusades to the Holy Land.

And verily, wherever this “Holy Spirit” led its knights, always in such campaigns did—goats and geese, and wry-heads and guy-heads run *foremost!*—

Here he mentions the Holy Ghost, so we were following his underlying idea. Nietzsche usually realizes slowly, in subsequent paragraphs, what has been underlying before. It slowly rises to the surface, and if you are shrewd enough you can guess what is welling up from what lies underneath. So now he cannot help remembering the Holy Spirit and how close he is to the symbolism of Christianity. But in contradistinction to the Holy Ghost that in the past led the forefathers to the cross, Nietzsche’s teaching would of course have a different end in view; his great goal is the creation of the superman—whatever the superman may be. Now what is the goal of Christianity? Is it really the cross—if you take it historically, not morally? Of course our theology tells us that the Holy Ghost led us to the cross, but that is only a partial truth. Christ did not mean that. He did not leave his Comforter in order to bring us to the cross.

Mrs. Sachs: He meant to find the Kingdom of God.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the early Christian idea was that we were all going forward into the Kingdom of God, not to the cross at all. That is a later, moralistic misunderstanding. The original Christian message was that the kingdom of God was coming near and that we were all making ready for it, so it was also a goal, and decidedly a social goal in the near future. Of course it was meant spiritually, yet it had its social aspects: it was a community of the saints, a wonderful condition in which all conflicts would be settled. The Superman is very much the same idea, a sort of redeemed man living in an entirely new spiritual condition. So Nietzsche’s idea is not so different, but is simply another word for the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom of God; it is now the kingdom of man, but the Superman, a god-man, no longer the ordinary man. Then just before, he says something quite interesting which we passed over: “Your Will and your feet which seek to surpass you—let these be your new honour!” (third verse of part 12). What does that mean?

Mrs. Brunner: He alludes again to the concept of jumping over the primitive man.

Prof. Jung: Well, one should always make a vivid image of his metaphors, and what strikes one here is the will. Now where is the will?

Mrs. Crowley: In the head.

Prof. Jung: Yes, the will starts in the head because there is no will that is not a thought: one has always a goal, an end in mind. The will is a thoroughly conscious phenomenon. Then the feet are the other end, and something is in between.

Miss Hannah: The body.

Remark: The heart.

Prof. Jung: The whole body: the heart is only one of the series of chakras which are in between. So you are to go further with the head and the feet, and they are supposed to surpass you. But that would mean that your head might fly off your shoulders, rise up higher than your body, and your feet also. Your feet walk away with you and your head too, and whatever is between, the whole man practically, is perhaps carried—he doesn't know what happens to him, probably he is just left in the rear to rot away. It is an ugly metaphor. I should call it a schizophrenic metaphor, a dissociation. It is as if the will had liberated itself from the body, and the feet had dissociated themselves from the body and were now going away by themselves: they detach themselves and rise above you, and everything else is left in the rear. So the thing that arrives in the land of the superman is nothing but a head and two feet, just a head walking along. That is terribly grotesque. It looks as if there would be plenty of opportunity in such a kingdom of heaven for marching, feet walking about with nothing but heads above them. But how did things begin in Germany? With marching about. And they are all possessed by a will—will and feet: every other consideration had disappeared. This is really an extraordinary metaphor. It is a sort of abbreviated sign of man, a hieroglyph.

Mr. Bash: There is an interesting parallel to that in James Branch Cabell's *Figures of Earth*, in the peculiar way in which Dom Manuel serves Misery for thirty days in the forest.⁵ Misery is simply a head which moves about, so it may be considered as having feet. And each of the thirty days is as a year to him, but he stays there in order to win from Misery the soul of the person he loved, to recover it again from Hades.

Prof. Jung: That is quite apt symbolism for misery, because the heart

⁵ James Branch Cabell (1879-1958) a satirical, ironical American novelist, published *Figures of Earth* (1921) two years after his best known work, *Jungen*, which created a furor over its open sexuality.

of the body is absolutely left out of the game. And if you go by your will you only get into a miserable condition, because the man doesn't follow. He is left behind, really surpassed.

Mrs. Crowley: It is also prophetic in another way if you think of the machinery, flying, etc.—nobody walks any more.

Prof. Jung: Oh, but these do. They can't drive in automobiles because they have none. Now we go on (ninth verse of part 12):

O my brethren, not backward shall your nobility gaze, but *outward!* Exiles shall ye be from all fatherlands and forefather-lands.

That will happen, they will be uprooted. For it is the body, the feeling, the instincts, which connect us with the soil. If you give up the past you naturally detach from the past; you lose your roots in the soil, your connection with the totem ancestors that dwell in your soil. You turn outward and drift away, and try to conquer other lands because you are exiled from your own soil. That is inevitable. The feet will walk away and the head cannot retain them because it also is looking out for something. That is the Will, always wandering over the surface of the earth, always seeking something. It is exactly what Mountain Lake, the Pueblo chief, said to me, "The Americans are quite crazy. They are always seeking; we don't know what they are looking for." Well, there is too much head and so there is too much will, too much walking about, and nothing rooted.

Miss Hannah: I quite agree with the negative side, but could not the passage also have a positive meaning? We said last time that the new nobility were people who had stepped off the wheel and brought their Samskaras to an end. Are not such people able to dispense with looking back at the ancestral ways, for are they not in the mandala and able to look out on all the four sides through the gates of the four functions?

Prof. Jung: Of course that is the way Nietzsche understood it, but we are further away from him and we cannot help looking at it from the standpoint of subsequent events. Looked at from the standpoint of Germany as it was in those days, one understands that they really suffered from the weight of the past. Naturally they would begin to think: "If only there were a new wind somewhere that would blow away all that old dust so that we can move and breathe again." They would get the *Wandertrieb*,⁶ would feel that they ought to get out of that leaden weight of the past and of tradition. But one cannot preach it one-sid-

⁶ *Wandertrieb*: the impulse to wander, wanderlust.

edly. If one goes too far, if one loses too much connection with the past, one loses connection with one's ancestors.

Mrs. Jung: Dr. Heyer made a very good point in this connection when he spoke in his Ascona lecture of all this marching and trampling of the earth in order to get rid of the mother.⁷ I think that also means the past.

Prof. Jung: Quite. There is decidedly an attempt to get rid of the weight of the earth—the spirit of gravity, as Nietzsche calls it—and that is absolutely justifiable as long as the weight rules, as long as one is really suppressed. But if you move so far away that you forget about the past, you lose the connection.

Mrs. Flower: This new analysis gives a frightful picture of what is going on in Germany, in being only one-sided when trying to get rid of the past.

Prof. Jung: Russia is a still better example. Russia was entirely suppressed by the past, suffering under an enormous weight of old traditions, so there was the desire to make their way through it, to move on, but then it all became one-sided. That is the terrible danger of unconsciousness. As soon as you get rid of one evil, you fall into another, from the fire into the water and from the water into the fire. If you could only hold on and see the two sides! If you want to get rid of a certain Christian tradition, try to understand what Christianity really is in order to get the true value—perhaps you may return to the true value of Christianity. Or if you move on farther, don't say that Christianity has been all wrong. It is only that we have had the wrong idea of it. To destroy all tradition, as has happened already in Spain and Russia and is about to happen in several other places, is a most regrettable mistake. And that is expressed by the head which walks with two feet and nothing between. Nietzsche says, "Exiles shall ye be from all fatherlands and forefather-lands!" For how can you be connected with the chthonic gods, how can you be connected with your blood, your soil, if you are uprooted from it all? The past is really the earth; all the past has sunk into the earth, as those primitives say. The ancestors, the *alcheringa* people, went underground and their people must remain there, because there they can contact them and only there, nowhere else. That is such a truth to them that they can't even dream of taking another country, because they would lose touch with the spirits and be injured. The women would get the wrong ancestor spirits and then the

⁷ G. R. Heyer, a German neurologist, lectured on "The Great Mother in the Psyche of Modern Man" at the Eranos Conference in 1938.

children would have the wrong souls. They cannot live in the country of another tribe—it is absolutely impossible. They can only live where their totem ancestors have gone underground. That is an eternal truth, and whoever goes against it, gets the wrong ancestral souls, wrong influences; they get detached, they lose their instincts, and their civilization becomes strained and unnatural. They suffer from a pronounced dissociation between the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious is with the ancestors down in the bowels of the earth, and their consciousness is a head on two feet, constantly marching about in an awful restlessness. That is the restlessness of our time, always seeking—seeking the lost ancestral body, seeking the ancestral instincts. But they are only to be found on the spot where they have gone underground.

Mrs. Crowley: In the myth of the hero, is it not one of his functions to assimilate his ancestors?

Prof. Jung: The real hero is swallowed by the earth—the mother, the dragon, the whale—and apparently he goes under, down to the totemic ancestors, but he returns with them and brings them back. That is the proper hero according to mythology, not the one who runs away with a will and two feet. Now he says.

Your *children's land* shall ye love: let this love be your new nobility,—the undiscovered in the remotest seas! For it do I bid your sails search and search!⁸

He directs his disciples into the greater distances, as far away as possible from their origins. And not for themselves should they seek that land, but for their children, which is worse still. You see, in a country like England, where people have had a very sound egotism and where each generation has sought to increase their wealth and comfort, they left very decent conditions to their offspring. But if they had run after all the countries in the world and deposited themselves there, what would have been left to the children? Nothing. When you neglect your own welfare in seeking the welfare of the children, you leave the children a bad inheritance, a very bad impression of the past. If you torture yourself in order to produce something for the children, you give them the picture of a tortured life. Therefore away with all that. It is all wrong, says the child, and it commits the other mistake. If you are always preparing for the happiness of the children, you don't know

⁸ Jung's final citation from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is from section 56 of Part III. Four other sections from this part and all of Part IV remain without his commentary.

how to look after your own happiness, nor do your children learn how to look after theirs. They in turn may go on to prepare for the happiness of your grandchildren, and the grandchildren for your great-grandchildren, and so happiness is always somewhere in the future. You think happiness is something to be attained in the future, that you cannot attain it, but your children will have it. So you fill your life with ambitions for that kingdom to come and it never comes. Every generation is doing something towards it. They all torture themselves in order that the children shall attain it, but the children grow up and are the same fools that we are. They receive the same evil teaching.

Try to make it here and now, for yourself. That is good teaching. Then the children will try to make it here and now for themselves—then it can come into the real world. Don't be unnatural and seek happiness in the next generations. If you are too concerned about your children and grandchildren, you simply burden them with the debts you have contracted. While if you contract no debts, if you live simply and make yourselves as happy as possible, you leave the best of conditions to your children. At all events, you leave a good example of how to take care of themselves. If the parents can take care of themselves, the children will also. They will not be looking for the happiness of the grandchildren, but will do what is necessary to have a reasonable amount of happiness themselves. And so when a whole nation is torturing itself for the sake of the children, an inheritance of misery is all that they leave for the future, a sort of unfulfilled promise. So instead of saying, "I do it for the children—it may come off in the future," try to do it for yourself here and now. Then you will see whether it is possible or not. If you postpone it for the children, you leave something which you have not dared to fulfil, or perhaps you were too stupid to fulfil it; or if you had tried to fulfil it you might have seen that it was impossible, or all nonsense anyhow. While if you leave it to the future you leave less than nothing to the children—only a bad example.

REFERENCES TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF *THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA* BY CHAPTER

Part I

Prologue	3
----------	---

CHAPTER

1 The Three Metamorphoses	254
2 The Academic Chairs of Virtue	274
3 Backworldsmen	286
4 The Despisers of the Body	359
5 Joys and Passions	424
6 The Pale Criminal	450
7 Reading and Writing	489
8 The Tree on the Hill	514
9 The Preachers of Death	540
10 War and Warriors	553
11 The New Idol	572
12 The Flies in the Market-place	601
13 Chastity	619
14 The Friend	626
15 The Thousand and One Goals	638
16 Neighbour-Love	685
17 The Way of the Creating One	703
18 Old and Young Women	725
19 The Bite of the Adder	748
20 Child and Marriage	769
21 Voluntary Death	775
22 The Bestowing Virtue	786

Part II

23 The Child with the Mirror	844
24 In the Happy Isles	861
25 The Pitiful	955

INDEX

CHAPTER

26	The Priests	1005
27	The Virtuous	1040
28	The Rabble	1057
29	The Tarantulas	1075
30	The Famous Wise Ones	1116
31	The Night-Song	1142
32	The Dance-Song	1151
33	The Grave-Song	1175
34	Self-Surpassing	1210
35	The Sublime Ones	*
36	The Land of Culture	*
37	Immaculate Perception	*
38	Scholars	*
39	Poets	*
40	Great Events	1215
41	The Soothsayer	1224
42	Redemption	1231
43	Manly Prudence	1243
44	The Stillest Hour	1243

Part III

45	The Wanderer	1251
46	The Vision and the Enigma, part 1, part 2,	1256 1264
47	Involuntary Bliss	1311
48	Before Sunrise	1319
49	The Bedwarfing Virtue	1339
50	On the Olive-Mount	*
51	On Passing-by	1386
52	The Apostates	1422
53	The Return Home	1422
54	The Three Evil Things	1424
55	The Spirit of Gravity	1463
56	Old and New Tables	1483
57-80		**

* Chapters 35-39 and 50 are passed over by Jung.

** The seminars ended at the discussion of chapter 56, part 13.

INDEX

- Aargau, Canton of, 181
 Abegg, Emile, 4n, 1306
 Abraham, 1246, 1327
 Abu Simbel, temple of, 936
 Abudabad, 157
 Accidents as punishments, 713-15
 Acropolis, 756, 1523
 Action, symbolic, 91, 109
 Actor of roles, 1348-49
 Adam, 105, 1418, 1423, 1440; and Eve, 1418; Cadmon, 1180; Primus, 1180
 Adaptation, 1497-98, 1517, 1533
 Adler, Alfred, xi, 1211, 1451
 Aeneas, 1397
 Aetna, Mt., 1217
 Aetoi, 35
 Affect, 1193, 1379. *See also* Emotion
 Africa: Christianity in, 1530; dance, 46; and the dead, 176, 1191; myth of death, 1246; initiation rites, 1524; soul as serpent, 756-57
 Agathodaimon, 1295, 1300, 1310
 Agrippa von Nettesheim, 907
 Ahriman, 7, 190n, 1086, 1095, 1368-69, 1534
 Ahura Mazda, 6-9, 492-93. *See also* Ormuzd
 Aion, 1282
 Aischrologia, 953, 1283
 Ajna chakra, 253, 257, 1375
 Alberich, 868
 Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great), 243, 1050
 Albigenses, 1536
 Albrecht, King, 241
 Alchemy, 64, 167, 204, 243, 480, 653, 949, 1104, 1260, 1407, 1413; aim, 105-6, 444-45, 522, 549, 653; vision of Aris-leus, 1448-49, 1485-88; Avicenna, 1413; *Cabala Chymica*, 311; problem of chaos, 105, 1400, 1404-10, 1418; relation to Christianity, 1048; *Chymical Marriage of Christian Rosenkreutz*, 312; colors in, 547; eagle and toad, 967, 1413, 1419; fire, heat (*see also* Aris-leus), 1067-68, 1079, 1486; Goethe and, 893-95; gold in, 444-45, 796, 1073, 1223; Her-foretus (Harpocrates), 853; hermaphrodite in, 533; and lead, 1260; *materia*, 1046, 1073; Middle Ages, 311-12; old man in, 308; *ouroboros*, 1286; *prima materia*, 886, 954, 1046; projection in, 1496; three roses, 888; spirit, 1067; stone, 949; use of symbol, 1248-49; tri-angle, trinity, 1079, 1085; *vas Hermeti-cus*, 1085, 1086; water, 1079. *See also* Hermetic philosophy, Philosopher's stone
 Alcheringa, 1266, 1522, 1528-30, 1531, 1542
 Alcohol, 1039
 Alexandria, 1533
 Allah, 7, 369
 Alphonse of Spain, 643
 Altjiranga. *See* Alcheringa
 Altruists, 1146
 Alypius, 685
 Ambrose, St., 879, 1049
 Amenhotep IV, 252, 794, 1405
 Amesha spentas, 9
 Amfortas, 854, 866
 Amor fati, 87, 275
 Anahata, 394, 395
 Analysis, 66-67, 84-85, 100, 106, 468, 486, 742, 758, 763, 1184, 1357, 1360; danger of, 278-79, 476; dreams in, 1302, 1411, 1430-31; problems in, 497-98; process of, 955-56, 1358; tech-nique, 1320, 1321
 Analyst, 1087; neurosis of, 154, 618; task of, 708, 1358
 Analytical psychology, 329
 Ancestors, 1530, 1541, 1542; represented by snakes, 1282
 Ancestral life, 941-42; spirits, 160; units, 643, 1267-68, 1399-1403, 1404

Anchorite, 177, 952, 969. *See also* Hermits, Old wise man
 Andreä, Joh. Valentin, 312
 Andromeda, 264
 Anecdotes: alcoholism convention, 687;
 black lad and rice, 1192; boys who ate toads, 1502; Christ as grasshopper, 1530; the Church and books, 1510; clergyman who could not be alone, 799; clergymen's children, 1096; Columbus, 1122; crosses in Aztec civilization, 704; divorce, 268; doctor who cured patients by spirits, 164-65; Edison and the first phonograph, 1222; elves and the Lord's Prayer, 1181; Empedocles, 1217; Forel and abstinence, 1270; God and dirt, 261; he who loves or hates God, 72; hermit, 1124; hippopotamus, 686; initiation in Masonic lodge, 462; insane man and mosquitoes, 641; Jung in India, 1276; Jung's mother and telephones, 589-90; Jung's students, 85; Lutheran pastor, 261-62; man in termite tree, 1500; man who jumped gate out of fear, 1500; man who wished to look into soul of saint, 1097; Marabout in Africa, 46-47; Middle Ages, 354, 656, 1122; Negro woman and banana heap, 406; Nietzsche and student, 1361-62; Nietzsche in Italy, 628; Pan, 36, 1405; patients who won't listen, 1499; phonograph record of wife's voice, 1416-17; pigs in the trees, 642; Plato's parable of horses, 846; Primitives, 272, 663-64; prisoner of war in Celebes, 454; unwilling prisoner, 947; professor at funeral, 1219; rabbi and count, 298-99; rain-maker of Kiau Tschou, 824-25; rooster who laid an egg, 1467; Schopenhauer, 346-47, 857, 1268; Schreber's dissociation, 364; sleepless man in debt, 338; Society for Prevention of Immorality, 545, 1389; sorcerer who drove out ghost, 180; spider, 1085-86; starved children, 763; talkative woman, 220-21; Tao, 1374; telepathic dream, 316; ultra-sociable man, 698; Zen and consciousness, 1290; Zola and the priest, 1010

Anempfindung, 317
 Angel of the Face, 7, 319, 369, 1531, 1534
 Angrö Mainyush, 7-8, 492-93. *See also* *Ahriman*
 Anima, 28, 31, 155, 167, 264, 394-95, 522, 597, 621, 726-32, 734-46, 750-51, 944, 1048, 1152, 1156, 1167, 1171-72, 1178, 1185, 1231-32, 1247, 1265, 1380, 1393, 1418; animus of, 731; breath of life, 442; caught by, 166; depreciation of, 632; identification with, 529-30, 741-42, 857, 864-65, 1153; and individuation, 742; as inferior function, 162-63; inflation, 296; mother and, 1157, 1160; myth of Leto, 887; old wise man and, 530-33; plurality of, 1156, 1164; possession, 731, 1349-50; projection, 1168; separating from, 221; shadow and, 622, 626, 1163-64, 1185-88; snake and, 748, 750, 754, 756; symbol, 871; and transference, 726-27; as trap, 755
Anima mundi, 1401
 Animal, 180, 640-42, 915-16, 935-36, 938, 966; attributes of gods, 1393, 1523; in dreams, 896, 1411-12; as instincts, 17, 168; life, 516, 1398; living with one's own, 546, 1471-73; plant life and, 515-16, 519-21, 1399, 1434-36; in rites (theriomorphic), 35; totem, 1436, 1467, 1523, 1533; wisdom of nature and, 1393. *See also* Ape, Ass, Camel, Cow, Dog, Elephant, Hippopotamus, Hyena, Lion, Rhinoceros, Wolf
 Animism, 1496
 Animus, 155, 167, 522, 727-32, 734-46, 1170-72, 1231, 1265, 1380; of anima, 731; from father, 1157; identification with, 295-96; as multiple, 1156; pneuma, 441-42; possession, 220-21, 731, 1349-50; Projection, 1168; in woman's conscious, 871
 Annunciation, 888
 Anoia, 936, 959
 Anselm of Canterbury, 1352
 Antaeus, 1283
 Anthony, St., 1123, 1235, 1267
 Anthropos, 305, 722, 1180
 Anthropophagus, 170, 175-76
 Antichrist, 12-13, 868

- Antinomies, 393
 Antinomist, 200n, 267-69
 Antioch, chalice of, 1439
Anuradhapura, 1443
 Ape, monkey, 1392-94
 Apepi, the serpent, 1285
 Aphrodite. *See* Venus
 Apocalypse, 1386. *See also* Bamberger
 Apocrypha, 218n, 464, 464n, 493n, 1032, 1326
Apokatastasis, 265, 1341, 1355, 1355n, 1377
 Apollo, xiii, 898-99
 Apollonian, 143, 144n
 Apollonius of Tyana, 546, 653, 1086
 Apostolic succession, 1532, 1537
 Apotropaic actions, 1083, 1270
 Apuleius, 1159
Aqua divina, 1486
 Aquarius, 372, 375, 376, 377, 420, 421, 423, 500
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 243n
Arabian Nights, 640
 Archetypal experience, 297-98, 968-77;
 in children, 1203; images, 670, 1202-4;
 Situations, 22-23, 240-41, 298, 977
 Archetype, xix, 21, 22, 27, 29, 161, 284, 315, 380, 611, 614, 970, 971, 977, 1171, 1342-43, 1449; based on animals, 1393; constellation of, 22-23, 31, 178, 532, 753; identification with, 27, 215, 221, 231, 240-41, 284, 702; possession (*see also* Anima, Animus), 163, 1343, 1357; self and, 150-55
 LIST OF ARCHETYPES—ego consciousness, 161; fool, jester, clown (*see also* Buf-foon), 163; ford, 22-23, 241, 977; Lo-gos, 759; medicine man, 313; monster, 977; mother, 166-67; old wise man, 163; pass, 22, 977; plant life, 516; re-birth, 54; psychopompos, 204; of Sex-uality, 754; tree of life, 518-21. *See also* Anima, Animus, Old wise man
 Architecture: Egyptian, 948, 950, 1100; Greek, 948; Norman and Gothic, 948, 1109-10
 Aris-leus, vision of, 1448-49, 1485-86
 Aristotle, 88n, 833
 Arius, Arian, Arianism, 97, 98n, 902
Arktoi, 35
 Arnold, Eberhard, 324
 Art: symbolic, 461; psychology of, 667
 Artemis of Ephesus, 35
 Artist, 947-49; anonymous, 655; creative process and, 57-58, 60, 73; as Prophet, 225. *See also* Creative force, man
Asonakes, 305
 Ass, 1492. *See also* Body
 Assimilation, 1518-19. *See also* Projection
Assur-bani-pal, 247
 Astarte, 400, 1158, 1160, 1490; pond of, 1169, 1352, 1496, 1519
 Astrology, 75, 374-77, 670, 1352, 1496, 1519
Asura, 6
 Athanasius, 951, 968, 969, 1059, 1268
 Atheist, 40, 54, 72, 95, 96, 122, 1011
 Athens, 756, 1522
Athla, 1252
L'Atlantide. *See* Benoit, Pierre
 Atlantis, 860
 Atlas, 1397
Atman, 64, 65n, 75n, 151, 152, 327n, 391-99, 428, 792, 1313, 1314, 1383
 Atom, and psychology, 244-45, 415
 Attis, cult of, 157, 160, 1252, 1397
 Attitudes, 28n. *See also* Extravert, Intro-version
 Augustine, St., 42, 50-51, 685-86, 830, 952, 1048, 1059, 1070, 1308
 Augustus, Emperor, 1440, 1519
 Australian primitives, 431, 675, 1235, 1266, 1522n; Churingas and, 1235
Autogenes, 722
 Avicenna, 967, 1413
Avidya, 1315, 1363
 Aztec civilization, 704
 Babylon, Babylonians, 207, 1405, 1428
 Bacchus, Bakcheus, 35, 1166, 1440. *See also* Dionysos
 Bach, Johann Sebastian, 656, 1396-97
 Bachofen, Johann, 1301
 Backworldsmen (*Hinterwelter*), 286
 Bad. *See* Evil; Good, and evil, Spirits
 Baghdad, 1026
 Ball, golden (*pelota*), 107, 781-86, 792, 794, 1417
 Bamberger, Fritz, 123

INDEX

- Baptism, 80, 657, 959, 1252, 1486, 1535
 Barabbas, 719, 782
 Bardo life, 1203, 1204
 Barrie, Sir James, 1152
 Barth, Karl, 293, 346, 832, 880, 1017
 Basel, 16, 162, 1359, 1467; Cathedral, 1445
 Basilius the Great, 1049, 1050n
 Basra, 184, 1031
 Baudouin, Charles, 272n
 Bears. *See* *Arktoi*; Berne, the bear of
 Beauty, 118
 Beethoven, 144n
 Behemoth. *See* Monster
 Belief, 837-38, 849, 850, 929-30, 1352;
 herd instinct, 909; in oneself, 605; vs.
 knowledge and experience, 294-95
 Belur Mutt, temple of, 1373
 Benoit, Pierre, 634, 635n, 1178
 Berne, the bear of, 1467
 Bergson, H., xi
 Beroalde de Verville. *See* *Songe de Poli-
 phile*
 Besançon codex, 439
 Besant, Annie, 634
 Bethlehem, 160
 Bethmann Hollweg, Theodore von, 813
 Beya, 1448-49
Bhagavad Gita, 93
 Bible: citations, 92n, 93n, 99, 265n, 367,
 400n, 724; as authority, 907. *See also*
 separate books
 Biedermeier period, 1155-56
Bildung, 101-2
Binarius, 1534, 1536
Bindu, 417, 794
 Birds, 186-87, 250, 429, 431; and Golden
 Egg, 471; man-birds, 1468-72; water-
 birds, 888. *See also* Dove, Eagle, Owl,
 Raven, Swan
 Bismarck, Otto von, 196, 1353-54
 Black, blackness, 377, 547, 1302. *See also*
 Mass, Black
 Blavatsky, Elena Petrovna, 653
 Bleuler, Eugen, 1270n
 Blond beast, 62, 142, 143n, 1460
 Blood, 495-99, 1379; poisoning, 607
 Blue, 547, 861, 1401
 Blumhardt, Pastor J. C., 261
 Boboli gardens, 948
 Böcklin, Arnold, 1192
Bodh Gaya, 1439
Bodhi, 1375, 1441
Bodhisattvas, 13, 97
 Body, the, 70, 82-85, 100, 169, 189-90,
 359, 396-403, 448-50, 800-801, 1174,
 1202; appreciation of, 110; as ass in sta-
 ble, 401-2; Christianity and, 85, 94,
 100, 177, 234, 399-403, 448, 952; con-
 sciousness and, 350, 967; diamond (*see*
 also Subtle body), 444-46, 1443; genetic
 influences on, 1399; individuation and,
 64, 202; inferior function and, 1149;
 inflation and, 1359; intuitives and, 168,
 354, 1391-92, 609, 808, 1082-83, 1141,
 1149, 1150, 1391-92; living, 360, 368,
 396, 1398; the metaphysical and, 342,
 351, 760; mortification of, 399; over-
 rating, 399; and psyche, 355; psychic
 disturbances of (*see also* Body, intuitives
 and), 195-98, 750, 808, 1039, 1055,
 1056, 1082, 1391-92; as restrictive,
 349; as revelation, 809; and self, 396-
 97, 405, 428; soul and, 142, 1423; spirit
 and, 62-71, 85, 100, 169-72, 177, 186,
 239, 251-52, 539-40, 807-9, 816-17,
 1066-67. *See also* Corpse, *Sarx*, Subtle
 body
 Boehme, Jakob, 292
 Bolshevism, 376
 Bonifazio (Boniface), St., 1102
Book of the Dead, 304, 1285, 1428
Book of John. *See* Mandaeen
Book of Krates, 1448, 1448n
Book of Wisdom, 875
 Borderline concept, 208, 413-14, 432
Bosheit, 864
 Brahman, 392-93, 413, 418, 988, 1406
 Brain, 250-51
Brausewind. *See* Wind
 Bread, 184, 832-33
 Breasted, James H., 1438n
 Breath, breathing, 361-62, 1423. *See also*
 Subtle body
 Brethren of the Free Spirit, 1103, 1487-
 88
 Breuer, Josef, 27n
Bridge of San Luis Rey, 412

- British colonial policy, 672-73
 Brünnhilde, 1153
 Brunner, August, 690
 Brunner, Emil, 346
 Buber, Martin, 128n, 223, 296
 Buddha, 212, 264, 732, 768-69, 783, 797, 1290, 1296, 1333, 1382, 1405, 1435, 1436, 1439, 1443, 1526; *Amitabha*, 13; birth of, 887; *Maitraya*, 13; Mara experience of, 1304; *Sakya Muni*, 13; tree of the, 527
 Buddhism, 41, 69, 76, 95, 97, 132, 264, 325, 819, 933, 1008, 1315, 1334, 1382-83, 1411, 1436, 1439; cosmogony, 693; Hinayana, 69, 97, 970; influence on West, 345; Mahayana, 97, 845, 883, 970; Pali canon, 1333; *Samyutta Nikaya*, 1436; Sangha, 1526; Tantric, 78n, 151-52, 326; wheel in, 1333
 Budge, Sir Wallis, 1404, 1428
Buddhi, 1363-64
 Buffoon, 112, 115, 122, 128, 129, 150, 156, 161, 162-63, 164, 204, 1112, 1387, 1392, 1394, 1421, 1468, 1505
 Buganda, 674
Bugari world, 431
Bugishu, 175-76
 Bull, 157, 1397, 1398. *See also* Mithras
Bundahish, 190, 1306
 Buonaiuti, Ernesto, 1024
 Burckhardt, Jakob, x, xi, 29, 30n, 94, 273, 274, 603, 612-13, 862, 1301, 1333, 1358, 1464
 Burghöltzli Hospital, xi
 Burial customs, 159-60, 175-76, 181, 190, 194
 Burton, Richard, 1398
 Butterfly, 1159, 1433
 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 1156

Cabala Chymica, 311
 Cabell, James B., 1540
 Caesarism, 1027
 Calvin, John, 832
 Camel, 7, 256, 258
 Campbell, Joseph, 190n
Candide, 91, 92n, 112. *See also* Voltaire
 Cannibalism, 1251
 Carlyle, Thomas, 911

 Case histories: diagnosis of inflammation of ventricle from a dream, 1411-12; father whose son had his dreams, 1495; girl with father complex, 316; girl with needle in neck, 332; girl with delusion of snake in abdomen, 297; infantry officer who had foot problems, 1302; insane man and phallus of sun, 242, 853; insane man and typhoid, 137-38, 513; insane man who identified with Mary, 863; insane man who thought himself invisible, 509-11; insane woman and language, 29; insane woman's telephone, 137, 513, 683; insanity case and young analyst, 279; intuitive who bathed under a sheet, 65; two Jesuses, 135; man with vision of crucifixion, 339; man who could not swallow, 195; man who identified with Pale Criminal, 463; memory of eighty, 247-48; man's skeleton, 195-96; neurotic who feared waiters, 559-60; Catholic woman who discovered moisture in the air, 294; woman who forgot her thoughts, 512; woman who had a child by her cousin, 720-28; woman who let Christ decide, 1494, 1499, 1509; woman who listened to the spirit, 1131; woman who needed a mirror, 1343-44; woman who was murderess, 490, 930-31; woman who was raped, 1057; woman who thought she had tuberculosis, 1057; woman whose glasses broke, 1190; woman with drawings, 542, 1407-9; woman with unexplained neurosis, 370
 Castration, 400
 Catacombs, 159
 Catholic. *See* Church
 Caves, grottos, 160, 1252
 Cecrops, 756, 1523
 Celebes, 454
 Cellini, Benvenuto, 650
 Coenesthesia, 542
 Cerebro-spinal system, 749, 1299, 1302, 1307, 1411, 1418, 1435, 1436
 Ceylon, 1333n, 1439, 1443
 Chain. *See* *Nidana* chain
 Chakras, 363, 393
Chakra-puja, 373

- Chalice. *See* Antioch, chalice of
- Chance, 126, 816-17, 821; vs. purpose, 127
- Chaos, 817, 823-25, 1400-1413
- Character indelebilis*, 1532-35
- Charcot, J. M., 27n
- Cheper, 1299
- Chi*, Platonic, 679
- Chidr, 7, 320, 369, 1029, 1531
- Child, children: attitude of, 1326; becoming like, 1325; dreams of, 1052, 1170, 1202, 1203-4, 1401, 1411; fulfilling parents, 941; inheritance, 1543; psychology, 935, 963, 990, 1327, 1388; as symbol, 270-71
- Chiliastic mood, 104
- China, Chinese, 77, 94, 233, 236, 244, 245, 367, 586-88, 597-98, 649, 797, 1080, 1374; dragon, 233, 793, 1055-56; symbolism, 793, 794. *See also* *I Ching*, Lao Tse, Rain-maker of Kiau Tschou, Tao, Yang and Yin
- Chinese Yoga, 444-45, 1055
- Chitta (citta)*, 1372
- Chou, Duke of, 875
- Christ, 12, 35, 42, 208, 212, 400, 442, 653, 657, 704, 721-22, 746-47, 788, 790, 940, 958, 970, 1032, 1166, 1180, 1296, 1326, 1486, 1525, 1532, 1536; in *Apocrypha*, 340; relation to Bacchus, 1440; baptism of, 53, 1533; birthplace, 160; as creator, 668; as criminal, 267, 282; and crucifixion, 158, 439-40, 439n, 443, 448, 455, 474, 998, 1252, 1304, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1402, 1439; death of, 779, 781-82, 998; deceiver, 185, 1033; at fifty, 507; Gnostic idea of, 656, 1031; as grasshopper, 1530; historical, 1026; identification with, 758; *Imitatio Christi*, 158-59, 199, 758; as Lamb, 1512, 1515-16; and the law, 1325; not a model, 767-68; new Apocryphal sayings, 217, 340, 995-96, 1033, 1068; relation to Orpheus, 1440; Osiris and, 208, 657, 1384-85; as *Poimen* (Shepherd), 1292; as *Puer Aeternus*, 889; sacrifice of, 158, 1371, 1506, 1515, 1517, 1519-20; as savior, 767, 952, 1165; as scapegoat, 472, 923; as Self, 95, 98, 265, 738, 985, 1383; as serpent, 1281, 1297, 1300, 1310-14, 1384; as Superman, 53; symbolic, 208, 212, 768; teachings of, 1030-31, 1488-89, 1532; temptation of, 722, 760, 767-69, 884; as wheat, 830, 1385; wound of, 854, 1014
- Christian, Christianity, 33, 41, 69, 161, 199, 259-60, 704, 759-60, 788, 791, 809, 901, 940, 952, 1008-14, 1530; ab-solution, 802; assimilation of, 1518-19, 1525; the body and, 85, 94, 100, 177, 235, 399-400, 809, 951, 952; and Bud-dhism, 768-69; decay of, 842; early, 182, 685, 830, 950, 1027, 1525-26; Eastern, 214; eternal return, 1341-42; and feminine principle, 1050; and Good and Evil, 919; ideal, 798; and Lamb, 1465; and love, 99, 100, 699-706, 992-93, 1473, 1477, 1478; and Mandala, 1384; and marriage, 1023, 1084, 1093; and metaphysics, 291; modern man and, 94-98; and morality, 1513; origins of, 34, 41; plant symbol-ism in, 1399; psychology appearing in anti-Christian way, 1513, 1515-16, 1524-25; socialism and, 1523; and the soul, 732; symbolism, 208, 796, 838; Zoroastrianism and, 9, 12, 34. *See also* Christ, Church, Protestantism
- Christian Science, 109
- Christmas and Christmas tree, 240, 520
- Chroshtag*, 306
- Chthonic, 18-19, 159, 227; powers through snake, 1282-85
- Church, 970, 993, 1000, 1006-18; as au-thoritarian, 260, 574
- Church, Protestant, 174, 199, 261, 289-90, 345, 539, 576, 593, 595, 880, 906, 1115, 1206; and God's Grace, 346; and inferior man, 1006-7; and the soul, 102. *See also* Protestantism
- Church, Roman Catholic, 41, 170, 174, 279-80, 345-46, 536, 576, 584, 593-94, 758, 833, 880, 909, 918, 959, 1011-14, 1016-17, 1049, 1115, 1116, 1351, 1370, 1385, 1490, 1510, 1532; attitude to dreams, 121, 1307; feminine principle in, 536, 1080, 1081; God's identity in,

- 907; imagination and, 1024-25; and inferior man, 1005-17, 1023-26; the Mass, 182, 1009; medieval, 159; origin of rites, 182; principle of evil and, 1080, 1082-84; and the soul, 102; teaching of Christ and, 1488-89, 1533; and the unconscious, 76-77, 96, 120-22
- Churingas*, 529, 1235
- Cinta mani*, 1441
- Circle, 153, 784, 1045, 1048, 1310, 1400, 1441, 1443, 1491; galactic, 1045; squaring of, 985, 1088, 1400, 1401. *See also* Mandala
- Circumambulatio*, 1045
- Cities, uniformity and, 660-61
- Civilization: and the shadow, 120; trends of, 372-80; widening of consciousness, 252. *See also* Modern movements
- Clement of Alexandria, 1062n
- Cleo de Merode, 616
- Clothing, men and women's, 658-61
- Cold, 1099, 1139, 1148
- "Collective unconscious," 14, 71, 102, 178, 206, 380, 391, 531, 554-56, 751, 932-33, 1029-30, 1356, 1404, 1409, 1418, 1431-32, 1517, 1528; *a priori*, 986-88; as Christ, 97; as dragon, 899; ideas in, 602-3, 605, 608, 611; identification with, 607, 639; Indian concepts of, 1363-64, 1372-75; in modern times (*see also* Modern movements), 812, 842, 1517; as people, 1360; synthesis of, 1430-31; water world, 887
- Collectivity, 639, 665, 675-76, 677, 689-90, 851; influence on clothing, 658-61, 675-76; isolation and, 789. *See also* Mob
- Collectivum*, 1433
- Colors as symbols, 547-48; in painting, 949. *See also* Black, Blue, Green, Yellow
- Commandments, 258, 1508-11
- Common sense, 429
- Communion, 174, 175, 290, 351, 657, 704, 830, 1251, 1371, 1385; Manichean, 492
- Communist Party, 1523, 1525
- Communist equality, 1101
- Compass, 1395-96
- Compassion, 957, 961, 1001, 1004, 1098, 1377
- Compensation, 111, 145n, 1260, 1359, 1415-16, 1422-23
- Complexes, 82, 143-44, 562n, 939, 1180
- Compulsion. *See* Neurosis
- Concupiscentia*, 325
- Confession, 477-78, 802, 1535-36
- Conflicts, 269, 445-49, 561-63, 723, 1133-35
- Confucius, 597
- Coniunctio, coniunctio*, 1407
- Connelly, Marc, 1093
- Conscientious objectors, 1275
- Conscience: bad, 120; collective, 676, 705-6
- Consciousness, 15-20, 50, 114, 144, 224-25, 247, 252, 403, 447, 677-79, 750, 831, 935, 956, 959, 966-67, 974-76, 979-82, 1005, 1106, 1416; autonomous, 623; body, brain and, 250-51, 349, 350; bridge between unconscious and, 1232; collective, 206, 689, 1404; continuity and, 247, 911, 944; dangers of, 476-84, 1290-91; and emotion, 1498; extension of, 822-23, 827, 836-37, 937-39, 967, 974, 980; and free will, 623, 662-63; integrated, 827, 836-37; levels of, 476-81, 499; and meaning, 350; as monocular, 971; overdeveloped, 936; primitive, 663-64; projection and, 1496; different realities of, 691; and the self, 403, 407, 408-12, 568, 822-23, 977, 1047-48; structure of, 1192; transformation, 938, 941; and the unconscious, 24, 124, 1230-31; will to, 938-41. *See also* Ego, Sun
- Contagion, mental, 828, 840, 842, 851, 1139
- Contamination. *See* Unconscious
- Contempt, 68-69, 75-76, 101
- Corinthians, Epistle to, 105n, 443n
- Coronation, 656, 1428
- Corpse, 156-65, 1397-1403
- Corpus hermeticum*, 652, 1026
- Cosmogonic principle, 366
- Cosmos, 314, 325-28, 693. *See also* Myths
- Coué, Emile, 477
- Cow, the dappled, 272-73
- Creation, 408; as criminal act, 267; destruction and, 45, 52, 56, 289, 327, 654,

- Creation (*cont.*)
 1022; inferiority and, 1006, 1021,
 1025; of love, 680, 1004-5; and symbol,
 1021; of world, 309-10, 1533. *See also*
 Myths, cosmogonic
- Creative force, faculty, creativity, xii, 38,
 57, 193-94, 196-97, 196n, 358, 495,
 661-63, 856, 915, 937, 940, 1021, 1261;
 as autonomous and amoral, 654, 666,
 668, 675, 681, 719; direction of, 661-
 63, 666, 1025; ego-will, 942, 943; loss
 of, 931-32; man, 719, 720, 1009, 1015-
 16; and personality, 667; primitive,
 663; process, 57, 61, 73, 193-94, 653-
 56, 674-75, 854-56, 933, 937, 946-47
- Creators, 580-81, 703-4; as victims, 720
- Creed. *See* Dogma
- Crete, 1432
- Crime, 712-15; madness before a, 471,
 472, 1452-54; naming a, 469; psychol-
 ogy of, 453-54, 463-73, 485-88, 1452;
 shadow aspect of, 481. *See also* Punish-
 ment
- Criminal: pale, 451-52, 457, 462-63, 480-
 83, 489-90, 506, 712; social role of,
 471-73
- Cripples, 1232-36, 1239
- Cross, 157, 158, 191, 199-200, 422, 440,
 448, 1397-99, 1402
- Crucifixion, psychology of, 187, 472. *See*
also Christ, Cross, *Transitus*
- Cruelty, 1017; and children, 963, 990
- Cryptomnesia, 1218, 1383
- Crystal, 450
- Cult. *See* Mystery
- Culture (*Bildung*), 101-2
- Cumont, Franz, 157-58
- Cupid. *See* Eros
- Cybele, 1397
- 327, 1390; star, 106-7; symbolism, 106-
 7, 1390
- Dante, 203-4, 838, 1084, 1172
- Darkness. *See* Light
- Darwin, Charles, 74, 329, 924
- Daudet, Alphonse, 1335-36
- Daudet, Leon, 1267
- David-Neal, Alexandra, 697
- Dawa-Sandup, Lama Kagi, 1495-96
- Dea Artio*, 1467
- Dead: eating of, 175-76; spirits of, 1191-
 92, 1401. *See also* Ghost
- Dea Matuta*, 190, 191
- Death, 141, 399, 404-5, 411-12, 777-81,
 1178, 1201; archetypal images before,
 1201; dreams, 1201, 1411; fear of, 251-
 52; myth of origin, 1286; and philoso-
 phy, 777; sacrificial, 1520, 1524-25;
 South Sea ceremonies at, 181; volun-
 tary, 486-87. *See also* Christ
- Decker, E. D., 1334
- Decline of the West*, 104
- Degeneration, 801, 802, 811
- Delos, 884
- Dementia praecox*, 242
- Demeter, 1283
- Demiurgos*, 119, 310, 328
- Democracy, 1003, 1101; fallacy of demo-
 cratic ideas, 1003
- Democritus, pseudo-, 1260
- Demons. *See* *Daimon*, Devil
- Depression, 1175
- Destiny. *See* Fate
- Destruction, 93-95, 170-71, 440; creation
 and, 45, 52, 56, 289, 325-26, 654-55; of
 Values, 215-16; will to, 93-94, 1275-77
- Destructiveness, 901, 1415-16
- Deus absconditus*. *See* God
- Deus leontocephalus*, 1282
- Deussen, Paul, 1373
- Deutsche Michel, 1292, 1303, 1373
- Devata*, 1436
- Devil, 8, 42-43, 162, 170, 288, 704, 721,
 882, 883, 919, 952, 1041, 1081, 1083,
 1084, 1086, 1161, 1162, 1320-25, 1328;
 in projection, 1320, 1321; reverse of
 God, 845; in woman, 743
- De Vita Contemplativa*, 41-42
- Devotion, 1323
- Daimon*, *daimonion*, 130-34, 882n
- Damasus I, Pope, 5
- Danaides, 1146
- Dance, dancer, dancing, 45, 46-47, 56,
 60, 178, 507, 566, 1154, 1266; Hopi
 snake dance, 238, 1282; rope (*see also*
 Rope-dancer), 44, 47, 49, 52, 81, 82,
 114-15, 154; Shiva, 45, 56, 107, 289,

- Dew, 1246, 1247, 1486
Dewey, John, 1498
Dharana, 1372-73
Dhyana, 1290, 1363, 1372-73
Diagrams. *See* Pictures
Dictator, 1522, 1523, 1525. *See also* Hitler, Mussolini
Dieterich, Albrecht, 1046
Differentiation, 65, 425, 602
Digulleville, Guillaume de, 1081
Diogenes, 409
Diogenes Laertius, 133n
Dionysius Areopagita, 988
Dionysos, Dionysian, 10, 143-44, 189, 192, 289, 369, 448, 704, 813, 874, 889, 898, 1129, 1166, 1440. *See also* Bacchus
Diotima, 1168
Disappearance: into desert, 932-33; into Yoga, 933
Discrimination, 677-78, 681, 1356
Diseases, attempt to heal, 1232; psychic causes (*see also* Intuitives, body and), 195-96, 750, 808, 1391-92
Disintegration: of personality, 870, 1402, 1410-11; social, 1525
Dismemberment, 58, 446, 448, 704
Disobedience, 935-36, 937
Dissolution. *See* Disintegration, of personality; Consciousness; Unconscious
Divinity without God, 1524-25
Doctors, psychology of, 1096
Dog, 546, 1118, 1291, 1274, 1277-78, 1279; virtues of, 437; wild, 537-38
Dogma, creed, 593-94, 1249, 1352
Doketic teachings, 53, 443, 657, 998
Domicilium solis, 897, 1491
Doppelgänger, 626-27
Doresse, Jean, 228n
Dorn, Gerhard, 1534
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 26n, 288n
Doubt, 849-50, 1008
Dove, 1484, 1489, 1532
Dragon, 77, 77n, 155-56, 233, 263, 598, 748-49, 756, 761, 900-901, 1055-56, 1061, 1158, 1285, 1418; in China, 233, 793-94, 1055; as symbol, 261, 749; "Thou shalt" as, 258-70; and the virgin, 264
Dramatis personae, 1291
Drawings, of insane, 542-43, 641, 745
Dreams, 316, 1085, 1221, 1258, 1308-9, 1387, 1395, 1432, 1495; in analysis, 1430-31; ancestral units in, 1400-1401, 1411; animals in, 896; of children, 404, 642-43, 1152, 1201-2, 1401, 1411; compensation in, 516-17; creative, 1254; death in, 1201, 1411; diagnosis of disease from, 1411-12; fear, stopping dream, 1221; of fire, 1378-79; forgetting, 1429; interpretation of, 117, 207, 231-32, 845, 884, 1031, 1475-76; mandala in, 1203; mirror in, 1415; of Saints, 1054, 1096, 1103, 1308; shortcomings of, 1395; small things in, 642-43; telepathy and error, 316, 1258, 1259
DREAM TEXTS: clergyman's dream of water closet, 1398; between the legs of an elephant, 683; enormous globe, 1203; father complex, 316; fossil in lake bed, 1411; Greek poet and stolen vase, 1309; Hannibal's of the monster, 598, 1296, 1462; Jung's of Kaiser, 697-98; Nietzsche's of toad, xii, 609; Roman senator's daughter, 1308; Roosevelt's, 1309; snake and scarabs, 1298-99; snake and two Catholics, 1307-8; listening to spirit, 1131; burnt by the sun, 1125; swarm motif, 1411; tablets falling in shaft, 1202; white maidens (boy's dream), 1170, 1201; Zarathustra's dream, 1225
Dunne, J. W., 693
Dürer, Albrecht, 1396
Dwarfs, 1235, 1262, 1264, 1269-72, 1291
Eabani, 246
Eagle, 18-19, 1072-73, 1466-67; and snake, 219, 227-33, 236-41, 246, 251, 848, 1309; and toad (alchemy), 967, 1413
Earth, 62, 67, 72-73, 1077, 1081, 1085; gold in, 1223; identity of women with, 1283; Virgin Mary as, 952. *See also* Mother
East: gods of (*see also* Kali, Prakrti, Shakti, Shiva), 845, 883, 1179; overpopulation of, 1276; philosophy of, 139, 151, 715,

- East (*cont.*)
 933, 1055, 1276, 1331-33, 1426; and
 West, 1056-57, 1289-90. *See also* Bud-
 dha, Buddhism, China, India, Lama-
 ism, Yoga
- Eating, 184, 186, 188
- Ebionites, 53n, 998
- Ecce Homo*, 24, 191n, 205
- Eckhart, Meister, 183, 204, 391, 567, 723,
 842, 875, 1102, 1314n, 1487-88, 1526-
 27
- Ecumenical conference, 1007
- Edda*, the, 187
- Eden, Garden of, 1430, 1471
- Education, 197
- Edward VIII, 814
- Eggs, golden, 431
- Ego, 345, 347-50, 360-61, 407-12, 638-
 41, 663-65, 689-90, 783, 822, 855, 935,
 940, 943, 965, 1193-96; as center of
 consciousness, 389; diagram of, 1193;
 identity of, 1267; as superior function,
 638-39; and willpower, 966
- Ego complex, 412
- Ego-will, 403, 913
- Egoismo, sacro*, 1366
- Egypt, Egyptian, 189, 655; *Book of the
 Dead*, 304, 1285, 1428; companies of
 the gods, 1404, 1406; God, 52, 1404;
 isles of the great green, 861; pyramids,
 1403; religion, 207-8, 303-4, 366; sym-
 bolism, 252, 793, 794; tree in, 1429,
 1437. *See also* Horus, Isis, Osiris, Phar-
 aoh, Ptah, Ra, Set
- Eidon, Eidolon*, 284
- Eidos*, 449-50, 575
- Einsiedler* (one-dweller), 216, 323. *See also*
Zwei-siedler
- Einstein, Albert, 842
- Eisler, Robert, 1165, 1440
- Ekstasis*, 206, 232, 289, 339, 351, 514, 520,
 806, 807, 808, 842, 875, 1064, 1065,
 1111, 1433; collective, 924
- Elephants, 1393-94; dream of, 683
- Eleusis, 1283, 1385
- Elgon, Mount, 1191
- Elijah, 186, 1072, 1073
- Elmo, St., 531
- Emasculating condition, 659-60
- Emerald table. *See Tabula smaragdina*
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 1048-49
- Emotions, 1497-1500; collective, 924;
 overcoming of, 158; overwhelming, as
 God, 904-5; positive side of, 1499-
 1500; possessive quality, 1184, 1497;
 projections, 1236, 1497-98. *See also*
 Moods, Affect
- Empedocles, 782, 785, 905, 1217
- Empfindung*, 385
- Enantiodromia*, xiv, 186, 258, 260, 275,
 439, 451, 516, 541, 555, 654, 670, 775,
 790, 957, 1070, 1126, 1171, 1214-15,
 1217, 1459, 1525
- Enemy within, 558, 567-68, 1187
- Energy, 1134; from reconciling oppo-
 sites, 805. *See also* Libido
- England, 647-48
- English gentlemen, 645-46
- Engrammata*, 748, 941
- Enjoyment, 962-63
- Enkidu*, 246-52
- Enkratites*, 200n, 269
- Enlightenment, 1018
- Ennoia*, 936, 959
- Entheos*, 137, 200, 1062, 1295
- Entrückt, entrückung*, 693-94
- Ephesians, Epistle to. *See* Paul, St.
- Epicurean, 550
- Epiouision, Epiouios*, 184, 833
- Epopiteia*, 1385
- Equality, 1095, 1101
- Equinoxes, precession of, 374-76. *See also*
 Astrology
- Eranos Lectures*, (1933) "Zur Empirier des
 Individuationsprozesses," 1407; (1934)
 "Über die Archetypen des kollektiven
 Unbewussten," 905; (1935) "Traum-
 symbole des Individuationsprozesses,"
 1085, 1152; (1936) "Die Erlösungsvor-
 stellungen in der Alchemie," 1085
- Erasmus, 832, 1491
- Erechtheus, 756, 1523
- Erigena, John Scotus, 831
- Erkönig, Der*, 1152, 1201
- Eros, 382-84, 537, 735, 740, 1168, 1492;
 as Cupid, 1155, 1157
- Essenes, 1031
- Eternal return, 191, 399, 405, 933, 1043,

- 1263, 1271, 1273, 1288, 1341-42; ring of, 1044-45
- Ethics, 623
- Euangelion*, 826, 831, 855, 981
- Eudaimonestatos theos*, 905
- Euthermus, euhemerism, 649, 911, 970; and paranoia, 921
- Euphoria, 1073
- Evangelists, 474-75, 492. *See also* Gospels
- Evans-Wentz, W. Y., 1495, 1496n
- Evil, 744, 846, 990-91, 1100; principle of, and the Trinity, 1080, 1082, 1084; projected, 1495. *See also* Good, Spirits
- Evolution, 74
- Existence, 326, 939, 988
- Experience, 975; mystical, 694-95, 1369; nameless, 422-23; original or individual, 459-61; in poetry, 1144; religious, 97, 108, 292, 723, 862-64, 1176; transcendental, 443, 1435, 1436; trans-subjective, 292, 295-96, 298
- Exteriorization, 1190
- Extravert, 118n, 1182
- Eye, 409, 1163; snake eyes of heroes, 757, 1285
- Fairy tales: *Hans in Glück*, 1304; *Dumme Hans*, 1304; "The princess and her golden ball," 1417; *Rumpelstiltsken*, 426; Russian, 1528
- Faith, 293; and doubt, 850. *See also* God, Belief
- Family, 1012
- Fantasies of the Living*, 1219
- Fascinosum*, 985
- Fascism, 377, 665-66, 814
- Fate, destiny, 139n, 919, 1252-53; maker of one's own, 818, 942-43, 1375-76, 1479-81
- Father complex, 316, 1096-97
- Faust*, 556, 934. *See also* Goethe
- Faust (character), 204, 223-24, 369, 789-90, 894, 956, 974, 1073, 1142, 1153, 1259, 1303, 1368, 1490
- Fear, panic, 1379
- Feeling, 298, 459, 942-45, 385, 957, 1195-96, 1335, 1442; inferior, 989, 1184, 1186, 1195-96; and sensation, 385
- Feminine element in Church, 536
- Feminine principle, 327, 1080-82, 1492
- Fertility: of fields, 643, 752-53, 952; rites of, 1282-85
- Feuerbach, Ludwig Andrew, 329
- Fig leaf, 752-53
- Finnegan's Wake*, 1402
- Fionn, 1402
- Fire, 1067, 1073, 1286-87, 1378-79, 1386, 1480; fire-dog, 1221-22, 1486; kingdom of, 722; of life, 728; pillar of, 1420; of St. Elmo, 531, 1482
- Fish, 1165, 1402, 1440; contents of the unconscious, 1090; as symbol of time, 500. *See also* Pisces, Swarm
- Fisherman, 1164, 1165
- Fisher ring, 1403
- Flamines*, 177
- Flaubert, Gustave, 969, 1059, 1125
- Flowers, 887-88
- Fly, 607, 620
- Föhnwind*, 1030
- Fool. *See* Buffoon
- Foote, Mary, ix, x
- Ford, 241
- Forel, August, 1270
- Forest, 178
- Förster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth, 1155, 1218, 1383
- Four, 449, 1404, 1443, 1486; square, 356-69; three and, 1085. *See also* Function, Pillars, Quaternium
- France, 503, 534n, 554, 1156, 1517, 1523. *See also* French Revolution
- France, Anatole, 365, 384
- Francis, St., 292, 807, 820, 1102
- Fraser, Ronald, 696
- Frederick the Great, 1353
- Freedom: and consciousness, 822; and morality, 262, 266; political, 1026
- Freemasons, 460, 462
- Free will, 662, 666, 749
- French Revolution, 118, 121, 1002, 1012, 1021, 1023-24, 1100
- Freud, Sigmund, xi, 113, 196, 371, 650, 651, 939, 1354, 1431, 1432, 1451; and Jung, 132n; *Future of an Illusion*, 343
- Friends, Society of, 972
- Friendship, 626-27. *See also* Nietzsche
- Fröbe-Kapteyn, Olga, 300

- Frog, 6, 255, 900, 1413, 1417
 Fuchs, Carl, xv
 Fulfillment, 801-3
 Functions: differentiation of, 1400; four, 152, 547-48, 1400, 1403, 1441; goal of life, 386-87; identification with, 387, 1187, 1234; inferior (*see also* Man, inferior; Shadow), 145, 632, 822, 954, 958, 1021, 1029, 1088, 1089, 1154, 1161, 1162, 1184, 1186, 1189, 1235, 1400; in literature, 634; superior, 298, 638, 954, 1187, 1400; transcendent, 976, 1231; unconscious, 1083. *See also* Feeling, Intuition, Sensation, Thinking
 Future. *See* Past; *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, as prophetic

 Gabicus, 1448-49
 Gabriel, 1097
 Galatea, 947
 Galloi, 400
 Gamaliel, the Elder, 1031, 1341
 Gandhara, 493, 493n
 Gandu, the sorcerer, 180
 Ganges, 1284, 1418
 Ganymede, 18, 230, 1305, 1466
Ganz andere (totally other), 880
Garuda, 238, 238n, 263
 Gast, Peter, 1490
Gāthās, 4-5
Gehorchen, gehorsam. *See* Hear, Hearing
Geist, 364n, 365, 378-79, 809, 810, 897, 1039, 1065, 1066, 1128, 1133, 1209-10; *Seele und*, 388; *Sinn and*, 388. *See also* Spirit
 Geley, Gustav, 450
Gemüt, Gemütlichkeit, 385, 388, 566
 Genesis, 1072, 1423, 1533
 Genetic mixtures, 643-44
 Genus, 801, 802, 811
 George, St., 260
 George, Stefan, 635
 Gerhard, Paul, 1396
 German, Germany, 89, 373, 503, 534, 813, 862, 868, 872, 924, 1027, 1156, 1514-15, 1517, 1523-24; and Christianity, 1517; language, 1066; as *Puer Aeternus*, 533-34; psychology, 535, 1107-8; Reformation, 314, 1115. *See also* Hitler, Wotan, Yggdrasil
 Ghost, 164-65, 174-75, 179, 198, 512, 1189, 1274, 1278; bodies and, 168, 174-75, 179; house, 454; land, 1189, 1191. *See also* Goblins, Holy Ghost
 Gibbon, Edward, 273
 Gide, André, 711n
 Gideon, dew of, 1247, 1486
 Gilgamesh epic, 186, 246-52, 861, 885
 Giving and receiving, 799-803, 1143
 Glasenapp, Helmut von, 211
 Glass house, 1448, 1486
Glossolalia, 366, 854, 1378
 Glowworm, 1393
 Gnosis, Gnosticism, 98, 99, 106, 106n, 119, 166, 167, 211, 215, 229, 306, 327, 328, 441-43, 530n, 652-53, 665, 815, 959, 988, 995-96, 1031, 1115, 1116, 1179, 1180, 1490; antimonies, 267-68; beliefs, 166, 327-28, 441-42, 657, 936; creator myth, 738; and God, 327, 665; idea of Christ, 656; of life, 569; Sippahs, 184-85. *See also* Mandaeans
 Goals, 1537-38
 Goblins, 504-5
 God, gods, 323, 335, 846, 902-22, 999, 1028, 1136, 1138, 1310, 1370-71; as absolute, 293; animal as attribute of, 1523; Aspects, 127-28, 143, 260, 263, 845, 882; birth of (myth of Leto), 886, 899; in Buddhism, Lamaism, 97, 107, 883-84, 1074; conceptions of, 204, 288-94, 326, 334-36, 1049, 1368; a conjecture, 911, 920, 927-29; and consciousness, 980-81; created in his own image, 64-65, 1533; as creator, 904, 914, 1405, 1415; is dead, 128, 142, 287-94, 333, 461, 843, 902, 997-98, 1002, 1055-56, 1306, 1526-27, 1530-32; *Deus absconditus*, 53, 1041, 1295; dying and resurrecting, 51, 657, 781; as experience, 919, 928-30; as an exclamation, 904; as fate, 918; as father and son, 1370; fear of, 128; hate of, 73, 396; as inconceivable, 927-29; identification with, 913, 1376; Jewish, 327; of Job, 591-92; as limited, 288, 1511; in man, 657, 722-24, 998, 1352, 1527, 1530-33; as old wise man, 287, 319, 916; as paradox, 1144; as projection, 259, 1496; as power, 1343; psychological fact, 336,

- 843, 902-3, 916, 919, 920, 1038, 1041, 1049, 1250, 1352, 1496, 1530-31; sacrifice of, 855, 883; as snake, 1295; suffering, 325, 330-33, 335-40, 854; as *Summum bonum*, 929; as Superman, 1368; as tempter and Self, 906-7, 977-78, 988; transformation of, 207, 287, 725; universal, 576, 914-15. *See also* Christ, *Homo-ousios*, Jahveh
- Goddess of Reason, 118
- Godhead, 1527
- Goethe, xii, xvii, 224-25, 556, 698, 790, 893-94, 934, 1152, 1152n, 1201, 1255, 1261, 1303, 1313, 1368, 1490
- Goetz, Bruno, 534, 635, 870, 1107
- Going-down. *See* *Untergang*
- Gogarten, Friedrich, 287, 846, 907
- Gold, 445, 795-96, 1223. *See also* Alchemy, Ball, *Hiranyagarbha*, World Golem, the, 1261. *See also* Meyrink, G.
- Good, 564-65, 567-69, 719-20, 820; and bad, xv, 233n; and evil, xv, 5, 8, 94, 209, 233, 433, 436, 485, 665, 681-85, 846, 848, 1321-23, 1328, 1369
- Gospels, 474-75, 796. *See also* John, Luke, Matthew
- Gothic cathedral, 1110. *See also* Architecture
- Gottähnlich*, 354
- Gothelf, Jeramias, 1085
- Grail, Holy, 187, 867, 936, 1365, 1377
- Grandfather time, 1522, 1528-29
- Gravedigger's jest, 167-70
- Gravity, spirit of, 1154, 1160, 1273, 1469, 1479
- Greatness, 611-14
- Greece, Greek, 655, 1156, 1282; gods, 917, 1522-23; sculpture, 1110
- Green, 547
- Green face, the. *See* Chidr
- Gregory, St., 1102
- Grenfeld, Bernard P., 217n
- Grimm, Brothers, 108n, 757n
- Grünwedel, Albert, 493
- Guillaume de Digulleville, 1081
- Guilt, 1091-92; and pain, 1513
- Hades, 180, 1191, 1217. *See also* Underworld
- Hadrian, 160
- Hagenbeck, Carl, 1471
- Haggard, Rider, 155, 395, 634, 694-95, 733, 1167, 1178
- Hal Safliena, 1252
- Hali, Prince of Egypt, 951
- Hamlet, 605
- Hammurabi, 247
- Hamsa* (swan), 186-87, 230, 231, 430
- Hands, 1139
- Hannah, Barbara, 1038n
- Hannibal, dream of, 598, 1296, 1462
- Hans in Glück* (Grimm), 1304
- Hapsburgs, 643, 1399
- Harding, Esther, 166
- Harpocrates, Harforetus, 853, 889, 1449
- Harran, 1158
- Hartmann, Eduard von, x, 326-27
- Hate, 463; of God, 72-73; love and, 397, 1477
- Hauer, J. W., 215, 326, 692, 813, 906, 1373
- Hauptmann, Gerhard, 759
- Hawwah, 532
- Hay, Marie, 726-27
- Healing or helping others, 825, 829, 831
- Hearing, 1264-65, 1381
- Heart, as source of will, 89, 92-93, 1428
- Heaven, 1401; kingdom of, 806, 1326, 1526; vision of, 1081. *See also* Kian
- Hebrews, 918
- Hedderheim relief, 1398
- Hedonism, xviii
- Hegel, 1121
- Heimarmene*, 1519
- Heisenberg, Werner, 244n
- Helena, 1153
- Heliopolis, 1405
- Helios, 938, 1398, 1443
- Hera, 886
- Heraclitus, xiv, 135, 562, 682n, 718, 722, 1067, 1073, 1174, 1215
- Hercules, 791, 1283, 1397
- Herd, 646, 677; psychology, 700. *See also* Collectivity, Mob
- Herder, J. G., 209
- Here and now, 151, 808-15, 1289, 1544
- Heretics, 1102
- Hermaphrodite, 395, 533, 784, 796, 1076, 1350, 1407

- Hermes, Trismegistus, 304, 309, 325, 869, 936, 1033, 1533
- Hermetic philosophy, 936, 950-51, 985, 1044-45, 1048, 1085, 1248-49, 1260, 1329. *See also Corpus Hermeticum*
- Hermits, 323, 596, 769, 951, 968-69, 974, 1118, 1124
- Hero, 52, 1158-59, 1449, 1543; and grandfather, 1529; ideal, 545; and martyrs, 548; and snake, 756, 757, 1285, 1523. *See also Myth*
- Herod, 899
- Herodotus, 211, 359
- Hesperides, garden of, 1430, 1448
- Hexenschlaf*, 332, 1318
- Heyer, G. R., 1542
- Hierarchic structure, 988
- Hieronymus, St., 833
- Hinayana. *See Buddhism*
- Hindu, 314; gods, 1173
- Hippokrates, 200
- Hippolytos, 160, 1385n
- Hippopotamus, 686
- Hiranyagarbha*, 444, 782, 796, 988, 1384
- Hiroshigi, 655
- Hirtenknabe*, 1292
- Historical vision, 1522
- Hitler, 554, 872, 1523
- Hokosai, 655
- Hölderlin, Friedrich, 887
- Holocaust, 1420
- Holy, holiness, 554, 585, 984-85
- Holy Ghost, Holy Spirit, 92, 171, 429, 722, 731, 738, 810, 879, 952, 968-77, 979, 1378; and the devil, 968-69, 984-87, 1075, 1386, 1488-89, 1490, 1532, 1536; dove and, 1310; self and, 738, 986-87
- Homer, 174-75, 180, 517n, 1191, 1522
- Homeric times, 1522
- Homo-ousios*, *homoi-ousios*, 97-98, 902, 998
- Homo maximus*, *homo minimus*, 1384
- Homosexuality, 626, 629-31, 1171
- Homunculi*, 1249
- Horfoltus, 1442. *See also Harpocrates*
- Horneffer, August and Ernst, 1044
- Horoscopes, 374-75. *See also Astrology*
- Horus, 852-53, 889
- Hosea, 496n, 881, 1054
- Host, 448, 1533
- Hostility, 1320
- Houdon, Jean Antoine, 948
- House of Exile*, 587-88
- Human relatedness, 102
- Humor (a fluid of body), 547-48
- Hunchbacks, 1235
- Hunger, 167-70, 171-72, 174, 179, 184, 213-14; from giving, 1145
- Hunt, Arthur S., 217n
- Hunt, Dorothy, 828
- Huss, Johann, 719-20
- Hyena, 176, 180
- Hyle* (body), 306, 442
- Hylikos*, 517-18, 548
- Hypatia, 332, 1028
- Hypnosis, 470
- Hyslop, James H., 512
- Hystaspes. *See Vishtaspa*
- Hysteria, 1082, 1319, 1320, 1451
- "I," the, 344, 345, 370-71, 393, 676; body and, 360-61, 663, 665. *See also Ego*
- I-Thou*, 688
- Ice, 1073, 1099, 1139
- I Ching*, 245n, 356-58, 421, 451, 621n, 875
- Idea(s): emotional power of, 380; for man, woman, 736; made visible, 197
- Identification, 134-35, 153, 161, 203, 222-23, 231, 240-41, 284, 315, 544, 703, 757, 913, 1305, 1423; with anima, animus, 296, 857; with archetype, 27, 221, 231, 240-41, 284, 315, 757-60; with beauty, 615-16; with collective unconscious, 607, 608; with consciousness, 410; with creative impulse, 194; dangers of, 607; with a function, 387, 865, 1234; with gift, 1305; with God (*see Inflation*), 912, 1039; men and spirit, 859-60; with mind, 623; with mood, 839; of Nietzsche with Zarathustra, 857; with self, 391, 839; with spirit, 852, 1065; with unconscious, 1229, 1312-13, 1360-61
- Iliad and Odyssey*, 462n
- Illumination, 1290
- Illusion, world as, 934, 1177, 1415. *See also Maya*
- Images, making of, 1321-25

- Images, primordial. *See* Archetype
- Imagination, 1024; active, 1126, 1167; altering world, 341
- Imitation of Christ (*Imitatio Christi*), 158, 199, 758
- Immaculate conception, 731-32, 853, 1050
- Immorality, 935-36
- Inclusion, psychological, 1202, 1403
- India, 6, 210, 236, 373; clothing, 659, 660; colonial, 1212; philosophy, 797, 1363, 1372-75, 1382-84, 1418; snake cult, 1288; temples, 948; and the West, 1372-75. *See also* Tantric Yoga
- Indian, American, 175, 530; Pueblo, 163, 238, 361, 395, 1266, 1486, 1541; Hopi snake dance, 238, 1282
- Individual, 670, 746-47; and collective man, 1120-21; concept of, 656, 657, 658-69, 677; as subjective, 669
- Individualism, 348, 660-61, 907-8, 1101
- Individuality, 425, 1120-21
- Individuation, xviii, 123, 214, 271, 411, 573-74, 577, 742, 772, 787-88, 828, 839, 906, 1087-88, 1443, 1527; body and, 63-65, 202; and collectivity, 790; and conflict, 439-40, 448, 562, 710; creative instinct in, 667-68, 1020-22; of criminal part, 469; definition of, 208; early Christian vs. modern, 217-18; and love, 1019-21; overcoming of opposites in, 208-9; purpose of, 469; relationships and, 102, 795, 1019, 1485; and shadow, 124; symbols of, 106-8 (dancing star), 153, 271 (sun, wheel), 439, 573-74, 952, 985, 1044, 1045, 1407
- Infection, 607-10, 827; psychic, 840
- Inferiority, 264, 1080; acceptance of, 1478; power attitude and, 1211-14, 1353. *See also* Function, Man
- Inflation, 27, 28-29, 30, 32, 50-51, 52, 56-57, 125, 133, 135-36, 153-55, 161, 204, 391, 565, 602-3, 611-17, 620, 644, 702-3, 758, 860, 1039, 1077, 1090, 1136, 1140, 1183, 1213, 1303, 1357, 1445
- Inheritance, 1098
- Initiation, 236, 521, 1189, 1252, 1253, 1443, 1526; Isis and Osiris, 211-12; modern, 460-61, 1524; rites, 53, 197, 211-12, 1061-62, 1282, 1449. *See also* Sabazios
- Innocence, 1292
- Innocent, St., 1102
- Inquisition, 1103
- Insanity, 29, 135, 162-63, 296, 509-14, 696, 956, 1088-90, 1241, 1279, 1304, 1386; broken images in drawings, 542-43, 1409-10; physical illness and, 137-38, 513; psychological insight and, 1089; psychosis, 912. *See also* *Dementia praecox*, Madness, Nietzsche, Paranoia, Schizophrenia
- Inspiration, 379; of Nietzsche, 24, 55
- Instincts, 17-19, 28, 88, 539, 650, 674-75, 897, 1277, 1307, 1326, 1380, 1541; eagle and serpent symbols, 856
- Integration, 210, 831. *See also* Consciousness, Myths, Personality
- Intellect, 865, 1137
- Intelligence, transcendent, 371
- Intergang*, 84
- Intestines, 1082
- Introjection, 1369
- Introspection, 250-51
- Introversion, 118n, 143, 754, 1182
- Intuition, intuitives, 17-18, 205, 259, 315, 317, 381-82, 1079-80, 1139, 1147, 1329, 1440, 1503-4, 1514; body and, 168, 354, 609, 808, 1082-83, 1141, 1149-50, 1391-92; effect on object, 616-17; as inferior, 1149; of patients, 618; revelation and, 878-80; unchecked, 1391
- Invention, 334, 521-22
- Irrational, the, 1335
- Isaiah, 876, 945
- Ishvara, 395
- Isis, 211, 315, 938
- Islam, 99, 214-15, 492-93, 1127, 1164. *See also* Sufi
- Island, isles, 1175, 1182-83, 1191, 1215; happy floating, 861, 885-87, 898
- Isolation, 627, 789, 796-97, 1486-87
- Italy, 554, 585, 814, 1025
- Izdubar*, 246
- Jacob, 241
- Jahveh, 203, 366n, 724, 868, 1050, 1085, 1093, 1233, 1420

INDEX

- Jains, 1075
 Jamblichus, 359
 James, William, 66n, 108, 1176, 1351
 James-Lange theory of affects, 1379
 Japan, 585, 655
 Jester. *See* Buffoon
 Jesus. *See* Christ
Jeu de pelota, 741-42, 781
 Jew, 400, 548, 917, 922
 Jewish anima, 917, 918, 922, 1085, 1322.
 See also Jahveh, Job
 Jewel, 264-65, 424, 653, 737-38. *See also*
 Body diamond
 Joan of Arc, 880-81
 Job, 261, 591-92, 681, 917-18, 1050,
 1323, 1368
 Johannes, Oannes, 888, 971
 John the Baptist, 184-87, 447, 569, 944,
 1030-31
 John St., Evangelist, 228, 881, 1033; Gos-
 pel of, 41, 242, 366, 760n, 769, 789,
 999, 1295, 1300, 1488; revelation of,
 885
 John, St. of the Cross, 19n
 Joke, pathological, 168
 Jonah, 1111, 1281
 Joyce, James, xii, 224-25, 275, 1351, 1445
 Judge as avenger, 712-13
 Judgment, 1452-53
 Jung, C. G.: compared with Freud, Adler,
 1451; as doctor, 499; in Kenya, 188n;
 reading of *Zarathustra*, ix, 544, 1350;
 seminar on children's dreams, 555n,
 1152, 1202
 WORKS: *Answer to Job*, 288n; *Dream Analy-*
sis, ix, x, 1403n; *Memories, Dreams,*
Reflections, x-xi, 10n, 46n, 119n; "On
Psychic Energy," 1249; *Psychological*
Types, xi; *The Psychology of the Uncon-*
scious, 190, 1397, 1451; *Wandlungen*
und Symbole der Libido, 337, 1284; Intro-
 duction to Wilhelm's *Secret of the Golden*
Flower, 223, 324, 478; "Sigmund Freud
 in his Historical Setting," 1354; "The
 Psychology of Religion" (Terry Lec-
 tures), 1323; "Traumsymbole des Indi-
 viduations-prozesses," 745n, 1152; *The*
Zophingia Lectures, xn. *See also* Eranos
 Lectures, *Vision Seminars*
 Jung, Edgar, 1002
 Juno Ludovisi, 118
 Jupiter. *See* Zeus
 Justin Martyr, 704, 1129
 Kali, 845, 1390
 Kant, Immanuel, xi, 140n, 266, 362, 528,
 926, 927
 Karma, 465
 Karpokrates, 99, 992-93, 996
 Katabasis, 694, 1194
 Katha Upanishads, 65n
 Kavirondos, 1524
 Kékulé and the Benzol ring, 195
 Keller, Gottfried, 604, 860, 1096, 1157
 Kempis, Thomas à, 158n, 199
 Kerner, Justinus, 250, 889, 1217-18
 Kerényi, C., 953n
 Keyserling, H. A., 17, 18, 70, 826, 1016
 Kian, 358
 Kieser, F., 311
 Killer, man as, 1104
 King, as a god, 657, 1428; myth of corpse
 and, 1396
 Kingdom of heaven, 217, 806
 Kirchner, Athanasius, 470
 Klages, Ludwig, 66, 171, 365, 368, 494,
 1056, 1128
 Klinger, Max, 233
Knabe Lenker, 1073
Kobold, 1193
 Koinos, 542
 Komarios, 1068
Koran, 184, 1164
 Krafft-Ebing, Richard von, 912
 Krishna, 1153, 1160, 1178, 1185
 Krug, Gustave, 635
 Kuan-Yin, 884
Kuei, 442, 444
 Kundalini, 307, 326, 374, 542, 794, 888,
 1281; Yoga, 274, 394-96
 Kundry, 1231-32
Kut-el-amara, 184, 1031
Kwan Yin, 1179
 Lamaism, 107n, 883
 Lama Kagi Dawa-Sandup, 1495
 Lamb, symbol for Christ, 1512, 1515,
 1517, 1520

INDEX

- Lange, C. G., 1379
 Language, 28-29, 823-24; of archetypes, 178; collective, 103; French, German, 566; Nietzsche's, 103, 133; speech, 367; of wise old man, 134; writing, 367
 Lao Tse, 15, 28-31, 597, 847, 848
 Laparotomy, 1057
Lapis philosophorum. See Philosopher's stone
 Last man, the, 11, 101, 104-5, 108, 110-16, 277, 1443
 Laughter, 1306
 Law, 1509-10; responsibility toward, 264, 265-66, 712-14
 Lawrence, D. H., 779n
 Lead, 444, 478-79, 483-84, 486, 1260
 Leader, political, 640
 Legend: of Paradise, 1341; of Zarathustra, 1306. See also Myths
Leichnam, Licham, 1396n, 1397
Leidenschaft, 340, 464
 Lemmings, 192, 586
 Leo, 1492
 Leontes, 35
Les Tableaux des Riches Inventions, 320
 Leto, myth of, 884, 899; interpreted psychologically, 886
 Leviathan. See Monster
 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 1524n
 Lévy-Brühl, L., 430, 607n
 Libido, 111, 113, 1299; loss of, 1150
 Lidzbarski, Mark, 185
 Life, 569-71, 588-89, 811-12, 817-19, 1020-21, 1071, 1105, 1107, 1109, 1214; through anima and animus, 1172; criterion for truth, 1332; meaning of, 499, 935, 1172; negative experience, as projection, 1187; provisional, 410-11, 815, 970, 972, 974, 1289, 1335; second half of, 226, 227n, 820, 1069, 1195-96, 1380-81, 1454. See also Ancestral life, Animal life, Plant life, Tree of life
 Light, 258, 792; as consciousness, 1264, 1381; and darkness, 5, 306-7, 493; and shadow, 433; symbolism of, 166, 183, 258
 Lightning, 77, 78, 92, 101-2, 149-50, 530-31, 1409
Lilith, 1156
Lind, Lindwurm, 749
 Linnaeus, Carolus, 384
 Lion, xii, 897; laughing, 1484, 1489-92; as symbol of Sun, 1491; in *Zarathustra*, 269, 270, 1491. See also *Deus Leontocephalus*
 Liszt, Cosima, 633n
 Litvinov, Maxim, 814
 Living. See Body
 Living without thinking, 921
 Lloyd George, David, 376
 Leull, Ramon, 121n
 Loeff, W., 470n
Logion, 722
 Logos, 6, 309-10, 366, 381-84, 492, 537, 578, 756, 809, 849, 1521; *Spermaticos*, 739. See also Christ, Light, Marduk, Ormuzd, Pope, Thoth, Word
 Loneliness, 1182
 Lord's prayer, 184, 832-34
 Loretto, litany of, 536
 Lotus, 887, 1434
 Love, 265, 718, 996, 1004-5; Christian, or brotherly, 99-100, 992, 1473, 1476-77; creativeness in feeling, 680; contempt, 1367; extraverted, introverted, 1019-20; falling in, 622; and God, 997; and gratitude, 689; and hate, 72-73, 397, 622; of life, 508; men's vs. women's, 736; mother, 1022, 1043; responsibility for, 686-89; thy neighbor as thyself, 99-100, 685-91, 698-702, 799-801, 992-93, 996, 1019-20, 1022, 1366, 1476-77, 1512; of self, 1001, 1468, 1470-78, 1501; without understanding, 997
 Loyola, St. Ignatius, 549
 Lucifer, 166, 171
 Luke, Gospel of, 993-94
 Luther, Martin, 175, 290, 503, 576, 721, 789, 1041, 1491
 Lutheran, 576, 908
Lux Moderna, 1486
 MacDonald, George, 871, 1156
 Macquart, Macke, or Macourt, 1157
 Madness, fear of, 1090
 Maeterlinck, Maurice, 318
 Magic, 302; in Church, 290
Magna Mater, 1327

INDEX

- Mahayana. *See* Buddhism
- Maitland, Edward, 223
- Makara, 681. *See also* Monster
- Malice, 563-67
- Malleus Maleficarum, 332, 1318
- Malta, 1252
- Malthus, 551
- Mamallapuram, 1284, 1418
- Man (mankind), 271, 720; as carrier of consciousness, 980; in collectivity, 659, 1416; collective, 102, 108-10, 216-17, 1007, 1013, 1021, 1087, 1120-21, 1458; double aspects of, 122n, 626-27, 629; genius of, 1305; inferior (see also *Enkidu*, Function, Shadow), 102, 105, 620-22, 638, 1001-4, 1006, 1008, 1014, 1022-26, 1057-62, 1090-91, 1356-62, 1367, 1457, 1461, 1514; as killer, 1104; as measurer, 652, 671; nature and, 42-43, 1513-14; roles assigned by Gods, 1348-49. *See also* Primordial man
- Man (male): and Anima (see also Anima, identification with), 731, 738, 1164; clothing, 658; effeminacy, 659, 1349-53; feelings, 1156, 1160; natural, 1513-14; and woman, 1084, 1093-94. *See also* Last man, Old wise man
- Mana, 130, 175, 301-3, 335, 425, 985, 1260, 1536, 1537; ancestral, 1282
- Mandâ d'hayyê, 569
- Mandaean, *Book of John*, 185, 228-29, 569, 1031, 1033; Sippahs, 184-85
- Mandala, 35, 151-52, 188-89, 232, 271, 317, 374, 393, 784, 887, 1443; *Bodhi*, 1441; Christian, 204; dance, 1153; Lamaistic, 151, 548; medieval, 1384. *See also* Circle
- Mandrake, 1084
- Mani (founder of Manichaeism), 492-93, 668, 1526
- Manichaeism, 306-7, 492, 658, 853, 1086, 1116, 1526
- Manilius, 1313
- Manipura, 754, 1056-57
- Mann, Thomas, 1255n
- Mantra, 369
- Marabout, 46
- Marduk, 319
- Markandeya, 430
- Marriage, 771, 774-76; Christian, 1023, 1084, 1093; as compensation, 773, 776-78
- Martyrs, 159
- Marx, Karl, 348, 713, 1101
- Mary. *See* Virgin
- Masefield, John, 1151
- Masonry, 460, 462
- Mass, Black, 1324
- Mass movements. *See* Modern movements
- Masses, danger of, 720. *See also* Herd, Mob
- Mater sarcophaga, 190
- Materia, 326, 1073; *prima*, 954, 1046
- Materialism, 243, 329, 348, 369-70, 401, 649-51, 1314
- Materialistic science, 228
- Matronarum auriscalpius, 5
- Matter, 194, 949; a divine thought, 139; mind and, 697; and spirit, 227, 234, 239, 243, 725, 1181-82
- Matthew, St., Gospel of, 99, 183, 400n, 788
- Mauthner, Friedrich, 364
- Maximilian, 1399
- Maya, illusion, 326, 795, 1173-74, 1182, 1415, 1526
- Mazdaznan sect, 9
- McDougall, William, 1374
- McGuire, William, x, xxii, 300n
- Mead, G.R.S., 304, 309, 315, 441, 1490n
- Medicine man, 21-22, 154, 163, 449, 694, 1402
- Meditation. *See* Imagination, active
- Mediums, 164-65
- Megalomania, 26-27, 133, 135, 503-4, 1211
- Meier, C. A., 244n
- Melancholic. *See* Temperament
- Memories, 1184, 1192, 1194-99; possession by, 1197; vulnerable to, 1198
- Memory, loss of, 247-48
- Mendelian laws, units, 643, 1399-1401, 1403-4. *See also* Ancestral units
- Mephistopheles, 444
- Messenger of God. *See* Angel of the Face
- Metaphors, 1126, 1264, 1381
- Metaphysical, 833. *See also* Body

- Metaphysics, 287
 Metatron, 1531
 Meyrink, Gustav, 214n, 445, 1029, 1261n
 Michael Majer (Maier), 1088, 1413
 Michelangelo, 948, 1110
 Middle Ages, 79, 1350-51; concept of the individual, 669. *See also* Gothic cathedral
 Milarepa, 308
 Mind: God's playground, 1305; and matter, 697; natural, 383; and self, 396; spirit and, 367, 379; and the unconscious, 1232, 1250-51
 Minerva, 1309
 Minoan civilization, 1433
 Mirror, 844; intellect as, 119; the unconscious as, 553, 1425
Missale Romanum, 42, 79
 Missionary, 98, 1524, 1530; attitude, 213-14, 254, 1004, 1524
 Mithraism, 35, 41, 157-61, 177, 535, 938, 1046, 1072, 1251-52, 1282, 1397, 1398
 Mob, psychology, 583-86, 596, 1003, 1021-34, 1404, 1453-54. *See also* Rabble
 Modern movements, 182, 226, 375-76, 499-501, 503, 553-54, 575, 812-13, 842, 872, 1107-8, 1517-18; Wotan as symbol, 869
 Mohammed, 1127, 1531. *See also* Islam
 Molière, 153n
 Moira, 917
 Moleschott, Jacob, 1314n
 Monasteries, 42, 951, 1124-25; *Kultur*, 1016
Mondsucht, 1279
 Monkey. *See* Ape
 Monogenes, 722, 986
 Monotheism, 1405
 Monster, leviathan, 681-84. *See also* Dragon; Hannibal, dream of; State
 Montgomery, J., 234n
 Moods, 731
 Moon, 166, 226n, 853, 1087, 1278-79, 1407; sickness, 1279
 Moore, George, 779
 Moral: categories, 1479; code, 569, 671; conscience, 1452; institutions, 583-84
 Morality, 262, 268-69, 563, 567, 672-74, 711, 819, 922-23, 1101, 1452-53; Gnostic, 996; and instincts, 651, 674; and power instinct, 647; Protestant, 963-64; traditional, 273; utilitarian, 1053
 More, Thomas, 932
 Morgan, Christiana, ix, 3n
Morienus Romanus, 951
 Moses, 651, 876, 1164, 1531
 Mother: as anima, 1157, 1160; cult, 1252; earth, 523, 952; feelings, 1043, 1156; love, 1022, 1043; the unconscious as, 1402
 Motivation, intrinsic, 716
 Motives for power, money, 716
 Mount Meru, 227
 Mountain Lake, 163n, 1541
 Movement: collective, 1095, 1101-3; right hand and left hand, 373-77. *See also* Modern movements
Muladhara, 395, 444, 533, 888, 1055-57; *chakra*, 257, 326, 358; mandala, 794
 Müller, Max, 392n
 Multhauf, R. P., 951n
 Mulungu, 904
 Mundy, Talbot, 696
 Murder, 453, 470. *See also* Crime
 Murderer: sacrificial death of, 471-72; as scapegoat, 471-72
 Mussolini, 98, 585
Mysterium, 79
 Mystery, mysteries, cult, 35-36, 198, 482-83, 1524, 1526; Bacchic, 1440; Christian, 788, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1402; Dionysian, 704, 889; Eleusinian, 953, 1283, 1385; Hellenic-Egyptian, 211; of Sabazios, 1061-62, 1281, 1286. *See also* Attis; Grail, Initiation, Mithras, Mother
 Mystics, 1108-9, 1170
 Mystical experience. *See* Experience
 Mysticism, 933, 1108
Mythology of All Races, 263
 Myths: consciousness (Persian), 305, (Manichaeism), 492-93; corpse and king (Indian), 1260, 1397, 1398; cosmogonic, 64, 422 (Indian), 132, 327, 611 (Gnostic), 815-16; creation of man, 1180; the Cross, 1399; death (African), 1286; Garuda and the Naga (Indian), 237, 238; Gilgamesh (Babylonian), 247-52; Grail, 1231, 1365; hero and

Myths (*cont.*)

dragon, 267; integration (Irish), 1402;
Kali (Indian), 1390; Krishna and
Rhada (Indian), 1153, 1158, 1160;
Leto and birth of Apollo (Greek), 885,
898-99; Markandeya (Indian), 430;
Mary, 731-32; misery in the forest,
1540; night sea journey (*see* Myths,
hero and dragon); Osiris (Egyptian),
304; paradise, 936, 966, (Gnostic)
1342, 1441; primal man (Persian), 305;
Psyche (Persian), 305; Psyche and Eros,
1158-59; Ra and snake bite (Egyptian),
754, 1285; rebirth (*see also* Arisleus, vi-
sion of; Myth, hero), 1449, 1485; soul,
and moon, 852-53, 1087, as a spark
(Gnostic), 722; snake, 1282-83, 1285,
1342, 1449, 1486; sun, 852-53, 1087,
1287; virgin sacrificed to dragon, 267;
wisdom (Germanic), 874. *See also* Tree,
of life (Egyptian), Yggdrasil (German);
Wotan

Mythology and archetypes, 24, 166-67

Naassenes, 35n

Naga, 238, 1284

Names, 434-40; giving, 446-48, 469, 652;
family and Christian, 427; power of,
426-27, 437-38

Napoleon, 1522

National Socialism, xvi-xvii, 87, 373, 376,
634; and male friendship, 634

Nations, 572; prejudice of, 645; and val-
ues, 645-46

Nature, 1254, 1276; and anima/animus,
1232; aristocratic, 1003; and conscious-
ness, 935, 938; laws of, 935, 966; wis-
dom of, 873-74, 877

Nazareth, 267

Nebi Issa, 493

Neoplatonist philosophy, 367, 722, 822,
1026

Neovitalism, 398

Neptune, 1084

Nervous system. *See* Cerebro-spinal sys-
tem, Sympathetic nervous system

Nestor, ring of, 1432, 1437

Neti, 394, 784, 1369

Neuheidnische Bewegung, 501-2

Neurosis, 464, 559, 939, 1060, 1453,
1454, 1493; and analysts, 707; collec-
tive aspect, 555; compulsion, 930; and
main function, 1299, 1302; husband
and wife, 1060; projection of, 1497;
spirit and, 1130. *See also* Hysteria

Neurotics, 119, 204, 1200

New Testament, 79, 183, 200, 319, 810,
832, 1068, 1377

Newton, Isaac, 1321-22

Nicene Creed, 98n

Nicholas von der Flüe, 223, 272, 288,
297-98, 883, 958

Nidana chain, 1315, 1382

Nietzsche, Friedrich: and his age, 279,
1122-23, 1248, 1354, 1488; ancestry
and family (*see also* Förster-Nietzsche,
Elizabeth), 650, 776-77, 1095; anec-
dotes, 255, 609, 1204, 1206n, 1226-27,
1273, 1277, 1279, 1361-62; the artist,
946, 1038, 1254-55, 1263, 1311-16; at-
tire, 463, 637-38, 658; and the body,
222, 343, 394, 623; and Burckhardt,
1306, 1317, 1464; and the church, 537,
1014, 1017, 1026, 1322, 1385, 1539,
1512, 1514-15; and collective man,
108-9, 715-16; and conscious ego,
1047; and contemporary world, 104,
893-95; destructive influence of, 1061;
his finances, 1362; and happiness,
1317-18; his health, 109, 154, 329, 484,
509, 609-10, 619-20, 808, 1127; influ-
ence on Germany, 274, 475; influence
on Jung, 1301; language, 1214, 1225;
his loneliness, 103, 557, 1060, 1099,
1175, 1182, 1358-59, 1448, 1485; and
music, 15; as philosopher, 329, 337,
771-72, 774, 1047; as psychologist, 120,
745-46, 1043, 1095, 1347, 1364, 1450;
and relationships (*see also* Gast, Peter;
Salomé, Lou; Wagner, Richard), 189,
609-10, 626-33, 635-36, 847, 1490; as
rope-dancer, 115; as teacher, 329,
1129; sexuality, 242; in Sils Maria, 209,
235, 273; sleeplessness, 277, 282-83,
961; and symbols, 1250; as tarantula,
1117; as a trinity, 1172; as two,
Nietzsche and Zarathustra, 1047; as
ugliest man, 1002; venereal disease,

- 602-9; and women, 633, 733-35, 737, 743-45, 753, 770; and Zarathustra, 1090, 1112, 1165
- IDEAS: the Antichrist, 339, 869; beyond good and evil, 1369; God is dead, 330-31; the "I," 347-48, 350; individualism, 266n, 350, 791-92; the last man, 110-11; love thyself, 1477; on morality, 447-49, 671, 761-64, 993-95, 1020, 1049; negation as universal, 1292; denial of the past, 1538; philosophy as drama, 346; theory of power, 671, 1211; reality as body, 344, 347; on religious reform, 1364; Superman, 571, 615, 639, 1103; on truth, 1135; will as redeemer, 1237; on value, 645-46
- JUNGIAN ANALYSIS: as analysand, 856, 1240; anima, 730-31, 744; collective unconscious, 483-84; contempt, hatred, envy, 557, 1060; and devil, 1000; Dionysian, xiii, 368-69, 601; dissociation, 1242; as double, 626-27; extraverted mind, 145; feelings, 628-29, 737, 1184-86; identification with archetype, 240-41, 1428, 131-32, 150, 152, 169, 202-3, 205, 220, 278, 285, 534, 862, 913, 1000, 1329; identification with spirit, 1141-42; inferior functions, 680, 958, 960, 1184-86; inferior man, shadow, 638, 1064, 1113, 1117, 1356, 1457-58; inflation, 333-35, 861, 1343, 1359; insanity, xiii, 92, 95, 95n, 115, 133n, 136-37, 144, 205, 459, 519-20, 622, 841, 902, 1155, 1227, 1306, 1319-20, 1328, 1492; intuitive type, 421, 632, 958, 1078, 1083, 1133, 1136, 1503-4; moodiness, 1258; mother feeling, 1043; neurotic, 329, 1346; persona, as shouter, 1330; as Prometheus, 143; relation to self, 960, 1211, 1254, 1332, 1348-49, 1376, 1388, 1461; resentment, 1364, 1421; temptation, 1125; and unconscious, 405; ungrounded, 507
- WORKS: *The Anti-Christ*, 339; *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, xiii, 1133n; *Beyond Good and Evil*, xi; *Contra Wagner*, 1377n; *Ecce Homo*, 24, 38n; *The Gay Science*, xi, 498, 1178; *The Genealogy of Morals*, xi, 120, 672; *Human-all-too-Human*, 1377n; "Lamentation of Ariadne," 189; *Twilight of the Idols*, 337n, 944; *Untimely Meditations*, xi, 171, 722n, 1133n, 1377n; "The Wagner Case," 1377n; *The Will to Power*, 120; *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (general references), 162, 274-75, 459-61, 475-76, 509-12, 625-26, 841, 895, 955, 1069, 1132, 1135, 1142, 1254, 1358-59, 1447-48, 1468, 1487, public reaction to, 1447-48, writing of, 666-67, 1489. See also *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, as prophetic
- Night sea journey, 19, 219, 1251
- Ninck, Martin, 813
- Nineteenth-century psychology, 911-12
- Nirvana, 325, 612
- Nixe, 1165
- Nobility, 1526
- Noon, high, 226, 227n
- Noontide, 226, 1069-70, 1380-81, 1386, 1420, 1463
- Nordau, M., 801n
- Nostradamus, 496, 497n, 498
- Notre Dame, 1110
- Noumena, 407
- Nous, 815, 936, 1180
- Numen, 335, 452
- Numinosum, 985, 1038-39
- Nyagrodha. See Tree, *nyagrodha*
- Oannes (Babylonian; Greek *Johannes*), 888, 971, 1033
- Obedience, 936, 1508-11
- Obelisks, 1439
- Objectification. See Personification
- Objectivity: psychic (seeing oneself), 389-90, 914-15, 1176, 1417; psychological, 928
- Objects activated by man, 351-52, 528
- Obscenity, 953
- Odin, 187, 197-98. See also Wotan
- Oehler, Pastor, 1218, 1383
- Old Testament, 328, 1378, 1420, 1486
- Old wise man, 10, 21-22, 24, 32, 41, 43-44, 112, 125, 133, 134-35, 153-54, 155, 161, 163, 166, 169, 173-74, 230, 277, 282, 300-20, 518, 523, 738, 1064, 1172, 1343, 1392; and anima, 33, 183, 529-

- Old wise man (*cont.*)
 32, 626, 758; and animus, 739; eagle
 as, 230; identification with, 203, 1343
- Oligarchy, 1101
- Olympische Fruhling, 224
- Olympus, Mt., 886, 898, 1328
- Om mani Padme Hum*, 264
- One, the, 784
- One-sidedness, 1080, 1085, 1099, 1109,
 1187, 1400
- Ophites, Christian, 1061-62, 1062n,
 1284, 1295
- Opposites, 20, 60, 70, 117-19, 120, 123, 163,
 209, 235, 244, 257, 433, 581-82, 631,
 649, 682n, 884, 1111, 1134-36, 1158,
 1287, 1292, 1319, 1322; balance of,
 484; big/small, 1139-40; coming to-
 gether, 1028, 1030, 1094; conflagration
 of, 726; hammer/anvil, 1134; hot/cold,
 1139-40; lion/dove, lion/lamb, 1489;
 necessity of, 1322; in unconscious, 531,
 682-84; union of, 62, 809, 811, 818,
 1079, 1094, 1309, 1368, 1489. *See also*
 Consciousness and unconsciousness,
 Good and evil, Light and darkness,
 Snake and eagle, Static and dynamic,
 Virtue and vice, Yang and Yin
- Ordensburgen, 1523-24
- Ordinary man, 546, 613, 615, 620
- Organization, 591, 592, 598
- Origen, 160n, 400, 830
- Ormuzd, Ormazd, 305, 306, 307, 1368,
 1369, 1534. *See also* Ahura Mazda
- Orpheus, 1165, 1166, 1296, 1440
- Orphic symbol. *See* Phanes
- Ortega y Gasset, José, 1458n
- Os sacrum*, 1438
- Osiris, 52n, 176, 207-8, 212, 304, 331,
 657, 861, 869, 889, 1026, 1073, 1384,
 1428, 1430, 1438-39
- Ostell, E., 450
- Otéro, La Belle, 616
- Otto, R., 985, 1038
- Otto, W., 1385n
- Oupnekhat, The*, 325, 1382, 1383
- Ouroboros*, 784, 1286, 1309, 1340, 1407,
 1410, 1418
- Ousia, ousios*, 184, 833
- Overbeck, F., 635-36, 862, 1492
- Overleaping, 1514-19
- Overpopulation, 93, 588, 1276
- Ovid, 947n
- Owl, 1205-6
- Oxford Movement, 376, 687, 788, 790,
 802, 877, 1162, 1493-94; organization
 of, 834-35
- Oxyrhynchus papyrus, 217-18, 323-24,
 445, 992, 993, 995, 996
- Padma, 887, 888
- Padwahlag*, 306-7
- Paganism in Germany, 496, 498-500
- Pain, and body, 332
- Painting in Renaissance, 400
- Pali canon, 1333n
- Palissy, B., 196
- Palladius, 1124
- Pallas Athena, 1205
- Pallium*, 1428
- Pan, 35n, 36, 500, 1405
- Pandora, 1086
- Panglosse, 91
- Panic, 1379, 1386, 1420, 1500
- Pankhurst, E. G., 1349
- Parables, 1216. *See also* Myths
- Paracelsus, 907
- Paraclete (Holy Ghost), 34, 41, 973, 1486,
 1532
- Paradise, 204, 1441; cabalistic legend of,
 1341. *See also* Tree, of paradise
- Paranoia, 463, 921, 1121, 1242
- Parents, influence on children, 963, 990,
 1097-98, 1544
- Parousia*, 838
- Parsifal*, 1365, 1377
- Parsons. *See* Priests
- Participation mystique*, 326, 607, 987, 1496;
 analyst and, 618
- Paschal lamb, 1512, 1515
- Passion, 340, 463-64
- Past, the, 1196-98, 1541-43; attitude to-
 wards, 940, 942, 943, 1538; and future,
 283; as monster, 899, 901-2; in uncon-
 scious, 944-45, 1254. *See also* Ancestral
 life, Memories
- Patanjali *Yogasutra*, 1372-73
- Paul, St., 105, 217, 265, 367, 443, 482,
 790, 881, 900, 909, 929, 959, 988,

1056, 1129, 1176-77, 1355; a Gnostic, 1031; epistle of, 1341, 1377; feminine principle in, 536
 Pegasus, 420-21
Penguin Island, 96
 Pentecost, 171, 722, 810, 1532-33
 "People of the Book," 184
 Pepi, King, 1437
Peripeteia, 161
 Perron, Anquetil du, 325
 Persecution. *See* Paranoia
 Perseus, 264
 Persian, 649, 1014; gods, 1368. *See also* Zoroaster
 Persona, 116, 1200, 1480; voice as, 1212
 Personality, 667, 1267-69; first and second, 10n, 1267, 1403; integration and disintegration of, 1401-2, 1404, 1409; internal conglomeration, 1268; multiple, 1319; and self-doubt, 1269
 Personification, 1232, 1260, 1265; internal, 1291; of shadow, 1360
 Peter, St., 41, 1532; and unclean meat, 879
 Petrarch, 43
 Phallic figures, 752
 Phanes, 796
Pharmakon athanasias, 80, 252, 448, 576, 1449
 Pharaoh, 207-8, 580, 656, 657
 Pharisee, 1103
 Pherekydes, 1444
 Philo Judaeus, Philo the Alexandrian, 41, 366, 1031
 Philosopher's stone (*Lapis Philosophorum*), 405n, 480, 796, 944-45, 950, 953, 988, 1046, 1401, 1443, 1486, 1496
 Philosophy, 416, 1450, 1462 as confession, 1129; God as philosophical concept, 212; Greek, 438; as intellectual exercise, 1066; Platonic, 421, 449-50, 678-79; real, 1066, 1332; source of, 1462 and the unconscious, 1233. (*see also* India and East)
 Philostratus, 546
 Phlegmatic. *See* Temperament
 Phoenicians, 1327, 1405
 Phoenix, 430, 722-23, 818, 1072
 Physics, 244-45. *See also* Atom

Physis, 1180
 Pictures, diagrams, illustrations: Avicenna, the eagle, and the toad, 1412; bird and snake, 237; chaos (*massa confusa*), 1400; church of St. Ambrogio, 1310; cross (water closet), 1398; ego (Jung), 1193; from Eranos Lecture 1933, 1408; garden of Eden, 1441; *I Ching*, 356-58; Nestor's ring, 1437; Nietzsche-Zarathustra (*soreites syllogismos*), 130; planetary gods, 1413; plant and animal life, 516; Platonic *chi*, 679; schizophrenic drawings, 1409-10; self (Mrs. Baynes), 413; self (Prof. Hauer), 419; *Le Songe de Poliphile* frontispiece, 1406; spirit house and trail, 179; subtle body, 442; Taigitu, 1287; Tet of Osiris, 1438; time, self (Mrs. Baumann), 420; Yang and Yin lines, 244
 Pigeons. *See* Doves
 Pillar(s): of Aachim and Boas, 1399; of fire, 1420; four, 796, 887-88, 899; of light, 1087; of life, 853
 Pirandello, Luigi, 1261
 Pisces, 375, 377, 420-21
Pistis, 442, 909, 929, 930, 939, 975
Pistis Sophia, 442, 442n, 532, 533n, 1490
 Pity, 1001
 Plant life, 61-62, 74, 107, 956. *See also* Animal, plant life and; Tree
 Plato, Platonists, 167, 284, 328n, 367, 517n, 577, 784-85, 846, 992, 1076; the *chi*, 422, 679; *Parmenides*, 678n; Platonic philosophy, 449-50; same and other, 678n; and Socrates, 678-79; *Symposium*, 1076n; *Timaeus*, 679n, 1076n
 Platonic time, 12, 375, 421
 Pleroma, 222
 Plutarch, 35n, 211, 359
Pneuma, 365, 368, 369, 441, 494, 519, 794, 809, 810, 815, 853, 858, 1039, 1067, 1536; as masculine or feminine, 1075-76
Pneumatikos, 517-18
 Poe, Edgar Allan, 1261
 Poets as liars, 935-36
 Poimandres, 308-10, 815n, 1033, 1166
Poimen (shepherd), 106, 1033, 1170, 1171, 1292, 1296

- Poison. *See* Infection
- Poliphile. *See* *Songe de Poliphile*
- Polytheism, 1405
- Pompeii, 1440
- Pope, the, 160, 319, 594, 1027, 1165, 1327, 1403; infallibility of, 1534-35; Pius XI, 1023n
- Population, increase of, 1275-76
- Porto Fino, 1427
- Poseidon, 884, 887, 899
- Possession, 32, 220, 1264-68, 1343-45, 1349-50, 1485; by Spirits, 164, 174. *See also* Anima, Animus, Archetype
- Potentiality, 418
- Power: and inferiority feelings, 1213, 1353; lion as symbol for, 871; psychology, 94, 1211-14, 1353, 1451; will to, 482, 672, 1354
- Prajapati, 428, 611, 1383-84, 1415
- Prakrti, 1415, 1416, 1417
- Prana, 365, 368, 1398
- Preaching, 59, 253-54
- Prejudice, 352, 645
- Presence, feeling of, 1174, 1176, 1179
- Pre-Socratics, 678
- Priapus, 752
- Priests, 1004-10, 1015, 1096; divine prerogative of, 1532, 1533-34
- Prima materia*. *See* *Materia*
- Primal man, 305, 310
- Primeval world, 1201-2
- Primitives, 21-22, 126, 335, 589, 664, 672-75, 694, 1528-29; beliefs, 527-28, 732, 756-57, 839, 845, 1423, 1533; effect of Christianity, 1530; clothing, 659; and consciousness, 361, 493-94, 663, 1265-66; dreams, 1308; emotions, 915, 1497-98; evil spirits and, 1264; ghosts and, 179-80, 198; love of self, 689; projections, 1495; rites, 6, 27, 46, 198, 453, 1251, 1266, 1522n, 1524, 1526; conception of time, 1522; unconscious, fear of, 1271; work and initiative, 272; writing, 187. *See also* Africa; Australian primitives; Indian, American; Initiation; Medicine man
- Primordial experience, 224
- Primordial man, 80, 190n, 721, 722, 722n, 784; and woman, 190n. *See also* Primal man
- Primordial will, 345
- Projection, 84-85, 95, 119, 194, 559-60, 562, 611, 688, 727-28, 795, 1021, 1189, 1197, 1345, 1347, 1360, 1496, 1518-19; assimilation of, 175; conscious of, 132, 138; and emotion, 1236, 1497-98; handling, 1321-25; of inferior side, 1059, 1100, 1113, 1150, 1320-22; into matter, 949, 950; of opposite, 726; reality and, 1274-75, 1352; religious, 95n; and self-deception, 1493; of suffering, 331-33, 337, 1494-95; and unconscious thoughts, 545
- Prometheus, 614, 667, 854, 855, 1466; and sin, 936. *See also* Spitteler, Carl
- Prometheus and Epimetheus*, 224
- Propaganda, 122
- Prophets, 496, 554, 876, 878. *See also* Unconscious
- Protestantism, 13, 145, 285-87, 289, 290-91, 324, 691, 906, 923-24, 1017; and authority, 576, 908; and the body, 177, 539; and a vengeful God, 1116; Jewish, 917; and Jews, 922; morality, 963-64; responsibility and grace, 922. *See also* Church
- Provisional life, 410-11, 815, 1289, 1335
- Psyche, 355, 396, 407-8, 441; autonomous quality of, 1312; collective, 423; continuity of, 920; dissociable, 363; historical, 1015; inferior, 246; inherited, 1399-1403; internal personification, 1291; reality of, 1352; structure of, 124, 1343; two-dimensional, 972-75
- Psyche (mythological character). *See* Myth, Psyche
- Psychikos*, 517, 517n
- Psychology: attitude of Church, 96, 121; child (see also Cruelty, and children), 935, 1097-98, 1201, 1388; mob, 583, 584-85, 586, 596, 1003, 1021-34, 1404; nineteenth-century, 911-12; personal, 971-73; power, 1211-14, 1353, 1451-52; as science, 415
- Psychopomp*, 153, 1166
- Psychosis. *See* Insanity
- Psychosomatic disturbances, 1082, 1391-92. *See also* Body, psychic disturbances
- Ptah, 366, 491-92, 723
- Pueblo, 163, 163n, 238, 360-64, 1486,

1541. *See also* Indian, American
Puer Aeternus, 38, 533-34, 597, 626, 634-35, 888-89, 971, 1107-8, 1153, 1407, 1418
 Punishment, 764, 1453; capital, 468-69; its necessity, 485-88; psychology of, 454, 466-67, 712-13, 731
Purusha, 795, 1313, 1331, 1383. *See also* Atman
 Pygmalion, 947
 Pyramid, 1403, 1437, 1438n
 Pythagoras, 416, 422, 718, 1272, 1442, 1449

Quadrangulum, 1400
Quaternium, 422, 796, 1400, 1441
 Quest, 521-22, 695-98, 702, 705, 707, 721, 1024-25
 Quetzalcoatl, 232
Quinta essentia, 1401-2, 1407

 Ra, 207-8, 304, 657, 1072, 1285, 1295, 1299; and snake, 754, 1285
 Rabble in oneself, 1057-62
 Races, 643-44
 Radbertus, Paschasius, 830
 Radramndus, 831
 Rainmaker of Kiau Tschou, 824-25
 Rainmaking rite, 6
 Ramakrisna, Sri, 1373
 Rational and irrational, 1335; types, 1147
 Raven, 1073
 Reality, 987, 1066; different kinds of, 693; projection, 132, 139-40; trans-subjective, 287, 292-98
 Realization, 30, 1289-91, 1293, 1329, 1333, 1375; ambition of mankind, 1293; and Eastern mind, 1425-26
 Reason: antinomies, 450; as goddess, 1002-3
 Rebirth, 105, 190-91, 430. *See also* Baptism, Initiation, Gods Dying and Resurrecting, Myth, hero and dragon
Rebis, 1407
 Reconciling symbol. *See* Symbol
 Redeemer. *See* Savior, Christ
 Redemption, 234, 465, 484, 665, 1487; of world, 345
 Reé, Paul, 633n
 Reformation, 802, 1003, 1024, 1526. *See also* German Reformation
 Regression, 1016; in world movements, 372-73, 376-78
Reichsapfel, 1428
 Reichstein, Tadeus: Seminar report on "The Archetype of the Old Wise Man," 300-315
 Reincarnation, 941
 Reitzenstein, R., 305
 Religion(s), 1013-18, 1519-20, 1525-26; conversions, 79, 80, 1129; development of religious thought, 206-7; incompatibility of, 543; as psychology, 1011; as vessel for unconscious, 73, 1351. *See also* Experience, religious
 Reni, Guido, 157
Représentation collective, 54, 167, 178
 Repression, 1431; of shadow, 1113-14
 Resentment, resentment, 714, 1098, 1100, 1184, 1198, 1346
 Responsibility, 262, 264, 338, 825, 882, 921-23, 1538; of consciousness, 1098, 1247; in actions, 1053; and irresponsibility, 568; for love, 686-89; moral, 266-67, 268-69; towards world conditions, 1275
 Revelation, 206, 207, 652-53, 806, 815, 876, 881, 999, 1487-89; and archetypal world, 979; vs. inventions, 970-71
 Revelation, Book of, 12, 104, 223, 598, 1377, 1428
 Revenge, 1091, 1113, 1114
 Rex Marins, 1448
 Revolutionist, 1023
 Rhada, 1153
Rhenovacensis, Codex, 952
 Rhine, 224-25
 Rhinoceros, 1049
 Rigidity, 60
Rigveda, 6, 314
 Rilke, Rainer Maria, 145n
 Ring. *See* Fisher ring, Nestor
 Ripley, Sir George, 1418n
 Ripley scroll, 1407, 1418n
Rishis, 14
 Risk, 87, 116
 Rites, 53-54; of adoption, 1062; fertility, 1282-85; *Rite de sortie*, 14, 27. *See also* *Alcheringa*, Initiation, Mystery, Primitives

- Rituale Romanum*, 536n
 River, 749, 869, 1339
 Rockefeller, John D., 583
 Roles, assigned by Gods, 1348-49
 Rome, Romans, 157, 181, 1027; senator's daughter's dream, 1308
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 376, 1309
 Rope-dancer: as symbol, 114-15, 117, 1392; in *Zarathustra*, 102, 109, 111, 112, 128, 129, 141-42, 149-50, 520, 1161, 1262, 1387, 1392, 1468. *See also* Dancer
 Rose, mystical, *rosa mystica*, 204, 888
 Rosicrucians, 167
Rotundum, 1401
 Round Table, Knights of the, 694
 Rouselle, Erwin, 232
 Rune, 855
Runenkunde, 187
 Russell, Bertrand, 1108
 Russia, russians, 374, 376, 378, 1115, 1523, 1524, 1528, 1542
 Ruysbroek, Jan van, 1399
 Rye, Steller, 122n

 Sabazios. *See* Mystery, of Sabazios
 Sabbath, working on, 464, 1326
 Sachseln, 883
 Sacrifice, 922, 1514; for one's children, 1543; of first fruits, 1506, 1512, 1515, 1517; rites of, 1516, 1524. *See also* Christ, Scapegoat
 Sacrificial death, 1525
Sacro egoismo, 1366
 Safety, 126
Sahasrara, 395, 1375, 1375n
 Saints, 223; dreams of, 1059, 1096, 1103, 1308. *See also* Ambrose, Anthony, Augustine, Elmo, Francis, John, Hieronymus, Paul, Peter, Sebastian, T  r  se
 Salamander, 398
 Salin, Edgar, 1306, 1317
 Salome, 31, 533, 944
 Salom  , Lou, 633n, 755, 772
Samadhi (dissolution of consciousness), in unconsciousness, 1363-64, 1372-73
Sambodhi, 1290
Samkhya philosophy, 1415
Samskaras, 1526

Samyutta nikaya, 1436
 Sanchi, 1443
 Sanguine. *See* Temperament
 Sanskrit terminology, 1372-73
 Saoshyant (savior), 12-13, 24
 Sarcophagus, 189
Sarx (body), 442, 446
 Satan, 1324
 Satori, 1290
 Saturn, 1260
 Savior, 1011, 1030, 1032, 1486; from the earth, 952. *See also* Christ
 Scapegoat, 472, 969; sacrificial, 922-23
 Scheler, Max, 494
 Schiller, Friedrich, 117, 118, 143, 144n, 528, 1255
 Schisms, 1115
 Schizophrenia, 237, 284, 363, 511, 541, 640-43, 1319, 1403, 1409-10
Schlaraffenland, 502
 Schleich, Carl Ludwig, 138
 Schopenhauer, xi, xii, xiii, 118-19, 120, 289, 324-26, 345, 346-47, 517, 550, 746, 857, 1098, 1268, 1269, 1314, 1382, 1384, 1426, 1442
 Schreber, D. P., 364, 641
 Science, 444; as authority, 574; replacing religion, 1351
Scoria, 460
 Sebastian, St., 1187
Seeress of Prevorst, 250, 1221
Seele und Geist, 388. *See also* Geist, Soul, Spirit
 Segantini, Giovanni, 1159
 Self, 73-75, 85-94, 396, 408-20, 627, 699-711, 838-42, 977-86, 1366-67, 1401, 1484-85, 1543; archetype and, 32, 92, 150-55, 319; and body, 94, 95, 394-95; as chosen, 827-28; Christ as, 265; in Christianity, 988; collective man and, 102, 103-4; and conflict of opposites, 433-35, 1368-69; as creator, 703; definition of, 102, 127, 389-406, 407, 413-17, 444, 781-83, 905, 977-78, 983, 1046-48; diagrams of, 413-17, 419, 421; ego and, 403, 408-12, 568, 639, 713, 823, 906, 977, 1047-48; elements of, 63, 953, 977-84; in Gnosticism, 988; Holy Ghost and, 738, 984-87; love of,

- 102; obeying, 1508-9, 1513-14; projected, 95; quest of, 695-98, 702, 705, 707, 721-23; relatedness, 102, 795, 797, 1019, 1485; shadow and, 123, 124, 703, 721, 722, 953, 955; as superior function, 1187; symbol (*see also* Body, diamond; Philosopher's stone), 71, 414, 444, 478-79, 678, 708, 738, 781-82, 792, 795, 905-6, 953, 985, 988, 1087, 1384; and "thou shalt," 568, 570-71; as a total, 714, 826; as transcendent, 988; uniqueness of, 151, 425; vs. self, 1044; as Zarathustra, 571, 1486.
See also Atman
- Self-concern, 706-7
- Self-deception, 1293
- Self-esteem, 397, 844
- Selfishness, 799, 1451, 1459
- Self-knowledge, 992-93, 1000, 1242
- Self-love, 1000
- Self-realization, 1334, 1485
- Sensation: and body, 1150; as compensation, 1391-92; as inferior, 1195, 1391-92; type, 385, 1078, 1149, 1442
- Sentimentality, 738-39, 1195
- Serpent. *See* Snake; Symbol, serpent
- Sexuality, 619, 621
- Shadow, 76, 85, 122-23, 125-30, 162-63, 374, 405, 433, 451, 506, 581, 622, 626, 721, 1090-91, 1100, 1113-14, 1264, 1320-25, 1356-72, 1472, 1475, 1477-78; acceptance of, 257; active, 115-16; alter ego, 389; as ape, 1392; assimilation of, 390, 1366-67; criminal, 481; indirect expression, 1395; and inflation, 702-3; neglect of, 634; rejection of, 738; as rope-dancer, 113, 114, 130; ugliest man, 702. *See also* Man, inferior; Functions, inferior
- Shakespeare, William, 29n, 612, 1255
- Shakti, 151-52, 327, 795, 1182, 1491
- Shamba*, 1283
- Shame, 959-60, 965, 966
- Shaw, George Bernard, 122, 829
- Shen, 442
- Shepherd, 1292; as divine figure, 1296, 1298; sheep and, 1008; snake passage, 1279-97, 1300-1309. *See also* Hermes, Poimandres, Poimen
- Shepherd of Hermas*, 106, 223, 953, 1403
- Shilluks, 660-61, 686
- Shiva, 107, 151-52, 506, 845, 1415, 1491; bindu, 326, 1182; dancing, 45, 56, 289, 327, 1390
- Sibylla* or *somnambule*, 530, 757
- Siegfried, 1197, 1285
- Signs, 414
- Silesius, Angelus, 144-45, 152, 284, 285, 292, 1016n
- Simile, 806
- Simon Magus, 530n, 653, 738, 1153
- Simplicissmus*, 869
- Sin, 268; banal, 86; inherited, 963; as separation, 665, 676
- Sinbad, 1014
- Sinn*, 385, 388
- Sippahs. *See* Mandaeen
- Sleep, 282-85
- Sleeplessness, 277-78, 285, 1204-5
- Snake, 748-62, 793, 794, 1281-86, 1299, 1302-3; anima and, 748, 754, 756; bite of, 307, 754-55, 766; heroes and, 1282-85, 1286, 1342, 1449, 1486; initiation with, 1061, 1282, 1286. *See also* Eagle, and snake; *Ouroboros*; Shepherd, snake passage
- Sneeze, 1423
- Snow, ice, 1099
- Socialism, 348; and Christianity, 1523, 1525
- Socrates, 130, 133, 1168
- Sodom and Gomorrah, 1420
- Solitude, 1485
- Solomon's temple, 1399, 1439
- Somalis, 850
- Song of Songs, 536, 952, 953
- Songe de Poliphile*, 1079, 1152, 1406
- Sophia, 442, 507, 532-33, 1032, 1075, 1167, 1205, 1490
- Sorietes syllogismos*, 129, 130-31, 154, 1165, 1505
- Soul, 69-70, 143, 1181; ancestral, 1401, 1522n; bestowing, 801; body and, 142, 1423; Bush, 527-29; of Dead, 181, 756-57, 1087. *See also* Myth, soul
- Soviets. *See* Russia
- Space and time, 987
- Spain, 1115, 1399

INDEX

- Spartacus, 1003
Spear, sword, dagger, 865, 867
Speech, 362, 365
Spelaum, 160. *See also* Mithras
Spengler, Oswald, 104
Spesz, Alexander, 1211
Sphairos, 782, 785, 905
Spider, 1085-88, 1278; *Kreuzspinne*, 1078;
 web, 383. *See also* Tarantula
Spinther, 722
Spiral, 364-71, 484, 956
Spirit, 53-61, 71-75, 170-72, 378-81, 849-
 67, 1065, 1128-46, 1179, 1181-82,
 1185; in blood, 495-98, 500-504; body
 and, 63-67, 84-85, 170, 177, 186, 235,
 239, 251-52, 539-40, 805, 810, 815-17,
 1062-63, 1066-67; denied, 1057; "Di-
 vine Breath," 986; house, 180; a pecul-
 iar immateriality, 984-85; matter and,
 234, 237, 725, 816; mind and, 364-65,
 367-68; movement of, 1103; past and
 future, 283; petrified, 1109; principle
 of, 401; sex of, 1075; as wind (see also
Pneuma), 361, 380, 520, 852, 858-60,
 1029-30, 1062, 1074, 1136-37, 1140;
 word, and, 366-67, 381-82, 491-92. *See*
 also *Geist*, Holy Ghost
Spirits, 178-79, 200; of the dead, 1402;
 evil, 1264. *See also* Ghost
Spiritual development, 1071
Spiritualism, 512-13
Spiritus, 365, 495, 809; *phantasticus*, 58.
 See also Spirit, as wind
Spitteler, Carl, 224, 871, 1445
Square, 888, 1442
Standard Oil, 583, 592
Star, 374; Soviet, 374; wearing, 1428. *See*
 also Dance, star
State, the, 578-79, 603, 1025, 1027-28,
 1515, 1517, 1525; as authority, 574; as
 idol, 573; service and, 1354
Static and dynamic, 1108-9, 1114-15
Staudenmayer, Ludwig, 363
Steward, parable of unjust, 993-94, 1031
Stirner, Max, 1101
Stone, 948. *See also* Philosopher's stone
Strasbourg theologians, 100
Strauss, David Friedrich, 1222
Student of Prague, 122, 1392
Stupa, 373, 1441, 1443
stupidity, 1177
Subconsciousness, 1431
Sublimation, 1067
sublimity, 563-65
Subtle body, 187, 432, 441-46, 449-50,
 1067-68, 1081, 1486, 1495; diagram of,
 442
Successful people, unhappiness of, 196-
 97
Suffering, 325-37, 464, 556, 963-64;
 from misdeeds, 1453; as passion, 340;
 and shame, 960. *See also* God
Sufi, 7, 99, 319, 336, 369, 1531
Suicide: moral, 465; Nietzsche's infatua-
 tion with, 465; wish, 402, 789
Sun: as Cheper, 1299; as cold, 1148; as
 gold, 1223; as god, 15, 242, 1428,
 1491; as Helios, 938, 1398, 1443; as
 Horus, 853; as Ra, 754, 1285, 1295,
 1299; symbol of consciousness, 17, 25,
 26, 1125, 1285, 1370, 1381. *See also*
 Domicilium solis; Symbol, sun
Superman, 47, 49, 52, 55, 60-62, 71, 77,
 79, 81, 83, 90, 93, 105, 111-12, 130,
 133, 149-50, 172-73, 205, 286, 323,
 333, 336, 401, 439, 448, 467, 490, 568,
 571, 602-3, 612, 688, 701, 703, 725,
 826, 828, 843, 903, 944-45, 1004-6,
 1040, 1103, 1262, 1380, 1508; between
 animal and, 838-39; as compensation,
 1233; creation of, 906; historical
 source, 1539; inferior man and, 1367;
 longing for, 84; moral task, 921-22; as
 singular, 1502-4; superconsciousness,
 839, 925; symbolic idea, 925. *See also*
 Surpassing man
Superstition, 1519-20
Supersubstantialis, 832-33
Superwoman, 739
Surpassing man, 1503-5, 1506, 1514
Svadhistana, 444, 1056
Swan, 186-87. *See also* *Hamsa*
Swarms, of small things, 640, 1400-1401,
 1411
Swastika, 372-73, 377
Swedenborg, Emanuel, 1383
Switzerland, 181, 273, 554, 1026-27,
 1467

- Sword. *See* Spear
- Syllogismos (syllogism), 601. *See also* *Soreites syllogismos*
- Symbol, 132, 132n, 393, 414, 573-74; for deity, 916; of eating, 186; of fertility, 1448; of incubation, 1252; of opposites, 684, 1287; reconciling, 795-97, 975; transformative power, 1248; value of, 1248-51. *See also* Alchemy; Individuation, symbols of; Self, symbol; Unconscious, symbol of
- LIST OF SYMBOLS: ass, 1492; bird, 431; blood, 1438; bowels, 62; bridge, 117, 1060, 1231; butterfly, 1433; circle, 153; communion, 176; dancing maidens, 1173; howling dog, 1289; dove, 1490; fig tree, 752; hecatombs, 192, 794, 795; jewel, 738; lake, 866; masculine and feminine, 794, 795; moon, 166, 226n; owl, 1205, 1206; plant, 1399, 1434; promontory, 1427; ring, 1044, 1045, 1052; rope, 117; scarab, 1298; serpent, 227, 228, 246, 748, 1298, 1384, 1435; ship, 970; snake bite, 754; spider, 1085; spear, 865; star, 106, 107, 1045; sun, 166, 242, 271, 781, 782, 792, 795, 1285, 1381; tarantula, 1077, 1087; tiger, 871; toad, 255; triangle, trinity, 1079; treasure, 653; water, 1055; wheel, 107, 708; wood(s), 178, 1118. *See also* Anima, Buffoon, Colors as symbols, Cross, Dance, Dragon, Eagle, Fire, Light, Lion, Old wise man, Rope-dancer, Tree
- Symbolism, 1249; Christian, 981; dream, 1387; hero and monster, 1487; spirituality, 1434
- Sympathetic nervous system, 749, 750, 751, 900-901, 1082, 1278, 1299, 1300, 1411, 1435, 1436
- Synchronicity, 162-63, 228, 421, 423
- Syncretism, 918
- Synesius, Bishop, 58
- Synthesis, 1021. *See also* Creation, Unconscious
- Tabula smaragdina*, 1329, 1533, 1534
- Tages, Etruscan, 888, 889, 971
- Taigitu, 420, 423; illustration, 1287
- Talavakara Upanishad, 391
- Talbot, P. A., 176n, 191
- Talking people down, 59, 1271
- Talmud, 185
- Tantric Yoga, 151-52, 194, 326, 327, 366, 888, 906, 1375. *See also* Ajna chakra, Anahata, Buddhism, Kundalini, *Muladhara*, *Svadhastana*, *Visuddha*
- Tao, 313-14, 357, 385, 749, 824-25, 831, 979, 1374, 1436
- Tao-Te-King, 848, 875
- Tapas*, 1373, 1384, 1486
- Tarantula, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1082, 1083, 1086-88, 1105-6, 1109, 1111
- Tathagata*, 212, 1304
- Tauton*, 679-80
- Tchorten*, 373, 375
- Tefnut, 1428
- Telepathy, 315-16, 987
- Temperament, 548, 651-52
- Temptation, 1123. *See also* Christ
- Tertullian, 42, 53, 80, 657n, 687, 830, 1506, 1535
- Tet, 1438
- Tetraktys, 887-88
- Tetramorphos, 796
- Tetrarchos of Palestine, 1031
- Thateron, 679-80
- Theater and catharsis, 849
- Thebes, 1405
- Theologians on God, 287-92
- Theosophists, 374
- Theotokos* (Gnostic), 442, 536
- Therapists, 1031
- Thérèse of Konnersreuth, St., 186
- Thérèse of Lisieux, St., 186n
- Thiasotai*, 181
- Thinking: function, 1147, 1442; in heart, stomach, 361; type, xi; in word, 362
- Thomas, Acts of, 1032, 1075, 1490
- Thomas à Kempis, 199
- Thoth, 304, 313, 319
- Thought, 139; eternal, 933; Giving body to one's, 194-95; Not one's own, 1273, 1274
- Thun, Lake of, 749
- Thus Spake Zarathustra*, as prophetic, 348, 841, 870, 876-78, 1002, 1038, 1301, 1518, 1521; of Nietzsche's death, 1263;

- Thus Spake Zarathustra (*cont.*)
of his insanity, 136, 141, 163, 205, 224,
625, 931, 961, 1219, 1224, 1387, 1505;
of Germany and the modern world,
348, 495-96, 534-35, 553-54, 576, 602.
See also Nietzsche, works
- Tibet, 14, 97n, 373, 1495; *Book of the
Dead*, 164, 1259. *See also* Lamaism
- Till Eulenspiegel, 226
- Time, 443, 987, 1122-23, 1522
- Titans, 704
- Toad: boys who ate a, 1502; Nietzsche
and, 255. *See also* Eagle, Frog
- Tolstoi, Leo, 551
- Torquemada, 1103
- Tot, 1033
- Totalitarian, 575, 593, 595
- Totem animal, 1436, 1467, 1533
- Tradition, 1542
- Transcendent object, 407
- Transference, 84, 154, 955
- Transfiguration, 187
- Transformation, 186, 198, 236, 336, 502-
3; of consciousness, 941-42; of the
"grandfather," 1529; following sacri-
fice, 1524. *See also* God
- Transitus*, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 191,
1251, 1256, 1397, 1399, 1402
- Transmutation, 1249, 1252
- Transubstantiation, 175n, 290, 830, 950,
1012-15
- Transvestite, 636
- Tree, 514, 518-21, 1071, 1072, 1429,
1432-41, 1448-49; apple, 752; *arbor phi-
losophorum*, 1071-72; *asvatta*, 527;
bodhi, 1441; Christmas, 240, 1444; as
Christ's cross, 1398; fig, 752; of life (*ar-
bor vitae*), 520, 752, 1437-41; magic of,
527; *nyagrodha* (soma), 1407, 1438,
1439; of paradise, 965, 1438, 1439; of
Pherekydes, 1444; sequoia, 530; sym-
bolism of, 190, 195, 515, 956, 1071,
1399, 1432-33, 1448, 1449; world-tree,
190, 1432, 1438; Yggdrasil, 190n,
524n, 1072, 1430, 1438, 1439, 1444
- Trimurti*, 527
- Trinity, 902, 1079-80, 1172, 1182, 1404-5
- Truth, 66, 189, 717-19, 1008, 1119-20,
1135, 1271, 1272, 1385, 1472; crite-
rion, 1332; of inferior man, 1014; as
nourishing, 980; as "I will," 1348; writ-
ing as, 234
- Tschorten*, 373
- Turba*, 640, 642
- Twain, Mark, 316-17, 1177
- Twice-born, 656-57
- Tylor, E. B., 939n, 1496
- Types. *See* Functions, Thinking, Intui-
tion, Feeling, Sensation
- Typhoid and insanity, 139, 513
- Übergang*, 84
- Übermensch*. *See* Superman
- Uganda, 672-73
- Ugliest man, 141, 143, 336, 565, 620,
702, 990, 1004, 1014
- Ugliness, 563
- Ulysses, 175, 1191, 1192
- Unconscious, 95, 267, 405, 653, 822-23,
1189, 1191, 1257-59, 1273, 1356-57,
1395-96; in actions, 1052-53; approach
of West to, 1055-56; aspects, 1228;
body and, 749-51, 1239; compensatory
function, 826; and consciousness, 278-
79, 955-56, 979-82, 1089, 1227-32,
1237, 1246, 1267; contamination in,
1356, 1429-31; and death, 1257; de-
structive, 554; and devils, 1015; disas-
sociation from, 295-98; fragmentary na-
ture of, 1404, 1429-31; identification
with (*see also* Anima, Animus, Arche-
type), 1228-29, 1312-13, 1485; indefi-
niteness of, 194; infection through,
840; integration of, 827, 836-37; listen-
ing to, 1240; living in, 353; as mirror,
1425; as mother, 1402; as noumenal,
407; opposites in, 681; possession,
1274, 1350; primitives' fear of, 1271;
prophetic dreams, 554; as a river, 869;
somatic, 441; symbol of, 155-56, 178,
1055, 1252-54, 1278, 1299, 1339, 1418,
1427; synthesis, 1430-32; well of life,
1058; as wind, 1227. *See also* Collective
unconscious
- Underworld, 861. *See also* Hades
- Unicorn, legend of, 1049-50
- Unigenitus*, 986
- Unity of body and psyche, 355

- Universe, as *homo maximus*, 1384
Untergang (a down-going), 86-87, 88-89, 243, 1160, 1492
 Upanishads, 65n, 75n, 152, 211, 325, 325n, 327, 365, 391, 396, 399, 611, 681-82, 782, 792, 909, 1381-84
Ur-geiste, 379
Ur-phänomen, 379
 U.S., 503
 Utilitarianism, 502
Utnapishtim, 252

Vajra, 151
 Values: as Discrimination, 677-78; of modern world, 646-48; moral, 671; national, 645-46; natural, 649, 651-52; reversal of, 1101; transformation of, 1040
 Van Gogh, Vincent, 668
Vas Hermeticus, *Krater*, 936, 1085, 1086
 Vengeance, 1113, 1114
 Venice, 1490
 Venus, Aphrodite, 741, 1160, 1490, 1492, 1497
 Venusberg, 1160
Vergeltung, 486
Ver sacrum, 1506, 1515
 Vices: power (Adler), selfishness (Jung), voluptuousness (Freud), 1450-51
 Victorian era, 1354
Vikram and the Vampire, 1398, 1399
 Virgil, 203-4
 Virgin Mary: Annunciation, 886-87; and the cross, 1397, 1440; as earth, 830, 952, 1081; as Holy Ghost, 1490; immaculate conception, 731-32, 853, 1050
 Virginité, 1327
 Virgo, 1492
Viridarium, 1413
 Virtue(s), 76, 88, 424-28, 432-40, 446-49, 469, 1020, 1042-54, 1459; "The Academic Chairs of Virtue," 274, 281; evil and, 474; as gifts, 437; and their shadow, 884; and vices, 451, 472-73
 Von Vischer, Friedrich Teodor, 352
 Vishnu, 211, 227n, 1165
Vishtaspa, 6
 Vision: of Arisleus, 1268, 1448-49, 1485; as consciousness, 1264; Digulleville's, of heaven, 1081; dream and, 1446; of Nicholas von der Flüe, 223, 298, 883, 958; of patient, 339
Vision Seminars, ix, 3n, 166, 460n, 523
Visuddha, 395, 756
 Vitality, 569
Vohu Manō, 6, 7, 8, 492
 Voice, as persona, 1212
 Voltaire, 91, 92n, 563-64, 565, 566, 1015, 1023
 Vycheslauzett, Boris, 94

 Wagner in *Faust*, 974
 Wagner, Richard, xiii-xiv, xix, 12n, 329n, 636, 846-47, 868, 1153, 1160n, 1365, 1377
 Wallis-Budge, E. A., 176, 1059n
 Waln, Nora, 587n
Wandertrieb, 1541
 Wang Yang-ming, 394n
 War, 126, 553, 572, 718, 1275; God of, 1516-17, 1277
 Warriors, 557-59
 Water, 749, 1079, 1444; divine, 1486-87 "We," 821-23
 Well, 1151, 1158, 1163
 Wells, H. G., 574-75, 693
Weltanschauung, 975
 Wen, King, 357
 Whale, 900. *See also* Dragon
 Wheat. *See* Christ
 Wheel, self-rolling, 270, 708, 771, 781-83
 White race: as symbol, 547; madness of, 1080
 Whitelock, family of, 1399
 Wholeness, 1020-21
 Wilde, Oscar, 1261
 Wilder, Thornton, 412n
 Wilhelm, Richard, 215, 358, 359, 385n, 462, 478, 824n, 985n
 Will, 123-24, 1540, 1541; blind, 1382; and body, 1540; creative, 942-43; ego and, 402-3, 940; free, 124-25, 623, 662-63, 749, 822, 938, 1238, 1240, 1348; limited, 913; self-, 403-4; unconscious, 119. *See also* Heart
 Wind, 520, 852-53, 1536-37; whirlwind, 1029-30; sun and, 853; as the uncon-

INDEX

- Wind (*cont.*)
 scious, 1227. *See also* Spirit, as wind,
 Spiritus
Wirklichkeit, 1115. *See also* Reality
 Wisdom: of nature, 1299, 1393; wild,
 873-74, 876-81, 1140, 1167
 Wise man, 530. *See also* Old wise man
 Witch(es), 332; as projections, 1321. *See*
 also Magic
Witches' Hammer, 1318
 Wolf, 179, 180, 184, 354, 1118-19
 Wolff, Toni, 1108n
 Woman, 383, 634-35, 740-44, 1108,
 1108n; understood through Anima,
 734; as cerebro-spinal animal, 1418;
 clothing, 659; disregard of, in religion,
 535-37; identity with earth, 1283; Eros
 in, 735; and literature, 1108; and man,
 735, 1084, 1093-94; masculinity in,
 659, 1349-53; old wise man in, 523-24;
 as tree, 1448-49. *See also* Feminine ele-
 ment, Feminine principle
 Womb, 752, 753
 Woodroffe, Sir John, 1495-96
 Word, 578; conception by, 732-33; *das*
 Wort, 366. *See also* Logos, Spirit
 World, 692-97, 1313-14; as an apple,
 1427-28; antique, 1516-19; and con-
 sciousness, 349; creation of, 682, 1533;
 as illusion (*see also* Maya), 139-40, 1313,
 1415; image of God, 1534; rejection of,
 767. *See also* Cosmos, Schopenhauer,
 Underworld
 Wotan, 187n, 501, 524, 813-14, 854, 867-
 68, 895, 898, 903, 974-75, 1074-75,
 1204, 1226-27, 1516, 1521; as arche-
 type, 1076; as symbol of modern world,
 869; as *Wal-Vater*, 870, 884
 Wound, 866-67, 1364, 1369; symbol of,
 854-55
 Writing, 187; as truth, 234, 248
 Wu Wei, 580, 586, 587n
Yajnavalkya, 396, 792
 Yang, 243, 1148
 Yang and Yin, 244-45, 535, 852, 1081,
 1093-94, 1134, 1151, 1171, 1182, 1287,
 1350
Yasna, 4
 Yellow, as symbol, 356-57, 548
 Yggdrasil. *See* Tree
 Yin, 219, 794, 1163, 1173-75, 1177-78,
 1492
 Yoga, 1065, 1425-26; plant or tree, 1399.
 See also Chinese Yoga, Kundalini, Tan-
 tric
 Yongden, Lama, 697

 Zarathustra as a historical figure, 3-9,
 1033, 1306
 Zarathustra as character, *passim*, but *see es-*
 pecially: identity with the anima, 731,
 1166, 1244-47; as *Geist*, God, Logos,
 messenger of God, 845, 849, 1210,
 1531; and Nietzsche, 222, 526-27, 648,
 1151, 1177-79, 1421; shadow of, 283,
 702-3, 1322. *See also* Old wise man,
 Thus Spake Zarathustra
 Zen, 1290
Zend Avesta, 4
 Zeus, 6, 228, 230, 704, 886-87, 899, 917,
 1305, 1309, 1323, 1328, 1332, 1466
 Zimmer, Heinrich, 153, 232n, 1326-27,
 1396-97
 Zodiac, 374-76, 670. *See also* Aquarius,
 Leo, Pisces, Virgo
 Zola, Emile, 570, 1010
 Zoroaster, 4, 7, 11, 305, 492, 649, 1534.
 See also Zarathustra
 Zoroastrianism and Christianity, 7, 11, 34
 Zosimos, 949n, 1260, 1448
 Zrwanakarana, 1282
 Zwei-seidler (two dwellers), 216, 323
 Zwingli, Ulrich, 175, 290